

**Tilburg University**

## **Intensity of Competition and Market Structure in the Italian Banking Industry**

Giannetti, C.

*Publication date:*  
2008

[Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Giannetti, C. (2008). *Intensity of Competition and Market Structure in the Italian Banking Industry*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-43). Finance.

### **General rights**

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

### **Take down policy**

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

No. 2008–43

**INTENSITY OF COMPETITION AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN  
THE ITALIAN BANKING INDUSTRY**

By Caterina Giannetti

April 2008

ISSN 0924-7815

# Intensity of competition and Market structure in the Italian Banking Industry

This version: April 2008

## Abstract

This work tests the predictions of Sutton's model of independent submarkets for the Italian *retail banking* industry. In the first part of this paper, I develop a model of endogenous mergers to evidence the relationship between firms' conduct, market entry and market structure. In the second part, I identify the submarket dimension and estimate the relationship between market size and market structure using data on bank branches. The size of the submarkets turned out to be at most provincial whereas the limiting concentration index - as argued by Sutton for industries with exogenous sunk costs - goes to zero as the market becomes larger.

**Keywords:** Concentration, Truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial models, quantile regressions

**JEL Classification:** C24, D43, L11, L89

---

<sup>1</sup>Email: c.giannetti@uvt.nl

I am grateful to Luigi Buzzacchi for his guidance and his precious indications. I also thank Marcello Messori, Giampiero M. Gallo, Elena Carletti, and Hans Degryse for valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Paul Belleflamme and to participants at the IV Doctoral Workshop in Economics (Louvain-la-Neuve), the 34<sup>th</sup> EARIE Conference (Valencia), the ESSID Workshop (Cargèse), as well as seminars participants at CES (University of Paris I).

This paper was partly written while I was visiting CORE, and I am grateful to them for their hospitality. I also acknowledge the financial support from the EDNET Marie Curie fellowship program. All remaining errors are my responsibility.

# 1 Introduction

Sutton's model of independent submarkets emphasizes the strategic choice of sunk costs and, unlike the traditional structure-conduct-performance approach, considers how changes in firms' conduct affects the condition of entry, altering by consequence market structure. Under this scheme, both homogeneous-horizontally differentiated products and advertising-R&D intensive (vertically differentiated products) industries can be analysed. For the former type of industries, with fixed sunk costs, it is possible to show an inverse relationship between market size and market structure. For the latter type of industries, where sunk costs are endogenous, such a negative relationship does not necessarily emerge as market size increases. This is because sunk costs, such as advertising or R&D expenditure, raise with market size. Such expenditures are choice variables of (perceived) quality: by increasing the level of advertising-R&D, firms are able to gain (or to maintain) market share. Therefore, as market size becomes larger, an '*escalation mechanism*' could raise fixed costs per firm to such an extent that the negative relationship between market size and market structure will break down. Sutton's model offers therefore very clear and testable predictions about the relationship between market-size and market-concentration.

The aim to this paper is to analyse the Italian *retail banking* industry as a special case of the first type of industries, since products are rather standardized and there is a limited scope for cost-decreasing or quality increasing investments. This industry can be viewed as made of a large number of local markets that arise because there are many different geographical locations throughout the country: in every submarket products are fairly good substitutes and banks compete against each other by means of their branch locations. The degree of substitutability is substantially lower for products and services offered in neighbour submarkets.

In the first part of this paper, relying on the model developed by Vasconcelos (2006), I examine the firm strategic behaviour referring to a three-stage non cooperative game. In line with Sutton's theory, the aim is to highlight the relationship between firm conduct, entry and market structure while explicitly allowing for a merger process in the industry. In so doing, it is possible to show that the incentives to merge to a monopoly are lead by the intensity of competition and by the degree of product substitution. This ultimately shows how the number of banks as well as the share

of the main bank are determined in each submarket, and offers indications on the variables to be used in the empirical section. In the second part, I will estimate the market structure-market size relationship in the Italian retail banking industry. Testing this relationship empirically requires identifying a set of independent submarkets. In order to do that, I estimate the number of firms in each province using data on the national bank branch location. To take into account that the number of firms is discrete and greater than zero, a truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial models are used. This analysis confirms that the province (at most) is the size of each submarket. In fact, firm variables related to neighbour provinces turned out to be insignificant in determining the number of bank in each province. Once the size of the submarket has been identified, I will investigate the market structure-market size relationship by regressing the one firm concentration ratio on market size variables. As the limiting concentration ratio approaches zero as market size goes to infinity, the hypothesis of exogenous sunk costs for the *retail banking* industry can be accepted.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework to analyse the relationship between firm conduct and concentration based on the Sutton approach. Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe the banking industry referring to this framework and the characteristic and the construction of the dataset. In section 5 the econometric model and results are presented. Conclusions are in the final section.

## **2 The theoretical approach**

Sutton (1991, 1997, 1998) describes the impact of firm conduct on market structure identifying two key aspects: the intensity of competition and the level of endogenous sunk costs. Considering these elements, he distinguishes between two general types of industry. One class is characterized by industries that produce homogeneous and horizontally differentiated products. The other category is composed of industries engaged in the production of vertically differentiated products. In the first type of industries, the only important sunk costs are the exogenously determined setup costs, given by the technology. In such industries Sutton (1998) predicts a lower bound to concentration, which goes to zero as the market size increases and rises with the intensity of price competition.

The idea is that as market size increases, profits also increase, and given free entry, other firms will enter the market until the last entrant just covers the exogenous cost for entry. Also, the higher the competition, the higher the concentration index. In fact, as the competition gets stronger, the entry becomes less profitable and the higher the level of concentration is to be in order to allow firms to cover their entry cost<sup>1</sup>. It is important to underline that the intensity of competition will not simply represent firm strategies but, rather, the functional relationship between market structure, prices and profits. It is derived by institutional factors, and therefore is not only captured by the price-cost margin. More generally, an increase in the intensity of competition could be represented by any exogenous influence that makes entry less profitable, e.g the introduction of a competition law (Symeonidis (2000), Symeonidis (2002)). In the second type of industries sunk costs are endogenous. Firms pay some sunk cost to enter but can make further investments to enhance their demand. As market size increases, the incentive to gain market share through advertising and R&D expenditure also increases, leading to higher fixed cost per firm. Even though room for other firms is potentially created, the ‘escalation mechanism’ will raise the endogenous fixed costs, possibly breaking down the negative structure-size relationship that exists in the other type of industries. For such industries Sutton’s model predicts that the minimum equilibrium value of seller concentration remains positive as the market grows<sup>2</sup>.

Sutton’s model offers very clear predictions for the first group of industries whereas it is not possible for industries where sunk costs are endogenous. Despite Sutton’s insights on the relationship between market concentration and market size, there are few empirical works testing these predictions. Previous works that test the Sutton approach are Sutton (1998) for the US Cement Industry, Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) for the Italian Motor Insurance Industry, Asplund and Sandin (1999) for the Swedish Driving Schools Sector, (Walsh and Whelan (2002)) in Carbonated Soft Drinks in the Irish retail market, Hutchinson et al. (2006) across manufacturing industries in UK and Belgium, and Ellickson (2007) for the supermarket industry in the United States. These

---

<sup>1</sup>A way to model an increase in the ‘toughness of price competition’ is to consider a movement from monopoly model to Cournot and Bertrand model. For any given market size, the higher the competition at final stage, the lower the number of firms entering at stage 1, and the higher the concentration index (ex-post). See Sutton (2002).

<sup>2</sup>To be more precise, Sutton goes further in distinguishing within the endogenous cost categories between low- $\alpha$  and high- $\alpha$  industries. In the low- $\alpha$  type industries, due to R&D trajectories, we will still observe low level of concentration

papers mainly test Sutton's predictions by typically looking if a measure of firm inequality - such as the Gini coefficient - increases with the number of submarkets. Specific to the banking sector are the works of Dick (2007) for the Banking Industry in the United States and de Juan (2003) for the Spanish Retail Banking Sector. Although Dick (2007) investigated the relationship between market size and market concentration, she considered the banking industry without distinguishing the retail segment from the wholesale. In particular, she focused on banking quality through a set of variables, such as geographic diversification, employees compensation and branch density, finding a non-decreasing concentration ratio as market size gets larger. She concluded that endogenous quality model characterized the industry. de Juan (2003) analysed instead another important insight of Sutton's analysis: the degree of concentration and the level of aggregation of submarkets. Focusing on retail market only, and after having identified the individual submarkets, she tested the bound on the inequality of firm size distribution at different levels, local, regional and national. The purpose of this paper is to verify if empirical evidence for the Italian retail banking industry is consistent with Sutton's predictions. To apply this framework to the Italian banking industry is of interest since during the nineties it experienced a deregulation and consolidation process. Therefore, in order to identify the relationship proposed by Sutton, the choice of the year is crucial. I will assume that the industry reached in 2005, the year of the analysis, an equilibrium. Similar to de Juan (2003), I will make an effort to empirically test the size of the submarket but I will depart from her work by investigating the market size- market concentration relationship. As the focus is on the retail banking, this paper also differentiates from Dick (2007) as she considered both the industry segments, wholesale and retail. The present paper is also strictly related to the theoretical analysis developed by Cerasi (1996). Cerasi developed a model of retail banking competition in which banks compete first in branching and then in prices. In line with Sutton's analysis her model predicts that deregulation should lead to an increase in the degree of concentration whereas, with respect to branching, an increase in market size is followed by a decrease in the degree of concentration in branching.

### 3 Exogenous sunk cost industries: the model

Using the model developed by Vasconcelos (2006), as modified in order to explicitly account for the intensity of competition, this section analyses the market size-concentration relationship in exogenous sunk cost industries. In such industries, firms will face some sunk cost to enter but cannot make further investment in order to enhance their demand. Assuming that all consumers have the same utility function over  $n$  substitute goods (or  $n$  varieties of the same product) as follows:

$$U(x_1, \dots, x_n; M) = \sum_k (x_k - x_k^2) - 2\sigma \sum_k \sum_{l < k} x_k x_l + M, \quad (1)$$

where  $x_k$  is the quantity of good  $k$  and  $M$  denotes expenditure on outside goods whose price is fixed exogenously at unity. The parameter  $\sigma$ ,  $0 \leq \sigma \leq 1$ , measures the degree of substitution between goods<sup>3</sup>. When  $\sigma = 0$  the cross product term in the utility function vanishes so that product varieties are independent in demand, whereas if  $\sigma = 1$ , the goods are perfect substitutes. For the utility function (1), the individual demand for good  $k$  is:

$$p_k = 1 - 2x_k - 2\sigma \sum_{l \neq k} x_l \quad (2)$$

If there are  $S$  identical consumers in the market and we denote with  $x_k$  the per-capita quantity demanded of good  $k$ , market demand for this good is  $Sx_k$ .

Considering now a three stage game. In the first stage, a sufficiently large number of ex-ante identical firms,  $N_0$ , simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the market incurring an entry cost of  $\epsilon$ . In the second stage, firms that have decided to enter decide to join a coalition. All the firms that have decided to join the same coalition then merge. In the third stage, firms set their output. All coalitions are assumed to face the same marginal cost of production  $c$ , which we can normalize to zero.

---

<sup>3</sup>This is a quadratic utility function and it has previously used by Spence(1976), Shaked and Sutton (1990), Sutton (1997, 1998) and Symeonidis (2000). The banking sector is usually analysed under hotelling-type model. However, it is possible to show that any hotelling-type model is a special case of vertical production differentiation. See Cremer and Thisse (1991).



## 4 The game: equilibrium analysis

In stage 2, each firm  $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  simultaneously announces a list of players that it wishes to form a coalition with. Firms that make exactly the same announcement form a coalition together. For example, if firms 1 and 2 both announced coalition  $\{1, 2, 3\}$ , while firm 3 announced something different, then only players 1 and 2 form a coalition. Since all firms are initially symmetric, members of each coalition are assumed to equally share the final stage profit.

Let  $\lambda = \frac{dx_j}{dx_i}$  represent firm  $i$ 's conjectural variation, that is its expectation about the change in its competitors production resulting from a change in its own production level, and assume that this conjecture is identical for all firms ( $\lambda_i = \frac{dx_j}{dx_i} = \lambda$ ).

Assuming that quantity is a strategic variable, profit maximization requires that  $\partial \Pi_i / \partial x_i = 0$ . In equilibrium:

$$x_i = \frac{1}{2(2 + (N - 1)\sigma(1 + \lambda))} \quad (3)$$

and the profit of each of the  $N$  firms is

$$S\Pi_i = S \frac{1 + \lambda(N - 1)\sigma}{2(2 + (N - 1)\sigma(1 + \lambda))^2} - F \quad (4)$$

Let  $\Lambda$  be equal to  $\sigma(N - 1)\lambda$ . It is possible to refer to  $\Lambda$  as the competitive intensity of the industry, with lower values of  $\Lambda$  corresponding to more intense competition.

For  $F \geq 0$ ,  $N \geq 2$  and  $-1 \leq \Lambda \leq 1$ , and  $0 \leq \sigma \leq 1$  each firm's profit is a decreasing function of the number of firms in the industry, its competitive intensity and the amount of fixed costs. Two reasons could lead firms to merge: market power and efficiency. To maintain things simpler, I avoid to account for efficiency gains. In this analysis, firms could not make any further investments to enhance their quality (and hence the demand) of the product offered. So, it is possible to set  $F = 0$ . In any case, a clear picture in a similar framework is offered by Rodrigues (2001).

Following the traditional backward induction procedure, I analyze the condition under which I get a monopoly in *exogenous sunk cost industries* model.

**Quantity setting stage** Let  $N_2$ ,  $N_2 \leq N \leq N_0$ , denote the number of coalitions of firms at the end of stage 2. From equation (4) firm profits are

$$S\Pi(N_2) = \frac{1 + \Lambda}{2(2 + \sigma(N_2 - 1) + \Lambda)^2} \quad (5)$$

**Coalition formation stage** At this stage those firms who entered may merge to form a coalition. A coalition structure is said to be an outcome of a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to either (individually) migrate to another coalition or to stay alone (Vasconcelos (2006); Yi (1997))<sup>4</sup>. Consider a coalition structure composed of coalitions of the same size. It is said to be stand-alone stable if

$$\frac{N_2}{N} [S\Pi(N_2|\Lambda, \sigma)] > S[\Pi(N_2 + 1)|\Lambda, \sigma] \quad (6)$$

In case of monopoly,  $N_2 = 1$ . Hence, in order for a single ‘grand coalition’ to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation game in *exogenous sunk cost industries*, the following is a necessary and sufficient condition<sup>5</sup>

$$\Pi(1)/N > \Pi(2) \quad (7)$$

Hence,

$$\frac{(1 + \Lambda)}{2(2 + \sigma + \Lambda)^2} < \frac{1}{8N}$$

$$N < \frac{(2 + \sigma + \Lambda)^2}{4(1 + \Lambda)} \equiv \bar{N}(\sigma, \Lambda) \quad (8)$$

I restrict the industry conjectural variation coefficient to the range  $-1 \leq \Lambda \leq 1$ . In so doing, the possibility of  $\Lambda$  being larger than the value that would imply perfectly collusive post-merger behaviour is restricted.

A merger towards monopoly leads to the formation of a single grand coalition with  $N$  firms.

A firm belonging to the initial wave of  $N$  entrants will get a share  $1/N$  of the coalition overall

---

<sup>4</sup>To be more precise, this latter case in which no firm can unilaterally improve its payoff by forming a singleton coalition is called stand-alone stability. However, stand-alone stability is a necessary condition for Nash stability.

<sup>5</sup>The only possible deviation it is in fact towards the singleton coalition.

profits, whereas by free-riding on its  $N-1$  merging rivals it can obtain duopoly profits. Each time in which the ‘grand coalition’ is unstable, as market size increases, more firms want to enter and to free ride and form a duopoly instead of joining the grand coalition. That means, as the market size rises, the concentration ratio goes down <sup>6</sup>. This result shows how this process in turn affects the one firm concentration ratio,  $C_1 = \frac{q}{N_2 q} = 1/N_2$ .

When  $\Lambda$  lies in the range previously defined, and fixed costs are zero,  $N(\sigma, \Lambda)$  is strictly decreasing in  $\Lambda$ . Therefore, the weaker the competitive intensity, the larger the pre-merger market concentration should be for a monopoly to emerge through merger.

In particular, if  $\sigma = 1$ , we can rewrite equation (8) as

$$N < \frac{1(\Lambda + 3)^2}{4(\Lambda + 1)} \quad (9)$$

The RHS is strictly decreasing in  $\Lambda$ . As  $\Lambda$  approaches -1, the value of perfect competition, condition (9) is always satisfied, and so, merger to monopoly would occur whatever the number of firms in the industry. Hence, the higher the intensity of competition at stage 3, the lower the pre-merger market concentration could be in order for a monopoly to emerge through merger. When  $\Lambda = 0$ , that is firms behave as in Cournot, monopolization will occur only if  $\sigma \geq 0.83$ . If this condition is not met and more than two firms enter in stage 1, and merge in a single grand coalition, that equilibrium might not be stable. As  $\sigma$  approaches 1, competition becomes tougher as products are closer substitutes, and the lower bound to the one firm concentration ratio decreases as market size increases. On the other hand, in perfectly cooperative industries, where  $\Lambda = 1$ , or when demands are perfectly independent, where  $\sigma = 0$ , merger to monopolization will never occur. However, it is important to remark that we are not considering cost efficiency gains that would probably give an incentive to merge even in the case that market demands are completely independent.

**Entry stage** At stage 1 firms decide to enter.

If  $\sigma = 1$  products are perfect substitutes, a merger to monopoly will occur at the second stage of the game if firms compete very toughly. Then, if firms anticipate that a monopoly coalition

---

<sup>6</sup>It is valuable to remark that in this model it is implicitly assumed that the pre-merger behaviour is not affected by the coalition formation stage.

structure is going to be formed at stage 2, firms will enter up to a point at which  $N$  is the largest integer value satisfying

$$\frac{1}{N}(S\Pi(1)) \geq \epsilon \quad (10)$$

where  $\epsilon > 0$  is the entry fee. By the same reasoning, therefore, if the competitive intensity is extremely strong, the firms will merge to monopoly. For any given level of market size, the equilibrium level of concentration is higher. However, entry will occur at the first stage and the lower bound to concentration goes down<sup>7</sup>. If products are imperfect substitutes - and  $\Lambda = 0$  - a merger to monopoly might not take place. In particular, when  $\sigma < 0.83$ , a merger to monopoly might not take place since a firm could prefer to get all the profits of a duopolist. This means that as the market size rises, more firms enter and this makes the monopoly unsustainable as individual firms want to free ride and form a duopoly. Thus, there is an upper bound to concentration that goes down as market size increases (Vasconcelos (2006)).

## 5 The Italian retail banking industry

The presence of different territorial dynamics is a characteristic of the Italian banking industry (Guiso et al. (2004), Guiso et al. (2006); Colombo and Turati (2004)). I consider the retail Italian banking industry as belonging to an industry of the first type, where sunk costs are exogenous and the size of the submarkets is provincial. Since lending and borrowing take place mostly in a narrow geographical place and operation are similar and repeated during time, this industry can in fact be viewed as made of a large number of local markets, corresponding to different provinces (geographical units close to US counts). These submarkets are independent both from the supply and demand side. On the supply side, in each one of these independent submarkets, banks' goods are fairly substitute whereas banks' products of neighbouring provinces are not. In particular, in each province banks can mitigate price (interest rate) competition by means of their branch location<sup>8</sup>. However, opening new branches, independently of the size of their operations,

<sup>7</sup>Also, from the previous analysis, since  $\partial\Pi/\partial N < 0$  and  $\partial\Pi/\partial\Lambda > 0$ , by applying the implicit function theorem, one concludes that  $\partial N/\partial\Lambda = \frac{-\partial\Pi/\partial\Lambda}{\partial\Pi/\partial N} > 0$ . The equilibrium number of firms is decreasing in the intensity of competition at stage 3.

<sup>8</sup>See also Cerasi et al. (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2004)

has fixed costs, for example the cost of hiring personnel, the cost of renting or buying facilities in particular province and other province specific elements. As documented in (Cerasi et al. (2000)), in Italy in the recent years, as a result of reforms on entry and branching regulation, the cost of branching has decreased. On the demand side, despite the advances in home and phone banking, preferences of customers seem to be still biased toward entities with strong regional and local contents. A customer is likely to shop only at those banks that operate in the local area where he lives and works. In other words, zero/small cross-elasticities are likely to characterize the demand of geographically separated submarkets whereas positive elasticities are likely to characterize the demand in each province.

## 6 Exogenous or endogenous sunk costs?

As we would expect both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs to be relevant in the banking industry, with both horizontal and vertical differentiation, some point of remarks are deserved. In this work I am considering the *retail sector* by looking at branches as the main distributional channel of certain standardized banking products. Therefore, I am not looking as in Dick (2007) at branches, as one of the costs in advertising and quality (employee compensation, branch staffing) that banks will incur in order to enhance consumer willingness to pay. Indeed, as banks become more and more visible through branches, one could consider branches as a form of advertising itself. In other words, I am assuming that branches of different banks offer similar (bundle of) services despite bank size and, hence, the number of branches in a given submarket could be considered as the number of varieties of services offered by banks. Even in the case, however, there are circumstances in which endogenous costs could arise. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1995) relationship lending may generate severe barriers to entry. However, the advent of information and communication technologies increased the ability of banks to open branches in distant locations, considerably reducing the cost of distance-related trade and enhancing competition in local banking markets (Berger and Udell (2006), Affinito and Piazza (2005))<sup>9</sup>. In addition, developments in the

---

<sup>9</sup>Besides, Berger himself has recently taken an opposite view with respect to his previous study (Berger et al. (2003)) where it is claimed that services to small firms are likely to be provided by small banking institutions since they meet the demands of informationally opaque SMEs that may be constrained in the financing by large institutions. He now claims that this vision could be an oversimplification: new transaction technologies are now available enabling large banks to overcome informational constraints.

financial industries with new contracts and new intermediaries are likely to reduce the role of close bank-firm relationships (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). The opinions are not unique. Whatever the conclusion might be, we can foresee that it will at least influence the structure of the banking system in terms of the local nature of the banks but not the number of branches that could be opened given market demand<sup>10</sup>. It is obvious that in the industry as a whole (*retail* and *wholesale*) both endogenous and exogenous interact costs with one another to determine market structure. The approach and conclusion could be very different (Dick (2007)).

## 7 Market equilibrium

The predictions of Sutton's model apply to markets in equilibrium. However, discontinuities in the normative (or economic) conditions can lead to process of consolidation. Unless we are observing the market at the end of this process, it will be difficult to disentangle the relationship between competition and concentration as predicted by Sutton from that caused by mergers and acquisitions. This means that I am making the implicit assumption that the retail banking sector reached an equilibrium in 2005, the year for which I collected the observations. This assumption - though strong - seems reasonable. Beginning in the 1980s, the Italian Banking system underwent a series of reforms aimed at increasing the competition in the market through liberalizing branching and easing the geographical restrictions on lending. In fact, the opening of new branches had been regulated by the 'branch distribution plan', issued every four years. The last distribution plan was issued in 1986 and, since March 1990, the establishment of new branches has been completely liberalized. The number of branches increased steadily, up to 31.081 in 2005, as well as the number of people served by each branch, 47 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004 (compared to 59 EU mean). In particular, the number of banks mergers and acquisitions of control per year was 45 in 1990 and decreased substantially to 5 in 2005<sup>11</sup>. At the same time, in more than 50% of the provinces, new banks entered the market. This process of new entry, parallel to the process of consolidation, made the average number of banks in each province rise from 29 in 1990 to 34 in 2005.

---

<sup>10</sup>To have a picture of the role of local banks and how the probability of branching in a new market depends on the features of both the local market and the potential entrant, see Di Salvo et al. (2004), Bofondi and Gobbi (2004) and Felici and Pagnini (2005).

<sup>11</sup>Referring to December 2005. It is important to remark that the process of consolidation with foreign banks is now gaining relevance. See ICB (2004).

## 8 Characteristics and construction of the dataset

The dataset is composed of 103 Italian provinces and 784 banks. In total, there are 85 groups of banks to which 230 banks belong. The greater part of banks, 554, does not belong to any group. The Italian territory is divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical units close to US counties. For each provinces, I have data on the number of banks and their number of branches for the year 2005 as collected by the Italian Central Bank (Banca d'Italia)<sup>12</sup>. I also have data about GDP, number of inhabitants, density of population as collected by National Institute of Statistics (Istat). According to the criteria developed below, four provinces will be excluded when estimating the submarket size since these are - by definition - considered 'isolated' provinces<sup>13</sup>. A description of the variables involved in the analysis follows, as well as indications for the theoretical variables they should account for. The name of the variable that will be used in the empirical assessment is reported in square brackets. Summary statistics are reported in tables (1).

- *Concentration* =  $C_1$

To measure concentration the 'one-bank concentration ratio',  $[C_1]$ , is used. The bank concentration ratio is defined as the fraction of the number of branches owned by the largest bank within the market.

- *Market size* =  $S$

It is likely to vary with the level of demand measured by  $GDP$ ,  $[VA\_pct]$ , and by population,  $[logPOP]$ , in the province considered<sup>14</sup>.

- *Intensity of competition and product differentiation* =  $\Lambda$  and  $\sigma$

So as to control for different market features, I control for population density,  $[DENS]$ , measuring thousands of people per  $Km^2$ . The higher the density, the lower the number of

---

<sup>12</sup><http://siotec.bancaditalia.it/sportelli/main.do?function=language&language=ita>.

<sup>13</sup>These provinces are: Potenza, Palermo, Trapani and Sassari. Therefore, in that case I considered 573 banks or group of banks over 99 provinces for a total of 2673 observations. I do not consider in this count the number of branches belonging to foreign banks. For further information, see ICB (2005) and [http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/ricerc/relann/rel05/rel05it/vigilanza/rel05\\_attivita\\_vigilanza.pdf](http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/ricerc/relann/rel05/rel05it/vigilanza/rel05_attivita_vigilanza.pdf)

<sup>14</sup>Since data on GDP for the year 2005 was not available, in the analysis I used the percentage of value added pertaining to each province for year 2004. The relative position of each province is unlikely to markedly change from one year to another. Regarding data on population for the year 2005 I relied on Istat forecasting at <http://demo.istat.it/stimarapida/>

banks: comparing two submarkets with the same number of inhabitants, I expect that the number of branches will be less in the submarket with a high population density.

To measure the intensity of competition and product differentiation, I computed three indices:

-  $[K] = Totalbranches/Km^2$ . It represents the monopolistic power of each branch and could be considered as a proxy of the (inverse of) transportation costs. More branches in the same provinces means, for each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach a branch, a weaker power exerted by bank branch and an overall higher degree of competition.

-  $[P] = Totalbranches/Population$ . It is the number of branches for a thousand inhabitants. The higher P, the higher the competition. It can be considered as a proxy for the (inverse of) queueing costs. The less the population served by each branch (or the higher the number of branches for each individual), the lower the cost met by the customers<sup>15</sup>.

-  $[CV] = standarddeviation/Branchesmean$ . It is the coefficient of variation. It is a dimensionless number and it is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of branches in each province. The higher the CV, the higher the degree of differentiation by branches opening, since some bank has smaller branch network size whereas others have greater branch network size.

- *Market Borders*

Since the unit of observation is the bank (or group of banks), I also compute for each bank in every submarket (province)

- the total number of its own branches  $[NB\_OWN_{i_m}]$

- the total number of branches of its competitors  $[NB\_COMP_{i_m}]$

The same quantities are also computed for all the ‘closest’ provinces (less than 100 Km)

$[NB\_OWN\_OUT_{i_m}]$  and  $[NB\_COMP\_OUT_{i_m}]$ <sup>16</sup>.

---

<sup>15</sup>It is interesting to note that these two indices,  $K$  and  $P$ , split the information contained in the density of population,  $DENS = population/Km^2$

<sup>16</sup>I performed an alternative analysis computing the number of branches of each bank, and those of its competitors, outside the province but in the same region. The reason for trying this specification is to test the alternative regional dimension for market size that is, in general, used by the authorities or in similar studies. The results are substantially analogous.



## 9 Intensity of competition and concentration: Empirical model and results

According to Sutton's model, the number of branches per submarket is a function of the relative size of the submarket, of the intensity of competition and of the cost incurred to entry. As market size increases, profits also increase, and given free entry, other firms will enter the market until the last entrant just covers the exogenous cost of entry. As the previous analysis also showed, the relationship between the number of firms (or concentration) and the market size will in general depend on the intensity of competition and the degree of product differentiation.

The Italian Antitrust Authority defines the province as the market geographical scope. Prior to analyse the relationship between the one-bank firm concentration ratio and market size, this hypothesis is tested.

## 10 Model description: identifying the size of the submarket

In order to test the submarket dimension, I construct a model for the number of competitors in each province. Given the data, no observations are possible for provinces with zero banks, since a criterion for sample inclusion is that there is at least one banks in the province. This is to be distinguished from datasets without 0 values, but which may have 0s. Thus, the dependent variable of the model, the number of banks in each province, is truncated at zero, taking only positive values. A zero-truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial models are therefore appropriate, since these models allows us to take into account that the dependent variable,  $NFIRMS$ , is also a non negative-integer. The truncated densities of these models are easily obtainable by slightly modifying the untruncated models and have been presented in Cameron and Trivedi (1998), Gurmu and Trivedi (1992) and Gurmu (1991).

The latent variable,  $NFIRMS^*$ , is assumed to be

$$NFIRMS_{i_m}^* = X'_{i_m} \delta + e_{i_m} \quad (11)$$

where  $m = 1...99$  is the submarket,  $i_m$  is bank  $i$  in submarket  $m$ ,

$$X_{i_m} \equiv (NB\_OWN_{i_m}, NB\_COMP_{i_m}, NB\_OWN\_OUT_{i_m}, NB\_COMP\_OUT_{i_m}, CV_m, P_m, K_m, VA_m\_pct)$$

and

$$NFIRMS_{i_m} = NFIRMS_{i_m}^* \quad \text{if} \quad NFIRMS_{i_m}^* > 0 \quad (12)$$

Since not all of the 573 banks (or group of banks) are active in every province, the subscript  $i_m$  goes, for each  $m$ , from  $N_{m-1} + 1$  to  $N_m$ , where the total numbers of banks,  $N_m = N_{m-1} + n_m$ , gets incremented by  $n_m$ , the total number of banks in each province and  $N_0 = 0$ . The overall sample size,  $n_1 + \dots + n_{99}$ , is equal to 2673. Observations may be considered independent across provinces (clusters), but not necessarily within groups. Cluster devices must be adopted. The number of bank branches in each province,  $NB\_OWN_{i_m}$  is likely to vary with the level of demand. Therefore, it is reasonable in the estimation to control for the level of demand, represented by GDP,  $[VA_m\_pct]$ , and the population spread,  $[DENS_m]$ . Furthermore, to account for different intensity of competition in the province, I computed two indices of competition,  $K_m$  and  $P_m$ <sup>17</sup>. Then, to take into account the border of submarkets, I consider the number of branches of each bank in each province  $[NB\_OWN_{i_m}]$  and outside the province  $[NB\_OWN\_OUT_{i_m}]$ , and the number of branches of ‘other banks’, distinguishing them between competitors’ bank branches in the same provinces  $[NB\_COMP_{i_m}]$  and competitors’ bank branches outside the provinces  $[NB\_COMP\_OUT_{i_m}]$ <sup>18</sup>. The degree of product differentiation is captured by the coefficient of variation,  $[CV_m]$ , that measures how banks are differentiated in terms of total size of their network of branches inside each province. For the Poisson model the probability that there are exactly  $N$  firms in the market, conditional on  $N$  being greater than zero, is

$$Prob(NFIRMS_{i_m} = N | N > 0) = \frac{e^{-\gamma_{i_m}} \gamma_{i_m}^N}{N!(1 - e^{-\gamma_{i_m}})}, \quad (13)$$

for  $N = 1, \dots, \infty$  and  $\gamma_{i_m} = exp(\delta X_{i_m})$ .

Unlike the Poisson distribution, the zero-truncated Poisson distribution does not present equidispersion (that is, the equality between the conditional mean and variance). In fact, the average of the

<sup>17</sup>See section 4.

<sup>18</sup>Please see note 14.

truncated distribution is higher than the average of non-truncated distribution while its variance is smaller. In addition, contrary to the non-truncated case (Asplund and Sandin (1999)), the estimates of the regression parameters will be biased and inconsistent in the presence of overdispersion because consistency requires the proper specification of all the moments of the underlying relevant cumulative distribution. These findings are similar to the result that the Tobit estimator, unlike ordinary least squares, yields inconsistent parameter estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity (See Grogger and Carson (1992)). Given the importance of accounting for overdispersion in the truncated context, I also present a model for truncated counts based on the Negative Binomial distribution. The conditional distribution of a truncated Negative Binomial is

$$Prob(NFIRMS_{i_m} = N | N > 0) = \frac{\Gamma(N + \frac{1}{\alpha})}{\Gamma(N + 1)\Gamma\frac{1}{\alpha}} * \frac{1}{(1 + \alpha\gamma)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} - 1} * (\frac{\alpha\gamma}{1 + \alpha\gamma})^N, \quad (14)$$

As for the Poisson distribution, the average of the truncated negative binomial distribution is higher than that of the non-truncated one. Though the truncated Poisson distribution no longer shows the equidispersion characteristic, the truncated Negative Poisson model introduce overdispersion, in the sense that its variance is higher than that of the Poisson<sup>19</sup>.

## 11 Model description: testing market size-market concentration relationship

In practice the relationship between market size and market concentration has been investigated by estimating a lower bound where a concentration measure is regressed on market size variables.

In that case,

$$\log\left(\frac{C_1}{1 - C_1}\right) = a + b\frac{1}{\log(S/\epsilon)} + v \quad (15)$$

The constant represents the value of the limiting concentration as the market size approaches infinite, that is  $C_\infty = \exp(a)/1 + \exp(a)$ . The most used approach is the Smith's two step procedure, where the error distribution is a two or three parameters assumed to be drawn from a Weibull

---

<sup>19</sup>For the truncated Poisson distribution the first and the second moment are:

- $E(N|N > 0; X) = u = \lambda + \sigma$
- $V(N|N > 0; X) = \sigma^2 = \lambda - \sigma(u - 1)$

with  $\sigma = \lambda/(e^\lambda - 1)$ . The mean and the variance of the truncated negative binomial regression are the following:

- $E(N|N > 0; X) = u^* = \lambda + \sigma^*$
- $V(N|N > 0; X) = \sigma^{*2} = \lambda + \alpha\lambda - \sigma^*(u^* - 1)$

with  $\sigma^* = \lambda/((1 + \alpha)^{\alpha^{-1}\lambda} - 1)$ .

distribution. See for example Marin and Siotis (2007). Lyons and Matraives (1996) proposed to use a stochastic (cost) frontier approach, allowing for disequilibrium deviations from the bound. As estimating a stochastic lower bound by maximum likelihood methods is possible only when the least squares residuals are positively skewed, Symeonidis (2000) suggest to simply use OLS regressions. I will follow Giorgetti (2003) relying on quantile regression, as estimations obtained with this procedure are robust to outliers. In particular, I will estimate the following lower bound

$$\log\left(\frac{C_1}{1-C_1}\right) = a + a_1TYPE1 + a_2TYPE2 + a_3REGION1 + a_4REGION2 + b\frac{1}{\log(S/\epsilon)} + v \quad (16)$$

where TYPE and REGION are dummies variables, which account for different macro regions in which the Italian territory can be divided and for the different type of banks. For example, the limiting concentration ratio in a province in the NORTH, where the major bank is a cooperative, will be equal to  $C_\infty = \exp(a + a_1 + a_3)/1 + \exp(a + a_1 + a_3)$ .

## 12 Results

The results of the zero truncated Poisson are reported in table (2). These results suggest that province could be considered - in general - as an independent submarket. As expected, the value of the coefficient is higher for branches in the same provinces [ $NB\_OWN_{i_m}$ ] and [ $NB\_COMP_{i_m}$ ], and lower and close to zero for banks outside [ $NB\_COMP\_OUT_{i_m}$ ]. Regression in column 2 and 3 in table (2) replicate the analysis in column 1 accounting for *i*) different macro-regions ( $REGION1=Nord, REGION2=Centre, REGION3=South$ ) in which it is possible to group provinces, and *ii*) different types of banks ( $TYPE1=BCC, TYPE2=BP, TYPE3= S.p.A$ ). The inclusions of these variables improve the explanatory power of the model (likelihood ratio tests are significant). In particular, supporting the point of independence among provincial submarkets, we can accept the null hypothesis that both the coefficients of branches belonging to banks outside the province are zero. The sign for the K coefficient is negative and significant whereas the value of the P coefficient is smaller, positive and significant. These results suggest, as one could expect, that transportation costs are more relevant in the retail market, and, therefore, a higher branch density increases competition lowering the expected (ex-post) number of banks. The value of the coefficient

on  $CV$  is positive and significant. In accordance with the model developed in the previous section, the higher the degree of differentiation, the higher the number of banks. Since consumers have preferences about total number of branches, some banks have greater network size with respect to other competitors and are able to capture more consumers by differentiating themselves by opening more branches. In equilibrium, therefore, higher asymmetry in branch size (a higher value of  $CV$ ) is compatible with a large number of banks. On the contrary, the sign of the coefficient for the density of population is significant with unexpected signs, where  $GDP$  is positive and insignificant. This is probably due to the non-linear relationship between these variables and the dependent variable, and to the fact that higher density will capture the same effect of  $GDP$  (since higher density is associated with higher  $GDP$ ). Results for the zero Truncated Negative Binomial are reported in table (3). These regressions are in line with those of the zero Truncated Poisson. However, our interest lies in measuring the change in the conditional mean of  $NBANKS$  when regressors  $X$  change by one unit, the so called marginal effects<sup>20</sup>. For reporting purposes, in tables (4) a single response value - the mean of the independent variables - is used to evaluate the marginal effects for regression 3 in table (2) and (3). At this point it is important to control for overdispersion, since in context with truncation and censoring it leads to problems of inconsistency (Hilbe (2007)). Several test procedures can be followed to test the (truncated and untruncated) Poisson model against the Negative Binomial model. As the Negative Binomial model degenerate into a Poisson model when  $\alpha = 0$ , all tests (score test, Wald test, likelihood test) are based on testing the overdispersion parameter  $\alpha$  equal to zero (Yen and Adamowicz (1993)). Since both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial model have been estimated a likelihood-ratio test is straightforward. From the previous tables, it is possible to compute the likelihood-ratio test of  $\alpha = 0$ . This is the likelihood-ratio chi-square test that is equal to  $\chi_{(1)}^2 = -2(\ln(Poisson) - \ln(NegativeBinomial))$ . The large test statistic would suggest that the response variable is over-dispersed and it is not sufficiently described by the Poisson distribution. In all cases, this test is significant (for example, for regressions (3) is equal to  $\chi_{(1)}^2 = 357.26, p < 0.001$ ). In the end, these preliminary analysis allows me to analyse the main relationship of interest, that is the one between the size of the market and

---

<sup>20</sup>For linear regression marginal effects coincide with the estimated coefficients. For non linear regression this is no longer true. In that case,  $E[NBANKS|X] = \exp(X'\beta)$ , then  $\partial E[NBANKS|X]/\partial X = \exp(X'\beta)\beta$  is a function of both estimated parameters and regressors.

the one-firm concentration ratio at the provincial level, relying only on a subsample made of one observation for each submarket. I will measure market size by means of two variables: the population in each province and the number of banks as estimated in previous section. Concerning the choice of this latter variables, it is important to notice that in homogeneous industries, the number of firms represents the ratio between market size and sunk costs, that is  $S/\epsilon$ . In addition, I can rely on 99 submarkets instead of 103 since four provinces have been excluded from the previous regressions as were considered isolated by definition. Tables (5) and (6) report quantile regressions for the fifth, tenth and fiftieth percentile. Results are very similar and support the hypothesis that the retail banking industry is characterized by exogenous sunk costs: the estimated limiting concentration,  $C_\infty$ , approaches zero as the market size approaches infinite. It would be better to have an industry with endogenous costs so as to compare the value of the limiting concentration. However, the quantile regressions, using both measures of market size, indicate that when market size increases, the concentration index goes down. This result is weaker in provinces located in the South and in the Centre whereas it is stronger in province where the main banks is a TYPE2 (that is, Banche Popolari).

### 13 Robustness checks

The aim of this section is to control for issues that could weaken previous results, mainly endogeneity and model specifications. Endogeneity may be an important concern when testing the size of each submarket, since there are variables that could be considered jointly determined with the number of banks if the industry has not reached an equilibrium. In particular, at firm level, a troubling variable could be the number of branches a bank has in the province ( $NB\_OWN$ ). The easiest way to test for endogeneity is to use a method suggested by Wooldridge (1997) for count models with endogenous explanatory variables along similar lines to those suggested in other limited dependent variable contexts by Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vounig (1988). For any given explanatory variable  $x$  which is potentially endogenous, it is possible to estimate a reduced form regression of the form

$$x = z'\pi + v \tag{17}$$

where  $z$  represents a vector of exogenous explanatory variables including at least one not included in  $x$  for identification,  $\pi$  the vector of reduced form coefficients and  $v$  is the reduced form error term. If it is possible to obtain consistent estimates of  $\pi$ , Wooldridge shows that the residuals  $\hat{v} = x - z'\hat{\pi}$  can be included as an additional covariate in a maximum likelihood estimator for count data model. A significant coefficient on  $\hat{v}$  in the augmented regression is a robust test of endogeneity of  $x$ . I test for possible endogeneity of  $NB\_OWN$  using as an identifying instrument the same variable in year  $t - 2$ . The reason to choose  $NB\_OWN_{t-2}$  instead of in year  $NB\_OWN_{t-1}$  is to avoid the risk of unit root. The reduced form is presented in table (7), whereas the residuals from this regression are then used as an additional covariate in the zero truncated Negative Binomial regression in table (8). The coefficient of the residuals is not significant, suggesting that in year 2005 the Italian Banking industry reached an equilibrium. To analogous (not reported) conclusions leads a test for endogeneity of  $NB\_OWN$  and  $NB\_COMP$ . Another concern is related to the specification on the model for the relationship between market size and the one firm concentration ratio. A better alternative to estimate a model where the dependent variable is a proportion is to use generalized linear models (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)). Results reported in table (9) confirm those obtained by means of standard regression model .

## 14 Conclusions

The aim of this work was to test Sutton model of independent submarkets checking his predictions for the Italian *retail* banking industry and using the framework for the exogenous sunk costs industries. Even though the banking industry as a whole should be considered as characterized by endogenous sunk costs, there are several features that indicate the retail industry to be one of the former type. In particular, as banks branches sell slightly differentiated products in the retail sector, it is possible to look at the number of banks branches as different varieties of the same product offered by banks to their client. In addition, despite the advances of the phone banking, consumers' preferences are still biased toward regional entity, suggesting province as submarket dimension.

The model developed in the first part of the paper indicates which factors should influence the

number of banks in each submarket, and as a consequence the one firm concentration ratio: the initial number of banks, the intensity of competition and the degree of product differentiation.

In the second part, a truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial model have been used in order to estimate the number of banks in each submarket. This way of proceeding allowed me to check the hypothesis about the size and the independence among submarkets. In fact, the value of the coefficient on the number of branches for banks outside the provinces, but within a radius of a hundred of kilometers, turned out to be insignificant. These results permitted to examine the one bank concentration ratio at provincial level. Interestingly, the limiting concentration ratio approaches zero as market size goes to infinity. That means that exogenous sunk costs are involved in the Italian *retail* banking industry. As argued by Sutton, as the dimension of the submarket becomes larger, and given free entry, the value of concentration ratio has to go down.



## References

- Affinito, M. and Piazza, M. (2005), "What determines banking structure in European regions?" *Paper prepared for the XIV International Tor Vergata Conference on Banking and Finance*.
- Asplund, M. and Sandin, R. (1999), "The Number of Firms and Production Capacity in Relation to Market Size," *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 69–85.
- Berger, A.N. and Udell, G. (2006), "A More Complete Conceptual Framework for SME Finance," *Journal of Banking and Finance*, vol. 30, 2945–2966.
- Berger, A., Dai, Q., Ongena, S. and Smith (2003), "To What Extent Will the Banking Industry be Globalized? A study of bank nationality and reach in 20 European nations," *Journal of Banking and Finance*, vol. 27, 383–415.
- Bofondi, M. and Gobbi, G. (2004), "Bad Loans and Entry into Local Credit Markets," *Banca d'Italia Temi di discussione, No 509*.
- Buzzacchi, L. and Valletti, T. (2005), "Firm Size Distribution: Testing the Independent Submarkets Model in the Italian Motor Insurance Industry," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, vol. 24, 1–50.
- Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. (1998), *Regression Analysis of Count Data*, Cambridge University Press.
- Cerasi, V. (1996), "A model of Retail Banking Competition," *mimeo*.
- Cerasi, V., Chizzolini, B. and Ivaldi, M. (2000), "Branching and Competitiveness across Regions in the Italian Banking Industry," in "Industria Bancaria e Concorrenza," Il Mulino, a cura di Polo, M.
- Cerasi, V., Chizzolini, B. and Ivaldi, M. (2002), "Branching and Competition in the European Banking Industry," *Applied Economics*, vol. 34, 2213–2225.
- Cohen, M. and Mazzeo, M. (2004), "Market Structure and Competition Among Retail Depository Institutions," *FEDS Working Paper, No 4*.

- Colombo, L. and Turati, G. (2004), "The role of local real and financial variables in banking industry consolidation: the case of Italy," Working Paper 80, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Cremer, H. and Thisse, J. (1991), "Location Models of Horizontal Differentiation: a Special Case of Vertical Differentiation, Models," *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, vol. 39, 383–390.
- de Juan, R. (2003), "The Independent Submarkets Model: an Application to the Spanish Retail Banking Market," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, vol. 21, 1461–1487.
- Di Salvo, R., Lopez, J.S. and Mazzilis, C. (2004), "I Processi Concorrenziali e l'Evoluzione del Relationship Banking nei Mercati Creditizi locali," in "La Competitività dell'Industria Bancaria Italiana," Nono Rapporto sul Sistema Finanziario Italiano. Fondazione Rosselli, a cura di Bracchi G. e Masciandaro D., pages 87–118.
- Dick, A.A. (2007), "Market Size, Service Quality and Competition in Banking," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, vol. 39, 49–81.
- Ellickson, P. (2007), "Does Sutton apply to supermarkets?" *The RAND Journal of Economics*, vol. 38, 43–59.
- Felici, R. and Pagnini, M. (2005), "Distance, bank heterogeneity, and entry in local banking market," *Banca d'Italia Temi di discussione, No 557*.
- Giorgetti, M. (2003), "Lower Bound Estimation - Quantile Regression and Simplex Method: An Application to Italian Manufacturing Sectors," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, vol. 51, 113–120.
- Grogger, J.T. and Carson, R.T. (1992), "Models for Truncated Counts," *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, vol. 6, 225–238.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2004), "Does Local Financial Development Matter?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 119, 929–969.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2006), "The Cost of Banking Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

- Gurmu, S. (1991), "Tests for Detecting Overdispersion in the Positive Poisson Regression Model," *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics*, vol. 54, 347–370.
- Gurmu, S. and Trivedi, P. (1992), "Overdispersion Test for Truncated Poisson Regression," *Journal of Econometrics*, vol. 54, 347–370.
- Hilbe, J. (2007), *Negative Binomial Regression*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hutchinson, J., Konings, J. and Walsh, P. (2006), "Company Size, Industry and Product Diversification. Evidence from the UK and Belgium," *mimeo*.
- ICB (2004), "Relazione Annuale," *Banca d'Italia*.
- ICB (2005), "Relazione Annuale," *Banca d'Italia*.
- Lyons, B. and Matraves, C. (1996), "Industrial Concentration," in "Industrial Organization in the European Union: Structure, Strategy, and the Competitive Mechanism," Oxford University Press, Lyons et al. (eds).
- Marin, P. and Siotis, G. (2007), "Innovation and Market Structure: an Empirical Evaluation of the 'Bound Approach' in the Chemical Industry'," *Journal of Industrial Economics*, vol. 55.
- Papke, L. and Wooldridge, J. (1996), "Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates," *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, vol. 11, 619–632.
- Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. (1995), "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationship," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 110, 407–43.
- Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (2003), "Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European Finance," *NBER Working paper series*.
- Rivers, D. and Vuong, Q. (1988), "Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models," *Journal of Econometrics*, vol. 39, 347–366.
- Rodrigues, V. (2001), "Endogenous mergers and market structure," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, vol. 47, 1245–1261.

- Smith, R. and Blundell, R.W. (1986), “An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit-Model with an Application to Labor Supply,” *Econometrica*, vol. 54, 679–685.
- Sutton, J. (1991), *Sunk Costs and Market Structure*, MIT Press.
- Sutton, J. (1997), “Game Theoretic Models of Market Structure,” in “Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications,” Cambridge Univ. Press, Kreps, D. M. and Wallis, K. F (eds).
- Sutton, J. (1998), *Sunk Costs & Market Structure: Theory and History*, MIT Press.
- Sutton, J. (2002), “Market Structure. The Bound Approach,” LSE, Paper prepared for the Volume 3 of the Handbook of I.O.
- Symeodonis, G. (2000), “Price Competition and Market Structure: The impact of Cartel Policy on Concentration in the UK,” *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, vol. 48, 1–26.
- Symeodonis, G. (2002), *The Effect of Competition Cartel Policy and the Evolution of Strategy and Structure in British Industry*, MIT Press.
- Vasconcelos, H. (2006), “Endogenous mergers in endogenous sunk cost industries,” *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, vol. 24, 227–250.
- Walsh, P. and Whelan, P. (2002), “Portfolio Effects and Firms Size Distribution: Carbonate Soft Drinks,” *The Economic and Social Review*, vol. 33, 43–54.
- Wooldridge, J. (1997), “Quasi-maximum Likelihood Methods for Count Data,” in “Handbook of Applied Econometrics Vol II,” Oxford; Blackwells, Pesaran, H. and Schimdt, P. (eds), pages –.
- Yen, S. and Adamowicz, W. (1993), “Statistical Properties of Welfare Measures from Count-Data Models of Recreation Demand,” *Review of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 15, 203–215.
- Yi, S. (1997), “Stable Coalition Structure with Externalities,” *Game and Economic Behavior*, vol. 20, 201–237.

Table 1: Summary statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>	<b>N</b>
Nbanks	34.598	19.096	8	86	2673
C1	24.869	8.153	12.963	80.672	2673
CV	1.626	0.419	0.691	2.648	2673
DENS	0.033	0.044	0.004	0.264	2673
K	0.002	0.002	0	0.012	2673
P	0.06	0.019	0.022	0.104	2673
NB_OWN	0.001	0.002	0	0.043	2673
NB_COMP	0.045	0.048	0.002	0.231	2673
NB_OWN_OUT	0.005	0.01	0	0.093	2673
NB_COMP_OUT	0.177	0.156	0.002	0.631	2673

Table 2: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Poisson  
 Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks - equation (13)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
NB_OWN	9.242*** (2.062)	9.080*** (1.967)	9.043*** (1.744)
NB_COMP	8.190*** (1.344)	8.482*** (1.242)	8.404*** (1.204)
NB_OWN_OUT	-2.699*** (0.623)	-2.122*** (0.566)	-0.874 (0.594)
NB_COMP_OUT	-0.049 (0.182)	0.004 (0.216)	-0.011 (0.205)
CV	0.167 (0.151)	0.228 (0.140)	0.231* (0.134)
K	-141.197*** (48.777)	-126.401*** (41.179)	-124.354*** (39.865)
P	9.768*** (2.876)	12.335*** (2.900)	11.658*** (2.737)
DENS	3.859*** (1.322)	3.163*** (1.105)	3.135*** (1.065)
VA_pct	1.627 (2.158)	0.572 (1.741)	0.677 (1.675)
REGIONE1		-0.204* (0.123)	-0.198 (0.121)
REGIONE2		-0.248** (0.123)	-0.229* (0.118)
TYPE1			0.106*** (0.031)
TYPE2			0.032*** (0.012)
Constant	2.338*** (0.219)	2.237*** (0.200)	2.231*** (0.191)
ll	-9490.302	-9347.755	-9266.454
N	2673	2673	2673
chi2	1051.747	1067.701	1097.830
p	0.000	0.000	0.000

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 3: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Negative Binomial  
 Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
NB_OWN	9.227*** (2.278)	8.933*** (2.194)	9.042*** (1.890)
NB_COMP	8.564*** (1.428)	8.615*** (1.279)	8.527*** (1.236)
NB_OWN_OUT	-2.559*** (0.601)	-2.121*** (0.562)	-0.843 (0.600)
NB_COMP_OUT	-0.032 (0.170)	0.026 (0.206)	0.010 (0.195)
CV	0.163 (0.142)	0.219 (0.137)	0.222* (0.132)
K	-141.481*** (48.087)	-124.063*** (42.405)	-121.415*** (40.864)
P	8.761*** (2.610)	11.128*** (2.885)	10.515*** (2.751)
DENS	3.729*** (1.294)	3.081*** (1.161)	3.045*** (1.115)
VA_pct	1.479 (2.352)	0.557 (1.846)	0.647 (1.762)
REGIONE1		-0.177 (0.124)	-0.173 (0.121)
REGIONE2		-0.209* (0.123)	-0.193 (0.118)
TYPE1			0.114*** (0.032)
TYPE2			0.036*** (0.013)
Constant	2.392*** (0.193)	2.289*** (0.189)	2.278*** (0.181)
lnalpha	-3.676*** (0.371)	-3.831*** (0.425)	-3.930*** (0.422)
ll	-9196.711	-9138.896	-9087.824
N	2673	2673	2673
chi2	600.999	641.091	657.921
p	0.000	0.000	0.000

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 4: Estimation results: Marginal effects

Variable	(ztp)	(ztnb)	(Variable Mean)
NB_OWN	283.1834 (52.357)	283.0865 (56.701)	.0011403
NB_COMP	263.1779 (36.787)	266.9689 (38.366)	.0447364
NB_OWN_OUT	-27.37672 (18.463)	-26.40309 (18.601)	.005079
NB_COMP_OUT	-.3452477 (6.431)	.2979915 (6.110)	.1772281
CV	7.227972 (4.238)	6.952858 (4.167)	1.625817
K	-3894.202 (1238.163)	-3801.284 (1277.182)	.0018006
P	365.0903 (87.430)	329.2003 (87.960)	.0600712
DENS	98.17784 (32.976)	95.34141 (34.739)	.0327039
VA_pct	21.21327 (52.418)	20.25852 (55.120)	.0143725
REGIONE1 (d)	-6.113763 (3.697)	-5.35278 (3.708)	
REGIONE2 (d)	-6.920037 (3.473)	-5.862967 (3.508)	
TYPE1 (d)	3.423496 (1.037)	3.673721 (1.093)	
TYPE2 (d)	1.002621 (0.392)	1.144445 (0.417)	

(d)marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

Table 5: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS

Variable	Quantile5%	Quantile25%	Quantile50%
1/log(POP)	51.416*** (5.967)	37.429*** (12.168)	34.027*** (10.508)
REGIONE1	0.186 (0.162)	0.070 (0.160)	0.005 (0.107)
REGIONE2	0.253 (0.180)	0.035 (0.172)	-0.025 (0.114)
TYPE1	-0.041 (0.111)	-0.122 (0.179)	-0.204* (0.114)
TYPE2	-0.046 (0.116)	0.094 (0.200)	-0.005 (0.129)
Constant	-5.737*** (0.455)	-4.225*** (0.949)	-3.644*** (0.817)
$C_\infty$ REGION1	0.0039 (0.0021)	0.0154 (.0144)	0.0256 (0.0205)
$C_\infty$ REGION2	0.0041 (0.0020)	0.0149 (0.0142)	0.0249 (0.0198)
$C_\infty$ REGION3	0.00321 (0.0015)	(0.0144) (0.0135)	0.0255 (.0203)
N	103	103	103

\*p&lt;0.10,\*\*p&lt;0.05,\*\*\*p&lt;0.01



Table 6: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS

Variable	Quantile5%	Quantile25%	Quantile50%
1/log(banks)	7.556* (4.440)	7.078 (5.069)	2.947 (3.001)
REGIONE1	0.428*** (0.099)	0.232 (0.199)	0.029 (0.100)
REGIONE2	0.437*** (0.132)	0.196 (0.202)	-0.022 (0.102)
TYPE1	0.011 (0.186)	-0.108 (0.203)	-0.198** (0.097)
TYPE2	0.057 (0.089)	-0.019 (0.237)	-0.054 (0.116)
Constant	-3.123*** (0.719)	-2.498*** (0.818)	-1.500*** (0.489)
$C_\infty$ REGION1	0.0633 (0.0455)	0.0940 (0.0646)	0.1824** (0.0730)
$C_\infty$ REGION2	0.0638 (0.0441)	0.0909 (0.0655)	0.1791*** (0.0679)
$C_\infty$ REGION3	0.0422 (0.0290)	0.0760 (0.0574)	0.1868*** (0.0683)
N	99	99	99

\*p&lt;0.10,\*\*p&lt;0.05,\*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 7: Estimation results: OLS - Reduced form Dependent variable: NB\_OWN

Variable	Coefficient
NB_OWN_03	0.9798*** (0.008)
NB_COMP	0.0003* (0.000)
NB_OWN_OUT	0.0002 (0.001)
NB_COMP_OUT	0.0001 (0.000)
CV	-0.0000 (0.000)
K	-0.0025 (0.009)
P	0.0002 (0.000)
DENS	0.0002 (0.000)
VA_pct	0.0003 (0.000)
TYPE1	0.0000 (0.000)
TYPE2	0.0001*** (0.000)
REGION1	-0.0000 (0.000)
REGION2	0.0000 (0.000)
Constant	0.0000 (0.000)
R <sup>2</sup>	.9883225
N	2414.000
p	0.000

\* p&lt;0.10, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \*\*\* p&lt;0.01

Table 8: Estimation results: Augmented Zero Truncated Negative Binomial  
 Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks

Variable	(1)
NB_OWN	9.170*** (1.923)
NB_COMP	8.556*** (1.255)
NB_OWN_OUT	-0.591 (0.587)
NB_COMP_OUT	0.006 (0.203)
CV	0.225* (0.135)
K	-121.924*** (41.176)
P	10.713*** (2.718)
DENS	3.087*** (1.128)
VA_pct	0.613 (1.770)
TYPE1	0.121*** (0.032)
TYPE2	0.034** (0.014)
REGION1	-0.181 (0.124)
REGION2	-0.201* (0.120)
vhat	-2.433 (8.790)
Constant	2.260*** (0.186)
	-3.852*** (0.404)
ll	-8245.051
N	2414.000
chi2	666.529
p	0.000

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 9: Estimation results: GLM

As the dependent variable C1 is a proportion, it is to use generalized linear model with family binomial family, logistic link function. Standard errors scaled using square root of Pearson X2-based dispersion

<b>Variable</b>		
1/log(POP)	43.956***	
	(12.273)	
REGIONE1	-0.173	-0.145
	(0.117)	(0.136)
REGIONE2	-0.227*	-0.188
	(0.124)	(0.139)
TYPE1	-0.234*	-0.263*
	(0.132)	(0.138)
TYPE2	0.040	-0.088
	(0.145)	(0.160)
1/log(banks)		-0.848
		(4.023)
Constant	-4.221***	-0.686
	(0.957)	(0.656)
$C_\infty$ REGION1	0.0122	0.3034**
	(.0115)	( 0.1256)
$C_\infty$ REGION2	0.0116	0.2943**
	(0.1098)	(0.1283)
$C_\infty$ REGION3	0.01450	0.3349**
	(0.0144)	(0.1462)
N	103	99

\*p<0.10,\*\*p<0.05,\*\*\*p<0.01