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# **Identification with feminism: antecedents and consequences**

Maartje H. J. Meijs

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# **Identification with feminism: antecedents and consequences**

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# CHAPTER 1

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## Introduction

## What is a Feminist?

This dissertation discusses the antecedents and consequences of identification with feminism. In order to do that it is important to define what a feminist actually is. Famous singer Beyoncé Knowles knows what a feminist is and in her lyrics from ‘\*\*\*Flawless’ she uses the definition by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie and sings “Feminist: A person who believes in social, political, and economic equality of the sexes” (www.beyonce.com). More technically, the Oxford dictionary says that a feminist is “A person who supports feminism”, and feminism means “The belief that men and women should have equal rights and opportunities”. There are many definitions of feminism and individuals often define feminism differently. Scholars generally use a definition in which a reference to women’s equal rights, the need for social change on behalf of women, or acknowledgement of inequality between men and women is made (see also Robnett, Anderson & Hunter, 2012).

There are many branches of feminism. *Gender equity feminists* argue that men and women should be treated the same and actively strive for equal (legal) rights (Sommers, 1994). *Cultural feminists* (Gilligan, 1982) argue that treating men and women the same will lead to disadvantages for especially women because inherently men and women are not the same. Therefore, they argue that we should celebrate the differences between men and women and take these differences into account when creating equality between men and women. *Radical feminists* (Mackinnon, 1987) argue that the main problem of gender inequality is that men have higher status and more power. Therefore men and women should not be treated as if they are the same because that maintains inequality. Hence, radical feminists challenge social norms and existing social institutions. Other subgroups of feminists call themselves socialist feminists, liberal feminists, lesbian feminists, or Black feminists (Swim & Hyers, 2009; Szymanski, 2004). Despite their many differences, what all of these branches

of feminists have in common is that they are willing to label themselves as a feminist. Interestingly, some people believe that men and women should be equal, but do not identify as a feminist (e.g., 'weak feminists'; Duncan, 2010). Others believe in gender equality based on individual values and self-determination, and therefore call themselves neo-liberals (Fitz, Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2012; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), or egalitarians (Zucker, 2004).

Some people argue that there is more to being a feminist than merely believing that men and women should be equal. For example, being a woman is sometimes seen as a requirement for being a feminist (Houvouras & Carter, 2008), as is being an activist and actively striving for equal rights (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & Toller, 2006). In fact, according to one feminist identity model (Downing & Roush, 1985), active engagement in collective action is the final stage of developing a feminist identity (but see Liss & Erchull, 2010). To conclude, feminism (or feminist) is a multifaceted concept and there is not one definition. In all definitions though there is one corresponding aspect and that is that feminism is about the equality of the sexes.

### **Is Identification with Feminism Important?**

When people identify with and are committed to a certain group, they are more likely to act on behalf of that group and to engage in collective action (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 2011). Hence, identification with feminism is important for people who believe in gender equality, because when men and women are willing to identify as a feminist, they are more likely to engage in collective action. This collective action is essential to facilitate progress toward gender equality (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011). And, unfortunately, collective action for progress toward women's equality is still needed: Women are twice as often

illiterate than men (United Nations, 2010), are underrepresented in the top employment positions in business (Fortune, 2010; The Economist, 2014; United States Department of Labor, 2010; Vinnicombe & Sealy, 2013), are underrepresented at higher education institutions (League of European Research Universities, 2012), and receive less salary than men, on average (The Economist, 2014).

A second reason why identification with feminism is important for those who value gender equality, is that men and women are still expected to behave according to their gender roles. That is, when men and women behave in violation of their respective gender roles, they experience backlash— negative consequences of behaving in gender violating ways (Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012; Thomas, 1959; Vingerhoets, 2011). In Chapter 2 I investigate whether gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior can also be seen as acceptable behavior by looking at gender role violations of both male and female targets in the context of using this gender role violation in a clever way to get ahead.

Although Chapter 2 gives first evidence that gender stereotype-inconsistency might be seen as acceptable behavior in some cases, in many instances it still evokes disapproval. This is especially the case for women who act in masculine ways. In our current society, men are seen as having more power than women (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Schneider, 2004) and high-power groups are allowed to behave in more variable and distinctive manners than low-power groups (Brauer, 2001; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002). These dominant groups are also less sensitive to acting in line with social norms (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). Women's behavior is more restricted because they are seen as a subordinate group (Dahrendorf, 1968; Foschi, 1996; 2000; Glick &

Fiske, 2001). However, if men and women are seen as equals—as the goal of many feminists is—this means that *both* genders are expected to follow social norms less and to behave less in accordance with their group’s behavior. Ultimately, the disapproval of gender roles violations might become less when men and women are seen more in equal terms. This resonates in the finding that intuitively feminism is associated with masculine women and feminine men (Suter & Toller, 2006). Because these counter-stereotypical exemplars are associated with feminism this could indicate that acceptance of feminism might in fact change expectations of gender roles.

To conclude, identification with feminism is important and preferable for those who value gender equality, because engagement in collective action towards gender equality becomes more likely and stereotypical gender roles might become more lenient.

### **Identification with Feminism**

It seems that identification with feminism is not chosen by some men and women who do believe in gender equality and do know what feminism is: Women are often unwilling to self-identify as feminist (Charter, 2015; McCabe, 2005; Robnett et al., 2012). In fact, of all the women who agree with at least some tenets of feminism, only 1 in 6 women in the United States is willing to identify as a feminist (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000). An analysis of qualitative interviews showed that both men and women eschew the feminist label (Suter & Toller, 2006). And this also holds for female celebrities: For example, when receiving the Billboard Women in Music Award in 2012, pop singer Katie Perry stated in her acceptance speech: “I am not a feminist, but I do believe in the strength of women” (Hampp, 2012). And Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer said that she believes that “women are just as capable”, and she believes “in equal rights”, but that she does not identify as a feminist (Baker, 2012).

This trend of non-identification with feminism seems to imply that the antecedents of identification with feminism are different from merely agreeing with the values of feminism. In the remainder of the introduction of this dissertation I will discuss which antecedents of identification with feminism are already known in the literature and which two antecedents I focus on in my dissertation. Furthermore, I will discuss the known consequences of identification with feminism and which consequence is the focus of my dissertation.

### **Antecedents of Identification with Feminism**

There are many reasons why women do or do not identify with feminism. First, people need to understand what feminism is. When people are given the definition of feminism as “someone who supports political, economic, and social equality for women” significantly more people identify as feminist (Huddy, Neely, & Lafay, 2000). Most obviously, agreeing with feminist values is an also important predictor in identification with feminism. Some women do not endorse gender equality and therefore do not identify as a feminist (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Others who endorse gender equality, but do not see it as a feminist issue, are also less likely to identify than women who see gender equality as inherent to feminism (Fitz et al., 2012).

But, some men and women who believe in gender equality and understand what feminism is also do not identify as a feminist. There are several reasons that are found for disidentification as a feminist. First, women who do not believe in the benefits of collective action are less likely to identify with feminism than are women who do believe (Williams & Wittig, 1997). Second, regarding life-experiences, it is found that women who have never been exposed to feminism, feminist ideas, or sexism are less likely to identify with feminism than women with more exposure

(Leaper & Arias, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Williams & Wittig, 1997).

The last group of predictors is related to stereotyping. Feminists are strongly negatively stereotyped (Robnett et al., 2012) and are seen as being unattractive (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007) and as lesbian, bitchy, aggressive, and whiny (Houvouras & Carter, 2008). Even our implicit associations connect feminists to negativity and masculinity (Jenen, Winqvist, Arkkelin, & Schuster, 2009). On the other hand, feminists are also seen in a positive light and are evaluated as being assertive, career-oriented, independent, and powerful (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Despite these positive characteristics feminists are seen as less positive than women in general (Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Having negative evaluations of feminists is related to less identification with feminism than having positive evaluations (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Redford, Howell, Meijs, & Ratliff, 2015; Robnett et al., 2012). However, having positive evaluations of feminists is not enough; crucial in identification with feminism is a feeling that others have positive evaluations of feminists as well (Ramsey et al., 2007; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Some women are reluctant to identify as feminists, because they are afraid that the negative consequences of the stereotype will be applied to them personally (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).

Hence, there are many reasons why men and women do not identify as a feminist even though they believe in gender equality and they understand what feminism is. I believe that two important processes have been overlooked as antecedents in identification with feminism. In Chapter 3 I will investigate the influence of perceived discrepancy between how women view themselves and how women view feminists on the dimensions of warmth and competence on the extent to

which they identify as feminists. Chapter 4 looks at the idea that women are becoming more motivated to be independent actors in their lives and that this motivated independence is an important reason for disidentification with feminism.

### **Consequences of Identification with Feminism**

Research on the consequences of identification with feminism has shown that it brings advantages for women on a personal level: Identification with feminism is positively correlated with psychological well-being (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006), higher personal self-efficacy (Eisele & Stake, 2008), higher levels of self-esteem (Hurt et al., 2007), better coping mechanisms for dealing with sexism and sexual harassment (Leaper & Arias, 2011), and better relationship health, relationship stability, and sexual satisfaction (Backus & Mahalik, 2011; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Yoder, Perry, & Saal, 2007). Furthermore, feminist women are seen as confident, but only by other women (Anderson, 2009).

On the other hand, there is also evidence that the consequences of identification with feminism are not so advantageous. For example, feminist men are seen as favorable, but low in attractiveness and masculinity and feminist women are seen as not favorable and as high in masculinity by both male and female raters (Anderson, 2009). More importantly, feminist women are taken less seriously when they are discriminated against—they are less seen as a victim and more of a complainer—compared to non-feminist women (Roy, Wieburst, & Miller, 2008). These negative consequences of identification with feminism are perhaps not so surprising given that the stereotype of feminists is so negative (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007).

This negativity towards feminists can also be experienced in our media landscape. A feminist reply to Robin Thicke's number one song 'Blurred Lines' was removed from YouTube because of explicit content although it contained less nudity

than the original video (Covert, 2013). After Emma Watson's speech at the UN Women to promote feminism #RIPEmmaWatson was trending and there was a threat to make her nude pictures public (Hajema, 2014) and when women like Beyoncé, Emma Watson, and Jennifer Lopez talk about women's rights, they are immediately 'slut shamed' and commented on their looks and sexuality (Van der Poel & Tuenter, 2014).

Thus, the consequences of identification with feminism seem to be mixed. As mentioned before, some women focus on the negative consequences and are therefore reluctant to identify as feminists (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Therefore, in Chapter 5 I investigate whether this hesitation is justified by examining whether women who label themselves as feminists are judged more negatively than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. I do this by looking at the dimensions of warmth and competence.

## **Chapter Overview**

With this dissertation I aim to better understand the psychological processes of identification with feminism by investigating why women are reluctant to identify with feminism and by examining whether the hesitation to identify with feminism is justified. In Chapter 2 I find that gender stereotype-inconsistency is not always experienced as a negative event, but that it can also be seen as a positive event. When observers see a man or a woman that behaves in a gender stereotype-inconsistent way (e.g., a woman behaving assertive or a man behaving flirtatious), they judge the behavior as acceptable: Only if the actor is a man (and thus acts in a stereotypical female way) and only if the behavior is seen as clever (e.g., to get away with a ticket or to persuade someone). Across four studies, these effects are driven by the evaluation of the gender stereotype-inconsistent acts as more clever and less trashy than the gender stereotype-consistent acts. In that same chapter, I propose that double

standards might play a role, because whereas men can benefit from gender stereotype-inconsistency, this is not the case for women.

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I describe two reasons for why women do or do not identify as feminists. Specifically, Chapter 3 shows that the discrepancy between how women view themselves and how women view feminists is an important antecedent in identification with feminism. This is examined on the dimensions of warmth and competence. In this chapter I find that women do not identify with feminism if they see themselves as different in competence than feminists: The more women see feminists as differently in competence, the less they identify with feminists. Women also do not identify with feminism if they see themselves as higher in warmth than feminists. This chapter also shows that perceived discrepancy predicts identification with feminism even after controlling for women's agreement with feminist values.

In Chapter 4 I find that although women have become increasingly independent, this independence also has a down-side. Not labeling as a feminist is for some women a deliberate choice, because labeling themselves restricts their view of themselves as an independent individual. Women are becoming more independent and are motivated to be independent actors. Chapter 4 shows that both men and women experience motivated independence and that this is an important reason to not identify as a feminist. In addition, in this chapter I find that women with an independent mindset disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-feminist message, but that this difference is not found for men or for women with a dependent mindset.

Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of feminist labeling. In this chapter I find that the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs—women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. The strength of these feminist beliefs causes a

decrease in warmth and an increase in competence evaluations: Feminist labelers are thus seen as less warm, but as more competent than women who do not use the feminist label, but do believe in gender equality. This chapter shows that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as more negative compared to women who merely express the same gender equality beliefs. This is the case because it is inferred that the feminist labeler in fact does not have the same, but stronger gender equality beliefs than the woman who believes in gender equality.

Let me end this introduction with some comments about the following chapters. All chapters can be read individually and in a non-fixed order. They are written as separate journal articles and are or will be published individually. For that reason there might also be an overlap in the introductions of the chapters. In addition, I wrote this introduction and the final chapter using 'I' but in all the other chapters I use 'we' because the other chapters were coauthored by my supervisors.



## CHAPTER 2

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Gender stereotype-inconsistent acts are seen as more acceptable than stereotype-consistent acts, if they are clever

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This chapter is based on: Meijs, M. H. J., Lammers, J., & Ratliff, K. A. (2015a).

Gender stereotype-inconsistent acts are seen as more acceptable than stereotype-consistent acts, if they are clever. *Social Psychology*, in press.

Imagine you are riding the subway when you see an attractive young person who does not have a valid ticket. The person flirts with the conductor and tries to use their physical attractiveness to charm their way out of the problem. How would you feel about the ticketless passenger? The current chapter suggests that the answer to this question depends on whether they are a man or a woman. Gender carries strong role expectations (Eagly, 1987; Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Rudman & Glick, 2008; Wood & Eagly, 2009). Being flirtatious is prescriptive for women, who are expected to rely on their charms and attractiveness to influence others. Men, on the other hand, are expected to use more domineering strategies, such as relying on their status, assertiveness, or dominance to get their way (Eagly, 1987; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2008). Although different influence behaviors are prescriptive for men and women, the literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of when a target's gender affects whether his or her behavior is found acceptable. In fact, the literature offers two different and opposite answers to this question.

On one hand, research has shown that violating expectations can lead to more negative perceptions of behavior. Behaviors that are consistent with gender roles are often evaluated more positively than behaviors that are inconsistent with gender roles (Heilman, 2001; Schneider, 2004). In contrast with violation of descriptive gender norms (what men and women are), violations of prescriptive gender norms (how men and women should behave) in particular induce disapproval, negativity, and penalties for the violator (Heilman, 2012). People dislike transgressions of gender norms that are strongly associated with gender identity, such as female leadership (Rudman et al., 2012). Similarly, women who are arrogant (Prentice & Carranza, 2002) or promiscuous (Thomas, 1959), and men who are modest (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010)

or who cry (Vingerhoets, 2011) are all evaluated more negatively and experience the so-called 'backlash effect' (Rudman & Glick, 2001) than men and women who act in a way that is consistent with their gender roles. Such effects seem to be so robust that even young children criticize gender role-violating peers (Blakemore, 2003), although the extent to which violators are criticized depends greatly on the content of the violation. In summary, research suggests that the behavior of a woman who uses attractiveness to get by without a train ticket might be seen as relatively acceptable, but that the behavior of a man engaging in the same behavior (a violation of expectations) would be judged more harshly.

There is, however, reason to believe that there are situations in which gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistency. Behaving in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent demonstrates that one has the ability to play with expectations. This might be particularly seen as positive in Western European cultures where individualism is seen as a sign of success and emancipative values are encouraged (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). Although gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior violates a prescriptive norm, it might also demonstrate that the target has behaved cleverly to gain an advantage over others who act in line with their gender roles.

This link between positivity and gender stereotype-inconsistency is rooted in research showing that deviance is associated with creativity (Amabile, 1996; Barron, 1955). Creative and clever people like artists and scientists stand out from the crowd and behave in ways that are unexpected and deviant from the norm (Sternberg, 2001). Not surprisingly, the stereotype of creative people is thus associated with deviance (Sternberg, 2001). Experimental studies have shown that exposure to a deviant target compared to exposure to a conformist target increases creativity

(Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005) and that counter-stereotypical thinking leads to the generation of more creative ideas (Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Gocłowska, Crisp, & Labuschagne, 2013). Gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors can also be seen as clever or creative because they demonstrate that one has the ability to approach a situation in a new, uncommon way and use that to one's own advantage (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Mayer, 1999).

Although the ideas or behaviors of creative and clever people are often inconsistent with conventional ways of thinking and thus regularly experience exclusion or social rejection (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991; 1995), creativity is generally seen as a positive trait (e.g., Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Prokosch, Coss, Scheib, & Blozis, 2009). Creativity signals intelligence, motivation, and knowledge (Kaufman, Kozbelt, Bromley, & Miller, 2008; Nettle, 2008) and a recent study shows that eccentric artists were perceived to have a higher artistic skill and their art was appreciated more than (the art of) less eccentric artists (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2014).

Creativity involves originality, novelty, and usefulness (Mayer, 1999) and deliberately switching gender roles is creative, not only because it is unexpected, but also because it is original and useful. Boys who play with a toy kitchen, for example, might only be criticized (Blakemore, 2003) until it is clear that there is a purpose for their behavior (e.g., they want to become a top chef); then the cleverness of their behavior is recognized and accepted. Put differently, using behaviors that are stereotypically associated with the other gender shows that one has the ability to approach a situation in a new, uncommon way (Baas et al., 2008). Such creative and useful gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior may evoke less negative backlash because it is enacted to effectively deal with a situation. In such cases, the negative consequences of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior may be less strong (Heilman, 2012). After all, in such cases people do not act in a role inconsistent

manner to undermine the existing order, but merely do so to deal with the situation. In this chapter it is proposed that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior will be seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior if it is seen as clever or creative. This is in contrast to the backlash effect (negative evaluation of a gender stereotype-inconsistent target) that is expected if the behavior was seen as mundane or commonplace.

In addition, using traits that are stereotypically associated with one's own gender (gender stereotype-consistency) might be seen as a cheap and trashy attempt at influencing others and benefitting the self. This prediction is consistent with research showing that, although physically attractive people on average receive more lenient sentences (Downs & Lyons, 1991; Efrak, 1974; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), they lose that advantage if their attractiveness is actually part of the crime (e.g., a woman who uses her beauty to swindle a rich man into giving her his wealth; Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). Similarly, research has shown that if male defendants are described as aggressive—suggesting that they used a stereotypical male trait in perpetrating their crimes—they are more readily seen as guilty (Alicke & Yurak, 1995). Furthermore, behaving consistently with expectations associated with one's group is a sign of lack of status. People with power, class, and status are more inclined to take the privilege to act as they choose: They present themselves in a wider variety of different ways (Guinote et al., 2002). Slavishly following the roles associated with one's group suggests that people lack the autonomy and freedom to make their own choices (Fiske, 1993). And having low social-economic status is associated with negativity, for example White poor Southerners are often called 'white trash' (Billings, Norman, & Ledford, 2000).

In the present chapter the mediating role of perceptions of cleverness and trashiness in the relationship between gender stereotype-consistency and judgments

of acceptability (with greater perceived cleverness relating to higher judgments of acceptability and greater perceived trashiness leading to lower judgments of acceptability) is tested and demonstrated. In summary, existing research suggests that gender expectations in behavior should have strong effects on the degree to which people find such behaviors acceptable, opposite hypotheses may be formed on whether following or violating such gender expectations will lead to a lower judgments of acceptability. We predict that an individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent will be judged less negatively than an individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-consistent. We propose that the positivity that is associated with gender stereotype-inconsistency (cleverness) and the negativity that is associated with gender stereotype-consistency (trashiness) will account for the respondents' ratings of the acceptability of the behavior. To be more specific:

*Hypothesis 1:* The behavior of a woman who behaves in a dominant (Study 2.1.1, Study 2.1.2, Study 2.2) or aggressive (Study 2.3) way (gender stereotype-inconsistent) will be seen as more clever and less trashy, and therefore more acceptable, than the behavior of a man who behaves in a similar (but gender stereotype-consistent) way.

*Hypothesis 2:* The behavior of a man who uses attractiveness (Study 2.1.1, Study 2.1.2, Study 2.2) or behaves in a passive (Study 2.3) way (gender stereotype-inconsistent) will be seen as more clever and less trashy, and therefore more acceptable, than the behavior of a woman who behaves in a similar (but gender stereotype-consistent) way.

In Study 2.1.1 these hypotheses are tested by means of a scenario in which the male or the female target uses dominance (consistent with the male stereotype) or attractiveness (consistent with the female stereotype) to get their way out of a ticket. Study 2.1.2 uses the same paradigm with the techniques of dominance and attractiveness, but in a different scenario in order to increase generalizability. Specifically, the target here tries to delay a plane to allow a friend who is late to still board. In Study 2.2 it is tested whether gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are seen as more isolated events and are therefore seen as more acceptable. We aim to show this is not the case. Finally, in Study 2.3 it is tested whether the interpretation of the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as clever can explain when our effect (gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistency) and when a backlash effect (gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as less acceptable than gender stereotype-consistency) occurs. Throughout these studies, participant gender is taken into account as an independent variable. Although there were not any specific a priori predictions about the role of gender given the clear implications for gender relations and gender inequality, it could be that gender stereotype-inconsistency will be especially attractive for women because they have a stronger interest in a reversal or dissolution of traditional gender roles than men (Robnett et al., 2012). However, there is also evidence that there are no gender differences in a plethora of psychological traits (Hyde, 2005) and judgment of gender violations in particular (Heilman, 2012).

### **Study 2.1.1**

Participants read a scenario in which a target was riding the subway without a valid ticket. The target either used dominance (prescriptive for men; Eagly, 1987; Prentice & Carranza, 2002) or attractiveness (prescriptive for women; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004) to avoid a fine from the conductor. We

expected that a woman who uses dominance (gender stereotype-inconsistent) would be rated less negatively than a man who uses dominance (gender stereotype-consistent); we expected that a man who uses attractiveness (gender stereotype-inconsistent) would be rated less negatively than a woman who uses attractiveness (gender-stereotype consistent).

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Two hundred and fifty respondents from the United States (92 women and 158 men,  $M_{age} = 30.9$  years,  $SD = 11.4$  years) were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.40. A sample size of 240 was chosen *a priori* to detect a Cohen's  $d$  of 0.35 (based on the parameters from a pilot study) with 80% power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Data from one participant was excluded from analysis because he entered garbled text. Data from another participant was excluded because he indicated that he did not take participation seriously. These exclusions did not influence any result. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) between-participants design with participant gender as an additional factor.

### **Materials.**

**Scenario (independent variable).** Participants read a scenario about either a male target (Simon) or a female target (Sarah) who was riding the subway without a ticket. When approached by a conductor of the other gender, the target either relied on attractiveness (gender stereotype-consistent for female target; gender stereotype-inconsistent for male target) or on dominance (gender stereotype-consistent for male target; gender stereotype-inconsistent for female target) to avoid a fine (see Appendix 2A for the full text).

***Cleverness and trashiness (mediators).*** Perceived cleverness of the behavior (I think Simon's/ Sarah's behavior is ... clever/ creative/ smart;  $\alpha = .90$ ), and perceived trashiness of the behavior (... cheap/ trashy/ classy (reversed),  $\alpha = .75$ ) was measured. The selection of these measures was based on a pilot study ( $N = 597$ ) conducted on the Project Implicit research website (<http://implicit.harvard.edu>) in which participants answered 11 items regarding cleverness, trashiness, and acceptability using the same gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as a manipulation. Using a factor analysis two scales (cleverness and trashiness) were designed by building on the items with the highest factor loadings (trashy, clever, creative) and adding close synonyms (cheap, classy, smart) in order to have three items per scale. All items were answered on seven-point-scales between 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 7 (*strongly agree*).

***Perceived acceptability (dependent variable).*** Participants responded to a measure of perceived acceptability of the target's behavior ("How acceptable is Simon's/Sarah's behavior?") on a seven-point-scale ranging from 1 (*very unacceptable*) to 7 (*very acceptable*). Before answering the measure of acceptability, participants were instructed to deliberate well about their response before answering. They were also asked to write down their thoughts on an open-response item.<sup>1</sup>

## **Results**

***Perceived acceptability.*** A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the

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<sup>1</sup> For exploratory purposes, participants responded to scales measuring perceptions of unexpectedness (Mayer, 1999;  $\alpha = .89$ ), identification with feminism ( $\alpha = .94$ ), and hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996;  $\alpha = .92$ ). Participants found it more unexpected if a woman relied on dominance compared to when a man did so,  $p < .001$ , but less unexpected if a woman relied on attractiveness compared to when a man did so,  $p < .001$ . Repeating all analyses while controlling for identification with feminism and hostile sexism, did not affect the results.

target's behavior to be acceptable, showed a main effect of scenario type,  $F(1, 240) = 7.80, p = .006, \eta^2 = .03$ . More importantly, this main effect was qualified by the expected interaction effect between target gender and scenario type,  $F(1, 240) = 20.69, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$ . As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants thought it to be more acceptable for the male target to use attractiveness ( $M = 4.38, SD = 1.68$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 3.48, SD = 1.67$ ),  $t(124) = 3.01, p = .003$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.54$ , but thought it more acceptable for the female target ( $M = 3.67, SD = 1.46$ ) to use dominance than for the male target to do so ( $M = 2.95, SD = 1.57$ ),  $t(120) = -2.64, p = .009$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.48$ . This supports both Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves dominantly will be seen as more acceptable than that of a man who behaves similarly) and Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves flirtatiously will be seen as more acceptable than that of a woman who behaves similarly).

Finally, there was also an unexpected three-way interaction with participant gender,  $F(1, 240) = 6.37, p = .01, \eta^2 = .03$ . Analyses showed that the predicted two-way interaction effect was strong and significant for female participants ( $p < .001, \eta^2 = .18$ ) but much weaker and only a statistical trend among male participants ( $p = .10, \eta^2 = .02$ ). We return to this issue in the General Discussion of this chapter. No other main or interaction effects were significant ( $p$ 's  $> .45$ ).

**Cleverness.** We expected that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act would be seen as more clever than a gender stereotype-consistent act. A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of cleverness showed a main effect of scenario type,  $F(1, 240) = 5.39, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$ , which was qualified by the predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type,  $F(1, 240) = 26.94, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$ . Consistent with expectations, participants thought using

attractiveness was more clever for the male target ( $M = 4.82, SD = 1.53$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 3.97, SD = 1.80$ ),  $t(124) = 2.84, p = .005$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.51$ , but that using dominance was more clever for the female target ( $M = 4.43, SD = 1.64$ ) than for the male target ( $M = 3.28, SD = 1.60$ ),  $t(120) = -3.90, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.71$ . Not bearing on our predictions, we also found an interaction of target gender and participant gender,  $F(1, 240) = 5.57, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$ . There were no differences in the evaluation of the female target,  $p = .43$ , but the behavior of the male target was seen as more acceptable by the male participants ( $M = 4.32, SD = 1.61$ ) than by the female participants ( $M = 3.63, SD = 1.87$ ),  $p = .04$ . No other main and interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .06$ .

**Trashiness.** We expected that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act would be seen as less trashy than a gender stereotype-consistent act. Consistent with this expectation, a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of trashiness showed the predicted interaction effect of target gender X scenario type,  $F(1, 240) = 24.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$ . Consistent with expectations, simple effects showed that in the dominance scenario participants rated the perceived trashiness as higher for the male target ( $M = 5.36, SD = 1.26$ ) than the female target ( $M = 4.63, SD = 1.27$ ),  $t(120) = 3.21, p = .002$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.59$ , while in the attractiveness scenario the effect reversed and participants rated the perceived trashiness as higher for the female target ( $M = 5.18, SD = 1.36$ ) than the male target ( $M = 4.32, SD = 1.40$ ),  $t(124) = -3.52, p = .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.63$ . No other main or interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .11$ .

**Mediation.** Finally, a mediation analyses was conducted to test the prediction that cleverness and trashiness would have opposite mediating effects. That is, we expected that the finding that a gender stereotype-inconsistent act is seen as more

clever and less trashy than a gender stereotype-consistent act, would help to explain why it is seen as more acceptable. To do so, we employed a regression analysis according to the specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model 4 with 5000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013) and both mediators were simultaneously entered in the model. The analyses revealed that both cleverness and trashiness mediated the effect of the target gender X scenario type interaction on acceptability. Both the indirect effect through trashiness,  $B = -0.55$ ,  $SE = 0.06$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $CI = [-0.67, -0.43]$ , and the indirect effect through cleverness,  $B = 0.37$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $CI = [0.27, 0.47]$ , significantly mediated the scenario type X target gender interaction, whereas the direct effect of the target gender X scenario type interaction on acceptability turned not significant,  $B = 0.12$ ,  $SE = 0.16$ ,  $p = .45$ ,  $CI = [-0.20, 0.45]$ . For correlations see Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

*Zero-order correlations among study variables in Study 2.1.1*

	Perceived Acceptability	Cleverness	Trashiness
Perceived Acceptability	-	.63*	-.66*
Cleverness		-	-.54*
Trashiness			-

*Note.* \* = Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### **Study 2.1.2**

Study 2.1.2 uses the same paradigm of Study 2.1.1 with a new scenario. One problem with Study 2.1.1 was that in the scenario the conductor was described as easy to intimidate in the dominance scenario, but not as such in the attractiveness scenario. Therefore the conditions did not only differ in the behavior shown by the male or the female target, but also by the responder. Study 2.1.2 addresses this issue by providing

no information about the other actor in the story, thus making the two conditions equal in that respect. In addition, this study makes use of the same gender-associated behaviors (dominance for men; attractiveness for women), but in a completely different setting, making the findings more generalizable across different settings.

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Three hundred and eight respondents from the United States (102 women and 206 men,  $M_{\text{age}} = 33.4$  years,  $SD = 10.5$  years) were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.40. Because it is especially recommended to have sufficient power for replication studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2012) we decided to increase the a priori power from 80% to 95% and a sample size of 300 completed sessions was chosen a priori based on the parameters from Study 2.1.1 (Cohen's  $d = 0.48$ ; Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) between-participants design with participant gender as an additional factor.

### **Materials.**

**Scenario (independent variable).** Participants read a scenario about a target person who was described to be waiting on a plane for a friend to board. As the friend was late, the target person was trying to stop the plane from leaving.

Depending on condition, the target person was either described as male or female (target gender) and was also described to either rely on attractiveness or dominance (scenario type). As in Study 2.1.1, attractiveness is considered gender stereotype-consistent for female targets and inconsistent for male targets, while dominance is considered consistent for male targets and inconsistent for female targets. See Appendix 2B for the full text.

**Perceived acceptability (dependent variable).** Participants responded to the measure of perceived acceptability of the target's behavior ("How acceptable is the man's / woman's behavior?") on a seven-point-scale ranging from 1 (*very unacceptable*) to 7 (*very acceptable*).<sup>2</sup> Finally, participants could fill in any comments they had on an open-response item.

## Results

**Perceived acceptability.** A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the target's behavior to be acceptable, showed a main effect of target gender,  $F(1, 296) = 6.55, p = .01, \eta^2 = .02$ . More importantly, this main effect was qualified by the expected interaction effect between target gender and scenario type,  $F(1, 296) = 7.22, p = .008, \eta^2 = .02$ . As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants thought it to be more acceptable for the male target to use attractiveness ( $M = 3.44, SD = 1.39$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 2.36, SD = 1.43$ ),  $t(141) = 4.54, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.76$ . However, it was not more acceptable for the female target to use dominance ( $M = 2.84, SD = 1.49$ ) than for the male target ( $M = 2.68, SD = 1.32$ ),  $t(159) = -0.74, p = .46$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.12$ . In other words, these results support for Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves flirtatiously will be seen as more acceptable than that of a woman who behaves flirtatiously), but do not support for Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves dominantly will be seen as more acceptable than that of a man who behaves similarly).

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<sup>2</sup> Perceived cleverness and trashiness was also measured using the same items as in Study 2.1.1. Unfortunately, this data was lost for a large group of participants ( $N = 155$ ). The data loss left some cells with such small numbers of participants (e.g., 6) that the data cannot be interpreted.

Finally, as in Study 2.1.1, there was also an unexpected three-way interaction with participant gender,  $F(1, 296) = 7.68, p = .006, \eta^2 = .03$ . But unlike in Study 2.1.1, analyses now showed that the predicted two-way interaction effect was significant and in the expected direction among male participants,  $p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$ . However, the expected two-way interaction was fully absent among female participants,  $p = .96, \eta^2 < .001$ , meaning that for female participants neither Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 was supported. No other main or interaction effects were significant ( $p$ 's  $> .11$ ). We return to this in the General Discussion of this chapter.

### **Discussion Study 2.1.1 and Study 2.1.2**

Study 2.1.1 demonstrated that, for both male and female targets, gender stereotype-inconsistent acts were seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent acts. More specifically, the behavior of a man who relied on attractiveness was seen as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a woman (Hypothesis 2). Further, the behavior of a woman who relied on dominance was seen as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a man (Hypothesis 1). Also, gender stereotype-inconsistent acts were seen as more clever and less trashy than gender stereotype-consistent acts, and these ratings of cleverness and trashiness mediated the effect of the target gender and scenario type interaction on acceptability of the behavior.

Study 2.1.2 replicated the finding that the behavior of the male target who used attractiveness was seen as more acceptable than the same behavior performed by a female target. However, unlike in Study 2.1.1, this result was only found among male participants, while the pattern was not significant for female participants (though was in the expected direction, using attractiveness for the male target ( $M = 3.23, SD = 1.36$ ) and for the female target ( $M = 2.80, SD = 1.36$ ),  $p = .29$ ). One possible

explanation is that there were fewer female participants ( $N = 102$ ) than male participants ( $N = 201$ ) and therefore post-hoc power for a Cohen's  $d$  of 0.45 in the female participants sample was only 60%.

Another difference between Studies 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 is that, in the first study participants saw the dominant behavior of the female as more acceptable than the same behavior of the male target, whereas in the second study, participants saw the dominant behavior of the female target *not* as more acceptable than the same behavior of a male target. This difference could possibly be explained by double standards: Whereas men can reap the benefits of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, this might be less possible for women. We return to this issue in the General Discussion of this chapter.

## **Study 2.2**

The result of Study 2.1.1 confirmed that gender stereotype-inconsistent acts are rated as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent acts, and Study 2.1.2 confirmed this finding, but only for male targets. Study 2.1.1 demonstrated that this advantage of gender stereotype-inconsistent acts could be explained by the fact that these acts were seen as more clever and less trashy. However, as an alternative to our explanation, it could be that people may infer from a gender stereotype-inconsistent act that it is an isolated, incidental event. That is, people may think that women who rely on dominance or men who rely on attractiveness are unlikely to show similar behavior in the near future, compared to those who stick to stereotypical gender roles. For example, men and women who behave in a gender stereotype-consistent manner receive higher punishments than those who behave in gender stereotype-inconsistent ways, presumably because jurors think they are more dangerous and more likely to commit further violations (cf., Alicke & Yurak, 1995; Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). People may see gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as more acceptable

simply because they think it is a glitch and the target otherwise never behaves like this. To rule this out, in Study 2.2 it was manipulated whether the gender stereotype-inconsistent act was an isolated event or a recurring event. We expect that this manipulation does not affect perceived acceptability, because the behavior of the target is judged as more clever regardless whether the behavior is recurring or an isolated event.

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Two hundred and fifty United States citizens (100 women and 150 men,  $M_{\text{age}} = 31.6$  years,  $SD = 9.7$  years) were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.40. A sample size of 240 was chosen a priori based on the parameters from Study 2.1.1 (Cohen's  $d = 0.48$ ) with 95% power (Faul et al., 2009). In Study 2.2, an instructional manipulation check was used to screen out inattentive participants (as recommended by Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). It consisted of three multiple choice questions about the scenario. Participants who failed to follow instructions were a priori excluded from analysis ( $N = 76$ ) and left 174 respondents in the final sample. Fortunately, analyses not using these exclusion criteria lead to the same results. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants design with participant gender as an additional factor.

### **Materials.**

**Scenario (independent variable).** The scenario was the same as in Study 2.1.1. The only difference between this study and Study 2.1.1 is that in the recurring occurrence condition the following sentence was added: *Simon/Sarah knows how to make use of attractiveness/dominance and he/she often does so. The scenario below describes an event that happened to Simon/Sarah last week, but things like this*

happen to him/her more often. Simon/Sarah is sitting in the subway and he/she left his/her wallet at home. ....he/she didn't buy a ticket for the subway. The isolated occurrence condition was equivalent to the conditions in Study 2.1.1.

**Cleverness, trashiness, and usefulness (mediators).** Participants completed the same measures of cleverness ( $\alpha = .89$ ) and trashiness ( $\alpha = .74$ ) as in Study 2.1.1. Whether the target's behavior was perceived to be useful was also measured ("Is the target's behavior useful/functional/goal directed?";  $\alpha = .86$ ).<sup>3</sup>

**Perceived acceptability (dependent variable).** Participants completed the same measures of perceived acceptability as in Study 2.1.1.

## Results

**Perceived acceptability.** A 2 (target gender: male, female) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) X 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of acceptability showed a main effect of occurrence,  $F(1, 158) = 7.71, p = .006, \eta^2 = .05$ , in which the isolated event ( $M = 4.37, SD = 1.88$ ) was seen as more acceptable than the recurring event ( $M = 3.50, SD = 1.92$ ). There was also a main effect of target gender,  $F(1, 158) = 6.35, p = .01, \eta^2 = .04$ , that more importantly, was qualified by the predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type,  $F(1, 158) = 7.30, p = .008, \eta^2 = .04$ . As expected, simple comparisons showed that participants considered using attractiveness as more acceptable for the male target ( $M = 4.82, SD = 1.67$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 3.34, SD = 1.83$ ),  $t(94) = 4.12, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.85$ , but considered using dominance as equally acceptable for the male target ( $M = 3.71, SD = 2.07$ ) and female target ( $M = 3.77, SD = 1.97$ ),  $t(76) = -0.12, p$

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<sup>3</sup> Participants also completed the same measure of experienced unexpectedness as in Study 2.1.1 ( $\alpha = .63$ ). Only a main effect of scenario type was found,  $F(1, 166) = 5.02, p = .03, \eta^2 = .03$ .

= .91, Cohen's  $d = 0.03$ . In other words, as in Study 2.1.2, this again supports Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a woman who behaves flirtatious will be seen as less acceptable than that of a man who behaves flirtatious), but does not support Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves dominant will be seen as more acceptable than that of a man who behaves dominant). Importantly, the question whether this behavior was recurring or isolated did not moderate this effect,  $F(1, 158) = 2.28, p = .13$ , as expected. No other main or interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .16$ .

**Cleverness.** A 2 (target gender: male, female) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) X 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of cleverness showed a main effect of occurrence,  $F(1, 166) = 17.78, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$ , in which the isolated event ( $M = 5.36, SD = 1.23$ ) was seen as more clever than the recurring event ( $M = 4.42, SD = 1.67$ ). More importantly, the predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type was found,  $F(1, 166) = 7.49, p = .007, \eta^2 = .04$ , showing as expected that participants saw attractiveness as more clever for the male target ( $M = 5.50, SD = 1.27$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 4.58, SD = 1.44$ ),  $t(94) = 3.32, p = .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.68$ , but that using dominance was not seen as less clever for the male target ( $M = 4.48, SD = 1.69$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 4.91, SD = 1.58$ ),  $t(76) = -1.16, p = .25$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.27$ . No other effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .07$ .

**Trashiness.** A 2 (target gender: male, female) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) X 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of trashiness showed only a main effect of occurrence,  $F(1, 166) = 9.47, p = .002, \eta^2 = .05$ , in which the isolated event ( $M = 4.24, SD = 1.32$ ) was seen as less trashy than the recurring event ( $M = 4.87, SD = 1.51$ ). All other effects were not significant,  $p$ 's  $> .08$ .

**Usefulness.** A 2 (target gender: male, female) X 2 (scenario type: attractiveness, dominance) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) X 2 (occurrence: recurring, isolated) between-participants ANOVA on the level of usefulness showed a main effect of occurrence,  $F(1, 166) = 12.83, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07$ , in which the isolated event ( $M = 5.33, SD = 1.10$ ) was seen as more useful than the recurring event ( $M = 4.57, SD = 1.53$ ). The predicted interaction effect between target gender and scenario type was also found,  $F(1, 166) = 14.56, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$ , showing that participants saw attractiveness as more useful for the male target ( $M = 5.37, SD = 1.07$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 4.49, SD = 1.52$ ),  $t(94) = 3.33, p = .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.69$ . Using dominance was seen as less useful for the male target ( $M = 4.61, SD = 1.65$ ) than for the female target ( $M = 5.29, SD = 1.05$ ),  $t(76) = -2.23, p = .03$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.51$ . No other effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .12$ .

**Mediation.** Finally, we conducted a mediation analysis according to the specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model 5 with 5000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013) with both mediators entered simultaneously in the model. The analyses revealed that both cleverness and trashiness mediated the effect of the target gender X scenario type interaction on acceptability. Both the indirect effect through trashiness,  $B = -0.63, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001, CI = [-0.83, -0.43]$ , and the indirect effect through cleverness,  $B = 0.45, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001, CI = [0.29, 0.61]$ , significantly mediated the scenario type X target gender interaction. The direct effect of the target gender X scenario type interaction on acceptability was no longer significant,  $B = -1.05, SE = 0.84, p = .21, CI = [-2.71, 0.60]$ . For correlations see Table 2.2.

## **Discussion Study 2.2**

Study 2.2 confirmed Hypothesis 2 and again showed that, as expected, a male target's gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as more acceptable than the

Table 2.2

*Zero-order correlations among study variables in Study 2.2*

	Perceived Acceptability	Cleverness	Trashiness	Usefulness
Perceived Acceptability	-	.57*	-.61*	.50*
Cleverness		-	-.44*	.63*
Trashiness			-	-.35*
Usefulness				-

*Note.* \* = Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

same behavior performed by a female target. Adding to previous studies, the results of Study 2.2 demonstrate that the effect is not affected by whether the behavior is recurring or is an isolated event; a male target's gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as more positive regardless of whether the event occurs frequently or only once. Again there was no support for Hypothesis 1 that a female target's gender stereotype-inconsistent would be seen as more acceptable than the same behavior of the male target. This provides evidence for the double standards explanation described previously. In short, whereas men can get away with gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, this is more difficult for women.

### **Study 2.3**

The results of Studies 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.2 showed that, in two different scenarios, male targets' gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are seen as more acceptable than the same behavior of a female target. Conversely, female targets' gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are not consistently more acceptable than the same behavior of a male target. Mediation patterns suggested this to be due to the fact that the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as clever (Study 2.1.1, Study 2.2).

In order to more directly test the influence of cleverness on evaluations of individuals who engage in stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, cleverness is manipulated (rather than measured) in Study 2.3. This experimental causal chain design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) also allows us to reconcile the present findings with the literature on backlash effects (Rudman & Glick, 2001). We used a scenario previously used to demonstrate backlash (Costrich, Feinstein, Kidder, Marecek, & Pascale, 1975). In the original research, a female student who behaved aggressively (compared to a male student who behaved aggressively) and a male student who behaved passively (compared to a female student who behaved passively) faced backlash for breaking stereotypical gender roles (Costrich et al., 1975).

We expected to replicate that backlash effect and that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior will be seen as less acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior. However, this effect will reverse if participants are pointed to the fact that gender stereotype-inconsistency can be seen as clever. More specifically, we hypothesize that the behavior of a female target who behaves aggressively will be seen as more acceptable than the behavior of a male target who behaves aggressively (Hypothesis 1); conversely, the behavior of a male target who behaved passively will be seen as more acceptable than the behavior of a female target who behaves passively (Hypothesis 2).

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. A sample size of 300 was chosen a priori based on the parameters from the Study 2.1.1 (Cohen's  $d = 0.48$ ) with 95% power, but a total of 307 adult United States citizens (130 women, 177 men,  $M_{\text{age}} = 35.0$  years,  $SD = 11.5$  years) completed all study materials. Participants were randomly assigned to

one condition of a 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: aggressive, passive) X 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) between-participants design.

### **Materials.**

***Scenario (independent variable).*** Participants read a scenario, adapted from Costrich et al. (1975). Specifically, in this scenario a student tries to get a better grade by approaching the student counselor and complains about having received a low grade. The student, who is either given a male name (Marc) or a female name (Mary), does so in either an aggressive manner (gender stereotype-consistent for men and stereotype-inconsistent for women) or in a passive manner (gender stereotype-consistent for women and stereotype-inconsistent for men). The scenario in the cleverness/trashiness frame condition was adapted by pointing to the fact that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior can be seen as clever (“*Men (women) often behave aggressively (passively) and assertively (unassertively), but in this case the student decided to try something clever and creative, in other words, he (she) decided to act passively (aggressively) and unassertively (assertively) to try to get his (her) way*”) and gender stereotype-consistent behavior as trashy (“*Men (women) often behave aggressively (passively) and assertively (unassertively), and in this case the student decided to get his (her) way using the same, cheap strategy*”), depending on condition. In the control condition, the same instruction as used by Costrich et al. (1975) was maintained.

***Cleverness and trashiness (manipulation check).*** As manipulation checks, the same measures of perceived cleverness ( $\alpha = .92$ ) and trashiness ( $\alpha = .78$ ) were used that were used as mediators in the previous studies.

**Perceived acceptability (dependent variable).** Participants completed the same seven-point measure of perceived acceptability of the target's behavior as in the other studies.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** For the purpose of the manipulation check the target gender and the scenario type factor were combined into a consistency factor. The scenario of the male target acting aggressive and the female target acting passive was coded as being gender stereotype-consistent, whereas the scenario of the male target acting passive and the female target acting aggressive was coded as being gender stereotype-inconsistent. It was expected that when the cleverness/trashiness frame was given the gender stereotype-consistent behavior was seen as more trashy and the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior was seen as more clever, both compared to when no frame was given.

A 2 (consistency type: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the target's behavior to be trashy showed a main effect of framing,  $F(1, 298) = 6.10, p = .01, \eta^2 = .02$ , that was qualified by a marginal significant interaction effect of framing and consistency type,  $F(1, 298) = 3.57, p = .06, \eta^2 = .01$ . As expected, in the cleverness/trashiness frame condition ( $M = 4.08, SD = 1.23$ ) gender stereotype-consistent behavior was seen as more trashy compared to the control frame condition ( $M = 3.46, SD = 1.12$ ),  $t(149) = -3.28, p = .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.54$ . Also as expected, for the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior the cleverness/trashiness frame condition ( $M = 3.70, SD = 1.47$ ) did not differ from the control frame condition ( $M = 3.62, SD = 1.16$ ),  $t(149) = -0.39, p = .70$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.06$ . No other main effect was significant ( $p's > .45$ ).

A 2 (consistency type: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the target's behavior to be clever did not show the expected interaction effect of framing and consistency type,  $F(1, 298) = 1.61, p = .21, \eta^2 = .005$ . For exploratory purposes simple effects were conducted. Although the means were in the expected direction, in the cleverness/trashiness frame condition ( $M = 3.36, SD = 1.53$ ) gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior was not seen as more clever compared to the control frame condition ( $M = 3.01, SD = 1.43$ ),  $t(149) = -1.48, p = .14$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.24$ . As expected, for the gender stereotype-consistent behavior the cleverness/trashiness frame condition ( $M = 3.02, SD = 1.44$ ) did not differ from the control frame condition ( $M = 2.96, SD = 1.32$ ),  $t(149) = 0.28, p = .78$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.05$ . No other main effects were significant ( $p$ 's > .23).

**Perceived acceptability.** A 2 (target gender: male target, female target) X 2 (scenario type: aggressive, passive) X 2 (framing: cleverness/trashiness frame, control frame) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the degree to which respondents thought the target's behavior to be acceptable, showed a main effect of scenario type,  $F(1, 286) = 5.25, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$ , and a main effect of target gender,  $F(1, 286) = 5.27, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$ . More importantly, these main effects were qualified by the expected three-way interaction between target gender, scenario type, and framing,  $F(1, 286) = 4.59, p = .03, \eta^2 = .02$ . No other main or interaction effects were significant ( $p$ 's > .16).

This three-way interaction was first analyzed by running a separate planned comparison for the control condition to test for a backlash effect (women being punished more for aggressive behavior than men for aggressive behavior).

Participants found it marginally less acceptable for a female target to be aggressive ( $M = 3.49, SD = 1.33$ ) than for a male target to show that same behavior ( $M = 4.14,$

$SD = 1.67$ ),  $t(72) = 1.85$ ,  $p = .07$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.44$ . As expected, participants did not find it more acceptable for a female target ( $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ) than for a male target ( $M = 4.41$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ) to show passive behavior,  $t(76) = 0.08$ ,  $p = .93$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.02$ . In other words, without being pointed to the potential cleverness of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, the same aggressive behavior by women was seen as (marginally) less acceptable than the same aggressive behavior by men, because it is gender stereotype-inconsistent for women but consistent for men, replicating the backlash effect found by Costrich et al. (1975).

This three-way interaction was then analyzed by running a separate planned comparisons for the aggressive and the passive scenario type. For the aggressive scenario type we found that when no frame was given to participants the behavior of the female target ( $M = 3.49$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ) was marginally less acceptable than the behavior of the male target ( $M = 4.14$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) as discussed above,  $p = .07$ . This effect was not present in the cleverness/trashiness framing condition: Specifically, providing the cleverness/trashiness frame reduced the backlash effect and participants did not find it less acceptable for a female target to behave in an aggressive manner ( $M = 3.81$ ,  $SD = 1.79$ ) compared to when a male target ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ) did so,  $t(72) = -0.08$ ,  $p = .94$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.02$ . Although again no support was found for Hypothesis 1 (the behavior a woman who behaves aggressively will be seen as more acceptable than that of a man who behaves aggressively), the results do seem to indicate that the cleverness frame increased the acceptability of the female target acting aggressively and the trashiness frame decreased the acceptability of the male target acting aggressively.

For the passive scenario type when no frame was given to participants, the passive behavior of the female target ( $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ) was not seen as more acceptable as that of the male target ( $M = 4.41$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ) as discussed above,  $p =$

.93. However, in the cleverness/trashiness framing condition, participants found it more acceptable for a male target to use a passive approach ( $M = 4.39$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ) compared to when a female target did so ( $M = 3.61$ ,  $SD = 1.44$ ),  $t(74) = 2.45$ ,  $p = .02$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.57$ . This supports Hypothesis 2 (the behavior a man who behaves passive will be seen as more acceptable than that of a woman who behaves passive). The results seem to suggest that the cleverness frame did not increase the acceptability of the male target acting passively, but that the trashiness frame did decrease the acceptability of the female target acting passively.

## **General Discussion**

Four studies, using three different scenarios, showed that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior was seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior with two caveats: (1) only for men, and (2) only if the behavior was seen as a clever and creative way to play with gender roles. More specifically, a male target using attractiveness (Study 2.1.1, Study 2.1.2, and Study 2.2) or passive behavior (Study 2.3) was seen as more clever, less trashy, and therefore more acceptable, than a female target who used the same (gender stereotype-consistent) behaviors. Contrary to expectations, the results were not replicated for female targets. Although Study 2.1.1 showed that a female target using dominance was seen as more clever, less trashy, and therefore more acceptable than a male target who used the same (gender stereotype-consistent) behavior, these results were not replicated in the other three studies. In those studies, gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior by a woman was not seen as more acceptable than the same (but gender stereotype-consistent) behavior by a man. However, there was also no backlash effect in Study 2.1.2 and Study 2.2. If there had been a backlash effect, then the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior of the woman would be seen as less acceptable than similar behavior by a man, instead the gender-stereotype inconsistent behavior of the woman was seen as

just as acceptable as similar behavior of a man. In Study 2.3 as expected there was a backlash effect against a woman who behaves aggressively (i.e. her behavior was seen as less acceptable than the aggressive behavior of a man) but only when participants were not pointed to the fact that the behavior was clever. The backlash effect disappeared when exactly the same behavior was framed as creative and clever and thus provides support for the idea that a woman who engages in a clever gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is less subject to backlash than a woman who engages in commonplace gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior. In other words, in all studies there was no backlash, although such a backlash effect is well-supported (Costrich et al., 1975; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Thomas, 1959; Vingerhoets, 2011). These results suggest that women can engage in gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior without facing a gender penalty, with one important caveat—that their behavior is seen as a clever way to achieve an end goal.

It is interesting to note that the results of these studies demonstrate a double standard in which it is easier for men to reap the benefits of acting in a gender stereotype-inconsistent manner than it is for women. This chapter shows that although women can evade the costs associated with acting in a gender stereotype-inconsistent manner (if observers see that behavior as clever), they do not reap the benefits that men gain from doing so. That is, although it is not necessarily *negative* for women to behave in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent (if the behavior is clever), it is also not *positive* for them to do so--while for men, it is positive to act inconsistent with gender expectations.

One explanation for these double standards comes from research into the psychological effects of social status and power, which has reliably demonstrated that people expect members of high-power groups, such as men (Eagly & Steffen, 1984;

Schneider, 2004), to behave in an objectively more variable and idiosyncratic way than women and other members of subordinate, low-power groups (Brauer, 2001; Guinote et al., 2002). As a result, members of dominant and superordinate groups are less expected to follow social norms. A position of elevated status and power is associated with reduced sensitivity to social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008; Johnson & Lammers, 2012) and an increased tendency to violate such social norms (Lammers et al., 2010; Piff et al., 2012). Members of high-status and high-power groups are allowed to more freely violate social norms, because norms serve to maintain the status quo between groups. Given that dominant groups occupy a privileged position, there is less need to restrain their behavior than there is to restrain the upward tendencies of subordinate groups (Dahrendorf, 1968; Glick & Fiske, 2001). As a result, social norms tend to be more strictly enforced for members of subordinate groups than for members of dominant groups (see also Foschi, 1996; 2000). Where gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior demonstrated by men is seen as playful and creative, gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior demonstrated by women may in the worst case be interpreted as an attempt at changing the status quo (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Westwood, 2002). This of course increases the threshold for deeming such behavior as acceptable.

Heilman (2001) noted that evaluations of transgression of prescriptive norms (how men and women should behave) might be more difficult to influence than evaluations of transgressions of descriptive norms (what men and women are). This chapter shows that the interpretation of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as clever can be a contextual cue that changes the evaluation of the transgressions of a prescriptive norm. Rather than acting gender stereotype-inconsistent for the sake of merely acting inconsistent, the behavior is executed to deal with a situation or to achieve a certain goal. When such gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are

judged as clever or creative, these behaviors (transgressions of a prescriptive norm) will be seen as acceptable.

There are some important limitations to the studies conducted in this chapter. In Study 2.3 explicit information that the behavior was trashy or clever was provided in the scenario. Possibly, this may have led to experimenter demand effects. If participants inferred that they were supposed to find clever behavior acceptable and trashy behavior unacceptable, then this may explain the results. Second, in all studies there was a closed and happy ending to the scenarios. We chose to provide such a closed ending in order to avoid any ambiguity and room for interpretation. Future research should investigate whether scenarios in which the outcome is unknown or negative lead to the same results. Finally, participants were given enough time to think about their opinion and no time pressure was posed upon them. It could be that under time pressure the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as negative and therefore we do not find the same effects. We do note, however, that we did look at the immediate response in one (unreported) study and found similar results as presented here.

In analyzing these results, participant gender was added as a factor. The results of Study 2.1.1 showed that female participants accepted gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior more than male participants did. This finding fits with the notion that women have a stronger interest in a reversal or dissolution of traditional gender roles than men, because of their more disadvantaged position in the current status quo (Robnett et al., 2012). However, the results of Study 2.1.2 showed the opposite, while in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 no gender differences were found, in accordance with Heilman (2012) and Hyde (2005) who also found no gender differences in evaluations of psychological traits or judgments of gender violations. It is therefore not entirely clear whether participant gender plays a role in these issues.

An important contribution of the present chapter is that it focuses on the perception of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior as clever and creative. This helps to explain why these findings might seem to contradict previous research showing that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is viewed negatively, as in the case of female targets who behaved in an arrogant manner (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), or who were promiscuous (Thomas, 1959), or male targets who were modest (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), or who cried in public (Vingerhoets, 2011). In these studies, gender-inconsistent behavior was evaluated more negatively than gender-stereotypical behavior; however, in none of these studies did targets use gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior in a clever manner.

### **Conclusion**

Although gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is often seen as less acceptable, the results show that gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior can also be seen as more acceptable, if the behavior is clever. However, these effects were only found for male targets and not for female targets which suggests that double standards might play a role: Whereas men can reap the benefits of gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, this is not the case for women. These results qualify the dominant idea that people inherently dislike gender stereotype-inconsistency. When it comes to men using these gender roles in a clever way, gender stereotype-inconsistency can also lead to more acceptance than gender stereotype-consistency.

## CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

### Appendix 2A – Scenarios used in Studies 2.1.1 and 2.2

#### *Female target; Attractiveness scenario*

Sarah is an attractive 25-year-old woman who studies Geography at a local college. The scenario below describes an event that happened to Sarah last week. Please try to imagine it in as much detail as possible. Sarah is sitting in the subway when she realizes that she left her wallet at home. She has a monthly pass for the subway so normally she has a valid ticket, but today she finds herself without. In the distance she sees the conductor approaching and notices that he is a man in his thirties. Sarah knows that her excuses will not make him overlook the fact that she has no ticket, so she decides to use the power of attraction: She unties her hair, unbuttons the top button of her blouse, and quickly puts on some lip gloss. When the conductor is close to her, Sarah gives him her best smile and she tells him in her sexiest voice that this never happens to her, but that she just realized that she forgot her wallet and that she only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently charmed by Sarah and turns a blind eye to her ticketlessness.

#### *Female target; Dominance scenario*

Sarah is an attractive 25-year-old woman who studies Geography at a local college. The scenario below describes an event that happened to Sarah last week. Please try to imagine it in as much detail as possible. Sarah is sitting in the subway when she realizes that she left her wallet at home. She has a monthly pass for the subway so normally she has a valid ticket, but today she finds herself without. In the distance she sees the conductor approaching and notices that he is a man in his thirties. Sarah knows that her excuses will not make him overlook the fact that she has no ticket, but luckily the conductor is a rather small and weak man who seems easy to intimidate. Sarah is a tall girl and she knows that some people indeed find her intimidating. When the conductor is close to her, Sarah stands upright, straightens her shoulders, and expands her chest to appear even taller. She tells him in her most authoritative voice that this never happens to her, but that she just realized that she forgot her wallet and that she only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently impressed by Sarah and turns a blind eye to her ticketlessness.

#### *Male target; Attractiveness scenario*

Simon is an attractive 25-year-old man who studies Geography at a local college. The scenario below describes an event that happened to Simon last week. Please try to imagine it in as much detail as possible. Simon is sitting in the subway when he realizes that he left his wallet at home. He has a monthly pass for the subway so normally he has a valid ticket, but today he finds himself without. In the distance he sees the conductor approaching and notices that she is a woman in her thirties. Simon knows that his excuses will not make her overlook the fact that he has no ticket, so he decides to use the power of attraction: He combs his hair with his fingers, puts on his blazer, and quickly sprays on some cologne. When the conductor is close to him, Simon gives her his best smile and he tells her in his sexiest voice that

this never happens to him, but that he just realized that he forgot his wallet and that he only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently charmed by Simon and turns a blind eye to his ticketlessness.

*Male target; Dominance scenario*

Simon is an attractive 25-year-old man who studies Geography at a local college. The scenario below describes an event that happened to Simon last week. Please try to imagine it in as much detail as possible. Simon is sitting in the subway when he realizes that he left his wallet at home. He has a monthly pass for the subway so normally he has a valid ticket, but today he finds himself without. In the distance he sees the conductor approaching and notices that she is a woman in her thirties. Simon knows that his excuses will not make her overlook the fact that he has no ticket, but luckily the conductor is a rather small and weak woman who seems easy to intimidate. Simon is a tall guy and he knows that some people indeed find him intimidating. When the conductor is close to him, Simon stands upright, straightens his shoulders, and expands his chest to appear even taller. He tells her in his most authoritative voice that this never happens to him, but that he just realized that he forgot his wallet and that he only has to ride the subway to the next stop. The conductor is evidently impressed by Simon and turns a blind eye to his ticketlessness.

## **Appendix 2B – Scenarios used in Study 2.1.2**

### *Female target; Attractiveness scenario*

After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This woman, who seems to be in her thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that is still connected to the fixed walkway. She is clearly trying to persuade the male flight attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as her friend is still on the way to the gate and probably will not be there in time. The woman is using the power of attraction to charm the flight attendant into making the plane wait. This is obvious, as she is unbuttoning the top button of her blouse, and winks at and compliments the flight attendant. In the end, she succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes before leaving.

### *Female target; Dominance scenario*

After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This woman, who seems to be in her thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that is still connected to the fixed walkway. She is clearly trying to persuade the male flight attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as her friend is still on the way to the gate and probably will not be there in time. The woman is using her stature and strong physique to impress the flight attendant into making the plane wait, stretching to look tall while only keeping minimal distance. In the end, she succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes before leaving.

### *Male target; Attractiveness scenario*

After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This man, who seems to be in his thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that is still connected to the fixed walkway. He is clearly trying to persuade the female flight attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as his friend is still on the way to the gate and probably will not be there in time. The man is using the power of attraction to charm the flight attendant into making the plane wait. This is obvious, as he is constantly correcting his cuffs and tie, and winks at and compliments the flight attendant. In the end, he succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes before leaving.

### *Male target; Dominance scenario*

After spending your vacation at the beach, you are waiting in an airplane for the doors to close and to start the flight. As this is the holiday period, the aircraft is filled with different types of people. The plane is being delayed by another passenger. This man, who seems to be in his thirties, is standing near the door of the airplane that is still connected to the fixed walkway. He is clearly trying to persuade the female flight attendant to stop the plane from leaving, as his friend is still on the

way to the gate and probably will not be there in time. The man is using his stature and strong physique to impress the flight attendant into making the plane wait, stretching to look tall while only keeping minimal distance. In the end, he succeeds and the plane waits for a couple more minutes before leaving.



## CHAPTER 3

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Magnitude of discrepancy between women's self-views  
and feminist-stereotypes predicts lower identification  
with feminism

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This chapter is based on: Meijs, M. H. J., Ratliff, K. A., & Lammers, J. (2015a).

Magnitude of discrepancy between women's self-views and feminist-stereotypes predicts lower identification with feminism. *Manuscript under review.*

Despite more than a century of suffrage, progress toward women's equality has been slow and incomplete. For example, women are twice as often illiterate than men (United Nations, 2010), and women are underrepresented in the top employment positions (The Economist, 2014; U.S. Department of Labor, 2010). In fact, only 15 of Fortune's 500 largest corporations are run by female CEOs (Fortune, 2010). In 2009, the Financial Times Stock Exchange Indicator even observed a decline in the number of female executive directors in the top 100 companies on the London Stock Exchange with the highest market capitalization (Vinnicombe & Sealy, 2013). In Europe, while women are somewhat well represented in the parliaments (near 26.4%), they still on average receive 15% less salary than men in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries (The Economist, 2014). And whereas 42% of all PhD-students in Europe are female, only 13% of heads of higher education institutions in Europe are women (League of European Research Universities, 2012).

To address these issues, it is important that more women identify with feminism. After all, collective action for female equality is key to facilitate progress toward gender equality. Identification with the group and commitment to that group are essential prerequisites for such collective action to occur (Ellemers et al., 1997; Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Yoder et al., 2011). Identification with feminism is important because as long as women are unwilling to identify with feminism, they are unlikely to engage in the type of collective action that could be beneficial to them in the long run (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).

But women are often disinclined to openly identify with feminism. For example, when pop singer Katie Perry won the Billboard Women in Music Award 2012, she stated in her acceptance speech: "I am not a feminist, but I do believe in the strength of women". This was not an isolated incident. Many women who accept the

basic tenets of feminist ideology are nonetheless reluctant to call themselves feminists (Robnett et al., 2012). One study found that, although over 90% of women agreed with at least some tenets of feminist ideology, only 16.6% self-identified as feminist (Burn et al., 2000).

The present chapter offers an explanation for why many women do not identify as a feminist – even if they agree with the basic tenets of feminist ideology; they see themselves as too dissimilar to (their stereotype of) feminists. In other words, the current chapter examines whether identification with feminism is predicted by the discrepancy between one’s self-view and one’s view of feminists.

### **Why Do Women Not Identify as Feminists**

There are many reasons why women may not identify with feminism. Most obviously, a woman might not consider herself a feminist because she does not share feminist ideology; that is, some women do not endorse gender equality (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Other women might endorse gender equality, but not see it as a feminist issue; such women are less likely to identify with feminism than are those women who see equality as inseparable from feminist ideology (Fitz et al., 2012). Thirdly, women who have never been exposed to feminism, feminist ideas, or sexism are less likely to identify with feminism than women with more exposure (Leaper & Arias, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Williams & Wittig, 1997). A fourth reason is that women who do not believe in the benefits of collective action are less likely to identify with feminism than are women who do believe (Williams & Wittig, 1997). Finally, women who have negative evaluations of feminists are less likely to identify with feminism than women who have positive evaluations (Houvouras & Scott Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Redford et al., 2015; Robnett et al., 2012).

In this chapter, we offer an additional explanation, focusing on the discrepancy

(versus overlap) between one's views of the self and one's views of feminists. That is, we aim to examine whether women are not only disinclined to identify with feminism because of having a negative view of feminists, but also because their view of feminists may not match with how they view themselves.

In investigating this question, we focus on self-feminist discrepancy on the dimensions of warmth and competence, which are the primary dimensions on which groups are evaluated and stereotyped (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; see also Eagly & Steffen, 1984, for evaluations of gender in specific). The stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) also proposes that these evaluations are often mixed: A group that is seen as low in warmth (competence) is generally also seen as high in competence (warmth). However, there are also certain groups that are both seen as low in warmth and in competence (e.g., poor people) and groups that are both high in warmth and competence (e.g., middle class; Fiske et al., 2002). Earlier literature has demonstrated that warmth and competence are also central dimensions for evaluation in people's views of feminists (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006), and that feminists are seen as low in warmth but high in competence (Fiske et al., 2002).

### **Discrepancy Magnitude**

In this chapter we first of all expect that the *magnitude of the discrepancy* between women's self-view and their view of feminists will be related to lowered identification with feminism. In other words, we expect that seeing oneself as having trait X, but seeing feminists as lacking that same trait, or seeing oneself as lacking trait X, but feminists as having it, should lead to lowered identification. Support for this hypothesis comes from cognitive consistency theories that suggest that people strive for consistency between their beliefs, attitudes, identities, and other

psychological attributes (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, 2009; Heider, 1958; Howell, Gaither, & Ratliff, 2015; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Further support for this hypothesis comes from Social Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) which states that groups are partially defined by their stereotypical attributes, and that people will self-categorize themselves as a group member in those groups for which the stereotypical representation and self-concept overlap (Hogg, 2003). In this way, both self-concept and stereotypes are important for predicting group membership.

### **Discrepancy Direction**

In addition, we also expect that the *direction of the discrepancy* between women's self-view and their view of feminists will relate to their identification with feminism. In other words, we expect that seeing oneself as being more positive than feminists should lead to less identification with feminism. Social Identity Theory postulates that people prefer to seek inclusion in groups that confer a positive identity on them and from which they can derive a positive self-view (Devos & Banaji, 2003; Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1990; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Based on this we would expect that women will identify as feminists to a lesser extent if their self-view is more positive than their view of feminists.

Importantly, we expect that the effects of discrepancy will be different for the two dimensions of warmth and competence. More specifically, we hypothesize that the *magnitude of the discrepancy* between one's self-views and feminist-views should predict identification with feminism for both the warmth and competence dimensions, but also expected that the *direction of the discrepancy* should only matter for the warmth dimension, but not for the competence dimension.

## **Warmth**

One of the most defining gender stereotypes is that women are warm and, as such, women are expected to be warm (Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Heilman, 2012; Kite, Deaux, & Haines, 2008; Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; White & Gardner, 2009). These stereotypes are so strong that women may even be penalized if they demonstrate insufficient interpersonal warmth (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Therefore, we expect that, because women want to be seen as warm, they will identify with a group—feminists, in this case—if they feel that the group is warm. If they think that feminists are colder than they themselves are, we expect that women will not want to be associated with the group at all, because doing so will not confer a positive identity (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Tajfel, 1974; White & Gardner, 2009). Put another way, as long as a group is thought to be as warm as the self, women will feel positive about joining that group. However, if the group is thought to be colder than the self, women will not want to join that group on any account. Therefore, we predict that, on the warmth dimension, both the magnitude and the direction of the discrepancy between women's self-view and their view of feminists will predict identification with feminism, meaning that women are disinclined to identify with feminists if they see themselves as different and in particular higher, in warmth.

## **Competence**

For competence, we do not expect discrepancy direction to matter. Although warmth is considered an unequivocally positive trait for women, competence is not (Fiske et al., 2002; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Whereas men are rewarded unconditionally for being competent, evaluations of competent women are more ambivalent (Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Kite et al., 2008; Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Spence & Helmreich, 1972). On

the one hand, being competent is valuable as it suggests that women can deal with the challenges posed to them. The stereotypical perception of women is changing and slowly includes more and more competence traits that traditionally are associated with men (Diekmann & Eagly, 2000; Diekmann & Goodfriend, 2006). In addition sex differences on the masculine dimension of the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974) are *decreasing* over time, indicating that women are increasingly endorsing agency traits (Twenge, 1997; Spence & Buckner, 2000). On the other hand, there is no shortage of examples of situations in which competent women are evaluated negatively (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Fiske, 1993; Heilman, 2001; 2012; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Powell, Butterfield, & Parent, 2002; White & Gardner, 2009). As a result, showing agency for women remains a balancing act, between looking incompetent and too competent (Cuddy 2009; Cuddy, Kohut, & Neffinger, 2013). For the competence dimension, we therefore expect that only the magnitude of the discrepancy between women's self-view and their view of feminists predicts identification with feminism. In other words, we expect that women identify with feminists if they believe them to be equally competent as they, but not if they think feminists are less competent than they, *or* if they think they are more competent. After all, both a very competent and an incompetent group violates gender roles and is therefore unattractive in conferring a positive identity (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Tajfel, 1974; White & Gardner, 2009).

### **Chapter Overview**

In summary, we predict that for the warmth dimension, both the magnitude and the direction of the discrepancy between women's self-view and their view of feminists predicts identification with feminism (following Social Identity Theory; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), while for the competence dimension we expect that only the magnitude of the discrepancy between women's self-view and their view

of feminists predicts identification with feminism (following consistency theory and Social Categorization Theory; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Turner et al., 1987). We test this in three studies, in which female participants rated themselves and rated feminists on a number of traits related to warmth and competence. Next, they completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (SIF; Szymanski, 2004). We then computed the magnitude of the discrepancy between self- and feminist-ratings (e.g., how differently warm or competent one sees themselves than feminists), and the direction of the discrepancy between self- and feminist ratings (i.e., is the difference because one sees the self as warmer or more competent because one sees the self as colder or less competent).

The first study was exploratory in nature. In particular, a priori we only expected the magnitude of discrepancy to be relevant and not the direction. We therefore designed Studies 3.2 and 3.3 to replicate the findings from Study 3.1. Furthermore, in Study 3.3 we also aimed to demonstrate that self-feminist discrepancy predicts identification with feminism even after controlling for endorsement of feminist values. Although identification with feminism and holding feminist values are often conflated (Eisele & Stake, 2008; Hurt et al., 2007) they are not the same construct. There are women who do not identify as feminist because they do not hold feminist values (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), but it is likely that there are also women who do not identify as feminist despite holding feminist values (because of the described self-feminist discrepancy). Therefore, we believe that endorsement of feminist values is only part of the puzzle, and hypothesize that the discrepancy between women's self-view and feminist view will predict identification with feminism even when controlling for endorsement of feminist values.

## Study 3.1

### Method

**Participants.** Participants were female volunteers recruited at the website of Project Implicit (<http://implicit.harvard.edu>) who were randomly assigned to one of approximately ten studies in the research pool. The final sample of participants consisted of 387 adult female United States citizens ( $M_{\text{age}} = 32.1$  years,  $SD = 13.5$  years). This sample size gives us 84% power to find the posteriori smallest effect ( $R^2 = .03$ ; G\*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009).

### Materials.

**Predictor measures: self- and feminist-ratings.** To measure Self- and Feminist-Ratings, participants were given a list of 20 traits for which they rated themselves and their “general impression of feminists” on five-point-scales ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*). The selection of items was based on combining items administered by Berryman-Fink and Verderber (1985), by Reid and Purcell (2004) and by Suter and Toller (2006). A factor analysis with Varimax rotation on the feminist-ratings and self-ratings yielded a *Warmth* subscale (concerned with appearance, attractive, fun, likeable, nurturing, and open-minded;  $\alpha_{\text{feminist}} = .81$ ;  $\alpha_{\text{self}} = .65$ ) and a *Competence* subscale (ambitious, independent, intelligent, opinionated, and career-oriented;  $\alpha_{\text{feminist}} = .81$ ;  $\alpha_{\text{self}} = .73$ ). Both subscales had Eigen values  $> 3$  and accounted for 42.8% of the variance. Nine items were dropped from the analyses due to lack of intercorrelation with other scale items. The same two scales were also construed for the self-ratings (here, the two factors accounted for 36.5% of the variance and had Eigen values  $> 1.7$ ).

**Dependent measure: self-identification as a feminist.** Participants completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ; Szymanski, 2004), which consists of four items (“I consider myself a feminist; I identify myself as a

feminist to other people; feminist values and principles are important to me; I support the goals of the feminist movement”) rated on a five-point-scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The mean identification with feminism score was 3.33 ( $SD = 0.91$ ).

**Procedure.** Participants first rated their “general impression of feminists” on the 20 traits. All items were administered in random order. After completing these items, participants indicated for the same items how they rated themselves, also in random order. Then, participants completed the self-identification as a feminist scale. Participants also completed two exploratory Single-Category IAT’s (SC-IATs; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006)—one measuring identification with feminism and one measuring evaluations of feminists. The psychometric properties of these measures were poor (e.g., low reliabilities, large within-measure order effects) so we were not confident in analyzing those measures.

## Results

**Analytic Approach.** Following earlier research (Briñol et al., 2006; Howell et al., 2015), we first computed two self-feminist discrepancy scores by subtracting the self-ratings from the feminist-ratings on each of the two stereotype dimensions (warmth and competence). Then, from each of those self-feminist discrepancy scores, we created two additional variables. *Discrepancy Magnitude* is the absolute value of the mean-centered discrepancy score; higher scores on this variable indicate that the participant sees herself as more different from feminists. *Discrepancy Direction* was created by coding -1 when feminist-ratings were lower than self-ratings, 0 when feminist- and self-ratings were equal, and +1 when feminist-ratings were higher than self-ratings. We also computed the *Magnitude\*Discrepancy* interaction by multiplying the discrepancy magnitude and discrepancy direction scores. This allows us to test whether the effect of discrepancy magnitude on identification depends on

the direction of that discrepancy. Next, we ran two regression analyses to test whether identification with feminism was predicted by the *magnitude* of the discrepancy between feminist-ratings and self-ratings, the *direction* of the discrepancy between feminist-ratings and self-ratings, and the *interaction* between magnitude and direction. We did that for warmth and competence separately.

**Warmth.** Of the 387 women, 80 (21%) saw themselves as less warm than feminists, 44 (11%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 259 (67%) saw themselves as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 3.25 ( $SD = 0.64$ ), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.67 ( $SD = 0.49$ ), and the mean difference score was -0.41 ( $SD = 0.68$ ).

The overall model was significant,  $F(3, 379) = 26.26, p < .001$ , and explained 17% of the variance. Direction of the discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth and Self-Warmth ratings significantly predicted identification with feminism,  $B = 0.26, SE = 0.06, \beta = .24, t(379) = 4.56, p < .001$ . The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a significant predictor of identification,  $B = -0.12, SE = 0.16, \beta = -.07, t(379) = -0.73, p = .47$ . More importantly, as expected these results were qualified by a significant interaction between magnitude and direction in predicting identification with feminism,  $B = 0.47, SE = 0.17, \beta = .25, t(379) = 2.77, p = .006$ .

A simple slopes analysis, performed to interpret that interaction effect, shows that, for women who saw feminists are less warm than themselves (higher Self-Warmth than Feminist-Warmth ratings) there was a significant negative relationship between the magnitude of self-feminist discrepancy on identification with feminism,  $B = -0.60, SE = 0.09, \beta = -.34, t(335) = -6.45, p < .001$ . But, for those women who saw feminists as warmer than themselves (lower Self-Warmth than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was no relationship between discrepancy magnitude and identification with feminism,  $B = 0.22, SE = 0.36, \beta = .12, t(335) = 0.60, p = .55$ . To conclude,

women identified less strongly with feminism if they saw feminists as less warm than themselves and the larger this discrepancy was the less likely they were to identify. If, however, women saw feminists as warmer than themselves, there was no relationship between the size of that discrepancy and identification.

**Competence.** Of the 387 women, 233 (60%) saw themselves as less competent than feminists, 53 (14%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 97 (25%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence score for feminists was 4.00 ( $SD = 0.59$ ), for the self-ratings the mean competence score was 3.76 ( $SD = 0.57$ ), and the mean difference score was 0.25 ( $SD = 0.67$ ).

The overall model was significant,  $F(3, 379) = 4.51, p = .004$ , and explained 3% of the variance. As expected, the magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings significantly predicted identification with feminism,  $B = -0.38, SE = 0.11, \beta = -.19, t(379) = -3.63, p < .001$ , meaning that the larger the discrepancy that women experienced in the degree to which they see themselves and the degree to which they see feminists as competent, the less likely they were to self-identify as a feminist. As also expected, there was no relationship between discrepancy direction and identification with feminism,  $B = -0.00, SE = 0.06, \beta = -.00, t(379) = -0.04, p = .97$ , and also no relationship between the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism,  $B = 0.05, SE = 0.12, \beta = .03, t(379) = 0.45, p = .65$ . In summary, women were less likely to identify as feminist to the extent that they saw themselves as differently competent than feminists, regardless of whether that was because they saw themselves as more or as less competent than they saw feminists.

### Study 3.2

The results from Study 3.1 support the general hypothesis that discrepancy between one's views of feminist and views of the self is related to lowered

identification with feminism. More specifically, the more women see themselves as overlapping with feminists on the competence dimension, the more strongly they self-identify as a feminist. This is true regardless of whether they see themselves as more or less competent than feminists. On the other hand, the more women see feminists as colder than themselves, the less likely they are to self-identify as a feminist. If they see feminists as warmer than themselves, feminist identification is not related to the self-feminist discrepancy. We did not expect this prior to running Study 3.1 as the first study was exploratory in nature, and therefore we designed Study 3.2 to replicate the findings from Study 3.1 with a different sample of participants.

## **Method**

**Participants.** Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.40. At the beginning of the study, participants were given an instructional manipulation check that was designed to screen out inattentive participants as recommended by Oppenheimer et al. (2009). Data from 25 participants were a priori eliminated on the basis of this check. In total, 288 adult female United States citizens ( $M_{age} = 32.7$  years,  $SD = 11.3$  years) completed all study materials. This sample size gives us 83% power to find the posteriori smallest effect ( $R^2 = .04$ ; G\*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009).

**Materials and Procedure.** The materials and procedure were identical to those presented in Study 3.1. The reliability of the self-ratings and feminist-ratings subscales was also comparable: Warmth ( $\alpha_{feminist} = .87$ ;  $\alpha_{self} = .73$ ) and Competence ( $\alpha_{feminist} = .81$ ;  $\alpha_{self} = .74$ ). The reliability of the Self-Identification as a Feminist scale was again high ( $\alpha = .93$ ). The mean identification with feminism score was 3.07 ( $SD = 1.13$ ).

## Results

**Warmth.** Of the 288 women, 66 (23%) saw themselves as less warm than feminists, 30 (10%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 191(66%) saw themselves as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 2.92 ( $SD = 0.76$ ), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.45 ( $SD = 0.61$ ), and the mean difference score was -0.53 ( $SD = 0.90$ ).

The overall model was significant,  $F(3, 282) = 36.21, p < .001$ , and explained 28% of the variance. Similar to the results found in Study 3.1, direction of the discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = 0.50, SE = 0.08, \beta = .37, t(283) = 6.38, p < .001$ . The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a significant predictor,  $B = -0.10, SE = 0.14, \beta = -.06, t(283) = -0.75, p = .46$ . As expected and as in Study 3.1, these results were qualified by a significant interaction between magnitude and direction in predicting identification with feminism,  $B = 0.56, SE = 0.14, \beta = .31, t(283) = 3.90, p < .001$ .

A simple slopes analysis shows that, for women who saw feminists as less warm than themselves (Self-Warmth higher than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was a significant negative relationship between discrepancy magnitude on identification with feminism,  $B = -0.65, SE = 0.09, \beta = -.40, t(252) = -6.89, p < .001$ . But, for those women who saw feminists as warmer than themselves (Self-Warmth lower than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was no relationship between discrepancy magnitude on identification with feminism,  $B = 0.50, SE = 0.27, \beta = .31, t(252) = 1.85, p = .07$ .

**Competence.** Of the 288 women, 199 (69%) saw themselves as less competent than feminists, 29 (10%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 59 (21%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence

score for feminists was 3.96 ( $SD = 0.65$ ), for the self-ratings the mean competence score was 3.45 ( $SD = 0.71$ ), and the mean difference score was 0.52 ( $SD = 0.79$ ).

The overall model was again significant,  $F(3, 282) = 4.22, p = .006$ , and explained 4% of the variance. As expected, magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = -0.48, SE = 0.17, \beta = -.25, t(282) = -2.79, p = .006$ , such that participants were less likely to self-identify as a feminist to the extent that the magnitude of the discrepancy between the Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was larger. Unexpectedly, there was also an effect of the direction of that discrepancy on identification with feminism,  $B = 0.23, SE = 0.09, \beta = .17, t(282) = 2.52, p = .01$ , as such that women who see feminists as more competent than themselves are more likely to identify than women who see themselves as more competent than feminists. There was no relationship between the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism,  $B = 0.15, SE = 0.19, \beta = .07, t(282) = 0.80, p = .43$ .

### **Study 3.3**

Studies 3.1 and 3.2 showed that discrepancy is predictive of identification with feminism and support the hypothesis that women identify more strongly with feminism to the extent that they see themselves as overlapping with feminists in warmth and competence. Confirming our hypotheses, the results also indicate that the direction of discrepancy predicts identification with feminism only for the warmth dimension – if women see themselves as more warm than feminists, a larger discrepancy between themselves and feminist-stereotype is related to less identification with feminism; if women see themselves as less warm than feminists, feminist identification is unrelated to the magnitude of the discrepancy. The results of Study 3.2 replicate Study 3.1 in a different participant sample. The purpose of

Study 3.3 was to replicate the previous results and to show that discrepancy predicts identification while controlling for endorsement of feminist values. Therefore, in this study participants were asked to indicate their agreement to three feminist values.

## **Method**

**Participants.** Participants were recruited on Amazon MTurk and participated in return for \$0.45. In total, 116 adult female United States citizens ( $M_{age} = 35.3$  years,  $SD = 10.6$  years) completed all study materials. This sample size gives us 68% power to find the posteriori smallest effect ( $R^2 = .07$ ; G\*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009).

### **Materials.**

**Predictor measures.** Materials were identical to those presented in Study 3.1 and 3.2 and the reliability was also comparable: Warmth ( $\alpha_{feminist} = .86$ ;  $\alpha_{self} = .75$ ), Competence ( $\alpha_{feminist} = .77$ ;  $\alpha_{self} = .74$ ). In addition we measured endorsement of feminist values by means of the 3 items of the Feminist Beliefs and Behavior measure (Zucker, 2004; Fitz et al., 2012; “Women and men should be paid equally for the same work”, “Women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued”, “Girls and women have not been treated as well as boys and men in our society”).

**Dependent measures.** Participants completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist scale ( $\alpha = .92$ ; Szymanski, 2004). The mean identification with feminism score was 2.73 ( $SD = 1.05$ ).

**Procedure.** Participants first rated their “general impression of feminists” on the 20 traits. All items were administered in random order. After completing these items, participants indicated for the same items how they rated themselves, also in random order. Then, participants completed the self-identification as a feminist scale and filled in the endorsement of feminist values questionnaire.

## Results

**Warmth.** Of the 116 women, 27 (23.3%) saw themselves as less warm than feminists, 10 (8.6%) saw themselves as equally warm, and 77 (66.4%) saw themselves as warmer than feminists. The mean warmth score for feminists was 2.76 ( $SD = 0.79$ ), for the self-ratings the mean warmth score was 3.41 ( $SD = 0.65$ ), and the mean difference score was -0.65 ( $SD = 0.94$ ).

The overall model was significant,  $F(3, 110) = 18.48, p < .001$ , and explained 34% of the variance. Similar to the results found in Study 3.1 and 3.2, the direction of the discrepancy between Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = 0.69, SE = 0.15, \beta = .56, t(110) = 4.54, p < .001$ . The magnitude of that discrepancy was not a significant predictor,  $B = 0.13, SE = 0.27, \beta = .09, t(110) = 0.49, p = .63$ . As expected and as in Study 3.1 and 3.2, these results were qualified by a significant interaction between magnitude and direction in predicting identification with feminism,  $B = 0.65, SE = 0.29, \beta = .39, t(110) = 2.26, p = .03$ .

A simple slopes analysis shows that, for women who saw feminists as less warm than themselves (Self-Warmth higher than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was a significant negative relationship between discrepancy magnitude on identification with feminism,  $B = -0.51, SE = 0.14, \beta = -.36, t(110) = -3.79, p < .001$ . But, for those women who saw feminists as warmer than themselves (Self-Warmth lower than Feminist-Warmth ratings), there was a marginal relationship between discrepancy magnitude on identification with feminism,  $B = 0.88, SE = 0.45, \beta = .61, t(110) = 1.95, p = .05$ .

Endorsement of feminist values was added to the model and accounted for an additional 6.6% of the variance,  $\Delta R^2 = .07, \Delta F(1, 109) = 12.07, p = .001; B = 1.22, SE = 0.35, \beta = .27, t(109) = 3.48, p = .001$ . Magnitude of the discrepancy between

Feminist-Warmth ratings and Self-Warmth ratings was again not a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = 0.18$ ,  $SE = 0.26$ ,  $\beta = -.12$ ,  $t(109) = 0.67$ ,  $p = .50$ . More importantly, the effect of discrepancy direction on identification with feminism remained significant,  $B = 0.66$ ,  $SE = 0.15$ ,  $\beta = .53$ ,  $t(109) = 4.52$ ,  $p < .001$ , and the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy on identification with feminism turned marginally significant,  $B = 0.56$ ,  $SE = 0.28$ ,  $\beta = .33$ ,  $t(109) = 2.02$ ,  $p = .05$ .

**Competence.** Of the 116 women, 83 (71.6%) saw themselves as less competent than feminists, 6 (5.2%) saw themselves as equally competent, and 25 (21.6%) saw themselves as more competent than feminists. The mean competence score for feminists was 3.96 ( $SD = 0.63$ ), for the self-ratings the mean competence score was 3.39 ( $SD = 0.69$ ), and the mean difference score was 0.57 ( $SD = 0.86$ ).

The overall model was again significant,  $F(3, 110) = 2.92$ ,  $p = .04$ , and explained 7% of the variance. Unexpectedly and in contrast to the results found in Study 3.1 and 3.2, magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was not a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = -0.45$ ,  $SE = 0.24$ ,  $\beta = -.27$ ,  $t(110) = -1.92$ ,  $p = .06$ . There was an effect of discrepancy direction on identification with feminism,  $B = 0.36$ ,  $SE = 0.13$ ,  $\beta = .28$ ,  $t(110) = 2.71$ ,  $p = .008$ , as such that women who see feminists as more competent than themselves are more likely to identify than women who see themselves as more competent than feminists. There was no relationship between the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy and identification with feminism,  $B = 0.21$ ,  $SE = 0.25$ ,  $\beta = .11$ ,  $t(110) = 0.83$ ,  $p = .41$ .

Endorsement of feminist values was added to the model and accounted for an additional 17.1% of the variance,  $\Delta R^2 = .17$ ,  $\Delta F(1, 109) = 24.60$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  $B = 1.96$ ,  $SE = 0.40$ ,  $\beta = .44$ ,  $t(109) = 4.96$ ,  $p < .001$ . Magnitude of the discrepancy between Feminist-Competence ratings and Self-Competence ratings was again not a

significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = -0.35$ ,  $SE = 0.22$ ,  $\beta = -.20$ ,  $t(109) = -1.61$ ,  $p = .11$ , and there was again no relationship between the interaction of magnitude and discrepancy on identification with feminism,  $B = -0.13$ ,  $SE = 0.24$ ,  $\beta = -.07$ ,  $t(109) = -0.56$ ,  $p = .58$ . The effect of discrepancy direction on identification with feminism remained significant,  $B = 0.28$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $\beta = .22$ ,  $t(109) = 2.35$ ,  $p = .02$ .

## **Discussion**

In summary, these results replicate Study 3.1 and 3.2 by showing that women identify less with feminists if they see feminists as less warm than themselves. However, in this study we find that women identify more as a feminist if they see feminists as more competent than themselves. In addition, endorsement of feminist values significantly predicted identification with feminism, but discrepancy predicted feminist identification even when statistically controlling for endorsement of feminist values. These results provide evidence that self-feminist discrepancy has predictive power, above and beyond feminist values alone, in understanding identification with feminism.

## **General Discussion**

Three studies supported the hypothesis that greater discrepancy between women's self-view and feminist-view on two dimensions—warmth and competence—is related to weaker identification with feminism. For the warmth dimension, the direction of the discrepancy plays an important moderating role. More specifically, the magnitude of self-feminist discrepancy predicts identification with feminism for those women who see feminists as being less warm than the self, but not for women who see feminists as being warmer than the self. For competence, only the magnitude of the discrepancy predicts identification with feminism and the direction of the discrepancy is irrelevant; women identify less with feminism to the extent that they see themselves as differently competent than feminists, regardless whether that is

more *or* less competent than feminists.

In all studies the explained variance was larger for the discrepancy between women's self-views and feminist views of warmth (17%, 28%, and 34% in Studies 3.1-3.3, respectively) than for the discrepancy of competence (3%, 4%, and 7%, respectively). This difference in explained variance is most likely due to the fact that whereas warmth is seen as unequivocally positive trait for women, competence is more ambivalent. Thus whereas it is very clear for women that they should not want to identify with feminists who for them are lacking warmth, differences in competence have more ambiguous implications. This also suggests that interventions targeting stereotypes of feminists as being cold can be particularly effective. Not only will they avoid the risk of backfiring—as might be the case for competence, given that women may not identify as feminists if they see feminists as too competent—but also will these interventions based on warmth be likely to produce the strongest effect.

Developing such interventions to increase identification with feminism can be very helpful for women—both as individuals and as a collective. It can improve outcomes for women collectively, given that identification as a feminist can also lead to individuals' willingness to engage in collective action and seek to improve the status of women (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). At the individual level, identification with feminism is important because it is related to a variety of positive outcomes. Women who self-identify as feminists experience higher personal self-efficacy than women who do not—even if they do endorse feminist attitudes (Eisele & Stake, 2008). They also have better coping responses, such as seeking social support when confronted with sexism or sexual harassment (Leaper & Arias, 2011), they have better psychological well-being (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006), and they experience less body shame, engage less in body surveillance, show less symptoms of depression, and enjoy higher self-esteem (Hurt et al., 2007).

Finally, self-reported feminist identification positively predicts relationship health, relationship stability, and sexual satisfaction among women and among men with feminist partners (Backus & Mahalik, 2011; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Yoder et al., 2007). In sum, we believe it is important to increase identification with feminism and feel that the current results, that help to get a better understanding of the psychological dynamic behind identification with feminism, are important.

The results of Study 3.3 also show that the discrepancy between women's self-views and feminist views predicts identification with feminism while controlling for endorsement of feminist values. Feminist values are certainly an important piece of feminist identification, explaining 6.6% (warmth) and 17.1% (competence) of the variance in identification with feminism. Endorsement of feminist values is related to greater identification with feminism. However, discrepancy between self-ratings and feminist-ratings is important above and beyond feminist values, predicting an additional 7% (competence) and 34% (warmth) in the variance in identification with feminism. Study 3.3 shows that there are different pieces of the puzzle why women do not identify with feminism: Both endorsement of feminist values and discrepancy between self-ratings and feminist-ratings are important in predicting identification with feminism. We believe these two predictors may tap into different components of social identification (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). On the one hand there is the reasoned and cold cognitive explanation about perceived disagreement on the values that feminism endorses. On the other hand there is the hot emotional explanation about discrepancy between one's self-views and one's feminist views that is based on people's feelings. These two components work together to predict identification with feminism.

Based on our findings, we believe that future research should examine how the changing status of feminists influences women's identification with feminism. Prior

research shows that the status of the group is important in identification (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers et al., 1997), such that people are more likely to identify with higher-status groups than lower-status groups. In contemporary society, feminists are generally viewed as a low status group (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Robnett et al., 2012). It is possible that this low status explains, in part, why women do not identify (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). However, as more and more high-status women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014), the status of the group could rise. And if group status of feminists is rising, women should have more positive evaluations of the group, leading to greater identification.

Purely theoretically, feminism is an interesting group to study because it is ambivalent—women might endorse gender equality but feel that the stereotype of feminists does not fit them. We might expect that the same process would be at work with other such ambivalent groups. For example, someone might have a favorable attitude toward science, but only identify as a scientist—and possibly only choose a science-oriented career—if there is little discrepancy between their self-views and their view of scientists. Future research could explore this idea that, to the extent that one is ambivalent toward a group, the discrepancy between self-views and group-views will predict identification.

## **Conclusion**

The present chapter demonstrates that women's self-view is an important factor in predicting identification with feminism and one that explains more variance than purely endorsement with feminist values. Specifically, the discrepancy between women's self-view and women's view of feminists strongly predicts their identification with feminists, so that women identify more with feminists if they see

feminists as warmer or as similarly competent than themselves. These findings are important in understanding why some women fail to identify with feminists and— even more importantly—how that can be changed.



# CHAPTER 4

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## Motivated independence and feminist self-labeling

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Motivated Independence and Feminist Self-labeling. *Unpublished manuscript.*

Many women who have feminist beliefs do not explicitly identify as feminists (Burn et al., 2000; Robnett et al., 2012). This reluctance is problematic because identification with feminism is crucial for engaging in collective action to achieve progress toward gender equality (Ellemers et al., 1997; Kelly, 1993; Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Nelson et al., 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Yoder et al., 2011). In addition, identification with feminism can have beneficial individual effects for women, such as greater relationship health, stability, and sexual satisfaction (Rudman & Phelan, 2007), better mechanisms for coping with sexism (Leaper & Arias, 2011), and higher self-efficacy (Eisele & Stake, 2008). It is therefore important to understand why women are so reluctant to identify themselves as feminists. In the current chapter, we explore one reason why women may make a deliberate choice not to identify as a feminist—because labeling themselves restricts their view of themselves as an independent actor.

This idea is inspired by the notion of motivated independence, which has been used in political science to explain why so many voters are unwilling to explicitly identify with a single party (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2010; Wattenberg, 1981). Motivated independence is the notion that some people want to be independent actors: They value individualism and objectivity, do not want to be constrained by groups or social movements, and want to be seen as independent thinkers rather than making their judgments based on group membership (Dennis, 1988b; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). Around 34-40% of the American voters do not identify with either the Democratic or the Republican Party (or a third party), but instead call themselves independents (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). These independent voters are, in fact, motivated to be independent; it is not merely that they do not consider themselves Republican or Democrat, but they make a deliberate choice to identify as independent. For example, over two thirds of these voters agree with

statements that they “do not like to label themselves”, “are independent by nature”, and “prefer to think for themselves” (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012) and they overtly self-identify as an independent because they positively identify themselves with the “citizenly ideal of independence” (Dennis, 1988a).

The strive to become autonomous and to exercise free will is growing and people want responsibility across all kinds of contexts of life—not merely in politics (Dennis, 1988b). These feelings of motivated independence may be further strengthened by the fact that, in Western cultures, individualism is seen as a sign of success, emancipative values are encouraged (Hofstede et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010), and objectivity and independence are valued (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). We propose that, in general, identification with a group—as for instance feminists—violates feelings of independence and individualism. The motivation to be independent in combination with this violation will, as a result, lead to people disidentifying with feminism.

In this chapter, we thus propose that the desire for motivated independence might hold not only for disidentification with political parties, but also for disidentification with feminism. When female celebrities are asked about feminism, their answers often imply such motivated independence: For example, Beyoncé said (before she declared herself a feminist at the VMA 2014): “Why do you have to choose what type of woman you are? Why do you have to label yourself anything?” (Sheridan, 2013) and Carrie Underwood said: “I wouldn’t go so far as to say I am a feminist, [...]. My parents raised me to be pretty independent.” (Bang Showbiz, 2012). The only female CEO of a Dutch stock market listed company also states: “I don’t believe in labeling. [...] I see myself as me.” (Bijlsma, 2014). Empirical evidence for this idea of motivated independence is also found in the analysis of qualitative interviews about identification with feminism in which participants showed a general

unwillingness to label themselves (e.g. “I’m not a big labels person”; Suter & Toller, 2006). In addition, women who do not label themselves a feminist but do endorse feminist values tend to endorse more individualistic values than women who do label themselves feminist (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007).

Importantly, feminism has led to the empowerment of women in which empowerment is defined as “a process by which individuals with lesser power gain control over their lives and influence the organizational and societal structures within which they live” (Segal, Silverman, & Temkin, 1995, p. 215). Women have increased self-esteem, self-efficacy, and power and control over resources (Bay-Cheng, 2012; Peterson, Grippo, & Tantleff-Dunn, 2008; Riger, 1993). This road to economic independence might also lead to feelings of motivated independence because women do not want to be seen as part of group but as an individual that can pull her own weight. The positive consequences of feminism—women getting empowered and becoming economically independent—can have the ironic result of women identifying less with feminism *just because* they are motivated to be independent. This idea is supported by research showing that feelings of power increase the feelings of self-sufficiency (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012).

Further inspiration for the idea that motivated independence might occur with feminism comes from the literature on social identity. The idea of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1974) is that an individual’s self-concept is based on the groups that the individual belongs to and on the knowledge, attitudes, value, and emotions that go with that group membership. Regarding feminism, labeling oneself as part of a larger collective stresses group membership—feminist—at the expense of individual identity—me—which can have positive effects on self-esteem (Tajfel, 1974). If, however, individual identity—*independence*—is valued more than collective identity—*feminism*—, then identifying with a group does not bring any positive self-esteem and

hence, self-labeling will be reduced (see also Green (2004) for social identity in relation to political independents).

Finally, the relation between motivated independence and identifying as a feminist is driven by the literature on psychological reactance. Psychological reactance is an aversive state experienced as a result of the perception that one's freedom and autonomy are being constrained (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Women eschew the feminist label (Suter & Toller, 2006) because they feel that labeling themselves as a feminist limits their individual freedom. This reasoning is strengthened by the idea that when identifying with a certain group you have to behave according to the social norms of that group (Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

To sum up, we expect that women's motivation to be independent is negatively related to identification with feminism, and that an increase in motivated independence is related to less feminist identification. Study 4.1 examines reasons for not identifying with feminism among Dutch students who state that they are not feminists, showing that motivated independence is an important reason for not identifying. Study 4.2 replicates these results and further supports this idea with analyses of motivated independence predicting the extent of feminist identification as a continuous variable. Study 4.3 uses an experimental design in which independence is manipulated and identification with feminism and agreement with a feminist message is measured.

### **Study 4.1: Motivated Independence**

Before testing the underlying mechanism or the model to explain a phenomenon, it is central to give a description of the properties of a phenomenon (Rozin, 2001) and thus explaining the functional relationship between variables is valuable in itself (Rozin, 2009). In Study 4.1 we therefore merely measured whether

people identified as a feminist and what the reasons were if they did not identify as a feminist. We hypothesized that motivated independence would be an important reason—the reason that would be endorsed most—to not identify as a feminist. In addition, we measured three other potential reasons for not identifying with feminism: perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity toward feminism and feminists, and potential for social rejection.

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Dutch participants were recruited on Facebook and participated voluntarily. As many participants as possible were recruited in the period of one week. In total 153 participants completed the survey. Of those, 114 participants (43 male, 71 female,  $M_{age} = 33.4$ ,  $SD = 17.5$ ) indicated that they did not identify as a feminist and therefore completed the statements about not identifying as a feminist.

**Materials and procedure.** Participants were first asked whether they self-identified as a feminist. Participants who did not identify were asked to rate 34 statements on a five-point-scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) about why they were not willing to identify as a feminist (adapted from earlier studies; Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Hall & Rodriguez, 2003; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Liss & Erchull, 2010; Riley & Scharff, 2012; Roy et al., 2007; Suter & Toller, 2006; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). The underlying structure of the 34 statements was analyzed with a factor analysis with Varimax rotation. Four factors (with Eigen values > 2) were identified as underlying the used traits and accounted for 45.0% of the variance. Reliability analyses showed four reliable scales with a total of 18 items.<sup>4</sup> Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.1.

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<sup>4</sup> The other sixteen items were dropped from the analyses due to lack of inter correlation with other scale items.

Table 4.1

*Descriptive statistics in Study 4.1*

	M (SD)
Motivated independence	
I'd rather think for myself than support the beliefs of an ideology-based group	3.89 (1.05)
I find it more important to be independent than to belong to an ideology-based group	3.75 (0.92)
I do not want to commit myself to a certain belief	3.61 (1.08)
It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed (being labeled or categorized)	3.61 (1.07)
I dislike ideology-based groups in general	2.85 (0.94)
Negativity toward feminism and feminists	
I see feminists as a group of women who are unable to solve their own personal problems	2.73 (1.26)
I dislike feminists	2.39 (1.16)
I dislike feminism	2.35 (1.12)
I am offended when someone calls me a feminist	2.76 (1.14)
Perceived disagreement with feminist values	
Feminism beliefs are too extreme for me	3.50 (0.98)
Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs	3.49 (0.97)
Feminists are trying too hard to be right	3.59 (1.05)
Feminism won't help me in achieving equal rights	3.28 (1.02)
I disagree with what feminism stands for	2.86 (0.98)
I think feminism focuses too much on women	3.55 (1.09)
Potential for social rejection	
Society has a negative image of feminism	2.07 (0.90)
I do not want others to know that I am a feminist	2.21 (0.94)
Feminism is not consistent with my lifestyle	2.58 (0.99)
	M (SD)
Motivated independence	3.54 (0.65)
Negativity toward feminism and feminists	2.55 (0.99)
Perceived disagreement with feminist values	3.38 (0.69)
Potential for social rejection	2.29 (0.71)

Note. 1= *strongly disagree* to 5= *strongly agree*

**Motivated independence.** The motivated independence scale consisted of five reasons ( $\alpha = .65$ ) based on Hawkins and Nosek (2012): “I’d rather think for myself than support the beliefs of an ideology-based group”, “I find it more important to be independent than to belong to an ideology-based group”, “I do not want to commit myself to a certain belief”, “It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed (being labeled or categorized)”, and “I dislike ideology-based groups in general”.

**Negativity toward feminism and feminists.** The negativity toward feminism and feminists scale consisted of four reasons ( $\alpha = .86$ ; “I see feminists as a group of women who are unable to solve their own personal problems”, “I dislike feminists”, “I dislike feminism”, “I am offended when someone calls me a feminist”).

**Perceived disagreement with feminist values.** The perceived disagreement with feminist values scale consisted of six reasons ( $\alpha = .77$ ; “Feminism beliefs are too extreme for me”, “Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs”, “Feminists are trying too hard to be right”, “Feminism won’t help me in achieving equal rights”, “I disagree with what feminism stands for”, and “I think feminism focuses too much on women”).

**Potential for social rejection.** The potential for social rejection scale consisted of three reasons ( $\alpha = .62$ ; “Society has a negative image of feminism”, “I do not want others to know that I am a feminist”, and “Feminism is not consistent with my lifestyle”).

## Results

A repeated measures ANOVA with the four reasons as a within subject factor and participant gender as between subject factor showed that there were significant differences in the endorsement of these reasons, Wilks’ Lambda = .31,  $F(3, 110) = 81.43$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .69$ , and an interaction of the endorsement of reasons and participant gender, Wilks’ Lambda = .90,  $F(3,110) = 4.01$ ,  $p = .009$ ,  $\eta^2 = .10$ . To better understand the differences between endorsement of the reasons, paired sample  $t$ -tests compared motivated independence to the other three reasons, separately for men and women.

For male participants, motivated independence ( $M = 3.62$ ,  $SD = 0.71$ ) was seen as a more important reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward feminism and feminists, ( $M = 3.01$ ,  $SD = 0.97$ ),  $t(42) = 3.08$ ,  $p = .004$ , Cohen’s  $d =$

0.95, or potential for social rejection ( $M = 2.35$ ,  $SD = 0.84$ ),  $t(42) = 7.24$ ,  $p < .01$ , Cohen's  $d = 2.23$ . Motivated independence was an equally important reason for not identifying with feminism as perceived disagreement with feminist values ( $M = 3.58$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ),  $t(42) = 0.29$ ,  $p = .77$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.09$ . For female participants, motivated independence ( $M = 3.49$ ,  $SD = 0.62$ ) was seen as a more important reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward feminism and feminists ( $M = 2.28$ ,  $SD = 0.89$ ),  $t(70) = 10.38$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 2.48$ , potential for social rejection, ( $M = 2.25$ ,  $SD = 0.62$ ),  $t(70) = 11.45$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 2.74$ , or perceived disagreement with feminist values ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 0.69$ ),  $t(70) = 2.53$ ,  $p = .01$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.60$ .

Study 4.1 showed that both men and women indicate that motivated independence is an important factor in the decision to not identify with feminism; moreover, for women, it is a more important factor than negativity towards feminism and feminists, than potential for social rejection, and than perceived disagreement with feminist values.

### **Study 4.2: Motivated Independence predicts Feminist Labeling**

Study 4.2 is a replication of Study 4.1 (that were found in a Dutch sample) using a US sample instead. In Study 4.1, we simply examined reasons for disidentification among people who stated that they do not identify with feminism. In Study 4.2, we perform that same analysis, but also include a continuous measure of the extent of feminist identification. For the latter measure, we expect that motivated independence will predict the extent of identification with feminism even while controlling for endorsement of the other three reasons.

### **Method**

**Participants and design.** Participants were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. In total 307 participants (197 male, 111

female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 31.4$ ,  $SD = 9.5$ ) completed the statements about identifying as a feminist.

**Materials and procedure.** Materials and procedures were the same as in Study 4.1 except that the statements were translated into English and a seven-point scale was used in the reasons endorsement items. Participants were asked to rate the four scales with the 18 statements from Study 4.1 as reasons why they did or did not identify as feminist: Motivated independence ( $\alpha = .82$ ), negativity toward feminism and feminists ( $\alpha = .90$ ), perceived disagreement with feminist values ( $\alpha = .93$ ), and potential for social rejection ( $\alpha = .48$ ). Finally, all participants completed the Self-Identification as a Feminist (SIF) scale ( $\alpha = .95$ ; Szymanski, 2004), which consists of four items (“I consider myself a feminist”; “I identify myself as a feminist to other people”; “feminist values and principles are important to me”; “I support the goals of the feminist movement”) rated on a five-point-scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

## Results

**Reasons.** Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2. A repeated measures ANOVA on the four reasons as within subjects factor and participant gender as between subjects factor showed again that there were significant differences in the endorsement of these reasons, Wilks' Lambda = .44,  $F(3, 300) = 136.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .56$ , and an interaction effect between the endorsement of reasons and participant gender, Wilks' Lambda = .92,  $F(3, 300) = 8.87$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .08$ . To better understand the differences between endorsement of the reasons, paired sample *t*-tests again compared motivated independence to the other three reasons, separately for men and women.

For male participants, motivated independence ( $M = 4.78$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ) was seen as a more important reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward

Table 4.2

*Descriptive statistics in Study 4.2*

	M (SD)
Motivated independence	
I'd rather think for myself than support the beliefs of an ideology-based group	5.45 (1.23)
I find it more important to be independent than to belong to an ideology-based group	5.43 (1.28)
I do not want to commit myself to a certain belief	4.45 (1.56)
It is natural for me to resist being pigeonholed (being labeled or categorized)	5.12 (1.34)
I dislike ideology-based groups in general	4.68 (1.48)
Negativity toward feminism and feminists	
I see feminists as a group of women who are unable to solve their own personal problems	3.63 (1.77)
I dislike feminists	3.55 (1.71)
I dislike feminism	3.85 (1.71)
I am offended when someone calls me a feminist	3.69 (1.74)
Perceived disagreement with feminist values	
Feminism beliefs are too extreme for me	4.79 (1.72)
Feminism does not adequately reflect my beliefs	4.93 (1.47)
Feminists are trying too hard to be right	4.60 (1.69)
Feminism won't help me in achieving equal rights	4.83 (1.50)
I disagree with what feminism stands for	3.73 (1.67)
I think feminism focuses too much on women	4.22 (1.75)
Potential for social rejection	
Society has a negative image of feminism	4.84 (1.36)
I do not want others to know that I am a feminist	3.28 (1.56)
Feminism is not consistent with my lifestyle	4.88 (1.58)
	M (SD)
Motivated independence	5.02 (0.96)
Negativity toward feminism and feminists	3.68 (1.43)
Perceived disagreement with feminist values	4.52 (1.28)
Potential for social rejection	4.33 (1.08)

*Note.* 1= *strongly disagree* to 7= *strongly agree*

feminism and feminists ( $M = 3.37$ ,  $SD = 1.51$ ),  $t(195) = 14.06$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 2.01$ , than perceived disagreement with feminist values ( $M = 4.15$ ,  $SD = 1.50$ ),  $t(195) = 6.56$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.94$ , and than potential for social rejection ( $M =$

4.09,  $SD = 1.17$ ),  $t(195) = 8.62$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.23$ . For female participants, motivated independence ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ) was also seen as a more important reason for not identifying with feminism than negativity toward feminism and feminists, ( $M = 2.73$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ),  $t(108) = 11.99$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 2.31$ , than perceived disagreement with feminist values ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ),  $t(108) = 8.77$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.69$ , and than potential for social rejection ( $M = 3.87$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ),  $t(108) = 4.93$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.95$ .

**Identification.** We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with identification with feminism as the outcome. The predictors were participant gender, motivated independence, negativity toward feminism and feminists, perceived disagreement with feminist values, potential for social rejection (the four factors), and interactions between each of the four factors and participant gender (nine total predictors). In Step 1 participant gender, perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity towards feminism and feminists, potential for social rejection, and the three interaction terms of these three factors with participant gender were entered in the model (seven predictors). The overall model was significant,  $F(7, 302) = 58.05$ ,  $p < .001$ , and explained 57.9% of the variance in identification with feminism.

Participant gender was a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = 0.80$ ,  $SE = 0.35$ ,  $\beta = .33$ ,  $t(302) = 2.30$ ,  $p = .02$ , perceived disagreement with feminist values also predicted identification with feminism,  $B = -0.47$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $\beta = -.66$ ,  $t(302) = -6.80$ ,  $p < .001$ , and the interaction term between participant gender and perceived disagreement with feminist values was also significant,  $B = -0.26$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $\beta = -.41$ ,  $t(302) = -2.17$ ,  $p = .03$ . There were no other significant effects,  $p > .34$ . Simple slope analyses showed that for both male participants,  $B = -0.43$ ,  $SE = 0.04$ ,  $\beta = -.59$ ,  $t(302) = -11.70$ ,  $p < .001$ , and female participants,  $B = -0.65$ ,  $SE = 0.04$ ,  $\beta = -$

.90,  $t(302) = -14.72, p < .001$ , the relation of perceived disagreement with feminist values and identification with feminism was significant, but it was stronger for female participants. For both genders there was a negative relationship indicating that more perceived disagreement with feminist values was related to less identification with feminism.

In Step 2 motivated independence and the interaction term of motivated independence and participant gender were added to the model (nine predictors). The overall model was significant,  $F(9, 302) = 53.84, p < .001$ , and the addition of motivated independence explained 4.4% of the variance in identification with feminism,  $\Delta F(2, 293) = 17.03, p < .001$ . Consistent with the hypothesis, motivated independence was a significant predictor of identification with feminism,  $B = -0.31, SE = 0.06, \beta = -.32, t(302) = -5.51, p < .001$ , and there was no interaction of motivated independence and participant gender,  $B = 0.17, SE = 0.09, \beta = .33, t(302) = 1.89, p = .06$ . The relation of participant gender and identification with feminism turned not significant,  $B = 0.22, SE = 0.39, \beta = .09, t(302) = 0.58, p = .57$ , whereas the other relations remained the same. The negative relationship between motivated independence and identification with feminism indicates that for both men and women an increase in feelings of motivated independence is related to a decrease in identification with feminism.

### **Study 4.3: Manipulating Motivated Independence**

Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 show us that both men and women experience motivated independence as an important reason in the decision to not identify with feminism. Motivated independence was seen as a more important factor than negativity towards feminism and feminists, than potential for social rejection, and than perceived disagreement with feminist values. Moreover, Study 4.2 found that

motivated independence predicts identification with feminism for both men and women even while controlling for endorsement of these other three reasons.

The purpose of Study 4.3 was to manipulate feelings of independence to determine its causal effect on identification with feminism and agreement with the feminist message. To do that, participants recalled a situation in which they were independent of others and/or had control over others. To test whether feelings of independence did not lead to disagreement in general—that is, disagreeing with every message participants read—we manipulated whether participants read a feminist message (career is important and should be pursued) or whether they read a non-feminist message (family is important and should be pursued) that was relevant to our target sample that were Dutch university students. Based on the relation between independence and identification with feminism from Studies 4.1 and 4.2, we hypothesize that women with an independent mindset would identify less with feminism. In addition, we expect them to in particular disagree with a feminist message compared to the non-feminist message.

In addition to manipulating disagreement with a feminist or non-feminist message, we also measured disagreement in two other ways: Reactance towards persuasive messages in general and trait psychological reactance. We expected that women with an independent mindset would not show more reactance towards persuasive messages and not show more psychological reactance in general—but that the effect would be specific for feminist messages.

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** Two hundred and twenty five participants (154 women and 71 men,  $M_{\text{age}} = 20.6$  years,  $SD = 3.0$  years) were recruited on the Tilburg University campus and participated in return for course credit or 5 Euros.

Participants were randomly assigned across the conditions of a 2 (Mindset:

Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) between-participants design with participant gender as an extra factor.

### **Materials.**

**Manipulations.** To manipulate motivated independence, participants completed a recall task in which they either recalled *a situation in which they were independent of others and/or had control over others* (independent mindset condition) or *a situation in which they were dependent of others and/or were controlled by others* (dependent mindset condition). This manipulation was based on the power recall manipulation by Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003), but the word ‘power’ was omitted to match with our focus to solely manipulation motivated independence.

To manipulate the type of message participants received, participants either read a short scenario describing a recent poll showing either that parents find it important that their children *raise a happy family and that raising a family should be pursued in life* (non-feminist message type condition) or that parents find it important that their children *have successful careers and that a successful career should be pursued in life* (feminist message type condition). We modeled these messages on work by Inesi and Rios (2013) who found that power in particular increases reactance towards close significant others, such as parents.

### **Measures.**

**Disagreement.** Disagreement was measured with two items; one of those items varied between the message type conditions and the other was the same in both message type conditions. Participants who read the non-feminist message were asked “To what extent to you also want a family?”. Participants who read the feminist message were asked “To what extent to you also want a career?”. Participants in both message conditions were asked “To what extent to you want to do other things in

your life?”. To analyze the extent to which participants showed disagreement we calculated the difference score between whether they also wanted a career or family and whether they wanted to do other things in life by subtracting the first score from the latter: Positive scores on this measure indicate that participants disagree with the message given (and thus want something else in life), whereas negative scores on this measure indicated that participants agree with the message given (and thus also want either a career or family).

*Identification with feminism.* The Self-Identification as a Feminist (SIF) scale from Study 4.2 was administered ( $\alpha = .85$ ; Szymanski, 2004).

*Reactance towards persuasive messages.* Then, participants completed the reactance towards persuasive messages scale to measure whether they felt reactance towards our specific message ( $\alpha = .85$ ; Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & Tutzauer, 2007). It consists of four items and was adapted towards our specific message (“I feel uncomfortable when/I do not like it when/I feel irritated when/I dislike that I am being told how to feel about the future”).

*Trait psychological reactance.* Participants also completed the 12 items of Hong’s trait psychological reactance scale that measures psychological reactance in general ( $\alpha = .84$ ; Hong & Faedda, 1996; e.g., “Advice and recommendations induce me to do just the opposite”).

*Manipulation check.* Finally, participants completed a 6 item manipulation check to test how independent or dependent they felt in the situation that they had to recall in the recall task ( $\alpha = .92$ ; “I felt independent/ in control/ being a leader/ dependent [reversed]/ unimportant [reversed]/ subordinate [reversed]”).

**Procedure.** Participants first recalled a situation in which they felt independent or dependent. Then, depending on condition they either received a feminist message or a non-feminist message. Finally, they completed all measures in

a fixed order: disagreement, feminist identification, reactance towards persuasive messages, trait psychological reactance, and the manipulation check.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) X 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on the manipulation check found, as expected, a main effect of mindset,  $F(1, 217) = 174.11, p < .001, \eta^2 = .45$ , in which participants who recalled a situation in which they felt independent ( $M = 5.46, SD = 0.82$ ) felt more independent than participants who recalled a situation in which they felt dependent ( $M = 3.34, SD = 1.31$ ). There were no other significant effects,  $p > .09$ .

**Disagreement.** A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) X 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on the difference score showed a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 217) = 6.83, p = .01, \eta^2 = .03$ , and an interaction effect between message type and participant gender,  $F(1, 217) = 6.18, p = .01, \eta^2 = .03$ . Female participants who read the feminist message disagreed more with the message ( $M = -0.92, SD = 1.63; p = .001$ ) than female participants who read the non-feminist message ( $M = -2.04, SD = 2.05$ ). Male participants did not differ in disagreement whether they read the non-feminist message ( $M = -0.54, SD = 2.61$ ) or the feminist message ( $M = -0.88, SD = 1.64; p = .51$ ).

The expected three way interaction between mindset, message type, and participant gender was not significant,  $F(1,217) = 2.38, p = .13, \eta^2 = .01$ . For exploratory purposes, simple effects were performed: Female participants who recalled a situation in which they felt independent disagreed more with the a feminist message ( $M = -0.80, SD = 1.62$ ) than with the non-feminist message ( $M = -2.40, SD = 1.69$ ),  $t(73) = -4.16, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.97$ . This difference in disagreement with

the message was not found for female participants who recalled a situation in which they felt dependent,  $t(77) = -1.37, p = .18$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.31$ , and also not for male participants regardless whether they recalled a situation in which they felt independent,  $t(36) = 0.82, p = .42$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.27$ , or dependent,  $t(31) = -0.12, p = .90$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.04$ . There were no other significant effects,  $p > .16$ .

**Identification with feminism.** A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) X 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on identification with feminism found a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 217) = 42.23, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16$ , and an interaction effect of participant gender and mindset,  $F(1, 217) = 3.98, p = .05, \eta^2 = .02$ .

When participants who recalled a situation in which they felt independent, female participants identified more with feminism ( $M = 2.98, SD = 0.82$ ) than did male participants ( $M = 2.47, SD = 0.88; p = .001, \eta^2 = .05$ ). However, when they recalled a situation in which they felt dependent, this effect was much larger with the effect size almost tripling and female participants identified even more with feminism ( $M = 3.12, SD = 0.71$ ) than male participants ( $M = 2.14, SD = 0.77; p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$ ).

Crucially, we did not find that female participants in an independent mindset identified less with feminism ( $M = 2.98, SD = 0.82$ ) than female participants in a dependent mindset ( $M = 3.12, SD = 0.71; t(146.36) = 1.13, p = .26$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.19$ ). Male participants in an independent mindset ( $M = 2.47, SD = 0.88$ ) did not differ from male participants in a dependent mindset ( $M = 2.14, SD = 0.77; t(69) = -1.67, p = .10$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.40$ ). There were no other significant effects,  $p > .39$ .

**Reactance towards persuasive messages.** A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) X 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on reactance towards the message found only an interaction effect of participant gender and message type,  $F(1, 217) = 5.39, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$ .

Female participants who read the feminist message ( $M = 4.85$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ;  $p = .02$ ) showed more reactance towards the persuasive messages than female participants who read the non-feminist message ( $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ). In contrast, there was no difference in reactance for male participants after reading the non-feminist message ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ) compared to the feminist message ( $M = 4.44$ ,  $SD = 1.16$ ;  $p = .22$ ). There were no other significant effects,  $p$ 's  $> .63$ .

**Trait psychological reactance.** A 2 (Mindset: Independent, Dependent) X 2 (Message Type: Feminist, Non-Feminist) X 2 (Participant Gender: Male, Female) ANOVA on reactance towards the message found a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 217) = 4.36$ ,  $p = .04$ ,  $\eta^2 = .02$ . In general, male participants ( $M = 4.14$ ,  $SD = 0.72$ ) showed more state psychological reactance than female participants ( $M = 3.90$ ,  $SD = 0.78$ ). There were no other significant effects,  $p > .22$ .

## Discussion

The results of Study 4.3 suggest that women with an independent mindset indeed disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-feminist message. Thus when women feel independent and read that they should pursue a career, they disagree more compared to when they read a message that they should pursue a family. This difference was not found for women who felt dependent and for male participants. In addition, as expected women with an independent mindset did not show more trait psychological reactance or reactance towards persuasive messages in general. Our hypothesis that women in an independent mindset would identify less with feminism was not supported.

## General Discussion

In this chapter we investigated whether motivated independence—defined as valuing individualism, not wanting to be constrained by groups or social movements, and wanting to be seen as an independent thinker rather than making judgments

based on group membership—was negatively related to identification with feminism. Studies 4.1 and 4.2 indeed found that both men and women experience motivated independence. In addition, Study 4.2 showed that this predicts identification with feminism: An increase in motivated independence is related to a decrease in identification with feminism. Finally, Study 4.3 showed that women in an independent mindset disagree more with a feminist message than with a non-feminist message.

These results suggest that men and women have the idea that being an independent actor and being a feminist are mutually exclusive concepts. In other words, they feel that women cannot be independent if they identify as a feminist and therefore identification with feminism is less likely to happen if independence is valued.

Notably, there were no gender differences in Studies 4.1 and 4.2; both men and women experienced motivated independence and for both genders it was a significant predictor of identification with feminism in Study 4.2. These results are in line with research showing that the unequal gender distribution among people who identify as political independents (Dennis, 1988a; Norrander, 1997) has in fact disappeared throughout the years (Pew Research Center, 2010). And because women have increased power and control over their lives (Bay-Cheng, 2012; Peterson et al., 2008; Riger, 1993), they might also be more likely to be motivated to be independent.

In contrast to Studies 4.1 and 4.2, gender differences were found in Study 4.3: In Study 4.3 we did not measure motivated independence as we did in Studies 4.1 and 4.2, but we manipulated it by means of a recall task. Furthermore, in Study 4.3 whether participants read a feminist—career should be pursued—or a non-feminist message—family should be pursued—was also manipulated. Only women with an independent mindset showed more disagreement with feminist messages than with

non-feminist messages. For men this message might cause less possibility for disagreement, because for male student participants pursuing a career might be the default option for their future. For female student participants, pursuing a career is probably not default and therefore, especially when feeling independent, they will disagree more with this feminist message.

Study 4.3 thus shows some evidence that the feelings of independence makes women disagree with feminist messages. However, this study does not yet test the idea that the positive consequences of feminism—women becoming independent—have the negative result of women identifying less with feminism. A future study should directly manipulate these positive feelings associated with feminism, for example by reminding women the progress that has been made possible by the women’s movement, and test whether this reminder increases feelings of motivated independence and decreases identification with feminism. Future research could also investigate whether non-identification with feminism increases over time, because women are expected to be and are actually becoming more economically independent than they were before (Council of the European Union, 2014).

Increases in power are not only related to feelings of self-sufficiency and distance towards others (Lammers et al., 2012; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Magee & Smith, 2013), but also to a decrease in affiliative motives (Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015). Because closeness to others and commonalities between yourself and others is important in social identification (Hogg, 2003), this increased social distance and decrease in affiliative motives could lead to women identifying less as part of a larger collective, for example feminists. Future research should investigate whether increases in feelings of independence indeed lead to less identification via the process of increased social distance and decreased affiliative motives.

Research on political independents has shown that identifying as a political independent does not necessarily result in negative feelings towards the political parties or political uninvolvedness (Dennis, 1988a; Miller & Wattenberg, 1983; Wattenberg, 1981). In fact, political independents often do have political preferences and their political engagement and voting behavior can be reliably predicted on the basis of these preferences (Dennis, 1988a; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Klar, 2014; Miller & Wattenberg, 1983). These results might indicate a less negative image of disidentification with feminism, because although women are not willing to identify as feminist, they might not be necessarily negative towards feminism or the women's movement and might still be willing to be involved in feminist issues.

Three studies show that motivated independence is an important reason to not identify with feminism. To increase identification with feminism among these men and women it is therefore important to emphasize that feminism and independence do not have to be related. In fact, neoliberal feminism that especially female celebrities promote states that feminism is mostly about choice for women and girls, about individual action, and about personal responsibility (Keller & Ringrose, 2015). Furthermore, more and more independent and strong women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014) and show that one can be independent and a feminist at the same time. Maybe these examples show to other women that independence and feminism are not mutually exclusive and that motivated independence does not necessarily have to lead to disidentification with feminism.





# CHAPTER 5

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## Perceptions of feminist beliefs influence ratings of warmth and competence

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This chapter is based on: Meijs, M. H. J., Ratliff, K. A., & Lammers, J. (2015b).

Perceptions of feminist beliefs influence ratings of warmth and competence.

*Unpublished manuscript.*

Imagine a woman who mentions that she is a feminist. Do others think she is warm? Do they think she is competent? Many studies have shown that feminists generally receive negative evaluations (Ramsey et al., 2007). More specifically, they are seen as aggressive, whiny, bitchy, and crazy (Houvouras & Carter, 2008). But is this evaluation due to negative associations with feminists as a group, or with the content of the feminist message? In other words, is the woman who labels herself a feminist judged as more negative than a woman who labels herself as someone who believes in gender equality? In this chapter, we suggest that she is and we ran six studies to test whether this may be the case.

There are multiple reasons to expect that a woman who labels herself a feminist will be seen as more negative than a woman who believes in gender equality who does not use the feminist self-label. A first reason to predict that adopting the feminist label would lead to negative evaluations is that feminists as a group are evaluated negatively (Robnett et al., 2012). Feminists are seen as complaining, as taking advantage of the possibility for discrimination (Roy et al., 2009), as being unattractive (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007) and as lesbian, bitchy, aggressive, and whiny (Houvouras & Carter, 2008). Also measured indirectly, people have been shown to implicitly associate feminists with negativity and masculinity (Jenen et al., 2009). Furthermore, it seems that the feminism label is perceived to be particularly damaging when it is adopted by women. For example, Anderson (2009) found that both men and women rated feminist women as less favorable, and as higher in masculinity, than non-feminist women (but see Breen & Karpinski, 2008). In summary, adopting the label of feminism in particular can lead to negative evaluations.

A second reason why adopting the feminist label may lead to negative perceptions of the labeler is that people negatively evaluate groups that call for social

change (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013) and feminists are by definition a group that call for social change (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & Toller, 2006). People have a negative stereotype of activists regardless the domain of activism, partially because they have negative attitudes towards social change in general or towards the social issue at hand. Activism is seen as an attempt at aggressively promoting change and therefore activists, including feminists, are quickly associated with militancy and hostility (Bashir et al., 2013). Explicit usage of the feminist label indicates the politicizing of gender equality beliefs (Duncan, 2010) and the label suggests active engagement in political or collective action (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007; Downing & Roush, 1985; Duncan, 2010; Zucker, 2004). In summary, people have negative views of those who adopt any label associated with social change—including that of feminism.

A third and final reason for why a woman who labels herself a feminist may be perceived as negative, is because she may be seen as holding stronger gender equality beliefs than a woman who does not label herself as a feminist. Feminist beliefs have been shown to correlate with engagement in collective action (Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004) and because, as discussed before, activism is seen as negative (Bashir et al., 2013). Therefore, having stronger feminist beliefs is also seen as negative. This impression that a woman who labels herself a feminist has stronger gender equality beliefs than a woman who does not label herself might not be erroneous; some research shows that labeled feminists do indeed have stronger gender attitudes than non-labelers and non-feminists (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999). And when comparing self-identified feminists with women who do not label themselves as feminists, but who agree with feminist values, the former group has higher levels of feminist consciousness (Zucker, 2004; but see Liss, O'Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Quinn & Radtke, 2006; Roy et al., 2007). Because there

is a difference between labelers and non-labelers in strength of feminist beliefs, and perceivers might know this, it could be that negative evaluations of the feminist label are in fact due to perceived differences in perceived strength of gender equality beliefs.

In the current chapter, we focus in particular how feminist identity affects perceptions of warmth and competence. We focus specifically on these two dimensions—warmth and competence—because these are seen as the most important dimensions in person perception (Bakan, 1966; see also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al., 2005). Warmth and competence have been also shown to be particularly relevant for the stereotype of feminists (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006; see also Chapter 3). In particular, the stereotype of feminists is generally seen as being high in competence, but low in warmth (Fiske et al., 2002; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). In this chapter we however do not focus on the evaluations of feminists as a group, but on feminist self-labeling. That is, we do not test perceptions of feminists as a whole, but of individuals who label themselves as a feminist (also see Van Osch, Blanken, Meijs, & Van Wolferen, 2015, for differences in group and individual evaluations).

Warmth and competence have been shown to be important factors in hiring decisions in which an increase in warmth is usually associated with a decrease in hiring chances (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Masser, Grass, & Nesic, 2007; Phelan, Moss-Racusin, & Rudman, 2008). In addition, when forming first impressions, people also form judgments of warmth and competence fairly quickly and reliably (Bergmann, Eyssel, & Kopp, 2012; Fiske et al., 2007; Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Lydon, Jamieson, & Zanna, 1988; Willis & Todorov, 2006).

Many women are reluctant to self-identify as a feminist although they agree with at least some tenets of feminism (Robnett et al., 2012). And for some women the negative connotations of the feminist stereotype are especially important because they fear being negatively evaluated themselves (Burn et al., 2000; Charter, 2015; McCabe, 2005; Suter & Toller, 2006). Therefore we believe it is important to test whether this hesitation is justified by investigating whether explicit labeling as a feminist indeed has an effect on evaluations of warmth and competence. We do this by means of the two paradigms of hiring decisions and first impression formation.

### **Chapter Overview**

In six studies we test the overall hypothesis that a woman who labels herself a feminist will be seen as less warm and more competent than a woman who believes in gender equality but who does not label herself as a feminist. Study 5.1 shows that that labeling as a feminist leads to higher competence and lower warmth ratings than merely stating one's belief in gender equality. Evidence from a manipulation check also showed that the feminist label lead to perceptions of stronger gender equality beliefs than simply stating one's belief in gender equality. Therefore, in Studies 5.2-5.6 we test whether this strength-of-belief explanation can indeed explain why feminist self-labeling leads to perceptions of lower warmth and higher competence than expressing gender equality beliefs alone.

### **Study 5.1**

In Study 5.1 we test the hypothesis that a woman applying for a job who labels herself as feminist on her resume will be seen as more competent and less warm than a woman who merely believes in gender equality but does not label herself a feminist. This hypothesis is based on previous research showing that feminists, as a group, are seen as warmer and less competent than non-feminists (Fiske et al., 2002). We also measure perceived strength of the target's feminist beliefs to test whether a woman

who labels herself a feminist is seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than a woman who states only that she believes in gender equality.

## **Method**

**Participants and design.** A hundred and sixty nine students from Tilburg University (34 male, 135 female,  $M_{age} = 19.65$ ) participated in return for course credit. A target sample size of 150 was chosen in order to have 80% power to find a medium effect (G\*Power 3.1, Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control).

**Manipulation of feminist self-label.** Participants were instructed to imagine that they were part of a hiring committee to fill the position of a laboratory manager of the psychology department. They read a description of the responsibilities of the laboratory manager and one of three fictional resumes. In all conditions, participants received a resume of a female applicant. Depending on condition, this female applicant either stated having gender equality beliefs and labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-labeled), or she merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist (feminist-content-only), or she expressed neither those beliefs, nor did she adopt the label (control). Specifically, in the feminist-labeled condition, the applicant listed her research interest as gender equality and wrote: “As a feminist, I am fascinated with the link between theories in social psychology and gender research.” Additionally, she listed her academic minor as women’s studies. In the feminist-content-only condition, the applicant’s resume was exactly the same as in the feminist-labeled condition, except that the three words “as a feminist” were omitted. Her research interest and academic minor were the same. In the control condition, the applicant wrote “I am fascinated with the link between theories in social psychology and behavioral economics” and she listed economics as her academic minor.

## Measures and Procedure.

**Warmth and competence.** After viewing the resume, participants evaluated the applicant on Warmth (concerned with appearance, attractive, fun, likeable, nurturing, and open-minded;  $\alpha = .76$ ) and Competence (ambitious, independent, intelligent, opinionated, and career-oriented;  $\alpha = .88$ ; Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006; also see Chapter 3). All items were rated in random order and on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).<sup>5</sup>

**Beliefs.** Participants indicated the extent to which they perceived the applicant held feminist beliefs on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*).

**Manipulation check.** Finally, as a manipulation check participants indicated whether the applicant identified as a feminist on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) to test whether participants indeed thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist would be more likely to identify as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and the woman in the control condition.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on identification as a feminist showed that the manipulation worked,  $F(2, 167) = 44.13, p < .001, \eta^2 = .35$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.96, SD = 1.96$ ) identified more as a feminist than the woman who only expressed

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<sup>5</sup> Other measures that were not directly relevant for our hypotheses were included in this study, Study 5.2, and Study 5.4. These are not discussed here but are available in the public dataset (<http://osf.io/ca37h>).

gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ),  $t(107.97) = 5.08$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.98$ , and than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.23$ ,  $SD = 0.98$ ),  $t(111.98) = 8.85$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.67$ . The woman who only expressed gender equality beliefs was also seen as identifying more as a feminist than the woman in the control condition,  $t(111) = 4.06$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.77$ .

**Warmth.** To test the hypothesis that a woman who labels herself as feminist will be seen as less warm than a woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who expressed neither those beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of warmth. It showed a significant main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 167) = 4.17$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $\eta^2 = .05$ . Simple comparisons showed that participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.25$ ,  $SD = 0.80$ ) to be marginally less warm compared to the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.54$ ,  $SD = 0.82$ ),  $t(111) = -1.89$ ,  $p = .06$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.36$ , and significantly less warm than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 4.67$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ),  $t(112) = -2.87$ ,  $p = .005$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.54$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs was seen as equally warm as the woman in the control condition,  $t(111) = -0.89$ ,  $p = .38$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.17$ .

**Competence.** To test the hypothesis that a woman who labels herself as feminist will be seen as more competent than a woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who expressed neither those beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of competence. It showed a significant main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 167) = 3.38$ ,  $p = .04$ ,  $\eta^2 = .04$ . Participants thought

the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 6.08$ ,  $SD = 0.85$ ) was more competent than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 5.59$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ )  $t(98.54) = 2.52$ ,  $p = .01$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.51$ , and marginally more competent than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 5.76$ ,  $SD = 1.00$ ),  $t(112) = 1.83$ ,  $p = .07$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.35$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs was seen as equally competent to the woman in the control condition,  $t(111) = -0.86$ ,  $p = .39$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.16$ .

**Beliefs.** To test whether that the woman who labels herself as feminist will be seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than a woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs without labeling herself as a feminist and than a woman who expressed neither those beliefs nor adopt the label, we conducted an one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of feminist beliefs. It showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 167) = 38.88$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .32$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 5.12$ ,  $SD = 1.52$ ) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.09$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ),  $t(111) = 3.54$ ,  $p = .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.67$ , who in turn had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.58$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ),  $t(111) = 5.14$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.98$ .

## **Discussion**

The results of Study 5.1 showed that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as slightly less warm, and as significantly more competent, than women who do not label themselves as feminists but merely express gender equality beliefs. In addition, women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who label themselves as merely believing in gender equality. This suggests that the feminist label indeed has an effect on judgments of

warmth and competence, but that it might be because the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs. If perceptions of warmth and competence are influenced by the feminist label in itself and not by the strength of feminist beliefs however, we would expect to see that women who express feminist beliefs will be seen as equal in warmth and competence compared to women who do not label themselves a feminist and do not express gender equality beliefs. The remainder of the studies tests this prediction.

## **Study 5.2**

In Study 5.2 we first aim to replicate the results of Study 5.1 (conducted with a Dutch sample) in an US sample. As in Study 5.1, we aim to show that a woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as less warm, more competent, and as having stronger feminist beliefs than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs. In addition, we also manipulate the type of advertised job. When competence is an important characteristic of the job, women who label themselves as feminists may be seen as more suitable—because the feminist stereotype is related to high competence—and therefore evaluated more positively. However, when warmth is an important characteristic of the job, the feminist stereotype may not match the job and those women who label themselves as feminists may be evaluated more negatively (MacDonald & Zanna, 1998) To rule out that the advertised job cues a focus on either competence or warmth and that this focus causes a difference in perceptions of warmth and competence, in Study 5.2 we manipulated the job type that was advertised. We aim to show that this manipulation does not affect the effect of feminist labeling on warmth and competence ratings.

### **Method**

**Participants and design.** Six hundred and ten United States citizens (360 male, 250 female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 32.44$ ) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. A target sample size of 600 was chosen in order to

have 95% power to find a medium effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions of a 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-subjects design.

**Manipulation.** All materials were identical to those presented in Study 5.1 except that they were translated into English and that we now manipulated the description of the job. Specifically, the position of laboratory manager was either described as “the daily operations include managing participant recruitment, welcoming and instructing participants, and coordinating staff meetings” (high warmth) or as “the daily operations include assisting with multiple projects, performing data analysis, and programming experiments” (high competence). A pre-test ( $N = 197$ ) confirmed that the warm job type ( $M = 5.32, SD = 1.07$ ) was seen as warmer than the competent job type ( $M = 3.41, SD = 1.46$ ),  $t(155.39) = 10.26, p < .001$ , Cohen’s  $d = 1.65$ . The competent job type ( $M = 5.70, SD = 1.01$ ) was seen as equally competent to the warm job type ( $M = 5.81, SD = 0.97$ ),  $t(195) = -0.77, p = .44$ , Cohen’s  $d = 0.11$ .

**Measures and Procedure.** Participants first indicated their perceptions of warmth and competence, then indicated whether the applicant held feminist beliefs, and finally whether the applicant identified as a feminist. Both Warmth ( $\alpha = .77$ ) and Competence ( $\alpha = .71$ ) had an acceptable reliability.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on identification as a feminist showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 595) = 178.12, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$ , no effect of job type,  $F(1, 595) = 0.05, p = .83, \eta^2 < .001$ , nor an interaction effect of labeling type and job type,  $F(2, 595) = 0.16, p = .85, \eta^2 = .001$ .

Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.24, SD = 1.04$ ) would identify more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.35, SD = 1.35$ ),  $t(377.89) = 7.41, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.76$ , who in turn would identify more as a feminist than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.10, SD = 0.97$ ),  $t(365.92) = 10.63, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.11$ .

**Warmth.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 599) = 11.78, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04$ , no effect of job type,  $F(1, 599) = 3.51, p = .06, \eta^2 = .006$ , nor an interaction effect of labeling type and job type,  $F(2, 599) = 0.20, p = .82, \eta^2 = .001$ . Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.19, SD = 0.83$ ) as less warm than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.48, SD = 0.68$ ),  $t(401) = -3.77, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.38$ , and less warm than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 4.50, SD = 0.65$ ),  $t(376.37) = -4.29, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.44$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs and the woman in the control condition did not significantly differ from each other,  $t(403) = -0.50, p = .62$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.05$ .

**Competence.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the level of competence showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 600) = 8.31, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03$ , no effect of job type,  $F(1, 600) = 0.25, p = .62, \eta^2 < .001$ , nor an interaction effect of labeling type and job type,  $F(2, 600) = 1.87, p = .16, \eta^2 = .006$ . Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 5.54, SD = 0.66$ ) and the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 5.46, SD = 0.73$ ) as equally competent,  $t(402) = 1.17, p = .24$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.12$ . The woman who labeled herself a feminist and the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs were

seen as more competent than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 5.25$ ,  $SD = 0.81$ ),  $t(400) = 3.93$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.39$ , and  $t(404) = 2.73$ ,  $p = .007$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.27$  respectively.

**Beliefs.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (job type: warmth, competence) between-participants ANOVA on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 595) = 123.40$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .29$ , no effect of job type,  $F(1, 595) = 0.03$ ,  $p = .85$ ,  $\eta^2 < .001$ , nor an interaction effect of labeling type and job type,  $F(2, 595) = 1.25$ ,  $p = .29$ ,  $\eta^2 = .004$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself feminist ( $M = 4.63$ ,  $SD = 0.87$ ) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.92$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ),  $t(330.06) = 5.97$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.66$ , who in turn had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.67$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ),  $t(400.51) = 8.84$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.88$ .

## Discussion

These results show that, as in Study 5.1, women who label themselves as feminists are seen as less warm and more competent than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. Furthermore, Study 5.2 again found that the feminist label indicated stronger gender equality beliefs than merely expressing them. In addition, whereas in Study 5.1 we found that women who merely expressed gender equality beliefs were seen as just as warm and competent as women in the control condition, in this study we find that women who expressed gender equality beliefs are seen as more competent and just as warm as women in the control condition. This strengthens our reasoning that the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs which causes changes in perceptions of warmth and competence, because now we find that merely expressing beliefs also causes changes in perceptions of competence. Finally, we did not find any effects of the type of job that was advertised indicating

that it is not a certain focus on either warmth or competence that changes perception, but it is the feminist label.

### **Study 5.3**

In Study 5.3 we seek to replicate the results found in Study 5.1 and 5.2 with judgments of first impressions in an interpersonal situation rather than on a resume. The dimensions of warmth and competence have been shown to be important in first impressions and people reliably and quickly make judgments of warmth and competence (Bergmann et al., 2012; Fiske et al., 2007; Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Lydon et al., 1988; Willis & Todorov, 2006).

In addition, Study 5.3 tested whether a feminist label produces more perceived competence and less perceived warmth when it is applied by another person or only when it is applied to the self. The feminist label conveys information about the social identity of the woman (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987); this might be especially true when it is self-labeling (“I am a feminist”) compared to when another person labels a woman (“She is a feminist”). This would suggest that self-labeling should lead to stronger effects than being labeled by someone else. If, however, strength of feminist beliefs is conveyed by means of the feminist label, it could be that labeling as a feminist is seen as a cue of strength of feminist beliefs regardless whether that label is used by the self or by another person. We test this idea by introducing the woman either by herself or by another (mutual) friend.

#### **Method**

**Participants and design.** Three-hundred-and-two United States citizens (166 male, 136 female,  $M_{age} = 33.7$ ,  $SD = 12.0$ ) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. A target sample size of 300 was chosen in order to have 80% power to find a medium effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled,

feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants design.

**Manipulation.** Participants were asked to imagine having a drink with coworkers after their first day of a new job. When a woman named Jenny is introduced, the topic of Jenny's blog is discussed. Depending on condition, Jenny either stated writing about gender equality and labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-labeled), or she merely wrote about gender equality without labeling herself as a feminist (feminist-content-only), or she wrote about gender equality nor did she adopt the label (control). Specifically, in the feminist-labeled condition, Jenny was introduced as "As a feminist, she mostly writes about gender equality and other gender issues." In the feminist-content-only condition "As a feminist" was omitted from the introduction, but Jenny did write about gender equality, whereas in the control condition Jenny wrote about "current literature and films". In the self-introduction condition, Jenny herself discusses her blog and in the other-introduction condition, a coworker discusses the blog.

**Measures and Procedure.** First, participants rated their perceptions of warmth and competence and participants then indicated whether Jenny held feminist beliefs and finally whether she identified as a feminist. The reliability of Warmth ( $\alpha = .91$ ) and Competence ( $\alpha = .82$ ) was acceptable.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants ANOVA on identification as a feminist showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 296) = 91.57, p < .001, \eta^2 = .38$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 5.88, SD = 1.65$ ) identified more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.97, SD = 1.70$ ),

$t(198,67) = 3.87, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.55$ , who in turn identified more as a feminist than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.88, SD = 1.51$ ),  $t(195,96) = 9.21, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.32$ . No other main and interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .10$ .

**Warmth.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 296) = 7.90, p < .001, \eta^2 = .009$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.78, SD = 0.83$ ) and the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.94, SD = 0.90$ ) were less warm than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 5.23, SD = 0.72$ ),  $t(200) = -4.11, p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.58$  and  $t(199) = -2.56, p = .01$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.36$ . The woman who labeled herself a feminist was equally warm as the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs,  $t(199) = -1.28, p = .20$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.18$ . No other main and interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .10$ .

**Competence.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants ANOVA on the level of competence showed no main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 296) = 0.80, p = .45, \eta^2 = .005$ . No other main and interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .11$ .

**Beliefs.** A 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (introduction method: self-introduction, other-introduction) between-participants ANOVA on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 296) = 86.87, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.09, SD = 0.78$ ) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.74, SD = 0.90$ ),  $t(194,54) = 2.95, p =$

.004, Cohen's  $d = 0.42$ , who in turn had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.51$ ,  $SD = 0.99$ ),  $t(199) = 9.22$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.31$ . No other main and interaction effects were significant,  $p$ 's  $> .33$ .

## **Discussion**

In contrast to Study 5.1 and Study 5.2, in Study 5.3 we find that women who label themselves as feminists and women who merely expressed gender equality beliefs are seen as less warm than women in the control condition. In addition we do not find any differences in perceptions of competence. We do find support that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than women who merely express believing in gender equality. These results imply that it is not the feminist label that stands out and causes changes in perceptions of warmth, but that the strength of feminist beliefs triggers these changes in perceptions of warmth. This is endorsed by the fact this pattern of the strength of feminist beliefs is found in all three studies.

## **Study 5.4**

In the first three studies, participants judge a woman who labels herself as a feminist who also states that she studies or writes about gender equality. Therefore in Study 5.4, to more explicitly and strictly test whether the feminist label by itself influences the ratings of warmth and competence, we disentangled the feminist label and feminist beliefs. To do so, we added a condition in which a woman uses the feminist label, but does not express feminist beliefs. With this condition we test whether the feminist label in itself has an effect on perceptions of warmth and competence. It could be that the feminist label without the mentioning of feminist beliefs cues that the woman has feminist beliefs and therefore there is still an, but attenuated, effect of feminist labeling on perceptions of warmth and competence.

## Method

**Participants and design.** Four hundred and three United States citizens (244 male, 159 female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 33.38$ ) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. A target sample size of 400 was chosen in order to have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control).

**Manipulation.** The same manipulation was used as in Study 5.3, but an extra condition was added in which the feminist label was presented, but there was no reference to gender equality beliefs (the mere-feminist-condition). Specifically, Jenny in this condition introduced herself by "Although I am a feminist, I mostly write about wildlife and nature documentaries." The control condition was changed to "I mostly write about wildlife and nature documentaries.", because writing about current literature might imply to participants that the woman wrote about feminist literature.

**Measures and Procedure.** Participants first rated Jenny on warmth and competence and then indicated whether the Jenny held feminist beliefs and finally whether she identified as a feminist. The reliability of the Warmth ( $\alpha = .76$ ), and Competence scales ( $\alpha = .71$ ) was acceptable.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on identification as a feminist showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(3, 397) = 131.14, p < .001, \eta^2 = .50$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.53, SD = 0.71$ ) identified more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.01, SD = 0.87$ ), the woman who

merely labeled herself as feminist ( $M = 4.18$ ,  $SD = 0.77$ ), and the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.40$ ,  $SD = 0.96$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .02$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs and the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist were perceived to identify themselves equally as a feminist,  $p = .48$ , but more than the woman in the control condition,  $p$ 's  $< .001$ .

**Warmth.** An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(3, 399) = 5.07$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $\eta^2 = .04$ . Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.70$ ,  $SD = 0.83$ ), the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.78$ ,  $SD = 0.67$ ), and the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist ( $M = 4.78$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ) as equally warm,  $p$ 's  $> .46$ . These three women were all seen as less warm than the woman in control condition ( $M = 5.07$ ,  $SD = 0.60$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .004$ .

**Competence.** An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on the level of competence showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(3, 399) = 8.68$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .06$ . Participants rated the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 5.71$ ,  $SD = 0.66$ ) and the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 5.60$ ,  $SD = 0.66$ ) as equally competent,  $t(200) = 1.22$ ,  $p = .22$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.17$ . The woman who labeled herself a feminist was seen as more competent than the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist ( $M = 5.51$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ) and the woman in the control condition ( $M = 5.25$ ,  $SD = 0.68$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .03$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs was not seen as more competent than the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist,  $t(195) = 0.97$ ,  $p = .33$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.14$ , but was seen as more competent than the woman in the control condition,  $t(198) = 3.58$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.51$ . Finally, the woman who merely labeled

herself as feminist and the woman in control condition also significantly differed from each other,  $t(199) = -2.66, p = .009$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.38$ .

**Beliefs.** An one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, mere-feminist-labeled, control) between-participants ANOVA with four conditions on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(3, 397) = 110.84, p < .001, \eta^2 = .46$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.50, SD = 0.66$ ) had stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.04, SD = 0.80$ ), the woman who merely labeled herself as feminist ( $M = 3.93, SD = 0.80$ ), and the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.55, SD = 0.95$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .001$ . The woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs and the woman who merely labeled herself as a feminist were seen as equal in beliefs,  $p = .77$ , but as higher in beliefs than the woman in the control condition,  $p$ 's  $< .001$ .

## **Discussion**

Study 5.4 again confirms that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. In contrast to the previous studies both women are seen as equally warm and competent. The women who merely label themselves as feminists but do not express any gender equality beliefs ("I am a feminist, but I write about nature documentaries") are seen as equally competent, equally warm, and having equally strong gender equality beliefs in comparison to women who express gender equality beliefs. In this study we thus find evidence that the mere usage of the feminist label implies some adherence to feminist ideology—as the results on strength of feminist beliefs show—and that the feminist label indeed cues strength of feminist beliefs.

## Study 5.5

In Study 5.5 we further explore the effect of feminist labeling by testing whether denial of the feminist label has a reverse effect on warmth and competence ratings—and thus an increase in warmth and a decrease in competence compared to using the feminist label. We based this on the idea that some women actively distance themselves from the feminist label. For example, when pop singer Katie Perry won the Billboard Women in Music Award 2012, she stated in her acceptance speech: “I am not a feminist, but I do believe in the strength of women” (Hampp, 2012). When Salma Hayek was honored for her battle in women’s rights at the Make Equality Reality Event in 2014 she said: “I am not a feminist [...] I believe in equality” and there are many more examples to be found in the media (e.g., Elison, 2013; Luscombe, 2013; Setoodeh, 2012).

The plethora of these examples might indicate that these women see advantages of not using the feminist label and indeed, it could be argued that if the feminist label has negative consequences on warmth and competence that the active denial of the label could have positive consequences. Actively distancing from the feminist label could possibly attenuate the negative effects of the label on warmth and competence. Study 5.5 tests whether rejecting the feminist label causes an increase in warmth and a decrease in competence compared to expressing gender equality beliefs. In addition, we contrast the evaluations of women who accept or reject the feminist label to the evaluations of women who accept or reject the non-feminist label in order to test whether there is something specific about the feminist label or whether labeling in general cues strength of beliefs.

### Method

**Participants and design.** Six hundred and thirty one United States citizens (419 male, 212 female,  $M_{age} = 31.39$ ) were recruited from Amazon’s MTurk and

participated in return for \$0.30. A target sample size of 600 was chosen in order to have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) X 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between participants design.

**Manipulation.** The feminist classification conditions were the same as the manipulations of Study 5.4: Jenny either stated believing in gender equality and labeled herself as a feminist (feminist-labeled) or that she merely believed in gender equality (feminist-content-only). In the added rejection-labeled condition, Jenny stated that that she believed in gender equality, but did not call herself a feminist (feminist-rejection-labeled). In the non-feminist classification conditions, Jenny either stated not believing in gender equality and labeled herself as a non-feminist (non-feminist-labeled), that she did not believe in gender equality (non-feminist-content-only), or that she did not believe in gender equality, but did not call herself a non-feminist (non-feminist-rejection-labeled).

**Measures.** Participants followed the same procedure and materials as in Study 5.4. Participants first indicated warmth and competence and then whether Jenny held feminist beliefs and as finally whether she identified as a feminist or as a non-feminist. The same dependent measures as in the other studies were administered and showed acceptable reliability: Warmth ( $\alpha = .84$ ), and Competence ( $\alpha = .78$ ).

## Results

**Manipulation check.** A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) X 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of feminist identification showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 603) = 144.98, p < .001, \eta^2 = .33$ , no effect of classification,  $F(1, 603) = 0.78, p = .38, \eta^2 =$

.001, and an interaction effect of labeling type and classification,  $F(2, 603) = 6.45, p = .002, \eta^2 = .02$ . Simple effects showed that regarding the feminist classification, participants thought the woman who labeled herself feminist ( $M = 4.30, SD = 0.79$ ) would identify more as a feminist than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.67, SD = 1.10$ ) who in turn would identify more than the woman who rejected the feminist label ( $M = 2.11, SD = 1.16$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .001$ . Regarding the non-feminist classification, participants thought the woman who labeled herself a non-feminist ( $M = 4.17, SD = 1.04$ ) would identify more as a non-feminist than the woman who merely expressed in terms of gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.51, SD = 1.5$ ) who in turn would identify more than the woman who rejected the non-feminist label ( $M = 2.65, SD = 1.27$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .001$ .

**Warmth.** A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) X 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed no main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 603) = 1.84, p = .16, \eta^2 = .006$ , a main effect of classification,  $F(1, 603) = 34.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$ , but no interaction effect of labeling type and classification,  $F(2, 603) = 1.95, p = .14, \eta^2 = .006$ . Participants thought the woman in the feminist classification condition ( $M = 4.83, SD = 0.81$ ) was higher in warmth than the woman in the non-feminist classification condition ( $M = 4.38, SD = 1.03$ ).

**Competence.** A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) X 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of competence showed no main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 603) = 0.64, p = .53, \eta^2 = .002$ , a main effect of classification,  $F(1, 603) = 73.39, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$ , but no interaction effect of labeling type and classification,  $F(2, 603) = 0.78, p = .46, \eta^2 = .003$ . Participants thought the woman in the feminist classification condition ( $M =$

5.41,  $SD = 0.78$ ) was higher in competence than the woman in the non-feminist classification condition ( $M = 4.81$ ,  $SD = 0.94$ ).

**Beliefs.** A 3 (labeling type: labeled, content-only, rejection-labeled) X 2 (classification: feminist, non-feminist) between-participants ANOVA on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 603) = 32.94$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .10$ , no effect of classification,  $F(1, 603) = 0.06$ ,  $p = .81$ ,  $\eta^2 < .001$ , and no interaction effect,  $F(2, 603) = 2.24$ ,  $p = .11$ ,  $\eta^2 = .007$ . Participants thought the woman who labeled herself ( $M = 4.05$ ,  $SD = 0.92$ ) had stronger beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.70$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) who in turn had stronger beliefs than the woman who rejected the label ( $M = 3.24$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ),  $p$ 's  $< .001$ .

## **Discussion**

Study 5.5 confirms that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. Importantly, it did not matter whether the label used was the feminist label or the non-feminist label: In both cases usage of the label cued having stronger beliefs. Furthermore, we find no evidence that rejecting the feminist label has positive consequences: Women who express gender equality beliefs, but reject the feminist label are seen as equally warm and competent as women who merely express gender equality beliefs.

## **Study 5.6**

In Study 5.6 we directly examined the influence of strength of feminist beliefs on the ratings of warmth and competence. Hence, by means of experimental causal chain design (Spencer et al., 2005) strength of feminist beliefs is manipulated directly. Therefore, in Study 5.6 there was no mentioning of the feminist label, but merely whether the woman had strong or weak feminist beliefs.

## Method

**Participants and design.** Two hundred and fourteen United States citizens (141 male, 73 female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 32.42$ ) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and participated in return for \$0.30. A target sample size of 200 was chosen in order to have 95% power to find a small effect (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (beliefs: strong, weak).

**Manipulation.** In the manipulation in this study there was no blog mentioned, because the fact that the person had a blog might be a cue to the strength of her beliefs. Therefore, it was merely mentioned whether Kate had strong beliefs in feminism ("I believe in all tenets of feminism and strongly believe in gender equality") or weak beliefs in feminism ("I believe in some tenets of feminism, but disagree with others, and to some degree believe in gender equality").

**Measures.** Participants followed the same procedure and materials as in Study 5.4. Participants first evaluated warmth and competence and then indicated whether Kate held feminist beliefs and whether she identified as a feminist. The reliability of Warmth ( $\alpha = .81$ ), and Competence ( $\alpha = .77$ ) was acceptable.

## Results

### Manipulation checks.

**Beliefs.** An independent samples *t*-test showed that the woman in the strong beliefs condition ( $M = 4.11$ ,  $SD = 0.88$ ) was seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than the woman in the weak beliefs condition ( $M = 3.07$ ,  $SD = 0.73$ ),  $t(198) = -9.15$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.30$ .

**Identification.** An independent samples *t*-test showed that the woman in the strong beliefs condition ( $M = 4.12$ ,  $SD = 0.91$ ) was seen as more likely to identify as a feminist than the woman in the weak beliefs condition ( $M = 2.84$ ,  $SD = 0.92$ ),  $t(198) = -9.88$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cohen's  $d = 1.40$ .

**Warmth.** An independent samples *t*-test showed that the woman in the strong beliefs condition ( $M = 4.61, SD = 1.02$ ) was not seen as less warm than the woman in the weak beliefs condition ( $M = 4.75, SD = 0.68$ ),  $t(198) = 1.09, p = .28$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.15$ .

**Competence.** An independent samples *t*-test showed that the woman in the strong beliefs condition ( $M = 5.50, SD = 0.82$ ) was seen as more competent than the woman in the weak beliefs condition ( $M = 5.21, SD = 0.66$ ),  $t(198) = -2.83, p = .005$ , Cohen's  $d = 0.40$ .

## **Discussion**

In Study 5.6 we directly manipulated strength of feminist beliefs instead of cueing this by means of the feminist label. We found that indeed women with strong feminist beliefs are seen as more competent than women with weak feminist beliefs. We did not find that women with strong beliefs are seen as less warm than women with weak feminist beliefs.

## **Integrative Data Analysis of Studies**

Three of the first five studies above show support for the idea that women who label themselves as a feminist are seen as more competent and less warm than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. In Study 5.3 and 5.5 however, we do not find support for this hypothesis regarding competence (Study 5.3) or both (Study 5.5). In order to investigate these differences in studies, we combined the data from the first five studies in an aggregated dataset to perform an integrative data analysis. Every study uses the same type of manipulation and the same dependent measures (warmth and competence). If the effect that a woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as more competent and less warm than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs is present in the combined dataset, then the effect seems robust (Curran & Hussong, 2009).

## Results

An analysis across the first five studies ( $N = 1587$ ; 714 women and 872 men) was run. The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1565) = 23.47, p < .001, \eta^2 = .029$ , in which the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.51, SD = 0.88$ ) was seen as less warm than the woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs ( $M = 4.68, SD = 0.77; p = .001$ ) who in turn was seen as less warm than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 4.81, SD = 0.73; p = .002$ ).

The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of competence showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1565) = 14.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .018$ , in which the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 5.56, SD = 0.76$ ) was seen as more competent than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 5.44, SD = 0.79; p = .001$ ) who in turn was seen as more competent than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 5.28, SD = 0.82; p = .04$ ).

The overall one-way (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) between-participants ANOVA with three conditions on the level of feminist beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1570) = 367.85, p < .001, \eta^2 = .32$ , in which the woman who labeled herself a feminist ( $M = 4.34, SD = 0.84$ ) was seen as having stronger beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs ( $M = 3.82, SD = 1.16; p < .001$ ) who in turn was seen as having stronger beliefs than the woman in the control condition ( $M = 2.55, SD = 1.19; p < .001$ ).

**Participant gender.** The integrative data analysis strategy provides us with enough statistical power to conduct exploratory analyses of these results with participant gender as an additional between-subjects factor. The 3 (labeling type:

feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of warmth showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1572) = 18.76, p < .001, \eta^2 = .02$ , a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 1572) = 19.82, p < .001, \eta^2 = .01$ , and no interaction effect of labeling type and participant gender,  $F(2, 1572) = 2.11, p = .12, \eta^2 = .003$ . We found the same pattern as described above for the effect of labeling type on warmth. Furthermore, female participants rated all targets as higher in warmth ( $M = 4.76, SD = 0.76$ ) than male participants ( $M = 4.58, SD = 0.84$ ).

For competence, the 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1573) = 15.67, p < .001, \eta^2 = .02$ , a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 1573) = 42.30, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03$ , and no interaction effect of labeling type and participant gender,  $F(2, 1573) = 0.44, p = .65, \eta^2 = .001$ . We found the same pattern as described above for the effect of labeling type on competence. Furthermore, female participants rated all targets as higher in competence ( $M = 5.58, SD = 0.79$ ) than male participants ( $M = 5.32, SD = 0.77$ ).

Finally, the 3 (labeling type: feminist-labeled, feminist-content-only, control) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-participants ANOVA on the level of strength of beliefs showed a main effect of labeling type,  $F(2, 1566) = 366.46, p < .001, \eta^2 = .32$ , a main effect of participant gender,  $F(1, 1566) = 19.24, p < .001, \eta^2 = .01$ , and no interaction effect of labeling type and participant gender,  $F(2, 1566) = 0.95, p = .39, \eta^2 = .001$ . We found the same pattern as described above for the effect of labeling type on strength of beliefs. Again, female participants rated all targets as higher in feminist beliefs ( $M = 3.76, SD = 1.24$ ) than male participants ( $M = 3.52, SD = 1.33$ ).

**Mediation.** A mediation analyses was conducted to test whether the effect of labeling type on warmth and competence was mediated by strength of feminist beliefs. That is, labeling as a feminist or believing in gender equality causes an increase in the strength of feminist beliefs and that in turn causes a decrease in warmth and an increase in competence. To test this, a regression analysis according to the specifications of PROCESS for SPSS using Model four with 5000 bootstrap resamples (Hayes, 2013) was employed with labeling type entered as two dummy variables. The analyses for warmth revealed that beliefs indeed mediated the effect of labeling type on warmth,  $B = -0.06$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $p = .0002$ ,  $CI = [-0.09, -0.03]$ . The direct effect of labeling type on warmth turned not significant for the dummy variable differentiating the feminist-content-only condition,  $B = 0.06$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p = .23$ ,  $CI = [-0.04, 0.15]$  but not for the dummy differentiating the control condition,  $B = 0.12$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p = .03$ ,  $CI = [0.01, 0.22]$ . For competence, the analyses revealed that beliefs mediated the effect of labeling type on competence,  $B = 0.09$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $p < .0001$ ,  $CI = [0.06, 0.13]$ . The direct effect of labeling type on competence turned not significant for both dummy variables,  $B = -0.07$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p = .14$ ,  $CI = [-0.16, 0.02]$  and  $B = -0.05$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p = .33$ ,  $CI = [-0.15, 0.05]$ .

## **Discussion**

The integrative data analysis shows that overall women who label themselves as a feminist are seen as less warm, more competent, and having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. Participant gender did not influence any of these results, but we did find that female participants rated all targets consistently higher on all dimensions. Finally, the mediation analysis shows that strength of feminist beliefs mediates for both warmth and competences evaluations in the main comparison between women who labels themselves as a feminist and women who merely express gender equality beliefs.

## General Discussion

In this chapter we give an answer to the question whether women who label themselves as feminists are judged as more negative than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. An integrative data analysis across five studies shows that indeed women who label themselves as feminists are seen as less warm and more competent than women who express gender equality beliefs but do not label themselves as feminists. This difference in evaluations is caused by the idea that women who label themselves as feminists are seen as having stronger gender equality beliefs than other women. This is also confirmed in the sixth study that found that women with strong feminist beliefs are seen as more negative than women with weak feminist beliefs. Hence, this research shows that in addition to the negative evaluations of the feminist stereotype (Anderson, 2009; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007), the feminist label might cue strong gender equality beliefs towards an observer that in turn might also cause negative evaluations.

The finding that women who label themselves a feminist are perceived as having stronger gender equality beliefs than women who merely express gender equality beliefs makes sense: Research has shown that self-reports of feminist-labelers indicate they indeed have stronger gender- and feminist beliefs than non-labelers (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999; Zucker, 2004). It seems that our results match the findings of these self-reports: Observers of the feminist label also infer a difference in strength of feminist beliefs and consequently make judgments based on the strength of these beliefs. A recent study also found that both self-labeled feminists and women who actively engage in feminist behavior (e.g., confront sexism at work) are evaluated more negatively than women who do not engage in such behaviors

(Anastosopoulos & Desmarais, 2014) indicating that negative evaluations are not only about the feminist label, but also about strength of feminist beliefs and/or behaviors.

All studies, but Study 5.5, showed that the feminist label influenced perceptions of warmth and competence. In Study 5.5 we manipulated whether the target labeled herself a feminist, only expressed gender equality beliefs, or whether the target simply denied the feminist label. This study showed no effects of whether you label yourself a feminist or whether you deny the feminist label on evaluations of warmth and competence. In fact, although denial of the feminist label lowers the perception of the strength of feminist beliefs, the expected benefits of denial of the feminist label—for example increase in warmth and decrease in competence ratings—were not found.

We think consistency principles might play a role in the fact that no benefits of denial of the feminist label were found. People like to be able to predict the world (Schneider, 2004) and strive for consistency (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski et al., 2009; Heider, 1958; Nosek et al., 2002), but a statement such as “I believe in gender equality, but I am not a feminist” is contradictory. Therefore, it could also be argued that denying the feminist label while at the same time adhering to feminist values leads to negative evaluations because the target is seen as being inconsistent. Although many female celebrities see the advantages of denial of the feminist label (Elison, 2013; Hampp, 2012; Luscombe, 2013; Setoodeh, 2012), these results show that denial of the feminist label in fact does not lead to more positive evaluations.

The integrative data analysis showed that both male and female participants thought women who label themselves as feminists have stronger feminist beliefs, are less warm, and are more competent than women who merely express gender equality beliefs. Although both men and women showed this same pattern, women consistently rated all targets higher on warmth, competence, and feminist beliefs.

These higher ratings might be attributed to in-group bias or in-group favoritism in which liked in-group members are rated especially positive (Brewer, 1979; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

An important caveat is the first impression paradigm that was used in Studies 5.3 to 5.6. Self-presentation motives play an important role in first impressions as people generally try to construct a desired, beneficial, and believable identity (Schlenker, 2003). Observers are often aware of these self-presentation motives (Schlenker, 2003) and thus it could be that participants took these motives into account when evaluating our target. Or, as one participant commented: “I feel that you can't judge someone on a first impression and they might be bull shitting you on hot topics to see how and where you stand”. If indeed our participants assumed that the feminist label was merely mentioned to get positive evaluations in a first impression, it means that the (feminist) label factually provides fewer information than we think is the case and experimenter demand effects might play a role.

To conclude, it seems that the feminist label does not only directly influence evaluations of warmth and competence, but that the feminist label cues strength of feminist beliefs to observers. An increase in these feminist beliefs in turn causes a decrease in warmth evaluations and an increase in competence evaluations. This means that a woman who labels herself a feminist will be seen as more negative compared to a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs, because it is inferred that the feminist labeler in fact does not have the same, but stronger gender equality beliefs.





# CHAPTER 6

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## General discussion

With this dissertation I aimed to better understand the psychological processes of identification with feminism. I investigate why women are so hesitant to label themselves a feminist and examine whether this hesitation is justified. From Chapters 3-5 I can conclude that a) greater perceived discrepancy between women's self-view and feminist-view on the dimensions of competence and warmth is related to weaker identification with feminism, b) motivated independence is an important reason to not identify as a feminist, c) although women who label themselves a feminist are seen as less warm and more competent, this is not a consequence of the feminist label, but a consequence of the perceived strength of their gender equality beliefs. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 I found that although gender stereotype-inconsistency is in some specific cases seen as acceptable behavior, it still arouses disapproval especially for women who act in a stereotypical male manner. Together, these findings not only help us to gain a better understanding of why women are reluctant to identify as a feminist, but also help us to move toward a deeper psychological understanding of how this disidentification can be changed.

## **Chapter 2**

People do not like violations of gender roles (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012; Thomas, 1959; Vingerhoets, 2011) and men and women who act in ways that are inconsistent with their gender roles experience a 'backlash effect' (Rudman & Glick, 2001) in which their behavior is seen as less acceptable than the behavior of men and women who act in line with their gender roles. However, Chapter 2 finds first evidence that this is not always the case. By means of four studies and three different scenarios this chapter finds that an individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-inconsistent is judged less negatively than an individual who behaves in a way that is gender stereotype-

consistent with two important qualifiers: a) This only holds for men and b) this only holds if the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is seen as clever.

Study 2.1.1 found that the behavior of a woman who uses dominance (consistent with the male stereotype) and the behavior of a man who uses attractiveness (consistent with the female stereotype) are seen as more acceptable than their gender stereotype-consistent counterparts. Specifically, this study found that when these behaviors are used to get away with a ticket, the behavior of the actor who uses gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more clever than the behavior of the actor who uses stereotype-consistency. These ratings of cleverness mediate the effect of gender stereotype-inconsistency on acceptability of the behavior. In Study 2.1.2 the actors used the same behaviors but in a different scenario: The actor tries to delay a plane to allow a friend who is late to still board. In this study the behavior of the actor who uses gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as more acceptable than the behavior of the actor who uses gender stereotype-consistency, but only if the inconsistent behavior is performed by a male target. Study 2.2 tested the idea that gender stereotype-inconsistent acts are seen as isolated or incidental events—if these acts are merely perceived as a one-time error, then this can account for the idea why these behaviors are seen as more acceptable. Study 2.2 found again that only the gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior of the male actor was seen as acceptable. Moreover, it found that whether the behavior was a recurring or an isolated event did not matter for the evaluations, indicating that gender stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are not seen as a ‘glitch’. Finally, Study 2.3 found that when gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is not interpreted as clever, a backlash effect occurs, but when the same gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior is framed as being clever, the behavior is seen as more acceptable than gender stereotype-consistent behavior.

In all these studies, except Study 2.1.1, I found that only men can get away with gender stereotype-inconsistent behavior, whereas this is more difficult for women. That is, although it is not *negative* for women to behave in a way that is clever and gender stereotype-inconsistent, it is also not *positive* for them to do so. For men however it is positive and they reap the benefits of acting inconsistent with their gender role. Thus, although these results show some initial evidence that gender stereotype-inconsistency is seen as an acceptable way to act, it also shows a double standard. To me, this indicates that feminism and collective action towards gender equality might still be preferable. Both men and women should be allowed to behave as they want and not only as gender norms prescribe them: If men and women are seen more in equal lights, this might promote that indeed both men *and* women experience less disapproval when they violate gender roles.

## **Antecedents of identification with feminism**

### **Chapter 3**

In Chapter 3 I found that perceived discrepancy between a woman's view of herself and her view of feminists—on the dimensions of warmth and competence—is an important predictor in identification with feminism. In three studies I found that to better understand why women are reluctant to identify as a feminist not only feminist stereotyping must be taken into account, but also whether women see themselves as being different from feminists. The focus of this chapter was on the perceived discrepancy of warmth and competence, because these are the primary dimensions on which groups, such as feminists, are evaluated (Cuddy et al, 2008; Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al., 2005; see also Eagly & Steffen, 1984, for evaluations of gender in specific).

Study 3.1 was exploratory in nature and found that women identify less with feminism the greater they perceive the difference in competence with feminists—

regardless whether they see themselves as being more or less competent. Women also identify less with feminism when they see themselves as being warmer than feminists; however, if they see themselves as being colder than feminists, then the extent of this perceived discrepancy in warmth is not related to identification with feminism. Study 3.2 was a confirmatory study and replicates these findings in a different sample. Finally, Study 3.3 replicated the results of Studies 3.1 and 3.2 and found that perceived discrepancy predicts identification with feminism for both the warmth dimension and the competence dimension even after controlling for endorsement of feminist values. In summary, these three studies find that perceived discrepancy between how women see themselves and how they see feminists on warmth and competence predicts identification with feminism and that this factor is distinct from endorsement of feminist values.

With these findings of Chapter 3 we better understand why women are reluctant to identify as a feminist. This trend of non-identification with feminism might seemingly be in contrast with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) and Social Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) that states that people want to belong to groups and get part of their self-esteem from identification with groups. However, an important precondition of identification with groups in both of these theories is that groups should be positively valued—which is not always the case for the group of feminists (Robnett et al., 2012). When a group can positively differentiate from other groups, identification with that group is more likely and identification with that group can cause positive self-esteem (Devos & Banaji, 2003; Tajfel, 1987; Turner et al., 1987). This idea is further explored by Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, and Mellott (2002) who in their unified theory of social cognition state that there should always be balance-congruity between the self, components of the self-concept, and identity. That is, if people see themselves as positive and do not see

feminists as positive, the resulting imbalance-dissonance makes identification less likely (Devos & Banaji, 2003).

Because feminists are seen as cold, but competent women (Fiske et al., 2002), it is a positive development that, in general, competence for women is seen as a more desirable trait. For example, women are increasingly endorsing agency traits (Twenge, 1997; Spence & Buckner, 2000) and competence traits are slowly being included in the stereotypical perception of women (Diekmann & Eagly, 2000; Diekmann & Goodfriend, 2006). Because feminists are associated with high competence (Fiske et al., 2002) and competence is becoming more acceptable for women, the stereotypical perception of feminists might also become more positive. As said before, identification with groups that are positively valued is more likely and thus this development could mean an increase in identification with feminism.

Furthermore, people are also more likely to identify with high status groups in comparison to low status groups (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 1997). Unfortunately, feminists, although high in competence, are generally seen as a low status group (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Robnett et al., 2012). However, the group status of feminists might be on the rise, because more and more high-status and positively valued women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—openly self-identify as feminists (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014). If this association between feminism and positivity indeed increases the status of feminists as a social group this naturally occurring event could lead to greater identification with feminism as well (Doosje et al., 2002; Ellemers et al., 2002). This is especially likely because in general in-groups are seen as having high status (Fiske et al., 2002; see also Pekaar, Meijs, Janssen, & Lammers, 2015 on the relation of thinness and status). If feminists are also seen as a high status group, then the perceived discrepancy

between a woman's view of herself and her view of feminists decreases, making identification more likely.

Another intervention that is especially relevant to the findings of Chapter 3 is the campaign 'This is what a feminist looks like' ([www.fawcettsociety.org.uk](http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk)). This campaign was launched in 2014 by magazine ELLE UK and Fawcett, the United Kingdom's largest campaigning group for equality, and asked men and women to wear a T-shirt with the text 'This is what a feminist looks like'. This campaign was a great success and many people joined in. Not only a diverse group of general public, but also UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, UK Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, and famous actors such as Benedict Cumberbatch and Emma Watson put on the t-shirt. Campaigns like this make the diversity of men and women identifying with feminism visible. Exposure to the diversity of feminists might change the definition that people have of a feminist and lead people to redefine what a feminist is. Interventions like this could therefore show that the discrepancy between a woman's view of herself and her view of feminists is smaller than she perceives it is and hence promote identification with feminism.

Another important finding of Chapter 3 is that perceived discrepancy on the warmth dimension predicted more variation in identification with feminism than perceived discrepancy on the competence dimension. In Chapter 3 I explained this difference with the idea that warmth is seen as a positive trait for women (Abele, 2003; Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Fiske et al., 2002; Heilman, 2012; Kite et al., 2008; Lippa, 2001; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; White & Gardner, 2009), but that competence can be seen as a positive and a negative trait for women (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Cuddy 2009; Cuddy et al., 2013; Diekmann & Eagly, 2000; Diekmann & Goodfriend, 2006; Fiske, 1993; Heilman, 2001; 2012; Powell et al., 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Spence & Buckner, 2000; Twenge, 1997; White & Gardner,

2009). Because warmth is unequivocally seen as positive, an increase in the level of warmth of feminists will automatically be associated with an increase in identification with feminism. However, an increase in the level of competence of feminists can be associated with both an increase and a decrease in identification with feminism. This depends on whether the increase in level of competence causes a larger or a smaller perceived discrepancy for women. The difference in predictive power for identification with feminism between the warmth and the competence dimensions indicates that interventions that focus on the level of warmth of feminists might actually be more effective than interventions focusing on the level of competence of feminists. Given that warmth is unequivocally seen as a positive trait for women, the chance that an intervention targeting the 'cold' feminist stereotype will backfire is smaller than for an intervention targeting the ambivalent trait of competence.

#### **Chapter 4**

Chapter 4 highlighted another antecedent to identification with feminism that has been overlooked in the literature: motivated independence. In this chapter I argued that women do not want to identify as a feminist, because doing so restricts their view of themselves as an independent person. Study 4.1 found—in a Dutch sample—that both men and women indeed experience motivated independence: They value being an independent thinker instead of belonging to a group, and they do not like to label themselves. This motivated independence is an important reason to not identify as a feminist, and is seen as more important than three other reasons not to identify as a feminist: perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity towards feminism and feminists, and potential for social rejection. Study 4.2 replicated the effect that motivated independence is an important reason and is more important than three other reasons in a US sample. Moreover, this study found that motivated independence predicts identification with feminism for both men and

women while controlling for endorsement of perceived disagreement with feminist values, negativity towards feminism and feminists, and potential for social rejection. Study 4.3 used an experimental design in which an independent mindset is manipulated instead of measured. To test whether participants only disagree with feminism or whether they disagree with anything they encounter, I manipulated whether participants received a feminist message that said they should pursue a career or a non-feminist message that said they should pursue raising a family. Only women with an independent mindset show more disagreement with the feminist message than with the non-feminist message. This difference in disagreement was not found for men and not found for women with a dependent mindset. Together, these three studies found that motivated independence is an important factor in identification with feminism.

The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that disidentification can be changed by tackling the idea of incongruency between feminism and motivated independence that men and women have. As mentioned before, not only do many independent and strong women—Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, Emma Watson—identify as feminists nowadays (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; UN Women, 2014), they also emphasize that feminism is mostly about individual action and personal responsibility (Keller & Ringrose, 2015). These women show that it is possible to be both an independent actor and a feminist at the same time. Moreover, exposure to such successful female role models has also been shown to lead to women's empowerment and better self-evaluations (Latu, Mast, Lammers, & Bombari, 2013).

## **Consequences of Identification with Feminism**

### **Chapter 5**

Feminists are evaluated negatively (Anderson, 2009; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Jenen et al., 2009; Robnett et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild,

2007) and so are groups that call for social change—such as feminists (Bashir et al., 2013; Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & Toller, 2006). Because of these negative connotations, some women are reluctant to identify as a feminist out of fear of being evaluated negatively themselves (Burn et al., 2000; Charter, 2015; McCabe, 2005; Suter & Toller, 2006). In Chapter 5 I investigated whether a woman who explicitly labels herself a feminist is seen as more negative than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs. This chapter thus tests whether the reluctance towards identification with feminism is justified by investigating whether explicit labeling as a feminist indeed has an effect on evaluations. I tested this on the same dimensions used in Chapter 3: warmth and competence.

Study 5.1 found that Dutch participants who read a resume of a woman who labels herself a feminist (“As a feminist, I am interested in researching gender equality”) evaluate her as being less warm, but more competent, than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs (“I am interested in researching gender equality”). Study 5.2 replicated the results that the woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as less warm and more competent than the woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs in a US sample. In addition, this study found that giving participants a focus on warmth or on competence does not affect these results. Study 5.3 used a different paradigm in which the feminist label was not made explicit in a resume, but in a first impression formation scenario: A woman either introduces herself as being a feminist (“I am a feminist, and I write about gender equality issues”) or as believing in gender equality (“I write about gender equality issues”). Again, I found that the feminist label leads to a decrease in warmth evaluations. The competence evaluations are not affected in this study.

These first three studies thus found that indeed women who explicitly label themselves as feminist are seen as less warm and more competent than women who

merely express gender equality beliefs. Study 5.4 explicitly tested whether the feminist label in itself influences evaluations of warmth and competence by disentangling the feminist label from feminist beliefs. In this study a condition was added in which a woman introduces herself and merely labels herself a feminist but does not express any gender equality beliefs (“I am a feminist, but I write about nature documentaries”). This woman that only uses the feminist label is seen as equally competent, equally warm, and having equally strong gender equality beliefs to woman who expresses gender equality beliefs. Study 5.5 tested whether denial of the feminist label (“I believe in gender equality, but I am not a feminist”) has a reverse effect on warmth and competence ratings— but I found no evidence that denial of the feminist label has any positive consequences: The woman who expressed gender equality beliefs, but rejected the feminist label is seen as equally warm and competent to the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs. These five studies all found that the woman who labeled herself a feminist and expressed gender equality beliefs is seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than the woman who merely expressed gender equality beliefs. Therefore, in Study 5.6 I directly manipulated strength of feminist beliefs to test whether strength has an influence on warmth and competence ratings. I indeed found that a woman with strong feminist beliefs is seen as more competent than a woman with weak feminist beliefs, but found no effects on warmth evaluations.

Finally, an integrative data analysis across Studies 5.1 to 5.5 tested whether the effect that a woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as more competent and less warm than a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs is robust (Curran & Hussong, 2009) and whether the effect of labeling on evaluations is mediated by perceptions of strength of feminist beliefs. This data analysis showed that indeed the woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as less warm and more competent than

the woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs and that this effect is mediated by strength of feminist beliefs. This means that a woman who labels herself a feminist is seen as more negative compared to a woman who merely expresses gender equality beliefs, because it is inferred that the feminist labeler in fact has stronger gender equality beliefs.

These results seem to resonate in the current media landscape as well: Women who label themselves a feminist or show feminist behavior are especially seen as cold. For example, when Dutch female journalists said something in public about a sexist commercial—a commercial that promoted a toy vacuum cleaner for girls and said ‘be just as good as your mother’—they were immediately characterized as cold (bitter and whiny) and overly competent (feeling exalted) (Bosch, 2013). More generally speaking, women who identify as a feminist and are also seen as likeable and attractive, experience backlash and receive comments that feminism and warmth do not go together (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Van der Poel & Tuentner, 2014).

In addition to feminists being evaluated negatively, it seems that campaigns that are interpreted as being ‘feminist’ also experience negative consequences. For example, in March 2015 the German government introduced a gender quota that 30% of supervisory board of publicly traded companies should be women by 2016 (ANP, 2015). Although many were in favor of this quota, there were some protests as well: For example, the political party ‘Alternative for Germany (AfD)’ introduced a campaign against this quota called ‘I am not a feminist’ (White, 2014). Thus, it seems that the negative consequences of feminist labeling are not only applicable to women who label themselves feminist, but also to campaigns that relate to feminist ideology.

As said before, if there are more and more positive examples of feminist self-labeling (Duca, 2014; Gray, 2014; Holmgren, 2013; UN Women, 2014), there might be a more diverse view of what a feminist is. Consequently, women might experience

less discrepancy between their self-view and their view of feminists (see Chapter 3) and experience less motivated independence (see Chapter 4) which in turn might increase identification with feminism. In my opinion, an increase in identification with feminism itself might be an important factor in decreasing the consequences of the feminist label. The effects of feminist labeling on, for example, warmth and competence might decrease if the group of feminists becomes larger and more diverse.

### **Future directions**

In my dissertation as well as in other work on feminism, the focus has been on white women in western countries (but see Robnett et al., 2012). Future research should definitely look into for example black feminism in the United States (Swim & Hyers, 2009) or think about feminism in other non-western countries. Malala Yousafzai is a great example of a feminist who stands up for women and girl rights in her country Pakistan. Focus on non-western countries is especially important because feminism is needed in these countries: Child marriage is still prevalent in many South Asian and sub-Saharan African countries, with up to 77 percent of women (in contrast to only 5 percent of men) being married before the age of 18 (United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 2014). Over 35% of women worldwide have experienced violence in their lifetime (World Health Organization [WHO], 2014) and women are being murdered for marrying out of free will (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2014) or being raped for merely riding the bus (Kambou, 2014).

Although the results from Chapter 5 indicate that feminist labeling and merely expressing gender beliefs cue having stronger gender equality beliefs, future research should investigate whether disidentification with feminism might be influenced by the notion that believing that men and women should be equals has become part of the mainstream culture and might even have become normative (McCabe, 2005). If

you believe men and women should be equal, you are considered ‘normal’; you are not having any radical beliefs (McCabe, 2005). In accordance with that, some people view the world as naturally evolving: They believe that men and women will naturally be equals to each other in time and that you should not push that (Edley & Wetherell, 2001). Therefore, it could be that labeling has become especially important for groups that are seen as having opinions that deviate from the mainstream opinion. That is, although in contrast with the findings from Chapter 5—it could be that feminist labeling is becoming less important and informative, because implicitly it is assumed that all people believe men and women should be equal.

## **Conclusion**

To sum up, in this dissertation I found that although men receive benefits of acting in gender stereotype-inconsistent ways, for women these benefits are not present. Furthermore, I found that both perceived discrepancy with feminists and motivated independence are important reasons to not identify as a feminist and that women who label themselves feminists indeed experience negative effects because they are seen as less warm and more competent.

Given the recent changing image of feminists in the media and the fact that there is no decline in support for the women’s movement over the last years (Duncan, 2010; Huddy et al., 2000), it does seem that the stereotype of feminists is broadening and becoming more positive. However, the question to identify or to not identify as a feminist remains. And whereas some will identify and are proud to be a feminist regardless of any consequences (Holmgren, 2013), others will always have misconceptions about what a feminist is and will never identify as a feminist ([womenagainstfeminism.tumblr.com](http://womenagainstfeminism.tumblr.com)). With this dissertation I have shed some light on identification with feminism and have given some suggestions how to have more men and women say: ‘Yes, I am a feminist’.





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# Samenvatting

Vrouwen zijn terughoudend om zichzelf een feminist te noemen. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik waarom dit zo is en of deze terughoudendheid gerechtvaardigd is.

In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik gekeken naar mannen en vrouwen die zich inconsistent gedragen met hun gender stereotype. In het algemeen vinden mensen het onacceptabel als anderen zich niet volgens hun gender rollen gedragen en worden deze mensen negatief beoordeeld. In hoofdstuk 2 vind ik dat dit echter niet altijd zo is: Wanneer het inconsistente gedrag wordt uitgevoerd door een man (dus een man die zich vrouwelijke gedraagt) *en* dit gedrag wordt gezien als slim, dan wordt het gedrag acceptabel gevonden. Om meer specifiek te zijn vond ik in 4 studies dat het gedrag van mannen die flirten en van mannen die zich passief gedragen (allebei rollen die met vrouwen worden geassocieerd) als acceptabel wordt gezien als ze dit gedrag gebruiken om iets gedaan te krijgen, zoals het vermijden van een boete of het beïnvloeden van een mentor voor een hoger cijfer. Vrouwen die zich mannelijk gedragen (een vrouw die assertief of agressief is) hebben echter niet dit voordeel. Hoofdstuk 2 laat dus zien dat er nog steeds met twee maten wordt gemeten: Hoewel mannen wel de voordelen hebben van inconsistent gedrag, geldt dat niet voor vrouwen.

In hoofdstukken 3 en 4 heb ik me meer direct gefocust op de voorspellers van identificatie met feminisme. In hoofdstuk 3 laat ik zien dat wanneer vrouwen een zichzelf als anders zien dan het stereotype van feministen, ze zich minder snel een feminist noemen. Dit heb ik gedaan door te kijken naar twee dimensies die belangrijk zijn in de perceptie van personen, namelijk competentie (hoe intelligent, ambitieus en onafhankelijk ben je?) en warmte (hoe vriendelijk, open-minded, en verzorgend ben

je?). Drie studies laten zien dat als vrouwen zichzelf als anders zien in competentie dan feministen (ongeacht of ze zichzelf als meer of minder competent zien), ze zichzelf minder snel identificeren als feminist. Daarnaast identificeren ze zich minder met feminisme als ze zichzelf als warmer zien dan feministen. Als vrouwen denken dat feministen warmer zijn dan zichzelf, dan heeft dit geen invloed op identificatie. Omdat feministen stereotypisch worden gezien als hoog in competentie en laag in warmte, resulteert dit in lagere identificatie met feminisme. Echter, competente vrouwen wordt meer en meer geaccepteerd door de maatschappij en steeds meer vrouwen zien zichzelf als competent. Deze verandering kan er voor zorgen dat het stereotiepe beeld van de feminist positiever wordt en meer vrouwen zichzelf een feminist noemen.

Hoofdstuk 4 kijkt naar een andere voorspeller van identificatie met feminisme, namelijk gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid (*motivated independence*). In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat sommige vrouwen zichzelf geen feminist willen noemen, omdat ze dan geen onafhankelijk persoon meer kunnen zijn. In twee studies laat ik zien dat zowel mannen als vrouwen gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid ervaren: Ze vinden het belangrijk om onafhankelijk na te denken en vinden het niet fijn om een label op zichzelf te plakken. Deze gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid was een belangrijke voorspeller voor identificatie met feminisme (en belangrijker dan of je feministen negatief vindt, of je het eens bent met feministen, en of je bang bent buitengesloten te worden als je jezelf een feminist noemt). In een derde studie heb ik mannen en vrouwen zichzelf onafhankelijk (of afhankelijk) van anderen laten voelen. Daarna heb ik gevraagd of ze het eens zijn met een feministische boodschap en of ze een feminist zijn. Wat blijkt, alleen vrouwen die zich onafhankelijk voelden waren het meer oneens met deze boodschap. Echter, er was geen verschil in identificatie met feminisme tussen de twee verschillende groepen vrouwen. Deze bevindingen lijken te

suggereren dat vrouwen de ideeën van feminisme niet kunnen verenigen met onafhankelijk zijn. Tegenwoordig zijn er veel sterke onafhankelijke vrouwen in de media die laten zien dat je wel degelijk feminist en onafhankelijk kunt zijn; denk aan Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, en Emma Watson. Het blijkt dat blootstelling aan zulke rolmodellen ervoor zorgt dat je jezelf ook onafhankelijk voelt en dus kunnen deze mediavrouwen er misschien op den duur voor zorgen dat meer vrouwen zich identificeren als feminist.

In het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift heb ik gekeken naar de consequenties van jezelf een feminist noemen: Is het gerechtvaardigd om terughoudend te zijn met identificatie als een feminist? Ik heb opnieuw gekeken naar de dimensies warmte en competentie die ook in hoofdstuk 3 aan bod komen. In zes studies laat ik zien dat wanneer een vrouw zich een feminist noemt in een eerste kennismaking of op een curriculum vitae, deze vrouw als minder warm, maar als meer competent wordt gezien dan een vrouw die alleen uit dat ze voor gelijke rechten is. Verder laat ik zien dat het expliciet ontkennen van het feministische label (“Ik geloof in gelijke rechten, maar ik ben geen feminist”) geen positieve effecten heeft: De vrouw die dit deed in een eerste kennismaking werd als even warm en competent gezien als de vrouw die geloofde in gelijke rechten. In een analyse van al deze studies samen laat ik zien dat het verschil in warmte en competentie tussen de feminist en de vrouw die gelooft in gelijke rechten komt doordat mensen denken dat de feminist een sterkere mening heeft dan de andere vrouwen.

Deze resultaten kun je ook vinden in de hedendaagse media. Toen een journaliste bij Pauw en Witteman vertelde dat ze de reclames van Bart Smit seksistisch vond (een speelgoed stofzuiger reclame met ‘wordt net zo goed als mama’), werd ze bitter en een zeur genoemd (niet warm) en verheven (wel competent). In het algemeen wordt gezegd dat warmte en feminisme niet samen

gaan. Echter, de eerder genoemde mediavrouwen laten zien dat warmte en feminisme wel samen kunnen gaan en kunnen er daardoor misschien voor zorgen dat de negatieve effecten van het feministische label minder worden.

Om te concluderen, in dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat vrouwen zichzelf geen feminist noemen omdat ze een afstand voelen tussen zichzelf en feministen en door effecten van gemotiveerde onafhankelijkheid. Daarnaast laat ik zien dat feministische vrouwen worden gezien als minder warm, maar meer competent, omdat gedacht wordt dat ze een sterke mening hebben over gelijke rechten. Als laatste laat ik zien dat mannen wel voordeel kunnen halen uit inconsistent gedrag, maar dat dit voor vrouwen nog niet geldt.

Het lijkt alsof de maatschappij langzaam aan het veranderen is en dat het feministische stereotype positiever wordt. En hoewel sommigen vrouwen zich nooit zullen identificeren als feminist, heb ik met dit proefschrift enkele suggesties gegeven hoe je ervoor kunt zorgen dat meer mannen en vrouwen zeggen: Ja, ik ben een feminist.





# Bedankt - Thanks!

Writing a dissertation is like raising a family. It is hard, there are many sleepless nights, and sometimes you are dead tired of it and just want to go to a deserted island... But just like with raising a family: It is all worth it. It was a rocky path with some downs, but luckily lots of ups had the upper hand. There were wonderful moments to enjoy (yay! Supported hypothesis!), I got to meet amazing people (Go SISPP!), and it feels fantastic now that it is finally done. As they say in Dutch “*je krijgt er zoveel voor terug*” .

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