Age Justice in a Globalized World

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ABSTRACT

In *Justice Across Ages*, Juliana Bidadanure offers us a framework for thinking about social, economic, and political inequalities between young and old. In doing so, Bidadanure aims to provide a theory that is action-guiding for us in a nonideal world. She develops her account for socially unjust societies and shows how implementing her principles of age justice works “within the grain of social justice”. But while her luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism should commit her to global justice, questions of global justice are entirely absent from her account. In fact, in devising and defending her account, Bidadanure seems to idealize away global inequality and transnational migration. In this critical response, I argue that this idealization renders her account non-action-guiding in the relevant way. I suggest that the plausibility of Bidadanure’s principles of age justice hinges on their application to a globally just world. In a globally unjust world, Bidadanure’s principles may be inconsistent with reducing global injustices.

**Keywords:** age justice, intergenerational justice, global justice, nonideal theory.

1. INTRODUCTION

In *Justice Across Ages* (2021), Juliana Bidadanure offers us a framework for thinking about social, economic, and political inequalities between young and old. In doing so, Bidadanure aims to provide a theory that is action-guiding for us today: the framework should help us to identify whether our societies as they are now treat their young and old as equals, and the principles should tell us how a society can become more just. Our societies, as they are now, are far from socially just. They include many unjust

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1 My great thanks to Tom Parr and three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a political philosophy workshop at the department of government at the University of Essex. I would like to thank David Axelsen for his comments and the audience for their discussion.
inequalities tracking race, gender, and social class. It is a strength of Bidadanure’s account that it, as she puts it, “work[s] within the grain of social justice” (92). Her principles are tools that not only address age-group justice but also guide societies to reduce unjust interpersonal inequalities. Her account is able to do that because in developing it she does not abstract away from social injustice. However, Bidadanure’s account makes a different significant idealization. It is developed for single, closed societies. It assumes away facts about global inequality, poverty, and migration. In this short critical response, I argue that this idealization renders the account non-action-guiding in the relevant way for Bidadanure, making it vulnerable to her critique of Norman Daniels’s account. This is because the plausibility of Bidadanure’s principles of age justice hinges on their application to a globally just world. In a globally unjust world, Bidadanure’s principles may be inconsistent with addressing global injustices, or so I will argue.

In section 2, I briefly introduce Bidadanure’s principles of age justice and explain her commitment to an account that is action-guiding under nonideal circumstances. In section 3, I posit that Bidadanure idealizes away global injustice and explain how this idealization threatens the action-guidingness of her account. In sections 4 and 5, I offer considerations in support of the claim that Bidadanure’s principles may be inconsistent with addressing global injustice here and now, thereby limiting the plausibility of her principles to globally just circumstances. In section 6, I consider objections to my line of critique and defend the assumption that Bidadanure should be committed to egalitarian global justice. Section 7 concludes.

2. PRINCIPLES OF AGE JUSTICE FOR SOCIA LLY UNJUST SOCIETIES

Which social, economic, and political inequalities between young and old matter? Bidadanure proposes and defends three principles by way of an answer. First, the principle of “approximate equality between birth cohorts” distributes resources and opportunities among successive cohorts in a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian manner (42-7). Second, the principle of “prudential lifespan planning for age groups” models the problem of interpersonal distribution as one of interpersonal distribution, and it distributes resources and opportunities between age groups as an
impartial rational planner would distribute resources over a single whole life. The second principle has two components: a “lifespan sufficiency” component that ensures that individuals’ basic needs are met throughout their lives and that they continuously have access to a reasonable set of opportunities adequate for their age group (56-62); and a “lifespan efficiency” component that requires institutions to maximize lifespan utility, emphasizing the diachronic returns of early-in-life investment of resources (62-7). Third, the principle of “synchronic relational equality between age groups” goes beyond demands of distributive equality and demands that institutions realize conditions under which the young and old can relate to each other as equals (100-10).

These three principles are meant to guide us here and now. Bidadanure’s is a nonideal theory of justice (51, 77-9). Bidadanure’s commitment to nonideal theorizing is explicit in her discussion and critique of Norman Daniels’s prudential account of age-group justice, which forms the basis of her second principle. But it is also evident in the space she dedicates to carefully working out how the three principles combine with one another and with egalitarian principles of social justice (120-47).

As Bidadanure points out (50-5), Norman Daniels addresses the question of age-group justice in isolation from questions of social justice. Daniels models the problem of distributing resources between age groups into a problem of distributing resources over a single individual’s lifetime. To know how we should fairly distribute resources among age groups we should ask how impartial planners would distribute resources over a single life. We model impartiality by putting the planner behind a veil of ignorance: the planners don’t know their socioeconomic situation, conception of the good life, or “facts about their health, family situation or genetic history” (54). Daniels argues that behind the veil of ignorance we would choose to distribute resources over a single lifetime prudentially: we would accept having less resources at certain points of a lifetime if that allows us to have more at others.

Importantly, in defending his Prudential Lifespan Account, Daniels “assumes that society is just but for questions of justice between age-groups” (54, original emphasis). This is to say that Daniels’s impartial planners decide how to distribute resources and opportunities across a lifespan against the assumption that the society in question is just from an interpersonal perspective: individuals have their fair share of opportunities and resources. Bidadanure rejects this idealization on the grounds that it renders the outcome non-action-guiding in our world, a world with unjust interpersonal inequalities. But while she abandons the idealization, she does not abandon the principle of prudential lifespan planning. Instead,
she argues that when combined with the other principles in her framework, Daniels’s prudential principle can guide us in achieving age justice here and now. Her argument appeals to insights from the literature on intersectionality and studies on clustering of disadvantage to show how her principles for age justice can reinforce rather than undermine the pursuit of social justice (77-83).

3. IDEALIZING AWAY GLOBAL INJUSTICE

While Bidadanure takes on board the fact that societies have unjust interpersonal inequalities (and that there are multiple sources of unjust inequalities besides age, namely race, class and gender), she makes a different significant idealization: her theory is developed for single closed societies to deal with intra- and interpersonal inequalities among their young and old. It assumes that the world is just but for issues of age justice and domestic justice, and it assumes that individuals live their entire lives in the same societies. In other words, the idealization assumes away global inequalities and global mobility. But not only are global inequality and mobility important features of our world today, global inequalities are among the most egregious (with one’s place of birth being among the strongest determinants of one’s lifelong prospects), and migration can both remedy and exacerbate inequalities. So if Bidadanure’s theory is to guide us here and now, it must be able to guide us in a world of massive global inequalities and increasing global mobility.

Bidadanure’s theory tells us that justice requires that our societies, as they are today, apply her three principles of age justice. In doing so, societies become not only more age-just (reducing unjust intra- and interpersonal inequalities between young and old) but also more socially just (reducing unjust interpersonal inequalities over lifetimes). This alignment between age and social justice is not a coincidence. Bidadanure develops her principles with concerns of social justice in mind, so that the pursuit of age justice is consistent with the pursuit of social justice in unjust societies.

By theorizing for single closed societies, effectively idealizing away global inequalities and mobility, the question of global justice, however, does not arise. Indeed, it is entirely absent from Bidadanure’s account. Are Bidadanure’s requirements for age-group justice consistent with pursuing global justice in a nonideal world? I will suggest that it is not obvious that they are. It is not obvious that in our world of unjust inequalities, unjust border regimes, and noncompliance, Bidadanure’s principles retain their plausibility. But if the plausibility of Bidadanure’s principles hinges on assuming away global injustice, then her account is susceptible to the
same critique she lodges against Daniels: her principles of age justice apply only in a globally just world. Our world is unjust; hence her principles are non-action-guiding today.

Let me clarify further the nature of my critique: I take an inconsistency between applying Bidadanure’s principles and the pursuit of global justice to threaten the action-guidingness of her principles. In her critique of Daniels, Bidadanure acknowledges the concern that Daniels has about applying requirements of age justice to unjust societies. Along with Daniels, she worries that applying the requirements of prudence to an unjust society would be unfair since it would reinforce existing interpersonal inequalities or generate new interpersonal inequalities. For instance, in a society where some are getting much less than their fair share over time, denying a resource to a particular individual by virtue of their age, for instance, may increase complete lives inequalities. Rather, interpersonal justice likely demands that we focus on those worse off, regardless of their age. (78)

As noted earlier, Daniels addresses this worry by abstracting away from social injustice, and Bidadanure finds the abstraction unsatisfying. Bidadanure wants an account of age justice that can guide us today: if we abstract from social injustice, then the principles we derive can guide us only once we achieve social justice, but not in a world that is socially unjust. Bidadanure, therefore, works out principles that address age-group injustice in unjust societies, principles that work “within the grain of social justice” (80). But, by the same token, Bidadanure should find it concerning if applying her principles of age justice reinforced global inequalities or generated new global inequalities. It should matter to her that her principles work within the grain of global justice.

4. AGE JUSTICE IN A GLOBALLY UNJUST WORLD

From a global justice perspective, egalitarians should be most concerned with the resources and opportunities of the least advantaged worldwide. On most egalitarian accounts of global justice, many of the existing inequalities today between individuals worldwide (and between societies) are unjust. Global justice demands that we reduce inequalities in resources and opportunities between those in rich and those in poor countries. Is complying with Bidadanure’s principles of age justice consistent with reducing unjust global inequalities? It’s not clear that it is.

First, I think we have reasons to be skeptical about applying Bidadanure’s
first principle of “approximate equality between birth cohorts” in a globally unjust world. According to the principle “we ought to ensure that successive cohorts have access to their fair share of resources and opportunities” (123). For Bidadanure, the question of what counts as a fair share is settled by appeal to the luck egalitarian intuition that “[i]t is unfair if a birth cohort ends up worse off than the previous generation through no fault of its own” (123). The principle does not specify the scope of the principle. That is, it does not tell us whether the cohorts among whom equality is demanded are domestic or global. Yet it is clear from the discussion that Bidadanure is dealing with domestic cohorts. But while we might accept that inequalities between domestic cohorts are unfair in some sense, it might not be an unfairness that requires redress in a globally unjust world. We might think (and I do think) that when it comes to unfairness in the distribution of a good it matters whether the good in question is justly owned, and that justice does not demand that we ensure equality in the distribution of a good that is unjustly owned, even when the inequality is a result of luck. In our world today, many societies have more than their fair share of global resources and opportunities, with others having far less than their fair share. Arguably, societies like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which Bidadanure focuses on in her book, are among those societies that have well over their globally fair share of resources and opportunities. If I am right that justice does not require fairness in the distribution of unjustly owned goods, then it is no longer clear that we should ensure approximate equality between a younger cohort and an older cohort in countries like France, the UK, and the US, especially in the face of pressing demands of global justice.

One could agree that justice might not require fairness in the distribution of unjustly owned goods but maintain that in looking for avenues to correct global injustice (via redistributing resources and opportunities from rich to poor countries) considerations of fairness are relevant to how we distribute the burden among the domestic young and old. Wouldn’t fairness require, in line with Bidadanure’s first principle, that the old in rich countries bear the bulk of the burden, contributing much more than the young in rich countries to reducing unjust global inequalities? I am not

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2 I have concerns about talking of “a generation’s fault” that are similar if not stronger than the concerns I have about talking of a country’s fault. International mobility further strengthens these concerns: to the extent that our account of justice is sensitive to group responsibility, the fact that members of cohorts might leave or enter the group is problematic. Someone who migrates into a country at age forty will join that country’s cohort of those born in the 80s, but would it be fair to define her entitlements in light of what her generation is owed subject to group-responsibility-sensitive considerations?

3 There is a growing debate about the value of fairness in unjust circumstances. See Christensen, Parr and Axelsen 2022, and Gheaus 2020.
sure. Addressing unjust inequalities between the global rich and poor should, I think, take priority over concerns with fairness in how we distribute the burden of correcting for injustices among cohorts in rich countries. That is to say, if reducing global injustice is better achieved by policies in rich countries that equally burden the young and the old, or even burden their young more than their old, then, perhaps we should implement those policies against Bidadanure’s principles of age justice.

Second, the question of just entitlements is also relevant when it comes to the second principle in Bidadanure’s framework, its lifespan sufficiency component in particular. Lifespan sufficiency requires that we maintain individuals (of any age group) above two thresholds: (1) a threshold of human basic needs and (2) an age-relative and society-relative threshold of “a reasonable array of plans for a given age group in a given society at a given time” (123). One need not be an egalitarian about global justice to wonder whether the second threshold can be agreed on and justified independently of an account of globally just entitlements. What is reasonable as an array of plans for a given age should not be solely determined by deliberative procedures internal to a society, as per Bidadanure’s account (61-2). It must be sensitive to demands of global justice. With an eye on correcting severe global injustice and poverty, what a society deems reasonable for its age groups might go beyond what it is entitled to.

Couldn’t Bidadanure agree with these concerns and maintain that her principles speak to goods that are justly held? Indeed, her principle of approximate equality says that successive cohorts should have access to their fair share. Wouldn’t a charitable interpretation understand this principle as applying to distributing a society’s globally fair share of resources and opportunities between the domestic young and old? It would then seem right to say that wealthy states should distribute resources and opportunities within their fair share between their younger and older cohorts according to Bidadanure’s principles, but that beyond that point considerations of fairness between cohorts no longer apply. In the same way, Bidadanure might accept that deliberation on what counts as “a reasonable array of plans” is subject to a range of constraints including duties of global justice.4

My concern is that while this response maintains the plausibility of the principles, it does so at the expense of the principles’ action-guidingness in the relevant way for Bidadanure. This is because it is unclear to me how we can determine what a state’s global fair share is, or what constraints of

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4 I thank Tom Parr and this journal’s referees for pressing me to address this objection.
global justice are, absent globally just institutions. Bidadanure is guided by her principles when she advocates for (wealthy) societies to implement youth-oriented policies such as a basic income (183-208), youth job guarantee (154-62), and spatial independence (147-8). But I am not sure that we can say with any confidence that the resources and opportunities needed for these policies fall within the just entitlements of wealthy societies.

Given global injustice, it is not obvious that we should aim at approximate equality between cohorts in rich countries, nor for a higher threshold of society-relevant sufficiency. The fact that we shouldn’t will perhaps be clearest in situations where an alternative and feasible distribution of resources and opportunities can be to the benefit of those who are globally worse off. Indeed, one might object to the line of argument thus far by pointing out that given the current state of world politics, it far from likely that rich countries will undertake any serious measures to redress global injustice. The critic might add that it is much likelier that rich countries address the inequalities among their citizens. Faced with these facts about political will, shouldn’t we nonetheless pursue the implementation of Bidadanure’s principles and make some gains in justice?

But to see the challenge, we need not have in mind some global tax-and-redistribute scheme; we could limit ourselves to more immediately feasible and available alternatives. Moreover, instead of asking whether following the principles of age justice is conducive to reducing global inequality, we can set the bar as low as asking whether it doesn’t make things worse. It should be sufficient to worry us if the policies that Bidadanure favors (as approximating age-group justice) make some of the globally worst-off worse off than they would have been had we not implemented those policies. Clearly, evaluating whether they do requires serious empirical research, but it is noteworthy that it does not seem obvious that achieving age-group justice doesn’t harm some of the globally worst-off— that Bidadanure’s account of age-group justice works within the grain of global justice.

Consider that according to scholars of migration and of poverty, migration has been one of the more effective ways of reducing poverty and inequality (Milanovic 2016). And consider that policies which Bidadanure defends as favored by her framework, because they approximate an

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5 Clearly global justice demands the establishment of global institutions that can correct for global inequalities. I am unsure about how we should think about the domestic demands of justice (including age justice) if we know that just global institutions are not coming due to a lack of political will among the beneficiaries and contributors to the injustice themselves. I find it hard to accept that the right way to go about this is to focus on gains in domestic justice.
age-just society, might not be the friendliest to migrants. Take universal basic income, which Bidadanure defends (183-208). Some have raised the concern that sustaining a sufficiently generous basic income requires tighter (than current) restrictions on borders. This is because if a state introduces a basic income, then this will create a strong incentive for individuals from countries without a basic income to migrate to that state. To the extent that these migrants will be low earners or net beneficiaries, this could threaten the ability of that state to sustain a generous basic income (for an explanation of how transnational migrations put pressure on the stability and generosity of unconditional basic income schemes, see Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2010). If so, and if implementing sustainable and generous basic income policies demands higher controls on immigration (or more selective immigration), then it seems that a policy, such as basic income, which we should endorse on Bidadanure’s account would make potential migrants from poorer countries worse off than they would have been absent the policy. We might think that a country could provide a basic income without further tightening restrictions on borders by limiting basic income access to citizens and long-term residents. But there is a legitimate worry that this risks consigning migrants to working menial jobs where they are much cheaper to employ, and further undermining their standing by relegating them to a second-class citizenship, a worry that Bidadanure (2017) shares.

Another policy that Bidadanure endorses on grounds of age-group justice is the youth job guarantee (154-61). Bidadanure defends this guarantee on multiple grounds, including reasons to assist the young even when they are not worse off under cohort equality. Specifically, she argues that part of the age-relative sufficiency threshold for the young is their ability to be financially and spatially independent from their parents (147-8). Here too we should ask about the impact this would have on the availability of job opportunities and affordable housing to immigrants. A youth job guarantee might reduce the available jobs to migrants (or reduce their pay or their conditions) and reduce the availability of affordable housing in urban and accessible areas. I speculate here, but the point is that it is far from obvious that acting on Bidadanure’s principles of age justice doesn’t set back, let alone advance, the interests of migrants from poor countries.

5. AGE JUSTICE AND MIGRATION IN AN UNJUST WORLD

But let us concede that, global injustice notwithstanding, wealthy societies have a legitimate claim to a share of resources and opportunities that they
can distribute fairly among their young and old, and that wealthy societies that implement Bidadanure’s principles do not thereby act unjustly vis-à-vis potentially disadvantaged migrants. Transnational mobility in an unjust world would still reveal problems for Bidadanure’s account, this time due to the (possible) movement of wealthy rather than poor individuals.

To illustrate, consider two societies: Fogland and Sunland. On Bidadanure’s account, justice requires that each society complies with the three principles of age justice. Suppose that Fogland complies. In Fogland there is investment in youth, in securing sufficiency across age groups, and in ensuring that young and old stand as equals. Sunland does not comply. In Sunland, resources and opportunities are not distributed according to the lifespan prudential principle, and the youth are not treated as equals. There is very little investment in the youth, high youth unemployment, youth financial and spatial dependence on parents, and youth political marginalization and disengagement. Instead, Sunland’s policies are to the advantage of those in the middle of their lives. Bidadanure’s account seems to give us the following guidance: Sunland should implement policies that are guided by Bidadanure’s three principles. Fogland should maintain its policies.

Consider now four additional features of the case: (a) Fogland is wealthy and Sunland is poor; (b) the inequality between these two societies is unjust; (c) individuals can migrate between the two societies, with receiving states’ holding a right to exclude; and (d) Sunland fails to treat its youth equally in order to attract migrants from Fogland, who bring resources with them that Sunland uses to benefit its poor.

The (possible) mobility of individuals from Fogland to Sunland risks undermining the stability of complying with principles of age justice in Fogland. This is both because it could decrease the tax base required to sustain policies that secure age justice and because (the possibility of) free-riding on youth investment and old-age protections in Fogland (by Foglanders who migrate in middle age to maximize their earnings) may undermine support for the principles of age justice among Foglanders. The fact that mobility threatens compliance with Bidadanure’s principles is problematic. First, because it reveals yet another way in which Bidadanure’s demands of age justice might be inconsistent with the demands of global justice in a nonideal world. While Bidadanure’s account requires that both Fogland and Sunland comply with her principles, and, presumably, that

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6 All of which Bidadanure takes to characterize an age-unjust society (136-7, 147-8, 154-60, 209-31).
7 I thank Tom Parr for pushing me to think about this case.
they do not undermine each other’s ability to comply with the demands of justice, it is not obvious from a global justice perspective that Sunland is acting unjustly vis-à-vis both Fogland and its own citizens. Second, even if one were to deny that Sunland’s actions may be just from a global justice perspective (that it is just for Sunland to compete in this way for resources on the international scene against a background of unjust distribution), the worry remains for Bidadanure that her principles may not be stable in nonideal circumstances—their stability depends on Foglanders’ and on Sunland’s compliance. This is significant precisely because Bidadanure aims for her account to be action-guiding in nonideal circumstances. Given Bidadanure’s commitment to devising principles of justice that can guide us in a nonideal world, she cannot respond here that her account of age justice need not be sensitive to noncompliance, a feature characteristic of nonideal circumstances.

6. OBJECTIONS

My starting point in this paper was the claim that Bidadanure idealizes away from facts about unjust global inequalities and transnational mobility. I have suggested that taking unjust global inequalities and transnational mobilities into account reveals that Bidadanure’s principles of age justice may be inconsistent with reducing unjust global inequalities. Under global injustice, it is not clear that we should give weight to claims of fairness between old and young cohorts in wealthy countries. Instead, justice demands that we act in ways that decrease global inequalities to the benefit of the globally disadvantaged. Implementing policies that ensure age-group justice, such as basic income or a youth job guarantee in wealthy states may be in tension with reducing global inequalities—namely, via disadvantaging (potential) migrants from poor countries. Furthermore, given global injustice it may be permissible (or even required) for poor states to violate Bidadanure’s principles of age justice at home and abroad (by undermining wealthy states’ ability to comply with these principles).

The plausibility of Bidadanure’s principles depends then on idealizing away global injustice. If we apply these principles to our world as it is, they may reinforce or worsen global inequalities. This is particularly problematic for Bidadanure, since she proposes her account as one that can guide us in

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Note that Bidadanure’s account does not seem to have the resources to limit the impact of noncompliance in order to ensure stability: limiting free riding by restricting access to the social goods and opportunities of old age to those who have contributed their fair share in the past, and those of youth to those who commit to contribute their fair share in the future, would violate Bidadanure’s principle of lifelong sufficiency and is likely to violate her principle of synchronic relational equality.
a nonideal world. Recall her critique of Daniels: Daniels's account is non-
action-guiding for us today because he derives it for societies that are
socially just. But by the same token, Bidadanure’s principles are non-
action-guiding for us today because they are derived for a globally just world.

To further clarify and strengthen this critique, let me consider the
following objection. What if Bidadanure’s focus on justice within single
closed societies is the result not of an idealization but of a normative
commitment? That is to say, what if Bidadanure holds the view that
concerns of egalitarian justice arise only between co-citizens? My critique
casts doubt on the plausibility of Bidadanure’s principles in nonideal
circumstances on the grounds that they conflict with reducing unjust
global inequalities. But if Bidadanure rejects the demands of global
egalitarian justice, then it would seem that she can maintain that her
principles are plausible under nonideal circumstances (thereby not
needing to trade action-guidingness to gain plausibility).

Bidadanure’s relational egalitarian commitments might speak in favor
of this interpretation: it can be harder for relational egalitarians to defend
a global scope of justice (for a discussion of the obstacles that relational
egalitarians face in offering accounts of global justice, as well as a solution,
see Nath 2015). But her luck egalitarian sympathies speak clearly against it.
Recall that her first principle is grounded in luck egalitarian considerations,
namely that people should not be worse off through no fault of their own.
If justice is (partly) concerned with inequalities that result through absence
of fault, then, clearly, it should be concerned with inequalities that result
from place of birth or country of citizenship. I do not see how Bidadanure
can justify restricting the scope of egalitarian justice to the domestic level.
Moreover, her objections to relations of domination, exploitation, and
segregation indicate that migrants fall within the scope of relational
equality.

One might further object that my critique rests on a narrow
understanding of how wealthy states can discharge their duties of global
justice. In particular, one could argue that my critique that Bidadanure’s
age-just policies may be incompatible with adequately addressing global
inequalities because they might require the tightening of borders fails to
consider that states could combine the tightening of borders with increased
aid budgets. However, I would argue that Bidadanure’s hybrid

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9 I thank Tim Meijers for raising this objection.

10 To be sure, it is also possible that Bidadanure’s omission of global justice concerns is not
a methodological commitment (idealization) but simply an omission—the literature on age-group
justice that Bidadanure engages with is state-centric and she inherits its blind spots, in which case
the conclusions of this paper still apply.

11 I thank a reviewer of this journal for this objection.
commitment to luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism, in fact, strongly commits her to attending to border injustice: to how it undermines equality of opportunity for some, through no fault of their own, but also to how borders reinforce, create, and institutionalize objectionable relations between (potential) migrants and citizens (Sharp 2022).

7. CONCLUSION

Bidadanure aims for her account of age justice to guide us in a nonideal world. Accordingly, she develops her account for socially unjust societies and shows how implementing her principles of age justice works within the grain of social justice. But while her luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism should commit her to global justice, questions of global justice are entirely absent from her account. In fact, in devising and defending her account, Bidadanure seems to idealize global inequality and migration away. I have suggested that in a globally unjust world, applying Bidadanure’s principles of age justice may be inconsistent with reducing global injustice.

My argument in this paper is best understood as an internal critique. If Bidadanure is committed to developing an account of age justice that can directly guide societies here and now, and if (I am right that) Bidadanure is committed to egalitarian global justice, then she faces the problem that implementing her principles here and now may go against the demands of addressing global injustice. Bidadanure can maintain the plausibility of her principles, but to do so she might need to give up her ambition to offer a theory whose principles can guide us in a direct manner in our nonideal world.12

It could be that I am wrong about the inconsistency. The considerations and challenges I have offered in support of my argument are admittedly underdeveloped. They require further reflection and substantiation from empirical studies. Note, however, that it would a be an odd coincidence if Bidadanure’s principles worked within the grain of global justice given the account was developed with single closed societies in mind. In any case, the point remains that further reflection and research is needed before global egalitarians endorse Bidadanure’s account of age justice and the policies she recommends.

12 To be sure, I could also be mistaken about Bidadanure’s commitments to egalitarian global justice, in which case the critique of this paper might not disturb her. Setting aside the fact that adopting a statist view of the scope of justice would, as I have argued, be in tension with the hybrid grounds for endorsing egalitarianism, this paper’s argument remains valuable to global egalitarians who are attracted to Bidadanure’s account.
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