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The Influence of Risk-Taking on Bank Efficiency: Evidence from Colombia

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Abstract

We present a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters which is able to capture the influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency and that distinguishes those effects among banks with different characteristics. Cost and profit efficiency are found to be over- and underestimated when risk measures are not accurately modeled. We find that more capitalized banks are more cost and profit efficient, while banks assuming more credit risk are less cost efficient but more profit efficient. The magnitude of these effects vary with bank’s size and affiliation. Liquidity is found to affect cost efficiency only for domestic banks. Large and foreign banks benefit more from higher credit and market risk exposures, while small and domestic banks find more advantageous to be more capitalized. We identify some channels that explain these differences and provide insights for macroprudential regulation.

Keywords: Bank Efficiency, Bayesian Inference, Heterogeneity, Random Parameters, Risk-Taking, Stochastic Frontier Models.

\textregistered:\textsuperscript{C11, C23, C51, D24, G21, G32

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1. Introduction

The modern banking theory shows that banks’ behavior is subject to uncertainty derived from the behavior of borrowers, depositors and financial markets in which banks interact. This type of uncertainty is commonly referred as bank risk-taking. That is, the amount of risk that banks are willing to tolerate, which depends on competition, regulation and corporate governance (see Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Wagner, 2010). In their pursuit of better performance banks tend to engage in more risk-taking. However, excessive risk-taking lead the financial system to be highly vulnerable to shocks (Rajan, 2006). During the global financial crisis of 2007-08 excessive bank risk-taking was associated with banking runs, fire-sales, and financial fragility (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). In response to this behavior, banking regulators have imposed higher capital and liquidity requirements, leverage ratios, and countercyclical provisions for loan losses, among other regulatory measures (see Basel III standards BIS, 2010). Thus, understanding how risk-taking and regulation influences banks performance is a recent concern in the banking literature.

Several studies accounting for regulatory effects have found that stringency of capital regulation is associated with higher bank efficiency, while limiting banking activities discourages efficiency (see Chortareas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Berger and Bowman, 2013). Other studies have focused on identifying the relationship between credit risk, capitalization and bank efficiency (see the seminal work of Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Most of studies exploring these relationships have found that well-capitalized banks are more cost efficient than banks with low capitalization (see Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks with low cost efficiency have been found to exhibit higher proportions of bad loans and to be more prone to default (see Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Tabak et al., 2011, for some evidence from emerging economies).

From the banking production approach (or the so called structural approach), risk-taking has been identified as a crucial element of the banking production process which should be properly modeled into efficiency measurement (Hughes et al., 2001). Recent studies under this approach show that failing to account for risk-taking leads to biased estimations of bank efficiency as well as misleading estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities (Hughes and Mester, 2013; Koetter, 2008; Malikov et al., 2014).

Another widely used approach in the literature is to incorporate risk measures into frontier efficiency methods such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Under this approach, Radić et al. (2012) find capital and liquidity risk to have relevant effects on cost and profit efficiency of investment banks in G-7 countries. Also,
Pessarossi and Weill (2014) find that increases of capital ratios during 2004-2009 had a positive influence on cost efficiency of Chinese banks, suggesting that capital requirements may improve cost efficiency. Overall, these studies reveal that accounting for risk-exposure heterogeneity across banks is relevant when measuring bank efficiency. However, most of studies modeling the effects of risk on efficiency under this approach incorporate only proxies of credit risk and omit other important risks faced by banks (i.e. liquidity, market or insolvency risk). Moreover, omitting heterogeneity sources related to size and type of ownership has been identified to lead to biased estimations of bank efficiency (Bos et al., 2009; Feng and Zhang, 2012; Goddard et al., 2014).

Identifying inefficiency determinants and accounting for heterogeneity is particularly important in the Colombian banking sector given the rapid expansion of the sector in recent years, the important role of foreign institutions and the several mergers and acquisition (M&A) processes that have been carried out. These characteristics have increased the differences in terms of size and capital structure across institutions, which could affect banks’ risk-taking behavior and performance. Furthermore, since 2002 several regulatory measures have been implemented by the Colombian regulators in order to enhance provisions for loan losses, and to set adequate capital and liquidity requirements to limit risk-taking. These measures were initially motivated by a profound financial crisis at the end of 1990’s that evidenced the vulnerability of the Colombian banking sector to external shocks. Previous studies, although failing to control by risk, have found gains in efficiency of Colombian banks in recent years and have identified that large and foreign banks are more efficient than their counterparts. In this context, recognizing differences in the way risk exposure affects different types of banks becomes relevant in order to get more accurate efficiency estimations and a complete understanding of the effects of risk and macroprudential regulation on banks performance.

The aim of this paper is to identify the influence of risk-taking on cost and profit efficiency of banks and to differentiate these effects between banks with different size and affiliation. We contribute to the literature by proposing a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients, which is able to identify the influence of unobserved heterogeneity sources related to risk-taking on cost and profit efficiency of different types of banks. In particular, we analyze these effects on banks with different size and affiliation and account for capital, credit, liquidity and market risk exposures.¹ The model is estimated for the Colombian banking sector using bank-level data for the period 2002-2012. The inference of the model is

¹In contrast to the approach followed in Pessarossi and Weill (2014), we perform the analysis a posteriori after allowing for bank-specific coefficients instead of estimating interactions.
carried out via Bayesian methods that allows us to formally incorporate parameter uncertainty and to derive bank-specific distributions of efficiency and risk random coefficients.

The rest of this paper contains five additional sections. In Section 2 we describe the Colombian banking sector performance and regulation. Section 3 presents the proposed specification, the Bayesian inference, comparison criteria and the empirical models. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5 we present and analyze the main results. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses some regulatory implications.

2. The Colombian banking sector: performance and regulation

During early 1990s the Colombian banking sector was gradually introduced into the global economy by a financial liberalization program following the trend of other Latin-American economies (Carvalho et al., 2009). The program eased restrictions for foreign participation in the banking sector, established a kind of universal banking scheme intended to reduce specialization, and implemented financial regulatory measures to promote competition and efficiency in the financial sector.\(^\text{2}\) As a result, by 1997 most of state-owned banks were privatized. The share of public banks in the financial system’s assets dropped from 43% to 13%, the number of financial institutions grew from 91 in 1990 to 155 in 1997 and the ratio of credit to GDP increased from 30% to 44% (Uribe and Vargas, 2002).

Evidence has shown that the financial liberalization process in Colombia had positive consequences by increasing competition and efficiency, lowering intermediation costs and improving loan quality. However, after some years the greater competition with foreign banks resulted in higher risk levels and a subsequent deterioration of loans quality, especially among domestic banks (Barajas et al., 2002). In 1999 the Colombian banking sector was affected by local and external shocks that triggerred the financial conditions in the sector and lead to a profound financial crisis. The external shock from the Asian financial crisis led to capital outflows and a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. At local level, an economic downturn, and the raise of real interest rates forced to a rapid deterioration of loan quality that eroded the solvency of the sector. Previous studies reveal that this rapid deterioration of the financial sector was mainly a consequence of low provisions for loan losses and modest bank capitalization (Gomez-Gonzalez, 2009). Between 1998 and 2001 several banking institutions failed, and other were merged. Institutions specialized in mortgage loans were absorbed by large commercial banks. In consequence, the number of banking institutions fell from 100

\(^2\)Colombian banks are not allowed to offer some financial services that are included in the standard universal banking approach such as insurance and trust activities.
in 1998 to 57 in 2001; while the annual rate of credit growth declined from 30% to -6% during the same period.

Following the financial crisis, Colombian financial authorities strengthened the regulatory measures intended to enhance adequate provisions for loan losses, and higher capital and liquidity ratios. These regulatory measures were designed under the Basel standards with the aim of accounting for the interaction of credit risk with liquidity and market risk.

Since 2002, risky loans (based on internal loans ratings) were designated as the target measure to set banks provisions for loan losses, rather than the traditional non-performing loans (NPLs). Thus, loan provisions were settled on an ex-ante measure of credit risk instead of being computed using an ex-post measure of credit risk (i.e. NPLs). Market risk was defined as an estimated value by each bank using the Value at Risk (VaR) of its securities portfolio, which was included as an additional component in the capital ratio since 2008. Hence, the higher the market exposure the larger the required capital for the solvency ratio. New definitions of equity capital were also implemented to enhance quality of capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2). Finally, a short-run liquidity ratio (LR) was required for banks to hedge from liquidity mismatches.

Overall, the above-mentioned regulatory measures have served to influence banks behavior due to the incorporation of risk-taking. These measures along with other macroprudential policies implemented in 2006-07 played an important role to avoid the contagion from the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Nevertheless, as we show further, an important decrease in both cost and profit efficiency was observed during that period, especially for small and foreign banks.

During the period 2002-2012 the Colombian banking sector experienced a growing expansion that has been accompanied by the arrival of foreign banks. The aggregated value of loans grew 300% and the ratio of investments to assets doubled. Banks increased their competition in the securities market with non-banking institutions (i.e. Brokerage firms) and also boosted their participation in the money market for short-term liquidity. Several M&A processes were also carried out, con-

---

3Provisions vary according to borrowers rating from 1% for type A borrowers up to 20% for type E borrowers.

4Capital ratio (CR) should be greater than 9% and is defined as equity capital (CE) over risky weighted assets (RWA) plus 100/9 of the (VaR). Formally, \( CR = CE / (RWA + (100/9)(VaR)) \), where \( CR > 9\% \).

5LR is the value of liquid assets over short-term liabilities. LR should be positive for maturities of 7 and 30 days, although it can be negative for 14 days maturities in order to account for the reserve requirement that banks have to fulfill every two weeks. Previous to LR, regulators used a ratio of liquid assets over volatile liabilities.

6The government settled limits to banks positions in foreign currency and extended to two years the period for allowing foreign capital outflows.
centrating financial services in few but large institutions. As a result, risk exposure presented important increases.\(^7\) This has required the regulator to monitor closely credit and market risk and to face the challenges of systemic financial institutions (see León et al., 2012).

Figure 1: Evolution of risk exposure measures by type of bank 2002 - 2012

![Graphs showing the evolution of risk exposure measures from 2002 to 2012 for small vs large banks and domestic vs foreign banks.]

Figure 1 shows the evolution of the credit, liquidity, capital and market risk measures over the period 2002-2012 by distinguishing between small and large banks and foreign and domestic banks.\(^8\) We observe that the ratio of risky loans over total loans has declined for all banks although large and domestic banks exhibit higher levels than small and foreign banks. The ratio of liquid assets over total assets has gradually increased over time, specially for large and foreign banks. Capital ratio seems to be stable for large banks in Colombia while increasing for small and foreign banks. This is more evident during the 2007-08 period coinciding with the global financial crisis (see Berger and Bowman, 2013, for similar findings in the US banking sector). The ratio of securities over total assets has declined

\(^7\)In May 2013, Colombian Treasury Bill (TES) prices decreased 20% in two weeks as a result of the uncertainty related to FED’s exit strategy. This downward trend led to bank losses of COP 2.32 billion that represented 4.87% of their equity capital.

\(^8\)We define small and large banks as those below and above the median of the total assets level, respectively.
over the period, but large and foreign banks have a greater activity in security markets.

2.1. Efficiency of the Colombian banking sector

Early studies of banking efficiency have found evidence of low cost efficiency in the Colombian banking sector during the 90’s although some improvements during the first half of 2000s in merged banks (Estrada and Osorio, 2004; Clavijo et al., 2006). Recent studies have evidenced improvements in technical efficiency and productivity in the sector but large heterogeneity among banks. Sarmiento et al. (2013), using a non-parametric frontier model, found that Colombian banks improved in technical efficiency from 2000 up to the global financial crisis of 2007-08, when efficiency and productivity decreased. They also found M&A to have a significant and positive impact on bank efficiency, and high heterogeneity in efficiency irrespective of banks’ size and affiliation. Galán et al. (2015) estimated input-oriented technical efficiency during the period 2000-2009 using a dynamic Bayesian SFA model. They find out that foreign ownership has positive and persistent effects on efficiency of Colombian banks, while the effects of size are positive but rapidly adjusted. They also identified high inefficiency persistence and important differences between institutions. In particular, merged banks were found to exhibit low costs of adjustment that allowed them to recover rapidly the efficiency losses derived from merging processes.

Finally, Moreno and Estrada (2013) studied the role of market power in explaining efficiency gains in Colombian banks during the 2004-2012 period. By using alternative SFA and non-parametric models, they found a positive relationship between market power and efficiency, which is explained by product differentiation that allows banks to gain efficiency while they do not charge excessive credit prices. However, previous applications have not studied the influence of risk-taking on the efficiency of Colombian banks.

3. Methodology

Frontier efficiency methods have become a very important tool to identify relevant bank inefficiency drivers and to provide useful indicators of performance of the sector and individual institutions. In particular, SFA, firstly introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), presents the advantages of allowing inferences on the parameters, accounting for idiosyncratic errors and modeling firm characteristics that affect directly the inefficiency in a single stage. In this context, bank characteristics related to their risk exposures can be
easily and consistently accounted for in cost and profit efficiency estimations.

3.1. Heterogeneity and risk in bank efficiency measurement

Distinguishing inefficiency from heterogeneity is an important issue in the ef-
ficiency frontier literature. Omitting heterogeneity variables has been identified
to lead to biased estimations of inefficiency (see Greene, 2005). In the banking
literature, Bos et al. (2009) identify these effects on efficiency levels and rankings
when observed heterogeneity is omitted. In particular, in the case of risk exposure,
Radić et al. (2012) evaluate a sample of 800 investment banks of G-7 countries
during the period 2001-2007 and find that omitting bank risk-taking from effi-
ciency estimations leads to underestimating profit efficiency. The authors also find
liquidity and capital risk exposures to be the most relevant factors determining
cost and profit inefficiency.

Unobserved heterogeneity has also been found to affect estimations from stochas-
tic frontier models. In the banking sector, Feng and Zhang (2012) find that fail-
ure to consider unobserved heterogeneity results in misleading efficiency rankings
and mismeasured technical efficiency, productivity growth, and returns to scale.

Williams (2012) estimates a model where the scale parameter of a half-normal
distributed inefficiency is assumed to follow a random structure that accounts for
bank size interactions. However, the author estimates a second stage where cost
efficiency is regressed on a market power index and other bank characteristics,
which may suggest that the initial efficiency scores are biased and inconsistent
(Wang and Schmidt, 2002). Our proposal is intended to model unobserved het-
erogeneity sources related to risk exposure and accounting for bank characteristics
in a single stage.

3.2. A stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients

Since we are interested in identifying unobserved heterogeneity related to the
effects of risk on bank inefficiency, we propose a stochastic frontier model where the
coefficients of risk-exposure measures in the inefficiency distribution are modeled
as bank-specific parameters. The proposed specification is the following:

\[
y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + v_{it} - u_{it} \\
v_{it} \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2) \\
u_{it} \sim Exp(\lambda_{it}) \\
\lambda_{it} = \exp(z_{it}\gamma + z_{it}^*\gamma^*)
\]

\[\text{(1)}\]

\[\text{inefficiency heterogeneity in a consistent single stage.}\]

\[\text{Greene (2005) proposes different methods to deal with this kind of heterogeneity under the}\]
\[\text{frequentist approach. In the Bayesian context, Galán et al. (2014) propose the inclusion of a}\]
\[\text{random parameter that can be modeled along with other observed covariates and which is found}\]
\[\text{to perform well in capturing latent heterogeneity.}\]
where $y_{it}$ represents the output for firm $i$ at time $t$, $x_{it}$ is a row vector that contains the input quantities, $\beta$ is a vector of parameters, $v_{it}$ is an idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal distribution, and $u_{it}$ is the inefficiency component. The inefficiency is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with a firm specific and time-varying parameter $\lambda_{it}$, $\gamma$ is a vector of parameters which are common to all firms, including the constant and, $\gamma^*_{it}$ is a vector of firm-specific parameters intended to capture differences in the effects of covariates across firms on the inefficiency. Therefore, $z_{it}$ is a vector of heterogeneity variables whose effects are assumed to be constant across firms, and $z^*_{it}$ contains a set of heterogeneity variables with bank-specific effects.

This specification with random coefficients in the parameter of the inefficiency distribution is flexible in the sense that some covariates can be associated to firm specific coefficients while other heterogeneity variables may be modeled with fixed coefficients. In particular, the random coefficients are intended to capture differences in the way risk exposure affects efficiency of different types of banks. Thus, the model is able to identify not only the effects of risk on inefficiency but also the type of banks that are more affected by each of the risk exposure measures.

3.3. Bayesian inference

The inference of the model is carried out using Bayesian methods. This approach was introduced in stochastic frontier models by van den Broeck et al. (1994) and allows us to formally incorporate parameter uncertainty and to derive posterior densities of cost and profit efficiency for every individual bank.

We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. In particular, the distributions assumed for the parameters in the frontier are: $\beta \sim N(0, \Sigma_{\beta})$ where $\Sigma_{\beta}^{-1}$ is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all coefficients. The variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, that is equivalent to $\sigma_v^{-2} \sim G(a_{\sigma^{-2}v}, b_{\sigma^{-2}v})$ with priors set to 0.01 for the shape and rate parameters, respectively.

Regarding the inefficiency component, its distribution is assumed to be exponential: $u_{it} | \gamma, \gamma^*, z_{it}, z^*_{it} \sim Exp(\exp(z_{it} \gamma + z^*_{it} \gamma^*))$. The prior distribution of the vector of common parameters is $\gamma \sim N(0, \Sigma_{\gamma})$ with priors for the diagonal precision matrix $\Sigma_{\gamma}^{-1}$ equal to 0.1 for all the coefficients. For the firm-specific inefficiency heterogeneity coefficients, a hierarchical structure is defined, where $\gamma^*_{it} \sim N(\gamma^*, \Sigma_{\gamma^*})$ and $\gamma^*$ is defined in the same way as $\gamma$. Sensitivity analysis is performed to the use of an exponential prior distribution for the inefficiency parameters. In this case they are chosen to be centered in a given prior mean efficiency value $r^*$ following the procedure in Griffin and Steel (2007), where
\[ \exp(\gamma) \sim \text{Exp}(\ln r^*). \] Results show convergence to roughly the same values after the number of iterations described below.

Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and in particular the Gibbs Sampling algorithm with data augmentation, as presented by Koop et al. (1995) for stochastic frontier models, can be used here. The MCMC algorithm involves 50,000 iterations where the first 10,000 are discarded and a thinning equal to 4 is used to remove autocorrelations. Therefore, 10,000 iterations are used for the posterior inference.

We assess the fit and predictive performance of the different models using a version of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) called \( DIC_3 \) and the Log Predictive Score (LPS) (see Griffin and Steel, 2004; Galán et al., 2014, for applications of these criteria to Bayesian SFA models). The former is a stable variant of the within sample measure of fit introduced by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) commonly used in Bayesian analysis. Defining the deviance of a model with parameters \( \theta \) as

\[
D(\theta) = -2 \log f(y|\theta),
\]

where \( y \) is the data, then

\[
DIC = 2D(\bar{\theta}) - D(\theta).
\]

However, using an estimator of the density \( f(y|\theta) \) instead of the posterior mean \( \bar{\theta} \) is more stable. This alternative specification presented by Celeux et al. (2006) overcomes robustness problems when the original \( DIC \) is implemented to random effects and mixture models. The formulation for this criterion is:

\[
DIC_3 = -4E_\theta[\log f(y|\theta)|y] + 2 \log \hat{f}(y) \tag{2}
\]

Regarding LPS, it is a criterion for evaluating the out-of-sample behaviour of different models. This criterion was first introduced by Good (1952) and is intended to examine model performance by comparing its predictive distribution with out-of-sample observations. For this purpose the sample is split into a training and a prediction set. Our prediction set consists of observations corresponding to the last two observed years of every firm in the sample, and the training set contains all the rest. The formula is the following:

\[
LPS = -\frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \log f(y_{i,t_i}|\text{previous data}), \tag{3}
\]

where \( y_{i,t_i} \) represents the observations in the predictive set for the \( k \) firms in the sample and \( t_i \) represents the penultimate time point with observed data for firm \( i \).

\[ r^* \] is set at 0.65, following other Bayesian SFA studies in banking (see Tabak and Tecles, 2010).

\[ ^{12}\text{The implementation of our models is carried out using the WinBUGS package (see Griffin and Steel, 2007, for a general procedure).} \]
3.4. Translog cost and profit models

We use cost and profit functions for the frontier specification in (1), and we represent them with translog multi-product functions. The estimated model is:

\[
\ln c_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m \ln y_{mit} + \sum_{r=1}^R \delta_r \ln p_{rit} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{n=1}^M \beta_{mn} \ln y_{mit} \ln y_{nit}
+ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{r=1}^R \sum_{s=1}^R \delta_{rs} \ln p_{rit} \ln p_{sit} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{r=1}^R \eta_{mr} \ln y_{mit} \ln p_{rit} + \kappa_1 t \\
+ \frac{1}{2} \kappa_2 t^2 + \sum_{m=1}^M \varphi_m t \ln y_{mit} + \sum_{r=1}^R \varphi_r t \ln p_{rit} + v_{it} + u_{it}
\]

\[v_{it} \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)\]

\[u_{it} \sim \exp(\lambda_{it})\]

\[\lambda_{it} = \exp(\gamma_0 + \sum_{h=1}^H \gamma_h z_{hit} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j^* z_{hit}^*)\],

where \(c_{it}\) is the total cost or the total profit, \(y\) are outputs, \(p\) are input prices and \(t\) is a time trend in order to account for technological change. We also account for two types of heterogeneity variables affecting cost and profit inefficiency: A group of bank characteristics modeled in \(z\), which are assumed to have common effects on all banks, and a group of variables \(z^*\), capturing banks’ risk-exposure in the previous period and allowed to have specific effects on the inefficiency of each bank. In order to overcome the problem of calculations of logarithms of negative profits, we correct profit values by a factor corresponding to the absolute value of the lowest profit plus one (see Tecles and Tabak, 2010). Linear homogeneity of the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input prices by a chosen input price. Symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by imposing \(\beta_{mn} = \beta_{nm}\), \(\delta_{rs} = \delta_{sr}\). In the case of the profit function the sign of the inefficiency component \(u\) is reversed.

From (4) cost/profit efficiency of individual banks in each period is computed as:

\[CE_{it} = \exp(-u_{it}).\] (5)

Returns to scale (RTS) can be derived from the cost function as the sum of output elasticities as follows:

\[RTS = \left(\sum_{m=1}^M \frac{\partial \ln C(x, \gamma, t)}{\partial \ln y_m}\right)^{-1},\] (6)

where a RTS measure less than 1 indicates that the production technology present decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, increasing returns to scale are observed if the RTS measure is larger than 1, while if it is equal to 1 it indicates constant returns to scale.
Finally, technical change ($TC$) assuming constant returns to scale is given by:

$$TC = - \left( \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{\partial \ln C(x, y, t)}{\partial t} \right).$$

(7)

4. Data

We employ annual data from 31 commercial banks for the period 2002-2012. This is an unbalanced panel data set from the local central bank (Banco de la República) and the financial supervisory agency (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia). We follow the financial intermediation approach in which banks employ deposits, labor and physical capital to produce loans, securities investments and other financial services.\(^{13}\) We consider as input prices: the price of deposits ($p_1$), which is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total deposits; the price of labor ($p_2$), which is personnel expenses divided by the total number of employees, and the price of physical capital ($p_3$), which is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses (i.e. non-interest reduced by personnel) to total fixed assets. As outputs we consider: loans ($y_1$) including consumer, commercial, mortgage, and microcredit; securities ($y_2$), which includes public and private bonds holdings, and other securities investments; and off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities ($y_3$) measured as the ratio of non-interest income over total income. Non-interest income includes securitization, brokerage services, and management of financial assets for clients, which represent an important source of income for Colombian banks.\(^{14}\) Total costs are considered as the sum of interest and non-interest costs and total profit as the earned net profit.

We consider two bank-specific characteristics with common effects on the inefficiency of all banks. Those are, size ($z_1$), measured as the level of total assets; and foreign ownership ($z_2$), which is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if more than 50% of bank shares are foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. As aforementioned, these effects have been found to be relevant inefficiency drivers in previous studies.

As risk exposure measures with heterogeneous effects on bank-specific inefficiency, we include measures of credit risk, liquidity, capital and market risk in accordance Colombian financial regulation and the Basel III standards. Credit risk ($z_1^*$) is measured as risky loans over total loans.\(^{15}\) This measure of ex-ante credit risk is based on internal loan ratings performed by banks according to the Colombian regulation. This measure of ex-ante credit risk has been used before in the literature to identify

\(^{13}\)Hughes and Mester (1993) provide evidence that confirm that deposits should be treated as inputs (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977, for a discussion on the intermediation approach).

\(^{14}\)In a recent study, Tabak and Tecles (2010) find that omitting OBS as an output over- (under-)estimate cost (profit) efficiency results.

\(^{15}\)Risky loans are based on internal loan ratings performed by banks according to the Colombian regulation. This measure of ex-ante credit risk has been used before in the literature to identify
risk may avoid biased efficiency estimations that have been identified when using ex-post credit risk measures such as NPLs (see Malikov et al., 2014). Liquidity ($z_2^*$) is measured as the ratio of liquid assets over total assets, where liquid assets include cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt instruments and pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations. Capitalization ($z_3^*$) is measured as the ratio of capital equity over total assets. Finally, market risk exposure ($z_4^*$) is measured as securities investments over total assets. All risk variables are included lagged one-period in order to account for inter-temporal effects on inefficiency and avoid reverse causality.

Table 1 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables described above, where all monetary values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant prices of the year 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total loans</td>
<td>3,342,012</td>
<td>4,206,436</td>
<td>11,553</td>
<td>28,267,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>1,265,349</td>
<td>1,339,794</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>6,461,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBS</td>
<td>0.0354</td>
<td>0.0299</td>
<td>0.0266</td>
<td>0.0587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of deposits</td>
<td>0.0248</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of labour</td>
<td>36.44</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>142.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of capital</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>5,503,680</td>
<td>6,425,746</td>
<td>39,699</td>
<td>41,786,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit risk exposure</td>
<td>0.0988</td>
<td>0.0667</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.3839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity ratio</td>
<td>0.2296</td>
<td>0.0945</td>
<td>0.0377</td>
<td>0.8226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital ratio</td>
<td>0.1211</td>
<td>0.0757</td>
<td>0.0448</td>
<td>0.7854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market risk exposure</td>
<td>0.2381</td>
<td>0.1368</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.7478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>1,132,776</td>
<td>1,402,621</td>
<td>15,673</td>
<td>7,722,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total profit</td>
<td>76,927</td>
<td>377,974</td>
<td>-784,642</td>
<td>2,809,771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Colombian central bank and financial supervisory agency.

5. Results

For comparison purposes, we estimate three different cost (C1 to C3) and profit (P1 to P3) models from our proposed specification in (4) by including some restrictions. Models C1 and P1 do not include risk-exposure variables in the inefficiency, so $\gamma_{1i}^*, \gamma_{2i}^*, \gamma_{3i}^*, \gamma_{4i}^* = 0$. Models C2 and P2 include the risk covariates in the inefficiency but restrict them to have a common effect on the inefficiency of all banks; thus, $\gamma_{1i}^*, \gamma_{2i}^*, \gamma_{3i}^*, \gamma_{4i}^* = \gamma_1^*, \gamma_2^*, \gamma_3^*, \gamma_4^*$. Finally, our proposed specification to model random inefficiency coefficients is estimated in models C3 and P3.

Given that our interest is to analyze the effects of size, ownership and risk-exposure on efficiency, we present the estimation results only for the parameters in bank risk-taking in the credit market (see Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).
the inefficiency distribution. Tables 2 and 3, present the posterior mean and probability intervals for the parameters in the cost and profit inefficiency component, respectively. Results for the frontier parameters are presented in the Appendix in Tables A.1 and A.2.\(^{16}\)

Table 2: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameters in the inefficiency distribution of cost models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model C1 (No risk covariates)</th>
<th>Model C2 (Common risk coefficients)</th>
<th>Model C3 (Random risk coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma_0)</td>
<td>1.0350 [0.0142, 0.0591]</td>
<td>0.9046 [0.4875, 1.4407]</td>
<td>0.8925 [0.4532, 1.3128]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma_1)</td>
<td>-0.1981 [-0.2913, -0.0820]</td>
<td>-0.1823 [-0.3041, -0.0762]</td>
<td>-0.1595 [-0.3070, -0.0109]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma_2)</td>
<td>-0.8144 [-1.9580, -0.0943]</td>
<td>-0.6358 [-1.1525, -0.1482]</td>
<td>-0.2198 [-0.4206, -0.0693]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma_3)</td>
<td>0.3058 [0.0845, 0.5280]</td>
<td>0.2962 [-0.0598, 0.6511]</td>
<td>0.2863 [0.0932, 0.5816]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\gamma_4)</td>
<td>-0.8144 [-0.2913, -0.0820]</td>
<td>-0.1823 [-0.3041, -0.0762]</td>
<td>-0.1595 [-0.3070, -0.0109]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean efficiency | 0.8934 | 0.8923 | 0.7102 |
Mean efficiency s.d. | 0.0653 | 0.1466 | 0.2251 |

\(DIC_3\) | 2082.76 | 2416.44 | 2005.79 |
\(LPS\) | -9.62 | -61.57 | -91.79 |

Note: Values for \(\gamma_1^*\) to \(\gamma_4^*\) in Model C3 correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients.

5.1. Model comparison

Model comparison indicators lead to similar conclusions in both the cost and profit models.\(^{17}\) That is, models including risk exposure measures improve from models omitting these variables (C1 and P1). This suggests that risk-taking is an important determinant of banks’ inefficiency. From the models considering risk exposure, those including random coefficients for the risk covariates in the inefficiency distribution (C3 and P3) exhibits the best fit and predictive performance. These results suggest not only that risk exposure measures are important inefficiency drivers but also that risk has different effects on cost and profit inefficiency of banks with different characteristics. An important finding is that including risk

---

\(^{16}\)From the frontier parameter estimates, it is observed that loans, investments and OBS affect positively costs in all models as well as input prices. In the case of profits, the relationship is also positive for loans and investments but negative, although not significant, for OBS. This result for OBS was also found by Tabak and Tecles (2010) in an application to the Indian banking sector. However, they found loans and investments to be not significant when OBS is included in both cost and profit models. Regarding input prices the coefficients are not relevant in the profit models.

\(^{17}\)Lower values for \(DIC_3\) and \(LPS\) indicate better fit and predictive performance.
Table 3: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the inefficiency parameter distributions in profit models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model P1 No risk covariates</th>
<th>Model P2 Common risk coefficients</th>
<th>Model P3 Random risk coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>95% PI</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_0$</td>
<td>-0.9668</td>
<td>[-2.4390, 0.3062]</td>
<td>-1.2045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_1$ size</td>
<td>0.0556</td>
<td>[0.0226, 0.1491]</td>
<td>0.0779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_2$ foreign</td>
<td>1.0120</td>
<td>[0.6873, 1.3594]</td>
<td>1.0347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_1^*$ credit</td>
<td>-2.0264</td>
<td>[-2.8005, -1.3274]</td>
<td>-5.8122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_2^*$ liquidity</td>
<td>0.1925</td>
<td>[-0.6021, 1.0655]</td>
<td>0.5437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_3^*$ capital</td>
<td>-1.4811</td>
<td>[-2.0741, -0.6972]</td>
<td>-1.4367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_4^*$ market</td>
<td>-0.8884</td>
<td>[-1.5174, -0.2640]</td>
<td>-0.9531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean efficiency 0.5150 0.6205 0.6714
s.d. efficiency 0.1638 0.2281 0.3281
DIC3 3168.01 2458.10 2360.85
LPS -180.01 -302.42 -405.94

Note: Values for $\gamma_1^*$ to $\gamma_4^*$ in Model C3 correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients.

exposure measures as inefficiency determinants and also allowing them to have bank-specific effects on inefficiency, have important implications for efficiency estimations. In tables 2 and 3, we can see that the posterior mean cost and profit efficiencies are over- underestimated, respectively, when risk exposure measures are not modeled in the inefficiency distribution; while the dispersion increases. This suggests that accounting for risk exposures in the inefficiency and recognizing bank-specific effects of risk, identify important differences in the efficiency among banks.

Figure 2 exhibits also differences in the predictive efficiency distributions from the three cost and profit models. We observe that location and dispersion of the distributions is affected. Predictive efficiency distributions from models including risk in the inefficiency are more symmetric and the one derived from the model with random coefficients presents less dispersion. These results evidence the importance of modeling heterogeneity regarding risk exposure when estimating bank inefficiency.

5.2. Inefficiency determinants

We observe that size and foreign ownership are important inefficiency drivers in all the models. Their effects are negative on cost inefficiency and positive on profit inefficiency. Previous studies have found similar effects. Chen and Liao (2011) found that foreign banks perform better than local banks because they may deal better with risk exposure given cheaper access to funding sources and more diversification. Fries and Taci (2005) found similar results for banks with a majority of foreign ownership in emerging economies. Regarding size, previous
studies have found that large institutions tend to exhibit greater efficiency associated with higher scale economies (Bos and Kool, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013). In previous applications to Colombian banks, both foreign and large banks have also been found to be more cost efficient than local and small banks (Moreno and Estrada, 2013; Sarmiento et al., 2013; Galán et al., 2015).

This relative advantage of large over small banks has been recently reported in the literature as evidence of the *too-big-to-fail* dilemma where larger banks take advantage of their size to obtain funds at lower cost and to take on more risk (Santos, 2014). Bertay et al. (2013) analyzed a large sample of banks for 90 countries during the period 1992-2011 and found that banks’ interest costs tend to decline with systemic size.

Size and foreign ownership are also key characteristics determining the way credit risk, liquidity, capitalization and market risk affect cost and profit efficiency. This is identified through the random coefficient models. We analyze these effects by type of banks (i.e. small vs large and domestic vs foreign). Figures 3 and 4 present 95% probability intervals of average posterior random coefficients by type of bank in the cost and profit models, respectively. We observe two main results when bank-specific coefficients are estimated: firstly, some groups of banks are
more affected than others taking the same risk exposures; and secondly, the effects of risk exposures become relevant as inefficiency drivers for some types of banks.

5.2.1. Credit risk

Credit risk is identified as a key determinant of both cost and profit inefficiency though with opposite effects. While credit risk is found to have positive effects on cost inefficiency (i.e. negative effects on cost efficiency), it affects negatively profit inefficiency (i.e. positive effects on profit efficiency). These results are identified in both the fixed and the random coefficients models and may suggest that assuming higher credit risk exposures implies expending more resources on monitoring and administering problem loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997) also found evidence on this negative effect of problem loans on cost efficiency in U.S. banks and argue that extra costs may be represented by additional monitoring, negotiating possible workout arrangements, disposing collateral for possible defaults, defending bank’s safety to the market and supervisor, and additional precautions to reserve quality of other loans. On the other hand, in term of profits banks earn extra profits from riskier loans and may have incentives to engage on higher credit risk.

By type of banks, we identify important differences in the way credit risk affect efficiency. Large and domestic banks are found to be less affected in cost efficiency by assuming the same level of credit risk. That is, it is less costly for large and domestic banks to manage problem loans. A possible explanation could be related to the fact that local banks have better information about borrowers which implies that these banks may incur in lower monitoring costs. As to large banks, they may benefit from scale economies that allows them to incur proportionally in lower costs at the same credit risk levels. Regarding profit efficiency, large and foreign banks benefit more from assuming similar levels of credit risk. These types of banks may take advantage from their recognition in order to charge higher interest rates for loans of similar quality.

5.2.2. Liquidity

Although results from our models with common coefficients suggest that liquidity does not have relevant effects on efficiency of Colombian banks, the random coefficients model identifies an important positive effect of liquidity on cost inefficiency (i.e. negative effect on cost efficiency) for domestic banks. This suggests that holding the same proportion of liquid assets is more costly for local banks. This could be explained by the fact that foreign banks may have greater access to interbank markets and to cheaper sources of funding (Chen and Liao, 2011). In the case of profit efficiency, no differences are found in the way liquidity affects efficiency of banks with different characteristics of size and ownership.
5.2.3. Capital

We identify that higher capitalization lead to higher cost and profit efficiency. Reasons behind these results may be derived from the agency problems between shareholder and managers. Shareholders of highly capitalized banks have more incentives to control better costs and capital allocation than shareholders of thinly capitalized banks. This behavior incentivize managers to put in practice cost reducing strategies that lead to higher efficiency. Previous studies have also found evidence showing that highly capitalized banks tend to be more efficient than thinly capitalized banks (see Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Hughes et al., 2001; Koetter, 2008). Berger and DeYoung (1997) also suggest an indirect effect through credit risk. That is, highly capitalized banks have less moral hazard incentives to take on higher risk, and therefore they will incur in less costs.

Regarding differences in the effect of capital on efficiency between banks with different size and ownership, our results may suggest that small and domestic banks benefit more in terms of cost efficiency. However, it is worth to notice that the probability that these estimates are lower than those of large and foreign banks are less than 95%. On this regard, Berger and Bowman (2013) have found that small banks benefit more than large banks from increases in capital specially during the financial crisis. Also, Pessarossi and Weill (2014) have found that domestic banks in China benefit from having higher capital while the effect for foreign banks is not significant. They argue that domestic banks in China have more government
guarantees in case of financial distress. This would increase agency costs between shareholders and debtholders, which would become more important than agency costs between shareholders and managers. In terms of profit efficiency, no relevant differences are found between banks with different characteristics.

Figure 4: 95% probability intervals of average posterior distributions of random coefficients by groups of banks in profit efficiency model P3

5.2.4. Market risk

As to market risk, we find no evidence of important effects on cost inefficiency of Colombian banks. This result holds when heterogeneous effects are accounted for in the random coefficients models, suggesting that market risk is not a cost efficiency determinant for any type of bank. Nevertheless, market risk have important negative effects on banks profit inefficiency (i.e. positive effects on profit efficiency). Moreover, the random coefficients model shows strong evidence supporting that these effects are more important for large and foreign banks, which would have greater incentives to engage in more risk. Large and foreign banks may benefit from having more diversified portfolios and access to cheaper funding sources that allow them to get higher returns on their investments. Also, large banks are the primary dealers of the Colombian public debt market. This condition allows them to obtain higher profits by selling debt bills to small banks, who use them as collateral to obtain liquidity from the central bank and from the secured money market.

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5.3. Efficiency, technical change and returns to scale

The evolution of cost and profit efficiency over time is presented in Figure 5 by groups of banks. We observe that large and foreign banks exhibit higher costs efficiency levels than small and local banks. A possible explanation for the differences between banks with different size may be related to the fact that large banks might be considered by creditors as too-big-to-fail, which allows them to have access to cheaper funding sources. Small banks have been more volatile in both cost and profit efficiency over time, specially after the global financial crisis, while large banks have been more stable and present higher cost efficiency over the whole period. This may suggest that large banks are less sensitive to environmental conditions, possibly due to more stable funding sources. In the case of small banks the result can be seen as opposite in the sense that creditors and depositors may ask for higher returns from those banks as a way to exert market discipline (see evidence in Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Bertay et al., 2013; Hughes and Mester, 2013).

Regarding ownership, although foreign banks present higher cost efficiency than local banks, in terms of profit efficiency they exhibit lower scores and much more volatility over the whole period. The highest difference is observed in 2008 coinciding with the global financial crisis. This suggests that foreign institutions were more affected due to their operations and investments in international markets. Nevertheless, in the last few years, foreign banks have improved and exhibit an increasing trend in profit efficiency.

Finally, we compute technical change and returns to scale from Model C3 and report the results in Table 4 by groups of banks with similar characteristics of size and ownership. In general, we observe technical progress for all types of banks but specially for large and domestic institutions. This can be a consequence of the reorganization processes that these types of institutions have carried out during the period including several M&A. Regarding returns to scale, decreasing returns are observed in the Colombian banking sector, which may suggest low margin for more M&A processes. However, some important differences are found when the analysis is performed by groups of banks. We find that while large and domestic institutions operate at decreasing returns to scale, small and foreign banks exhibit increasing returns to scale. These results coincide with those reported by Galán et al. (2015), who suggest that M&A processes carried out mainly by domestic and large institutions may lead them to be oversized, while small and foreign banks may still present some potential scale gains. Furthermore, the fact that large banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale may confirm that their efficiency gains obey to external sources such as lower funding costs (i.e. deposits, subordinated debt or interbank loans) as a result of implicit government guarantees. On this regard, Davies and Tracey (2014) have found that large banks benefit from subsidies and
that suppressing them makes scale economies disappear.

Table 4: TC and RTS by type of bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank type</th>
<th>TC</th>
<th>RTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>0.0332</td>
<td>1.0473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>0.0522</td>
<td>0.9216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>0.0474</td>
<td>0.9211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0.0425</td>
<td>1.0413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All banks</td>
<td>0.0456</td>
<td>0.9618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Concluding remarks

Risk-taking is an inherent condition of the banking business. However, traditional studies on bank efficiency had assumed that risk is incorporated into bank output without explicitly modeling its role in explaining inefficiency. Recent studies show that failing to account for risk-taking leads to biased estimations of bank efficiency as well as misleading estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities. Likewise, the literature has focused mainly on credit risk, omitting other important risks faced by banks.

We present a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients, which is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity related to credit, liquidity, cap-
ital and market risk exposures. It also provides the first empirical evidence on
the role of bank risk-taking in the inefficiency of the Colombian banking indus-
try. Recent studies on efficiency of the Colombian banking sector have showed
improvements in technical efficiency and productivity among banks. However,
none of these studies have incorporated the impact of bank risk-taking behavior
on inefficiency, which plays a major role in banking production.

Our findings remark the importance of accounting for size, affiliation and risk
exposure in the estimation of banks efficiency. Cost and profit efficiency are found
to be over- underestimated when risk measures are not accurately modeled. More-
over, size and foreign ownership are found to be not only important determinants
doing these studies also key characteristics determining the way credit risk, liquidity,
capitalization and market risk affect cost and profit efficiency.

We find that higher credit risk exposures lead to lower cost efficiency given
greater expenditures on monitoring and administering problem loans. However,
our findings suggest that these costs are lower for large and domestic banks. Large
banks may benefit from scale economies that allows them to incur proportionally
in lower costs at the same credit risk levels, while local banks may incur in lower
monitoring costs given that they have better information about borrowers. We
also find credit risk to be associated with higher profit efficiency and that large
and foreign banks benefit more from assuming similar levels of credit risk.

We also find evidence to support the hypothesis that capital requirements may
contribute to enhance banking efficiency. We identify that more capitalization
leads to higher efficiency in both costs and profits, specially for small and do-
mestic banks. This can be related to agency problems between shareholders and
managers. Shareholders of highly capitalized banks have more incentives to con-
trol better costs and capital allocation, while managers of these institutions have
less moral hazard incentives to take on higher credit risk.

Our results also identify positive effects of market risk on profit efficiency.
In particular, large and foreign institutions have greater incentives to engage in
more market risk. These types of banks may benefit from having more diversified
portfolios and access to cheaper funding sources that allow them to get higher
returns on their investments. Large banks also benefit from being the primary
dealers of the Colombian public debt market which enhances their gains from the
trading activity in this market.

Finally, large banks were found to present higher efficiency than small institu-
tions and to be less affected by the financial crisis. Moreover, the fact that large
banks are found to face lower costs and to have incentives to take on more risk in
credit and securities constitutes a signal for regulators to monitor closely the be-
behavior of these type of banks and their riskiness. Regulators should also consider
alternative measures to limit risk-taking incentives associated with the fact that
large banks may benefit from being considered as *too-big-to-fail*. Work is currently in progress on the relationship between risk-taking and the *too-big-to-fail* dilemma in interbank markets.

Overall, banks’ cost and profit efficiency measures that account for risk-taking may constitute a useful indicator for financial stability considerations given that banks with lower efficiency have been found to be more prone to future bank fails (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008). In this context, regulators should be aware not only of the consequences of macroprudential regulation on banks performance, but also of the different effects that polices intended to discourage risk exposure and those on capital and liquidity requirements have on banks with different characteristics.

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### Appendix

Table A.1: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of frontier parameter distributions in cost models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model C1 Mean</th>
<th>95% PI</th>
<th>Model C2 Mean</th>
<th>95% PI</th>
<th>Model C3 Mean</th>
<th>95% PI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_1 )</td>
<td>3.025</td>
<td>[0.651, 5.395]</td>
<td>4.031</td>
<td>[1.639, 6.182]</td>
<td>2.914</td>
<td>[1.242, 4.282]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_3 )</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
<td>[-0.391, 0.013]</td>
<td>-0.261</td>
<td>[-0.436, 0.064]</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>[-0.339, 0.077]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{11} )</td>
<td>-0.457</td>
<td>[-0.713, -0.201]</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td>[-0.775, -0.251]</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>[-0.584, -0.171]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{12} )</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>[0.072, 0.459]</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>[0.092, 0.515]</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>[0.052, 0.388]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{13} )</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>[0.002, 0.033]</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>[0.004, 0.027]</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>[0.003, 0.023]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{22} )</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>[-0.108, 0.146]</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>[-0.107, 0.183]</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>[-0.071, 0.195]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{23} )</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>[-0.019, 0.013]</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[-0.013, 0.010]</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>[-0.005, 0.008]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta_1 )</td>
<td>-1.678</td>
<td>[-4.807, 2.347]</td>
<td>-4.381</td>
<td>[-7.473, 4.061]</td>
<td>-3.307</td>
<td>[-6.310, 0.640]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta_2 )</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>[-1.730, 3.605]</td>
<td>2.272</td>
<td>[-0.244, 4.209]</td>
<td>1.645</td>
<td>[-0.399, 3.689]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta_{11} )</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>[-0.141, 0.571]</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>[-0.301, 0.264]</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>[-0.253, 0.171]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta_{12} )</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[-0.372, 0.318]</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>[-0.182, 0.331]</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>[-0.075, 0.235]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta_{22} )</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>[-0.443, 0.343]</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>[-0.419, 0.177]</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>[-0.381, -0.031]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_{11} )</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>[-0.110, 0.416]</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>[0.015, 0.547]</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>[0.072, 0.394]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_{12} )</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>[-0.071, 0.319]</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>[-0.144, 0.223]</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>[-0.009, 0.226]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_{21} )</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>[-0.115, 0.140]</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>[-0.154, 0.075]</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>[-0.107, 0.044]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_{22} )</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>[-0.272, 0.008]</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>[-0.207, 0.028]</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>[-0.188, -0.034]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_{11} )</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>[-0.029, 0.017]</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>[-0.033, 0.005]</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>[-0.020, 0.003]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa_{21} )</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>[-0.023, 0.013]</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>[-0.014, 0.020]</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>[-0.014, 0.008]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_1 )</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>[-0.013, 0.028]</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>[-0.019, 0.010]</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[-0.011, 0.009]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_2 )</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>[0.010, 0.119]</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>[0.033, 0.127]</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>[0.043, 0.109]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_3 )</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>[-0.007, 0.000]</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>[-0.006, 0.000]</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>[-0.003, -0.001]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varphi_1 )</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>[-0.021, 0.128]</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>[-0.010, 0.101]</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>[-0.008, 0.057]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varphi_2 )</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>[-0.136, 0.030]</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>[-0.107, 0.005]</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>[-0.073, -0.013]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.2: Posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the frontier parameter distributions in profit models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model P1 (No risk covariates)</th>
<th>Model P2 (Common risk coefficients)</th>
<th>Model P3 (Random risk coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>95% PI</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_1$</td>
<td>0.0533 [0.0023, 0.1381]</td>
<td>0.0296 [0.0036, 0.0621]</td>
<td>0.0873 [0.0039, 0.1750]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_2$</td>
<td>0.0927 [0.0015, 0.2178]</td>
<td>0.0792 [0.0070, 0.2172]</td>
<td>0.0401 [0.0015, 0.1079]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_3$</td>
<td>0.0475 [0.0018, 0.1184]</td>
<td>0.0516 [0.0047, 0.1095]</td>
<td>0.0571 [0.0024, 0.1810]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{11}$</td>
<td>0.0712 [0.0192, 0.1282]</td>
<td>0.0780 [0.0292, 0.1290]</td>
<td>0.0873 [-0.0033, 0.1604]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{12}$</td>
<td>-0.0048 [-0.0110, 0.0008]</td>
<td>-0.0044 [-0.0095, 0.0007]</td>
<td>-0.0029 [-0.0099, 0.0034]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{13}$</td>
<td>0.0116 [-0.0350, 0.0591]</td>
<td>0.0157 [-0.0265, 0.0576]</td>
<td>0.0033 [-0.0754, 0.0694]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{21}$</td>
<td>0.0018 [-0.0021, 0.0057]</td>
<td>0.0015 [-0.0018, 0.0048]</td>
<td>0.0012 [-0.0029, 0.0054]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{22}$</td>
<td>0.2195 [0.0861, 0.3221]</td>
<td>0.1866 [0.0581, 0.2884]</td>
<td>0.0397 [-0.1571, 0.2172]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{23}$</td>
<td>-0.2212 [-0.3014, -0.1322]</td>
<td>-0.2062 [-0.2777, -0.1289]</td>
<td>-0.1467 [-0.2555, -0.0534]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_1$</td>
<td>0.1544 [0.0046, 0.4351]</td>
<td>0.1484 [0.0108, 0.3585]</td>
<td>0.0950 [0.0034, 0.2848]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_2$</td>
<td>0.1802 [0.0065, 0.6177]</td>
<td>0.1726 [0.0126, 0.4098]</td>
<td>0.1515 [0.0050, 0.4716]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{11}$</td>
<td>0.1508 [0.0996, 0.2006]</td>
<td>0.1492 [0.1040, 0.1930]</td>
<td>0.1623 [0.0808, 0.2325]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{12}$</td>
<td>-0.0298 [-0.0066, 0.0154]</td>
<td>-0.0289 [-0.0460, 0.0133]</td>
<td>-0.0354 [-0.0320, 0.0279]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{13}$</td>
<td>-0.0175 [-0.0744, 0.0207]</td>
<td>-0.0283 [-0.0585, 0.0165]</td>
<td>-0.0979 [-0.1702, -0.0233]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{21}$</td>
<td>-0.0836 [-0.1286, -0.0365]</td>
<td>-0.0752 [-0.1165, -0.0324]</td>
<td>-0.0439 [-0.1008, 0.0130]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{22}$</td>
<td>-0.0012 [-0.0009, 0.0004]</td>
<td>0.0017 [-0.0042, 0.0089]</td>
<td>0.0033 [-0.0035, 0.0117]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_{23}$</td>
<td>0.0035 [-0.0040, 0.0013]</td>
<td>0.0023 [-0.0043, 0.0083]</td>
<td>-0.0016 [-0.0104, 0.0057]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_1$</td>
<td>-0.3458 [-0.5945, -0.0978]</td>
<td>-0.3589 [-0.5671, -0.1485]</td>
<td>-0.3092 [-0.5264, -0.0984]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_2$</td>
<td>0.0022 [-0.0070, 0.1111]</td>
<td>0.0022 [-0.0054, 0.0096]</td>
<td>0.0051 [-0.0025, 0.0125]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_1$</td>
<td>0.0364 [0.0141, 0.0591]</td>
<td>0.0373 [0.0184, 0.0562]</td>
<td>0.0364 [0.0184, 0.0562]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_2$</td>
<td>-0.0344 [-0.0513, -0.0179]</td>
<td>-0.0349 [-0.0489, -0.0209]</td>
<td>-0.0359 [-0.0489, -0.0209]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_3$</td>
<td>0.0002 [-0.0013, 0.0018]</td>
<td>0.0001 [-0.0012, 0.0013]</td>
<td>-0.0006 [-0.0012, 0.0013]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi_1$</td>
<td>-0.0401 [-0.0680, -0.0127]</td>
<td>-0.0417 [-0.0653, -0.0184]</td>
<td>-0.0388 [-0.0651, -0.0131]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi_2$</td>
<td>0.0167 [-0.0067, 0.0408]</td>
<td>0.0166 [-0.0029, 0.0364]</td>
<td>0.0099 [-0.0105, 0.0314]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>