TILBURG UNIVERSITY

Understanding Society

Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies

Paper 214

Goffman and the everyday interactional grounding of surveillance

by

Ben Rampton© & *Louise Eley*©

(King's College London)

ben.rampton@kcl.ac.uk

November 2018



This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/

Goffman and the everyday interactional grounding of surveillance

Ben Rampton & Louise Eley

King's College London
www.kcl.ac.uk/liep

Abstract

It is often said that surveillance has massively transformed our social lives (Lyon, Haggerty & Ball 2012:1), but this claim is weakened by the admission that its "effects are difficult to isolate or observe, as they are embedded within many normal aspects of daily life" (*ibid*). Picking up the analytic challenge, this paper investigates the everyday interactional practice and experience of being surveilled, and to do so, it draws on Goffman's account of the interaction order, dwelling closely on 'unfocused interaction', in which people maintain a 'side-of-the-eye', 'half-an-ear' awareness of the people, objects and events in the space around them. Introducing key concepts from Goffman, the paper examines three scenes of surveillance: a woman walking down a city street, two men putting up street stickers (a civil offence), and passengers being scanned at an airport (Pütz 2012). It shows how different senses of potential threat and illegality enter the experience of surveillance, and it builds a rudimentary model. The paper considers only a tiny fraction of contemporary surveillance, but it shows Goffman's value as an analytic resource that can hold large-scale generalisations about 'the surveillance society' to account, allowing us to see agentive responses to surveillance that are too subtle to be captured by notions like 'subversion' and 'resistance'. Indeed, Goffman corroborates Green & Zurawski's 2015 suggestion that surveillance is a basic mode of the social, elaborated in different ways in different environments.

According to the first page of the *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, contemporary developments in surveillance have produced "social changes in the dynamics of power, identity, institutional practice and interpersonal relations on a scale comparable to the changes brought by industrialization, globalization or the historical rise of urbanization" (Lyon, Haggerty & Ball 2012:1). And yet there are empirical uncertainties: "[the] effects [of surveillance] are difficult to isolate and observe, as they are embedded within many normal aspects of daily life" (p.1; also p.9). Comparably, Green & Zurawski argue from an anthropological perspective that Surveillance Studies tends to operate with an "*a priori* categorization of what constitutes surveillance", treating "surveillance as so large, and such a complex set of processes, that it can best be researched and understood through its systems and structures, at the expense of attention to embeddedness in everyday life" (2015:31; see also Ball 2002, 2005, 2009; Ball & Wilson 2000; Ball et al 2015).

In sociolinguistics, our own (sub-)discipline, there is a long tradition of ethnographic work that examines power, ideology and social change in everyday communicative practice. This covers class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, generation etc across a host of sites (including homes, communities, schools, workplaces, clinics, mass & new media). So in principle, sociolinguistics ought to be able to contribute to the studies of everyday surveillance relations advocated by Lyon et al and Green & Zurawski, particularly if surveillance is an interactional relationship between watcher and watched, as many suggest. But somewhat remarkably, there is very little sociolinguistic research on surveillance (see however Jones 2015, 2017; Rampton 2016, 2017:11-12]; Lyon et al 2012:6).

To understand everyday experiences of being surveilled, the ambient monitoring that everyone engages in as a routine matter-of-course provides one obvious starting point. This is the kind of 'side-of-the-eye', 'half-an-ear' awareness of other people, objects and events that we rely on wherever we are go, and there is a detailed account of how it operates in social situations in Erving Goffman's work on 'unfocused interaction' – the interaction that occurs between people who are physically co-present but engaged in separate activities, focusing on different things. In surveillance studies, Goffman is sometimes brought into descriptions of how people manage or evade surveillance at work or in public places, but notions like by-standing and civil

inattention – key elements in unfocused interaction – hardly feature.[1] In sociolinguistics, Goffman has had a huge influence, providing concepts that are now accepted as basic to interactional sociolinguistic description (e.g. 'production formats', 'participation frameworks' [1981][2]), inspiring a major sub-field of sociolinguistic enquiry (politeness studies). But both here and in adjacent fields of communication research, the overwhelming emphasis has been on what Goffman calls '*focused* interaction', in which people do things together, rather than on people carrying out independent activities in each other's presence.[3]

So in what follows, we first outline Goffman's conception of the 'interaction order' (§1), a notion that treats surveillance-like activity as inextricably bound into everyday social life everywhere, regardless of the institutional domain (Jones 2017:170). We then move to a more detailed resumé of Goffman's account of unfocused interaction (§2), introducing the concepts that will play a central part in the analyses that follow. In the three sections after that, we examine the links between Goffman's unfocused interaction and surveillance commonly understood as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon 2007:14). Section 3 examines a video recording of a woman's brief walk down the street from one shop to another, and it shows how ambient monitoring, a relatively relaxed demeanour and institutional surveillance are closely interwoven, contributing to the normalisation of surveillance. Section 4 shifts to two men who engage in the (mildly) illegal practice of posting up stickers, and uses data from participant observation and interviews to bring out differences in their sense of the risks from surveillance, drawing on Goffman to attempt a more systematic account of thought and action at the point committing an offence under surveillance. A rudimentary model emerges which is then explored in §5 in a discussion of interactional experiences of surveillance technology described in Ole Pütz's 2012 study of airport scanning. In the final section, we summarise the analysis and consider its implications for understanding surveillance and social change, the politics of surveillance, and for the theorisation of surveillance itself, extending the account to the agents of surveillance in an appendix.

Overall, our discussion is offered as an interdisciplinary contribution to opening up the interactional experience of being surveilled (Ball 2009:640), making it easier to "isolate and observe" the effects of surveillance "embedded within many normal aspects of daily life" (Lyon et al 2012:1 above). In the cumulative process of comparative analysis that informs our (modest) theory-building, we draw on different types of data (audio-video recordings, participation observation, interviews) and different studies, not just our own. The only technical vocabulary we use is Goffman's (bolding the first use of terms which are especially significant in our analyses),[4] and in what follows, we use Goffman's account of the 'interaction order' as a framework of 'sensitising constructs', which "suggest directions along which to look" rather than 'definitive' concepts which "provide prescriptions of what to see" (Blumer 1969:148). In this way, we seek to contribute to ethnographic

[1] There is only one reference to Goffman in Ball et al's 472 page *Handbook of Surveillance Studies* (2012), two in the 330+ pages of Lyon (ed) 2006, and none in Surveillance Studies Network 2006.

[2] 'Participation frameworks' describe the configuration of participants when someone produces an utterance (addressed or unaddressed recipients, bystanders etc), and 'production formats' describe the capacity in which they are speaking (repeating someone else words? standing for the values they're articulating? etc).

[3] Admittedly, in linguistic anthropological work on indexicality, there is a very rich account of *un*intentional communication and the ways in which we draw inferences about others from much more than just what they say, but this is still usually analysed *within* events that people are participating in together. In ethnomethodological and conversation analytic micro-sociology, there is a growing body of work that uses video-recordings to look at how people interact on the move in public places (visiting museums, walking, driving, cycling), but intentional communication remains the central concern, whether this is person-to-person or mediated by material texts or objects (Kendon 1990; Mondada 2009, 2016:347ff; McIlvenny et al (eds) 2014; Haddington & Raunioma 2014; but see Ryave & Schenkein 1974; Hindmarsh et al 2001:18-19; vom Lehn et al 2001:203-207; Haddington et al 2012; Liberman 2013). In sociolinguistics, there is also a body of research that examines public signage in 'Linguistic Landscapes', and this now extends beyond the analysis of verbal and visual text to a view of how people interact around signs, moving through space (Scollon & Scollon 2003). This is certainly one significant source of nascent sociolinguistic interest in surveillance (Eley 2018; Jones 2017; Kitis & Milani 2015; Stroud & Jegels 2014), but even so, the potential significance of Goffman's account of *un*focused interaction for understanding surveillance remains largely unexplored.

[4] Indeed Goffman's work itself is sometimes seen as rough-and-ready when judged with the lenses used in empirical work influenced by conversation analysis (e.g. Schegloff 2002:322; Goodwin & Goodwin 2004:240). But even here, it is still very well acknowledged as a foundational inspiration (vom Lehn et al 2001; McIlvenny et al 2014:104; Mondada 2009, 2016)

"research on the constitution of surveillance relations and processes in everyday life" (Green & Zurawski 2015:38), developing the view that "'surveillance' is created and produced within social interactions in everyday life, as much as it is located by particular socio-technical networks or organizational institutions" (ibid p.29).

We recognise, of course, that surveillance takes many forms (Green & Zurawski 2015:29; Walby 2005:158; Haggerty 2006) and it is vital right from the start to recognise three dimensions of surveillance that fall outside our concerns here. First, we say nothing of what Simon calls the 'dataveillance' side of surveillance: the administrative design and management of information about individuals (Simon 2005:4; van Dijck 2013), and the ways in which organisations "keep the records, hold the tapes, maintain the databases, have the software to do the mining and the capacity to classify and categorise subjects" (Lyon 2007:23). This is because Goffman offers very little on this. Second, we glance only briefly towards the surveillance that is pervasive in interactional encounters with bureaucracy (cf Ball et al 2015 and note 28 below). On this, Goffman has a great deal to say, dwelling extensively on the relationships between "front regions where a particular performance is or may be in progress, and back regions where action occurs that is related to the performance but inconsistent with the appearance fostered by the performance" (1959:135).[5] But this would draw us away from the gap we see in contemporary sociolinguistics – unfocused interaction. Third, despite the fact that Goffman can throw a great deal of light on group relations, inequality and stratification (Rampton 1995, 2006), we touch only very briefly (in §4) on the part that surveillance plays in the (in)securitisation of particular social groups, treating them as 'suspect communities' (Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2014; Khan 2017; Charalambous et al 2018).

With this view of the paper's scope and limitations in place, we should now turn to a sketch of the interaction order, concentrating on unfocused interaction after that.

1. Goffman and the interaction order

When Goffman is cited in studies of surveillance, his work is usually used to characterise the surreptitious practices with which people in subordinate positions transgress, resist or otherwise adjust to rules and regimes that they are unable or unwilling to follow to the letter (e.g. Jacobs & Miller 1998; Collinson 1999; Helten & Fischer 2004:343; Ball 2005:96,102; Simon 2005:6-8; Cherbonneau & Copes 2006; Lyon 2007:82,166-7; Smith 2007:290,302,308; Gilliom & Monahan 2012:409; Marx 2009:299). Certainly, deception, concealment and collusion are recurrent themes in Goffman's work, but more generally, his *oeuvre* roams eclectically across a plurality of empirical and documentary sources in the pursuit of a rather coherent, cumulative career-long project of analytic distillation, focusing on what he came to call the '**interaction order**' (1983).[6] This involves the very basic structural arrangements, forms of attention and ritual sensitivities that arise whenever individuals are physically co-present, and his argument is that this underpins social activity everywhere. The interaction order is certainly always clothed in the kinds of cultural and institutional particularity that ethnographies describe, and these particularities have to be addressed in any empirical analysis of the interaction order. But Goffman insisted that the interaction order is only "loosely coupled" with institutional systems, roles and relationships, social statuses (age-grade, gender, class etc), cultural styles and so forth (what he called 'social structure' (1983:2)),[7] and as a result, the framework of concepts he developed is unaffected by "standard [sociological] contrast[s] between village life and city life,

[5] For example, front and back stage in a theatre, or the dining room and kitchen in a restaurant

[6] In earlier work, this is referred to as the 'situational' rather than merely 'situated' (e.g. 1963:22-23)

[7] It may help to clarify Goffman's account of the interaction order as a partly autonomous dynamic within social process if we compare it with the way that linguists think of phonology, grammar and lexis as separate levels of language. It takes different analytical vocabularies to account for the forms and rules structuring each of these linguistic levels, and there are, for example, variations in phonological structure which have no consequences for the patterning of grammar. Goffman extends the analogy: The "workings of the interaction order can easily be viewed as the consequences of systems of enabling conventions, in the sense of the ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code or the rules of syntax of a language" (1983:5).

between domestic settings and public ones, between intimate, long-standing relations and fleeting impersonal ones" (1983:2).

So what exactly does the interaction order consist of? The interaction order has a "body to body starting point", and it comes into operation in "environments in which two or more individuals are physically in one another's… presence", whether they are on their own ('**singles**') or in company (in '**withs**') (1983:2). This "co-presence renders persons uniquely accessible, available and subject to one another" (1963:22), and much of this happens in **focused interaction**. Prototypically, focused interaction covers "arrangements in which persons come together into a small physical circle as ratified participants in a consciously shared, clearly interdependent undertaking, the period of participation itself bracketed with rituals of some kind" (1981:7), but it also extends to activities in which talk plays a secondary role like "card games, service transactions, bouts of love making, and commensalism", activities involving an audience and platform format (plays, movies, formal meetings etc) (1983:7), quite large-scale celebratory occasions (ibid.), and to mediated communication such "telephonic connection and letter exchange"[8] (1983:6). In all these settings, participants "share a joint focus of attention, perceive that they do so, and perceive this perceiving" (1983:3). But as well as encompassing focused interaction, the interaction order also involves the presence of people (either as singles or withs) who are engaged in adjacent activity within visual range but *beyond* the circle in which one is principally occupied, and in the **unfocused interaction** that takes place in a larger gathering of this kind, people glean information from (and about) one another in glancing or in passing (1963:24,18). In fact, people are continuously giving off signs of their intentions: "It is not only that our appearance and manner provide evidence of our statuses and relationships. It is also that the line of our visual regard, the intensity of our involvement, and the shape of our initial actions, allow others to glean our immediate intent and purpose, and all this whether or not we are engaged in talk with them at the time" (1983:3). Participants' patterns of attention, "engrossment and involvement" play a constitutive part in the interaction order, and "emotion, mood, cognition, bodily orientation, and muscular effort are intrinsically involved" (*ibid).* "Ease and uneasiness, unselfconsciousness and wariness are [also] central" (1983:3), because "[w]hen individuals come into one another's immediate presence, **territories of the self** bring to the scene a vast filigree of wires which individuals are uniquely equipped to trip over" (1971:135-6). These territories cover a variety of preserves – our bodies, our personal space, our possessions, our reputations, the information about us (1971:Ch.2) – and in one another's presence, we "become vulnerable [not only] to physical assault, sexual molestation, kidnapping, robbery and obstruction of movement", but also "through their words and gesticulation to the penetration of our psychic preserves, and to the breaching of the expressive order we expect will be maintained in our presence" (1983:4). But these preserves aren't just the focus of constraint, prohibition and threat – when we invite or allow others into them, they are also vital resources for courtesy, affection and intimacy (1983:4).

Figure 1: Focused and unfocused interaction



Focused interaction between A & B

Unfocused interaction between C, D & A+B

Key: ↔ : mutually ratified & reciprocated attention
- - - - : ambient awareness

[8] This surely also extends to something like solitary book reading, a literacy event in which for example, there are clearly recognisable opening and closing sequences (picking it up, opening the covers, resuming at particular points etc) and the reader takes up a ratified recipient role intended by the text's author.

To reiterate: focused and unfocused interaction always takes place in settings that are culturally and historically specific.[9] Both individualising and/or collective classification frameworks feature in our identification of others (Goffman 1983:3), and the semiotic signs, expectations and material circumstances informing our interaction will vary from location to location. Nevertheless, within all the social and cultural variability, Goffman sees this embodied orientation to the co-presence of others as universal, maybe with roots in animal behaviour (1983:3,10), and this gives his work a significance that reaches well beyond the classification of tactics in the under-life of institutions, valuable though this can certainly be.

2. Unfocused interaction

Within the framework that Goffman develops, *unfocused* interaction is the most obvious place to start considering surveillance relations. In unfocused interaction in multi-party gatherings, people are conscious of co-present others with whom they are not themselves directly engaged, and whether these others are singles or withs, they themselves will also be monitoring their surroundings in some way or other, since in Goffman's account, every social situation involves "**mutual monitoring possibilities**" (1964/1972:63). In fact to map these social relations, operating either outside or at the margins of face-to-face encounters, Goffman develops quite an elaborate account of how people distribute their attention, organise their bodies, and display ritual respect for one another.

When individuals participate in focused and unfocused interaction simultaneously, orienting both to '**ratified participants**' inside particular conversational enclosures and '**bystanders**' within range (who may simply overhear parts of the talk or actively listen in as eavesdroppers 1981:131ff), their attention is necessarily divided. As well as being involved in the talk or task that is the main focus for ratified participants, they remain alert to the wider field of 'communication in the round' and particularly in gatherings and public places, they may scan the surroundings out of the corner of their eye, checking that there is nothing nearby to alarm them (1971:Ch.1). Both within and beyond the project or encounter in which they are principally engaged, people notice but actively **disattend** objects and activities that can be safely ignored (1974:Ch7; 1981:132), although this distribution of involvement can shift, either gradually or suddenly, so that a person changes from "placidly attending to easily managed matters at hand" to being "fully mobilised, alarmed, ready to attack… or flee" (1971:282; 1981:101-4).

Within these mutual monitoring environments, people also usually design their own behaviour and appearance in ways that display to others that they're not a threat themselves. As well as being able to 'transmit' linguistic signs in talk, people 'exude' information through their **body idiom**, which is open to interpretation by anyone within perceptual range (1970:5-11; 1963:33-35).[10] In addition, "this kind of controlled alertness to the situation will [often] mean suppressing or concealing many of the capacities and roles the individual might be expected to play in other settings" (1963:24-25), and there are a host of 'involvement shields' "behind which individuals can safely do the kinds of things that ordinarily result in negative sanctions" – pieces of furniture, objects, items of clothing, etc (1963:39ff; 1971:344-5).

In fact, in situations of co-presence, there is "strict normative regulation, giving rise to a kind of communication traffic order", and this is different from "the moral rules regulating other aspects of life… (codes of law, regulating economic and political matters; codes of ethics, regulating professional life)" (1963:24). As well as observing these **situational proprieties** in their own body idiom, participants usually collaborate in the maintenance of this normative order, and much of the time they do so through **civil inattention**. In civil inattention,

---

[9] "Each participant enters a social situation carrying an already established biography of prior dealings with the other participants – or at least with participants of their kind; and enters also with a vast array of cultural assumptions presumed to be shared" (Goffman 1983:4);

[10] "In American society," says Goffman, "it appears that the individual is expected to exert a kind of discipline and tension in regard to his [*sic*] body, showing that he has his faculties in readiness for any face-to-face interaction that might come his way in the situation…. In short, a kind of 'interaction tonus' must be maintained" (1963:24-25; 1971:326-7).

> "one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present…, while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from [him/her] so as to express that [s/he] does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design… By according civil inattention, the individual implies that [s/he] has no reason to suspect the intentions of others present and no reason to fear the others, be hostile to them, or wish to avoid them" (1963:84).

Occasions do arise when civil inattention is abandoned. For a variety of reasons (acquaintanceship, business etc), someone may seek to transition from unfocused interaction to a face-to-face encounter, displaying to the person they're approaching that they're no threat with an **access ritual** like a greeting. Alternatively, some violation of situational propriety may occur – someone steps on a toe, talks too loudly, or drops something – and this can instigate either a **remedial ritual**, which involves a variable sequence of interactive moves like 'primes' ('oi!'), explanations, apologies, remedies, appreciations ('thanks') and minimisations ('no problem'), or alternatively, a 'run-in' if for example the source of the infraction pointedly refuses to provide a remedy (1971:Ch.4; 1967; see also Pütz 2018). There are also 'non-persons' – for example, children, servants, and animals – who don't observe situational proprieties and aren't accorded civil inattention (1963:40, Ch.5), and there are others in **opening positions**, like police officers, who have "a built-in license to accost others" (1963:129).

In summary, unfocused interaction involves:

a) perceiving other people's activity from the outside, without being a ratified co-participant in the talk or task they are engaged in, and assuming that they are also aware of you;
b) styling your appearance and bodily conduct in non-threatening ways, broadly in accordance with the proprieties of the situation;
c) actively displaying civil inattention and a respect for the boundaries around the joint activity of 'withs' and the territories of the selves of 'singles';
d) only shifting into a focused encounter with an access ritual that provides reassurance that the approach is non-threatening, or if some un-ignorable infraction is jeopardising situational proprieties.

There are a lot more subtleties in Goffman's work, but this initial sketch should be sufficient to show that he sees unfocused interaction and the ambient monitoring it entails as an ineradicable aspect of our behaviour in social situations. But how is ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction linked with experiences of surveillance, defined as "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon 2007:14). We will explore this in the rest of the paper, and use the resources that Goffman provides to address their connection in everyday experience, beginning with data from Eley's fieldwork in the streets of Frankfurt.

3. Walking in a street and the normalisation of surveillance

The analysis in this section and the next draws on Eley's doctoral research, an ethnographic contribution to the study of Linguistic Landscape Studies that develops an interactional perspective on the regulation, perception and emplacement of signage in a large public thoroughfare in Frankfurt.[11]

Our analysis here focuses on a 3 minute 52 second audio-video recording of a woman leaving one shop, going out into the street in search of another, seeing it and then crossing the road to go into it – all in all, a process that would be hard to beat in terms of day-to-day mundanity (Green & Zurawski 2015:40). As such, it is a good test of our ability to document some lived experience of unfocused interaction with Goffman as a guide, and in what follows, we will consider the woman's humming and general demeanour, different types of ambient attention, and fleeting experience of the city traffic

[11] Eley 2018; see also Scollon & Scollon 2003; Blommaert 2013; Jones 2017; Stroud & Jegels 2014

police, which we recorded with a tiny audio-visual device built into the spectacles that the woman was wearing.[12] Here is a sketch of the background and the main actions recorded on the video.

Background: It's around 3pm on Friday in mid-March. The walker (henceforth 'Inge') is a middle-aged white German woman, who lived for several years in Turkey and speaks Turkish. She lives outside the neighbourhood, but likes to visit it from time to time, when "I'll run a few errands. I'll go to Her Şey[13] [a kiosk], chat with [the owner]. Buy fruit. The usual. Drink tea. Call xxx and ask if he'd like to drink coffee" (taken from Eley's conversation with Inge about her plans before she set off wearing the video glasses). But she hadn't been in the neighbourhood for a while, and was looking for Her Şey "because I didn't see [the owner] last time". During the video replay she tells us: "I'm looking because some shops have closed, I haven't been here since December…. Something is always closing here somewhere"… "Above all, I'm looking for Her Şey. Every time I look for Her Şey. I never find it… I keep looking across *((to the other side of the street))* right. [xx xx] Her Şey. It's on that side *((of the street))*". She started wearing the video glasses at around 3pm and stopped at around 4pm. The replay discussion took place immediately after Inge had finished her walk through the neighbourhood.[14]

Broad outline of actions:

27.42: starts to leave Turkish bookshop with her purchase in a bag and begins humming softly as she moves to the door. (Inge hummed when walking on other occasions during Eley's fieldwork, including when walking with Eley without the glasses on.)

27.46: turns left onto the pavement and walks along it, humming

28.28: crosses a side road (without stopping humming)

28.46: briefly interrupts humming to comment on an Indian bakery with papered up windows, noting that it's been closed: "Oh it's closed or something. Gosh!". Then resumes (Comment during the replay: "This shop on the corner has closed for example, yeah. That was a bakery right? Or something similar or ?")

29.12: moves closer to the left to the shop window and slows down for 4 seconds in front of a display of Turkish books and CDs

29.26 and 29.37: Inge has been looking across to the opposite side of the main road from time to time (28.52 – 29.02) and continues to do so later (29.58 – 30.00; 30.10 – 30.14), but now she stops and looks across road for 5 seconds and then again for 8 seconds at small shop missing a shop front sign displaying its name, with 4 men standing outside (still humming) (Inge during replay: "there I'm looking for Her Şey"). Then carries on walking (and humming)

30.03: comments looking up at shop: "This is new here. Okay?". Resumes humming.

---

[12] Audio-video recording someone walking down an urban street presents a major methodological challenge: how do you decide what parts of the data to analyse? Studying *focused* interaction, the analyst can coordinate their focus with that of the participants they're investigating, but without that anchoring, s/he is presented with a very considerable on-screen array of activities, people, signs and objects, very large and very small, most of which the walker hasn't noticed and/or isn't aware of. Using video glasses with a small camera built into the nose bridge and an audio recorder located inside the right arm (1080P HD Camera Eyewear) helped to overcome this problem, at least in part, because the camera records what is visually available to the wearer when their head is pointed in a particular direction. The view that subsequently appears on the analyst's screen doesn't reveal what the wearer of the glasses is actually looking at, but it does provide a record of her/his head movements and approximate gaze direction, the path they are navigating through the people, objects and built environment ahead, the variable speed at which they are moving, the features and movements of the people and objects most directly in view, and any vocalisations they produce in the course of their movement. This combination of elements provides a base for starting to infer what they are attending to, especially when this is combined with ethnographic knowledge of the walker and the setting, and a debriefing interview in which they watch and comment on the recording retrospectively. So if for example, they move closer to the roadside of the pavement, slow down and/or stop, move their heads left and right up and down the road, it is safe to assume that they are attending to the task of crossing the road, an inference that their next actions will then confirm or challenge (in the latter case, inviting retrospective interview discussion if they don't actually cross the road in spite of its being clear).

[13] The name of the kiosk has been changed to protect the identity of our participants.

[14] Eley wasn't in audio contact with her during the walk, and did not follow her.

30.23: approaches a second side road, glances left twice at small cluster of men (two in city traffic police uniforms), momentarily stopping the humming during the first glance (see below). Crosses the side road (humming again).
30.40: moves to the right of the pavement, and while looking up and down the main road she says she's seen the Her Şey shop front: "((*unclear word*)) there seen it"
30.43: crosses the rather traffic-free main road (humming till she reaches approximately half-way, resuming when she reaches the pavement)
31.05: slows down as she approaches the shop front, which is covered with stickers and posters, and stops humming
31.09: stops walking for nearly 20 seconds to read a poster stuck to the wall outside, going close up to one (no humming)
31.28: moves along towards the Her Şey shop door (resuming humming)
31.30: turns right through the shop door, sees the shop-owner close at hand, and slips straight from humming to a greeting

There are important clues to Inge's shifts of attention and experience of the surroundings in the humming that she keeps up for most of the walk, stopping at particular moments, and Goffman facilitates three observations.

First, Goffman sees humming[15] as a 'side involvement', one among a number of activities that "an individual can carry on in an abstracted fashion without threatening or confusing simultaneous maintenance of main involvement. Humming while working, knitting while listening" (Goffman 1963:43, 70). This fits the video: Inge's main involvement is finding Her Şey, but she drops her humming when she refers out loud to changes that she notices (the shops that have closed and opened since her last visit [28.46, 30.03]), as well as when she stops outside Her Şey to look at a poster (31.09) – in other words, she stops humming when particular things catch or require her closer attention. Second, whereas full-voiced singing would draw attention, the softness of her humming is consistent with situational propriety[16] and the display of civil inattention. This kind of private orientation to music (and other auditory artefacts) involves an "inward migration from the gathering":"[w]hile outwardly participating in an activity within a social situation, an individual can allow his attention to turn from what he and everyone else consider the real or serious world, and give himself up for a time to a playlike world in which he alone participates" (1963:69). The local conventionality of being '**away**' like this is suggested by the headphones worn by a couple of the pedestrians who pass Inge (28.18, 30.38; cf Jenkins 2010:267-9). Third, Inge's humming suggests that she feels relatively safe in the street, presupposing an environment that doesn't demand full alertness, where she can "placidly attend to easily managed matters at hand" (1971:282; also Rampton 2006:107). Right at the start of the recording, it looks as though she expects to find this kind of ambience outside when she starts humming before she gets to the door of the shop that she's leaving (27.42). Indeed, when we ourselves watch the video, the street scene presents "nothing out of the ordinary", only "normal appearances [which] mean that it is safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand with only peripheral attention given to checking up on the stability of the environment" (1971:283): trams and cars, people going about their business, many in work clothes, well-wrapped on quite a cold day, looking at shops, sitting outside in a café with a glass of wine, taking the outdoor opportunity to smoke (cf Stroud & Jegels 2014; Heath, Luff & Sanchez Svensson 2002). There is, though, one episode relevant to institutional *surveillance* when this situation seems marginally less stable.

[15] See Rampton 2006:Ch.3 for an analysis of the interactional affordances of humming in company (in 'withs').
[16] Goffman wrote quite extensively about the vocalisations that people produce in unfocused interaction as singles in the co-presence of others: 'self-talk' (eg 'how did I do that?!'), 'response cries' ('ouch!' or 'wow!') and 'imprecations' ('shit!'), and he attributes at least four characteristics to utterances of this kind. Firstly, they're oriented to deviations from normal conduct (1981:82,89). Secondly, they do not necessitate a response. On the surface at least, they appear to be natural and spontaneous emotional expressions, and they don't seem to be recipient-directed (1981:97,112,114). Thirdly, despite appearances, they are actually very sensitive to the people around them (eg 'sugar!' instead of 'shit!'). They are often styled to be overheard in a gathering, they can provide bystanders a half-licence to start interacting verbally, and they are often adjusted to the audience's sensibilities (1981:97-8).

As Inge approaches the second side road, a man, who has just crossed it and is walking towards her, briefly turns his head right to look down the side road (30.18, see Figure 2), looks ahead again, and then glances back once more (30.19).[17] He passes Inge on the inside of the pavement, and then as she moves closer to the corner with a view down the side road, she also turns her head to look down the side road (even though from the other direction, a car is starting to turn down this street, potentially presenting her with an obstacle when she tries to cross it (30.21)). A group of three men standing and talking come into view, one of them behind a pedestrian barrier (30.22, see Figure 3). Two are in city traffic police uniforms, one with arms folded (behind the barrier), the other with hands held behind his back, while the un-uniformed man has his hands in his pockets. Another pedestrian, who had been walking ahead of Inge and has turned down the side street, can be seen glancing back in the direction of the group. As the threesome comes into view, Inge stops humming for about 2 seconds (30.22-24). She then resumes the tune, turns her head back to the direction she's going (to avoid the bollard ahead 30.26), but then looks back down the side-street once more for a couple of seconds, with the group of three to the left of her vision. After that, she turns her head back in the direction she's going, humming and walking forward across the side road.

Figure 2: Oncoming pedestrian turning head right to look down side road (circled in blue)



[17] In fact, although we certainly can't claim that Inge has noticed any of it since it required quite a lot of replays and slow-motion for us to discern, close-up inspection of the video reveals more. A few seconds before (30.15), there is a man in a blue T-shirt and white apron standing on the corner with his arms folded looking down the side street (in the direction of the three men), and he briefly turns his head towards our oncoming pedestrian who, without changing his pace, also starts turning his head to look down the side street (are they exchanging a couple words?). The aproned man looks back down the side street, and the oncoming pedestrian turns his head sideways more fully to look. The camera that Inge is wearing then swings away to the right, giving a fuller view of the main road, and when this corner scene comes back into view, the man in the apron has disappeared (most likely into the restaurant) and the oncoming pedestrian is getting closer. But he is still looking down the side road to his right (30.18).

Figure 3: The scene recorded by the video-glasses at the moment when
Inge is turning her head down the side-street and stops humming. The two uniformed men are circled in blue, the un-uniformed man in white, and the pedestrian glancing back in yellow.

So what can we learn from all this about ambient monitoring and experiences of surveillance in unfocused interaction? To answer, we can first focus on the walker, turning to the surveillance studies afterwards.

The video we've described lasts less than four minutes, but it provides quite a rich socio-cognitive view of Inge's fluctuating and multi-track attention to the circumstances around her (cf Goffman 1974:Ch.7). Her overall *intention* is to locate and reach Her Şey, and the video captures her actively looking, walking forwards and from time to time *scanning* the opposite side of the road, at one point stopping for over 10 seconds to look more closely (29.26 and 29.37). There are also moments of *noticing* when she slows down (29.12; 31.05), stops (31.09) or comments (28.46; 30.03; 30.40) near things that catch her attention and speak to her cultural interests (in Turkish culture, in the poster at the kiosk which she thought was advertising a reading/exhibition, in the changing neighbourhood). For much of the time, she is '*away'* in the tune that she is humming, although she does this in a way that displays respect for the situation.[18] In fact, she passes more than 20 pedestrians coming towards her on the pavement without any problem, and in doing so, she employs a '*dissociated vigilance*' that "provide[s] a running reading of the situation, a constant monitoring of what surrounds… out of the further corner [of the] eye, leaving the individual [her]self free to focus [her] main attention on the non-emergencies around [her]" (1971:282). Of course the passers-by also contribute to avoiding collision, mutually monitoring and adjusting their own paths as well (Goffman 1971:28; Ryave & Schenkein 1974; Haddington et al 2012:¶40-42,47).

But beyond the different kinds of (often simultaneous) awareness [19] displayed in Inge's practices, what about her experience of organised institutional surveillance? There is a non-smoking sign on the door of the bookshop that she leaves, and as Jones notes, this implies that "someone… is watching… to make sure that [customers] do not engage in these prohibited activities" (2017:154). But in the recording, it appears only very briefly at the edge of the screen – Inge doesn't appear to pay any attention to this on the video (and doesn't light up when she gets outside). Nor does she look up at any of the CCTV cameras that she passes.[20] It is most likely that both types of surveillance are just

[18] Indeed, as Goffman notes, activities "differ widely in the involvement prescribed for participants sustaining them. Some, like traffic systems, are properly sustained as an off-and-on focus of attention whose claim upon the participant is deep only when there is sudden trouble to avoid" (1974:345).
[19] On the simultaneity of different kinds of awareness, see Goffman 1974:Ch.7
[20] Judging from Eley's photographs of the street, there are at least three CCTV cameras that she walks past.

taken-for-granted,[21] but this is *not quite* the case with the two uniformed employees of the city traffic police she passes, even though their 'opening position' means that they might also be taken for granted. Here it looks as though she is alerted to something non-normal by the two rightward glances of the pedestrian coming towards her, and she appears to pay greater attention to the scene with the traffic police when she glances towards the group for 4 seconds (30.22 – 30.26), momentarily stops humming (30.22 – 30.24), and then looks back for 3 seconds as she moves past (30.26 – 30.29). But that's it. The body idiom of the three men suggests nothing untoward (arms folded, hands clasped behind back, hands in pockets); "as the individual moves, some potential signs for alarm move out of effective range (as their sources move out of relevance)" (Goffman 1971:301); and "the actions of passers-by form a chain of embodied events that signal and help maintain normalcy in a situation that at first glance might appear extraordinary and unusual" (Haddington et al 2012:¶35) – the oncoming pedestrian whose sideways glancing Inge copied didn't look unduly concerned, and nor does anyone else.

If we turn to the literature in surveillance studies, this account of the subjective experience of surveillance is very broadly compatible with the phenomenological approach suggested by Friesen et al (2009) and Ball (2005:96-98, following Crossley 1995, 2001), addressing "lived space, lived time, lived body, lived human relations" and "a-thematic consciousness" ("awareness that is not intellectual, interpretive or deciphering") (Friesen et al 2009:85,88). But as an empirical method, the introspectively generated narratives that Friesen et al recommend are unlikely to be able to capture the synchronised interplay of physical movement, built environment, body idiom, gaze and vocalisation recorded in the 10 seconds of video in which Inge oriented to (non-)events with traffic police down the side-street. Indeed, more generally, the narratives produced in interviews are likely to have quite serious limitations as sources of insight into the lived experience of surveillance. This is because narratives tend to dwell on what's tellable (and often a little bit more dramatic), thereby missing the mundane unremarkable-ness of surveillance in a scene like the one that Inge experienced during her walk (cf Green & Zurawski 2015:28,31).[22] And yet it is essential to address this humdrum ordinariness if we are interested in the *normalisation* of surveillance (Lyon et al 2012:1). In fact, the combination of Goffman and an audio-video recording like this allows us to spotlight the very practices with which the normality of surveillance is produced and maintained – mid-afternoon on a Friday for Inge at least.

So here, for example, we have observed her ignoring CCTV cameras and taking the surveilled prohibition of indoor smoking for granted (a prohibition implicitly ratified by the outdoor smokers Inge passes?). For a passing moment, cued by the head turns of an oncoming pedestrian, Inge attends to a scene with uniformed men, but there is nothing in their body idioms or in those who've observed them to suggest anything unusual. Nor indeed is there anything in Inge's own behaviour to cause concern to anyone employed to surveil the streets: her conduct and appearance are well-adjusted to the norms of the situation, and she and others seem sufficiently confident of their safety to relax into distractions they enjoy (humming, headphones), staying vigilant enough at the same time not to collide with objects and other people, as well as alert to how others are distributing their attention. In other words, the official surveillance supported by organisations here seems to be inextricably interwoven with the routine practices of unfocused interaction that everyone performs in Inge's vicinity as she takes a walk looking for Her Şey on Friday afternoon.

But of course our account has been closely tuned to the experience of one particular person, a respectable middle-aged woman. The links we've made to Goffman should be sufficient to show that our case isn't utterly idiosyncratic, but even so, experiences of surveillance differ considerably, and it

[21] Can it be said that in wearing these video glasses, Inge was herself was carrying out surveillance? Not if we follow the definition of surveillance offered in the Appendix, where we characterise surveillance as "predominantly unfocused interaction in Goffman's sense, in which one of the parties concentrates more closely on the others, without communicating with them directly about their concern with threats to well-being, sometimes feeding the information gleaned through observation into focused interaction within their own 'team'". Inge wasn't tuned to specific kinds of risk in her observation of the scene around her, and she wasn't targeting particular types of people or activity. From the information she received on Eley's project, she knew of our interest in people's everyday conduct and perceptions of their surroundings, and she was simply asked to go about her usual day-to-day activities when she put on the video glasses.

[22] Indeed, in this context, it is maybe worth noting that she didn't comment on the side-street episode during her playback interview.

is worth now turning to a case study of two people with everyday interests that bring them closer to the borders of legality. In the process, we will develop another angle on how surveillance is experienced, and start build to a model to represent this.

4. Posting up stickers and the experience of feeling surveilled

It is a civil offence in Frankfurt to post up stickers (small pieces of adhesive material carrying text and/or images) in the street, and the local authorities and public transport operators employ cleaners to take them down. Eley's PhD fieldwork included a number of individuals and groups who regularly put up stickers in the neighbourhood she was researching (which also had more CCTV cameras than any other part of the city). While some engaged in stickering for fun, because they liked particular stickers and enjoyed seeing interesting or amusing ones around, others used them in social, political and commercial projects that they were committed to, and their stickers carried messages about welcoming migrants, new musical outlets and so forth (cf Eley 2018). In both categories, people said that they liked to have some stickers ready in their pockets whenever they went into the streets. We didn't video anyone placing stickers, but we asked about and/or observed the process, and it is worth comparing what two of them told us.

Adnan was in his late twenties, was born in Turkey, came to Germany as a child, now ran a small business, and put up stickers if he liked the political message or found them entertaining. Talking about putting up stickers on trains, he said:

> "Yeah because vandalism is anti-social ((*laughs*)). It's vandalism vis-à-vis the City… There are cameras everywhere... Yeah or ticket inspectors are there" (translated from German).

And he explained how he actually posted them up:

> "Just like that, put it in your hand... Sticker is here, you hold it so like ((*bends fingers inwards to cup hand, traces with other hand the rectangle shape of the sticker*)) you take the backing away and ((*stretches arm out as if leaning with hand against surface*))… Looks as though it was already there" (translated from German).

Figure 4: Preparing to place a sticker covertly (not demonstrated by Adnan)



In Goffman's terms, Adnan was using his hand as an 'involvement shield', concealing the sticker and disguising his action as a mundane stretch or lean.

James, also in his twenties, had been born in the UK but spent a lot of time growing up abroad. During a stay in Frankfurt he became increasingly involved in a third sector organisation and

remained in the city, supporting himself by working as a waiter. His stickers promoted the work, projects and politics of the organisation, and when we asked him about stickering, he said:

> "no I don't care about cameras. a lot of people care about cameras, I don't... like I don't think anybody is gonna look at a camera twenty-four hours. and even if they see somebody sticker something they're like okay. like if you go graffiti something maybe be a bit more wary. but a sticker like yeah it's not much".

And here is Eley's field diary about walking with him from one of his organisation's events to the nearest tram stop:

> "James left a trail of stickers along the route that we walked. While he walked, he took the backing from the back of the stickers and placed them on objects along our path, including two bollards, and he left one unstuck on a car. He appeared calm and unconcerned with who may be watching him, not looking around or over his shoulder at all, for example to see if CCTV cameras or any individuals were watching him. He took care and time to place the stickers straight, by holding them at the corners, and then wiped his hand over the top to stick them securely."

There are obvious differences in James and Adnan's approaches to being surveilled, and Goffman's account of the remedial interchanges that sometimes turn unfocused into focused interaction helps to systematise them. In remedial interchanges, says Goffman, it is important to distinguish between (a) an act and (b) its categorisation or not as an offence, and (c) the interaction following the act in which the moral status of the act and its perpetrator is negotiated (1971: 99,102,106). So when, for example, a person does something which appears to breach situational propriety ('the deed'), people in the vicinity are likely to display some concern, and it is how the actor then responds to their display – whether or not s/he appears repentant, convincingly disowns it etc – which determines whether the deed is deemed 'inoffensive' and normal order is restored, or whether further sanctions need to be pursued. Both Adnan and James are committed to the act of stickering, but in Adnan's account, bystanders and CCTV watchers would object to the act and initiate an interaction that could lead to sanctions. His concealment strategy was not only designed to hide the act but to provide him with a ready denial if held to account ('the sticker was already there'). In contrast, James didn't think that anything could happen (no one would be watching CCTV and stickering wasn't serious enough to pursue). But he did imagine other people reacting to his stickers, and this influenced where he placed them: he didn't put them up on surfaces belonging to local and migrant-run businesses as "they're… in the same bracket as us who are working class. They're the people we wanna get on our side." If/when the staff have to scrape the stickers off, "they'll see the name and might think negatively towards the project". In addition, he said he knew when and where cleaners went about their business, and generally posted his stickers up at times and places where they were likely to last longest. So overall, James worried less about being spotted doing something illegal than about creating a bad impression on people that he didn't want to alienate, or about choosing a spot where the sticker would have a chance of surviving longer. Comparing the two, Adnan's concerns were much more immediate – being seen committing the act and being accused of an offence – and their differences on the issues at stake in provoking a remedial sequence are laid out in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of how Adnan and James' anticipate the act of stickering leading to remedial interchanges[23]

a) *who could observe the act and/or its outcomes, when?*:
Adnan: CCTV cameras and ticket inspectors – now, during the emplacing
James: nobody will be looking the CCTV; later on, local business and car owners, cleaners

b) *what would they think of it?*:
Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – vandalism
James: CCTV operators – too minor to pursue; local car & business owner – a nuisance, requiring time-consuming removal; cleaners – a work task

c) *what actions would they be likely to pursue if they spotted the act?*
Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – they'd pick you out and intervene, now or later
James: CCTV operators – nothing; locals – scrape off the stickers, and think badly of the project being publicised; cleaners: scrape them off

d) *what are the implications of all this for here-and-now performance of the act?*
Adnan: conceal the act of stickering, and be ready with a disclaimer
James: ignore the CCTV and carry on stickering as normal; don't post stickers up on local businesses, or use adhesive on local cars; put them on surfaces that cleaners seldom work on

This difference no doubt partly reflects differences in their ethnicity and biographical experience: on other occasions, Adnan talked about racial profiling and encounters he had had with security personnel. But staying with the close-up exploration of experiences of surveillance, we can bring in Goffman's notion of the ***Umwelt*** to differentiate Adnan's perspective from James'. The *Umwelt* refers to "the sphere around the individual within which… potential sources of alarm are found" (1971:297), and when stickering, Adnan's sense of *Umwelt* threats was quite pressing. James certainly imagined the negative reactions and remedial actions that his stickers could generate, but from his own account and the way he went about stickering, he didn't attend to any immediate risks on hand. We can't say for sure whether James' *Umwelt* orientation was closer to Inge's than Adnan's when he was posting up stickers, but if we bring Inge back into the account, we can differentiate experiences of surveillance more clearly.

As Inge walked down the street, there was a ten second period when the gaze direction of another pedestrian and the sight of a scene in which there were uniformed men drew her attention, but there was no inkling of any untoward event, transgressive act or perpetrator (to which, for example, she might be drawn in as witness). More generally, other than the cars, oncoming pedestrians and street furnishings that her dissociated vigilance helped her to avoid, there was little sense that Inge was watching out for particular threats or types of people who were likely to draw her into remedial interchanges. This was ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction, running along with a

[23] It is important to distinguish these calculations from the way in which James and Adnan thought about the reception of the content that the stickers carried. The content was addressed to audiences who, they anticipated, would respond to the stickers' images, assertions and information, laughing, dis/agreeing or going to the website. This communication was obviously mediated artefactually rather than face-to-face, and would happen some time after the posting itself, but it was designed to get passers-by to see or read pictures and texts that Adnan and James wanted to draw to their attention to. In other words, this was focused interaction (in mediated form). In contrast, the figures imagined by Adnan in potential remedial interchanges started out as bystanders, and were less concerned with the sticker's message than its adhesive, more likely to see mess than art or politics, reading the text for clues to its culpable source rather than its representation of the world. These figures and reactions belonged to *unfocused* interaction, and they were avoided (or ignored) rather than ratified as targets that the stickers were addressing. (Of course, actual individuals could take a sticker both ways – cleaners might be amused or sympathetic to particular texts – but their reactions would be steered by their institutional roles.)

respectfully conducted side-involvement (humming), interspersed with noticings and scannings in search of her destination.

Adnan also described unfocused interaction but there was much more than dissociated vigilance or being 'away' in the conduct he described. Rather than operating like Inge with a generalised awareness of whoever happened to be in the vicinity, Adnan was alert to the threat from very particular social types when he posted a sticker up – officials nearby or behind the CCTV – and he engaged in fabrication: "an intentional effort… to manage activity so that… others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is going on" (1974:83). His actions appeared to take a determinate shape that he was able to reflect and report on, and if we combine this with concepts offered by Goffman, we can suggest a general structure for the experience of surveillance that Adnan described:[24]

i. an experience of surveillance like Adnan's starts when an individual considers carrying out an act that they know is sometimes regarded as an offence;
ii. s/he reckons with the *Umwelt,* and imagines co-present observers who are likely to see his/her act as an offence, to view him/her as a suspect, and to initiate particular kinds of remedial sequence (see Table 1)
iii. s/he decides whether to abandon the act or go ahead with it, concentrating on body idiom to conceal it if they opt for the latter
iv. the experience ends either when he/she moves out of range of the observers and relaxes, or when the surveillers declare themselves, maybe in uniform or through a public address system, at which point some kind of synchronous interaction takes over (an arrest, a remedial interchange etc).[25]

As a short-hand for this kind of experience of surveillance, with its heightened but disguised concern with surveilling bystanders, we can perhaps refer to Adnan's only-apparently unfocused conduct as 'crypto-focused' interaction under surveillance, distinguishing this from the fluid and multi-track ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction that we saw with Inge on the one hand, and on the other, the kind of focused encounter that his targeted concealment seeks to evade.

But in developing a model involving fabrications and heightened *Umwelt* awareness, are we losing touch with *ordinary* everyday experiences of surveillance, and/or simply repeating the accounts of deception that feature most prominently in interpretations of Goffman in surveillance studies? Is our account site specific? Can processes like the ones we have described be found away from the background awareness and subjective imaginings of surveillance that occur in a street? What about all the points at which human bodies intersect with surveillant technologies in very well defined ways? In everyday life, notes Lyon, people take it for granted when they "key in their PINS, use their passes, scan their RFID entry cards, give out their Social Insurance numbers, swipe their loyalty cards, make cell-phone calls, present their passports, surf the internet, take breathalyzer tests, submit to face iris scans…. in routine ways" (Lyon 2007:164). Can Goffman's unfocused interaction and/or our elaboration of it speak to routine compliance at points like these where "the surfaces of contact or interfaces between… life-forms and webs of information,… between organs/body parts and entry/projection systems" (Bogard 1996:33, cited in Ball 2005:94; Simon 2005:17; Ball 2005, 2009, Ball & Wilson 2000)? In the next section, we will explore these issues with the ethnographic description and Goffmanian theorisation in Ole Pütz's account of scanning at an airport security check point.

[24] It is tempting to call this a 'surveillance event' from the vantage point of the surveilled, but at least in sociolinguistics, this isn't possible, because 'events' involve focused interaction and are generally associated with two-way exchange, a shared understanding of the particular kind of event that people are participating in (which helps them to coordinate their utterances and actions), and, very often, "clearly recognisable opening and closing sequences" (Gumperz 1972:17-18). In contrast, here the opening and closing are deliberately masked from the people that the surveillee has in mind, and the whole activity is unilateral, designed to *avoid* the two-way exchange involved in any remedial sequence that the act might spark if spotted.
[25] There is another possibility: the surveilled address the surveillers, turn them into an audience - see Smith 2007:293-4, 299.

5. Airport security scanning and close-up interaction with surveillance technology

Pütz' study focuses on the brief but highly standardised process of preparing for an airport security check, stepping through a metal detector scanner, and being patted down by security staff if the scanner raises the alarm (2011:164). This is a situation in which it is hard for travellers to ignore the fact that they are being actively surveilled as a potential security threat, but Pütz details the ways in which everyone intensifies the effort to act as if nothing untoward is happening. He notes that the closer passengers come to the checkpoint itself, the quieter they become, dropping conversation and turning off their cell phones (p.172). One adult enters the walk-through metal detector at a time and "if the scanner detects metallic objects, screeners must identify who raised the alarm and pat this traveller down to locate the source of the alarm on his body" (168). At this point, Pütz brings Goffman into the analysis, and proposes that this patting-down potentially violates the travellers' personal space (cf 'territories of the self' in §1). But the screeners and travellers conduct this "breach of personal space in a way that reduces the social implications of bodily proximity" (173). The screeners use a hand-metal detector, "a lifeless technical object"; they wear gloves so there is no skin to skin contact; and they avoid "private parts and do… not linger long on any part of the body" (173). The travellers who are stopped and patted down "avert their eyes while being patted down and focus visually on a point in the middle distance. They thus minimise the appearance of [focused] interaction, because eye contact is a clear indicator of [this]… [But they] do not fully avert the eye or stare dreamily into space; they are able to observe the situation out of the corner of the eye and stay cooperative" (p.173).

Pütz draws on the notion civil inattention to account for this conduct, and in fact remedial interchanges are also potentially relevant to the description. At this particular point of the security process, involving the scanning of bodies (and personal possessions), the unstated question organising the procedure is: "Do you carry weapons or contraband which is a source of risk?" (2012:169). This question is itself potentially offensive to travellers, casting doubt on their moral character, and this contributes to the de-personalising avoidance strategies that Pütz outlines (175). But in addition, Pütz notes that "some travellers duck while [entering the scanner], although they could easily pass through. Other travellers take a deep breath before stepping through the metal detector. Some pause right in front of it and take one large step, as if passing a point of no return." (171). These sound like cases of what Goffman calls a 'body gloss', which involves the "relatively self-conscious gesticulation an individual can perform with his whole body in order to give pointed evidence concerning some passing issue at hand" (1971:160). Goffman lists several kinds of body gloss, and two could be particularly relevant here: "no-contest signals" showing that "no offence is being taken" (1971:156),[26] and 'overplay glosses', produced when "circumstances… arise which cast some doubt on [the individual] being in full control… The individual throws [him/herself] into what would … become of [her/him], but [s/he] does so in an unserious manner, thereby covering any signs of real constraint by much larger unserious ones of the same kind" (1971:167-8).[27] To arrive at a more precise classification of these body glosses, it would take video-recordings of individuals entering the metal detector, which Pütz was prohibited from making, and indeed, as in ethnography more generally, there is often quite a significant element of interpretive leeway and indeterminacy when Goffman's categories are applied to actual strips of conduct (Levinson 1988; Irvine 1996). Even so, the relevance (and empirical subtlety) of Goffman's framework should be clear. Indeed, it is worth comparing Pütz's account with the details of our own account of street surveillance in order to see whether in spite of the obvious differences, Goffman can point us to some underlying commonalities.

Starting with our characterisation of Adnan stickering, there are several obvious differences to the airport scene. At the point where they start to interact with surveillant technologies, the surveillees are

[26] For example: "In our own middle-class society…, there is a standardised little… smile, held overlong,… 'transfixed' so that throughout the whole period of an offender's behaviour he will be accorded a sign that… no contest is involved, and that sympathy is present for whatever alignment to the situation he chooses to take" (1971:156).

[27] Goffman gives examples of 'overplay' like the following: "Lifting a heavy object which might expose him in naked effort, a man enacts utter strain unseriously… Falling down on a skating rink or ski slope, the overturned performer plays it big, taking the fullest possible fall, ending spreadeagle, and stays longer than necessary in that position. Walking on a narrow plank that requires some balancing effort, the individual guys the balancing act as though [they] were walking on a slippery wire" (1971:168).

guided by different concerns/main involvements: posting up a sticker *vs* getting on the plane. The technologies also work differently: CCTV scans the street and picks out individuals and activities that have/are/could compromise security and public order, often differentiating among pedestrians by age, ethnicity, gender as well as activity and appearance. The step-through substance detector at the airport is used on all the passengers, regardless of social and personal identity, and it is looking very specifically for materials associated with weapons, explosives and other disallowed items that could endanger the flight. These differences in the main involvements of the participants and the ways in which the technologies search for sources of alarm can be linked to different readings of the *Umwelt* and different orientations to remedial interchanges.

As we saw in the comparison of Adnan and James (Table 1), stickerers vary in their interpretations of potential reactions to their acts of sticker emplacement – Adnan was wary of CCTV when stickering, while James' was nonchalant, and this influenced their conduct. But in the airport scanner, a standardised interpretation of *Umwelt* risks takes over and governs everyone's behaviour (someone could be trying to board the plane with material that threatens everyone's safety). The difference extends to remedial interchanges: although Adnan and James differed in their accounts of the who, when, what etc of reactions to their stickering, both of them wanted to avoid remedial interchanges. In contrast, as noted above, the airport passengers were already drawn into a remedial sequence, positioned as suspects and probed with technologies which investigated whether they were carrying material they shouldn't. But the practices associated with unfocused interaction allowed them to co-construct this as an impersonal passing-through, and passengers let staff go about their business undistracted, disattending the incursions into their own personal preserves at certain points, at others using body glosses to display their compliance. We don't have a record of Adnan's unfocused interaction practices while he was actually emplacing a sticker, though we can assume that he fabricated a body idiom that displayed respect for situational propriety (as well as using his hand as an involvement shield). But this obviously didn't involve the intricate coordination between surveillers and surveilled taking place at the security checkpoint.

Even though these experiences of surveillance are obviously very different, it looks as though Goffman's account of unfocused interaction, remedial interchanges and the *Umwelt* are relevant to both, and this allows us to go one step further schematising the differences. Pütz characterises the airport scanning process as a 'non-event', despite the fact that the procedure is very clearly standardised and structured, with a rather well-defined beginning and end, as well as embodied (rather than just imagined) interaction between passengers and security staff. But he calls it a non-event because it does not acknowledge the passenger as an individual (2012:158) – turning back to Goffman, we can suggest that this is one of those "'blind' transactions, in which persons come together to accomplish a joint activity but do not bracket this spate of mutual coordination ritually, that is, do not sustain a social encounter", which would involve "an exchange of words or other recognition rituals and the ratification of mutual participation in an open state of talk" (1971:97; also 1963:88ff). In fact, the 'non-event' classification invites further elaboration in our differentiation of experiences of surveillance. So on the one hand, we have

- focused interaction, where, for example, security staff abandon their surveillant position as by-standers and engage the (erstwhile) surveilled in a mutually acknowledged encounter such as a remedial interchanges (as in stop-&-search). Alternatively, the (formerly) surveilled act up to the cameras (Smith 2007).

Then on the other, we have:

- *un-focused* interaction, exemplified by Inge's ambient awareness, her ease in an *Umwelt* characterised by normal appearances, doing nothing likely provoke a remedial sequence, displaying only a very fleeting interest in uniformed personnel, taking surveillance for granted for the rest of the time;
- *crypto-focused* interaction under surveillance, involving the appearance of unfocused interaction even though actor's attention and actions are directed towards co-present observers. This was

Adnan, concealing his activity from the CCTV and uniformed personnel that he was now more acutely aware of, and was keen to avoid any remedial engagement with;

and now:

- *non-focused* interaction under surveillance, involving surveillers and surveilled in a collaborative refusal to initiate a ritually ratified engagement, already finding themselves in a highly standardised remedial interchange, with the surveilled seeking to relinquish the status of suspect as soon as possible.

The lines between these four types of interaction are obviously porous – un-, crypto- and non-focused interaction can swiftly become focused, crypto- can slip back to unfocused, and so forth. But returning to the questions that motivated this section, we can say that yes, our Goffman-inspired account of ambient awareness and surveillance in the street can be applied to close-up interaction with at least some surveillance technologies, and it can cover compliant as well as non-conformist conduct. We certainly can't claim to cover either the full list of digital operations that Lyon refers to (PINS, loyalty cards etc etc), or the kinds of surveillance that start in focused interactions with bureaucracy (as we acknowledged at the outset).[28] But through a cumulative process of comparative analysis we've elaborated a number of Goffman's concepts that should at least provide a starting point for further investigation of experience under surveillance, and in the Appendix, we sketch the case for extending this to the surveillers.

It is worth now turning to the broader implications of our analyses.

6. Summary and conclusions

Our discussion of scenes from everyday life has tried to show that Goffman's work provides a multitude of empirical "entry points" into the (inter-) subjectively lived experience of surveillance, in all its "ubiquity and relative normalization" (Lyon et al 2012:9). At first glimpse, it might look as if some of the Goffman's key concepts are principally intra-mental, referring to psycho-cognitive processes and states, only accessible introspectively or in interviews or structured elicitations ("attention", "involvement", "respect for situational propriety"). But Goffman is centrally concerned with the interactional constitution, display and management of these feelings and perceptions in practices that we can observe and record – as Luff et al note, "awareness is a gloss for a set of practices" (2008:432) – and this means that they can be investigated *in situ* in a plurality of settings.

[28] In the unfocused interactions central to this paper, surveillance is conducted in the here-and-now by co-present observers who are usually out-of-focus in the background, and this can happen anywhere. But there are other kinds of surveillance that involve institutional organisation stretched across time and space, that start in focused, client-facing interaction and then pass information about the client 'back stage' without their knowledge. These two types of surveillance obviously aren't mutually exclusive – for example, CCTV control rooms involve spatial separation and often belong to organisations with elaborate reporting systems. But surveillance by co-present bystanders watching in the background isn't involved in bureaucratic processes like those analysed by, for example, Ball et al (2015), who describe the ways in which front-line staff in UK travel companies and financial organisations have to watch out for indications of criminal and terrorist activity when they are talking to clients, managing potentially conflicting concerns with sales and security within these encounters, generating data that passes back for closer scrutiny in other organisational units if there are suspicions (2015:139-140, 160). More generally, say Ball et al, surveillance is pervasive inside focused interactional encounters with bureaucracy, since "surveillance… is a process of information gathering, analysis and application that makes modern living possible", and "as bureaucracies developed to manage local populations and supply goods and services, so did information systems containing records of individual customers and citizens" (Ball et al 2015:22). Admittedly, within this kind of backstage bureaucratic surveillance, a number of the elements associated with unfocused interaction still apply: being interested/alert to relations and activities in which you yourself aren't/weren't/won't be a ratified participant (≈ [a] in §2 above); pursuing this interest discretely (≈ [c]), or engaging in access rituals or remedial interchanges when broaching it with clients/customers/ patients etc (consent forms, parking tickets etc etc) (≈ [d]). Territories of the self and information preserves are also still at issue (privacy and confidentiality), and there are intricate and highly relevant accounts of detection, deception, collusion and the ways in which people try to manage potentially discrediting personal information elsewhere in Goffman's work on focused interaction (e.g. 1959, 1963a, 1970). Even so, it should be clear that main focus of our paper here – information gleaned from unfocused interaction between watcher and watched – isn't the only concern in contemporary surveillance.

Our efforts to "isolate and observe" the effects of surveillance have prioritised the kinds of social activity where *bystanders* (and eavesdroppers) are most significant – unfocused interaction. Using Goffman's framework as our theoretical/technical resource, we first scrutinised a recording made with video-glasses and identified a range of actions produced by the walking wearer and the people around her that pointed in quite specific ways to the interplay of different types of attention and awareness – actions involving directions of gaze, head, arm and body movements, changes of pace and path, vocalised utterances and humming; types of attention and awareness such as guiding intentions ('main involvements'), noticings, side-involvements and 'aways', civil inattention, dissociated vigilance.[29] For the most part, Inge seemed to take organised surveillance for granted, and her experience looked consistent with Goffman's observation: "whatever range of risk and opportunity an environment contains, the individual exposed to these considerations typically comes to terms with them, making what adjustments are necessary in order to routinely withdraw [her/his] main attention from them and get on with other matters" (1971:283). But experiences of surveillance are of course heavily influenced by activity and setting, as well as stratification, inequality and difference, and our second case study drew on participant observation and interview data to look at two men putting up stickers, an act that counts as a civil offence. Here, Goffman's account of remedial interchanges helped us to map differences in their expectations of being surveilled, and to bring out differences in their sense of *Umwelt* vulnerability. From there, we outlined a stage-by-stage model of the intensified reckonings and calculated actions involved in the stickering under surveillance experienced by the man who felt less secure, and contrasted this with Inge's ambient awareness. We took this model further in the third scene we considered, exploring the experience of surveillance with a different technology – the airport security scanning described by Pütz. Here passengers' conduct was governed by a standardised public interpretation of ambient risks (rather than the individual assessments found in the previous case), and rather than avoiding them like the stickerers, passengers were placed inside remedial interchanges with very little say-so. But staff and passengers impersonalised the interchange through practices of civil inattention, also often making light of it with body glosses, effectively producing unfocused interaction rather than ritually ratified encounters, despite the bodily proximity involved. Seen together, these cases cover only a tiny fraction of the different ways in which people experience being surveilled (leaving out dataveillance and the surveillance in bureaucratic encounters), but our analyses do at least demonstrate the value of Goffman's concepts, and in our elaboration of them, we were able to distinguish three types of interaction under surveillance – un-, crypto- and non-focused.

All this represents an initial attempt to map unfocused interaction as a dimension of communication that sociolinguistics has hitherto rather neglected, despite its relevance to debates about surveillance.[30] Admittedly, a study dedicated to, for example, the *comparative* analysis of recordings from video-glasses worn by different types of walker would benefit from a more technical transcription than we have provided (see e.g. Mondada 2009). But that would be more than required in a cross-disciplinary paper like this, which looks towards empirical processes that have yet to be properly explored, describes the support that Goffman can provide, and points to ways in which interactional and ethnographic sociolinguistics can start to build its account of surveillance, contributing to work in surveillance studies.[31] At least in our own work, we see three kinds of contribution.

---

[29] It is perhaps worth adding that there is no one-to-one mapping of actions and forms of attention. Both for actors and for analysts, sense-making is always locally situated and draws on highly contingent configurations of signs and inferential orientations (cf Goodwin 2000).

[30] Certainly, there have been good reasons for this oversight. If one has an interest in the concerns, practices and life worlds of the people under study, it makes much more epistemological sense to start with how they talk or interact in tasks together than to concentrate on their conduct with peripheral bystanders and passers-by. Visual and embodied signs typically play a more important part in unfocused interaction than linguistic ones, and for a long time, socio*linguists* regarded them as less interesting. Technologically, sound recording has been easier than film and video in data collection, leading to a focus on speech in focused encounters.

[31] There is of course also a great deal of scope for ethnographic and interactional sociolinguistic contributions to the study of surveillance in focused interaction, and in the 'New Literacy Studies' that developed in the 1980s, there are precedents that are relevant to data management and dataveillance.

Up until the 1980s, in what Brian Street called the 'autonomous model of literacy', reading and writing were commonly seen as neutral technologies that had universal cognitive effects unaffected by context, and the distinction between literate

First, one of the most obvious implications of our approach is to hold large-scale generalisations to account, providing resources with which to examine the manner and extent to which "technological innovations fundamentally alter the organisation, practice and effects of surveillance relationships" (Simon 2005:1), changing "the dynamics of power, identity, institutional practice and interpersonal relations on a scale comparable to… industrialisation, globalisation and… the rise of urbanisation" (Lyon et al 2012:1). If some of the practices and relations that Goffman described in embodied interaction can be found in technologically mediated surveillance, then surveillance before and after technological change can be compared, interrogating the alteration more closely. All the cases we have discussed involved at least partly embodied interaction, but the concepts we have used are also relevant to surveillance in entirely web-based communication (Jenkins 2010). Marwick and boyd, for example, investigate US teenagers' concerns about 'social surveillance' by friends and family, arguing that social media present them with entirely new experiences of exposure because of on-line 'context collapse'. Off-line, they suggest, "different social contexts are typically socially or temporally bounded, making the expected social role quite obvious [but] technology blurs the boundaries between formerly strict categories" (Marwick 2012:386); "social media technologies collapse multiple audiences into single contexts" (Marwick & boyd 2010:1). There is, though, a challenge to this in Goffman's civil inattention (boyd & Marwick 2011:25), deriving as it does from our ability to divide attention and handle the co-presence of a lot of different people as a matter of routine, managing a main involvement with ratified participants at the same time as disattending – but remaining alert to – others in the vicinity, known and unknown. In other words, the experience of public exposure notionally associated with context collapse isn't exclusive to on-line environments, and isn't generally very problematic. Off- and on-line communication are obviously different, but with Goffman, we can investigate the differences with more specific questions, such as: what semiotic strategies and resources take the place of body idiom in displays of situational propriety in online gatherings? How far and in what ways does digital platform architecture provide new or different resources for concealing negatively sanctionable acts ('involvement shields') and so forth (cf Westlake 2008)[32]

---

and pre-literate was regarded as a 'great divide', giving "a new lease of life" to the idea that there were major differences in the thinking processes of social groups, describable as "logical/pre-logical, primitive/modern and concrete/scientific" (Street 1984:24). But this view of literacy was seriously challenged by ethnographies which pointed to a plurality of different forms of literacy with different socio-cognitive effects in different communities, and the description of 'literacy *events'* provided crucial evidence. These were defined as "occasions in which written language is integral to the nature of participants' interactions and their interpretive processes and strategies… In such literacy events, participants follow socially established rules for verbalizing what they know from and about the written material. Each community has rules for socially interacting and sharing knowledge in literacy events" (Heath 1982:50). With literacy events in focus, ethnographers described elaborate but regular patterning in the ways that literacy was woven into specific types of talk, specific activities, roles, genres, purposes etc. These descriptions were combined in comparative accounts that controverted the 'great divide', and replaced the literate/non-literate binary with a very differentiated view of varied literacy practices (a.k.a. literac*ies* in the plural) (Heath 1983 and Street 1984 are the classic texts).

There are echoes of Street's 1984 critique of the autonomous model of literacy in Van Dijck's deconstruction of 'dataism' and the idea that Big Data is a 'neutral paradigm', "gathering [and analysing] data… outside any preset framework [or…] purpose" (2014:202, 206). Treating the design and interpretation of surveillance data as 'literacy events' would also be a productive way of investigating the 'pragmatics' involved in e.g. the construction of digital data profiles/data doubles, processes that are guided by institutional priorities rather than just assembling information in neutral portraits of real individuals (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:614). And when Walby argues that the bureaucratic dynamics of surveillance should be studied by following the traffic of "databases, forms, dossiers, records, reports, etc., [that] connect surveillance agents and subjects", looking at how "texts are created, translated, forwarded, interpreted, in order to explicate how surveillance processes connect down with the local and connect up with various institutions", there are strong potential links to detailed sociolinguistic studies of textual trajectories, which examine the ways in which writing in the here-and-now selectively inscribes only some (and not other) aspects of a scene into texts that are intended to carry forward into other settings ('entextualisation'), and how these texts are then reinterpreted when (and if) they arrive there ('recontextualisation') (cf Bauman & Briggs 1990; Blommaert 2005,2008; Kell 2015; Maybin 2017).

[32] Goffman's framework can also help researchers avoid what Schegloff calls "premature antiquarianism" in the study of fast-evolving digital communication technologies, where researchers find that the technology they have been analysing "of course, changes – often before the publication comes out" (2002:290). To avoid this, Schegloff says that investigators need to have "a clear notion of the more general processes or domains of phenomena they study[, capturing] the way in which that technology embodied the value of some variable with greater staying power, however transiently" (ibid). Goffman provides a very substantial array of variables "with greater staying power" of this kind.

Second, our study has implications for political interpretations of surveillance. Lyon et al claim that "surveillance, although a normal everyday process in many contexts, is one which is inherently political: its very application constitutes a polity" (Lyon et 2012:1). In an important though abstract sense, this is true in so far as control and influence are at stake. But whether or not the people involved in a surveillant relationship *experience* it as political – as oppressive, necessary, acceptable or nothing of note – is subject to the kinds of variation we have described, in which the observation of others is hard to separate from negotiations of propriety and respect for personal preserves. In surveillance studies, there is a risk that this variation is overlooked, and that no distinction is drawn between "intrusive forms of intelligence and pervasive forms of everyday surveillance, including inside the academic literature" (Bigo 2017:3). Such a conflation of the intrusive and mundane has at least two effects. First (and of immediate concern to Bigo), a failure to distinguish the intrusive from the everyday can be used by professionals in the security field to "justify an extension of intrusive intelligence" (Bigo 2017:3), bolstering this with claim that as a pervasive feature of daily life, people aren't worried about surveillance. Second, if it is all seen as intrusive, there is a temptation for research on everyday experiences of surveillance to emphasise resistance: "closing blinds, shredding documents, purchasing anti-surveillance devices, or learning how to 'hide in the light' (Lyon et al 2012:4; Marx 2009). This runs with the narrower reading of Goffman mentioned at the start of §1, and it can also sometimes lean towards de Certeau's rather romantic account of everyday practice as a set of activities that, "far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance" (1984:96). But how accurate would it really be to classify Inge's experience of surveillance as one of de Certeau's "surreptitious creativities" (ibid), or equally, to apply a formulation of that kind to the ways that security personnel and travellers collaborate in the production of unfocused interaction at the airport scanner?

Last, our analysis has implications for the theorisation of surveillance itself, which we can tie to one of Green & Zurawski's central questions: Can surveillance be seen as a basic mode of sociality that is elaborated in different ways in different environments – surveillance as "a dimension of the social" that becomes "manifest in other activities and practices" that are perceived (or not) as such (2015:29,35; also Simon 2005)? Our answer is 'yes'. Unfocused interaction involves: being alert to others beyond the task or encounter that you're focused on, and knowing you're also visible to them; styling your conduct and outward appearance to conform to the proprieties of the situation, restricting intrusive gazes either way with civil inattention; and shifting to direct engagement only if you can display benign intent or there's some un-ignorable infraction. Most if not all these forms of awareness, practices and concerns seem fundamental to sociality, and in our three case studies, we have seen how different ways of enacting unfocused interaction contribute to the normalisation of institutional surveillance, as well as to the ways in which sharper experiences of being surveilled are differently configured.

In surveillance studies, Foucault's panopticon has been a cardinal reference point (1977). In contrast, Goffman's work has made only a rather minor contribution, being drawn into the description of how subordinates cope, often with references to Goffman's early work on impression management and *Asylums* (1959, 1961). But as we have tried to show, Goffman has a much broader view of interaction, seeing it as a fundamental form of sociality. Contemporary developments are likely increase the relevance of this perspective. In Foucault's panopticon, the inmate "is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (1977:200). Goffman also wrote a great deal about people being the objects of information, but his starting assumption was that even though people's agendas and constraints might be very different, this monitoring is *mutual.* Seen from this vantage point, the panopticon looks like an attempt to *limit* and *restructure* interactional capacities and practices of the kind we have discussed – indeed, in the C17th plague prevention order with which Foucault opens his account of panopticism, there is lockdown and a ban on gatherings, a primary site of unfocused interaction.[33] More recently, however, the view has been growing that the panopticon is no longer adequate as model of contemporary control (Deleuze 1992;

[33] "everyone is ordered to stay indoors: it is forbidden to leave on pain of death… If it is absolutely necessary to leave the house, it will be done in turn, avoiding any meeting… [Space is] segmented, immobile, frozen… Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment" (Foucault 1977:195)

Fraser 2003; Rampton 2016). Haggerty, for example, speaks of 'tearing down the walls,… demolishing the panopticon" (2006), and like others, he opts instead for Foucault's notion of governmentality, allowing more scope for the activity of the governed: "while governance inevitably involves efforts to persuade, entice, coerce or cajole subjects to modify their behaviour in particular directions, the targets of governance are understood to be a locus of freedom… subjects as active agents" (2006:40). Haggerty conceptualises this interactional agency more narrowly than we suggest, prioritising "resistance, avoidance or subversion" (ibid)). Even so, if Goffman is given the kind of broader reading that we have attempted, his work can serve as a central point of departure for investigation of the everyday enactment and experience of surveillance in contemporary life.

References

Ball, K. & D. Wilson 2000. Power, control and computer-based performance monitoring: Repertoires, resistance and subjectivities. *Organisation Studies* 21/3:539-65

Ball, K. 2002. Elements of surveillance: A new framework and future directions, *Information, Communication & Society*, 5:4, 573-590

Ball, K. 2005. Organisation, surveillance and the body: Towards a politics of resistance. *Organization.* 12/1:89-108.

Ball, K. 2009. Exposure: Exploring the subject of surveillance. *Information, Communication and Society* 12/5:639-57

Ball, K., A. Chanoto, E. Daniel, S. Dibb, M. Meadows and K. Spiller 2015. *The Private Security State? Surveillance, Consumer Data and the War on Terror.* Frederiksberg: CBS Press

Ball, K., K. Haggerty & D. Lyon (eds) 2012. *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies.* London: Routledge.

Ball, S. 2013. *Foucault, Education and Power.* London: Routledge.

Bauman, R. & Briggs, C. 1990. Poetics and performance as critical perspectives on language and social life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19: 59-88.

Bauman, Z. & D. Lyon 2013. *Liquid Surveillance.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bigo, D. 2008. Globalized (in)security: The field and the ban-optican. In D. Bigo & A. Tsoukala (Eds), *Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (pp. 10-49). London: Routledge.

Bigo, D. 2017. Beyond national security, the emergence of a digital reasons of state(s) led by transnational guilds of sensitive information: The case of the Five Eyes Plus network. MS. King's College London

Blommaert, J. & B. Rampton 2011. Language and superdiversity: A position paper. *Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies* #70

Blommaert, J. 2005. *Discourse: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blommaert, J. 2008. *Grassroots Literacy*. London: Routledge.

Blommaert, J. 2013. *Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Blumer, H. 1969. *Symbolic Interaction.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bogard, W. 1996. *The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies.* Cambridge: CUP

boyd, d. & A. Marwick 2011. Social privacy in networked publics: Teens' attitudes, practices and strategies. At https://www.danah.org/papers/2011/SocialPrivacyPLSC-Draft.pdf

Charalambous, C., P. Charalambous, K. Khan & B. Rampton 2018 Security and language policy. In J. Tollefson & M. Pérez-Milans (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Language Policy and Planning.* Oxford: OUP. 633-53)

Cherbonneau, M. & H. Copes 2006. 'Drive it like you stole it': Auto theft and the illusion of normalcy. *Brit. J. Criminol.* 46, 193–211.

Collinson, D.1999. 'Surviving the rigs': Safety and surveillance on North Sea oil installations. *Organisation Studies* 20/4:579-600.
Crossley, N. 1995. Body techniques, agency and intercorporeality: On Goffman's *Relations in Public. Sociology.* 29/1:133-49
Crossley, N. 2001. Merleau-Ponty, the elusive body and carnal sociology. *Body & Society* 1/1:43-63
de Certeau, M. 1984. *The Practice of Everyday Life.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
Deleuze, G. (1992). "Postscript on the Societies of Control", *October*, 59: 3-7
Eley, L. 2018. *Linguistic Landscape: An Interactional Perspective.* Unpublished PhD dissertation. King's College London.
Foucault, M 1977 *Discipline and Punish*. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Fraser, N. 2003. From discipline to flexibilisation? Rereading Foucault in the shadow of globalisation. *Constellations* 10/2:160-171
Friesen, N., A. Feenberg, & G. Smith 2009. Phenomenology and surveillance studies: Returning to the things themselves. *The Information Society.* 25:84-90.
Gilliom, J. & T. Monahan 2012. Everyday resistance. In Ball et al (eds) 405-411
Goffman, E. 1961. *Asylums.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Goffman, E. 1963. *Behaviour in Public Places.* New York: Free Press.
Goffman, E. 1963a. *Stigma.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Goffman, E. 1967. *Interaction Ritual.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Goffman, E. 1970. *Strategic Interaction.* Oxford: Blackwell.
Goffman, E. 1971. *Relations in Public.* London: Allen Lane.
Goffman, E. 1974. *Frame Analysis.* Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Goffman, E. 1981. *Forms of Talk.* Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press
Goffman, E. 1981. *Forms of Talk.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvannia Press.
Goffman, E. 1983. The interaction order. *American Sociological Review.* 48:1-17.
Goodwin, C. 2000. Action and embodiment within situated human interaction. *Journal of Pragmatics.* 32:1489-1522
Green, N. & N. Zurawski 2015. Surveillance and ethnography: Researching surveillance as everyday life. *Surveillance & Society.* 13/1:27-43
Gumperz, J. 1972. Introduction. In J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (eds) *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication.* Oxford: Blackwell. 1-25
Gumperz, J. 1982. *Discourse Strategies.* Cambridge: CUP. *(A classic reference point for interactional sociolinguistics)*
Haddington, P. & M. Raunioma 2014. Interaction between road users: Offering space in traffic. *Space & Culture.* 17/2:176-90
Haddington, P. 2012. Civil inattention in public places: Normalising unusual events through mobile and embodied practices. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research.* 13/3
Haggerty, K, and R. Ericson 2000. The surveillant assemblage. *British Journal of Sociology* 51/4:605-22
Haggerty, K. 2006. Tear down the walls: On demolishing the panopticon. In Lyon (ed). 23-45.
Heath, C. & P. Luff nd. Technology in practice. MS: King's College London.
Heath, C., P. Luff & M. Sanchez Svensson 2002. Overseeing organisations: Configuring action and its environment. *British Journal of Sociology.* 53/2:181-201
Heath, S. B. 1983. *Ways with Words.* Cambridge: CUP.
Helten & Fischer 2004:343
Hindmarsh, J. & C. Heath et al 2001. Interaction as a public phenomenon. Stockholm: CID, Centre for User Oriented IT Design.
Huysmans, J. (2014). *Security unbound: Enacting democratic limits*. New York: Routledge.
Huysmans, J. 2014. *Security Unbound.* London: Routledge
Irvine, J. 1996. Shadow conversations: The indeterminacy of participant roles. In M. Silverstein & G. Urban (eds) *Natural Histories of Discourse.* Cambridge: CUP. 131-159. *(A very good ethnographic application – cf Levinson 1988)*
Jacobs, B. A. & J. Miller 1998. Crack Dealing, Gender, and Arrest Avoidance. *Social Problems* 45/4: 550-569.

Jenkins, R. 2010. The 21st century interaction order. In M. Jacobsen (ed) *The Contemporary Goffman*. London: Routledge. 257-274.
Jones, R. 2015. Surveillance. In A. Georgakopoulou & T. Spilioti (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Language & Digital Communication.* London: Routledge. 408-11
Jones, R. 2017. Surveillant landscapes. *Linguistic Landscapes* 3/2:150-87
Kell, C. 2015. Ariadne's thread: Literacy, scale and meaning making across space and time. In C. Stroud & M. Prinsloo (eds) *Language, Literacy & Diversity: Moving Words.* London: Routledge 72-91. Also in Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies 118 (2013)
K.endon, A. 1990. *Conducting Interaction: Patterns of Behaviour in Focused Encounters.* Cambridge: CUP
Khan, K 2017. Citizenship, securitisation and suspicion in UK ESOL policy. In Arnaut, K,., M. Karreb{k, M. Spotti & J. Blommaert (eds) *Engaging Superdiversity: Recombining Spaces, Times and Language Practices.* Bristol: Multilingual Matters. 303-320.
Kitis, D. & T. Milani 2015. The performativity of the body: Turbulent spaces in Greece. *Linguistic Landscapes* 1/3:268-290
Levinson, S. 1988. Putting linguistics on a proper footing: Explorations in Goffman's concepts of participation. In P. Drew and A. Wootton (eds) *Erving Goffman: Exploring the Interaction Order.* Oxford: Polity. 161-227.
Liberman, K. 2013. The local orderliness of crossing Kincaid. In K. Liberman (ed) *More Studies in Ethnomethology.* Albany: SUNY Press.
Luff, Heath and Sanchez Svenson
Luff, P., Heath, C. & M. Sanchez Svensson 2008. Discriminating Conduct: Deploying Systems to Support Awareness in Organizations', *International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction*, 24/4:410 -436
Lyon, D. 2006 (ed) *Theorising Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Lyon, D. 2007. *Surveillance Studies: An Overview.* Cambridge: Polity
Lyon, D., K. Haggerty & K. Ball 2012. Introducing surveillance studies. In Ball et al (eds) 1-11
Marwick, A. & d. boyd 2010. I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. *New Media & Society.*
Marwick, A. 2012. The public domain: Social surveillance in everyday life. *Surveillance & Society.* 9/4:378-93
Marx, G. 2009. A tack in the shoe and taking off the shoe. *Surveillance and Society* 6/3:294-306
Maybin, J. 2017. Textual trajectories: Theoretical roots and institutional consequences. *Text & Talk* 37/4:415-435
Mc Cluskey, E. 2018. 'Solidarity' and 'gender equality' as a discourse of violence in Sweden:Exclusion of refugees by the decent citizen. In S. Buckley-Zistel & U. Krause (eds) *Gender, Violence, Refugees.* New York: Berghahn. Also in *Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies* # 209.
McIlvenny, P., M. Broth & P. Haddington 2009. Communicating place, space and mobility. *Journal of Pragmatics.* 41:1879-86
McIlvenny, P., M. Broth & P. Haddington 2014. Moving together: Mobile formations in interaction. *Space & Culture.* 17/2:104-6
Mondada, L. 2009. Emergent focused interactions in public places: A systematic analysis of the multimodal achievement of a common interactional space. *Journal of Pragmatics.* 41:1977-97.
Mondada, L. 2016. Challenges of multimodality: Language and the body in social interaction. *Journal of Sociolinguistics.* 20/3:336-366
Norris, C. & M. McCahill 2006. CCTV: Beyond penal modernism? *Brit. J. Criminol.* 46:97-118.
Pütz, O. 2012. From non-places to non-events: The airport security checkpoint. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography.* 41/2:154-88
Pütz, O. 2018. How strangers initiate conversations: Interactions on public trains in Germany. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography.* 47/4:426-53
Rampton, B. 2018. *Crossing: Language & Ethnicity among Adolescent. 3rd Edition.* London: Routledge.

Rampton, B. 2006. *Language in Late Modernity: Interaction in an Urban School.* Cambridge: CUP
Rampton, B. 2016. Foucault, Gumperz and governmentality: Interaction, power and subjectivity in the 21st century. In N. Coupland (ed) *Sociolinguistics: Theoretical Debates.* Cambridge: CUP. 303-330
Rampton, B. 2017. Interactional sociolinguistics. *Working Papers in Urban Language & Literacies* #205. At academia.edu
Ryave, A.L. & J. Schenkein 1974. Notes on the art of walking. In R. Turner (ed) *Ethnomethodology.* 265-74.
Schegloff, E. 2002. Beginnings in the telephone. In J. Katz & M. Aakhus (eds) *Perpetual Contact.* 284-300
Scollon, R. & S. Scollon 2003. *Discourses in Place.* London: Routledge.
Scollon, R. 1998. *Mediated Discourse as Social Interaction: A Study of News Discourse.* London: Longman.
Scollon, R. 1998. *Mediated Discourse as Social Interaction.* London: Longman. *(See the quotations in the text above).*
Simon, B. 2005. The return of panopticism: Supervision, subjection and new surveillance. *Surveillance & Society.* 3/1:1-20
Smith, G. 2007. Exploring relations between watchers and watched in control(led) systems: Strategies and tactics. *Surveillance & Society* 4/4:280-313
Street, B. 1984. *Literacy in Theory and Practice.* Cambridge: CUP.
Stroud, S. & D. Jegels 2014 Semiotic landscapes and mobile narrations of place: performing the local. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language.* 228:179-200
Surveillance Studies Network 2006. *A Report on the Surveillance Society: Full Report.*
van Dijck, J. 2013. *The Culture of Connectivity.* Oxford: OUP
van Dijck, J. 2014. Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology. *Surveillance & Society* 12/2:197-208.
vom Lehn, C. Heath & J. Hindmarsh 2001. Exhibiting interaction: Conduct and collaboration in museums and galleries. *Symbolic Interaction.* 24/2:189-216.
Walby, K. 2005. Institutional ethnography and surveillance studies: An outline for inquiry. *Surveillance & Society.* 3:2/3:158-172
Westlake, E. 2008. Friend me if you facebook: Generation Y and performative surveillance. *TDR* 52/4:21-40

Appendix

Un/focused interaction, surveillers and surveillance

This paper has been principally concerned with mundane experiences of being surveilled, and an exploration of Goffman's relevance to the agents of surveillance would require a separate paper. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly considering how our analytic framework could be extended to surveillers, and we can embed this in more general reflections on the theorisation of surveillance, going a little further with Green & Zurawski's interest in surveillance "as one form or mode of the social, becoming apparent in other activities and practices, something that is created, performed and perceived as such (in all its technical, discursive and interactional modes) – or not" (2015:29).

In Lyon's widely cited definition, surveillance is "the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (2007:14). This addresses modes of attention, the objects attended to and the purposes guiding this attention, but in order to get closer to the experience of being surveilled, separating it from the surveillers, we brought interactional relations into the account, concentrating on 'unfocused interaction' in Goffman's specialised sense. To extend this now beyond the watched to the watchers in a rudimentary elaboration of the terms we have used, we can characterise the core element of watching in surveillance as unfocused interaction in which particular *Umwelt* concerns (for well-being, safety, public order, crime prevention) lead watchers to concentrate more intently than usual on people, events, objects etc within range, without directly communicating the inferences they are drawing from their observation. Indeed, in organised surveillance, the information gathered in this unfocused interaction feeds into focused interaction among observers, becoming a focal issue in concerted activity of their own. This can be diagrammed as follows:

Figure 5: Asymmetrically focused surveillant interaction (by E & F)



Key:
→ unreciprocated but intensified attention
↔ : mutually ratified reciprocated attention
- - - - : ambient awareness

At the same time, of course, the un/focused relations sketched in this simple image all operate within the interaction order, involving (at the very least) shifting frames of engagement and lines of attention, multimodal semiotic production, situational proprieties, and ritual activity at the points of transition between mere co-presence and encounters (§1, §2). There is already a glimpse of the intricacy of the interactional relations that emerge from this in the data we have covered. In the recording of Inge's walk, the uniformed officials were engaged in a conversation, but simultaneously they were participating in unfocused interaction, giving off and gleaning signs from passers-by that things were okay, at least in terms of their institutional brief overseeing traffic. In Pütz's airport study, the ritual sensitivities of the passengers and security personnel meant that they worked rather hard to co-construct unfocused interaction in their 'non-encounter'. Indeed, processes like the ones we have been considering can be found in much more extended accounts of watchers and watching.

Jones (2017), for example, notes that in streets, shops and buses in Britain, CCTV cameras are supposed to be accompanied by signs which "include (i) a clear statement that security cameras are in operation, (ii) a statement of the identity of the person or organization responsible for the scheme, (iii) the purpose for which the monitoring is being carried out, (iv) contact details of the person or organization responsible" (2017:157). As the cameras themselves are usually visible, the first point ('cameras are in operation') is often redundant and instead, the signs can be seen as textual equivalents to body idiom and appearance, providing reassurance that CCTV's co-presence is benign (point iii), broadly similar to a uniformed guard's (points ii & iv).

We can also see Figure 5 coming to life *behind* the cameras in Luff, Heath and Sanchez Svenson's research on a London Underground CCTV control room. For much of the time, passengers were just a blur on monitors in the background: staff had too much to do to "spend much time looking at the CCTV monitors" (Luff et al 2008:418), and "unlike the conventional idea of surveillance, their conduct infrequently involves generalised 'monitoring' of the domain" (Heath et al 2002:198). Nevertheless, they were only able to take the images on screen for granted like this because they could rely on a technological infrastructure that had been carefully planned and organised with theories and accounts of how people move in the locales like the ones they were overseeing. According to Goffman, "sentinels and agents of social control" use "artificial receptors of various kinds, such as the telephone, telegraph, radar screens, and the like… [to] bring to… attention, through relays of signs, sources of alarm that are many miles away, or… right at hand but… hidden" (1971:298-300).[34] [35] These 'relays of signs' could be seen in operation in the Underground control centre when, for example, "supervisors discover incidents [off camera] by virtue of noticing that passengers themselves have noticed 'something' within their immediate environment – … *noticing noticings* is a critical resource through which supervisors discover and manage incidents" (nd:17-18). Control room staff were often expert readers of the interaction order in the environment they surveiled, where "[s]eemingly insignificant differences in an individual's conduct, ways of walking, looking, dressing, standing, carrying objects, gathering together and many other things besides, are noticed by virtue of the ways in which they stand in contrast to the familiar and the routine, the conduct of well behaved passengers" (Heath & Luff nd:14). Most of the time, staff held back from direct engagement with the people passing through the station, but this wasn't civil inattention – within the confines of the control room, it was their job to treat passengers as "target[s] of special curiosity or design", working within institutional concerns for safety and efficiency (Goffman 1963:84). When their attention was mobilised – for example, on receiving a request over the radio from platform staff concerned about a train being held at the station – they would talk to colleagues and use a combination of prior experience, video images, colleagues' observations and other data in processes of focused interpretation and decision-making, determining "the severity of the problem and whether intervention is necessary, either now or in the near future" (Heath et al 2002:192), sometimes shifting from unfocused to focused interaction with the travellers themselves through the public address system, drawing on the "license to accost others" afforded by their institutional opening position (Goffman 1963:129, cited above).[36]

So clearly, Goffman's work speaks to surveilling as well as to being surveilled, and the broader theoretical significance of this becomes clear if we compare Lyon's definitions of surveillance with our own. In one, surveillance entails

- "focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon 2007:14);

in the other, it involves

- predominantly unfocused interaction in Goffman's sense, in which one of the parties concentrates more closely on the others, without communicating with them directly about their concern with threats to well-being, sometimes feeding the information gleaned through observation into focused interaction within their own 'team' (Rampton & Eley).

[34] These devices include "pocket telescopes… commonly used for the purpose of observing one's neighbours without being observed in the act of observing" in the Shetlands in the 1940s & 50s (1963:15)

[35] In his retrospective 1983 lecture, Goffman affirmed his central interest in embodied interaction but added – in parentheses – "(Presumably the telephone and the mails provide reduced versions of the primordial real thing)" (1983:2, also p.6).

[36] For a description of heterodox behaviour in CCTV control centres that cites Goffman, see Smith 2007:294,302,303, 308.

Whereas institutionalisation and power stand out in Lyon's definition ('systematic', 'purposes of management, protection or direction'), our definition foregrounds the relations between people and the activities that connect them. In doing so, it provides more scope to investigate the *emergence* of surveillance in a range of different settings. Obviously in the Underground control room, the surveillance was very well-established and the roles were relatively fixed. But in principle, our interactional characterisation can also cover much less systematic cases which participants might or might not call 'surveillance' (Green & Zurawski 2015:28,34-35), where the targets, the technological supports, the ideas of what to look for, the members of the 'team', and the reporting requirements are less sophisticated – for example, children or next-door neighbours; net curtains; late arrivals home; reprimands or gossip. Whether it is inferences formulated in unfocused interaction that are subsequently broached and consolidated in focused encounters, or the suspicions expressed in private that guide observation in more open gatherings, our Goffmanian definition points towards the dynamic processes with which particular people and activities move in and out of the frame as objects of intensified interest, *together with* the ways in which the moral and ritual implications of these shifts are managed, licensing, justifying, mitigating, concealing, ignoring or contesting these intensifications of attention (cf Mc Cluskey 2018).

So, for the most part, our approach provides an elaboration that complements Green & Zurawski:

> "the term surveillance is used for quite a wide range of phenomena—activities and technologies, such as; face-to-face supervision, camera monitoring, TV watching, paparazzi stalking, GPS tailing, cardiac telemonitoring, the tracking of commercial/internet transactions, the tracing of tagged plants and animals, etc.' (Walby 2005:158). The term surveillance is used here to conceptualize these activities as if they may share a basic feature: that in each case a binary between two parties has been established – between watcher and watched – the position of watching acting as placeholder for all kinds of senses and recording or monitoring techniques" (2015:29).

But we diverge when they infer from this that "there cannot be one overarching method for the research of surveillance, whatever is understood by the term in a particular case" (*ibid*). Our central contention is that in Goffman's account of unfocused interaction and the interaction order, there is a general framework that capable of capturing a great deal of what happens in surveillance.