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Culture's Role in Entrepreneurship: Self-Employment out of Dissatisfaction
Culture's Role in Entrepreneurship; Self-Employment out of Dissatisfaction*

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Abstract

This paper studies the influence of cultural and economic variables on differences in the level of entrepreneurship in more than twenty Western nations and Japan, for the period 1974-1994. We combine data on entrepreneurial and economic variables with data on cultural variables. First, we consider cross-sectional relationships between the cultural variables and entrepreneurship. The results yield evidence that, across nations, dissatisfaction with society and with life in general are the main determinants of entrepreneurship. Countries where people are less satisfied have more entrepreneurs. These are often societies with larger power distance, stronger uncertainty avoidance, more bureaucracy and corruption, and which are relatively poor.

Subsequently, we carry out regressions including economic and dissatisfaction variables for which time series are available. There are indications for a U-shaped relationship between prosperity and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, unemployment is consistently found to be a significant push factor for self-employment. However, dissatisfaction with life and with society come out again as main determinants of entrepreneurship across nations, even stronger than the economic variables. Finally, by repeating the regressions for several cultural country clusterings, we show that neglecting the role of the cultural context creates an incorrect picture of the influence of the economic determinants on entrepreneurship.

INTRODUCTION

Importance of Entrepreneurship

Economic growth is a key issue both in economic policy making and in economic research. In Europe in particular, the interest in economic growth is widespread because of the persistently high levels of unemployment. Europe is bogged down in stagnant growth and high unemployment. About eleven percent of the work force in the European Union was unemployed in 1997, ranging from 3 percent in Luxembourg and 6 percent in the Netherlands, to 12.5 percent in France and even more than 20 percent in Spain. This high unemployment coupled with stagnant growth in Europe has triggered a plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy approach that ushered in European prosperity during the post-war era.

*The authors would like to thank Jessika van Veen for the tremendous (and often troublesome) job of collecting additional data.
There is a general feeling in Europe that stimulating entrepreneurship helps fighting unemployment (see, for instance, the Joint Employment Report 1997 of the European Commission). This feeling provides the justification for researching three questions: What is entrepreneurship?, Where does entrepreneurship come from?, and What does it lead to? The present paper deals with the second question by analysing the influence of cultural, social, and economic variables on differences in the level of entrepreneurship between more than twenty Western nations and Japan for the period 1974 through 1994. For this analysis a new and unique database has been set up.

In most OECD countries the first decades after World War II showed historically high rates of economic growth. Following the first oil crisis in 1973 a period of stagflation set in, characterised by a combination of inflation and slow growth. Since the mid-eighties economic growth in most countries has picked up again, but on the whole at a rate too slow to guarantee an acceptable level of unemployment. In the sixties and seventies, academic and political interest in many Western countries gradually turned to matters of demand management and income equality, whereas the interest in the causes of economic growth waned. Neo-classical theory explained economic growth by accumulation of production factors and by exogenous technological change. Mainstream economics, however, did not show great interest in the ultimate causes underlying long-term factor accumulation and technological development.

In the eighties, stagflation and high unemployment caused a renewed interest in supply side economics and, simultaneously, in underlying factors. As clearly exposed by North and Thomas (1973), Olson (1982), and more recently by Van de Klundert (1997), the institutional foundations and cultural factors of an economy are among the most prominent of these ultimate causes. These authors focus attention on factors such as incentives, regulation of markets, and social rigidities. Somewhat understated in their analysis, however, is the primal role of the economic agents (entrepreneurs) who link the institutions on the micro level to the economic outcome on the macro level (see for instance Wennekers, Thurik and Buis, 1997). In spite of a growing attention in research, presently still little is known about entrepreneurship. How and why for instance do individuals decide to start an enterprise themselves? Which role do institutional and cultural factors play in this decision process? And how exactly do these factors frame the decisions of the millions of entrepreneurs in small firms and of entrepreneurial managers working within large companies?

Determinants of Entrepreneurship

One can investigate the determinants stimulating or hampering entrepreneurship at many levels. At an individual level, one can examine the motives of people for turning into self-employment. Furthermore, one can investigate how the market, regulatory and organisational environment fosters entrepreneurial activity. One can also consider differences between countries and examine whether cultural factors are involved. The latter is the subject of this paper.

Why do some countries have more entrepreneurs than others? Many researchers have addressed this question and most of them have focused on economic explanations, thereby underexposing the role of culture. Some references in the literature have made attempts to study culture’s influence, but mostly without much empirical foundation.

In the present paper we aim at supplementing the research of the determinants of entrepreneurship on the country level by linking three bodies of literature and by subsequently combing different international databases into a new and unique dataset. Firstly, we consider the traditional economic explanation of levels of entrepreneurship. Factors like per capita income, unemployment and profit opportunities then play a role. Secondly, we embed our study in the literature on the role of cultural traits such as individualism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance in explaining people’s motives and actions within the economic arena (see Hofstede, 1980). Finally, from the
literature on the examination of motives for self-employment, we derive dissatisfaction as a major driving force.

The following model is set up to test our hypotheses. First, we carry out a simple analysis by considering correlations across countries between entrepreneurship and cultural traits, and between entrepreneurship and issues of dissatisfaction. From this, we obtain a first inkling of the role of culture and dissatisfaction in levels of self-employment. Subsequently, we carry out regressions on time-series data of entrepreneurship, including relevant economic and dissatisfaction variables. Thus we can distinguish the role of each explaining variable, and see which variable explains national differences in entrepreneurial activity best. (Cultural variables are not directly included in the regressions, since they are not available in time series.) Finally, we repeat the regressions for several country clusterings, based on cultural variables, to examine whether in different cultural clusters the economic and dissatisfaction variables influence entrepreneurship in different ways.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we derive hypotheses about the influence of several economic and cultural phenomena on national differences in entrepreneurship, based on the literature. Subsequently, in Section 3 we describe the data of the two databases used in this study. Furthermore, we consider correlations between cultural and dissatisfaction variables, and entrepreneurial activity. In Section 4 we carry out the regressions. The results of the correlation analysis and the regressions are discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions.

**Literature Review and Hypotheses**

**Definition of Entrepreneurship**

In colloquial speech the terms entrepreneurs, self-employed, and businessmen are often used as synonyms. In the management and economic literature, however, entrepreneurship is a behavioural characteristic related to perceiving and creating new economic opportunities (see also Wennekers, Thurik and Buis, 1997). Within the population of self-employed, some are economically marginal, others run their business in a managerial manner, and only a subset are intrinsically entrepreneurial. For practical reasons of measurement, we will equate entrepreneurs and self-employed in our empirical research. However, in formulating our hypotheses and in interpreting our results we will occasionally distinguish the marginal, managerial, and entrepreneurial dimensions.

**Framework of Explanations**

The literature provides many explanations of which factors play a role in the number of business start-ups or in the level of entrepreneurship. When explaining business start-ups, it is customary to use factors dealing with the perceived discrepancy between the role someone plays in society and the role one wants to play. Moreover, pull as well as push factors are discerned (see Stanworth and Curran, 1973). Pull factors are concerned with the expectation to be better off as an entrepreneur. Push factors take into account the conflict between one's current and one's desired role in society (see Shapero and Sokol, 1982). In this respect, Van Fraag (1990) develops a model separating the unobserved factors of 'opportunity' and 'willingness'. She applies a positive interpretation of the push effect. A similar approach is taken by Shapero and Sokol (1982), who also stress positive desirability aspects in the intentional phase preceding a start-up (see also Krueger, 1993).

This positive approach has roots in the work of Schumpeter (1934), where willingness and ability are emphasised as determinants. A more 'negative' approach is proposed by Weber (1930), stressing responsibility. Achievement motivation is the main driving force observed by McClelland
Early surveys on what makes people decide to start a business are provided by Brockhaus (1982) and Shapero (1982), stressing psychological and sociological issues, respectively. A survey of determinants proposed in studies with an economic flavour is supplied by De Wit (1993) (see also Blanchflower and Oswald, 1996). Other (and more recent) surveys can be found in Capon, Parley and Hoenig (1990), Birley and Westhead (1994), Van Praag (1996), Roquebert, Philips and Westfall (1996), and Lumpkin and Dess (1996).

From all these investigations and surveys we conclude that, next to demographic and economic determinants of entrepreneurship, we need to use a push factor indicating some level of 'dissatisfaction', and that we have to test for the stability of our results across different cultural environments.

Demographic and Economic Determinants

**Prosperity (level of per capita income).** There probably is a U-shaped relationship between the level of entrepreneurship and the stage of economic development. A low level of prosperity usually coincides with a low wage level, implying little pressure to increase efficiency or the average scale of enterprise. Small firms in crafts and retail trade are therefore dominant in such an economy. A major route for ambitious wage-earners to increase their income then, is to set up shop and become an entrepreneur. Economic development subsequently leads to a rise in wages, which stimulates enterprises to work more efficiently. Lucas (1978) shows that firm size is positively related to the development of national income when labour and capital are substitutes. Economies of scale set in, especially in manufacturing, and the number of small firms (including many marginal entrepreneurs) decreases.

In a later stage of economic development, services become more important and a new rise in entrepreneurship will occur. The advent of information technology, the availability of capital and the differentiation of markets (niches) lead to the occurrence of dis-economies of scale. An increased emphasis on subcontracting may strengthen this process (Acs, Audretsch and Evans, 1994; Bais, Van der Hoeven and Verhoeven, 1995). This may partly explain the present resurgence of entrepreneurship in some of the most highly developed economies. We would hypothesise that relatively many of these self-employed are highly educated and entrepreneurial.

**Female labour share.** In most Western countries, working women show substantially lower self-employment rates than working men. Under the assumption of constant female self-employment rates over time, a growing participation of women in the labour market automatically implies a decreasing share of entrepreneurs in the labour force (Acs et al., 1994).

Additionally, there might be other factors. Evans and Leighton (1989) point out that people who become entrepreneur have a long employment history. In many Western countries, married women have a shorter employment history than men, due to a break for getting children and raising a family, and so there is a smaller chance that they will choose for entrepreneurship. Besides, entrepreneurs often make long working days, which women cannot easily combine with their family obligations. Finally, the direction of causality may also be reversed, in that a high percentage of (male) entrepreneurship ties down many women in a supportive role of unpaid family worker.

Anyway, we expect female labour share to be negatively related to the entrepreneurship rate.

**Earning differentials.** Individuals may be hypothesised to compare expected profits and wages when weighing the possibilities of future entrepreneurship or wage-employment. They probably also consider the risks they will run either way, but these are extremely hard to measure. For the time being, we simply assume that a relatively high level of business profitability will *ceteris paribus* stimulate the entrepreneurship rate. High profits are thus seen as a pull factor for entrepreneurship
A pragmatic proxy for the earning differential on the country level is the so-called *labour income quota*, which measures the share of labour income (including the compensation of the self-employed for their labour contribution) in the net national *income*. The labour income quota is expected to correlate negatively with the entrepreneurship rate.

**Unemployment.** The relationship between entrepreneurship and unemployment is probably complex. On the individual level, unemployment (or the threat of it) primarily acts as a push factor for self-employment (Evans and *Leighton*, 1990; Acs et al., 1994; Foti and Vivarelli, 1994). Since the opportunity costs for unemployed persons to become entrepreneur are relatively low, they will make their choice for entrepreneurship sooner.

On the other hand, (high) unemployment may be connected with an economic decline, which makes prospects for entrepreneurship less profitable. In the literature (Hamilton, 1989; Meager, 1992) it is stated that in principle there is a positive relation, but it changes into a negative relation beyond a critical level when people get disillusioned (inverse U-shape relation).

**Population density.** Every region needs a minimum supply of facilities regarding trade and craft for their population to survive in these areas. Therefore, thinly populated areas with many dispersed small villages will often have many small retail outlets and workshops. Conversely, urban areas will give rise to economies of scale, through which small-sized entrepreneurship in trade and craft comes under pressure (Bais, Van der Hoeven and Verhoeven, 1995).

On the other hand, Reynolds and Storey (1993) state that a high population density in urban areas explains the birth of new firms in the services sector. Especially the presence of networks attracts other new firms in all urban areas. Consequently, population density may have the carve U-shaped relationship with entrepreneurship as prosperity.

**Cultural Factors**

**Competitiveness and corruption.** Few references in the literature deal with entrepreneurship directly; most deal with other phenomena, which may indirectly be related to entrepreneurship. For example, Lynn (1991) compares four psychological theories of economic growth (Weber’s work ethic, Schumpeter’s competitiveness, McClelland’s achievement motivation, and Wiener’s status of the lanH-nwnpr) and finds empirical evidence that Schumpeter’s theory explains economic growth best (for the contemporary period). This might suggest that competitiveness is also positively related to entrepreneurship.

Mauro (1995) analyses subjective indices of corruption, bureaucracy, and the efficiency of the judicial system (combined in his so-called *bureaucratic efficiency index*), and finds that corruption lowers private investment and thereby reduces economic growth. This might imply that corruption also hampers entrepreneurship.

**Hofstede’s cultural indices.** Many articles and books discussing the relationship between culture and economy refer to the four cultural indices of Hofstede (1980), viz. power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculinity (MAS), and individualism (IDV). However, the existing hypotheses with respect to the influence of the indices on entrepreneurship, or the hypotheses that can be inferred from indirectly related phenomena, are often contradicting.

For example, Shane (1992) investigates the relation between culture and *inventions*, and finds that countries with small power distance (PDI−) and high individualism (IDV+) are more inventive than others. Shane (1993) examines the influence of culture on rates of *innovation* (per capita number of trademarks), and finds that weak uncertainty avoidance (UAI−) has the strongest influence, even stronger than per capita income. PDI− and IDV+ are related to innovation as well, though to a lesser extent. Since innovation is more directly related to entrepreneurship than inventiveness,
the latter article shows more evidence for the influence of culture on entrepreneurship than Shane (1992). Although the relationships with culture are indirect, the results of the two references suggest that countries with PDI~1, UAI?, and IDV\textasciitilde are more entrepreneurial and hence may have more entrepreneurs than others.

McGrath, MacMillan, and Scheinberg (1992) also refer to Hofstede. The authors compare entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs across countries and identify certain entrepreneurial values, independent of culture. These values are subsequently associated with PDI\textasciitilde (this is contradicting with Shane, 1992, 1993), UAI~, high masculinity (MAS\textasciitilde), and IDV\textasciitilde. If entrepreneurs indeed hold values corresponding with larger power distance, uncertainty acceptance, masculinity, and individualism, the hypothesis then is that countries with this cultural pattern have more entrepreneurs. However, the arguments that the authors use to associate their findings with the indices of Hofstede are disputable.

Baum et al. (1993) Hypothesise a reverse role of individualism (at the level of countries). The authors argue that not high but low individualism may stimulate entrepreneurship: an individualistic society is more adapted to deal with people who want to do it their own way; both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs might be able to satisfy their motivational needs in a common organisational environment. In a less individualistic society, organisations and institutions do not yield these opportunities and, as a result, people with entrepreneurial needs are more inclined to start for themselves as they cannot satisfy their needs within the existing structures.

The only reference we found in which the direct relationship between culture and entrepreneurship at the level of nations is (empirically) examined, is the paper of Ács et al. (1994). However, the authors mainly focus on economic explanations and consider culture just marginally. Only the residual influence, which cannot be explained by other variables, is left to examine the effect of culture. Yet, the authors find that UAI\textasciitilde and IDV\textasciitilde are related to self-employment.

Altogether, there are several contradicting hypotheses with respect to the influence of culture on entrepreneurship. One hypothesis is that PDI\textasciitilde, UAI~, MAS\textasciitilde, and IDV\textasciitilde stimulate entrepreneurship (combining Shane, 1992; Shane, 1993; and McGrath et al., 1992). This is based on the assumption that countries with this cultural profile have relatively more individuals with entrepreneurial values. However, the opposite could also be true. Applying the reasoning of Baum et al. (1993) to all four indices, one could argue that 'entrepreneurial' individuals in countries with PDI\textasciitilde, UAI\textasciitilde, MAS\textasciitilde, and IDV\textasciitilde have more difficulties in 'doing things their own way', since organisations and existing structures are less suited for them. Dissatisfied as they are in their situation, they may choose for entrepreneurship to be as independent as possible. (The findings of Ács et al., 1994, empirically confirm this reverse role, at least for the indices UAI\textasciitilde and IDV\textasciitilde.)

Dissatisfaction. The latter hypothesis coincides with the aforementioned reasoning why a push factor indicating some level of dissatisfaction is needed to explain the level of entrepreneurship. Direct evidence of dissatisfaction as a motive on the micro level has time and again been found in survey studies concerning real-life entrepreneurs. See, for instance, Huisman and de Ridder (1984), who report that frustrations with previous wage-employment, unemployment, and personal crises are among the most-often motives of a large sample of entrepreneurs in eleven different countries. More recently, Van Uxem and Bais (1996) found that about 50% of almost 2000 new Dutch entrepreneurs mentioned dissatisfaction with their previous job among their motives to start for themselves, although some pull factors were mentioned even more frequently.

What exists on a micro level may also exist on a macro level: do countries where people are in general less satisfied with life and with society have more entrepreneurs than other countries? In this paper we will examine this by translating the individual push factor dissatisfaction into a cultural counterpart.

If dissatisfaction is indeed a determinant in entrepreneurship across countries, then it may also
also be true that the four indices of Hofstede are related according to a dissatisfaction motive: in countries with \( \text{PDI}^+ \), \( \text{UAI}^- \), \( \text{MAS}^- \), and \( \text{IDV}^- \) there may be more entrepreneurs, since 'entrepreneurial' individuals are more inclined to start for themselves as they cannot satisfy their needs within the existing structures. We will investigate this in this paper.

**Indirect influences of culture.** The above hypotheses refer to the *direct* influence of culture on entrepreneurship. However, culture may also have an *indirect* role. For example, one might hypothesise that in cultures characterised by \( \text{UAI}^- \) the average unemployed will be less fearful of becoming an entrepreneur, making an (assumed) positive relationship with entrepreneurship stronger than in \( \text{UAI}^+ \) countries. However, hypotheses like this are rather speculative. Therefore, we have adopted an explorative approach concerning this relationship.

**DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS**

The data used in this study come from two databases: a database with variables of entrepreneurship and several economic variables, collected by *EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy*, and a database with mainly cultural variables, collected by the *Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation (IRIC)*.

**EIM's Entrepreneurial and Economic Data**

There are several measures of entrepreneurship for a country at a certain time. For example: the total number of self-employed, the number of self-employed *per labour force*, and the number of self-employed *per population between 15 and 65 years*. In this paper we will consider the second measure, that is, the number of self-employed *per labour force*. EIM has these data available for 23 countries and for the period 1974-1994. The 23 countries are 18 European countries plus USA, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (see Table 1 for a list, with the corresponding abbreviations that we will use in this paper). The period 1974-1994 is covered by eleven moments in time, viz. the *even* years (1974, 1976, . . . , 1994).

**TABLE 1:**

The 23 Countries Studied in this Paper, with their Abbreviations

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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Luxemburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SUI</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>NZL</td>
<td>USA</td>
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EIM furthermore provides five economic variables corresponding with the (economic) issues discussed in Section 2, viz.:

1. Labour income quota;
2. Population density per square kilometre;

"*Notice that in this paper we consider the *stock* of entrepreneurs, and not the *flow* (such as the birth and death rate of firms). We also investigated the influence of culture on the flow of entrepreneurship, but we did not arrive at clear results."
3. Female labour force as a percentage of the total labour force;
4. Per capita income (GDP):
   b. Unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force.

These variables are available for the 23 countries listed in Table 1, and for the even years of the period 1974-1994.

The entrepreneurial and economic data were collected by combining several sources. The main sources are: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; OECD, Labour force statistics 1974-1994; and OECD, National Accounts 1960-1994, Detailed Tables. However, many data such as entrepreneurship, unemployment, and labour force were incomplete. EIM completed these data by using ratios derived from data of the Eurostat Labour Force Survey.

Furthermore, EIM made a unified dataset of entrepreneurs, which was necessary as in the OECD statistics the definitions of entrepreneurs were not fully compatible between countries. In some countries, entrepreneurs are defined as individuals owning a business that is not legally incorporated. In other countries, owner/managers of an incorporated business who gain profits as well as a salary, are also considered entrepreneur. Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and USA use the narrow definition, while the other countries apply the broader characterisation. Besides this difference, in some countries unpaid family workers are included in data of entrepreneurship as well. This is the case in Austria, France and the Netherlands.

For the countries not following the broader definition, EIM made an estimation of the number of owner/managers by using information derived from statistical bureaus in these countries. The same holds for the procedure to eliminate unpaid family workers.

IRIC's Cultural Data

IRIC's database DECOR (Database for European Culture cOMparison Research) contains many cultural and some economic and demographic variables. The most important sources of cultural variables are Hofstede (1980) and the European Values Studies project (Stoetzel, 1983; Harding and Phillips, 1986; Halman, 1990; and Ester, Halman, and De Moor, 1993). For this study some irrelevant variables were eliminated, leaving a total number of almost 300 variables. These variables cover many social issues, such as satisfaction with the current situation (life, society, financially, etc.), important values, opinion of social phenomena, confidence in institutions, perception of the economic situation, interest in politics, and many more.

A problem with many variables is that they are collected in only few (mostly European) countries. Each variable covers minimally 9 and maximally 21 of the 23 countries studied in this paper. For example, Iceland is not covered at all by cultural variables, and Luxemburg very scarcely. Besides, most variables correspond with cultural phenomena measured at only one moment in time, so that time-series analysis of these phenomena is not possible.

Yet, the database is unique for the multitude of issues covered. We will use it to carry out a first simple analysis by considering the correlation between each of these issues and entrepreneurship. This yields an idea of what role cultural and social variables play in differences in the level of entrepreneurship across countries.

Furthermore, IRIC provides two variables (in time series) corresponding with the dissatisfaction issue discussed in Section 2, viz.:

- **Dissatisfaction with life** (the percentage 'not at all satisfied with life'):
Dissatisfaction with democracy (the percentage 'not at all satisfied with the way democracy works').

These variables are collected from the Eurobarometer Trends (1994), and are available for twelve European countries. However, for one country (Greece) data are available since 1980, and for two countries (Portugal and Spain) only since 1984.

For some years data were missing. For example, dissatisfaction is not given for 1974. Instead, we took the average of 1973 and 1975. Furthermore, in many years dissatisfaction was measured twice, in which case we took the average of the two measurements. Data for 1994 were missing as well, and instead we took the last measurement of 1993. A similar action was done for the year 1980 for Greece, and the year 1984 for Spain and Portugal: as these were missing, we took the first measurement of the next year. Thus, we collected time series for the even years between 1974 and 1994.

Analysis of the Entrepreneurial Data

To get some idea of the differences between countries with respect to their entrepreneurial activity, we calculated for each country the average level of entrepreneurship in the period 1974-1994. Table 2 lists the countries in descending order of their number of self-employed per labour force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aver. (disp.)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aver. (disp.)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aver. (disp.)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>18.6 (2.8)</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10.2 (3.4)</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>8.4 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16.1 (4.0)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>9.9 (1.5)</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7.8 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.5 (2.9)</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9.8 (0.9)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>7.6 (2.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13.8 (3.5)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.5 (2.6)</td>
<td>Germany (W)</td>
<td>6.8 (1.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>13.3 (6.7)</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>8.8 (1.6)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.7 (1.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>11.9 (9.5)</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8.7 (2.0)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5.9 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11.2 (2.8)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.6 (3.7)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5.7 (3.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10.5 (1.7)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8.6 (5.3)</td>
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As can be seen from this list, the Southern European countries score high on entrepreneurship. The Anglo-Saxon countries are relatively wide apart, with Australia and New Zealand scoring comparatively high, Canada and the United Kingdom relatively low, and Ireland and the USA in between. Japan, Belgium and France score medium. The Scandinavian and Germanic countries, plus the Netherlands, Iceland, and Luxembourg, score medium to low.

The dispersion shown in Table 9, indicates for each country the absolute difference between the minimum and the maximum level of entrepreneurship in the period 1974-1994. For many countries the number of entrepreneurs (per labour force) has increased. For example, Portugal's entrepreneurship increased monotonously from 7.9 % in 1974 to 17.4 % in 1994, i.e., 9.5 percentage points. This implies an increment from the 16th place (out of 23) to the third (!). However, there are also countries for which the number of entrepreneurs has decreased. For example, Luxemburg's number of self-employed per labour force decreased monotonously from 9.8 % (10th place) to 5.6 % (23rd place). Several countries have U-shaped functions (e.g., AUT, NET, and NZL).
To get an inkling of how much a country's level of entrepreneurship is fluctuating compared to other countries, we calculated the correlations between entrepreneurship in the various years. These are given in Table 3.

**TABLE 3:**
Correlations Between Self-Employed per Labour Force in the Period 1974-1994

<table>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.78</td>
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<td>.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level.

The results indicate that the correlations between entrepreneurial activity in the various years are highly significant, but slightly decreasing for years wider apart. This implies that a country's entrepreneurial activity compared to other countries is changing, however slowly.

**Correlations between Culture and Entrepreneurship**

We first considered a simple measure of the relationship between culture and entrepreneurial activity: the correlation between cultural variables and the percentage of self-employed per labour force. In Section 2 we mentioned some cultural determinants which might play a role in entrepreneurship. These were (among others) Schumpeter's competitiveness (see Lynn 1991), the bureaucratic efficiency index of Mauro (1995), and the indices of Hofstede (1980). We have furthermore included the indices of Hoppe (1990), which are comparable with Hofstede's indices (though they were collected at another time, for a smaller set of countries, and for another group of respondents). Although the variables are measured at one point in time only, we correlated them with the number of self-employed for each year (the even years between 1974-1994). Table 4 tabulates the results.

One of the first observations is that the correlations with entrepreneurship vary in time. While in some years correlations are significant, this is not the case in other years. However, as can be expected from the high intercorrelations in Table 3, the differences for years not wide apart are small. Furthermore, assuming that the variables in Table 4 influence entrepreneurship, specifically the correlations in the period including and after the years of the variables' measurement are important.

As hypothesised, competitiveness is positively (and significantly) correlated with entrepreneurship (in the period of measurement and later). Corruption is also significantly correlated, but positively, contrary to the hypothesis in Section 2 (corruption is reversely represented by the bureaucratic efficiency index, and since the correlation between entrepreneurship and bureaucratic efficiency is negative, the correlation with corruption is positive). This implies that the more corruption in a country, the more entrepreneurs there are! (This may be a further confirmation of the dissatisfaction hypothesis, see later.)
**TABLE 4:**
Correlations Between Entrepreneurship and Lynn's, Mauro's, Hofstede's, and Hoppe's Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness (Lynn)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.50*</td>
<td>.55*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic efficiency (Mauro)</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.47*</td>
<td>-.49*</td>
<td>-.55&quot;</td>
<td>-.54*</td>
<td>-.58&quot;</td>
<td>-.56&quot;</td>
<td>-.59&quot;</td>
<td>-.63**</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distance index (Hofstede)</td>
<td>.47&quot;</td>
<td>.47&quot;</td>
<td>.49&quot;</td>
<td>.55&quot;</td>
<td>.54&quot;</td>
<td>.55&quot;</td>
<td>.52&quot;</td>
<td>.52&quot;</td>
<td>.49&quot;</td>
<td>.49&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty avoidance index</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>.57&quot;</td>
<td>.56&quot;</td>
<td>.56&quot;</td>
<td>.55&quot;</td>
<td>.54&quot;</td>
<td>.51*</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism index</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity index</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distance index (Hoppe)</td>
<td>.67&quot;</td>
<td>.68&quot;</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>.71&quot;</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.71&quot;</td>
<td>.73&quot;*</td>
<td>.73&quot;*</td>
<td>.72&quot;</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty avoidance index</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism index</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>-.51*</td>
<td>-.53*</td>
<td>-.50*</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>-.52*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Year of variable's measurement is underlined. (Lynn's competitiveness was measured between 1986 and 1989, Mauro's bureaucratic efficiency index between 1980 and 1983, and Hofstede's indices between 1967 and 1973.)

With respect to the indices of Hofstede, we first notice that they were measured before 1974. Yet, as far as the correlations with entrepreneurship are significant, this significance holds for the whole period 1974-1994. The Hofstede indices were based on aspects of culture that turned out to be stable over a period of time, and hence it is reasonable to assume that the indices (at least the countries' rank on these indices) still hold for some time after 1974. The stability of the indices is confirmed by the magnitude of the correlations in the several years, which is almost constant. Hence, it is also reasonable to assume that even though the indices were measured before 1974, they correspond to cultural values that are still relevant.

Hofstede's indices power distance and uncertainty avoidance are (significantly) correlated with entrepreneurship, according to the dissatisfaction hypothesis. That is, countries with large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance have more entrepreneurs. The same holds for individualism, which is indeed negatively correlated (however, not significantly). The correlations with masculinity are positive (contrary to the dissatisfaction hypothesis), but they are not significant.

The correlations between entrepreneurship and Hoppe's indices have the same sign as the correlations with Hofstede's indices, but the significance differs. Power distance is now the only significant variable (in the year of measurement and later). However, the results are not exactly comparable, since the Hoppe indices are available for fewer countries (17, whereas the Hofstede indices are given for 21 of the 23 countries).

**Dissatisfaction and Culture**

From the IRIC database, we considered the variables with a prima facie relationship to (dis)satisfaction, and we correlated them with entrepreneurship. We furthermore included the five economic variables, for the year 1984 (the median of 1974 and 1994). Table 5 lists the most significant correlations (*p < 0.01*).

For all variables in the table, the correlations with entrepreneurship are significant for the years of measurement and later. The only significant economic variables are GDP per capita and female labour share. The other three variables (labour income quota, population density, and unemployment) were not significant. This does not only hold for the year 1984, but for the other years as well.
TABLE 5: Most Significant Correlations Between Entrepreneurship and Dissatisfaction and Several Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity (per capita GDP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labour share</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with democracy (1977)</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with democracy (1993)</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with society (1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied with society (1990, male)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied with society (1990, female)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in legal system</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike people with different ideas</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall life satisfaction (1985)</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall life satisfaction (1993)</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with life (1990, male)</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with life (1990, female)</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion of happiness</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels:* p < 0.05, " p < 0.01, "* p < 0.001.

Year of measuring variable is underlined (two underlined years: measurement was in the odd year in between).

Well.

Summarising the correlations in Table 4 and Table 5, and adding other significant correlations (p < 0.05, which are not listed) yields the following connotations.

**Connotations.** Across countries, the following cultural and non-cultural phenomena are related to entrepreneurship.

**Less wealth** There is more entrepreneurship in the countries that are relatively poor.

**Kind of society** In countries with more entrepreneurship, the power distance is larger, there is stronger uncertainty avoidance, more bureaucracy and more corruption. There is also a lower female labour participation.

**Dissatisfaction with society** In countries with more entrepreneurship, people are less satisfied with the kind of society they live in. They like less the way democracy is functioning and they have less confidence in the legal system. They think that the society must be changed radically. They are less interested in politics, probably because they feel they cannot reach power holders.

**Dislike of 'deviant' behaviour** People accept less other people who are different. There is a rejection of homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia, unmarried mothers, and of other 'deviant' ideas, values and beliefs.

**Lower life satisfaction** In countries with more entrepreneurship, the overall life satisfaction is lower. Besides, there are larger differences in happiness between the happy and less happy people than in other countries.

**REGRESSIONS ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

In this section we will test the hypotheses of Section 2 with respect to the economic and the dissatisfaction issues discussed there. In Section 3 we described five economic and two dissatisfaction...
variables, given in time series. These variables will be used in the regressions on entrepreneurship.

Rather had we also included the indices of Hofstede, but these are, unfortunately, not given in time series. However, there is another way of studying their influence. We will carry out regressions for distinct cultural country clusterings, based on the Hofstede indices. This enables us to examine whether in different clusters the five economic and the two dissatisfaction variables influence entrepreneurship in different ways. Thus we can indirectly study the role of culture.

**Clustering of Countries**

Each Hofstede index is used to divide the countries into two clusters (for example: high PDI and low PDI). Thus we can investigate if, for example, in high-PDI countries the explaining variables influence entrepreneurship in another way than in low-PDI countries.

The advantage of using the Hofstede indices to determine country clusters, is that the indices are available for most or the countries studied in this paper. Unfortunately, for Iceland and Luxembourg, the four indices are not available, but for the latter country estimates are known, which will be used. Accordingly, for the regressions in country clusters only Iceland is excluded.

We will also use the combination of the four indices to make again two clusters. Altogether, with the four indices and the combination, we have ten different country clusters.

Given a Hofstede index, the two corresponding clusters are determined using the K-means algorithm. In this algorithm the countries are assigned in turn to the nearest of the two cluster centers (which are initialised as the lowest and the highest score among the 22 countries). When all cases have been added, each cluster center is updated as the average score of the countries it contains. This process iterates until the solution converges.

**Regressions Across All Countries** (No Clustering)

The dependent variable in the regressions is entrepreneurship (the number of self-employed per labour force), the independent (explaining) variables are the five economic and the two dissatisfaction variables described previously. The time series of all variables are 'pooled' over time, so that we obtain variables with maximally 23 x 11 = 253 cases (23 countries, 11 years).

We will first consider a regression without clustering of countries and without the two dissatisfaction variables. The reason for leaving out the dissatisfaction variables is that they are available for only twelve of the 23 countries studied in this paper, whereas the other five independent variables are given for all countries. Table 6 summarises the results of the regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>( N )</th>
<th>Diss. incl.</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
<th>Lab. inc. quota</th>
<th>Populat. density</th>
<th>Fern. lab. share</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Unempl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>23:</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(see Table 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.424)</td>
<td>(-1.210)</td>
<td>(-4.148)</td>
<td>(-3.487)</td>
<td>(3.919)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabulated are the standardised regression coefficients (T-values between brackets); coefficients with \( |T| > 2 \) are written in bold.

The first column of Table 6 shows the clustering of countries we are using. In this case we consider all 23 countries (indicated in column 2). The \( N \) in column 3 denotes the number of cases in

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2 These estimates were provided by the Institute for Training in Intercultural Management (ITIM) and are based on extensive data from training sessions.
the regression. Its maximum is 253 and since there are no missing data here, all cases remain. The fourth column indicates that the dissatisfaction variables are excluded from the regression. The fifth column denotes the amount of explained variance ($R^2$, also called the coefficient of determination). The last five columns correspond with the five economic variables.

The second row of Table 6 gives the standardised regression coefficients of the five economic variables in the regression equation, when they are all entered (these coefficients are usually denoted by $\beta$). In the third row, the corresponding $T$-values (between brackets) indicate the significance of the variables entered.

The significant coefficients in Table 6 (the coefficients with a corresponding absolute $T$-value of 2 or higher) are written in bold. Three of the five economic variables turn out to be significant: negative are female labour share and GDP per capita; positive is unemployment.

Subsequently, we consider the regression for the twelve countries for which we have the dissatisfaction variables. We will first include only the five economic variables, and subsequently add the dissatisfaction variables. The reason for this is that we can thus distinguish the additional explaining power. Table 7 summarises the results.

**TABLE 7:**
Regressions on Entrepreneurship Across Twelve Countries, Including Dissatisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Dahl, Luxembourg, Finland, Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Denmark, France, NET, FOR, SPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diss.</td>
<td>incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissat. life</td>
<td>no 0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissat. democr.</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab. inc. quota</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populat. density</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fern. lab. share</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempl.</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dice, incl.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.228)</td>
<td>(3.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.306)</td>
<td>(-1.779)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.832)</td>
<td>(-0.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.455)</td>
<td>(-1.740)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabulated are the standardised regression coefficients ($T$-values between brackets); coefficients with $|T| > 2$ are written in bold

In the regressions of Table 7 we apply again no clustering (column 1), i.e., we consider all countries (for which we have dissatisfaction variables). These countries are listed in column 2 (see Table 1 for the abbreviations used). Column 3 shows that there are $N = 119$ cases in the regression, which — because of some missing data (for Greece, Portugal and Spain the time series start later than 1071) — i.e., fewer than the maximum of 12 x 11 — 132 (12 countries, 11 years). The fourth column indicates whether the dissatisfaction variables are included in the regression or not. The last seven columns correspond with the seven independent variables (now including the dissatisfaction variables).

In case the dissatisfaction variables are not included and only the five, economic variables are considered (second row of Table 7), we see a slightly different picture than for the regression across all 23 countries (Table 6): only GDP per capita is significant (negatively again). The variables female labour share and unemployment are apparently not significant for this smaller set of countries.

If the dissatisfaction variables are included in the regression as well, the explained variance ($R^2$; fifth column) increases significantly from 39 to 51. Both dissatisfaction variables are positively influencing entrepreneurship (the relation is strongly significant). They are the only significant variables.

To conclude this section: across the twelve European countries GDP per capita influences entrepreneurship (negatively). However, dissatisfaction with life and with democracy are even stronger determinants.
We will now consider regressions for the various country clusterings based on the indices of Hofstede. Since the dissatisfaction variables are available for only twelve of the 23 countries studied in this paper, we first exclude theec variables from the regressions. In the next subsection we will discuss the regressions including the dissatisfaction variables.

Table 8 summarises the results. For example, the clustering based on the four indices PDI, UAI, MAS, and IDV (called \( \text{All}_4 \), see first column) divides the 22 countries (excluding Iceland) into two groups: 'All_4=1' and 'All_4=2'. The first group consists of the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands (see 2nd column). For these eleven countries there are no missing data, so that the number of cases (3rd column) is maximal: \( 11 \times 11 = 121 \) (11 countries, 11 years). For this country cluster all variables come out significantly in the regression with entrepreneurship: labour income quota, population density, and female labour share negatively; GDP per capita and unemployment positively.

### TABLE 8: Regressions on Entrepreneurship in Country Clusters, Excluding Dissatisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Diet. incl.</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
<th>Lab. incl. quota</th>
<th>Populat. density</th>
<th>Fem. lab. share</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Unempl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All_4=1</td>
<td>11: Anglosax, Scan, NET</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-0.258 (-3.452)</td>
<td>-0.334 (-4.206)</td>
<td>-0.027 (-4.023)</td>
<td>0.285 (2.249)</td>
<td>2.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All_4=2</td>
<td>11: Germanic, South, BEL, LUX, FRA, JPN</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>0.181 (2.572)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.178)</td>
<td>-0.022 (-2.932)</td>
<td>-0.333 (2.249)</td>
<td>4.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rtft- 13: Anglosax, Germanic, Scan, NET</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>0.330 (-2.927)</td>
<td>0.469 (-5.869)</td>
<td>0.059 (-1.684)</td>
<td>0.447 (3.695)</td>
<td>3.519</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI+ 8: South, BEL, LUX, FRA, JPN</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>0.177 (1.943)</td>
<td>0.040 (0.178)</td>
<td>-0.024 (-1.460)</td>
<td>-0.467 (4.143)</td>
<td>4.368</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAI- 13: Anglosax, Scan, GER, SWI, NET</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-0.288 (-3.664)</td>
<td>-0.421 (-5.801)</td>
<td>0.154 (-6.539)</td>
<td>0.300 (3.351)</td>
<td>3.849</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAI+ 9: South, AUT, BEL, LUX, FRA, JPN</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>0.190 (2.437)</td>
<td>0.104 (1.309)</td>
<td>-0.021 (-2.617)</td>
<td>-0.039 (-5.655)</td>
<td>4.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS- 9: Scan, NET, FRA, POR, SPA</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-0.366 (-5.927)</td>
<td>-0.316 (-4.059)</td>
<td>-0.083 (-6.290)</td>
<td>-0.167 (-2.189)</td>
<td>4.513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS+ 14: Anglosax, Germanic, BEL, LUX, OR, ITA, JPN</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>0.153 (2.346)</td>
<td>0.061 (1.288)</td>
<td>0.098 (1.068)</td>
<td>-0.349 (-3.740)</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDV- 1: AUT, CIRE, POR, JPN</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>0.598 (11.052)</td>
<td>0.247 (1.638)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.355)</td>
<td>-0.634 (-3.889)</td>
<td>3.321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDV+ 15: Anglosax, Scan, GER, SWI, BEL, LUX, FRA, ITA, SPA</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-0.384 (-4.835)</td>
<td>-0.303 (-4.743)</td>
<td>0.060 (0.833)</td>
<td>-0.349 (-1.015)</td>
<td>3.833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the other cluster based on the four indices ('\( \text{All}_4=2' \)), labour income quota is again significant, but positive now! Female labour share and GDP per capita are both negative, and unemployment SB positive. Population density is not significant for this cluster.

Considering Table 8, we make the following observations:

- **Female labour share** always has the (expected) negative influence (except in MAS\(^+\), but there it is not significant); apparently, this is independent of culture. However, the influence in the cluster 'All_4=1' is stronger than in the cluster 'AU_4=2'; in *\( \text{All}_4=1' \) it is the most significant variable. The same holds for the clusters PDI~ and UAI~, compared to PDI\(^+\) and UAI\(^+\). Notice that the clustering according to the indices PDI or UAI corresponds very much
with the clustering according to 'All_4'. Also for MAS, IDV, female labour share is the most significant variable.

- \( (IF) \) per. r.njt. i.n. is the most significant variable (negatively) for the clusters 'All_4=2', PDI+, UAI+, MAS, and EDV-. It has a positive influence for most of the other clusters (mainly 'All_4=r, PDI-, and UAI-'). We will discuss these interesting results in Section 5.

Population density always appears with negative sign when it is significant in the regression equation. It is only significant in 'All_4=l', PDI-, UAI-, MAS, and MAS+. For the other clusters, it is not significant. In 'All_4=l', PDI-, and UAI- it is the second-most significant variable (after female labour share).

- Unemployment always has a positive influence, irrespective of culture. However, the influence is stronger in 'All_4=2', PDI+, UAI+, MAS, and IDV+. In 'AU_1—2', PDI, and UAI it is the second-most influential variable (after GDP per capita).

The variable labour income quota has a negative influence in the clusters 'All_4=l', PDI-, UAI-, MAS, and IDV+. For the other clusters, the influence is positive (though less significant). Thus is puzzling, and we will further discuss it in Section 5.

To draw a conclusion from these results, we first notice that the most meaningful clustering (both with respect to the results of the regressions and considering the cultural similarity of the countries) is the clustering according to PDI or UAI, which is almost equivalent to the clustering according to 'AU_4'. The differences between these clusterings correspond to the exact position of the Germanic countries, but the results of the regressions are almost the same.

A general conclusion is that for the countries with PDI- and/or UAI- female labour share (—) is the most significant determinant of entrepreneurship, followed by population density (—). These are the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries including the Netherlands, but it also holds for the Germanic countries. For these countries, GDP per capita (+!!), labour income quota (—), and unemployment (+) are important as well.

For the other countries, the Southern European countries including Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and Japan, and also for the Germanic countries, GDP per capita (—) is the most significant determinant of entrepreneurship, followed by unemployment (+).

Regressions in Country Clusters, Including Dissatisfaction Variables

Now we will consider the twelve countries for which the dissatisfaction variables are given. For each clustering we have first carried out a regression without the dissatisfaction variables, to see whether for the twelve countries the influence of the five economic variables is different than for the 22 countries studied in the previous subsection. Subsequently, we added the two dissatisfaction variables to discern their extra explaining power. Table 9 summarises the results. (The clusterings according to PDI and UAI turned out to be equivalent. The clustering according to IDV is omitted, since IDV contained only two countries.)

Considering the five economic variables only (excluding the dissatisfaction variables), a first observation is that for this smaller set of countries fewer variables are significant. For example: in 'All_4=r and PDI-/UAI- there is only one significant variable (not the same one), whereas for the 22 countries all variables were significant in these clusters. Other observations are (in the order of the previous subsection):

- Female labour share is only significant in 'All_4=l' and MAS (negatively).
TABLE 9: Regressions on Entrepreneurship in Country Clusters, Including Dissatisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Des. incl.</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Diss. life</th>
<th>Popul. density</th>
<th>Lab. income quota</th>
<th>Diss. with democracy</th>
<th>Diss. with life</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Diss. with democracy</th>
<th>Diss. with life</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All_4-1</td>
<td>4: DEN, GRR, IRE, NET</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>no .30</td>
<td>-0.087 (-0.356)</td>
<td>-0.388 (-1.414)</td>
<td>-0.374 (-1.161)</td>
<td>0.575 (1.172)</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.073 (0.380)</td>
<td>-0.681 (-2.168)</td>
<td>-1.046 (-3.424)</td>
<td>1.266 (3.133)</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All_4-2</td>
<td>8: BEL, FRA, GER, GRE ITA, LUX, POR, SPA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>no .35</td>
<td>-0.005 (-0.022)</td>
<td>-0.106 (-0.498)</td>
<td>-0.044 (-0.258)</td>
<td>-0.411 (1.909)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.004 (-0.092)</td>
<td>-0.439 (-4.848)</td>
<td>-0.040 (-0.256)</td>
<td>0.004 (-0.256)</td>
<td>0.662 (3.555)</td>
<td>0.352 (2.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI- or UAI-</td>
<td>5: DEM, GBR, GER, IRE, NET</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>yes .50</td>
<td>-0.044 (-0.321)</td>
<td>-0.366 (3.555)</td>
<td>-0.021 (-1.118)</td>
<td>-0.004 (-0.256)</td>
<td>-0.106 (-0.498)</td>
<td>-0.288 (1.909)</td>
<td>-0.131 (-0.892)</td>
<td>0.069 (0.820)</td>
<td>-0.023 (-0.258)</td>
<td>-0.304 (3.555)</td>
<td>0.352 (2.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI+ or UAI+</td>
<td>7: BEL, FRA, GRE, OR, ITA, LUX, POR, SPA</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>yes .72</td>
<td>-0.131 (-0.892)</td>
<td>0.488 (4.474)</td>
<td>-0.224 (-2.519)</td>
<td>-0.288 (1.909)</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>-0.131 (-0.892)</td>
<td>0.131 (1.136)</td>
<td>-0.854 (2.143)</td>
<td>0.288 (2.514)</td>
<td>0.662 (3.555)</td>
<td>0.352 (2.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS-</td>
<td>5: DEN, GBR, GER, IRE, NET, POR, SPA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>yes .84</td>
<td>-0.488 (-5.847)</td>
<td>-0.274 (-4.862)</td>
<td>-0.940 (-3.334)</td>
<td>-0.312 (-3.243)</td>
<td>-0.131 (-0.892)</td>
<td>-0.288 (1.909)</td>
<td>-0.224 (-2.519)</td>
<td>-0.023 (-0.258)</td>
<td>-0.304 (3.555)</td>
<td>0.352 (2.514)</td>
<td>0.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS+</td>
<td>7: BEL, GBR, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, LUX, POR, SPA</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>yes .78</td>
<td>0.643 (2.939)</td>
<td>0.387 (2.124)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.168 (-1.122)</td>
<td>0.070 (0.664)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.664)</td>
<td>0.387 (2.124)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.168 (-1.122)</td>
<td>0.070 (0.664)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.664)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- GDP per capita is (again) the most significant variable (negatively) for the clusters ‘All_4-2’, and PDI+/UAI+.
- Population density is always negative, but only significant for 'All_4-2' and MAS-.
- Unemployment is always positive, but only significant in ‘All_4-2’, PDI-/UAI-, and PDI+/UAI+. In PDI-/UAI- it is the only significant variable. In ‘All_4-2’ and PDI+/UAI+ it is the second-most important variable (after GDP per capita).
- Labour income quota is only significant in MAS" (negatively).

Adding now the two dissatisfaction variables, we first observe that some economic variables that were not significant, now are. For example: in 'All_4=1' three of the five economic variables are now significant, whereas only one of them was significant with the dissatisfaction variables excluded. Furthermore, we observe the following:

- The explained variance \( R^2 \) increases significantly when the dissatisfaction variables are included in the regression.
- Dissatisfaction with life does not seem to be very important within country clusters (as it was across all countries, see Table 7). For MAS+, it still plays the main role. In MAS" it even appears with a negative sign (but only after four economic variables).
- Dissatisfaction with democracy now plays a very important role (positively). Only in MAS" it is not significant. It is the most significant variable in PDI-/UAI-, and the second-most significant variable in PDI+/UAI+ (after GDP per capita).
To conclude this subsection (again focussing on the indices PDI/UAI): For PDI/UAI, dissatisfaction with democracy (+) is the most important variable, followed by female labour share (—), unemployment (+) and GDP per capita (+). For PDI+/UAI+, GDP per capita (—) is the most important variable, followed by dissatisfaction with democracy (-f) and population density (—).

Summary of the Regressions

We will now summarise the results of the regressions on entrepreneurship discussed in this section. Considering first the economic variables, we see that across all countries the significant variables are (in order of significance) female labour share (—), unemployment (-f), and GDP per capita (—) (see Table 6). Within the country clusters PDI— and UAI— (see Table 8), female labour share (—) is still most important, followed by population density (—). The other three economic variables are also significant, but the order of significance differs slightly for the two country clusters. In the clusters PDI+ and UAI+ the most important variables are GDP per capita (—) and unemployment (+). Female labour share (—) and labour income quota (+) are also significant, but only for UAI+.

When all seven independent variables are included, we see that across all countries dissatisfaction with life (-f) and with democracy (+) are the most (and the only) significant variables (see Table 7). In the country cluster PDI−/UAI−, dissatisfaction with democracy (-f) is most important, followed by female labour share (—), unemployment (+), and GDP per capita (+) (see Table 9). For PDI+/UAI+ the significant variables are GDP per capita (—), dissatisfaction with democracy (+), and population density (—). Table 10 summarises the results.

### TABLE 10:
Significant Variables in the Regressions on Entrepreneurship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only Economic Variables:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Across all (23) countries:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Female labour share (—)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Unemployment (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: GDP per capita (-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In countries with PDI− or UAI:</td>
<td>In countries with PDI+/UAI+:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Female labour share (—)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Population density (—)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: GDP per capita (-f), Unemployment (+), Labour income quota (—) (3 and 4 only for UAI+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In countries with PPI− or UAI−:</td>
<td>In countries with PPI+ or UAI+:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Dissatisfaction with life (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Dissatisfaction with democracy (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Unemployment (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: GDP per capita (-f)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering this summary, we conclude that the influence of PDI and UAI on the role of the economic variables in entrepreneurship is especially clear for GDP per capita and labour income quota. For PDI−/UAI− GDP has a positive influence, and for PDI+/UAI+ it is negative. Labour income quota (—)
income quota also has a reverse role: across the 23 countries it is negative for PDI/UAI and positive for PDI+/UAI+ (but for PDI+ not significantly). Across the twelve countries, the positive influence of labour income quota in PDI+/UAI+ is not significant. For the other variables, the signs do not change. The only difference is that same vn.rin.helps lose their Rr{rificance in the other cluster, or change their order.

DISCUSSION

Cultural Variables and Dissatisfaction

The correlations between entrepreneurship and cultural variables listed in Tables 4 and 5 imply some interesting relationships. As was hypothesised in Section 2, entrepreneurship is positively related to Schumpeter's competitiveness (see Lynn 1991). But contrary to what was suggested, entrepreneurship is also positively related to corruption (i.e., negatively to the bureaucratic efficiency index of Mauro 1995). However, this positive relationship might very well have to do with the dissatisfaction issue raised in Section 2.

This hypothesis is supported by the correlations between entrepreneurship and cultural values, and the correlations between entrepreneurship and variables related to (dis)satisfaction with life and with society. The connotations listed in Section 3 leave quite a coherent picture. Countries in which people are less satisfied with life as a whole have more entrepreneurs. These are societies with larger power distance, stronger uncertainty avoidance, more bureaucracy, more corruption, and which are relatively poor. People in these countries are less satisfied with the way their democracy is functioning and with their society in general. Perhaps people in such countries are more easily forced into self-employment, as they cannot optimally develop themselves within existing structures and organisations. In other countries, people possibly have more opportunities to find an appropriate job within existing structures, and, as a result, are less inclined towards starting for themselves.

The dissatisfaction hypothesis is further confirmed by the results of the regressions in Section 4. Dissatisfaction with life and with democracy are even stronger determinants than the economic variables.

Economic and Demographic Variables

The distinction between countries based on cultural clusters turns out to be highly relevant for our analysis. Some economic variables have a negative influence on entrepreneurship in certain clusters, and a positive influence in other clusters. Besides, several variables which were not (or not always) significant in the regressions across all countries, more often appear significantly in the regressions across the cultural clusters. This would not have been visible if we had neglected the cultural context, and in that case we would have obtained incorrect results.

Overall, we find a positive relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship. Unemployment can thus be seen as a push factor in all countries. Since a negative relation was never found, we conclude that in the countries considered the unemployment rate generally remained below the level where it discourages people to start a business.

With respect to prosperity, a negative correlation with entrepreneurship dominates. However, when cultural clusters are distinguished, sometimes (for example in PDI~ or UAI~) a positive relation is found. Since the countries in for instance the PDI~ cluster are relatively affluent and those in PDI+ are less prosperous, these findings are in conformity with the U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and prosperity, as hypothesised in Section 2. In countries that have a relatively low level of GDP per capita, there is a negative relation due to the yet unexploited possibilities for economies of scale. In countries with a high level of GDP per capita, there is a
positive relationship because a stage of tertiaryisation, differentiation of markets, and dis-economies of scale has set in.

Since prosperity is negatively correlated with power distance, as well as with uncertainty avoidance; (be it weakly), and positively with individualism (see Rostlofde, 1991), it is likely that it is the level of prosperity which provides an indirect link between these cultural dimensions and entrepreneurship. The triangular relationship between cultural dimensions, prosperity and entrepreneurship obviously deserves further research.

Concerning labour income quota, only in some cases did we find significant evidence for the expected negative relation with entrepreneurship (implying that a higher level of profitability is a stimulus towards entrepreneurship). When (cultural) clusters are distinguished, a positive relationship is sometimes found (for instance in UAI and IDV), which is not confirmed by theory. This may, however, be due to a reversed causality when a high level of entrepreneurship causes a low level of profitability. In a country with little social security and a low supply of jobs, this situation may perpetuate itself. At the same time, the compensation of entrepreneurial labour is also counted within the labour income quota, which may cause a statistical artefact.

With respect to population density, there appears to be a negative relation with entrepreneurship, which implies that the minimum level of provisions (shops, crafts) needed in thinly populated areas and the effect of economies of scales in densely populated areas overrule the effect of the attractiveness of networks.

Finally, as predicted in Section 2, the participation of women in the labour force has a negative impact on entrepreneurship.

CONCLUSIONS

The determinants of entrepreneurial activity constitute a complex whole. But as far as national differences are concerned, one clear determinant appears: dissatisfaction. Across nations, dissatisfaction with society and with life in general seems to be a distinguishing factor: countries with people who are less satisfied with the society they live in and who have a lower overall life satisfaction, have more entrepreneurs.

Two warnings are appropriate here. First, the relationship between dissatisfaction and self-employment holds across nations, and may not be true for individuals within countries. It might be that dissatisfaction also plays a role within countries (as is often stated in the literature), but this cannot be concluded from this cross-national study. Secondly, one must be very prudent in extrapolating the conclusions found in this study to world-wide relationships. The results hold for Western countries (including Japan). It remains to be investigated whether the relationship still exists when other (e.g. developing) countries are included.

Finally, it is tempting to extract some 'stylised facts' from our research, regarding entrepreneurship and stages of economic development. In the early stages, when countries are relatively poor, their culture can often be characterised by large power distance and low individualism, and often also by strong uncertainty avoidance (at least in the Western countries). At the same time, their population is often relatively dissatisfied with society and life in general. All these circumstances give rise to a high incidence of (small-scale) entrepreneurship. In the next stage, countries start reaping hitherto unexploited economies of scale, prosperity rises, and dissatisfaction seems to diminish. The result is a definite decline of entrepreneurship. Finally, when countries are fully industrialised and a service economy sets in, several countervailing forces seem to dominate the scene. First of all, information technology and differentiation of markets create dis-economies of scale and invite new, innovative entrepreneurship. Simultaneously, a high level of satisfaction with life in these societies may, however, slow down the drive towards entrepreneurship. But when unemployment increases
for a longer period, due to the transition to the knowledge-based economy, this may again elicit new
(and perhaps marginal) business start-ups.

It is not straightforward, however, how governments in the most highly developed economies may
stimulate this resurgence of entrepreneurship by, for instance, safeguarding a reasonable profitability
of private enterprise.

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