Science, Values and Loves: Theologies as Expressive Constructions

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ABSTRACT
Invited to write “a manifesto for [my] own theological position”, I begin with science and human rights as excellent examples of universalist aspirations of modernity. Modern individualism is important too, as particular existential loves shape each life. Science, morality, and personal loves are interwoven in theologies, as creative constructions. The sciences are important, as we need not only individual authenticity but also accountability. My position presented here is science-inspired naturalistic theism. It is not “religious naturalism”, given the categorical difference between facts and values. It is not “natural theology”, as inductive approaches do not reach that far. It comes closer to a “theology of nature”, but it does not assume the epistemic claims involved. I consider theologies to be important expressive constructions.

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.—Immanuel Kant

At the end of his Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant wrote of two awe-inspiring themes: nature and morality, two domains in which our aspirations are universal. Existentially, each of us lives an individual, specific life; my particular “loves” shape my life. Those three issues, science, morality, and particular loves, come together in my understanding of theology. The editors of Theology and Science, Robert J. Russell and Ted Peters, invited me to write “a manifesto for your own theological position with special reference to the role science plays in your thinking”. I am most grateful for this invitation, which stimulated self-reflection, just as I have always been looking back with gratitude upon a semester at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS), 30 years ago, in 1987.

Modern aspirations include knowledge and values which are universal; such aspirations have been realized to a large extent in the natural sciences and in human rights. Conceptually, the modern orientation appreciates also human diversity. Each of us cares about particular humans, and not just about humankind. We join a particular religious community, if we do, and we share in its practices and convictions. Drawing for my understanding of religion on a definition by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, I take it that in a theology our worldview and our ethos may be interwoven, drawing on the resources of a particular
heritage. A theology thus expresses what one takes the world to be, what one would like the world to be, and what is existentially important to oneself. Authenticity is an important criterion, but accountability—relative to the best available science and the most fundamental human rights—is important too.

At the end of my reflections, I will explain the following answers to questions posed to me by the editors: “Is your position religious naturalism?” NO. “Is it natural theology or theology of nature?” NEITHER. “Something else?” YES! Theologies are human constructions, just as human culture and society are, and as constructions, they express something very important.

**Enlightenment and secularity: universalism and individualism**

A modern orientation rooted in the European Enlightenment, as I see it, combines universal ambitions about knowledge, morality, and politics, with awareness of historicity, of the contingent character of social, cultural and biological reality, and with a critical attitude towards traditional sources of moral and epistemic authority. The natural sciences and the moral claims articulated as universal human rights have been fairly successful in their global appeal. Aspirations went beyond practice, for instance with respect to the position of women and of persons of non-European backgrounds. Whether we failed those ambitions or are heading in the desired direction, as I hope in my more optimistic moments, the universal aspirations with respect to knowledge (science) and morality I consider to be indicative of deep values.

The dream of a universal language such as Esperanto, a language that would not be the language of any particular culture, failed, and so have visions of a world government or a global religion. Rightly so; some ambitions are too minimalist to live by. Humans are diverse in their ways of living, and this diversity is to be respected and appreciated. Thus, the modern orientation involves a conceptual individualism or liberalism. This need not imply social individualism, as humans freely choose to live and work with others.

Whereas the Enlightenment agenda is from the eighteenth century, European countries such as the Netherlands have shown a further shift towards secularity in recent decades. Secularization should not be understood as merely numerical change, less people in the pews, though that is part of the story. More fundamental, in my opinion, is that what it means to be religious has changed.³ This might be described as a move “from Authority to Authenticity”. Very schematically, in earlier times one used to be born as Roman Catholic, Anglican, Reformed, or whatever, and almost all stayed within the church into which they were born and raised. In the context of one’s community, a particular external authority—whether the Pope or the Bible as understood by the ministers of one’s church—was a given. Those who did not have a religious framework, also belonged to a particular social movement—say as social democrats or as communists—and with that came identity, safety and a sense of duty. One might speak of this—schematically exaggerated earlier situation—with a philosophical term as heteronomy, as the law (nomos) was given from outside. The term might be understood more easily when contrasted with its modern counterpart, autonomy, the law is set by oneself. By way of contrast, the more recent mood can be described as a turn towards individualism.

With the emphasis on the individual, the norm seems to have become “authenticity”; one has to choose whatever fits best who one really is or aspires to be, in one’s relations,
one’s work, one’s hobbies, and one’s religious engagement. Religion has become a chosen orientation. Even those who claim to return to the purity of their religious tradition, whether in an evangelical Christian commitment or as radical Islamists, do so as their personal choice. In the Protestant Reformation, the call to return to the sources, *ad fontes*, of early Christianity evoked study to find out what early Christianity really had been. Bypassing such scholarship, current radicals have elected to accept the authority of a tradition on the basis of their invented interpretation or of a leader who seems to them most authentic.

We see changing sources of authority, a shift away from a given community and its established leadership to the individual and the person’s immediate friends and acquaintances, even when those immediate relationships are globalized, maintained via modern communication technologies. It is not that “spiritual seekers”, say adherents of New Age, Paganism and the like, are less engaged socially and ethically than members of traditional churches, though there is a slight shift towards environmental causes versus social justice issues. It is not primarily moral engagement or “spiritual belief” that has changed, but the sources of authority people appeal to. A new voice from a religious organization such as Pope Francis may well attract attention, but that is not so much because he speaks for the tradition, as it is because he is seen as authentic, an individual of interest. This is not individualism, in the sense that people do not care about communities and friends. It is conceptual—the individual is the primary unit, rather than a given community or tradition.

So far on three fundamental elements in my orientation: respect for science, for human rights, and for individuals shaping their own lives. I consider as allies skeptics and others who are critical of external authorities and claims that conflict with science. But what insights does science provide, and what is not entailed by respect for science?

### The natural sciences

The natural sciences are extremely successful, precise, reliable and complete. An example of well-established science is chemistry, with its Periodic Table of the Elements, a scheme beginning with hydrogen and helium. One finds this scheme in many classrooms. All things in the visible Universe seem to be made of the elements represented there. It embodies knowledge that is used every day in material sciences, pharmacology, and elsewhere. With quantum physical models of atoms, the scheme can be understood; thus, chemistry and physics are unified. The Periodic Table is the same in Japan, Russia, and across the globe. Not only is it culturally invariant in use; it also is the fruit of work of chemists from many different cultural backgrounds. And if we ever were to encounter extra-terrestrial scientists who deal with matter under similar circumstances, I expect that their understanding will be similar, even though the names and symbols for the elements will be different.

Do we know what matter is, then? Atoms consist of a nucleus with protons and neutrons, surrounded by electrons. Those protons and neutrons consist of quarks, held together by gluons. At least, that is currently the best model at that physics level of description. And as we go further down, different ideas have been proposed. Perhaps matter should be understood as vibrating strings in a higher dimensional space, as superstring theories envisage. We are not there yet in our quest to understand matter; we have not hit rock bottom. Future theories may well change our understanding of reality, though pragmatically, current theories such as the knowledge represented by the Periodic Table will remain useful.
That future theories will be different, should make us cautious when we draw philosophical conclusions. Current theories may also have multiple interpretations as to what they mean. Many readers may be aware of this for quantum physics, but it applies as well to other theories. Various interpretations of a fundamental theory have equal standing, presenting ways the world might be, according to that theory. Thus, alongside the great success of science, there is an open side to it, especially when it comes to metaphysical consequences, our worldview. Experiments constrain but underdetermine our theories, the theories are not final even when they are adequate at their level of description, and our theories allow for multiple interpretations.

Science is awe inspiring for what it delivers. Denying consolidated science is an intellectual disaster. It may keep established knowledge and useful therapies away from vulnerable people, e.g. when the relation between HIV and AIDS is denied, and may result in less than adequate policies, for instance when human induced climate change is dismissed. Denying scientific insights may serve particular commercial interests, at the expense of interests of future generations. We should accept scientific insights as knowledge about the world.

At the same time, science is not final. Let me express this with an image from the philosopher Karl Popper.5

Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or “given” base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.

We can build, and we can drive the pillars deeper, but there is no absolute foundation. Nonetheless, as the city of Amsterdam shows, one can have a great city build on such human-made foundations. In fundamental physics, experts seek to drive the pillars deeper by inventing deeper theories. In other branches of physics and in the life sciences, colleagues are expanding the structure, using the best available current theories. Thus, while we do not really know what nature is like, deep down, we have well established, expanding knowledge at more mundane levels of existence. Science is a human product, with all the historical, social contingencies involved, but at the same time, science delivers insights that surpass human preferences and biases, individually, culturally and collectively.6

Though science is the prime source of reliable knowledge about the world, science does not have the answer to everything, nor will future science ever have the answer to everything. As mentioned earlier, there may well be multiple interpretations of the scientific theories involved. Besides, any scientific explanation of a phenomenon—say the weather today—involves assumptions about a preceding state—the weather yesterday—and about the natural laws that describes the dynamics of the system, in this case atmospheric physics. Science cannot explain without assumptions. Questions about “ultimate origins” and the ultimate rationality of reality are beyond science, even though the way such questions are framed, of course, always draw on the best available current scientific insights. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and “Why is the world mathematically rational?” are limit questions that arise in the context of scientific research, but are not answerable by science.7 Last but not least, some issues are categorically different. Mathematical knowledge is different from scientific knowledge. More important for my reflections here, moral values are of a different kind too.
Morality

Kant made universalizability the basic criterion for morality: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as principle in a giving of universal law”. Actual behavior, and justifications people offer, are, of course, often far more partisan, driven by the interests of oneself or one’s family at the expense of others. That is to be expected for living beings, given what we know of evolution.

How can we envisage morality with its universal aspirations, in a world that was shaped by evolution? We can understand the emergence of a human practice of making normative evaluations, judging others. In a group, we profit from pro-social behavior of others. This may be reinforced culturally, for instance by religious practices and beliefs.

Is it merely a pragmatic issue—it works for the group? Can moral arguments be justified, and not merely be explained? Criteria such as disinterestedness and universalizability may be understood in the context of our evolutionary past. Perhaps, one day a hominid was asked by another hominid something equivalent to: “Why did you do that?” Others may have been present. Emotions would not serve as an answer, nor would self-interest. The justification of one’s behavior would have to be sufficiently general to be recognizable to all. The application of criteria such as disinterestedness in the moral deliberation of many people together may have been important for the credibility of morality, as recommending practices that go beyond what is psychologically “natural”.

And to justify the “transcendental” validity of moral norms, one might argue along Kantian lines, for instance justifying values in the conditions for agency or judgement. Anyhow, without further argument in the context of this short paper, I acknowledge that morality is made by humans, but in its aspirations, its claim to value, morality categorically transcends us.

Loves: values in existence

I am convinced of the importance of human rights, for all humans, whether I like them or not. However, I care existentially about my wife, my children and various specific others. Susan Wolf made a distinction between “reasons of love” and reasons that would qualify as moral or selfish.

When I visit my brother in the hospital, or help my friend move, or stay up all night sewing my daughter a Halloween costume, I act neither for egoistic reasons not for moral ones. (…) Rather, I act out of love.

It may be accidental why my life has become interwoven with precisely these fellow humans, but my relation to them is important to who I am. And so too for certain pursuits, that are important to me, that make me who I am. My language. The stories that inspire me. The way I celebrate and the way I mourn. The way I relate to my family, the legacy I received. And to my country. Such “loves” and other markers of identity are my way of being in the world. I never speak “language”; it is always a particular language.

Adherents of a religion do not believe in “religion”, but are involved in a particular tradition, with its rituals and stories, its community and its convictions. How might we, then, honor universal ambitions in knowledge and in morality jointly with the plurality of particular identities, individually and collectively? We will consider this, with a focus on religions and theologies.
**Religions and theologies**

To approach the concept of religion, let us consider two dimensions of theism, which forms the background of much of our discourse on religion in general. Firstly, in theism God is understood to be the Creator of all that exists, a necessary being who is not dependent upon anything else for existence. Drawing on this example, one might conclude that a religion provides a frame to speak of ultimate cosmological, metaphysical questions regarding existence.

Secondly, in theistic discourse God is the ultimate judge. Religions articulate the possibility of evaluating our behavior from an impartial perspective that transcends all human interests and biases. A religious view offers stories and symbols that help us speak of values, of the axiological dimension of existence.

In a religion, these two dimensions—the cosmological and the axiological one—are intertwined. This understanding of religion is in line with Clifford Geertz’s anthropological definition of religions as systems of symbols that shape moods and motivations (the axiological side of things) by presenting us with an understanding of reality (the cosmological dimension) that is taken as true, thus supporting those moods and motivations. Religions intertwine models of the world and models for the world. To use theism once more as example: speaking of God as creator might integrate an idea about the ground of existence with an attitude of gratitude, humility, and respect for fellow creatures.

On the cosmological side, the models of the world, religions express aspects of our understanding of the world, and hence in our time should relate to science. On the basis of experiences and experiments, people have developed theories. Theories are mostly hypotheses, and not generalizations of data—and those hypotheses might be tested on the basis of the predictions that can be deduced from them. Theories, and more encompassing worldviews, are thus underdetermined by data, even though data may constrain the range of possible theories or worldviews. On the axiological side, the models for the world, there is a similar upward movement from personal preferences to general, abstract moral discourse, supported by ethics as philosophical analysis. This too might go far beyond what is included in “the data”, the underlying preferences and experiences.

Worldviews and values are intertwined in religious views and practices. When these go beyond symbols and stories, and are articulated in a systematic fashion, I would speak of theologies. Thus, someone’s theology is an integration of those two trajectories, of a vision for reality and an understanding of reality. It is an integration that draws on the particular resources available as legacy received and expresses the particular loves and concerns of the individual.

And if speaking of theology as integration suggests too much an intellectual project, one might also consider it more pragmatically. The question is how to think of the coexistence of two major but different human activities—science and morality—, working together for a common good. Working together may respect differences in kind and status. The main concern then might be to understand the good, and the factors that help promote “the good”, as the opposite of “good” is all too often a disappointed “intended well”.

Even if the driving ambition is “practical” (social, moral), we need critical intellectual consideration. Using the best available knowledge is a matter of intellectual honesty and of moral responsibility, as beliefs may have consequences. This responsibility is
well illustrated in the essay by the mathematician William K. Clifford (1879), “The Ethics of Belief”, and the response by William James (1896), The Will to Believe, which better could have been titled “The Right to Believe”, as James argues that under certain conditions where there is insufficient evidence, it is still legitimate to decide to hold a particular belief.14

How might science and religion work together for a common good? Science is primarily a source of understanding, models of reality, and through technology a source of power, the ability to modify reality. Scientific practice also provides a model for good collaboration and for rational operation, and hence a normative example. Religions primarily provide stories and visions, models for reality. They could also help us reflect on the “human condition”, individual and collective. One might hope that religions provide normative and inspiring examples, but given embarrassing examples from people who have religious offices or justify violence with religious motives, this exemplary role should be treated cautiously, if at all.

What might scholars in “religion and science”, contribute today? The particular intellectual niche, it seems to me, is to engage and nourish science and the intellectual ambition that comes by engagement with science, also in domains such as history, anthropology, psychology, the study of religions and the like. Not by dismissing human existential quests, as the new atheism seems to do, but neither by allowing “self-invented” varieties of science to stand for genuine science. The aim should be to bring a genuine scientific orientation to the table in the human, individual and communal discourses about our existential orientations and moral responsibilities, encouraging a constructive and critical reflection on worldviews and values.

Science-inspired naturalism

The editors invited me to label my position: Is it religious naturalism, natural theology, a theology of nature, or something else?

I have used the word naturalism in the title of one of my books, Religion, Science and Naturalism. Some have thus considered me a religious naturalist. However, that is not what I consider myself. I do consider myself a science-inspired naturalist, in the sense that when it comes to knowledge of the world, the sciences are our prime source of understanding nature; there is no ground to expect exceptions, whether as aura’s, angels, or miracles that go against nature. If something surprising is noticed, the aim will be to understand it in a way consistent with science, and thus to develop science.

However, in various publications I also pointed out that such a science-inspired naturalism does not answer limit questions about ultimate origins, and thus does not address the cosmological dimension of religion—illustrated earlier with the theistic image of God as creator. Nor does it deal with the categorically different kind of insight that is typical of mathematics, and even less with moral values. With respect to religious naturalisms, a major concern is that these tend to root values in “nature”, the “nature” that is studied by science or experienced personally. Of course, functional human values are rooted in our biological and cultural existence, and thus in nature, but whether those values should be valued, seems to me to be a question that highlights the categorically distinct, “transcendental” character of values; their actuality in our natural and cultural reality is not by itself enough evidence. Too often, humans have praised others with an appeal to
what is natural and criticized what is considered “counter-natural”. On the basis of reflection on human rights, later generations challenged such value judgements, and rightly so. Thus, a religious naturalism that seeks to ground values in nature as understood by the sciences, in my opinion bypasses philosophical insights about the distinction between facts and values, between what is and what should be.\(^{15}\)

What about natural theology? In this line of thinking, the main ambition seems to me to support conclusions about the existence and attributes of the deity, to draw on the title of a book by William Paley.\(^ {16}\) The line of reasoning is by and large inductive, from observations to conclusions. However, those conclusions are beyond reach. I already mentioned underdetermination—the theory does not follow from the data—the plurality of possible interpretations, and the possibility of future theories that will be rather different in ontology, even though there will be continuity in a pragmatic sense. Thus, the “upward” line of reasoning in natural theology pretends more than is given to us humans.

**Naturalistic theism as a theology of nature?**

What about theology of nature? As Ian Barbour used these terms, a “theology of nature does not start from science, as some versions of natural theology do. Instead, it starts from a religious tradition based on religious experience and historical revelation. But it holds that some traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in the light of current science.”\(^ {17}\) Thus, the domains are relatively independent. Moral and existential dimensions are relatively independent, but not the understanding of reality. But that too is recognized here, as the sciences do constrain the options, or at least, make it desirable to reformulate and perhaps reconsider traditional doctrines.

Currently, my preferred version of a theology of nature, relative to the scientific understanding, would emphasize God’s transcendence. God is transcendent to natural processes, which are understood as dynamics within the created order. In publications I have spoken of “a more transcendent God”, of “naturalistic theism”, and of “the divine as ground of existence and of transcendental values.”\(^ {18}\)

Perhaps the distinction between creation as temporal and the divine as timeless might help articulate the difference.\(^ {19}\) As I see it, a science-inspired naturalist can advocate a naturalistic theism; in this, the philosophical-theological tradition of Christianity (e.g. Anselm, Augustine) could be engaged. It would offer a way to interpret the transcendental character of mathematical truth and moral ideals as well as “answer” the limit questions. Of course, some of the reformulations proposed might be such that various adherents of the Christian tradition would consider it going too far, but that is a matter of further dispute.

In the structure of reasoning, any theology of nature that openly acknowledges that the theological proposal does not follow from science, but merely is supposed to be consistent with it, is somewhat akin to a hypothetical-deductive pattern of reasoning: the theory goes beyond the data, as a creative proposal, but can be tested for its consistency with data, old and new.

My main concern about a theology of nature is the status given to the creative proposal. Or, rather, to such a theology’s sources: tradition, religious experience, historical revelation, and such as Barbour has it in the passage quoted earlier. Given my appreciation of the role of science as way of approaching reality, I do not see how a category of revelation as a stable source of knowledge can be incorporated. I do see a place for the
vocabulary of revelation, for instance when someone says that this “was a revelation to me”. Something has become clear. It may even be a title of honor, just as the word miracle—my children are “miracles” to me.

If we look at religious traditions through the eyes of historians and scholars of religion, we see human movements. Their key figures, such as Siddhārtha Gautama, Jesus of Nazareth, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullāh, are all humans, just like you and me. They may have been particularly insightful and revealed important existential messages to fellow humans, but epithets such as the Buddha, the Christ, or the Prophet are best understood as honorific titles, given by humans, and not as terms that set them apart from the natural, human community.

Theologies as expressive constructions, interweaving knowledge, values, and loves

Theologies are human constructions. This does not set them apart as fictions, as constructions can be very real. Our whole world is full of human constructions, such as cities and computers. Social life is shaped by constructions, such as money and the state. Technology and culture are the two major spheres of life which are nothing but constructions, and as such very real. Science is a human construction as well, one tested against the world, in a way that makes it the best model for knowledge that is as objective as possible. Human rights are constructions too, but I see them as our best hope for a world in which all humans are treated fairly.

Theologies are constructions of a different kind. A plurality of voices is unavoidable, because theologies not only take into account our understanding of reality and our values, but also our more particular loves, the heritage that might be dear to us, the repertoire of stories that we use to educate and motivate, the music that moves us, the language, the rituals and symbols we might use. In theologies, we express in symbolic language our ideas on reality and values, universal and personal. The claims might be compared to convictions in a personal relationship. “My wife is the loveliest”, is something I can say, expressing my commitment and experience. This would not conflict with someone else making a similar pronouncement about another person.

In the end, I consider myself an agnostic on ultimate metaphysical issues, the ground of values and of existence; I do not think that we can reach that high. As a wondering human reflecting on “the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (to return to Kant’s motto), I find science-inspired naturalistic theism as described earlier personally attractive. As I see it, for all practical purposes one does wise to take a science-inspired naturalistic stance in daily life, e.g. when needing medical assistance. I consider Kantian constructivism our best hope when it comes to philosophical justification of values. And as a wandering human, living his life, I appreciate the motivating power of religious narratives that integrate ethos and worldview, and especially some of the Christian parables and hymns that stayed with me from my liberal protestant upbringing.20

Notes


6. Awareness of the historical, contingent character of science has been fueled by Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962). However, since then, good arguments have been made for piecemeal wise improvement, e.g. Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). It is such a pragmatic-naturalistic view of science that is adopted here.

7. I introduced the concept of Limit Questions in Beyond the Big Bang: Quantum Cosmologies and God (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1990), based on the PhD dissertation on which I worked during a Fulbright scholarship at CTNS in the Fall of 1987.

8. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 164 [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 5:30]


10. This was developed well in a recent PhD thesis by Sem de Maagt, Constructing Morality: Transcendental Arguments in Ethics (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2017), drawing on the work of Alan Gewirth and Christine M. Korsgaard.


13. In a different context, I found a version of “pragmatic expressivism” in Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 184, when he speaks of democratic social practices “as a tradition with which we have good reasons to identify”.


20. The distinction between wandering humans (and the need for particular narratives) and wondering humans (and philosophical speculation) I introduced in the final section of Religion, Science and Naturalism, pp. 274–283.

Note on contributor

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