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BOOK REVIEWS


Steven Shiffrin, The Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor of Law at Cornell University, observes that debates sometimes break out in his law classes between what he labels members of the religious Right and the religious Left. He generalizes, “The Right favoring tight relations between church and state; the Left opposing such connections” (p. 1). Who exactly fits in these categories? By the Religious left, Shiffrin’s means those citizens who “arrive at liberal political conclusions in accordance with religious premises whether those premises are thought to be theologically liberal or more traditional” (p. 1). To find out who he exactly refers to by the religious Right, one has to read until pp. 97-98 where he defines them as “those who belong to theologically conservative religious traditions and entertain politically conservative views.”

While these stereotypical categories may capture some general truth, they also miss the diversity in America. After all, some Christians on the political left, such as Ron Sider and Jim Wallis, favored faith-based initiatives in order to help the poor, while some Christians on the theological and political right actually oppose governing funding for religious nonprofits, because they believe it would corrupt the purity of their religious mission. As a result, from the start Shiffrin’s categories simplify a complex reality rather than illuminate it.

Shiffrin uses these categories, as the title indicates, to frame the central argument of his book. He seeks “to describe and defend a form of religious liberalism” over and against both the religious Right and the secular Left (which he never succinctly defines but identifies with figures ranging from Sam Harris and Richard Rorty to Martha Nussbaum and John Rawls). This form of religious liberalism both understands the elevated importance of religion in the constitution and “reaches liberal conclusions form religious premises” (p. 2). The first two parts of the book explain how he believes religious liberalism helps us properly interpret the religion clauses. The third part discusses what his view of religious liberalism means for democratic politics.

Shiffrin begins part one by explaining his philosophy of constitutional interpretation. He believes that while we should consider original intent and precedent, we must ultimately rely upon practical reason that involves balancing and making prudential judgments about multiple values in concrete contexts. Shiffrin particularly finds fault with attempts to interpret
the religion clauses by solely relying upon the value of equality (an approach he finds among both the secular Left and the religious Right). Equality or fairness, he maintains, cannot and should not always be achieved in our pluralistic society, since it is merely one among a dozen other values, such as liberty, autonomy, political community, religion and others, that undergird the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause.

In part two, Shiffrin examines the special case of compulsory public education and vouchers to prove this point. Despite the precedent supporting the right to private and home schooling established in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, Shiffrin defends the Constitutional right of states to require secular public high school education for all students. He defends this right with a number of charged questions and arguments that I have not seen a serious scholar in the conversation ask or make [e.g., “Should parents have a constitutional right to hermetically seal off their children from the views of others through their adolescent years?” (p. 66) “The notion that the message in public schools is monolithic from Holly Springs, Mississippi, to San Francisco, California, is really quite preposterous.” (p. 67)]. Shiffrin also uses the usual rhetoric of supporting “important interests for children and for the democratic system” to make his case (p. 93), but the reality is that Shiffrin’s position elevates the state’s power and interests over and against both parental rights and children’s rights since such his argument would also preclude teenagers, and not merely their parents, from choosing private schools. Despite his willingness to support this unusual legal view of the U.S. Constitution’s implication for limiting the educational choices or parents and children, he recognizes “compulsory high school public education is not a politically practical proposal” (p. 80).

Still, Shiffrin believes that his argument supporting the case for compulsory high school public education “leads to a strong support of a strong presumption against vouchers, at least at the high school level” (p. 64). Even if vouchers could be supported, he does not believe the Supreme Court’s *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris* decision regarding vouchers was decided correctly, and he draws upon the multiple values he defended in part one to make his case. Interestingly, what Shiffrin clearly does not value, however, is religious education. A prime example can be found when he addresses Michael McConnell’s important *Harvard Law Review* argument that “if progressives believe that the right to an abortion entails the conclusion that states may not subsidize childbirth without subsidizing abortions, then the right of parents to send children to private schools entails the judgment that state may not subsidize public education without subsidizing private education” (p. 83). Shiffrin simply dismisses this claim by asserting that the right to an abortion is a basic need whereas the right for a child to receive education that is shaped by belief in God is not a basic need. He even paints the motives of religious parents who desire such an education in unsympathetic terms: “A religious desire to deny the basic interests of children by attempting to rob them of the ability to choose between ways of life should not be enforced by the law.”
The fact that a parent might actually believe a religious education and the truths it may reveal makes a child more truly human and actually enhances their ability to make critical choices is not even considered.

In the third part of his book, he moves from the religion clauses of the First Amendment to democratic politics. Since the religious Right has brought theology into the public square to make its arguments, the secular left has responded by claiming such theological reasoning is illegal. Shiffrin finds this approach problematic for both constitutional and practical reasons. Furthermore, he claims that although “secular liberalism stands for freedom of religion and separation of church and state” (p. 100, later qualified slightly on p. 104), the secular left has a hard time answering why “the Constitution favors religion” (p. 107). In contrast, he believes religious Left can give a stronger defense of why religion is favored in the First Amendment by appealing to a broader range of values than that of equality when interpreting it. They can also better answer the religious Right, because they value religion and religious purity.

While Shiffrin’s argument in parts one and two suffers from a failure of consistency, a failure to demonstrate the value of religion by maintaining a value for religious education and religious ideas, his argument in part three suffers from a variety of defects. First, the Constitution singles out but does not necessarily favor religion (after all, the fact that the Establishment Clause cannot be applied to secular ideologies would appear to disadvantage religion in this respect). Second, what secular liberals ardently support is the Establishment Clause and not necessarily religious freedom (which does favor religion). The secular Left favors the Establishment Clause, because it can use it to single out religion for unequal treatment (e.g., secular speech, schools, and charities can be funded but religious speech, schools, and charities cannot). What the secular Left does not strongly defend, especially if one looks at what they actually do and not only their academic publications, is the free exercise clause or religious freedom in general. In fact, when it comes to religious freedom, the secular Left always places rights related to sexual freedom and identity on a higher plane than religious freedom (e.g., secular liberals resistance to Congressional efforts to strengthen religious liberty after Smith, the recent case of Christian Legal Society vs. Martinez-UC Hastings) and strongly resists taking religious freedom seriously in foreign policy (e.g., China, secular liberals resistance to the International Religious Freedom Act). The one thing he does get correct is that the secular Left has a hard time understanding why religious free exercise should be singled out for special treatment, although it’s not clear that they work hard to understand or defend this special status.

Overall, while Shiffrin demonstrates a keen and creative legal reasoning, he fails to be convincing. He claims to value religion but does not value religious education or the importance of allowing parents and children to choose one. Furthermore, his stereotypical categories limit the arguments’ effectiveness, and even when the categories are applied, it’s not clear he

Bangladeshi-Australian sociologist Golam Khan brings us a study of the human dimensions of the 1947 partition of Bengal, focusing on the experiences of East Bengal Hindu families who were forced by communal violence to migrate to Calcutta in West Bengal. This work is a sociology (not a history) of the partition, but it reads in part as a human history of those momentous events. Kahn weaves perspectives from the sociology of everyday life, the sociology of the family, refugee studies, and comparative political economy into a nuanced study of East Bengalis’ maintenance of customs, family structure, and cultural boundaries in the face of incredible adversity. He explains how East Bengalis have compromised on some aspects of their cultural preferences in order to achieve others: for example, in-marriage by district within East Bengal has been replaced by in-marriage within East Bengal origins in general. This satisfies the greater cultural goal of maintaining marriage practices without completely sacrificing the lesser cultural goal of maintaining East Bengali identity. Throughout the book, Kahn highlights similar acts of cultural compromise in the service of maintaining a distinct cultural identity among East Bengali refugee families living in West Bengal.

Kahn’s personal biography makes him interestingly well-placed to undertake this study. A Bangladeshi (East Bengal) Muslim, Kahn has strong personal and professional networks in Calcutta and has held academic positions both in Bangladesh and in Australia. He is strongly connected to the East Bengal Hindu refugee community in India, but not himself a member of it. He thus possess an strong vantage point combining intimate knowledge with scientific detachment. His book reflects this. Kahn uses a variety of methods including in-person interviews, extended family histories, newspaper content analysis, historical analysis, and demographic statistics to shed light on the East Bengal refugee experience from a variety of angles. His research results, however, are seamlessly integrated, pulling evidence as appropriate from each of these sources. The two main evidentiary chapters of the book — on the mechanics of migration and resettlement and on cultural boundary maintenance — are uncluttered by theoretical arguments and methodological minutiae. Instead, they focus on explaining the forced migrant experience to the vast majority of us who will never be so unfortunate as to find ourselves in that situation. The writing is, in a word, sympathetic.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book (at least for the non-specialist) is Kahn’s study of marriage practices. Here he takes a comparative
multi-method approach, contrasting East and West Bengal practices using matrimonial advertisements in newspapers, interview survey data, and ethnographic case studies. Kahn contrasts West Bengalis’ focus on caste with East Bengalis’ focus on regional origin, which is in part a response to the fact that most East Bengalis are of similar caste background but is also a compromise aimed at identity maintenance. In order to maintain their distinctive cultural identities while living among co-religionists who speak essentially the same language as they do, East Bengal migrants have chosen to place regional in-marriage above caste maintenance in their priorities for marriage. This facilitates the maintenance of their general cultural practice of living in multi-generational households, since West Bengalis generally live in nuclear family households. Kahn documents how marriage practices have changed, however, among second-generation Indian-born East Bengalis, who are increasingly socializing among and marrying West Bengalis. In the twenty-first century, economic class is displacing both traditional caste and regional origin as the primary consideration in partner selection among both East and West Bengalis.

Here, as throughout the book, Kahn’s micro-history intersects with macro-level political economy and the larger forces of history. In fact, as Kahn emphasizes, the 1947 partition of Bengal was not the first; in 1905 the British colonial government partitioned Bengal into separate Hindu- and Muslim-majority provinces, ostensibly to facilitate communications between districts and their governments but in fact, as Kahn argues, as a means of furthering British rule through communal division. The first partition lasted only six years, but Kahn argues that its effects were more long-lasting, in that it promoted the rise of a new class of Muslim political leaders in Bengal who by 1947 were impatient to gain power over a sovereign state of their own. Similarly, Kahn sees the communal violence (bordering on genocide) following the 1947 partition as having been driven mainly by political and economic (i.e., not interpersonal or cultural) forces. According to Kahn’s informants, the theft, killing, and rape they witnessed following the partition were not the result of spontaneous riots but were organized neighborhood invasions condoned by the new Pakistani government. Kahn’s sources also report rampant illegal seizure of cash and jewelry at border crossings into India. As with other episodes of genocide, the communal violence in East Bengal was at least perceived by its victims to have had the implicit state support.

The one weak point of this book is the editing. The book suffers from poor editing on two counts. First, it bears too strongly the organizational hallmarks of a Ph.D. thesis (introduction, methods chapter, theory chapter, etc.). The book would have been vastly improved had it received a once-over reorganization for book publication. With proper editing, it could have been both an academic monograph and a popular read; as published, it will mainly be of interest to academics. Second, the sentence-level editing is strikingly poor. For example, Kahn closes his introduction with: “In this research, the
conclusion is reached, based on discussions and findings.” (p. 11) Such examples of stilted prose are liberally scattered throughout the book. Professional proofreading would have immensely improved the final product here.

Also, Kahn leaves completely unanswered (presumably intentionally) the question of the experiences of Muslim refugees from West Bengal who migrated to East Bengal. Of course, his study is a study of East Bengal Hindus, but the general reader will be curious to know, even if only in a cursory fashion, something of the story of the opposite flow after partition. Were Muslim refugees similarly forced out? What were their experiences in the new Bangladesh? Kahn touches on these kinds of questions in a brief discussion of occasional house swaps arranged between well-to-do migrants on both sides, but is otherwise silent. One suspects that Kahn is being a touch too correct: a Muslim himself, he is at pains throughout his book to emphasize Hindu suffering at the hands of Muslim perpetrators. Millions of Indian Muslims suffered similar crimes at the hands of Hindus. Perhaps in excessive deference to the tribulations of his research subjects, Kahn makes no mention of this fact.

Overall, this is surely a good book in the sense that it leaves the reader wanting to know more. Kahn’s personal background, academic expertise, and writing style ideally equip him to write an engaging popular sociology of the partition of Bengal, telling the story in full from all sides of the event. In the meantime, his current book will be of interest to many scholars working beyond narrow fields like the historical sociology of India. In particular, scholars working in refugee studies are likely to find the experiences of East Bengal Hindu forced migrants very instructive. Despite representing a kind of refugee “best case scenario” — migration among co-ethnic co-religionists who speak the same language — East Bengal refugees were far from welcome in India. Even today they are struggling to regularize the settlements they set up over sixty years ago. The East Bengal Hindu refugee experience would make an instructive comparison with, for example, the Palestinian experience, which dates to exactly the same period in history. In short, there is plenty in Kahn’s book to keep scholars building on it for years. One can only hope that Kahn will go on to do so himself.

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Van Dongen’s book is dedicated to the division of family and professional work between men and women in Europe. Building upon already existing integrating policy oriented models such as transitional labor markets (TLM), flexsecurity models, dual earner /dual-carer models, and breadwinner / caregiver models, he aims to provide a scientific instrument for developing an
The author presents a holistic analysis of the issue of division of labor and focuses on conceptual, empirical and normative dimensions of the proposed combination model. The book is logically structured in three main sections which correspond to the aforementioned dimensions.

In the first section of the book, Van Dongen gives an overview of existing theoretical models dealing with division of labor between men and women during past decades (such as specialization and rational choice models, preference model, social exchange and economic bargaining models, and gender-role and socialization models) and critically evaluates them. Based on this, the author conceptualizes reconciliation of professional and family labor and provides the reader with a definition of the division of labor between men and women that does not include only references to unpaid family work and paid work in labor market organizations but also a whole market system as well as the public sector (public services, fiscal system, social security).

The second section presents how the gender division of labor evolved over time and provides empirical descriptions of the actual division of professional and family labor in EU and some OECD countries which are based on gender gap indicators, such as labor market activity rates; the number of hours of professional work, of family/household work and of personal care; and the share of flexible work arrangements. From a historical perspective, the book points out that the gender division of labor went through a various stages. The period 1950-1970 was characterized by extreme gender inequality in the division of labor between men and women, i.e. a strong breadwinner model. From the 1970’s till the 1990’s the composition of labor changed and the so called moderate breadwinner model, where women have become secondary earners but at the same time remain primary caregivers, has been installed in most of the European countries. After the 1990’s the division of labor between men and women evolved further and the so called combination models have been established. Given a different pace of the evolution of the gender division of labor in different countries, the four distinct types of combination models can be identified in nowadays Europe: the southern weaker combination model which strongly resembles the moderate breadwinner model; the continental moderate combination model; the Anglo-Saxon moderate combination model, and the Nordic and Eastern more advanced combination model.

In the thirds section of the paper, the author elaborates the normative dimension of the combination model and points out which form of this model would be the most desirable for the future European societies and under which conditions it could be implemented. Regarding the choice of the best form of the model, Van Dongen considers three types of combination model: strong, moderate, and complete. A very strong combination model aims at very high labor participation and an equal division of labor between partners with very limited freedom for personal choice. A moderate model offers more
space for an unequal division of professional and family labor at the expense of equality. The complete model that is presented in the book as the most suitable model for democratic countries should offer the biggest flexibility to people to organize the division of labor between men and women and should allow for many possible choices from a very equally divided professional and family tasks to a more unequal reconciliation arrangements between partners.

With respect to necessary preconditions of successful implementation and maintenance of the complete combination model, the author lists policy changes which should be undertaken. The establishment of the model requires the following simultaneous actions: widespread promotion of the model and strong democracy, policies leading to full employment and minimizing unemployment, transformation of the fiscal, social security, and care-service systems and implementation of combination policies in work organizations.

Having a look at these proposed prerequisites/suggested policy steps, it becomes clear that in order to make the division of labor between men and women more equal, it is necessary to reform most of, if not all, key institutional settings of nowadays democratic societies. As the complete combination model is presented as a policy-oriented model and not only as a theoretical concept, comments on its feasibility and implementation cannot be avoided, particularly now, in the context of financial crises and public expenditure cuts. No matter how appealingly, coherently and logically the author presents the model; the readings evoke some questions and demands for further precision.

Since the implementation of the complete combination model requires an integrated policy with sufficient consistency between very different policy fields it remains a question whether the implementation costs of the proposed restructuration of many existing institutional systems (educational, labor market, social security, fiscal systems etc.) would be affordable. Given the fact that the smooth running of the system depends heavily on a very strong, efficient and inevitably very centralized administrative system, the administrative costs of this rather complex system that allows for very diverse combinations of division of labor between partners could be extremely high.

Another interesting point which might raise some questions in the reader’s minds is the reach of the model. The combination model covers many, if not all, domains of everyday life, even those that were, up to now, considered as exclusively private, such as agreements between partners regarding division of household unpaid work within the family. The proposed system, clearly favours equal division of labor between partners while other forms of arrangements are possible but related to certain financial disadvantages.

Another point which that could deserve some more attention from the author is the assurance of democratic legitimacy of the model. In this context, it would be interesting to elaborate on the political feasibility of the
implementation of the model, mainly on the question whether the project that either explicitly or implicitly exhibits clear etatist and social-democratic features would get enough democratic support by the population and political parties, especially those situated more on the right-hand-side of the political spectra?

Despite the fact that the analysis is limited only to democratic, mainly European, countries it would be desirable to reflect on the applicability of the model in the context of globalizing economies and international competition. Implementation of a system which represents a heavy burden for public finances and has a direct impact on the labor market, should not be left aside without estimating potential effects of these changes on the labor cost, competitiveness of local economies implementing this model and other more global consequences.

The author rightly limits the applicability of the model only to the so-called strong democracies, for in countries with weaker and less transparent democratic system that do not meet the main preconditions of strong democracy (such as freedom, equality, solidarity and efficiency), this model can be neither introduced nor maintained.

To conclude, despite the comments made on the factual implementation of the Combination model in European countries of today, this work is an important contribution to the European and even global discussion on how temporary societies should be structured and run. Van Dongen presents both a vision as well as concrete policy steps which might lead to a more gender balanced society which is based on values of freedom, solidarity, equality and efficiency. By doing this he opens discussions regarding restructuring or reform of the currents systems.

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The book by Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn touches upon the most debated and controversial issues in Dutch politics and elsewhere, i.e., how to understand and deal with cultural diversity in society due to immigration. This relevance and their appealing style of writing certainly capture the reader’s attention.

The book is mainly about perceptions and prejudices in Dutch society regarding issues of cultural diversity. The main contribution of the book is to describe these perceptions and prejudices and to establish interrelations between them. The authors show that, to a considerable degree, Dutch respondents hold negative views on Islam and Muslim immigrants both on a general level and regarding specific practices like how Muslim men would
treat their women. They also point out that Muslims have different but equally negative opinions about the Dutch. The authors indicate that people in The Netherlands, across the political spectrum, adhere to prejudices towards minority groups and that such negative views and prejudices boost opposition against immigration. They also show that the degree to which Dutch people dislike minorities is related to perceiving them as a threat. Perceived threats to cultural identity are more likely to evoke exclusionary reactions than perceived threats to economic self–interest. At the heart of such threats is the fear that people will no longer be willing to conform to established rules and standards. These are interesting socio-psychological findings.

However, there are several issues that prompt doubts regarding the book’s scientific quality. Apart from the large categorical overlap between ‘Dutch’ and ‘Muslims’ – slightly less than a million people living in The Netherlands are somehow inspired by Islam and many of them have a Dutch passport – these doubts are first of all raised by the fact that most of the relevant studies regarding the issues the authors write about are ignored in the book. For example, the authors claim that their study is new in demonstrating a surprising continuity in negative Dutch perceptions on immigrants before and after the events of September 11, 2001. A discussion of the work by scholars like Baukje Prins, Elly Vasta, Willem Schinkel and Halleh Ghorashi would have taken away a large part of this surprise.

Moreover, the book is quite poor in discussing relevant theory that could help to clarify the significance and meaning of the authors’ findings. References to social identity theory and to realistic conflict theory are made in chapter four, but without linking these theories in a systematic way to the findings presented in the book. A stronger theoretical framing could have prevented a number of unfounded assumptions the authors maintain throughout the book. For example, the authors show that Dutch majority and minority respondents hold negative views on each other and each other’s cultures. On the basis of these findings they conclude that there is a conflict of values – between Western European and Muslim values – and that ways of life collide.

As we argue, such conclusions are quite problematic. Values become reified here, as if they were human beings involved in acts of conflicts. Values can be contradictory or incompatible but it is quite problematic to assume that they conflict unless you show that these values lead people to become engaged in conflictive behaviour. The book tells us nothing, though, about what people who may hold the perceptions and prejudices presented in the book actually do in social reality. Without any such data on behaviour, claims about colliding life-styles are hardly convincing.

Our own work among majority and minority employees of Dutch organizations suggests that people’s orientations and related behaviour are quite different from one context to another. In some contexts, minority and majority colleagues see each other as colleagues and cooperate very well and
in other contexts they identify each other in ethnic terms. Even such ethnic identification may lead to expressions of mutual interest in some contexts and to hostile behaviour in other contexts. That means that the relevance of general perceptions measured by way of surveys – as the authors did – for specific orientations people draw on in particular real-life situations is far from obvious. Relations between general perceptions and specific behaviour in real-life settings are much more complicated that the authors suggest.

Given the subject of the book, the absence of any reference to ethnic studies literature is remarkable. This literature may be very helpful, though, to understand both the findings and conclusions presented in the book. Scholars like Fredrik Barth and Andreas Wimmer point out that cultural oppositions and value contradictions themselves are not the main point in processes in which ethnicity becomes relevant. The construction of ethnic boundaries is what matters and cultural oppositions and value contradictions are created or invented for the purpose of constructing such boundaries between people. From such a perspective, the question is raised why people start to construct such (assumed or invented) oppositions in terms of values. Studying changes in, for example, dominant discourses on issues related to migration and minorities may be very helpful here.

Sniderman and Hagendoorn rightly argue that the concept of multiculturalism, that dominated the Dutch discourse until, roughly, the middle of the 1990s, portrayed people as members of ethnic communities that were distinguished based on assumed cultural differences. Multicultural society was far from ideal, as Halleh Ghorashi and Unni Wikan have shown in the cases of respectively The Netherlands and Norway, but cultural difference is not the same as cultural conflict. Since cultural relativism was an indispensable part of multiculturalism, no conflict was possible. After all, conflict presupposes that conflicting parties have some common standards based on which they can disagree. Cultural relativism suggests, though, that every standard is a particularistic cultural construct, so how can there be agreement or disagreement if there can be no common standards? Characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s was the very absence of conflicting behaviour in Dutch public space, despite what Sniderman and Hagendoorn claim about ‘conflicting values’.

Dominant discourse has changed dramatically since, roughly, the second half of the 1990s, something Sniderman and Hagendoorn fail to notice. Already in the second half of the 1990s asylum seekers were no longer conceived as people seeking refuge, but as fortune hunters, as Karin Geuijen has shown. In line with this shift, a clearly migrant-hostile immigration law was passed in 1998. Since these times, monoculturalism has replaced multiculturalism in the discourse on migrants and minorities in Dutch media and politics. Previous multicultural government policies tried to reinforce minorities’ cultures to encourage their ‘integration’ in society. By contrast, current monocultural policies portray the values of minority members as the main obstacle to their ‘integration’. Current policies force minority members
to adopt assumed ‘Dutch norms and values’ through obligatory civic integration programmes. Now conflict has become possible because ‘Dutch values’ are set as standards, also to migrants. Many of the respondents in our own research indicate that they experience much more ethnic conflicts in behaviour over the last decade than before.

Over the last decade, right-extremist politicians like Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders claim that there is a value conflict between so-called non-Western, basically Muslim values and something they claim to be Dutch or Western values. Now we find the same right-extremist ‘value conflict’ claim reappearing in exactly the same terms in the book by Sniderman and Hagendoorn. What does that mean? If these terms accurately reflect the opinions of their respondents, the authors fail to pose the obvious question whether these perceptions are much more infused by the current dominant monocultural discourse instead of by the previous multicultural one.

However, the research method applied by Sniderman and Hagendoorn does not allow us to answer this question in a straight-forward manner. Their method raises serious concerns. Many of the questions they posed in their surveys directly reflect central statements of the current monoculturalist discourse. Such a way of posing questions is highly suggestive and biased. Chapter five tells us that they even went to far as to instruct their interviewers to mislead their respondents and tell them at a certain moment that the interview is over and then continue to pose extremely biased questions and, even more, to encourage their respondents to agree with such clearly monoculturalist statements. Fortunately, as the authors themselves acknowledge, many respondents refused to go along with such a procedure and had the courage to defend good research ethics.

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