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The Third One
Imagination in Kant, Heidegger and Derrida

Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Tilburg,
op gezag van de rector magnificus,
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in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van
een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie
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door

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“Z.B. die Einbildung im Menschen is eine Wirkung, die wir mit anderem Wirkungen nichts als einerlei erkennen. Die Kraft, die sich darauf bezieht, kann daher nicht anders als Einbildungskraft (als Grundkraft) genannt werden.” (Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie, 180n-181n)

Immanuel Kant


Martin Heidegger

“[...] ‘le regard’ ne peut pas ‘demeurer’.” (La voix et le phénomène, 117)

Jacques Derrida
Preface

During the years of working on my dissertation I have been fortunate in meeting many people. I have been able to read and write about themes that have interested me for a long time, and I have been given opportunities to present and discuss papers here at the University of Tilburg and abroad. My supervisor Gido Berns has always supported and encouraged me in the experiences of writing, reading and discussing, and has managed to keep me excited throughout this journey. I wish to thank him for this, since, as he knows, writing a dissertation about a number of different philosophers has been one of my dreams. I am grateful for his support and trust, and for giving me the opportunity to work on this project.

Although the writing of a PhD thesis is often considered an individual project, it would have been impossible without many of my colleagues. I would especially like to thank all (former) PhD students working at the philosophy department of Tilburg University. Writing this dissertation would definitely have become an individual venture if it were not for the friendships that evolved in the years. Special thanks to Anton Frantzen. What started only with sharing a room and having regular coffee and tea breaks soon turned into friendship. I am grateful for this friendship, and despite (or because of) our philosophical differences I cannot think of a person who has become more involved throughout the whole journey. Of course I mention Mandy Bosma here as well. She witnessed the process of working on this dissertation from close quarters, and she always gave me an opportunity to say what was on my mind.

I wish to thank the participants of the former research group ‘Representation and Hermeneutics’ for many stimulating discussions. I value the time that Frans van Peperstraten and Aukje van Rooden gave for reading texts or chapters when needed, and I appreciate their many remarks.

I thank my family and friends for their patience and their willingness to deal with many of my struggles. I thank my parents, my brother Stefan and my sister Natascha. They have always been there for me. Even though the topic of this dissertation and of other articles I have written has been remote from their own interests, they saw, and always stimulated, the enthusiasm with which I worked. I also wish to mention Renske here for the years during which she has encouraged me to work on the things that interested me.

I would like to thank Camiel Donkers, Marta Kunecka and Eefje Vonken for their friendship and the constant help they gave me by coping with the mazes of my thoughts as well as for the time they gave me for necessary distraction both in the Netherlands and abroad. I am grateful to Camiel for giving me the opportunities to share many thoughts during the years, and this last year we had the pleasure of Twan and Jamie joining us for even more stimulating discussions. I thank Marta for the many conversations; we were lucky to meet on three different continents, and her encouragement every time motivated me to continue chasing a dream. I wish to thank Eefje for all the times we have spend together, for her hospitality, her caring, and most of all, for the friendship.

Finally, I would like to thank Jacob Rogozinski, Simon Critchley, Richard Lee, Frans van Peperstraten and Herman van Erp for their willingness to be on my committee, and the time they have taken to read the manuscript of this dissertation.
List of Abbreviations

WORKS BY KANT
All references to Kant are to Kants gesammelte Schriften (KGS), herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 volumes (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1902-). References to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions. Specific works cited in the main body of the text are referred to by means of the abbreviations listed below. The letters of Kant (published in Volume 10-12 of KGS, and partially translated in Correspondence, transl. A. Zweig, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) are identified by means of the recipient and date. The translations used are listed in what follows, and (except for the Kritik der reinen Vernunft) are referred to immediately following the reference to the volume and page of the German text.

ANTH: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (KGS 7).

BFA: Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (KGS 8).

DISS: De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (KGS 2).

EAD: Das Ende aller Dinge (KGS 8).

ENTD: Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neuen Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (KGS 8).

GMS: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 4).

GTP: Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie (KGS 8).

IAG: Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (KGS 8).
KPV: *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (KGS 5).

KRV (A/B): *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KGS 3 and 4).

KU: *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (KGS 5).

LOG: *Logik* (KGS 9).

MAM: *Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte* (KGS 8).


MS: *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (KGS 6).

OP: *Opus Postumum* (KGS 21 and 22).

PAD: *Pädagogik* (KGS 9).

PROL: *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (KGS 4).
   *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science*, in I. Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, transl. G. Hatfield, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 49-169.

RA: *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* (KGS 15.1).

REL: *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (KGS 6).

RM: *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* (KGS 18).

SF: *Die Streit der Facultäten* (KGS 7).

TG: *Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (KGS 2).

VKK: *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes* (KGS 2).

**VM:** *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik* (KGS 28.1).


**VN:** *Vorarbeiten und Nachträge* (KGS 23).

**VTP:** *Vor einem neuerdings erhobenen vernehmten Ton in der Philosophie* (KGS8).


**WHO:** *Was heisst: Sich im Denken orientieren?* (KGS 8).


**WWF:** *Welches sind die wirklich Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolff’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* (KGS 20).


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**WORKS BY HEIDEGGER**

The following abbreviations are used to refer to Heidegger’s work as gathered in the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) (Frankfurt a/M, Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–). Several editions will include a reference to the used English translations, listed in what follows, and are referred to immediately following the reference to the volume and page of the German text. Some references are to editions published outside the *Gesamtausgabe*, namely *Sein und Zeit*, *Zollikoner Seminare* and the correspondence between Heidegger and Jaspers.

**GA3:** *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929)


**GA5:** *Holzwege* (1935-1946)


**GA6.1:** *Nietzsche I* (1936-1946)


**GA7:** *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1953)

**GA8:** *Was heisst Denken?* (1951-1952)


**GA9:** *Wegmarken* (1919-1958)


**GA10:** *Der Satz vom Grund* (1955-1956)

**GA11:** *Identität und Differenz* (1955-1957)
GA12: *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1950-1959)
GA14: *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1962-1964)
GA15: *Seminare* (1951-1973)
GA18: *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (1924)
GA19: *Platon: Sophistes* (1924)
GA20: *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1925)
GA21: *Logik, die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (1925-1926)
GA23: *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant* (1926-1927)
GA24: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927)
GA25: *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1927-1928)
GA26: *Metaphysische Anfanggründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (1928)
GA27: *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1928)
GA28: *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart* (1929)
GA31: *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1930)
GA32: *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1930)
GA34: *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (1931)
GA38: *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* (1934)
GA40: *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935)
GA41: *Die Frage nach dem Ding, Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (1935)
GA47: *Nietzsches Lehre vom Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (1939)
GA53: *Hölderlins Hymne ‘Der Ister’* (1942)
GA55: *Heraklit* (1943-1944)
GA56/57: *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (1919)
GA64: *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924)
GA65: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938)

GA66: Besinnung (1938-1939)
GA69: Geschichte des Seyns (1938-1940)

SUZ: Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967.


WORKS BY DERRIDA


AID: Als ob ich tot ware – As if I were dead, Wien, Turia + Kant, 2000.


HC: *H.C. pour la vie, c'est à dire...*, Paris, Galilée, 2002.


Introduction

In the story of Eros and Psyche, as described in Apuleius’ *Metamorphosis* in the second century A.D., we read how Psyche, the third and youngest daughter of an unknown king and the personification of the soul (*psuchē*), is the last human being to enter the pantheon and become divine. It is, therefore, not surprising that she was not the focus of the same worship and cult as the other gods of ancient times, though many later painters (Gérard, Bouguereau), sculptors (Canova), poets (Tighe) and writers (Milton) tried to set this straight. John Keats was well aware of this when he wrote in a letter of 1819 to his brother and sister-in-law that “I am more orthodox than to let a heathen goddess so be neglected”.\(^1\) In the same year, Keats wrote the poem ‘Ode to Psyche’ in which a narrator (‘I’) eventually promises Psyche that he will become “thy priest”. Keats describes the poem as the one over which he, for the first time, took “moderate pains”. The poem presents events and describes situations as well as promises made by the narrator who remembers (dreaming of) a surprise encounter with Eros and Psyche lying in the high grass in a forest. Although he eventually decides or promises to sing for her, the poem itself begins by addressing itself to her: “O Goddess! hear these tuneless numbers, wrung / By sweet enforcement and remembrance dear, / And pardon that thy secrets should be sung / Even into thine own soft-conched ear” (ll. 1-4). While directing himself to her and singing to her, the ‘I’ promises to dedicate his life and words to her, and be her voice and instruments: “I see, and sing, by my own eyes inspir’d. / So let me be thy choir, and make a moan / Upon the midnight hours; / Thy voice, thy lute, thy pipe, thy incense sweet / from swung censer teeming; / Thy shrine, thy grove, thy oracle, thy heat / Of pale-mouth’d prophet dreaming.” (ll. 43-49; cf. ll. 30-35) He begins by doing what he only later promises to do.

That Eros appears in the poem is not arbitrary nor merely due to the fact that Psyche is in Apuleius’s *Metamorphosis* Eros’ lover, as love itself is an essential theme to Keats. As De Man summarizes, “Keats’s original dream […] is a dream about poetry as a redeeming force, oriented toward others in a concern that is moral but altogether spontaneous, rooted in the fresh sensibility of love and sympathy and not in abstract imperatives”.\(^2\) This redemption is something for the future, as the poem ‘Ode to Psyche’ describes towards the end. The ‘I’ gives his word (his poem and his promises) to “His [Eros’s] Psyche true” in a future tense: “And there shall be for thee all soft delight / That shadowy thought can win, / A bright torch, and a casement ope at night, / To let the warm Love in!” (ll. 64-67) The frozen or cold figures of the Ovidian *Metamorphosis* are confronted here with the warmth of love as if this warmth will give life to these figures and redeem the sorrow and suffering of others. In ‘Ode to Psyche’, this love is completely internalized (“Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane / In some untrodden region of my mind” (ll. 50-51)), although the warmth of Eros (Love) still seems to preserve something that is not completely of the mind or brain. What is most important for us, however, is that Keats associates this love (Eros) with the imagination (Fancy), and, as De Man underlines, love “naturally becomes one of the leading symbols for the working of the imagination.”\(^3\) What is essential to Keats’s involvement with love is not so much the sensation or experience – since it is more imagined than experienced – but the loss of the self in sympathy. “Keats, as I [De Man] see him, would be a case in point, where self-encounter and self-transcendence occur in one single, destructive moment that puts the entire

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3. Idem, 186.
strategy of the work in question. Without being narcissistic, Keats’ interest in Psyche does not begin with a love for the self or his soul, but with the forgetting of the self in sympathy for others. Here, the forgetting of the self disrupts all continuity and even consciousness, and for this reason the poet probably so often wonders about his experiences: “Surely I dreamt to-day, or did I see / the winged Psyche with awaken’d eyes? / I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly, / And, on the sudden, fainting with surprise, / Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side” (ll. 5-9). The self loses or forgets himself in these suspended conditions of sleep or trance.

Keats’s poet loses his individuality and character, as becomes clear when he writes to Woodhouse about “the poetical Character itself, (I mean that sort of which, if I am anything, I am a member [...] ), it is not itself — it has no self — it is every thing and nothing — It has no character — it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated.” Blanchot quotes this passage in a footnote when he speaks of “automatic writing” as “the language whose approach it ensures is not a power — is not power to speak. In it I can do nothing and ‘I’ never speak. And yet, is it not a stroke of good fortune as well? Does it not also guarantee us the freedom to say all [tout dire]? [...] Everything is his country, and everything his affair; and he has the right to see into everything. This is attractive and overwhelming.” Literature has the right to say and question everything, but, also, the duty not to consent to any choice. There is no ‘I’ that speaks in literature, so that the ‘I’ loses its authority in literature to come to a final conclusion or answer and, here, the ‘I’ remains powerless. When it does not have to choose sides, literature is forced to say everything in which it loses every fixed point of reference and absolute authority. Here, it reveals its fragility insofar as it cannot protect itself. The author has handed over his words to the other as soon as writing speaks automatically. Blanchot continues by emphasizing the powerlessness and the vulnerability of literature: “It is a matter of reaching the point where to speak is to say all and where the poet becomes the one who cannot withdraw from anything, who turns from nothing, but is yielded up, without any protection whatever, to the foreignness and the measureless excess of being.” It is here that Blanchot refers to Keats.

The fragment from the letter of Keats continues as follows: “It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the camelion Poet. It does not harm from its relish of the dark side of things any more than from its taste for the bright one; because they both end in speculation. The Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no Identity — he is continually in for — and filling some other Body — The Sun, the Moon, and Men and Women, who are creatures of impulse, are poetical — he is certainly the most unpoetical of all God’s Creatures. If, then, he has no self, and I am a Poet, where is the wonder that I should say I would write no more?” Where the philosopher virtuously seeks certainty and justice, the poet (Poet), whose characteristic it is to be without character, delights in deception and speculation. This shocks the philosopher, since the poet acknowledges that both the poet and the philosopher merely speculate; the philosopher has forgotten the speculative aspect of his claims. The reference to the personages (Iago, Imogen) is to Shakespeare’s plays: Iago from Othello, and Imogen from Cymbeline. However, we might also recognize Iachimo from Cymbeline, and, as is known, this was Keats’s favorite play. Iachimo wanted Posthumus to believe that the former could seduce, and indeed already had seduced the latter’s wife Imogen. Iachimo was called this way (Iachimo means ‘Little Iago’) because he deceived like Iago, who in turn deceived Othello (in Othello). Just as Iachimo or Iago, the Poet should be able to appear in different colors (“camelion Poet”) in order to speculate and be delighted in these speculation, and he has to

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4 P. de Man, Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism, 51.
5 J. Keats, Selected Letters, 147-148.
6 M. Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 179.
7 J. Keats, Selected Letters, 148.
present himself not as himself but as an other in being delighted in conceiving “an Iago [whom Arendt describes as one of the “greatest villains”, 8 JvG] or an Imogen”. Following Hazlitt, Keats describes Shakespeare as the cameleon poet, like the personages from his plays. As we read in ‘Ode to Psyche’, the power of this poetic self-destruction or forgetting is nothing else than that of the imagination: “With all the gardener Fancy e’er could feign, / Who breeding flowers, will never breed the same” (ll. 62-63). The self is opposed to the achievements of the imagination (Fancy) or poetry (Poesy), as becomes clear in Keats’s ‘Ode to a Nightingale’ where we read near the end: “Forlorn! the very word is like a bell / To toll me back from thee to my sole self! / Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well / As she is fam’d to do, deceiving elf.” (ll. 71-74) The colorful, perhaps deceiving, “camelion Poet” opposes his imagination to the virtuous philosopher whom Keats ascribes the power to speculate on what really is.

As Nancy stated, “it is perhaps […] as of Kant that one can no longer have either philosophy or literature […]. There will ‘only’ be a permanent entanglement [brouillage] of these categories that will permanently seek to be written [à s’écrire].”9 ‘The’ philosopher, however, will not content himself with the poetic multicolorous self, for, as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) writes, the “colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm [Reiz]” and what is most essential for the pictorial arts (bildende Kunst) and Fine Arts (schöne Kunst) is the drawing or pattern (Zeichnung). The reason for this is that the image pleases because of its form (cf. KU, §14, 225/110); the transcendental philosopher is first of all interested in form and, because of that, he has to separate (absondern) what belongs to perception (Empfindung), i.e., “impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.” (KRV, A20-21/B35) Here the first trait of Kant’s philosophy presents itself, namely the interest in form, in formation and delimitation, and with regard to the subject one will have to say that the subject in Kant becomes an empty cogito, a pure form. Indeed, in contrast to the “camelion Poet”, Kant held on to the “original-synthetic unity of apperception” (KRV, B131). To explain this he writes in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft that the representations given in intuition (space and time) belong to me as a whole (gehören mir insgesammt zu), since I (can) unite these in a self-consciousness. An ‘I think’ is able to accompany these representations as ‘my’ representations, for “otherwise I would have such a multicolored [vielfärbiges], diverse self, when I have representations that I am aware of [deren ich mir bewusst bin]” (KRV, B134). Here, the multicolored self is put aside in the name of the unity of apperception, while Keats explicitly opts for the many colors of the Poet: the homogeneous, formal unity of the ‘I’ versus the cameleon. This does not mean that the imagination has no role in Kant’s work, but, rather, he pushes the theme of the imagination into what Engell calls “a new realm and destiny”.10 When the philosopher can no longer hold on to the old points of reference to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge, Kant re-inscribes the (transcendental) imagination for the indispensable step. Where Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley and Crusius still had to rely on God to give them (the self) the possibility of speaking of reality, experience, knowledge or necessity, Kant could no longer continue this same path after Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber. Here, the transcendental imagination will become essential, and it is therefore not surprising to see this power reappear in different disguises in the work of Novalis, Coleridge, Kleist, Hölderlin, Fichte, Schelling or Hegel.

However, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) gave the most forceful and without any doubt most provocative reading of the functioning of the imagination in Kant when the former

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8 H. Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 74.
published his *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* in 1929.\(^\text{11}\) In the few pages of Kant’s book where the transcendental schemata (as the products of the transcendental imagination) are discussed, Heidegger finds his resource, his inspiration, and, as we will see, the trust, for formulating an original notion of time, namely time as pure auto-affection. For Heidegger, the transcendental philosopher formulates in his ideas concerning the role of the imagination not only the possibilities of this imagination, but, according to Heidegger, he also describes it in such a way that the *transcendental* imagination as a possibility or power becomes the condition or even origin of possibility itself. It has the power to give (its) power, to empower all the faculties of the mind. That this demands a certain force and a forceful reading of Kant’s book is of no real concern to Heidegger, since by posing with regard to metaphysics the question of Being – as “the problem of metaphysics” – Heidegger searches for possibilities that lie hidden in the text but which Kant did not explicitly express, except by leaving some traces or remarks that disclose the possibility of another thought. This asks for a forceful but necessary reading in which the question of Being can be resituated within, or at the limit of, metaphysics as its core problem. According to Heidegger, Kant initiated the rooting of ontology in time in the chapter on the transcendental schematism. “In line with the positive tendencies of this destruction [Destruktion], we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and whether the problematic of temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion [Zwang] of the phenomena themselves is Kant.” (SUZ, 23/44-45; cf. GA21, 194, 200) In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger determines the concept of phenomenon (from the Greek *phainomenon*) as the totality of “what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with *ta onta* (beings)” (SUZ, 28/51; trans. mod.). Not surprisingly, after pointing out that an appearance (*Erscheinung*) is only a vulgar (*vulgär*) understanding of the phenomenon, Heidegger is willing to consider (with certain reservations, that is, “vorbehaltlich anderer Unterschiede”) Kant’s ‘forms of intuition’ as “‘phenomena’ of phenomenology” (SUZ, 31/55). A formal concept of phenomena is gained with Kant’s forms of intuition.

As Heidegger attempted to show in the years 1925-1929, all faculties discussed by Kant in his critical work will (have to) be rooted in the transcendental imagination. Heidegger shows that the need to think temporality has to do with the question of Being (*Seinsfrage*), which brings us to the question of the ‘as’ (‘als’): how is *Seinsverständnis*, the recognition or understanding of beings as beings, something as something, possible, i.e., that something *is* (something)? Heidegger hoped to show in *Sein und Zeit* that this ‘as’ is grounded in what he calls “the ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality [ekstatisch-horizontalen Einheit der Zeitlichkeit]”, to which he adds: “In our fundamental analysis of Being, and of course in connection with the interpretation of the ‘is’ (which, as a copula, gives ‘expression’ to the addressing of something as something), we must again make the phenomenon of the ‘as’ a theme and delimit the conception of this ‘schema’ existentially [den Begriff des ‘Schemas’ existential umgrenzen].” (SUZ, 360/412-413) This was supposed to be worked out in the second volume of *Sein und Zeit*. Even though Heidegger never published this volume of *Sein und Zeit*, he indicates in the general introduction that the first chapter of this volume would have been concerned with “Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in the problematic of temporality [Kants Lehre vom Schematismus und der Zeit als Vorstufe

\(^{11}\) Cf. J.-L. Nancy, *Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus*, 17: “[I]t is not possible to take on kant [kant] without its repetitions: that above all points towards that of Heidegger.”
For Heidegger, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is not an epistemology, not a theory of ontic knowledge or experience, but rather a theory of ontological knowledge. While working on the question of Being and time, the Kantian time and transcendental schematism are most essential for Heidegger, and he will try to interpret time here in terms of auto-affection. However, when the transcendental imagination is first of all described in terms of a power that gives power and that empowers, we encounter the first part of our question: is the imagination, then, the power that empowers or produces what has always already been there as a possibility?

In Keats, we get a different impression when it comes to the imagination, as he writes of a feigning “gardener Fancy […] who breeding flowers, will never breed the same”. In contradistinction to Heidegger, the imagination for Keats will dissolve “the same” by always breeding (creating, fancying, imagining) differently or something different. Confronted with the imagination of Heidegger, we, therefore, have to ask ourselves whether there is another possibility, or better, the possibility of the impossible, namely, the possibility of inventing (i.e., imagining) what has never been present (“the same”). This additional question brings us to the last thinker who will be central in this study: Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). The literature on Derrida does not discuss the theme of the imagination in Derrida thoroughly, even though it has been one of his interests from the beginning. Besides several references given by Bennington or suggestions of Llewelyn, and despite Derrida’s outspoken interest in the imagination, the theme has mostly been ignored or avoided. Derrida remarks:

“Several things drew me towards the question of imagination, in various forms and languages (imagination in Aristotle is not the productive imagination in Kant or in Hegel). First of all, there is something about it that has made it a threat to truth, intellect and reality – yet a resource as well. […] It is the locus of fiction, but also of a certain synthesis, a place of mediation – especially in Kant where the imagination is precisely the third term, the ‘third’. And in the end everything we have said about the system comes down to a question of the ‘third’. This third term can be taken as the mediator that permits synthesis, reconciliation, participation; in which case that which is neither this nor that permits the synthesis of this and that. But this function is not limited to the form it has taken in Hegelian dialectic, and the third of neither-this-nor-that and this-and-that can indeed also be interpreted as that whose absolute heterogeneity resists all integration, participation and system, thus designating the place where the system does not close. It is, at the same time, the place where the system constitutes itself, and where this constitution is threatened by the heterogeneous, and by a fiction no longer at service of truth.”

(TS, 5)

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12 It should be noted that *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* contains the material used by Heidegger for the summer seminar of 1927, which he described as the “New working-out of the Third Division of Part One of *Sein und Zeit*” (GA24, 1n). In *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* Heidegger does not refer very often to Kant’s transcendental schematism or imagination (cf. GA24, 150), although a reference to “the Kantian interpretation of Being and the problematic of the temporal [die temporale Problematik]” succeeds what Heidegger calls the horizontal schemata (GA24, 445-452). Added to this we notice that this investigation remains unfinished. Cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, *Heideggers ‘Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie’. Zur ‘zweiten Hälfte’ von ‘Sein und Zeit’*.


14 “My principle interests have tended towards the great canon of literature – Plato, Kant, Hegel, Husserl; but, at the same time, towards the so-called ‘minor’ loci of their texts, neglected problematics, or footnotes – things that irritate the system and at the same time account for the subterranean region in which the system constitutes itself by repressing what makes it possible, which is not systematic. […] I think that the case of the imagination is enlightening in many ways.” (TS, 4-5) It is not difficult to show that the themes that Heidegger discussed when reading Kant have already been of interest to Derrida as early as the fifties; when one reads *Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl*, one finds similar topics as discussed by Heidegger, although then in relation to Husserl; themes such as temporality, *a priori* synthesis, intentionality (that has to serve as the “mediation” between the “formal *a priori*” and “material *a posteriori*”, both understood “in the Kantian sense”
What Derrida has said or will say of the imagination is shaped in these suggestive words. He never wished to make an exception for Kant’s transcendental schematism when philosophy raises the question of “third terms, mixed terms, intermediaries, which participate in the two terms of an opposition at the same time – sensible and intelligible, for example – putting the opposition in check”. Nevertheless, it “is true of the imagination in general” and “the case of Kant is particularly interesting, on account of the huge role the ‘third’ plays from the viewpoint of time, and of the relation passivity–activity” (TS, 75).

When the image (or, as we will see, a pure image, a schema, an image without image), has to make sure that the two heterogeneous poles of cognition – sensibility and intelligibility – are synthesized and united, then there is always the danger of delusion, madness, fiction, Schwärmerei, etc. As Derrida writes, when “[r]epresentation mingles with what it represents”, then “one thinks as if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the representer.” He immediately explains the complexity of this reflection:

A dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity between reflection and the reflected which lets itself be seduced narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other [un renvoi infini des unes aux autres], but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles [Le reflet, l’image, le double dédouble ce qu’il redouble]. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself [se regarder] is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three. (GR, 54-55/36)

This does not mean that Derrida gives in to a pure self-enclosed narcissism where it becomes futile to speak of image versus reality, but, rather, he will search for a “common root” that “excludes the resemblance of the ‘image’, derivation, or representative reflexion” (GR, 75-76/52).

Similar to what Derrida has to say about Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche – “rather than protect Nietzsche from the Heideggerian reading, we should perhaps offer him up to it completely, underwriting that interpretation without reserve” –, one might perhaps also say this about Heidegger’s forceful reading of Kant. Not in order to affirm everything that Heidegger has to say, and accept Heidegger as an authority, unless perhaps “in a certain way and up to a point” (GR, 32/19) where Heidegger’s reading is irrefutable and where we have to follow Heidegger’s path, taking into account his on-going attempts to take another step when posing the question of Being to metaphysics. This should perhaps not take place within but “on the horizon of the Heideggerian paths” (GR, 38/23). What is essential for Heidegger, then, is, as Derrida points out, “pure auto-affection that necessarily has the form of time and which does not borrow from outside of itself” (GR, 33/20). The complicated positioning of the third, this homeless third, as Heidegger formulated it, will be investigated as what both constitutes and threatens the system. In order to maintain his position, Kant has to discuss the distinctions between “the sensible and the intelligible, the phenomenon and the noumenon, the internal phenomenon and the external phenomenon, the purely sensible and the empirical sensible, the transcendental and the empirical, the pure and the impure, the a priori and the a posteriori, the objective and the subjective, sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason”. However, as “for the ‘internal’ difficulties of this [Kant’s] machinery, when it has the greatest difficulties maintaining the purity of these distinctions (the theory of the schematism,

(PG, 86; cf. PG, 213)), and the imagination (in relation to the discussion between Brentano and Husserl, cf. PG, 114-118), passivity/activity and production/receptivity are extensively discussed.
the critique of judgment and many other ‘compositions’ or ‘mixtures’ that make the enjoyment \[qui font le délice\] – and the excess of authority \[surcroît d’autorité\] of the great experts and repetitors \[répétiteurs\] of Kant, beginning with Hegel or Heidegger), they have also become canonical” (DP, 87-88).

Hence, the question will be that of the imagination. As Derrida writes, “Kant is the name of a ‘possible’: rendered possible and rendering possible in its turn”, and this formation is then “powerful” in the sense that it makes possible (possibilise) (DP, 86). Following a certain reading of Kant, as given by Heidegger, we have to ask ourselves whether the imagination is the (re-)production of images, and this in such a way that its power invents the possible and what it always already finds there. However, added to this, there is maybe more in Kant that is left aside by Heidegger when he searches in Kant for a ground-laying of metaphysics, and it is from here that we will have to direct ourselves to Derrida. What if the imagination invents or imagines what was never present or possible, i.e., when the power of the imagination needs to be thought in terms of the impossible. This does not mean that we will oppose Derrida to Heidegger’s reading, but that we will have to search for an answer to both aspects of the imagination, since, on the one hand, the imagination is the (re-)production of images, and, on the other hand, the imagination can perhaps produce what was never present.15 Instead of deciding between these options or aspects, the question will be whether this distinction can ever be pure (cf. T, 56). In a way, Derrida, then, wishes to move away from a certain Psyche. Perhaps away from a certain Keats as well. “The Third, we would immediately have to say, in English, the Third One in order to let the hesitation between the One and the Third. The Third One – is it someone, some One? The One of the Third – is that which participates in or proceeds from both the One and the Two, or the One or the Two, or again, neither the one nor the other? And would this ‘neither the one nor the other’ still be a relation?” (T, 56) For now, let us add that the question of the third, the third sister, the “latest born”, as Keats describes Psyche, will bring us to the question of death and that of mourning. If we follow Freud, we are inclined to say that the third sister (the beautiful, perfect, most desirable sister) is nothing more than Death, and death is for Derrida an “unimaginable image \[image inimaginable\]” (CFU, 235/192). The third sister, Psyche, psuchē, is intimately related to death.16 Keats recognizes Eros and the beauty of Psyche, while for Freud Psyche is more explicitly Death. Eros and Thanatos. As Derrida writes, “[i]f psuchē is Life itself, then mourning Psyche is not just any mourning among others. It is mourning itself. It is absolute mourning, mourning of life itself, but mourning that can neither be worn and borne (no life can put on such mourning any longer) nor go through the ‘work’ of mourning. Mourning without work of mourning, mourning without mourning.” (LT, 65/50-51) Here, then, it will become a question of the possibility of the impossible, of imagining the unimaginable.

15 “With imagination’s duplicity [as reproductive (retracing) and productive, JvG] functioning as a hinge, to render oneself master of, to control the ambiguity and risks, is the major strategic operation of mastery – we could almost say, mastery itself. But since mastery, in order to be what it is, must take possession of what is not, of nothing then, to be sure it is never itself. Mastery, if there is any, does not exist.” (AF, 61/78)

16 On the role of Psyche as the third sister, cf. S. Freud, ‘Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl’, 35n. For Freud, Psyche is despite her beauty (even when compared to that of Aphrodite) a goddess of death. A goddess of love, according to Freud, suppressed the goddess of death but was once identical to her. Indeed, both Aphrodite and Psyche maintain a certain relation to death. We briefly note here the role that Freud allocates to the phantasy. Phantasy appeals because of the possibility of the fulfillment of wishes that reality does not fulfill, and the goddess of love takes the place of or suppresses the goddess of death by satisfying unfulfilled wishes. The goddess of death is no longer the ugly, petrifying face, but turns (because of the phantasy) into the beautiful third sister. Freud remarks that Apuleius’ Psyche also maintains certain characteristics of a relation to death, as is clear from her descent into the Hades. In addition we might think here of the way Homer at times uses the “psuchē” (cf. K. Robb, Psyche and Logos in the Fragments of Heraclitus: The Origin of the Concept of Soul", 316).
In the first chapter, we will focus on Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, and by following his discourse and path, we will have to see how Kant at the same time wishes to release or liberate the imagination and exclude or suppress it. The terms that authorize this will be that of ‘schema’ (pure image) and ‘symbol’, since Kant attempted to formulate the possibilities and the limits of the imagination by distinguishing these two modes of representation. Subsequently, we will follow Heidegger’s reading of Kant in his *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Heidegger will, then, focus explicitly on the role of the chapter on the transcendental schematism as the centerpiece of Kant’s system. Here, Heidegger will try to find an original understanding of time as the horizon for the understanding of Being. In the last chapter, we will continue with Derrida. Although one will find many allusions to Kant’s schematism and Heidegger’s reading, he never wrote extensively about these themes. In that case, we will have to have recourse to these allusions in order to abstract his ideas of the imagination. At the same time, we will have to re-introduce other themes from Kant’s work that remained largely unmentioned by Heidegger, namely that of the ‘as if’ and the sublime. In the Epilogue we will return to the question of imagination and temporality in which we will focus on the role allocated by Kant to space. What if the imagination is first of all the power of spacing?
Chapter 1
Schema and Symbol in Kant

§1. Introduction
Posterity probably has no reason to regret Kant’s decision in 1764 to decline the Prussian government’s offer of the chair of Eloquence and Poetry, since years later, Kant was to present us with his “critical path” in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. According to Kant, philosophy in the beginning merely used poetic language to form or imagine the objects of pure reason. In his critical work Kant would however eventually attempt to liberate pure reason – and metaphysics – from the imagination’s disturbing influences and interferences. Kant not only wished to let reason speak for itself, but also wished to determine the limits of the imagination. First of all, Kant had to determine the limits of experience itself. This required him to make a decision regarding the extent of freedom which should be accorded to the imagination: “Everything that relieves us of the need to resort to empty spaces [was uns des Bedürfnisses überhebt, zu leeren Räumen unsere Zuflucht zu nehmen] is a real gain for natural sciences, for they give the imagination far too much freedom to make up by fabrication for the lack of any inner knowledge of nature [den Mangel der inneren Naturkenntniss durch Erdichtung zu ersetzen].” (MAN, 532) Philosophy becomes possible once it poses the question of delimitation, figuration, formation – in other words, of the imagination. For how could we distinguish metaphysics as a science from, for instance, mere Schwärmerei if the imagination – which so often becomes a source of delusion and madness – has not been assigned its proper field yet? In this chapter we focus on the question of the (transcendental) imagination as Kant presents and delimits it in his critical work. While sketching the history of philosophy in his *Logik*, Kant states that the first philosophers among the Greeks framed, expressed or clothed (einkleiden) “everything in images”, because “poetry, which is nothing other than the clothing [Einkleidung] of thoughts in images, is older than prose. Thus in the beginning one had to make use of the language of images [Bildersprache] and of poetic style [poetischen Schreibart] even with things that are merely objects of pure reason.” (LOG, 28/540) According to Kant, everything changed after either Pherecydes or Aristotle introduced prose into philosophy. Kant expressly hoped that this state of affairs would remain unchanged. As early as the *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes* (1764) and *Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (1766), Kant sensed the danger, the threat, of fictionalization (delusion, madness or Schwärmerei) in philosophy – something which was to haunt him for many years to come. To safeguard against all forms of misguidance, Kant proposed “[t]he critical path [which] alone is still open” (KRV, A856/B884; cf. KRV, AXIn, AXII). This in turn would demand of metaphysics a critical evaluation and delimitation of the human cognitive faculties.

Metaphysics consists in the totality of rational knowledge, that is, knowledge that is derived from the application of principles (cognitio ex principiis) and mediated purely through concepts, in other words, without inference from intuitive data (cognitio ex data). Principles are required in order to extend concepts beyond what they already contain – a mechanism through which metaphysical knowledge is made possible. An investigation into the conditions for the possibility of knowledge is required as an initial step to the mediation of metaphysical knowledge, and then specifically an investigation which does not merely revert the mere analysis of concepts, in other words, one which reaches beyond a concept while at the same time is not being inferred from the given intuitive data. How can a synthetic proposition, one whose predicate contains more than what is thought in the concept of the
subject of judgment, be possible? How can the synthesis of predicate and subject in judgment be possible when the predicate is not contained within the thought of the subject, but rather adds something new to it? What is the role of the imagination in all of this? These questions echo the central concern of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible? The conditions sought by Kant are first of all those fundamental principles (Grundsätze) according to which knowledge is possible. Beyond such principles no higher or more general knowledge exists. The function of the (transcendental) imagination is indispensable in the production of what Kant terms ‘schemata’, which allow us to relate a concept to intuition. In order to emphasize the importance of Kant’s chapter dealing with the schematism within the critical project as a whole, we may first of all think of Kant’s letter to Reinhold in 1789: “Mr. Eberhard says […]: ‘One seeks in vain for Kant’s principle for synthetic judgments’. But this principle is unequivocally presented in the whole Kritik, from the chapter on the schematism of judgment on, though not in a specific formula. It is: all synthetic judgments of theoretical knowledge are possible through the relation of a given concept to an intuition.” (Letter to Reinhold, May 12, 1789; cf. ENTD, 227-228/317)

In this chapter, we will focus therefore on Kant’s schematism and the theme of the imagination, a theme the significance of which Kant repeatedly underscored: “Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination [die blosser Wirkung der Einbildungskraft], of a blind though indispensable function of the soul [einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Function der Seele], without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious.” (KRV, A78/B103) In this chapter we will start off by the marker of Kant’s demand to think the limits of the faculties and powers of cognition. Kant’s demand results in him having to frame his problem and uncovering that metaphysics and eventually also the role of the syllogistic form of judgment are at issue here (§2). The syllogism is explicitly thematized in the Transcendental Dialectic. Because of the obscurity resulting from Kant locating this schematism within (the depths of) the soul, we will first discuss Kant’s notion of the soul (the transcendental apperception) before turning to a discussion of the schematism itself. In the Transcendental Dialectic, we read that psychology has the thinking subject as its object of investigation. The name of the thinking subject, of the ‘I think’ that precedes and is able to accompany every given representation, is ‘soul’: “Ich […] heiße Seele” (KRV, A342/B400) (§3). Next, it is necessary to introduce some of the faculties or powers – pure intuition and pure understanding – needed for cognition before one can move on to consider the legitimacy of relating these two cognitive faculties to one another (§4.). Following this, we will deal with the imagination as presented by Kant throughout the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. This in as far as Kant considers the schemata products of the imagination. Our discussion of the imagination here is however not limited to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (§5). After having introduced the two “stems” of cognition, one needs to make a start grappling with the transcendental schematism and the indispensable synthesis of pure intuition and understanding. However, because of the relevance of the noumena for Kant’s discussion with regard to the determination of the limits of reason (and, therefore, for the discussion on finitude), we cannot avoid a discussion of the noumena here (§6). Kant also tries to indirectly relate what he terms “the concepts of reason” (that is, Ideas) to intuition. He uses several terms to describe an analogon of the schema, but, as will be made clear, he always tries to determine a dissociation of the analogy from the imagination (§7). In conclusion to this chapter, we will search for a first hint at a link between the imagination and what Kant calls ‘transcendental illusion’ in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (§8). In summary then, in this chapter our aim is Kant’s positioning the imagination within his thinking so that the relevance of the question of representation in Kant’s process of delimiting knowledge to experience may be uncovered.
§2. The Invention of Metaphysics

“The worst thing is when children read novels.” (PAD, 473/462-463) Kant was often concerned with the dangers of novels, and he even considers it laughable to keep any novels at all: one should take the novels out of the hands of children, for in their hands it will lead to the forming or imagining (bilden) of new novels. This, however, merely “weakens the memory [schwächt das Gedächtniss]” (PAD, 473/463; cf. KU, §29 Anm., 273/155). Memory needs to be concerned with that which is important for us to remember, and it must have a relation to real life (auf das wirkliche Leben). Unsurprisingly, Kant often proceeds to the history of philosophy, of mankind, and to the philosophy of history. For instance, his Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Abicht (1784) aims at a description of a universal history, and the Idea of this history demands a philosophical point of view that directs us to “the perfect civil union of the human species [die vollkommene bürgerliche Vereinigung in der Menschengattung]” (IAG, 29/118). Then, two years later, Kant writes his Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte in which he presents some assumptions with regard to this history by following the paths described in the Book of Genesis. The Bible will be Kant’s chart or map (Karte), and he will at the same time imagine (zugleich einzubilden) “as if my flight [als ob mein Zug], which I make on the wings of the power of imagination [auf den Flügeln der Einbildungskraft], though not without a guiding thread attached by reason onto experience [obgleich nicht ohne einen durch Vernunft an Erfahrung geknüpften Leitfaden], might follow the same trajectory [Linie] which that document contains in historically prescribed manner [die jene historisch vorgezeichnet enthält]” (MAM, 109-110/163-164; transl. mod.). The task of the reader of the latter text will be to see whether the steps sketched in the Book of Genesis that give a certain direction meet (zusammentreffen) the steps that philosophy takes in accordance with concepts (nach Begriffen). Kant warns us in both texts against the confusion of his reading of history and a mere novel (Roman), and since Kant wishes to prevent philosophy from becoming literature, or imaginative, without reason accompanying the imagination, the Idea, irreducible to fictionalization, “should still serve us as a guiding thread [Leitfaden]” (IAG, 29/118; cf. MAM, 109/163).

A guiding thread will have to determine a destiny or direct itself to a destiny, namely the unification in the human species. We will have to look for what “[w]e want to see”, namely, “if [ob] we will succeed in finding a guideline [Leitfaden] for such a history, and want then to leave it to nature to produce the man [like Kepler or Newton] who is in a position [im Stande] to compose that history accordingly [darnach abzufassen]” (IAG, 18/109; cf. MAM, 109/163). We will have to discover this guiding thread in a “plan of nature [Naturplan]”, which opens up a “consoling prospect [tröstende Aussicht] into the future” in which the human species is represented (vorgestellt) in a distance (IAG, 30/119). Hence, even though Kant opposes philosophy to an illegitimate or improper involvement of the imagination, it will become difficult when we are still dependent on an instrument of representation, namely the guiding thread, “which is”, as Derrida writes contrary to Kant’s hopes, “not the surest way to escape from the novel [roman]” (DPC, 21). The Idea will have to serve as a guiding thread in order to present (darzustellen) an aggregate of actions into a “system”, beginning with the Greeks as they influenced the formation and disformation, the education and miseducation (Bildung und Missbildung) of the state body (Staatskörper) of the Roman nation, which in its turn influenced the barbarians who later destroyed the Romans. We have to follow the influence of the Greeks “down to the present time [bis auf unsere Zeit]” (IAG, 29/119).

However, Kant writes in other texts that we will first have to forget the past. We have to undo what has happened in/to philosophy. At least, this is what Kant tells us in the introductions to both the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and the Prolegomena. First, we will have to cross the “critical path” as presented in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft before we can judge
(the history of) metaphysics. In this book, the highest principles of judgment are presented as prejudices enabling us to judge. Kant will have to look for the highest principle in order to disclose the proper field or jurisdiction of judgment, that is, the limits of cognition and experience. Before this critical investigation takes place, Kant points out that the history of philosophy has merely shown that metaphysics has led into conflicts where a dogmatic use of reason lacking the critical interrogation results in assertions that are short of a foundation or legitimacy. Hence, Kant writes, we will have to consider every dogmatic attempt to construct a metaphysics as something that has not happened; one must regard these attempts as undone (als ungeschehen ansehen) (KRV, B23). Metaphysics has been overconfident in the abilities of reason when it tried to think the soul, the world or God by simply relying on an analytical principle (that of contradiction) that tell us nothing of experience or the objectivity of knowledge. Because of this, Kant writes his Prolegomena for “future teachers” in order to make them invent (erfinden) science (PROL, 255). He tries to convince those who take an interest in metaphysics, i.e., who find it worth dealing with metaphysics, that it is essential to suspend their labor (ihre Arbeit vor den Hand auszusetzen) and to “consider all that has happened until now as if it had not happened [alles bisher Geschehene als ungeschehen anzusehen]” (PROL, 255/53). One will, first of all, have to ask whether it is possible to consider metaphysics as if it does not yet exist, after which, according to Kant, one will realize that a “complete reform, or rather a new birth of metaphysics” is coming, even though the plan remains yet completely unforeseen (nach einem bisher ganz unbekannte Plane unausbleiblich bevorstehe) (PROL, 257/54). One can resist, like barbarians resisting Romans, but it is coming. As Heidegger will say, this does not mean that metaphysics is concerned with a specific problem or object (soul, world, God) but with metaphysics itself, and it has to be formulated as a problem for Kant’s “future teachers” or for Heidegger’s “future thinking” (cf. GA65, 253).

History is introduced again at the end of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, emphasizing that the final judgment on the question of the (conditions of) possibility of metaphysics will have to be a historical decision. History reappears after undoing this history and suspending the metaphysical labors, and after walking the only “path” remaining, namely that of the critical judge (‘I think’). Kant ends his Kritik der reinen Vernunft with ‘The History of Pure Reason’, a presentation of the historical ideas of pure reason as advocated by, for instance, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Leibniz and Hume. Even though Kant cannot avoid history insofar as he does not wish to invent a new language and uses terminology handed to him – Aristotle gave Kant the notion of ‘categories’, Plato gave ‘Ideas’ – we are actually reminded at the end of an historical context for Kant’s “critical path”. Why does Kant need to remind us of this history? He writes: “This title ['The History of Pure Reason'] stands here only to designate a place [um eine Stelle zu bezeichnen] that is left open [übrig bleibt] in the system and must be filled in the future [künftig ausgefüllet werden muss]” (KRV, A852/B880). This place (Stelle) is that of transcendental philosophy itself. This is what the transcendental point of view (Gesichtspunkt) uncovers: a place to be filled, an open place in the system to be “filled up” in the future. But how? At the end of the chapter, and, therefore, of the book itself, the reader is asked to judge: “If the reader has had pleasure and patience in travelling along in my company, then he can now judge, if [ob] it pleases him to contribute his part to making this footpath into a highway [um diesen Fusssteig zur Heeresstrasse zu machen], whether or not that which many centuries could not accomplish might not be attained even before the end of the present one: namely to bring human reason to full satisfaction in that which has always, but until now vainly, occupied its lust for knowledge.” (KRV, A856/B884)

The reader is asked to judge, and as we shall see, the ‘I think’ is appointed as the highest judge in the tribunal called *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. He has to follow the critical path. It is, therefore, not surprising that both versions of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* are dedicated to Von Zedlitz who was an admirer of Kant’s work, but most importantly, he was the Minister of Culture and Education under the reign of king Frederick II (who eventually died in 1786, a year before the second edition of the book was published). The book was not destined for the constitution of a new school or of coincidental convictions, as the quote from Bacon at the beginning of the second edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* indicates, but for the prosperity of mankind (KRV, BII). Kant wished for the rebirth of science and the founding of knowledge on the conditions of possibility that the critical work formulated. Von Zedlitz will have to judge by following Kant’s footsteps. Kant writes: “For someone who enjoys the life of speculation the approval of an enlightened and competent [würdige] judge is, given his modest wishes, a powerful encouragement to toils whose utility is great, but distant, and hence it is wholly misjudged by vulgar eyes.” (KRV, AV) Kant offers the book to Von Zedlitz, who will have to be for Kant the enlightened persons par excellence. Kant will advocate a similar, although more general call in *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* in which he repeats the motto of the Aufklärung: “Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding!” (BFA, 35/17) Kant’s contribution to the growth (Wachstum) of the sciences is first of all the transcendental perspective, but this remains an unfilled place. It is something for the future, and Kant places his bet on Von Zedlitz’s “gracious attention [gnädigen Augenmerke]” (KRV, AV/BVI). 18 However, for Kant, this is the only future of philosophy, for what is at stake on the critical path is that first of all, to put it in negative terms, both dogmatism and scepticism lead to “the death of a healthy philosophy, though the former might also be called the euthanasia of pure reason” (KRV, A407/B434). (We will come back to what Kant describes as the “death of philosophy” in Chapter 3, §2.1.) This science is a “narrow gate” taken care of by philosophy that knows how to show respect, for, as the second *Kritik* tells us at the end, “respect for ourselves [Achtung für uns selbst]” can guard us from any illegitimate intrusion in the mind (KPV, 161/269, 163/271). If we were to encounter this guard, what is he guarding that is of interest to us? In the Doctrine of Methods of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, and more specifically, in the Canon of Pure Reason, as soon as Kant discusses the highest goal of the pure use of reason, we read that the interest in the concepts of reason (soul, world, God) is mainly practical (instead of theoretical) when practical means: everything that is possible through freedom as causality.

Philosophy has to determine the conditions of possibility (i.e., the limits, legitimacy, possibilities, rules or prescriptions of what may be, of what is possible) for subsuming a given object under a (pure) concept of understanding. Considering this subsumption, we should not underestimate the relevance of the syllogistic form of judgment for Kant’s reasoning. The subjective, synthetic principles of reason – as we will see – will be derived from the different syllogisms. Where judgments, based on their structure of subject–predicate, are analyzed before the Transcendental Dialectic in order to find the limits that intuition and understanding set for experience, that is, to find in their relation the limits of cognition, the syllogisms relate judgments (major and minor) resulting in a conclusion (conclusio). This conclusion restricts a predicate to an object by first thinking this predicate (in the major of the syllogism) in its complete extent under a determinate condition. The example that Kant gives when discussing

18 The reference to Von Zedlitz as a “judge” has been deleted in the second edition as if he realized that Von Zedlitz’s seat would soon be taken by someone else, namely Wöllmer with whom Kant will have his own quarrels (for example, with regard to the publication of his *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*); maybe Kant kept hoping for a judgment of or a judge like Von Zedlitz when “the age of enlightenment and the century of Frederick [the Great]” was no longer the same and had changed with the death of this king (BFA, 40/21).
the syllogism has always been exemplary, namely, the predication of mortality to a singular human being: ‘Caius is mortal’. The concept as the condition under which a predicate (in Kant’s example ‘mortality’) is given, is here the concept of ‘human being’. When the predicate is subsumed under this condition – ‘All human beings are mortal’ – the judge (‘I think’) is able to conclude ‘Caius is mortal’. The judgment ‘Caius is mortal’ can be a judgment upon experience. However, Kant is not interested in the truth of this judgment, but in the function of reason itself that is at work in the syllogisms. What the Transcendental Dialectic discusses first is the transcendental apperception (‘I think’). This is the judge of the court of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft; as we will see, the ‘I think’ is able to accompany all its representation as if Kant is appealing to this judge in the reader that accompanies him on the critical path.

The syllogism subsumes by focussing on a third and shared term used both in the major (presented by understanding) and the minor (presented by judgment), for instance, that of mortality in the example of Caius. Kant says of reason that it is “considered [betrachtet]” as the “power of a certain logical form of knowledge”, and because of that, reason is the “power to conclude [Vermögen zu schliessen], that is, to judge indirectly (by the subsumption of conditions of a possible judgment under the conditions of a given judgment)” (KRV, A330/B386). Kant soon indicates that for him the conclusion in which a possible judgment (minor) is subsumed under a general rule (major) is “[t]he real judgment [wirkliche Urteil]” that expresses (aussagt) a rule for a case (KRV, A330/B387).¹⁹ The conclusion is the real judgment, produced by the power of reason, that is different from other judgments because this judgment (conclusion) is real and final (emphasized by Kant insofar as a conclusion is also a Schlussssatz). This means that a real judgment not only judges about a case (indicating that this conclusion is also knowledge (KRV, A330/B387)) but it also declares that a synthesis has taken place, i.e., that what has been said is final, the conclusion, or that reason has been able to subsume a case under a rule. Hence, as Custer states, the “syllogism is […] the occasion of a real judgment; more than a proposition (which it is as well), this judgment is at the same time a production of knowledge and of a mark of this production.”²⁰ This synthesis repeats, as we will see, the synthesis of the schematization, or better, it presents a case or example of synthesis that the schematism is supposed to present when relating intuition and categories.²¹

§3. Kant’s Rational Psychology

Before finally describing the history of philosophy, Kant presents the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Philosophy is classified into critical philosophy (which Kant calls propedeutica) ²²

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¹⁹ In the Introduction of the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant writes that a proposition of which the necessity is conceived is an a priori judgment. Moreover, if it is not derived (abgeleitet) from another proposition “unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a priori [schlechterdings a priori]” (KRV, B3).

²⁰ O. Custer, L’exemple de Kant. Fonctions et enjeux de l’exemple dans l’oeuvre kantienne, 128.

²¹ Cf. E. Curtius, Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 348-350; N. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, 335-336; H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 212-213. In these pages Allison briefly discusses the notion of ‘“subsumption” as a synonym for ‘application’. Moreover, in doing so, he [Kant] now takes it in its syllogistic sense.” For Allison this recourse to the syllogism in relation to the schematism merely functions as an analogy: “In the present case, where the categories are universal rules, there is need for some analogue of the ‘condition of rule’, or the middle term of the syllogism, under which the appearances can be ‘subsumed’. This analogue will turn out to be the transcendental schema, that infamous ‘third thing’, which makes possible to mediation of category and appearance.”

²² In the second introduction to the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant refers to the “critique of the judging subject and its powers of cognition [Erkenntnisvermögen],” which is the “propaedeutic of all philosophy.” (KU, Einl. IIX, 194/80) Kant uses the notion of Propädeutik again in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, when he says that the master or teacher is unable to tell his pupils how to make Fine Art. This master cannot present the pupils with the rules for
and metaphysics. The former examines reason with regard to pure *apriori* knowledge, while the latter examines the whole system of pure reason in which all philosophical knowledge is brought into systematic coherence. This system of metaphysics is divided in ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology and rational theology. Rational physiology deals with the nature of given objects, which itself is classified in *physica rationalis* and *psychologia rationalis*. We are now especially interested in this last domain, for Kant deals here with the metaphysics of the thinking nature. In this sense metaphysics is understood as *metaphysica specialis*, contrasted with the *metaphysica generalis* (i.e., ontology). To comprehend what is meant by ‘soul’, we shall go into Kant’s pure, rational psychology (*psychologia rationalis*) and the paralogism of pure reason. This way we will leave both the *cosmologia rationalis* and the *theologica transcendentalis*, that is, the cosmology and the theology, aside, even though they form an indispensible part of Kant’s transcendental dialectic. Because we are for now first of all concerned with the schematism, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to deal with these aspects of the dialectic as well. In his doctrine of the soul (*Seelenlehre*) he shows the inability to have knowledge of the soul, of the ‘I think’, i.e., of the transcendental apperception; he shows that rational psychology is concerned with a concept (Idea) that is not directly applicable to intuition.

Because the schematism is hidden in the depth of the human soul, we will first elaborate what Kant means by ‘soul’ before dealing with the transcendental schematism. At the same time we have to realize that the unity of consciousness – and the consciousness of this unity – is only reached by means of the harmony or identity of all the functions that are needed to unite the manifold given in intuition. It “would be impossible for the mind [Gemüth] to think *a priori* the identity of itself in the manifold of its representations [Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Vorstellungen], when it did not have the identity of its action in sight, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity […]” (KRV, A108). Rational psychology is concerned with the unity of the subject (insofar as ‘subject’ is still the appropriate term here), the soul as a transcendental Idea. Pure reason is the faculty that is assigned to the unification of the manifold of knowledge gathered by understanding. The concepts of reason – the transcendental Ideas – are concepts of an unconditioned totality of the conditions of understanding, and, therefore, they do not directly correspond to any object of experience. When Kant says that we do not have a concept of this object, he means that we do not have a concept of understanding (*Verstandesbegriffe*) of it. Because reason is concerned with establishing the absolute unity, the inference of the transcendental Ideas itself should also imply or result in a unity.

Before dealing with the transcendental apperception, the ‘I think’, Kant introduces the Transcendental Dialectic. The Transcendental Analytic deduced twelve categories by investigating the Table of Judgment. Instead of relating concepts and intuition, or better, before gathering all synthetic *a priori* judgments, Kant has to investigate the conditions of possibilities of these judgments. How is it possible to attribute a predicate to a subject and increase our knowledge of the object? Subsequently, Kant will have to investigate the possible relations between separate judgments themselves in order to find the principles of reason, i.e., the condition of possibility of drawing a conclusion, i.e., to judge on the basis of judgments. This takes place in the syllogism (*Vernunftschluss*), so Kant is forced to investigate subsequent to his analysis of (the principles of) understanding the principles of reason that enable us to draw these conclusions. By way of the three possible syllogisms – categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive – Kant will deduce three transcendental Ideas. Eventually Kant will infer three Ideas – soul, world and God – which are not to be understood making it. That is why Kant says that there is no *Methodenlehre* of taste, but only a propaedeutic, which is not a method of learning (*Lehrart or methodus*) by means of regulation or rules, but a way (*modus*) through which examples are presented without prescribing rules (see KU, §60, 355/229).
as three new unities; rather, the highest Idea (God) at the same time has to express the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general and the unity of the Ideas as such. (In the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and his *Opus Postumum* Kant argues that the existence of God needs to be postulated because there is the law (the categorical imperative).) As we saw, since we are dealing with an Idea, we should realize that when Kant speaks about God in this context, this Idea does not designate an object beyond experience that can be known with our faculties of cognition. There is no direct representation of this Idea. (This means that the limit designated by this Idea is a border that one cannot pass, a limit that one cannot transgress because there is no presentation (delimitation or imagination) possible beyond the limits of experience. As we will see more generally when discussing the sublime, it presupposes an *Unvermögen* of the imagination to present when the impossibility of comprehending marks the end of form or of the image.) However, this end is not simply a negation (death) of the image, but also its final end, the *Sein-zum-Tode* of the image (as Derrida stated), to which it has been directing itself; or as Kant said, an Idea is a *focus imaginarius* (*KRV*, A644/B672). To speak of the end of the image (perhaps also in the sense of the *focus imaginarius*), then, means that the limit presented in the image withdraws the imagining from the presented image of which Kant seemed aware when he formulated that the schematism is a “hidden art” of which we are only seldom aware.) The (subjective) deduction of the Ideas starts off with human knowledge from the paralogisms of pure reason, and proceeds by way of the antinomies of pure reason to the ideals of pure reason (cf. *KRV*, B396n). We will focus here on the paralogisms, for our concern is rational psychology.

The term ‘paralogism’ designates a certain type of formally fallacious syllogism. The syllogism is a paralogism when one deceives oneself by it. And a *transcendental* paralogism involves a transcendental ground, which results in a formally invalid conclusion. Instead of deceiving others, the transcendental paralogism is self-deception grounded in reason itself. It is reason itself that causes this deception concerning itself. Subsequently, Kant turns to the transcendental concept of the subject: I think, the transcendental apperception, which constitutes all transcendental concepts. According to Kant, the ‘I think’ is “the sole text of the rational psychology, from which it [i.e., rational psychology, JvG] will develop its entire wisdom” (*KRV*, A343/B401). Hence, rational psychology is first of all concerned with the ‘I think’. This concept is the vehicle of all concepts, without which any thought could not be my thought. Because of the transcendental apperception, all thoughts are introduced as belonging to one consciousness. Kant knew the difficulty and complexity of this matter, witness the fact that he rewrote a large part of the chapter on the paralogisms in the Transcendental Dialectic. We will return to this in Chapter 3 (§3.1). However, the problem of the transcendental apperception is introduced earlier in the text – and this part has also been changed in the second version – when Kant deals with the *a priori* synthesis by the imagination of the manifold of intuition into the unity of thought: “Now no cognitions can occur in us, no

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23 Crockett underscores that Kant’s rewritten transcendental deduction reduces the number of syntheses to two: the figurative and the intellectual synthesis. Because of this, the role of the imagination is, according to Crockett (in which he seems to follow Heidegger), reduced to mere sensibility, and understanding can carry out the intellectual synthesis alone “without any imagination” (*KRV*, B152). According to Crockett, this gives Kant the possibility to use the distance between the imagination and the understanding for a free play of the imagination – as analyzed in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* – and, eventually, in “the sublime, understanding is rendered completely incompetent, because the power of the imagination to apprehend to infinity outstrips the ability of understanding to conceptualize, comprehend, and present such an infinite apprehension as an intuition” (C. Crockett, *A Theology of the Sublime*, 80). However, Crockett seems to confuse the analysis of the sublime with Kant’s analysis of the genius that is characterized by his impressive productivity (originality and exemplarity) and the ability to present aesthetic Ideas. As we will see, subreption plays an essential role in the sublime, and we should not forget what Kant wrote in his first *Kritik*: “[A]ll errors of subreption are always to be ascribed to a defect in judgment, never to understanding or to reason” (*KRV*, A643/B671).

connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation [Vorstellung] of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness [reine ursprüngliche, unwandelbare Bewusstsein] I will now call [nennen] transcendental apperception.” (KRV, A107) This apperception is the unity of consciousness and identity of the self to which all my representations belong, thus the subject of all experiences: unchangeable, not empirically demonstrable and independent of the sensible. The manifold in intuition can only be my representation if it belongs to self-consciousness.

It is important to note here that apperception is both the subject of the ‘I think’ that can accompany all ‘my’ representations and the subject that represents this ‘I think’: apperception involves (the unity of) self-consciousness, although it cannot be directly intuited or experienced. Experience is for Kant empirical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of an object through perception, and, as Kant stated, the ‘I think’ is able to accompany (begleiten) representations. Hence, the unity of this apperception is presupposed in all experience, that is, in empirical knowledge, although it is itself not reducible to an object of cognition. The transcendental apperception is distinguished from empirical apperception, in which I am represented to myself as I appear, as I intuit myself. In the transcendental apperception (as a thinking self instead of intuited self) on the contrary I represent that I am. “The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity [Selbstthätigkeit] of a thinking subject.” (KRV, B278) Rational psychology is merely concerned with this subject, the ‘I think’ as its “sole text”; empirical psychology on the other hand has everything as the object of research that is added to the general or formal representation of this self-consciousness.

The principle of apperception is according to Kant the highest principle, for it demands conformity and is the foundation of the use of understanding. The principle says that all representations in a given intuition must be in conformity with the subjective conditions for representation to be recognized as my representations. “Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness could not be thought.” (KRV, B135) Hence, it would be impossible to think this transcendental apperception without the powers of intuition, imagination and understanding. How are the unity of the transcendental apperception and the synthetic unity (of the manifold synthesized by the imagination) connected? This synthetic unity of the manifold produced a priori in intuition, as we will see, presupposes the identity of the transcendental apperception, although this synthesis precedes all thoughts and knowledge. Insofar as the apperception is dependent on the synthetic unity, Kant says, the “principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of imagination prior to the apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience.” At the same time we should, on the contrary, realize that the transcendental apperception is more original than the synthesis, for it grounds the conditions of unity as “an a priori condition of the possibility of the composition of the manifold in cognition” (KRV, A118). This will be analyzed more extensively when we deal with the schematism itself.

As noted, a paralogism is self-deception in a formally fallacious syllogism, which will soon be discussed more generally in terms of a transcendental or dialectical illusion; we have also seen that the “sole text” of rational psychology is ‘I think’. All the thoughts of this ‘I think’ belong to it as its predicates. In this sense the ‘I think’ is unconditioned, that is, it cannot itself be accompanied by some other representation; it is the subject that thinks itself. That is why the judgment (principle) of rational psychology is never based on empirical data; however, this lack of intuition to give data for this judgment is even necessary for rational
psychology. The source of the formal invalidity in the transcendental paralogism is found in reason itself, for pure reason is the seat (Sitze) of the transcendental illusion. Kant will respond to the three questions of rational psychology – the question of the communion of the body and the soul, of the beginning of this communion and the end of this communion – by declaring that what is only thought is here hypostatized and taken as an existing object outside the thinking subject. Instead of treating the subject as subject, that is, as transcendental apperception, it transforms the subject into an object. If I am to myself as object, I intuit myself and I appear to myself as an empirical apperception; in this case I am given to myself in intuition by reference to the conditions of knowledge, to the unity of the transcendental apperception. Kant begins the introduction of the Transcendental Dialectic by outlining this illusion (Schein) and by contrasting it with other notions (namely, that of probability and appearance) and with other conceptions of illusion, such as the empirical and logical illusion. Illusion is first of all a matter of deception. Secondly, illusion is not found in the senses, but solely in judgment, that is, the origination of illusion is located in a disrupted relation between intuition and thought. The transcendental illusion arises with the transcendent principle that demands to transgress the limits of our possible experience. Finally, Kant dissociates this transcendental illusion from the logical illusion. The latter is solely the result of fallacious use of formal rules of thought. The transcendental illusion is inseparable from human reason, even after its fallacy, its illusionary character, has been exposed, and as noted we will return to the transcendentality of this illusion in Chapter 3.

As we will see, for Kant knowledge is only possible when concepts are related to intuition (in synthetic judgments). Rational psychology, however, just as rational cosmology and rational theology do – builds upon a proposition (in the case of psychology this proposition is ‘I think’) that excludes intuition, for otherwise it would be merely empirical psychology. Reason is considered knowledge through concepts that do not introduce an empirical element in the conception of the objects (soul, world, God). Reason erroneously tries to operate beyond the limits of experience when it tries to prove the immortality of the soul. Kant will try to uncover that the dogmatic argumentations for this immortality are the result of a false reasoning (the paralogisms). Every judgment based upon this ‘I think’ should be a priori if it wants to belong to rational psychology. The four paralogisms of pure reason that Kant will discuss in the first version of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft focus on the four propositions that can presupposedly be derived from this transcendental apperception: viz. (1) the thinking being (soul) is a substance; (2) it is simple (einfach); (3) it is a unity; (4) it is in relation to possible objects in space. Of course, Kant presents the paralogisms in syllogistic form in order to subsequently show the fallacy of the reasoning:

(1) The ‘I’ of ‘I think’ is represented as an absolute subject to which all representation belongs, but which thinks itself without being accompanied by further representations. This ‘I’ is a substance. Because a thinking being (soul) is an absolute subject, this thinking being is a substance.

(2) A thing is simple if the action is not considered as the concurrence of several things acting. The soul, the thinking being, is such a thing; therefore the thinking being (soul) is simple.

(3) That which is conscious of itself as a numerical identity throughout the changes in time is a person. The soul is such a numerical identity; therefore the soul is a person.

(4) Because the self is treated in this paralogism as the standard from which all other existences are derived, the existence of that which is inferred from given intuitions has doubtful existence (as scepticism showed). The existence of outer appearance is inferred; therefore the outer appearances have doubtful existence.

What is important is that, for Kant, the Idea of the transcendental apperception is without any further determination, because this Idea cannot be applied to any given intuition. The only
thing we can say when we ask what this ‘I’ is, is that it is the Idea through which any knowledge of objects is attained. Every experience is accompanied by this transcendental apperception, which itself cannot be an object of knowledge. This is what all four paralogisms just mentioned are based on, as Kant shows in his critique of the paralogisms:

(1) Rational psychology can maintain that there is an ‘I think’ that accompanies every thought, but it cannot conclude from this ‘I think’ that it is a permanent substance that underlies all determinations of objects. Rational psychology can only state that every determination implies self-consciousness; not that this self is a substance, and we will return to this in Chapter 3 where we will see that Kant defines this ‘I’ as “being itself [Wesen selbst]”. We cannot have knowledge of substance apart from the manifold given in our intuition.

(2) The same goes for the second paralogism. The unity of the transcendental apperception tells us nothing of the simplicity of the ‘I’, that is, it does not tell us that I know the real simplicity of this ‘I’. The assertion ‘the soul is simple’ is solely formal, for it does not say anything about the real or objective simplicity of the soul.

(3) The third paralogism exhibits the same illusion as the first two, although now related to the personality of the soul instead of substantiality or simplicity. The determination of external objects – in order to grasp the substantial element in it – serves to know the object of our experience. The ‘I’, on the contrary, does not know itself this way, for self-consciousness involves thinking of the ‘I’ (as subject) without knowing it (as object).

(4) Finally, the forth paralogism is based on two different senses of the term ‘outer appearance’. The fallacy lies in the assumption that these outer appearances coincide with things-in-themselves. The difference between the two lies in the distinction between objects of outer senses and objects (things-in-themselves) that are independent of self-consciousness. We will return to this in the following section.

As is clear from Kant’s critique, everything in the arguments which show the transcendental illusion is based upon what is meant by ‘substantiality’, ‘simplicity’, ‘unity’ and ‘possibility’, and on what the limits of the use of these concepts are. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy formulate, the first and most fundamental result is “that there is no intuitus originarius”, resulting for Kant in a notion of the subject that remains an empty form (the subject as a pure logical necessity); the “Kantian ‘cogito’, the thing is well known, is an empty cogito”. All four paralogistic propositions are based on the four headings of the categories (respectively relation, quality, quantity and modality), as will be discussed in the subsequent section; the categories themselves are deduced in Kant’s Transcendental Analytic from the possible forms of judgment (as presented in the Table of Judgments). As we will see, this deduction is essential for uncovering the possibility of the application of pure concepts as themselves (together with space and time as forms of intuition) conditions of possibility for experience. This ontology as part of metaphysics does not depend upon the supersensible, for it is concerned with pure intuition as the pure form of sensibility and the application of the pure concepts of understanding on the objects given by sensibility. Here, space and time as the forms of intuition will have to set the limits for the legitimate, i.e., empirical use of the concepts of understanding. This implies that we will have to return to the metaphysica generalis (ontology) instead of (rational psychology as part of) the metaphysica specialis.

25 Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe and J.-L. Nancy, L’absolu littéraire. Théorie de la littérature du romantisme allemand, 43. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy emphasize that it is because of the relation “between aesthetic and philosophy” that a “‘passage’ to Romanticism will be possible”.
§4. Kant’s Ontology (Metaphysica Generalis)

All a priori knowledge must form a systematic unity, and, for this reason, Kant defines his metaphysics as “the philosophy that has to present this knowledge in this systematic unity” (KRV, A845/B873). Metaphysics as transcendental philosophy – distinguished from the physiology of pure reason – investigates the a priori knowledge of pure understanding and pure reason, which implies that it is impossible to infer metaphysical knowledge from experience. Metaphysics (reason) tries to reach beyond the limits of experience, but it will inevitably lead to contradictions, or more precisely, to paralogisms, antinomies and the fallacies with regard to the ideal of reason (as presented in the ontological and cosmological proofs of the existence of God) when trying to derive an objective reality from concepts of reason (soul, world, God). Hence, metaphysics is best characterized as a continuous conflict in which all sites claim their own victories; however, the Kritik will have to formulate principles that cannot be doubted so that the conflict can be solved in a “verdict” securing “a perpetual peace” (KRV, A752/B780). Instead of immediately taking a (dogmatic) position that does not begin with an analysis of the limited possibilities of the faculties of cognition, Kant first investigates the conditions of possibility of knowledge itself, and the Transcendental Analytic is, then, an analysis of “transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible” (KRV, A146/B185; cf. GA3, 123/87; GA25, 194/132-133). This demands that we step back from all the dogmatic conclusions that have already been drawn in history in order to formulate the transcendental conditions of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant wrote in his Opus Postumum: “Transc. Philos. is the philosophy of the philosophy [die Philosophie der Philosophie] insofar as it comprises synthetic statements a priori”. (OP, KGS 22, 135) The critical process of pure reason as a philosophy of philosophy is an attempt to examine and judge upon the faculties in this conflict, and Kant several times uses the image of a court of justice (Gerichtshof) to position his critique of pure reason, for “the endless controversies of a merely dogmatic reason finally make it necessary to seek peace in some sort of critique of this reason itself, and, in a legislation grounded upon it” (KRV, A752/B780).

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant is interested in a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge that is not derived from experience, and yet constitutive of experience. According to Kant, this knowledge is necessary and universal although a priori knowledge cannot solely be derived from what is given in intuition (as Hume convincingly showed). Furthermore, all metaphysical judgments will have to be, just like mathematical and scientific judgments, synthetic. A judgment is the unification or synthesis of the manifold in a consciousness in which Kant follows the logical form of judgment as the synthesis of subject and predicate when the predicate says something general about the singular term expressed in the subject. With this, Kant introduces a distinction that needs explanation: analytic and synthetic judgments. All analytic judgments are based on the principle of contradiction and they are therefore all a priori. The denial of an analytic statement would imply the affirmation of a logical contradiction, because a judgment is analytic when the subject of the statement already and immediately incorporates the predicate. The synthetic judgment, however, is not solely grounded on the principle of contradiction, for, here, we expand our knowledge of the subject. It is, therefore, no problem to think of these synthetic judgments as a posteriori knowledge, but, according to Kant, there are also synthetic a priori judgments (in mathematics and natural sciences). Kant presupposes that synthetic judgments a priori are possible, but how, then, are these judgments possible?

§4.1. Pure Intuition and Pure Concepts

The first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements involves the Transcendental Aesthetics in which Kant inquires into the forms of intuition: space and time. This
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements merely supplies the tools (Bauzeug) for building a “total sum [Inbegriff] of all cognition of pure and speculative reason as an edifice for which we have in ourselves at least the idea”, or, as Kant also describes, it merely supplies the materials (Vorrath der Materialien) sufficient to build a house (Wohnhaus). With these materials, we cannot build a Babylonian tower that reaches heaven (Thurm...bis an den Himmel) as has so often been thought possible, but only a house that is just big enough for our “business on the plane of experience” and high enough to “survey [übersehen]” it. As Kant suggests, the initial attempts to rebuild the tower of Babel had to fail “out of lack of materials”, and the confusion of tongues or languages (Sprachverwirrung) did not help, causing a disagreement between the laborers and even a diaspora (“welche [...] sie in alle Welt zertreuen musste”), leaving everyone to build according to their own plans (KRV, A707/B735). This Doctrine of Elements will supply the tools and material, the “two stems [Stamme] of human cognition”, i.e., intuition and understanding, that “may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root [vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel]” (KRV, A15/B29). All thoughts are directed to intuition, which means that cognition begins with experience (mit der Erfahrung) without excluding the possibility of speaking of a priori knowledge. Kant argues that if we abstract the empirical concept such as ‘body’ from all its empirical aspects (light, weight, etc.), what remains is merely the space that it takes (or took). Further, if we abstract this concept from everything that experience teaches us of this object then we will notice that it is impossible to leave aside the thought of it as a substance (cf. KRV, B1-B6). Kant will have to begin with the first stem (intuition), since the “conditions under which objects are given precede those under which they are thought” (KRV, A16/B29). Eventually, what is given in intuition will have to be judged, and, as we will see, understanding is a spontaneous power to judge; nothing precedes sensibility and the whole critical investigation will have to begin with this, even though not everything arises from sensibility.26

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant analyzes what is necessary for an object to be given to us, before analyzing how an object can be thought. That analysis will take place in the Transcendental Logic. Intuition is characterized as a receptive faculty in which all the objects of experience are given. Kant calls the object ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) when concepts have not yet determined what is given in intuition, that is, an appearance is an undetermined object of empirical intuition. Something can be given as an appearance by way of intuition, and this is one of the purposes of the Transcendental Aesthetic: to give the conditions of the donation on the basis of which something can indeed be given. Intuition does not give these objects to itself; rather, the receptivity of sensibility makes it possible to receive the given impressions in intuition to which all thought is (directly or indirectly) engaged. Our (derivative) intuition is not capable of giving the object of experience to itself, for we are constrained by the limits of this receptive faculty and, because of that, unable to give the intuited to ourselves. Human intuition is not an intellectual or original intuition. A first delimitation of experience (empirical knowledge) is given by intuition, for it is this receptivity for what is given. In original intuition (intuitus originarius), however, the subject immediately presents the object of knowledge to itself, while, in the case of our derivative intuition (intuitus derivativus), intuition itself is not the cause of the intuited object, but, as we will see, ‘merely’ one of the conditions for the objectivity of the object when it restrains the use of pure concepts. According to Kant, something is not cognized as it is in itself (an sich), for it is given in an a priori, subjective form of intuition. A thing in itself (Ding an sich) cannot be known, and something can only appear as something in intuition. Because intuition is necessary for knowledge and even delimits the field of cognition, no inquiry is ever made in

26 Cf. J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 15.
experience to know a thing in itself, but only insofar as it appears (cf. KRV, A30/B45). More precisely, Kant emphasizes in his *Opus Postumum* that the thing-in-itself is “not another object [nicht einen anderen Gegenstand]”; rather, it presupposes “another, namely the negative point of view” (OP, KGS 22, 42). It is imperative not to think of pure intuition as a process of conceptualization or of structuring the given object by means of spatial or temporal concepts, for space and time are pure intuitions themselves as forms of intuition in which something can appear as spatial and/or temporal.

Against the empiricist and the sceptic, Kant will argue that pure intuition is always an a priori, subjective condition, which enables one to perceive an object in intuition. Conversely, Kant will argue against the rationalists that this a priori intuition is not conceptual. Space and time are outer and inner intuitions. The appearances are never the things-in-themselves, because an object of cognition first of all has to present ‘itself’ as appearance, synthetized or united by the formal structures of this same subject. Space and time can never be attributed to a thing-in-itself as one of its predicates. Something undetermined is, however, represented as appearance, which is always already taken up in the subjective conditions of sensibility. Kant argues for the pure forms by stating that we can think space and time without any objects in them, but we cannot delete space or time from our representations. (As we will see in Chapter 3 (§2.2), this will not prevent Kant from asking for a ‘place’ where there is no time (wo es keine Zeit gibt.) Kant emphasized that space and time are (pure) intuitions and not concepts. Space and time as forms structure all parts of space and time as a whole. They are the conditions of possibility of measurement (size and duration), and as such, they precede intuitions as their forms. All separate parts of space or time are parts

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27 Kant distinguishes in *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* (1770) the matter (Stoff) from the form (Form), which are both needed for sensuous cognition. While specifying the form, Kant explains that “the form of the same representation is undoubtedly evidence of a certain reference or relation in what is sensed, though properly speaking it is not an outline or any kind of schema of the object [adumbratio aut schema quoddam obiecti], but only a certain law, which is inherent in the mind and by means of which it co-ordinates for itself that which is sensed from the presence of the object” (DISS, 393/385). Before discussing the two conditions or forms of all sensuous knowledge separately, Kant explicitly determines them as schemata: “These formal principles of the phenomenal universe are absolutely primary and universal; they are, so to speak, the schemata and conditions of everything sensitive in human cognition. I shall now show that there are two such principles, namely, space and time.” (DISS, 398/391; cf. DISS, 403/397). As forms (schemata) of the intuitive representations, time would be “an imaginary being [ens imaginarium]", yet, in so far as it belongs to the immutable law of sensible things as such, it is in the highest degree true", and space is “imaginary [sit imaginarius]” and "it is not only a concept which is in the highest degree true, it is also the foundation of all truth in outer sensibility” (DISS, 401/395, 404/398). Kant argues that the concepts of time and space are neither innate, nor obtained, that is to say, these concepts are not obtained from sense perception, but from the activities of our faculties of knowledge. Without referring to this text, Heidegger will try to use this notion of the “ens imaginarium” of intuition in order to show that, in Kant, the imagination is at the basis of pure intuition.

As is well known, this text is an anticipation of his later critical work beginning with the publication of his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in 1781. In his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kant explicitly argues against Leibniz’s suggestion that the formal structures of intuition are abstractions from experience. On Leibniz’s view – at least in Kant’s interpretation – both space and time are merely “creatures of the imagination [Geschöpfe der Einbildungskraft] [...]”, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination [Einbildung] has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (KRV, A40/B57). We cannot go into this here, but it should be noted that Kant later seems to return to the ideas formulated in his *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*. Although Kant unmistakably denies in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that the forms of the intuition originate from the imagination – as is also clear from, for instance, his replies to Eberhard in his *Über eine Entdeckung* (cf. ENTD, 222/312) – we read in his *Opus Postumum* that space and time are “products (but primitive products) of our own imagination [Produkte (aber primitive Produkte) unserer eigenen Einbildungskraft]” and, as a consequence, they are “self-created intuitions, inasmuch as the subject affects itself” (OP, KGS 22, 37/176). Much later, he writes: “Empirical intuition through the sense, pure through the imagination experience through understanding [Empirische Anschauung durch den Sinn, reine durch die Einbildungskraft Erfahrung durch Verstand]” (OP, KGS 22, 476).
of, respectively, one space or one time, while concepts as rules only refer to singular examples.

The discussion of the pure forms of intuition does not answer the question of the conditions of possibility of thinking the given objects. This will be analyzed further in Kant’s Transcendental Logic, more specifically in the Transcendental Analytic, for then Kant deals with the pure concepts of understanding, the categories, which are other conditions for synthetic a priori judgments, i.e., experience itself. In contrast to general logic, transcendental logic only abstracts from the empirical content of knowledge but not from pure intuition, which will be his strategy for showing how not only a posteriori but also a priori synthetic judgments are possible. Formal logic tells us what the conditions are for a priori analytical judgments – by abstracting from all empirical conditions –, while transcendental logic opens the way to think of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments when it takes into account space and time as pure intuitions. It appears (es scheint), Kant states, that this latter logic is concerned with something other than general logic, namely it has to direct and secure (berichten, sichern) judgment, i.e., this transcendental logic will have to appoint the highest judge in the tribunal who takes care of the application of rules without being ruled by general logic: this judge is called the ‘I think’. Transcendental logic is able to point out a priori the case that can be subsumed under a rule (concept), and it is supposed to hand over the missing link in judging, or in juridical terms, to prevent us from a ‘lapsus judicii’, and, in simple medical terms, it might help us work on the “health” of philosophy. The necessity of a transcendental logic is indeed explained by Kant in an analogy with a doctor, a judge and a politician (Staatskundiger). General logic cannot contain any prescriptions (Vorschriften) for judging, since it abstracts from all content of knowledge. Similarly, a doctor can know all rules of pathology, just as the judge and politician know the rules in their field, but they might all fail in using their judgment. It is here that the stakes of the critique of pure reason become most clear when compared to politics, law and the medical practices. Philosophy has to find or determine its own health, its own legitimacy and its own rules. However, similar to the professions mentioned, knowing the rules of judgment, i.e., having uncovered the categories, does not prevent us from the error or mis-step of judgment (lapsus judicii). General logic does not tell us anything about the right use of judgment, for this use always implies that it is used for knowledge, i.e., applied to the objects given in intuition. Put differently, we might say that the concept does not regulate its own application; it does not tell us how to use it. There is, therefore, no rule for the application of concepts in general logic, which can only add new rules without being able to show how to subsume under a rule, i.e., determine when something falls under this rule (KRV, A133/B172). The relation between concepts and objectivity in synthetic a priori judgments remains undecided in general logic, and this problem will have to be resolved in transcendental logic. Examples cannot furnish us with the a priori principle that is needed for this relation. Instead, it is transcendental logic that will have to give these prescriptions (Vorschriften) for judgment.

Hence, the objectivity of knowledge does not solely stem from perception, for the objectivity conversely needs rules for synthesizing and determining the material and, thus, knowledge needs another faculty for its origination. This will be the faculty to judge and to give a rule: understanding. The Transcendental Analytic begins with the pure concepts of understanding that are deduced from the forms of judgment (the Table of Judgment), but the Transcendental Deduction will eventually aim at determining the objective reality of these pure concepts, i.e., the possibility of relating concepts to an object. Transcendental logic on the other hand is concerned with the a priori cognition of objects, which determines the rules of understanding and reason in relation to an object in which this relation itself is a priori. For Kant, all thinking is first of all judgment – unification by attributing a predicate to a specific subject by the spontaneous act of thinking – because of which he was led to a first deduction
of the categories by way of the Table of Judgment that Kant gathered in formal logic, so that
the concepts are not deduced from the empirical, but from the faculty of judgment itself. It is
only in the B-edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that Kant describes the section entitled
‘The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ as a “metaphysical
deduction” that establishes “the origin [Ursprung] of the a priori categories […] through their
complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking” (KRV, B159). In this
metaphysical deduction, Kant presents the following categories: under the heading of
quantity, we find the categories totality, plurality and unity; of quality, there are reality,
negation and limitation; of relation, Kant deduces the categories of inherence and subsistence
(substantia et accidens), of causality and dependence (cause and effect), and of community;
and, finally, the heading of modality gathers the pure concepts of possibility, actuality and
necessity. However, this metaphysical deduction has to be succeeded by a transcendental
deduction for exhibiting the possibility of categories “as a priori cognitions of objects of an
intuition in general”, for “if the categories did not serve in this way, it would not become clear
why everything that may ever come before our senses must stand under the laws that arise a
priori from the understanding alone” (KRV, B159-160).

§4.2. Transcendental Deduction

In the transcendental deduction, Kant will have to explain how the spontaneous activity of
understanding can have an “objective reality”, i.e., what justifies the application of the
categories to objects given in intuition as far as it concerns the laws of their combination,
“thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter
possible” (KRV, 159). As Nancy writes, “objective reality (Realität) is the condition of
possibility for grasping something in its actuality (Wirklichkeit), that is to say, that it
constitutes and commands the process of the presentation of the concepts in intuition (by
schematism)”.

In short, Kant has to show in a transcendental deduction why experience without the categories applied to the objects is impossible. This is one of those moments in
Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft where the second version shows a remarkable reworking.
Both in the first preface of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and in his Prolegomena, Kant hinted
at the complexity of the chapter on the deduction of the categories because of the lengthiness
(Weitläufigkeit). He also complains about the obscurity of the transcendental deduction as presented in the first version of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (cf. KRV, BXXXVIII; cf.
MAN, 476n/189n). His discontent with the first edition of the Kritik eventually resulted in
1787 in a partly rewritten version of the book, but Kant claims that he merely changed the
mode of presentation (Darstellungsart) (cf. KRV, BXXXIX). However, the difference
between these two versions of the deduction of the categories also consists in the attention
that is paid to the aspects of the synthesizing activity of imagination and understanding.
Instead of describing the psychological or transcendental moments of synthesis – as presented
in the first version –, in the second version Kant mainly focuses on the original synthetic unity
of the transcendental apperception. As we will see in the next chapter, Heidegger is more
interested in the first version, because here the importance and the synthesizing role of the
imagination is more apparent, allowing him to identify this imagination as the source of

29 Kant soon adds that the changes made also implies a “small loss” of some aspects and passages that are not
essential for the system, “despite the fact that some readers may not like doing without them, since they could
still be useful in another respect” (KRV, BXLII). Confident as he is, Kant subsequently writes: “To these
deserving men, who combine well-groundedness of insight so fortunately with the talent for a lucid exposition
(something I am conscious of not having myself), I leave it to complete my treatment, which is perhaps defective
here and there in this latter regard. For in this case the danger is not that I will be refuted, but I will not be
understood.” (KRV, BXLIII)
temporalization. Because of this and in spite of Kant’s discontent with his presentation in the first *Kritik*, we will mainly deal here with the first version of the deduction.  

The juridical term ‘deduction’ in Kant’s philosophical discourse indicates his search for the justification for the subsumption of cases under a rule. “*Quid iuris?*” (KRV, A84/B116) This question has to be posed in order to justify the use of these *a priori* representations (*Vorstellungen*). So the question is: *how can subjective conditions of thinking have an objective validity* (cf. KRV, A89/B122)? Nature is here not presupposed as a pre-given substance, for Kant will have to show how the cognitive functions constitute nature, that is, it has to be shown that pure concepts are conditions of all knowledge of objects, of objectivity. According to Kant, knowledge is only possible when the receptivity of intuition is connected to the spontaneity of the understanding, and this connection is made possible by way of a threefold synthesis. Synthesis is the act “of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition”; the manifold is “first gone through, taken up and connected in a certain way” (KRV, A77/B102), i.e., synthesis is the act of joining together the manifold in order to provide this as material for the concepts of understanding. This threefold synthesis entails: (1) the apprehensive synopsis of the manifold, (2) the reproductive synthesis in the imagination, and (3) the recognition in a concept. This threefold synthesis is based on the “three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of possibility of all experiences, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception*” (KRV, A94). This synthesis is not an act that can only be accomplished by pure understanding itself, for it also needs the imagination, but, reversely, the synthesis (of the imagination) remains blind without the conceptual recognition of what is given in intuition. The act of putting together the manifold is according to Kant reserved for the imagination. This synthesis eventually has to be brought to the concepts, but this is a function of the understanding. The threefold synthesis is essential to the possibility of understanding and experience. What is relevant for us – although we have not dealt with it yet – is that for Kant only time is the form of all objects of the senses: time is presupposed in the perception of all objects, because it is the form of the inner sense. Where space is only the form of the *external* senses, time, however, is the form of the *inner* sense, which subsequently implies for Kant that all objects will have to be represented in time-relations, for even the objects in space will be taken up in the inner sense, that is, in time. We will come back to this later.

With regard to the threefold synthesis, we can say:

(1) Perception not only implies the following upon each other of a manifold, but also consciousness of the succession of these impressions. Now, the synthesis of apprehension in perception is precisely this grasping of the various impressions; as apprehension it is directly oriented on the intuition that represents a manifold, and unites the manifold into one perception, in a single representation. The *pure* synthesis of apprehension also presupposes this spatial and temporal intuition, since it makes possible the representation of pure space and pure time.

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30 In the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction from 1787, Kant is more concerned with the possibility of self-consciousness as a response to Hume’s inability to think a subject over and above the ideas, for no fixed self can present itself throughout the changes of the appearances in the inner sense. By starting with an analysis of the transcendental apperception, Kant tries to show the objective validity of the categories. Therefore, Kant’s first concern in the B-edition is the distinction between inner sense and the transcendental apperception, where the highlighting of the different synthesizing capacities presented in the A-edition is subordinated to an analysis of the unity of apperception, even though these distinct moments of syntheses are not absent from the B-version. Still, this emphasis on the transcendental unity of apperception leads to a disregard of the different moments of synthesis and the different subjective conditions that are necessary for judgment.
(2) Reproduction in the imagination is needed for the connection of this momentary representation of the apprehension to the past. Because what appears to the subject is not the thing-in-itself but “the mere play of our representations [das bloße Spiel unserer Vorstellungen]” (KRV, A101), the synthesis of the imagination takes care of the reproduction of past appearances. Kant subsequently tries to show that a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination grounds the possibility of experience. If the synthesis of apprehension were separable from this reproduction, all perceptions would be forgotten and lost when they have elapsed eventually. Experience is only possible when appearances presuppose a combination or connection of the manifold that enables reproduction by the imagination. The reproductive synthesis of the imagination leads to the succession of perceptions by reproducing the preceding perception alongside the perception to which it has passed. Because apprehension and reproduction are inseparable, and the synthesis of apprehension is a transcendental condition of both empirical and pure a priori knowledge, the reproductive synthesis of imagination is a condition for judging synthetically and a priori. For this reason, Kant calls this power of reproductive synthesis the transcendental imagination.

(3) The last stage in this synthesis is that of recognition. Recognition is here the unification of representations in a concept. According to Kant, this totality has its ground in the transcendental apperception. When the subject loses its substantiality – a question that will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 3 when we will have to return to Heidegger’s interpretation of the transcendental apperception – the pure form of this subject or the subject as a pure form and a pure logical necessity reduces itself to a function of unity or of synthesis. Without the (unity of) consciousness, concepts and knowledge of the objects are impossible, for it generates coherence in all representations according to laws of nature. “This very same unity of apperception with regard to a manifold of representations (that namely of determining it out of a single one) is the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding.” Understanding is here the “legislation for nature [Gesetzgebung vor die Natur], i.e., without understanding there would not be any nature at all, i.e., synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances in accordance with rules; for appearances, as such, cannot occur outside us, but exist only in our sensibility” (KRV, A126-127). Much later Kant writes: “[P]ure reason leaves to the understanding everything that relates directly to the objects of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination.” (KRV, A326/B382-383) Consciousness of objectivity is only possible when the manifold of representations falls under the rules of the understanding, that is, the categories. Recognition is therefore the consciousness of the unity of synthesis; and it is a pure self-consciousness, the transcendental apperception, which is the source of all thinking.

Kant’s main question in the deduction is whether pure concepts can be a priori related to the objects of experience in such a way that the pure concepts are not derived from the objects. For Kant, a pure concept has to make the object possible, not by producing intuitions, but, rather, by recognizing appearances as objects of experience. This is what the deduction shows, for in an analytic judgment “I remain with the given concept in order to discern something about it. […] In synthetic judgments, however, I am to go beyond the concept [aus dem Gegebenen Begriff ausgehen] in order to consider something entirely different [etwas ganz anderes] from what is thought in it […]” (KRV, A155/B193) The object cannot simply be opposed to cognition to which it would correspond, for it is not given beforehand, but always something thought, “something in general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it” (KRV, A104). This object is also named “transcendental object”, which cannot be intuited but is constitutive
for the objectivity (objective reality) of concepts. “The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality.” (KRV, A109) Cognition needs an opening to what distinguishes itself from our concepts, to something utterly different, and Heidegger will emphasize that what is essential for the objectivity of the object (Gegen-stand) is that it ‘stands against’. This means, as Rogozinski states, that “the opening to the fully-Other [tout-Autre] exposes itself to a real opposition [opposition-réelle], to a trait of objection = X where transcendence gives itself a hold [arrêt].” This transcendental object = X opposes itself to (dawider) knowledge as an outside “that forms the horizon of every objectivation.”

Only by way of the connection of pure concepts to the mode of sensibility is it possible to derive other concepts. Hence, the “utterly different” of the concept to which these same concepts need to be related a priori is pure intuition, and, more specifically, time. Without this connection (i.e., schematization) a category such as ‘substance’ means nothing else than a something (Etwas) that can only be thought as subject of a judgment without being able to be attributed to anything else as a mere predicate. These categories without any sensible intuition merely express the thought of an object, which is, according to Kant, properly speaking no use (Gebrauch) at all. “Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule [die Anschauung nicht durch eine solche Function der Synthesis nach einer Regel hat hervorgebracht werden können] that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible.” (KRV, A105) Transcending (ausgehen) beyond the immanence of the concept in a synthetic a priori judgment is, therefore, made possible by a “third thing [ein Drittes]”, a “medium [Medium] of all synthetic judgments”, in which (worin) the synthesis of two concepts can come about (entstehen) (KRV, A155/B194). The question of the possibility of attributing a predicate to a subject (in which the former is not purely immanent to the latter concept) asks for a third term which is able to synthesize pure intuition and pure understanding. The categories can only be related to intuition when (as we shall see) the schematism of the transcendental imagination mediates between them, or better, this third term is the place, the milieu in which the synthesis takes place. As we will see, the relation to the form of intuition (time) is made possible by a schema as a “transcendental time-determination” for which sense, imagination, and apperception are the three sources of knowledge of objects, although it should be noted that this tripartite division of synthesis is less explicit in the second version of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Besides the empirical aspects of these three sources, Kant also considers them to have an a priori ground for their empirical use: pure intuition, pure synthesis of the imagination and pure apperception. Instead of stating that the reproductive synthesis of imagination can take place a priori, according to Kant only the productive synthesis of imagination has this possibility, for the former is based on empirical conditions.

Kant states that “[t]he unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagination, is the pure understanding. In the understanding there are therefore

31 As Deleuze writes: “Doubtless we know only qualified objects (qualified as this or that by a diversity). But the manifold would never be referred to an object if we did not have at our disposal objectivity as a form in general (‘object in general’, ‘object = x’). Where does this form come from ? The object in general is the correlate of the ‘I think’ or of the unity of consciousness ; it is the expression of the cogito, its formal objectivation. Therefore the real (synthetic) formula of the cogito is : I think myself and in thinking myself, I think the object in general to which I relate a represented diversity.” (G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy. The Doctrine of the Faculties, 15-16.)

32 J. Rogozinski, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’énigme de l’éthique, 178
pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances.” (KRV, A119) Understanding provides unity for the syntheses generated by imagination by giving categories that express necessary qualifications of an object, such as substantiality, reciprocity, cause and effect, etc. The synthesis of the imagination can be called transcendental when this imagination synthesizes the manifold that is given in intuition without using this manifold for the synthesis; hence, the synthesis has to be a priori. The unity of this synthesis is transcendental, for transcendental apperception necessarily presupposes it. All objects of experience – that is, the pure form of all possible experience – have to be presented by this transcendental imagination, and the categories of understanding are these necessary unities with regard to all possible experiences. In other words: the categories make it possible to think the reproduced images as not merely coincidences, but as following a rule based on an objective ground. “I [Kant] call this objective ground of all association of appearances their affinity. But we can never encounter this anywhere except in the principle of the unity of apperception with regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. […] The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (of original apperception) is thus the necessary condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on rules.” (KRV, A122) On account that we call the imagination productive, we then say that it is a faculty to an a priori synthesis, so that pure imagination is a “fundamental power [Grundvermögen] of the human soul, that grounds all cognition a priori [das aller Erkenntniss a priori zum Grunde liegt]” (KRV, A124).33 At the same time, understanding includes imagination as one of its functions, while the imagination is also allocated as belonging to sensibility. This has to be explained by the double structure of the transcendental imagination, which enables it to mediate between the two faculties, to connect both “extremes [äußerste Enden]” (sensibility and understanding).

This unity of the manifold of appearances correlates the transcendental apperception, that is, it makes of this apperception the objective ground of all representations. For Kant, the synthesized representations are impossible if the synthesizing subject first of all does not recognize itself as such and as one. This transcendental apperception is said in the transcendental deduction to remain identical throughout the changes of the manifold; therefore this ‘I’, that precedes all experience, cannot be intuited in empirical data, for these are determined by the formal conditions of receptivity. For Kant this is a necessary condition, because it could not be made understandable how the objectivity of experience is possible if this self-consciousness were not consciousness of itself as the preceding unity. At the same time, the ‘I’ of self-consciousness is only conscious of its power of combination; this can be thought by the subject, but it cannot be known, for this would require the application of categories to something that precedes this application, that is, the transcendental apperception. Thus, Kant explicitly warns us about confusing inner sense – which is a form of intuition – and this apperception. “I think is spontaneity and does not depend on any object. The representation [Vorstellung], however, with which I think myself [mit welcher ich mich denke], has to be given to me in intuition (by the imagination [durch Imagination]) in advance. In relation to this I am affected [In Ansehung deren bin ich afficirt].” (VN, 26)

§5. Imagination

Several times Kant declares that both intuition and understanding are the two sources of all our knowledge, although at times Kant also indicates the possibility of rooting these two stems in one common ground: “All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary [Vorerinnerung] is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise

from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.” (KRV, A15/B29; cf. KRV, A835/B863) Kant only hinted at the possibility of a common root without explicitly searching for a way of locating it. Because Kant himself never explicitly dealt with this difficulty, we should be wary of concluding from this that one of the faculties described above is precisely this common root. However, Heidegger does not hesitate and claims that the transcendental imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding, so continuing a path opened by Hegel. In Kant’s notes in his own copy of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* we even read that the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination is at the basis of all our concepts of understanding [transcendentale Synthesis der Einbildungskraft liegt allen unseren Verstandesbegriffen zu Grunde]” (VN, 18). Contrary to Heidegger, other interpreters of Kant have argued that apperception is this root.34 Although Heidegger does not very often refer to Kant’s *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Kant draws there the analogy between the theme of the affinity (*Verwandtschaft*, *affinitas*) in the sensible poetical power (*Dichtungsvermögen*) and in chemistry because of their interest in the origin (*Abstammung*) of representations. In chemistry, “an interaction of two specifically different physical substances intimately acting upon each other and striving for unity” is a “unification [Vereinigung]” in which something new, a third (*etwas drittes*), is brought about (*erzeugt*) that has qualities which can only arise in the “unification of two heterogeneous elements [Vereinigung zweier heterogenen Stoffen]”. Analogously, sensibility and understanding synthesize automatically (*so von selbst*) – despite the heterogeneity (*Ungleichartigkeit*) – in the development of our knowledge “as if one had its origin in the other, or both originated from a common origin [beide von einem gemeinschaftlichen Stamme ihren Ursprung hätten]” (cf. ANTH, 177/287; with regard to the analogy with chemistry, cf. KRV, BXXI). Kant subsequently mentions the root (Wurzel) again from which the heterogeneity supposedly comes forth, although, Kant writes, this will remain incomprehensible for us (*für uns unbegreiflich*).35 Although the schematism, described by Nancy as “the nerve of transcendental logic”, remains ungraspable for us, “at least it gives itself in an image, in a chemical and sexual analogy”.36

Before continuing our reading with Kant’s theory of schematization, we first have to deal with the imagination. Although the imagination is often mentioned in Kant’s work in relation to faculties such as sensibility and understanding, Sallis rightly points out that the imagination is surprisingly absent from the table of faculties in Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (KU, Einl. IX, 198/83),37 and, as Mörchen indicates, the imagination has hardly ever been an

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34 Cf. D. Henrich, ‘Die Einheit der Subjektivität’, 28-69. Gibbons criticizes Heidegger’s interpretation when she underscores that in her reading the mediating function of the imagination needs to be comprehended as a *additional* act to that of intuition and understanding: “While I do not disagree that imagination both marks and bridges the ‘gap’ between intuition and understanding, its mediating function follows rather than precedes the division of the ‘stems’. Thus, the characterization of the unity of apperception as possessing formal similarities with intuition appears more appropriate to the role of the common ‘root’ of human knowing.” (S. Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, 50n)

35 Henrich writes about Kant and Heidegger’s reading in the *Kantbuch*: “The structure that forms the power of the mind is according to its concept determined by that of finite self-consciousness, hence, by the apperception and its categories, in Kant’s words the radical power (radix!) of knowledge.” (D. Henrich, ‘Über die Einheit der Subjektivität’, 44) Similar to Cassirer, Henrich states: “[Heidegger]’s interpretation exceeds as from its beginning a historical explication [Auslegung] that formulates the opinion of the author itself whilst he wants to problematize the concept of which Kant makes use.” (D. Henrich, ‘Über die Einheit der Subjektivität’, 48)

36 J.-L. Nancy, *Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus*, 108. In a footnote added to the section on the sensible *Dichtungsvermögen*, Kant speaks of the “union of two sexes (which we then call male and female)” (ANTH, 177n/287n).

isolated theme for Kant. The sole text in which Kant explicitly takes up the theme of the imagination is his *Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, and, more specifically, Kant introduces the imagination in this book in the paragraph ‘Von den fünf Sinnen’ (On the five senses): “Sensibility in the cognitive faculty (the faculty of intuitive representations) contains two parts: sense and the power of imagination. – The first is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object, the second is intuition even without the presence of an object.” (ANTH, 153/265) Although it belongs to sensibility, which is characterized by its passivity, that is, receptivity, the imagination is capable of actively making present what is absent (cf. T, 65). Imagination plays with presence and absence by making present to intuition what is, in certain respects, absent although it does not lose its absence when brought to the fore. Perhaps we can say that, following Gasché, “imagination is this: the power to make intuitions point away from themselves, and there must be such a pointing away before imagination can divide into its various employments. Moreover […] as such a power, imagination cannot help but point away from itself as well. Always ahead of itself, this power of the sensible is by necessity understandable only through the powers that it serves, i.e., understanding and reason. Since imagination must interconnect and present, it is in itself nothing but the power to designate, a power that can only be designated by pointing ahead of itself to the other faculties.”

Kant’s analysis of the imagination (facultas imaginandi) continues in the section ‘Von der Einbildungskraft’; here, Kant first distinguishes the productive imagination (exhibitio originaria) from the reproductive (exhibitio derivativa). The former is the power to exhibit an object that precedes experience; the latter brings to the fore what has previously been intuited. Later this distinction is elaborated further by stating that the imagination is either poetizing / inventive (dichtend) and therefore productive, or recollective (zurückrufend), thus reproductive. The question, then, is what the product of the productive imagination can be. Kant explicitly states that its productivity is not creative (schöpferisch), that is, it cannot generate a sense representation that was never given before to the senses. In what sense, then, are the non-present objects (ohne Gegenwart) produced or presented by the imagination in an originary way (cf. ANTH, 167/278)? To be productive the imagination has to get its material from the senses; it can only give itself the spatial and temporal form of an object, or, as Kant writes, the pure “intuitions of space and time [reine Raumes- und Zeitanschauungen]”, while all the other functions of the imagination “presuppose empirical intuition, which, when connected to the concept of the object and thus becomes empirical cognition, is called experience” (ANTH, 167/278). The productive imagination presents as a poetizing (dichtend) power in that it gives a reality to imaginary or fictitious objects. Gasché points out that the imagination in Kant is in all its forms – as the power of (re-)presentation and of synthesis – a faculty of designation (Bezeichnungsvermögen, facultas signatrix), which is again comprehended as “the faculty of understanding the present as a means of connecting the conception of what is foreseen with that of the past”, and, as Derrida emphasizes, the “Kantian imagination” indeed “cannot but imply an ontological interpretation of time” (T, 65). Indeed, the synthesis in general (Synthesis überhaupt) is at times considered a function (Wirkung) of the imagination, often described in the transcendental deduction and the chapter on the schematism in terms of ‘drawing’ or ‘tracing’ (zeichnen) (B162), ‘noting’ (verzeichnen) (A141/B180, A163/B203), ‘marking’ or ‘characterizing’ (bezeichnen) accounts of imagination that appear throughout his [Kant’s] works, agree in principle on only one thing – imagination is not an independent faculty.” (R. Gasché, ‘Leaps of Imagination’, 35)

We also saw that intuition without concepts is blind while a concept without intuition is empty.

When we take a closer look at the imagination, more precisely the transcendental (synthesis of the) imagination, we can conclude that no form of imagination as described in Kant’s *Antropologie* takes the place of the transcendental imagination of the first *Kritik*. In second version of his *Kritik der reine Vernunft*, Kant defined the imagination as the faculty of representing an object even *without its presence* [auch ohne dessen Gegenwart] in intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and this synthesis of intuitions, *in accordance with the categories*, must be the transcendental synthesis of the *imagination*, which is an effect of the understanding of sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. (KRV, B151-152)

Between intuition and understanding, or, as the above fragment seems to suggest, both sensible and intelligible, the imagination is the power (*Vermögen*) or force (*Einbildungskraft*) of representation or exhibition, of (*a priori*) synthesis, or of presenting an object without its presence. In the first version of his *Kritik*, the transcendental imagination is contrasted to the empirical imagination, although both are characterized by their productivity. The empirical imagination synthesizes the empirical manifold, producing an image out of the given content, while the transcendental imagination synthesizes the *pure* manifold. This is, as Nancy indicates, not without relevance for situating Kant in the history of philosophy: “The Kantian imagination is in effect the first modern figure (if I try to speak here of figure… but that is a plan [dessein], as you can imagine) of a faculty of the image that is not representative (at least in the usual sense of the word), but presentative, appresentative or apperceptive (that is to say, perceiving for itself, perceiving *ad subjectum*), constructive or productive of its object – or also of itself as object – and thus, in the final account, purveyor of knowing [*pourvoyeuse de savoir*].”

According to Kant, only the productive imagination can generate an *a priori*
synthesis, and not the reproductive imagination, so the transcendental imagination contains no reproduction, but solely the giving of the manifold in pure intuition (time) for the pure concepts of understanding. Nancy seems to go even further here, by presenting it as the “purveyor of knowing” where he follows (to a certain extent) Heidegger’s reading of Kant. Kant concludes in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that the “principle of a necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination [is] prior to apperception [...] thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience” (*KRV*, A118). Although this passage again underlines the relevance of the imagination, the question is whether Kant is able to hold on to two requirements that the analysis of the imagination in the *Anthropologie* seems to structure. The analysis of imagination is continued in the *Anthropologie* with that of the power of invention or composition (*Dichtungsvermögen*). However, as Nancy indicates, this “analysis, along with the entire analysis of the imagination, moves with difficulty between two requirements: the recognition of the positive power of imagination (of this empirical imagination that one must not confuse with transcendental imagination, but which in the *Kritik* nevertheless constitutes the only model and the only reference for the thought of the ‘transcendental imagination’) – and the warning against the aggravating series of its dangers (the phantom, the grotesque, disgust, perversion, in short the pathological in general – to which the text does not cease to return with a troubling predilection…). In between these two, or participating in both, not without hesitations, one finds the artist, the poet, the novelist. But also the transcendental philosopher.”

§6. The Third Term

Understanding represents the objects “as they are” (i.e., represented as objects of experience) while intuition presents them “as they appear” (*KRV*, A258/B313). General logic merely deals with the form of understanding without involving intuition and imagination in its investigations, which underlines the need to introduce transcendental logic. Considering Kant’s attempt to examine critically the dogmatic claims that ground the objectivity of the object in a transcendent being (God), as, for instance, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley or Wolff tried to do, Kant divides this logic into the “logic of truth” (Transcendental Analytic) and the “logic of illusion” (Transcendental Dialectic). He not only has to show how the Transcendental Analytic manages to resolve the problem of the synthetic unity of pure intuition and pure understanding, but he also has to show that this is demanded by the theoretical suspension of the existence of God. Kant mentions Crusius in his *Prolegomena* when the latter stated that a spirit (*Geist*) implanted the laws of nature in us. Kant sought a new way of safeguarding the objectivity of the laws (cf. PROL, 319n/112n). Kant’s interest in synthetic *a priori* judgments makes it necessary to investigate the conditions of possibility for these judgments in which the utterly-other of the concept is not reached by way of a transcendent being (God), but by way of the schemata of the imagination. The synthetic character of judgment implies that there is a relation of the concept to something else, namely intuition; when this judgment is *a priori*, it concerns a relation between a pure concept and pure intuition. In his *Prolegomena*, Kant again emphasizes that we should prevent ourselves from using the categories on matters that are beyond all possible experience. Instead of showing this, Kant writes that “[t]wo important, nay completely indispensable, though utterly dry investigations were therefore needed, which were carried out in the *Krit.*, pp.137ff. and 235ff.” (PROL, 316/108-109) Kant refers here, respectively, to the chapters ‘*Von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe*’ (A137/B176) and ‘*Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phaenomena und Noumena*’ (A235/B294).


The former shows that the categories themselves are not provided to the senses unless by way of the schemata of pure concepts. Kant writes in the introduction to the Analytic of Principles that Chapter 1 (the chapter on the schematism) will present the “sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed” (KRV, A136/B175). Chapter 2, subsequently, will have to show that nothing can be known beyond the limits of experience by means of these categories. This chapter presents the System of all Principles of Pure Understanding as the fundamental principles that are necessary for all other a priori knowledge. These synthetic a priori judgments, i.e., these principles, “flow a priori from pure concepts of the understanding under these conditions and ground all other cognitions a priori” (KRV, A136/B175). It explains the relevance of the schematism, to which we will limit ourselves in this section. Chapter 3 then deals with the distinction between the phaenomena and the noumena in which Kant examines the external borders of experiences.

Early in his book Kant indicated the necessity of subsumption and application for cognition by pointing out that all concepts of understanding have to be applied to intuition, and objects of experience have to be subsumed under a general rule. Kant adds to this: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) it is to make its intuitions understandable [verständlich] (i.e., to bring them under concepts). Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification [dass sie sich vereinigen] can cognition arise.” (KRV, A51/B75-76) This unification can only be realized if there is a middle term, a third (ein Drittes) that functions as a mediator with on the one hand the characteristics of understanding – for it must be pure and spontaneous – and on the other hand the characteristics of sensibility – in the sense that it has to accomplish the sensibilization of pure concepts. This mediator, homogenous (gleichartig) to both the categories and appearances, is called the transcendental schema, one of the sources necessary to obtain knowledge and a condition of possibility for experience. A schema is neither a concept, nor an image. The schemata do not belong to the intelligible faculty, despite the rules or procedures they present; rather, they are products of the transcendental imagination. The subsumption of an object under a category is not regulated by general logic. However, objectivity demands that this subsumption is not arbitrary either, so that the schema is not an image, for it is not presented by the imagination in intuition. A schema is, rather, a procedure for synthesis. The schema is homogeneous with the categories insofar as it is general; but it is also homogeneous with appearances insofar as time is contained in the representation of the manifold. For this reason Kant determines the schema as a transcendental determination of time (transzendentale Zeitbestimmung). Both mathematics and natural sciences show the possibility of application, i.e., of synthetic a priori judgments, but it is up to transcendental philosophy to show the conditions of possibility for their subsumptions, even though there is a heterogeneity between intuition and understanding, especially when it concerns their purity. Kant exemplifies this with a number; five dots on a row can function as an image for number ‘five’, but the number cannot be reduced to these five dots. If one thinks any number, whether it is ‘five’ or ‘thousand’, this thought is more the representation of a method (Verfahren) of creating an image of this number than the image itself. This method of imagining – when it concerns pure concepts – is a schema. The best

48 Cf. H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 212. As Allison points out, subsumption has everything to do with the application of the categories: “Now how is subsumption of the latter under the former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance?” (KRV, A137-138/B176-177) Application is here the possibility of using the categories for determining appearances, while subsumption has to do with the classification or subdividing of the objects of experience under concepts of understanding.
way to characterize the schema is perhaps to say that it is a pure image, “a product and as it were a monogram [Monogramm] of the pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concept” (KRV, A142/B181).

In the introduction to the Analytic of Principles, Kant again speaks of the merit of transcendental logic in contrast to general logic. Because general logic abstracts from the content of cognition and every empirical condition, it is impossible to prescribe rules or precepts to judgment that would not again call for new rules when one asks for the possibility of the application of the rules. Examples can be useful for judgment that needs to practice (like the judge, the politician and the doctor). These examples show us what is possible and, therefore, they practice judgment without giving any rules. Even though the examples serve to sharpen (schärfen) one’s power of judgment, Kant also points out that they usually do not perfectly exemplify the a priori conditions of rules under which they are subsumed in judgment. At the same time, they make us lazy or at least dependent on them as if they are go-carts or “leading-strings” (Gängelwagen) of judgment. Instances can lose their exemplarity when the rules for our judgment still depend too much on these examples and “accustom us to use those rules more like formulas than like principles” (KRV, A134/B173).

According to Kant, an example is merely instrumental (like a Gängelwagen) by furnishing us with an example that allows us to practice judgment even though it does not present any rules as such. Judgment is a talent to be practiced, not to be taught, and no school will ever be able to compensate for a possible lack. Kant deals here with general logic, which is unable to give rules to judgment, and, because of this, Kant introduces transcendental logic. Transcendental logic provides an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the rules to judgment, and yet at the same time are not supposed to be incommunicable silhouette of their products or even of their critical judgments” (KRV, A570/B598). Kant calls these images “the ideals of sensibility because they are supposed to be the unattainable model for possible empirical intuitions, and yet at the same time they are not supposed to provide any rule capable of being explained or tested” (KRV, A570-571/B598-599). Kant contrasts this ideal of sensibility to the ideal that serves as an “original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy [Urbilde der durchgängigen Bestimmung des Nachbildes]”: “[W]e have in us no other standard for our actions than the pure concept [verständlichen Begriff]; they are, as it were, monograms, individual traits, though not determined through any assignable rule, constituting more a wavering sketch, as it were, which mediates between various appearances [eine im Mittel verschiedener Erfahrungen gleichsam schwebende Zeichnung], than a determinate image, such as what painters and physiognomists say they have in their heads, and is supposed to be incommunicable silhouette of their products or even of their critical judgments” (KRV, A570/B598).

Kant implicitly repeats here Plato’s discussion on the word ‘pharmakon’ in Plato’s dialogues, for it can both mean poison and medicine. Derrida writes: “The pharmakon has no ideal identity; it is aneidetic, firstly because it is not monoeidec (in the sense in which the Phaedo speaks of the eidos as something simple, noncomposite: monoeides). This ‘medicine’ is not a simple thing. But neither is it a composite, a sensible or empirical suntheton partaking of several simple essences. It is rather the prior medium in which differentiation in general is produced, along with the opposition between the eidos and its other; this medium is analogous to the one that will, subsequent to and according to a decision of philosophy, be reserved for transcendental imagination, that ‘art hidden in the depths of the soul’, which belongs neither simply to the sensible nor simply to the intelligible, neither simply to passivity nor simply to activity. The element-medium will always be analogous to a mixed-medium.” (DIS, 144/126)
logic will not present the schemata as mere logical forms regulating the application of the categories to intuition, for schemata do not belong to the field of general logic, but, rather, they open this system for the possibility of their application. Transcendental logic will therefore have to direct and secure the faculty of judgment in the employment of the categories. This logic reaches into the nature of judgment itself when it formulates the principle of synthetic a priori judgments, when it formulates the limits of possible experience. This nature does not belong to the rational psychology insofar as it concerns the “human soul”, and, as Nancy declares, it “will not be able to arise from anything other than a psychologia empirica: the latter, however, can have no grasp on either the schema and the a priori judgment”; “there can be no transcendental constitution of knowledge without talent, but neither can there be one without a rectification, correction, and a surveillance of this talent – in itself however unassailable [inassignable]. Transcendental logic begins by refraining from the pure and simple spontaneity and the free and natural disposition of talent. It refrains from what founds it and declares that it will regulate what escapes it…”52

Hence, Kant holds on to a distinction between schema and (pure) concept, which will turn out to be much more complicated as soon as Kant introduces the noumena. The schematism is the procedure for applying the deduced concepts53 and the transcendental logic will have to look for or, perhaps we can say, imagine the necessary schemata when wishing to formulate the Analytic of Principles.54 The higher faculties of cognition are understanding, judgment, and reason; the Transcendental Analytic is first of all concerned with the first faculties, while the Transcendental Dialectics – as the “critique of dialectical illusion” and “logic of illusion” (KRV, A61-62/B86, A131/B170, A293/B349; LOG, 16/531) – deals, as we will see, with reason as the seat of this dialectical illusion. Subsequent to the Analytic of Concepts – and more specifically to the transcendental deduction – Kant will try to show in the Analytic of the Principles “a canon for the power of judgment that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the conditions for rules a

52 J.-L. Nancy, Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus, 47.
53 It is impossible to retrace all discussions on the difference between the aim of the transcendental deduction and that of the schematism, beginning with Bennett, Prichard or Warnock, who declare that the chapter on the schematism is unnecessary or superfluous (cf. J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic; H.A. Prichard, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge; G.J. Warnock, ‘Concepts and Schematism’), which has been thoroughly and justly criticized by both Allison and Guyer. It is not based on the difference between general and transcendental logic (cf. D. Bell, ‘The Art of Judgment’, 227-228; C. La Rocca, ‘Schematismus und Anwendung’, 130; S. Gibbons, Kant’s Theory of Imagination, 61), for the transcendental deduction already introduces and emphasizes the importance of the subjective conditions of the objectivity of knowledge. It also seems questionable to state that the difference between the two parts is based on what has been called by Dahlstrom “to know that” (Erkennen dass) and “to know how” (Erkennen wie) (D. Dahlstrom, ‘Transcendentale Schemata, Kategorien und Erkenntnisarten’, 50-51; cf. G.E. Franzwa, ‘Space and schematism’, 150; R.B. Pippin, ‘Schematism and Empirical Concepts’, 160.) The supposed difference between the transcendental deduction and the schematism seems more apparent in the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, because in the rewritten deduction Kant is more concerned with showing the objective validity and reality of the categories by emphasizing the transcendental apperception instead of all the subjective conditions (sense, imagination, apperception). A distinction of the transcendental deduction and the schematism is especially not based on the difference between, what Kant calls, determinant and reflective judgment as Wolff states (cf. E.M. Wolff, Etude du rôle de l’imagination dans la connaissance chez Kant, 11-12; this point is affirmed in N. Rotenstreich, ‘Kant’s Schematism in its Context’, 9). This distinction within judgment is only introduced in the Kritik der Urteilskraft in order to think a relation to nature that is not based on knowledge. Finally, Levy hints at a difference by observing that the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic of Concepts together are the analytic part of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, while what follows – and this begins with the schematism – is the synthetic part (cf. H. Levy, Kant’s Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe. Erster Teil, 11; the second part of this study in which Levy was supposed to deal with the schematism has never been published). Probably the question needs to be approached by focusing on the structure or architectonics of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, as for instance suggested by Feuler (cf. L. Feuler, ‘Schematismus und Deduktion in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, 397-413).
"priori" (KRV, A132/B171). Understanding as the faculty to judge is here determined as the faculty of rules, i.e., concepts (categories), and the power of judgment is the power to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether a fact or case indeed falls under a given rule.

When understanding abstracts from all empirical conditions (time and space), there is only pure logic left. Pure logic is necessary as a form of understanding, that is, it gives the rules for the formal use of understanding and reason (a priori principles), but as such it merely serves as a “cathartic [Kathartikon] of the common understanding” (KRV, A53/B78; cf. LOG, 17/532). This brings us back to the question of synthetic a priori judgments. The latter concerns the conditions of possibility for the structures or relations of judging (in pure intuition and pure understanding), the possibility of relating a pure concept to pure intuition, i.e., synthetically and a priori attributing a predicate to a subject, which Kant soon reformulates as an instance of subsuming an object under a rule or concept. As noted, Kant distinguishes the objects of experience into what they “are” and their appearance. Hence, we will have to investigate the highest principles of understanding, i.e., of that “copula [Verhältnisswörtchen]”, the ‘is’ in judgment (KRV, B141), which already indicates Heidegger’s interest in this theme, although Heidegger will attempt to show more forcefully how time functions within this synthesis. A schema is a pure image, produced by the transcendental imagination, which empowers the application of categories. This schematization is necessary for pure concepts to have any meaning (Bedeutung).

The synthesis of the imagination is neither purely intuitive, nor purely conceptual, for the problem is the subsumption of an object under a concept of understanding. In order to indicate its independence from all sensibility, Kant says of understanding that “[i]t is […] a unity that subsists on its own, which is sufficient by itself, and which is not to be supplemented by any external additions” (KRV, A65/B89-90). In the chapter on the schematism, Kant first mentions the examples of the empirical concept ‘plate’ and the pure geometrical concept ‘circle’. These examples are no problem for Kant, for they simply deal with different representations (viz., conceptual and intuitive, on the basis of a synthesis by empirical concepts or of what Kant calls the construction of geometrical concepts). These concepts show that the same predicate can be attributed, like circularity, even though they represent it differently, viz. conceptually (synthetically) and intuitively (constructed). Even though the example of these concepts seems to simplify the aim of the investigation – for they merely wish to present the possibility of conceptualizations in different representations –, it at

55 Zschocke considers the problem of subsumption a “dogmatic remains” of the scholastic logic, as a result of which Zschocke wishes to present a new schematism (cf. W. Zschocke, ‘Über Kants Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Vernunft’, 173-174). Similar to Zschocke, Curtius argues that the subsumption cannot be understood in term of synthesis, because the former has to do with logic, while the synthesis is primarily epistemological (cf. E.R. Curtius, ‘Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, 363ff.) However, the subsumption is here not primarily logical, but epistemological concerning the synthetic unity of intuition and understanding.

56 Cf. O. Custer, L’exemple de Kant. Fonctions et enjeux de l’exemple dans l’œuvre kantienne, 123. Nolan suggests that there is the heterogeneity between categories and intuition, and the incongruence between empirical and mathematical concepts and intuition. Another example mentioned by Kant is the concept of dog. The empirical concept is not an image; it is immediately related to the schema of the imagination that enables the determination of the intuition. The concept ‘dog’ is not a pure concept, with the result that the concept means its own schema or rule for determination. As Nolan points out, Kant does not explicitly say that an empirical concept is its schema, but that it immediately means its schema (cf. J.P. Nolan, ‘Kant on Meaning: Two Studies’, 129n). In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant says that intuitions are always required to verify the reality of concepts. In the case of empirical concepts, these can be called examples, but in the case of pure concepts of understanding, Kant calls them schemata (cf. KU, §59, 351/225). Besides these empirical concepts, Kant also uses the concept of a triangle. He argues that an image of a triangle should not be confused with the concept of a triangle, for an image will never be as general as a concept. “The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with respect to pure shapes in space.” (KRV, A141/B180)
the same time underscores Kant’s actual problem, namely, where to find a third term when it concerns pure concepts? Since the Kritik der reinen Vernunft begins with the certainty that there are synthetic a priori judgments, namely those found in mathematics and natural sciences, these examples are not Kant’s real problem here. Both the sciences and mathematics have proven to Kant the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments; however, they are not able to solve the philosophical problem, namely the possibility of empirical cognition or experience as such. The question for the conditions of possibilities, and, therefore, for the possibilities as such of each faculty is put forward in transcendental logic.

Although heterogeneous, both intuition and understanding are related to each other with regard to time, i.e., in a “transcendental time determination [Zeitbestimmung]” that is homogenous with a category. For Kant, all objects of the outer senses are spatial. Space is in this respect only the form of the outer senses, and, as we have seen, time is the form of the inner sense. Allison says of this distinction: “[…] ‘Outside us’ clearly means external to or distinct from ourselves and our states; while the fact that such objects are also represented as in space is viewed as a specific feature of our outer experience. Similarly, by ‘inner sense’ is meant a sense through which one becomes perceptually aware of the self and its inner states.” But whether the appearances are given through the outer or inner senses, ultimately they will all belong to the inner senses as “modifications of the mind [Modificationen des Gemüths]”, and “as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal conditions of the inner sense, namely time” (KRV, A99). Kant points out that everything that follows will have to be grounded on this “general remark”. Time only determines the relations of the objects in our inner sense, and, therefore, everything appears in time-relations. Looking back at the Transcendental Aesthetic, we realize now more clearly that what Kant tried to formulate is not a division between the sensible and the intelligible, but that between the pure forms of intuition (space and time). “If it is thus conceded that one must go beyond a given concept in order to compare it synthetically with another, then a third thing [ein Drittes] is necessary in which alone the synthesis of the two concepts can originate. But now what is this third thing, as the medium of all synthetic judgments? There is only one totality [Inbegriff] in which all of our representations are contained, namely inner sense and its a priori form, time.” (KRV, A155/B194) Attributing a predicate to a subject – assuming the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject – needs this third term; hence, temporal conditions in general are at the basis of all synthetic a priori judgments. To give the categories content, i.e., meaning, implies that temporal correlates have to be found for them.

Halfway through the chapter on the schematism, Kant writes: “Rather than pausing now for a dry and boring analysis of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure concepts of the understanding in general, we would rather present them according to the order of the categories and in connection [Verknüpfung] with these.” (KRV, A142/B181) Kant proceeds by showing the different schemata for each category, but the excuse for not

57 Guyer writes: “In fact, Kant does not think that there is any real problem about the application of concepts in the case of two main classes of concepts which we ordinarily employ […]. From Kant’s point of view, there is a real problem about schematism […].” Walsh, Nolan, and Guyer rightly argue that for Kant the problem in the chapter on the schematism does not involve the application of empirical concepts or mathematical concepts, but solely that of categories (cf. P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 159; W.H. Walsh, ‘Schematism’, 99; J.P. Nolan, ‘Kant on Meaning: Two Studies’, 128).
58 H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 100.
59 Time can be represented by using analogies, that is, by presenting for instance a line as an “image [typus]” of the concept of time itself. “Thus, space is also applied as an image to the concept of time itself, representing it by a line and its limits (moments) by points.” (DISS, 405/399) In his Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, Kant uses the word ‘analogy’ to say something similar: “[T]he geometer represents stellt… vor time by a line, although time and space only agree with each other in their relations; they thus, presumably, only agree with each other analogically, never qualitatively.” (TG, 339/326; cf. KRV, A33/B50)
analyzing what is “required for the transcendental schemata” has twice been that it would be “dry and boring”. It is, therefore, no surprise that so many philosophers (like Hegel and Schopenhauer) complained about the obscurity of this important chapter, for it remains unclear how the schema as the third guarantees subsumption. And yet, we should not forget that for Kant, the problem remains transcendental and not empirical, indicating that an empirical description of the schematism is superfluous for the *Kritik*. After interrupting his analysis Kant stoically continues by declaring that a category falls under one of the different headings – quantity, quality, relation and modality – on the basis of which Kant divides the transcendental or *a priori* time-determinations into the time-series, the time-content, the time-order and the scope of time:

1) Kant starts with the schema of the categories of quantity; their schema is *number*, which is “a representation of which comprises the successive addition of homogeneous units” (KRV, A142/B182).

2) Next, Kant turns to the categories of quality. Reality and negation are concepts that refer to the being or non-being of an object in time. Here, we see the time-content. For Kant, there is a continuity of quantity all the way down to nothingness (negation); hence, there is continuity from reality to negation. Kant then concludes that “the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform production of that reality in time” (KRV, A143/B183). The category of limitation is not mentioned.

3) Thirdly, Kant deals with relation. “The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time” (KRV, A144/B183). Time itself does not have duration or does not change; only what happens in time can change. The schema of causality is the real that is succeeded by something else according to a rule. The schema of community or reciprocity is the coexistence according to a universal law.

4) Finally, the schemata for the three modal categories (possibility, actuality, necessity) are treated briefly: “The schema of the possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general”; “the schema of actuality is the existence in some determined time”; “the schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times” (KRV, A144/B184).

Kant has briefly discussed most of the schemata, where a “schema is a transcendental product of the imagination that concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to the conditions of its form, namely, time, in respect to all representations, insofar as these representations must be conjoined *a priori* in one concept, conformably to the unity of apperception” (KRV, A142/B181). The schemata as mediating third terms express the form as found in intuition in accordance to the rules formulated in categories. Without the schemata, the categories would only have a logical meaning and be merely functions of understanding without representing an object; for instance, without the sensible determination of substance as permanence, substance could not be thought as a predicate of something, but solely as a subject. The schemata limit the categories by relating them to intuition; only this way can a category be a representation of objects.60

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60 Why is the schematism considered an *art* (Kunst)? The first thing that should be noted is that, although sensibility is characterized by its receptivity, the power of the transcendental imagination – which is situated on the side of sensibility – is spontaneous. Hence, the ‘artistic’ feature of the schematism seems to indicate that the schematism is an activity, either aesthetic or technical. In his ‘Economimesis’, Derrida specifies this ‘artistic’ feature: “Imagination of course is the locus of schematism and the name of that art which is concealed in the depths of the human soul, but here [in Kant’s conception of the genius and the poet as the genius par excellence, JvG] we can better understand why this art should be ‘speech’ and why it is ‘poetic’ par excellence.” (EC, 18/82; cf. J.-L. Nancy, *Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus*, 108.) Cf. R. Gasché, *The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics*, 217-218: “By following Kant’s terminology in the *Anthropology*, we learn that such shaping of the formative power (Bildung) of Einbildungskraft of the mental faculties is *Dichtung*, that is, poetry.
Even though Heidegger will emphasize that Kant’s schematism is an analysis of the finitude of \( \text{Dasein} \), it is in the discussion on the \( \text{noumena} \) that the first steps are made to actually explore the limits of this finitude themselves by touching upon the question whether the thing-in-itself (\( \text{noumenon} \)) can be known and is of any interest to reason. Added to this, surprisingly, Kant does not introduce Chapter 3 (on the \( \text{noumena} \)) or the Appendix on the Amphiboly in the introduction of the Analytic of Principles as if their discussions touch upon the margins of the discussion on the conditions of possibility for all synthetic \( \text{a priori} \) judgments. Kant’s “final conclusion” in Chapter 2 on the Systematic Representation of All Synthetic Principles (i.e., the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Analogies of Experience, and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General) is that all synthetic \( \text{a priori} \) propositions are only related to (the possibility of) experience (KRV, B294). However, the discussion this far on the limits of cognition will be reversed and reflected upon as soon as Kant introduces the \( \text{noumena} \) in Chapter 3. Instead of investigating, what might be called, the internal limits, Kant examines the limits set by the \( \text{noumena} \) that will be thought “under the name of an unknown something [\text{unbekannten Etwas}]”. Understanding is, then, not restricted or limited by sensibility when it acquires a “negative expansion”, but immediately sets boundaries for itself (\( \text{er setzt sich...sofort selbst Grenzen} \)) when it does not cognize the \( \text{noumena} \) through categories (KRV, A256/B312). However, there is always, according to Kant, the danger and temptation of getting involved in illusions. He presents this in the image of the wild and stormy ocean (“the true seat of illusion”) that attracts the seaman who, thereby, is more or less forced to leave the safe shores of his island, the “land of truth” (representing the well-defined field of experience). One soon notices that the “voyager looking around for new discoveries [\text{auf Entdeckungen herumschwärmenden Seefahrer}]” (KRV, A236/B295) is an image representing the threat of \text{Schwärmerei}. Instead of beginning with the assurance that there are synthetic \( \text{a priori} \) judgments, because there is mathematics and science, the question now seems to become: what if there is also \text{Schwärmerei}? How will we judge or decide? Even though Kant again emphasizes in Chapter 3 the role of the “pure schema for possible experience”, he soon concludes that when understanding is solely used empirically, it will never be able “to determine the limits of its use [\text{die Grenzen seines Gebrauchs}]” (KRV, A237-238/BB296-297). This sketches the relevance of the notion of the \( \text{noumena} \) to which we will return later when discussing the determination of the limits (Grenzen).\(^61\)

\(^{61}\)Concepts “without intuitions” are representations that cannot be related to any object of experience (KRV, A258/B314). If one were to gain knowledge purely from analytical judgments, Kant will point out that understanding will not get far when it limits itself to what is merely contained in the concept. Hence, he writes, referring to the necessity of mediation: “Now I ask you where he gets these synthetic judgments from when the concepts do not have to count for possible experience, but for things-in-themselves (\text{noumena})? Where is here the third [\text{Wo ist hier das Dritte}] […]?” (KRV, A259/B315) Both (the early) Hegel and Heidegger will emphasize that the third between intuition and understanding in Kant, i.e., the transcendental schematism, is not an additional act, but, rather, an original unity or synthesis. But Kant is now concerned with the question of the third between concepts and \( \text{noumena} \). We notice that the third is maybe first of all a place (“\text{Wo...?}”) for a synthesis. However, where is this place of synthesis, the third like the schematism? The \text{noumenon}, however, is best thought of as a \text{Grenzbegriff} or a problematic concept; the space outside the domain of sensibility is empty for us. Understanding becomes problematic (\text{problematisch}) when it tries to reach outside the domain delimited by sensibility (i.e., time and space). The limits of general logic reveal the inability of pure concepts to have any meaning on themselves, so that Chapter 3, not surprisingly, ends with the conclusion – although it will be
§7. Analogy and Symbol

Kant presents in his Prolegomena a conclusion (Beschluss) in which he tries to find the determination of the boundary (Grenzbestimmung) of pure reason (PROL, §§57-60). Already in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant pointed out that this determination can only take place in accordance with a priori grounds by way of a critical investigation of pure reason (cf. KRV, A758/B786), and the “greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason” is merely “negative” when it speaks with a “silent merit of guarding against errors” (KRV, A795/B823). Even though theoretical reason cannot know what is beyond experience, there is a positive side to this inability and humiliation of human reason, for reason “has a presentiment of objects of great interests to it. It takes the path of speculation in order to come closer to these; but they flee before it. Presumably it may hope for better luck on the only path that still remains to it, namely that of its practical use.” (KRV, A796/B834) When we realize what is at stake here for Kant, it is clear why the Prolegomena ends with a ‘Conclusion on Determining the Boundaries of Pure Reason [Beschluss von der Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft]’. Cognition is only possible within the domain of experience where concepts are solely related to what presents itself as appearance and not as a thing-in-itself. Mathematics and natural sciences solely move within this field so that the progress of their investigations is rightly thought to be infinite. However, the progress and rapprochement to these sciences is not continuous insofar as they are not concerned with the innerness of things, for this does not appear; there is a “point or line of contact, as it were [gleichsam ein Punkt oder Linie der Berührung]” (PROL, 353/142). They are never concerned with metaphysical questions or concepts, at least, they do not need to pose metaphysical questions or use the concepts of, for instance, morality. Mathematics and natural sciences do not have an interest in it, for, Kant argues, they only have a theoretical interest with regard to appearances. The Grenzbestimmung as the metaphysical task is, therefore, not reducible to or identifiable with a mathematical or purely scientific discourse, for “metaphysics, in the dialectical endeavors of pure reason (which are not initiated arbitrary or wantonly, but toward which the nature of reason itself drives), does lead us to the boundaries [Grenzen]” (PROL, 353/143). Kant subsequently mentions the transcendental Ideas as already dealt with in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, to which he adds that these are necessary for indicating the limits (Grenzen) of the use of pure reason and the way of determining these limits; this “is the end [Zweck] and use [Nutzen] of this natural predisposition [Naturanlage] of our reason” whose favorite child (Lieblingskind) is metaphysics and whose procreation or generation (Erzeugung) is caused by a well organized seed (Keim). Metaphysics is, as Bennington points out, “more natural” to us than any other science.62

Kant points out in his Prolegomena that there is the thorny danger (i.e., something verfänglich) and a temptation (Anlockung) to use the concepts of understanding in a transcendent manner. Understanding, apparently, does not have an internal restraint, and, as we have seen, the forms of intuition define its jurisdiction. When the concepts are used independently of any sensible determinations, then reason is seduced to reach beyond every experience, as if the objects that they determine transcend experience as things-in-themselves. However, as Kant wishes to show, even though it seems to be conflicting (streitend), there is both the prohibition (Verbot) to make these transcendent judgments and the injunction (Gebot) to proceed to concepts that transcend (hinausgehen) the realm of the empirical use; this prohibition and injunction are connected (verknüpfen), “but only directly on the boundary [Grenze] of all permitted use of reason” (PROL, 356/146). There is, then, both an internal limit set for experience, which determines that there is no cognition possible beyond this supplemented with an Appendix on the Amphiboly – that a concept of intelligible objects “lacks all principles for its application” (KRV, A259/B315).

limit, and an external delimitation by *noumena*. Neither mathematics nor the natural sciences show any interest in things-in-themselves for the progression of these investigations and knowledge. However, reason holds itself at this limit, or better, in the undecided field between the inner and outer limit. The objects of its concepts (Ideas) only exist at the boundary (*auf der Grenze*) of all use of reason, for this limit belongs as much to the field of experience as to that of the beings of thought (*Gedankenwesen*). When discussing the difference between *Grenzen* and *Schranken* Kant points out that the former frontier presupposes a space outside determined space for which Kant gives the example of an extended being that presupposes a space outside itself, beyond the space that it encloses, while the latter is merely the “negation” of a size or magnitude (*Grösse*).63 “Our reason, however, sees around itself as it were a space for the cognition of things in themselves, although it can never have determinate concepts of those things and is delimited to appearances alone [*nur auf Erscheinungen eingeschränkt ist*].” (PROL, 352/142) The *Schranken* determine here the contingent limits of our cognition as actually incomplete, for they possess no “absolute completeness”. The mentioned space without *Grenzen* or *Schranken*, this empty space of the transcendental Ideas held in reserve for thing-in-themselves is the field of metaphysics, and, as Kant will try to show, the use of these Ideas is different from that of the categories.

What is at stake in distinguishing *Grenzen* from *Schranken* – a distinction, as we will see, that is merely analogical or imaginative – becomes clear when we notice the transformation of the limit as the negation into a place of contact (like a point, line or surface, or perhaps even like the skin), as something negative into something positive. When the *Schranken* of pure reason are set (or determined) beyond the point where there is no cognition possible, i.e., when the field of experience is determined, there is still the temptation (*Anlockung*) to cross the borders. Kant concludes that we “noted limits of reason with respect to all cognition of mere beings of thought [*blossen Gedankenwesen*]; now, since the transcendental Ideas nevertheless make the progression [*Fortgang*] up to these limits necessary for us, and have therefore led us, as it were, up to the contiguity [*Berührung*] of the filled space (of experience) with empty space (of which we can know nothing – the *noumena*), we can also determine the boundaries [*Grenzen*] of pure reason; for in all boundaries [*in allen Grenzen*] there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of corporeal space, yet is nonetheless itself a space; a line is a space, which is the boundary of a surface; a point is the boundary of a line, yet is nonetheless a locus in space), whereas limits [*Schranken*] contain mere negations.” (PROL, 354/143-144) The temptation to go beyond the *Schranken* transforms a limit into a *Grenze* as the point, line or surface of contact with an unknown and empty space as if this boundary were its skin. Therefore, as the Ideas indicate, reason holds itself at the limit when it is both seduced to cross the border and forbidden to do so. As we know, this is not a continual progress and approach that can only be thought by categories and their schematization as degree insomuch as “the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of that quantity in time [*kontinuirliche und gleichförmige Erzeugung derselben in der Zeit*], as one descends in time from the sensation that has a certain degree [*die einen gewissen Grad hat*] to its disappearance or gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude” (KRV,

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63 As one of the (mathematical) categories, limitation (*Limitation, Einschränkung*) is “nothing other than reality combined with negation” (KRV, B111). Mathematical categories are “concerned with objects of intuition (pure as well as empirical)”, while the dynamical ones (i.e., categories of relation and modality) are “directed at the existence [*Existenz*] of these objects (either in relation to each other or to the understanding)” (KRV, B110). Reality as the first mathematical category under the heading of quality corresponds to sensation (*Empfindung*) in general indicating “a being (in time)”, while negation is the “concept of which represents a non-being (in time)”; “every sensation has a degree or magnitude through which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an object, until it ceases in nothingness (= 0 = negation)” (KRV, A143/B182).
Rather, it is a disrupted, interrupted, indirect progress and approach whose rupture is indicated by something like a point or line of contact, i.e., a Grenze. Reason holds itself at this limit, by doubling the limit, saying that the limit is delimited from the inside as well as from the outside. It merely speaks of a limit, but presents this limit as a Grenze so that reason says of this limit that it has (perhaps) an empty space beyond it. Nevertheless, the only way to speak here, to make a judgment about the objects of the transcendental Ideas, is by way of an analogy, that is by way of an “as if [als ob]” Without reducing the field of pure reason to that of an experience, the “as if” works by way of an analogy in which the attribution of an ontological predicate (for instance, by saying that God is eternal or almighty) does not lead to any knowledge or determination. This limit as the point of contact, as a Grenze, is the proper place of reason, but, as we will see, this place can never be determined or identified as such. The initial distinction between Grenze and Schranke will later turn out to be more complicated when the Grenze is nothing else than an image of Schranken. At the limit, one can only act or say “as if”, so that what the transcendental Idea designates – if there is indeed any designation here – is supposedly (symbolically, analogically) the border as a Grenze.

The imagination is the synthesizing power between two (other) sources of cognition, which makes it possible for the pure concepts to go beyond themselves to something completely different (i.e., intuition) by attributing in a synthetic judgment a predicate that is “something entirely different [etwas ganz anderes] from that which I think in the mere concept” (KRV, B11). However, Kant explicitly discerns schematization from symbolization: “For the experience […] knowledge contains the schematism, either the real schematism (transcendental), or the schematism by analogy (symbolic). The objective reality of the category is theoretical, the objective reality of the Idea is only practical. – Nature and freedom.” (WWF, 332/412) In his Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant distinguishes two kinds of hypotyposis, namely the schematic and the symbolic, and subsequently defines the hypotyposis as a sensibilization (Versinnlichung) and a presentation (Darstellung, exhibitio, subiectio sub adspectum. The Greek ‘hypotyposis’ was usually translated in Latin as repraesentatio in which the ‘re-’ does not designate a repetition but an intensification. Gasché writes about the history of this concept: “In short, as a rhetorical notion, hypotyposis means an illustration in which the vividly represented is endowed with such detail that it seems to be present, and to present itself, in person and completely by itself.”64 This rhetorical notion would not have been so interesting if Kant did not dismiss rhetorics in his presentation of the hierarchy of Fine Arts where he writes about his appreciation of the poetic play of the imagination and his disapproval of all rhetorical deception. Following Gasché, we should ask ourselves why Kant uses this concept of hypotyposis when he writes about (re-)presentation in general. Does Kant still give the same rhetorical meaning to this concept or did he find a new and original use for it? The recourse to the analogy (ana-logos) that reason has when it places itself at the border, or when it finds its proper place at the limit, will be to language (Sprache), to logos (cf. PROL, 357/146; EC, 82/17-18).65 However, Kant eventually tells us that the Grenze he has been speaking about is perhaps only an image or metaphor (Sinnbild) of Schranken (PROL, 360/149), as if he realized that the delimitation of experience and of the field for schematization will be possible by way of having recourse to reason, to thinking, or more specifically, to language, and by way of an analogy, an analogy of the analogy.

The schematic hypotyposis is the place “where to a concept grasped by the understanding [den der Verstand fast] the corresponding intuition is given a priori” (KU, §59, 351/225). Contrary to this direct, demonstrative, schematic presentation, the symbolic

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presentation is characterized as indirect and analogous.\textsuperscript{66} Kant points out the similarity between understanding and reason: just as sensibility is the object of understanding, understanding is the object of reason. Reason will have to systemize the manifold actions of understanding, just as understanding has to conceptualize the manifold given in intuition. As we have seen, the concepts of understanding without the schemata are indeterminate (\textit{unbestimmt}). “Yet although no schema can be found in \textit{intuition} for the thoroughgoing systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogue of such a schema can and must be given, which is the idea of the \textit{maximum} of division and unification of the understanding’s cognition in one principle.” (KRV, A665/B693) The difference between the schemata and this \textit{analogon} of schemata is that the ‘schemata’ of reason do not lead to cognition, but solely to a rule or principle for the systematic unity of understanding. This principle is not a constitutive principle – which would imply that the \textit{analogon} does lead to an increase of cognition – but, rather, a regulative principle.

Due to this ‘schematization’ of transcendental Ideas, categories can be applied to them. This is only possible when the application of the categories is a relative assumption (\textit{suppositio relative}) – and not an absolute assumption (\textit{suppositio absoluta}) – with regard to the world of the senses. Reason has to think a systematic unity by giving its Idea an object, although this object cannot be one of experience. It is not assumed absolutely and in itself as something actual, “but is rather taken as a ground only problematically (because we cannot reach it through any concepts of the understanding), so as to regard all the connection of things in the world of sense \textit{as if} they had their ground in this being of reason” (KRV, A681/B709). At the same time, Kant emphasizes that, because one should not take the Idea to be a presupposition of something actual, “one leaves it entirely open what sort of constitution in itself this ground, which eludes our concepts, might have [...]}; in a word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle through which reason, as far as it can, extends systematic unity over all experience” (KRV, A681-682/B709-710). One has to guard oneself (\textit{man sich…hütet}) here from holding it something different than an Idea, for the properties could rest on a different ground, and it will prevent us from any “windy hypotheses [\textit{windige Hypothesen}]”. In other words, by using the categories, the object of such an Idea, such as ‘I myself’ as thinking nature (soul), can be presented with “a schema just \textit{as if} it were an actual being – indeed, it can be effected only and solely in this way. The psychological Idea can also signify nothing other than the schema of a regulative concept.” I cannot apply the categories “except insofar as its schema is given in sensible intuition. By this means, however, I will never attain a systematic unity of all the appearances of inner sense.” With regard to the second Idea, that of the world in general, we have (\textit{sollen}) to proceed \textit{as if} the series were in itself infinite, i.e., proceed \textit{in definitum}, but where reason itself is considered as the determining cause (in the case of freedom), hence in the case of practical principles, we should proceed as \textit{as if} we did not have before us an object of sense but one of pure understanding, where the conditions can no longer be posited in the series of appearances, but are posited outside it, and the series of states can be regarded \textit{as if} it began absolutely (through an intelligible cause)”; and in this way, it is clear that the Idea of God “means nothing more than that reason bids us consider every connection in the world according to principles of a systematic unity, hence \textit{as if} they had all arisen from one single all-encompassing being, as supreme and all-sufficient cause” (KRV, A684/B712; A685/B713; A686/B714). The categories are here not used to cognize the object of these Ideas; rather, they are employed in order to have a better insight in their (indirect) relation to intuition.

The discussion of the last Idea (God) is not arbitrary, for it allows Kant to introduce the analogy. We know nothing of a merely intelligible object, although “the existence of

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. F. Marty, \textit{La naissance de la métaphysique chez Kant. Une étude sur la notion kantienne d’analogie}, 344.
appearances, not grounded in the least within itself but always conditioned, demands that we look around us for something different from all appearances, hence for an intelligible object, with which this contingency would stop. But if we once take the liberty of assuming a reality subsisting by itself outside the entire field of sensibility, then appearances are regarded only as contingent ways intelligible objects are represented by beings who are themselves intelligences; and because of this, nothing is left for us but the analogy by which we utilize concepts of experience in making some sort of concept of intelligible things.” We have to gain access to these objects from pure concepts of things in general, and thus “the first step we take beyond the sensible world compels us, in acquiring new knowledge, to begin with the investigation of the absolutely necessary being” (KRV, 566-567/B594-595). The analogy expressed in the words “as if” wishes to uncover a pure relation by working analogous to the transcendental deduction of the categories in the hope to find a similar (or analogous) objective reality of the concepts of reason, just as that was found of the concepts of understanding in the transcendental deduction. However, the “as if” seems to give in to the impossibility or illegitimacy of doing precisely this: transgress the limits of experience. The analogical representation is not a schematization; cognition of the supersensible is not possible, since the pure concepts of understanding can only yield to cognition when applied to, and restricted by, pure intuition. As we will see, for Kant, Swedenborg’s *Schwärmerei* consists in the uncritical use of categories on objects that cannot be presented in intuition. Instead,

we attribute those properties [i.e., the properties of a supreme being, JvG], nonetheless, to the relation of this being to the world, and allow ourselves a *symbolic* anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only language, and not the object itself [*der in der That nur die Sprache und nicht das Object selbst angeht*]. If I say that we are compelled to look upon the world as if it were the work of a supreme understanding and will, I actually say nothing more than: just as a watch, a ship, and a regiment are related to an artisan [*Künstler*], a builder, and a commander, the sensible world (or everything that makes up the basis of this sum total of appearances) is related to the unknown – which I do not hereby cognize according to what it is in itself, but only according to what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part. (PROL, 357/146)

When we attribute a predicate to the concept of God, which has only meaning in relation to the sensible world, we should prevent ourselves from a *dogmatic* anthropomorphism, and realize, or better, say (*nur die Sprache*) that it is (merely) an analogy. As long as we say that it is impossible to know a supersensible thing in itself, nothing prevents us from using the categories when talking about the objects of the Ideas, since we then realize that no empirical object corresponds to these concepts.67

Reason has to speak by way of analogy – that is, reason says “as if” – in which it expresses the relation of different spaces, although space seems itself already too much an analogy, even when Kant speaks of the full space of experience and the empty space of the *noumena*. Reason speaks here – i.e., when or where it recognizes its limit that is doubled as if reason hovers between an inner and an outer limit – by way of this analogy, in a certain idiom

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67 However, saying is perhaps not always enough, for in the practical realm one will have to incorporate this analogy when following one of the definitions or prescriptions of the categorical imperative: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (GMS, 421/73). As Lyotard indicates, the ‘so, dass […]’ used by Kant in other formulations of the categorical imperative (GMS, 402/57, 440/89; KPV, 30/164; MS, 389/520) should first of all be considered an ‘als ob’, for the universality of the law cannot be directly found in the maxims of actions. This is more explicitly expressed in the ‘als ob’ than in ‘handle so, dass’ (cf. J.-F. Lyotard, *Le différend*, 182; A. van Roojen and J. van Gorkom, ‘De legitimatie van het ’alsof’. De ‘marginale’ discussie tussen Lyotard en Nancy’).
(“als ob”), in order to, as Bennington concludes, “avoid every objective transgression of the limit by permitting reason to find itself again different than understanding [autre que l’entendement]. In the analogy, reason recognizes itself at the limit.”68 Contrary to the schematization as the condition of possibility for experiencing relations between objects, the analogy represents a relation between relations, that is, a relation of concepts, and the analogy presents a relation of relations when the concepts are categories. An analogy is not an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect resemblance of two relations between entirely different objects. In the Prolegomena this is explained in the analogy between the relation of prosperity of mankind and the unknown God on the one hand, and that of the promotion of the happiness of the children and the parental love on the other. The analogy does not compare two things, but shows an equality of relations. This is what Kant wanted to say when he wrote on the analogon of the schema: there is a perfect similarity between the relation between sensibility and understanding and the relation between understanding and reason. The rule expressed in a category determines a relation, and when used in an analogy for another relation, this pure concept of a relation becomes the tool with which reason is able to situate itself at the limit, for here, in the analogy, reason says of itself that it has determined the limit of knowledge. Here, reason presents an analogy of relations, a relation of relations, of pure relations,69 and reason places itself at the limit by adopting the “as if”.

However, when the Grenze might simply be a Sinnbild for firmly posing (festzusetzen) borders (Schranken), there is no way of telling that the Grenze, which Kant initially tried to distinguish from the (negativity of) Schranken, is indeed a determination of a limit (Grenzbestimmung).70 There is always the danger of mixing the limits. When Kant tries to explain the revision of the opposition between Grenze and Schranke he points out that experience never delimits itself (begrenzt sich nicht selbst), for it merely goes from something conditioned to something that is as well conditioned. This progression can go on ad infinitum, and what ought to (soll) delimit (begrenzen) this field has to (müß) lie completely outside this field, “and this is the field of pure intelligible beings [Verstandeswesen]. For us, however, as far as concerns the determination of the nature of these intelligible beings, this is an empty space.” (PROL, 360-361/149) Here, Kant calls this delimitation or restriction of reason “real, positive cognition [wirkliche positive Erkenntnis]”, for a Grenze is something positive that “belongs as much to what is within it as to the space lying outside a given totality [Inbegriff]” – indicating the empty space of noumena —, and, furthermore, for it either contributes and participates by restricting reason or because reason restricts itself to these limits. It can reach

68 G. Bennington, ‘De la fiction transcendentale’, 156.
69 Idem, 157-158.
70 At the end of the Grundlegung Kant wishes to formulate the “Extreme Boundary of All Practical Philosophy”, “as if I tried to fathom [als ob ich zu ergründen suchte] how freedom itself as the causality of a will is possible” (GMS, 461/107). Kant’s reasoning seems similar to that of the Prolegomena, for here again Kant demands us to situate ourselves – or at least reason, but, then, in a practical investigation instead of a purely theoretical one – on the limit (Grenze) so that reason does neither fall back into the realm of the sensible world, nor does it powerlessly or impotently (kraftlos) “flap its wings without moving from the spot in the space, which is empty for it, of transcendent concepts called the intelligible world, and so lose itself among phantoms [damit sie auch nicht in dem für sie leeren Raum transcendentender Begriffe unter dem Namen der intelligibelen Welt kraftlos ihre Flügel schwingen, ohne von der Stelle zu kommen, und sich unter Hirngespinsten verliere]” (GMS, 462/107). Although all our knowledge stops at these limits, the concept of this intelligible world or “die Idee einer reinen Verstandeswelt” seems useful for a “vernünftigen Glauben”. Here, we have to take care of the maxims of freedom “as if they were laws of nature” (GMS, 463/108). We should not forget that, as both Perreijn (in discussion with Henrich, Kaulbach, Schmucker and Allison) and Rogozinski indicate, the deduction of the concept of freedom, in which autonomy (and not the imagination) will have to be the “third” between the law and freedom, is in the end unable to give the objective legitimacy of this concept like (i.e., analogous to) the transcendental deduction of the first Kritik (cf. W. Perreijn, Kants ethiek tussen ervaring en a priori, 257-272; J. Rogozinski, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’énigme de l’éthique, 71-102).
for this ‘beyond’, but there is no determination possible except of the limitation or setting of
the boundary (Begrenzung) of the field of experience when reason restricts or circumscribes
itself (sich einschränken) to “the relation of what lies outside the boundary to what is
contained within” (PROL, 361/150). The real and positive knowledge of the limits also
implies that reason restricts itself to a relation of which one can only speak by way of
analogy, even though every limit on which reason says it holds itself is perhaps merely a
Sinnbild of the place of analogy, herewith annulling the certainty that the place occupied by
reason is indeed a Grenze and not simply a Schranke.

It is not clear yet what Kant means by symbol, but as Kang rightly points out, “Kant’s
idea of analogy obtains more concrete content in his theory of symbols.”
Kant returns to the
problem of symbolization in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, where it is the faculty of judgment
(Urteilskraft) from which these symbols originate. This is not without interest, for analogous
to the schemata produced by the imagination, it is judgment that creates these symbols. We
will have to come back to this, for the apparent division of judgment and imagination is not
easily made. Kant explicitly tries to dissociate the functions of the imagination and that of
the judgment when writing about the symbol. In the third Kritik, Kant wishes to show that beauty
is a symbol of morality (Sittlichkeit), to which we will briefly return in Chapter 3 (§5.1 and
§5.2). Furthermore, Kant argues that all our knowledge of God is symbolic, for every symbol is,
according to Kant, a substitute for a supersensible object, and those who receive their
authority as it were from God will have to be approached in such a way (cf. MS, 319/462).
The symbolic, analogous presentation is further exemplified: the inspired, living body
(beseelter Körper) can be a symbol for the monarchic state, when it is governed by an inner
constitution; the hand mill (or any other machine (Maschine)) can be used as a symbol for the
dеспотic state, for both are governed by an individual absolute will. Kant adds that there are
many other such words in language that are not schematic but symbolic, such as “ground”
(Grund), “depend” (abhangen), “flow from” (woraus fliessen), or “substance” (Substanz). In
these symbols, as in the analogies presented above, the form of the relation is translated or
transposed, and not the objects of the relations themselves. In this process of symbolization,
the faculty of judgment performs a double function (ein doppeltes Geschäft), which also
explains why Kant speaks of an indirect presentation: first it has to apply the concept to the
object of intuition, and secondly, it has to apply the rule of its reflection upon this object to
another concept of which the former is the symbol. First, judgment has to determine the object
of intuition by applying concepts to it according to the procedure of schematization, and,
secondly, after this determination, this object can be used in a process of reflection as a
symbol. However, Kant does not make clear how this reflection is possible when he writes
that “this is not the place to dwell on it” (KU, §59, 352/226).

Nevertheless, Kant will make an effort to analyze the real differences between the
schematic and the symbolic hypotyposis. In his text on Kant’s use of the notion ‘hypotyposis’,
Gasché writes: “Hypotyposis, indeed, as a term perfectly describes the presentation of […]
precognitive figures as ‘type’ (typoi), that is, as impressions (in a seal), hollow moulds, or
engravings that provide the general outline, the prescribed form, the model for any particular
(cognitive and practical) realization.”

A representation is either schematic or symbolic, and Kant’s critical project is set out to distinguish the two forms of representation. However, a similarity or analogy is still presupposed or, as Kant says, it is “unterlegt”, as if there is, to use
De Man’s interpretation, “an ‘underlying’ similarity created between the symbol and the thing

71 Y.A. Kang, Schema and Symbol, 143.
72 Cf. M. Moors, “‘All Authority is from God’. An Aspect of Kant’s Theologico-Political Legacy’.
A symbolic representation is not considered to be the represented as it is in itself, but that which is symbolized (the enlightened state) functions like what is actually perceived (an organic body). They express “concepts not by means of a direct intuition, but only in accordance with an analogy with one, i.e., transportation of the reflection [der Übertragung der Reflexion] on one object of intuition to another, quite different concept [auf einen ganz andern Begriff], to which perhaps [vielleicht] no intuition could ever directly correspond.” (KU, §59, 352-353/226-227) Why does Kant here write ‘perhaps’? It disrupts Kant’s earlier certainty of the decision that is made about the distinction between schemata and symbols? As De Man writes: “The appearance of the word ‘perhaps’ in this sentence […] is most surprising. It has been the point of the entire argument that we know for certain whether a representation directly corresponds to a given concept or not. But the ‘perhaps’ raises the question of how such a decision can be made, whether it is in the nature of things or whether it is merely assumed (unterlegt).”76 As soon as Kant wishes to formulate the rigor of a distinction he uses “the elements of indetermination”.77 Because of their reappearance in this context, the rigor and certainty that Kant hopes to find becomes problematic. De Man concludes from this that “the sentence, which emphasizes that the decision as to whether a representation can be adequate to its object is of the order of the ‘perhaps,’ is more rigorous than the either/or distinction [this “either/or distinction” refers to Kant’s phrase “entweder Schemata oder Symbole”, JvG], despite, or rather because, of its vagueness. […] Not only our knowledge of God, to which the passage under examination returns at the end, but the knowledge of knowledge is then bound to remain symbolic. He who takes it for schematic and gives it the attributes of predictability and transcendental authority that pertain to the objective reality of entities unmediated by language is guilty of reification […] and he who thinks that the symbolic can be considered a stable property of language, that language, in other words, is purely symbolic and nothing else, is guilty of aestheticism [...].”78

§8. Imagination and the Transcendental Illusion

Kant ascribes to judgment the mediating function between reason and understanding, which enables the passage (Übergang) to reason. Kant’s first introduction to the Kritik der Urteilskraft describes judgment as the “intermediary [Mitteglied] between understanding and reason” (KU, Vorrede, 168/56).79 However, this mediation seems to result in certain illusions, as Kant formulates in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft when he distinguishes the empirical illusion from the transcendental illusion: the former, such as an optical illusion, concerns the illusion “through which the faculty of judgment is misled through the influence of imagination [Einbildung]”. The Transcendental Dialectic, then, has to do with transcendental illusion, “which influences principles” and, “contrary to all the warnings of criticism, carries us away beyond the empirical use of the categories and holds out to us the semblance of extending the pure understanding [Blendwerke einer Erweiterung des reinen Verstandes]” (KRV, A295/B352), that is, this Dialectic “will […] content itself with uncovering the illusion in transcendental judgments, while at the same time protecting us from being deceived by it; but it can never bring it about that transcendental illusion (like logical illusion) should even disappear and cease to be an illusion” (KRV, A297-298/B354).

75 P. de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 46.
76 Idem, 47.
77 Idem, 48.
78 Ibid.
79 In terms of the syllogism, Kant formulates this as follows: “In every syllogism [In jedem Vernunftschlusse] I first think a rule (the major) through the understanding. Next, I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (the minor) by means of the power of judgment. Finally, I determine my cognition through the predicate of the rule (conclusio), hence a priori through reason.” (KRV, A304/B360-361.)
To conclude this chapter, we will take a closer look at this distinction between the productivity of the imagination and this transcendental illusion.

As noted, the relation between sensibility and reason can only be that of an analogy; in his *Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* when dealing with the capacity to designate (Bezeichnungsvermögen, facultas signatrix), Kant once more refers to the possibility of symbolic representation. Here he writes: “Symbols are merely means that understanding uses to provide the concept with meaning through the presentation of an object for it. But they are only indirect means, owing to an analogy with certain intuitions to which the concept can be applied.” (ANTH, 191/299) A symbol is, therefore, opposed (entgegengesetzt) to the discursive, the intellectual and the conceptual (and not to intuition), and symbolic cognition is opposed to “discursive cognition” in which the character “accompanies the concept as guardian [als Wächter] (custos), in order to reproduce the concept when the occasion arises”. However, when one only uses symbolic language or presentations, then one “has only a few concepts of understanding [hat noch wenig Begriffe des Verstandes], and the lively presentations often admired in the speeches presented by savages […] is nothing but poverty in concepts and, therefore, also in the words to express them” (ANTH, 191/299). Not much further on Kant refers to the Swedish clairvoyant Emmanuel Swedenborg: “To claim (with Swedenborg) that the real appearances of the world present to the senses are merely a symbol of an intelligible world hidden in reserve is enthusiasm [Schwärmerei].” (ANTH, 191/299) This Schwärmerei is contrasted to enlightenment (Aufklärung), which of course characterizes Kant’s own thinking: Swedenborg versus Kant, Schwärmerei versus Aufklärung. This Schwärmerei is the delusion or illusion (Wahn) “of being able to see something beyond all the bounds of sensibility, i.e., to dream in accordance with principles (to rave with reason)” (KU, §29 Anm., 275/156). In contrast, Kant defines, as is well-known, enlightenment as “the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority [der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit]”, where ‘minority’ means the “inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another” (BFA, 35/17).

Another reference to Swedenborg is of interest here, namely the reference in Kant’s *Der Streit der Fakultäten*: “As for the charge that rational interpretation of the Scriptures is mystical, the sole means of avoiding mysticism (such as Swedenborg’s) is for philosophy to be on the lookout for a moral meaning in scriptural texts and even to impose it on them. For unless the supersensible (the thought of which is essential to anything called religion) is anchored to determine concepts of reason, such as those of morality, fantasy [Phantasie] inevitably gets lost in the transcendent [ins Überschwengliche], where religious matters are concerned, and leads to an illusionism in which everyone has his private, inner revelations, and there is no longer any public touchstone of truth.” (SF, 46/270) Here Kant uses the term ‘fantasy’ (Phantasie) instead of ‘imagination’ (Einbildungskraft). We should guard ourselves against the suggestion that ‘fantasy’ and ‘imagination’ are synonyms for Kant. In the section on the imagination in his *Antropologie*, Kant defines fantasy as an imagining insofar as it involuntarily (unwillkürlich) produces impressions (Einbildungen). Swedenborg is in Kant’s opinion a dreamer (Phantast, Träumer), for he considered his fantasy a true experience. All

80 “[A] delusion [Wahn] is called enthusiastic [schwärmerisch] when the imagined means [das eingebildete Mittel] themselves, being supersensible, are not within the human being’s power, even without considering the unattainability of the supersensible end intended through them; for this feeling of the immediate presence of the highest being, and the distinguishing of it from any other, even from the moral feeling, would constitute the receptivity of an intuition for which there is no sense [faculty] in human nature.” (REL, 174-175/194)

81 In his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* Kant adds: “The same typic also guards [bewahrt] against the mysticism of practical reason, which makes what served only as a symbol into a schema, that is, puts under the application of moral concepts real but not sensible intuitions (of an invisible kingdom of God) and strays into the transcendent.” (KPV, 70-71/197)
these references to Swedenborg are without any doubt a recapitulation of an early text of Kant, namely his Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766).

In order to dissociate himself from Schwärmerei Kant will have to show what the “seat” of the transcendental illusion is, and it is important to define herein the role of the (transcendental) imagination. Is pure reason alone the seat of the transcendental illusion, as Kant writes in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft? Or is it (also) something else? Answering this question comes down to “an archaic re-reading of certain texts”, as Sallis calls it, in which we come across a “number of textual indications of imagination’s complicity in the origination of dialectical illusion.” Sallis does not refer to Kant’s allusions to Swedenborg, even though Kant’s interest in Swedenborg seems to play an essential role on the background of his thinking, and, because of this, we will soon have to return to Kant’s early text. Instead of presenting the proposed re-reading in his book, Sallis merely assembles four “indications”. First, he refers to the Prolegomena, more specifically, to Kant’s summary of Hume’s point of view. Although reason traditionally and falsely considered causality as its child, Hume proved, according to Kant, that “it is really nothing but a bastard of the imagination” (PROL, 257-258/55; cf. T, 70). The causal connections inferred from experience are illegitimate fictions of the imaginations and not a priori concepts of reason. Another indication can be found in the section on the imagination of Kant’s Antropologie: “Deception due to the strength [Stärke] of the human power of imagination often goes so far that a person believes he sees and feels outside himself that which he has only in his mind [was er nur im Kopf hat]” (ANTH, 178/288). Although Sallis does not refer to it, we can already find similar remarks in Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers.

The third example can be found in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, more specifically, in the rational cosmology of the Transcendental Dialectic. In the passage, Kant is concerned with the deduction of the unconditional from the totality of the series of conditions: “Now this unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series if one represent [vorsitzen] it in the imagination [Einbildung]. Yet this absolutely complete synthesis is once again only an Idea […]” (KRV, A416/B444). As Sallis indicates, the interesting thing about this passage is that Kant seems to assume that the origin of the Idea is twofold, for both the imagination and reason are needed for its origination. Finally, Sallis turns to the beginning of the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, in which Kant elaborates what is meant by the transcendental illusion: “Now because we have no other sources of cognition besides these two [i.e., understanding and sensibility], it follows that error is effected only through the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment join with the objective ones, and make these latter deviate from their destination […]” (KRV, A294/B350-351). As we have seen, and just as Sallis points out in his book, the imagination is part of this sensibility; we can ask ourselves if the imagination is an active force with the capacity of effectuating this deviation or not.

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82 J. Sallis, The Gathering of Reason, 160-161. In the chapter ‘The Gathering of Reason’ of his Delimitations, Sallis specifies: “In other words, within the horizon of that particular strategy, it is shown that imagination plays an essential role in bringing forth those transcendental ideas which would otherwise be regarded as simply posited by reason.” (J. Sallis, Delimitations, 32)

83 Cf. J. Llewelyn, The HypoCritical Imagination. Between Kant and Levinas, 118: “[T]he so-called ideas of reason in which the illusion has its source are inseparable from imagination, and Kant concedes this at B444. […] Besides, although the illusion that Kant says is inseparable from human reason is regarded as a propensity that, although ineliminable, can be guarded against provided we remember that the ideas are employed rationally only when they are employed regulatively, what could that employment be except an employment of imagination if it is a gathering of reason that gathers hermeneutically as if in a focus imaginarius? It is as if imagination were the vertiginous abyss in reason’s ground, in sanity.”
Instead of looking further for these indications in the later works of Kant, we will now proceed with the earlier works. We remember that the transcendental illusion is inseparable from human reason, but the question is whether Kant’s struggle with illusions (the empirical and transcendental) does not presuppose some influence of the imagination. The importance of mentioning Kant’s early work becomes clear when we take a closer look at Kant’s text on Swedenborg. Already in 1763, Kant had written of Swedenborg in a letter to Charlotte von Knobloch who had asked him about the truthfulness of the stories surrounding Swedenborg (cf. Letter to Charlotte von Knobloch, August 10, 1763). Kant replied by describing many of the miraculous predictions of Swedenborg, and added that he was puzzled by Swedenborg’s credibility even though he was first sceptical about these kinds of gifts. However, curiously, at the same time in the 1760’s, Kant began to question more and more his own thinking as he had developed it throughout the preceding years. Though it is difficult to point out one single text that can be said to mark the turning point in his work, some interpreters have read Träume eines Geistersehers, erläuternd durch Träume der Metaphysik as Kant’s criticism on his early thinking itself and metaphysics in general. By reading the text as a first step towards a critical investigation of his published works from the 1750s and 1760s, and of metaphysics in general, perhaps this text could also give us some insight into the imagination, for it is mentioned several times under different names: Einbildung, Einbildungskraft, Phantasie, Hirngespinst. At the same time, it seems inevitable that we should also read Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes. This short analysis from 1764 is, besides a text on mental illness, an attempt to treat metaphysical investigations as a kind of insanity. His analysis of Swedenborg and metaphysics was thus preceded two years earlier by this essay on the maladies of the mind. In it, Kant had already described madness as an overflow of phantasms, just as he will describe it thirty-four years later in his Anthropologie. Kant constantly holds to an ambiguous relation between an imaginary world and the perceived world. According to Kant, it is possible that this relation inverts because of the ambiguity of the relation between the imaginary and what is perceived in experience. Although we all have imaginary worlds, such as dreams, the mad are characterized by the inability to separate perceived data from hallucinations or false interpretations based on fantasy. But why write an essay on madness? Is it to benefit from this investigation of philosophical maladies in order to avoid future subversions of the imaginary world and the real world? This seems to be the reason that Kant expresses on the last page his hope that the philosophers “who could prescribe the diet of the mind [die Diät des Gemüths]” will not be excluded (VKK, 271/77; cf. SF, 109/322).

Derrida writes that Marx “welcomes them [the ghosts] only in order to chase them away. As soon as there is some spectre, hospitality and exclusion go together. One is only occupied with ghosts by being occupied with exorcising them, kicking them out the door.” (SM, 223/141) As from 1766, the year of the publication of Träume eines Geistersehers, to 1798, Kant seems to think just one word is suitable for Swedenborg: Schwärmerei. The first text has posed great difficulty for interpreters, because of the lack of clarity in Kant’s purpose in writing the text. Was Kant attacking Swedenborg, his own previous work, or the preceding philosophical tradition? His critical work only aimed at a eventual return to dogmatism, as Kant writes in 1787 in a letter to Jakob just after publishing the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and while writing what was still entitled Kritik des Geschmacks (cf. Letter to Ludwig Heinrich Jakob, September 11, 1787). Kant considers Swedenborg a result of the dogmatic philosophy of his time to which Kant had contributed a great deal before writing his text in 1766. Every attempt to investigate this world beyond the sensible, a world which can

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84 Cf. J.H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, the Birth of Anthropology, 210-211, 260; M. Schönfeld, The Philosophy of the Young Kant. The Precritical Project, 234-244; M. David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison pure. Kant lecteur de Swedenborg, 71.
therefore not be perceived, is in principle doomed from the beginning, and, because of that, what is needed first (before being able to return to the dogmatic part) is the critical investigation of the limits of our cognitive faculties and the need to put aside or forget everything that has been said by metaphysics this far. Hence, before returning to dogmatism, Kant had to take a step back, and investigate critically the limits of reason. Kant’s fear for Schwärmerei remained persistent in his attempt to set the limits of reason against every Schwärmerei. Even after the publication of his Träume eines Geistersehers Kant had to struggle with someone like Swedenborg, but the book from 1766 gave way to a critical investigation. Nevertheless, Kant was forced to respond to Mendelssohn who wrote in his review of Träume eines Geistersehers that “this little work […] leaves the reader so often in doubt about whether Herr Kant wants to ridicule metaphysics or make clairvoyance [Geisterseherei] plausible [glaubhaft]”. 85 In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant, then, not only has to struggle against Schwärmerei, but also against that which opened “the gates wide to” Schwärmerei: Locke’s philosophy. Hume gave way to scepticism, but the “famous Locke […] encountered pure concepts of understanding in experience, also derived them from this experience, and thus proceeded so inconsistently that he thereby dared to make attempts at cognitions that go far beyond the boundary of all experience” (KRV, B127-128). It is as if Kant became preoccupied with Schwärmerei, for he recognized in its dreams the dreams of metaphysics. 86

As we have briefly seen, the delusions of spirit-seers are linked to the functioning of the imagination. The question in the third chapter of Träume eines Geistersehers is how it is possible that these spirit-seers “transpose the illusion of their imagination [Blendwerk ihrer Einbildung] and locate it outside themselves, and do so in relation to their body, of which also they are aware by means of the outer senses” (TG, 343/331). Instead of considering them as a result of the imagination, these objects are “perceived” by the spirit-seer as objects present to the external senses, but the work of the imagination is constantly pointed out by Kant as the source of these delusions and misleading images. These problematic presentations are criticized more rigorously from the time of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in which the different concepts are distinguished where pure intuition defines the limits of the use of concepts of understanding; but Kant does not make a clear distinction between these two kinds of concepts in 1766. Instead, he calls for a halt to philosophical inventions, for it can go on unrestricted, introducing ghosts, spirits, an immaterial world, etc. And Swedenborg’s theory is only a consequence of the metaphysical search for the material and the immaterial, body and soul, nature and God.

Recurring notions in Kant’s early text are ‘Analogie’, ‘Regel der Analogie’ or ‘analogische Vorstellungen’. Spiritual beings “can enter the personal consciousness of man, not, it is true, directly, but, nonetheless, in such a fashion that they, in accordance with the law of association of ideas, excite those images which are related to them, and awaken

85 M. Mendelssohn, I. Kants Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, 281.
86 David-Ménard rightly points out that it “is remarkable that when Kant evokes the theoretical side of hallucinations and the hypochondriac delirium, he puts himself in the foreground [of his Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes, JvG], in his production of the act of writing. We are presented with the ambiguity of the man of thought in the very act of writing his “miserable and sinister” treatise [David-Ménard quotes here from Kant’s essay, where Kant speaks of his “elende grüblerische Schrift”, cf. VKK, 271/77] on the maladies of the mind. It is a cure that the hypochondriac philosopher has prescribed for himself. Writing the last page of his treatise, he declares with vehemence what he hopes to gain from scientific investigation with regards to his own hypochondria: to learn how to avoid blatant extravagance.” (M. David-Ménard, “Kant’s “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” and his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime”, 87.) As Derrida writes in relation to Marx: “It has understood instantly that one is hunting it just to hunt it, chasing it away only so as the chase after it. […] One chases someone away, kicks him out the door, excludes him, or drives him away. But it is in order to chase after him, seduce him, reach him, and thus keep him close at hand.” (SM, 222-223/140)
representations which bear an analogy [analogische Vorstellungen] with our senses. They are not, it is true, the spirit-concept [geistiger Begriff] itself, but they are symbols of it.” (TG, 338-339/326) This also has to do with pathology, because healthy people do not intensify “the images of the imagination, according to the inner state of the soul [die Bilder der Phantasie dem innern Zustande der Seele gemäss]” as is the case with some people that consider the delusions of the imagination as appearances of the outer senses (TG, 339-340/327). However, Kant does not make a clear distinction between normal-abnormal or healthy-unhealthy, for it is – just as Kant says in his Antropologie – the intensity (Stärke) that makes a person healthy or unhealthy: people with an unusual sensitiveness will intensify the images to a higher degree than usual. Nevertheless, Kant still tries to determine a limit; and this limit is based on the distinction between internal-external as has been described above. A healthy person who is awake will be able to distinguish sense-impressions from those of the imagination, while in the case of certain diseases or accidents, the brain – as the inner place where all impressions meet – may have distorted this equilibrium. Sallis writes – although he does not refer to these early texts of Kant – that “an (illicit) turning from subjective to objective, though it may seem (even to reason itself) to originate from reason, actually originates from imagination – not, however, in a lawful way but illegitimately.” Kant would probably never agree, for how far is one from concluding that all the objects in space originate from the imagination? If this were the case, then intuition would be completely determined by imagination. After this short overview of Kant’s early texts, we can wonder whether Kant’s use of the term ‘imagination’ is here similar to the transcendent imagination as he develops it in the margins of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. We have already seen Kant’s determination of Swedenborg as a dreamer (Phantast), a person who mixes fantasy and experience. It seems impossible to equate this Phantasie and the transzendentale Einbildungskraft, as is clear from Kant’s Antropologie (even though the transcendental imagination is not mentioned in this text). It is also clear that Kant wishes to overrule this Phantasie: “We play with the imagination [Einbildungskraft] frequently and gladly, but the imagination (as fantasy [Phantasie]) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently [ungelegen].” (ANTH, 175/285) However, how do we determine when it is inconvenient, if the determination of the spirit-seer starts off with intensity?

Kant concludes in his Träume eines Geistersehers that the exercise (or exorcize) remains for now merely negative: “The theory [regarding the conception of spiritual beings, JvG] can be completed, albeit in the negative sense of the term, by securely establishing the limits of our understanding and by convincing us that the various different appearances of life in nature, and the laws governing them, constitute the whole of that which it is granted us to know.” (TG, 351/339) Here we read an early announcement of his critical project. It might also be justified to argue, as Laywine did, that Kant intended to publish this book in order to “prove to learned, brilliant minds like Lambert and Mendelssohn that even the most

88 Cf. M. David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison pure, 100.
89 Kant makes a similar remark in the preface to the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where he speaks of the purification by criticism, which is “only of negative utility, teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience”. Kant also explicitly formulates a positive side to this in 1787: “But this utility soon becomes positive when we become aware that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in extending our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more closely, inevitably result in narrowing it by threatening to extend the boundaries of sensibility, to which these principles really belong, beyond everything, and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) reason. Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use) […]” (KRV, BXXIV-XXV).
responsible philosophers are bound to go wrong unless he first investigates the limits of human reason.” Since the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ is dedicated to Von Zedlitz we might ask how this minister might have exercised his judgment for, as Kant hoped, the “satisfaction [Befriedigung]” in the desire for wisdom (Wissbegierde) of human reason (KRV, A856/B884)? What could he continue to hold on to, what is a healthy focal point? What is the _focus imaginarius_? He would clearly have to be aware of the dangers of deceiving the inner sense. Kant uses the notion of a _focus imaginarius_ in both the _Träume eines Geistersehers_ and the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Allison brings to our attention that “Kant apparently derived the idea of a _focus imaginarius_ from Newton’s _Opticks_. Newton’s concern was with mirror vision and the optical illusion it involves, whereby an object that really lies behind one’s back, and thus outside one’s visual field, appears to be in front, just as it would be if the lines of light reflected in the mirror actually proceeded in a straight course.” Similarly, Kant writes in 1766 that in external sensation the object is located at the point where different lines meet indicating the direction of the impression. In the case of a vision, this _focus imaginarius_ is located in the brain. In the case of for instance a delusion the person places this outside of himself even though it is a mere presentation of the imagination.

As said, Kant once again mentions the _focus imaginarius_ in the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, and more precisely in an Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic where Kant introduces the analogon of the schema. The ‘as if’ is presented in this Appendix where the analogy itself marks the limit (Grenze) that cannot be trespassed, and “outside which there is for us nothing but empty space [nichts als leerer Raum]” (KRV, A702/B730). It is here, in this Appendix, that Kant presents us for the first time with the regulative use of Ideas in order to prevent us from “imaginary knowledge [eingebildetes Wissen]” (KRV, A702/B730). The results of speculative reason had to be investigated by the tribunal of pure reason, chaired by its (highest) judge (‘I think’) (cf. KRV, A669/B697), because the transcendental illusion is both deceptive (täuschend), alluring (anlockend) and natural (natürlich), “and so will be present in the future too [so in alle Zukunft bleiben wird]” (KRV, A704/B732). Here, Kant presents the transcendental Ideas as regulative Ideas for which there are – to use the concepts of the _Kritik der Urteilskraft_ – only symbolic hypotyposes possible; the recourse to the analogy and the ‘as if’ is set, although it is at the limit of the logic of illusion. The reader who follows the critical path needs to focus on these words in judgment (the words “as if”) as if this will remind him that something like a Babylonian tower – mentioned at the beginning of the Transcendental Doctrine of Methods immediately following the discussed passages from the end of the Appendix – cannot be built with the given materials. The use of the Ideas should be regulative and not constituent because they are capable of “directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius), i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension” (KRV, A644/B672; cf. VOY, 124-125). Kant tells us in this Appendix (to the Dialectic as the logic of illusion and not that of truth) about the tools for judgment, because “it was advisable [ratsam] to draw up an exhaustive dossier, as it were, of these proceedings [gleichsam die Acten dieses Processes ausführlich abzufassen] and store it in the archives of human reason, so as to prevent future errors [zu Verhütung künftiger Irrungen] of a similar kind” (KRV, A704/B732). Here, Kant presents us not only the conflicts of faculties that resulted in the trials of the critical tribunal of pure reason, but he also tells us that we should remember these trials and conflicts in order to avoid future errors. Or better, Kant tells us how we can try to avoid errors and deal with the

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91 H. Allison, _Kant’s Transcendental Idealism_, 425.
transcendental illusion, by appending to the trial (Process) or conflict (Widerstreit) of reason (as presented in the Transcendental Dialectic) a reflection on them in which – at the limits of pure reason indicated by the transcendental Ideas – the possibility of the analogy is handed to us and the regulative use of the Ideas of pure reason is decided.\textsuperscript{92}

In Kant the whole discourse on the death of philosophy has to do with distinguishing \textit{false} philosophy from the true one. Kant wrote a letter to Lambert in December 1765, just after finishing his \textit{Träume eines Geistesesehers}, and before its actual publication in 1766. In this early letter he refers to the topic of the death, even euthanasia, of philosophy:

You complain with reason, dear Sir, of the eternal trifling of punsters and the wearying of today’s reputed writers, with whom the only evidence of taste is that they talk about taste. I think, though, that this is \textit{euthanasia} of false philosophy, that it is perishing amid these foolish pranks, and it would be far worse to have it carried to the grave ceremoniously, with serious but dishonest hairsplitting. Before true philosophy can come to life, the old one must first destroy itself [\textit{sich selbst zerstöre}]; and just as putrefaction signifies the total dissolution that always precedes the start of a new creation, so the current \textit{crisis} [\textit{Crisis}] in learning magnifies my hopes that the great, long-awaited revolution in the sciences is not too far off. For there is no shortage of good minds. (Letter to Johann Heinrich Lambert, December 31, 1765)

This has been a constant aim in Kant’s philosophy as from the mid-1760s when he started to question the metaphysical tradition. Already in 1765 Kant speaks about the euthanasia of philosophy – or of \textit{false} philosophy –, and the only possibility of reviving (\textit{aufleben}) the true wisdom of the world (\textit{wahre Weltweisheit}) is by a self-destruction or self-annihilation of the old philosophy. And, then, Kant’s \textit{Träume eines Geistesesehers} is published (anonymously) trying to provoke us and teach us to investigate the limits of reason. As Kant writes in response to a lost letter of Mendelssohn: “I am fully convinced that the path that has been selected is completely wrong, that the methods now in vogue must infinitely increase the amount of folly and error in the world, and that even the total extermination of all these chimerical insights would be less harmful than the dream science itself, with its confounded contagion.” The \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft} will eventually sketch a new path, demanding that – as Kant formulated in 1766 – metaphysics is understood (\textit{aneu}) from “its nature and its proper place in human knowledge”, since “the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends upon it” (Letter to Moses Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766).

The call to follow the critical path and to judge involves for Kant the question whether (\textit{ob}) human reason has found satisfaction with regard to its questions before the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. The first \textit{Kritik} does not end with a conclusion or a final judgment, but it sets the task for others to judge. Only the second \textit{Kritik} has an end or decision, i.e., a \textit{Beschluss} (KPV, 161-163/269-271), so it is perhaps a bit of a surprise that one encounters on the critical path a “narrow gate” of which Kant says that it leads to the \textit{Weisheitslehre}.

In a word, science (critically sought and methodically directed) is the narrow gate [\textit{enge Pforte}] that leads to the \textit{doctrine of wisdom}, if by this is understood not merely what one ought \textit{to do} but what ought to serve \textit{teachers} as a guide to prepare well and clearly the path to wisdom which everyone should travel, and to secure others against taking the wrong way; philosophy must always remain the guardian [\textit{Aufbewahrerin}] of this science, and though the public need take no

\textsuperscript{92} It is no surprise that the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is followed by a Transcendental Doctrine of Method as the prescription of the possibility of a system of all knowledge (both of understanding and of reason), and as what determines the systematic completeness of the limits and possibilities of knowledge: “By the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, therefore, I understand the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.” (KRV, A707-708/B735-736) For the use of the notion of schema in this Transcendental Doctrine of Method, and more specifically, in the Architectonic of Pure Reason, cf. DP, 361-370.
interest in its subtle investigations it has to take an interest in the doctrines which, after being worked up in this way, can first be quite clear to it. (KPV, 163/270-271; cf. REL, 160n/182n)

This is clearly a continuation of the Architectonic of Pure Reason in which Kant already advocated that one needs science to gain wisdom, for “the path of science [Weg der Wissenschaft]” is the only path that is not overgrown and does not lead to errors (Verirrungen) (KRV, A850/B878). In the second Kritik Kant presents respect (Achtung) as the only and best guard (Wächter) which will be able to protect us from corrupting motives (KPV, 161/269). Kant’s constant use of what might be called symbols give the reader an Idea to which thinking has to orient itself, but “our concepts” can perhaps be abstracted from sensibility, but they will “always” be “appended [hängt an] by image representations [bildliche Vorstellungen]” for their “experiental use [Erfahrungsgebrauche]” (WHO, 133/7).

Although Kant hardly ever gave any indication of a possible link between the imagination and the transcendental illusion, his Träume eines Geistersehers gives us perhaps some idea of the role of the imagination in cases of Geisterseherei. Every notion of spirits is based on invention (Erdichtung), and not on experience or conclusion. Was Kant able to stick to his plan when he finished the first part of his Träume eines Geistersehers and declared: “I shall now put to one side, as something settled and completed, the whole matter of spirits, an extensive branch of metaphysics. It will from now on be of no concern to me” (TG, 352/339)?

Even though Kant wants to relegate the old metaphysical visions to the supersensible, we can wonder whether he was able to chase away all the ghosts and phantoms, all the spirits, the dangers and deceits of Schwärerei and Geisterseherei, and whether Kant himself did not lose control over his imagination, of which he accused Herder in his review of Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. It is essential for Heidegger’s analysis that sensibility is not purely receptive as Kant apparently wants us to believe when writing the Transcendental Aesthetics, but, as Garrido also underlines, sensibility is a power, a faculty that consists in being “powerless [impouvoir], exposition, opening”. We already accentuated the importance of inner sense (time) for Kant, which is perhaps expressed best in the Antropologie where Kant stresses that time as the inner sense is not the consciousness of what someone does (tut) – inner sense is not pure apperception. Rather, “it is a consciousness of what he undergoes [leidet], in so far as he is affected [affizirt] by the play of his own thoughts [sein eignes Gedankenspiel]” (ANTH, 161/272). Because a human being has only one inner sense, Kant declares that the soul can be called “the organ of inner sense” that is subject to illusions when conceiving an appearance of inner sense as either

93 On this guard and gate, cf. J. van Gorkom, ‘Kant, Kafka, Josef K.;’ G. Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, 184-192.
94 This remark is found at the end of the first, “dogmatic” part of his Träume eines Geistersehers. The second part of this book, which Kant describes as the “historical” section, begins with the stories concerning the gift of Swedenborg, which Kant also mentioned in the letter to Charlotte von Knobloch. In the second part, Kant analyzes Swedenborg’s own explanation of his insights in the world of spirits. The division of the book leads to separate conclusions in each part: first a theoretical conclusion and at the end of part two, a practical conclusion. In this last conclusion, Kant states that hopes for the future should be based on the good soul, where Kant implicitly anticipates the thoughts he formulated in his second and third Kritik.
95 Also in his Pädagogik (1803) Kant emphasized that the imagination has to be restrained (gezügelt), that is, it has to be brought under rules; however, the imagination should not be left completely out-of-work (unbeschäftigt) either (PAD, 476/465). It should be noted that Kant here situates the imagination on the side of the lower powers of understanding (untern Kräfte des Verstandes) which is of course opposed to the higher powers, namely understanding, judgment, and reason. Although Kant rejects all supernatural spirits as phantoms placed outside us, Kant’s first Kritik ascribes to the imagination one of the fundamental places. In Spectres de Marx, Derrida suggests that Kant’s transcendental imagination is one of those ‘places’ where phantoms could be hiding (cf. SM, 227n-228n/190n-191n).
96 J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 12.
something of the outer sense, “that is, taking imaginings for sensations [Einbildungen für Empfindungen]”, or as a gift or inspiration (Eingebung) “caused by another being that is not an object of external sense”. Both cases are deceptions of inner sense and a mental illness (Gemüthskrankheit), although it is either a case of Schwärmerei or of Geisterseherei. Kant’s fear for deception when fiction is accepted as experiential cognition becomes clear when he subsequently declares that “the human being comes to regard that which he has intentionally put in his mind as something that previously already must have been there, and he believes that he has merely discovered in the depths his soul [in den Tiefen seiner Seele] what in reality he has forced on himself [das, was er sich selbst aufdrang]” (ANTH, 161). It is hard to ignore the warnings of Kant here when he repeats the words used by him for situating the schematism: in the depth of the soul (cf. SM, 227n/190n). This soul will have to recognize imaginings (Einbildungen) as imaginings, and not as sensations (Empfindungen), but, as we have seen, the imagination is the power that makes intuitions point away from themselves and from the imagination itself.97

We will return to this discussion in Chapter 3 where the conflict is not between Kant and Swedenborg, but between the philosopher and the mystagogue. Despite Kant’s efforts to attack Swedenborg’s reputation as a clairvoyant, Swedenborg influenced authors such as Blake, Flaubert, Balzac, Borges, and Miłosz, although for these authors it has never been a question whether Swedenborg actually travelled in the divine regions he described. On the contrary, Miłosz for instance states: “He only believed that he had access to the other world at any time […]. Everything happened only in his mind”.98 This corresponds to Kant’s criticism of Swedenborg’s practices when the former emphasizes that a visionary (Fanatiker, Visionär, Schwärmer) suffered from madness: “The latter is properly a deranged person [Verrückter] with presumed immediate inspiration [einer vermeinten unmittelbaren Eingebung] and a great familiarity [Vertraulichkeit] with the powers of heaven. Human nature knows no more dangerous illusion [Blendwerk].” (VKK, 267/73) The authors mentioned do not seem to attribute this danger to Swedenborg, but, then, it is probably also not their aim to safeguard the health or life of philosophy as Kant tried to do. This is not what is at stake for writers such as Blake or Miłosz. But, then, why did these authors find their inspiration in Swedenborg? Is it merely an interest in fiction? Miłosz answers as follows while focussing on Blake: “Neither Swedenborg nor Blake were aestheticians; they did not enclose the spiritual within the domain of art and poetry and oppose it to the material. At the risk of simplifying the issue by using a definition, let us say rather that they both were primarily concerned with the energy which reveals itself in a constant interaction of Imagination with the things perceived by our five senses.”99 Hence, Blake (or Miłosz) never attempted to create a world of fiction as the only possible world or oppose this fictive world to the real world, but, rather, to confront perceived things with Imagination, since this Imagination transforms eternal truths into visible shapes. In a sense, these authors did not read Swedenborg any differently from Kant, although Blake was mainly interested in the effects of “wonders Divine / of Human Imagination”, as he writes in his poem Jerusalem, which is a clear reference to Swedenborg’s erecting of the Church of the New Jerusalem. In Blake’s long poem, the Imagination, as the very God in us, forms the experience of space and time, and creates reality: “Creating Space, Creating Time according to the wonders Divine / of Human Imagination.” Even though Kant’s early book Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik marked a turning point in his own work, the influence of Swedenborg on philosophy and art remained largely unabated.

97 Cf. J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 14.
99 Idem, 125.
Chapter 2

Heidegger and the Occurrence of Imagination

§1. Introduction

As Sallis indicates, it might seem surprising that a phenomenologist like Heidegger took a positive interest in the imagination when the latter first of all listened to the call ‘Zu den Sachen selbst’.

In Platon: Sophistes, which gathers Heidegger’s lectures from 1924-1925 on Plato, he discusses Plato’s conceptions of imagination (eikasia, phantasia), but he emphasizes that Plato merely dealt with the image insofar as that what is presenting (which Husserl calls the image-object) is not what it shows as an image. Heidegger furthermore asserts that the essence of the image of something (Bildlichkeit, Bild-sein von etwas) has always been a significant matter for philosophy when it concerns knowing (Erkennen). Indeed, as often thought, the object is reproduced (abgebildet) as an inner object, or, inversely, it is only possible that there is a transcendent object (i.e., an object outside us) by way of this inner object. However, according to Heidegger, Husserl unmistakingly showed that the connection of knowledge with Bildlichkeit does not illuminate (aufklären) the former (cf. GA19, 399-400/276). Up to the summer of 1925 Heidegger seems to maintain a more or less Husserlian point of view concerning the imagination by way of which Heidegger comes to the theme of intentionality (GA20, 55-60/41-44).

In that summer Heidegger had also proclaimed that the Neo-Kantian view on Kant is narrow, and that one should try to surmount (überwinden) it (cf. GA20, 17-18/16). Not unexpectedly, then, in the winter of 1925-1926 Heidegger gave his lectures in Marburg on Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft and Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. In a letter to Jaspers, Heidegger eventually writes: “The most beautiful yet, I am starting to really love Kant.” (HJ, 57) The reasons for Heidegger’s sudden fascination for Kant are best expressed in a course given by Heidegger in that winter. Heidegger’s early steps towards the theme of temporality can be found in this period, and in the meantime he for the first time discusses the importance of time in Kant. Immediately after examining Hegel’s notion of time and a possible Aristotelian influence on him, Heidegger begins with a preview (Vorblick) of the meaning (Bedeutung) of time in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA21, 269-272). Heidegger’s thoughts for Sein und Zeit (1927) develop themselves in the meantime, and he finds a companion in Kant (cf. GA25, 431/292), for “the whole problematic in Kant” is determined by the “authentic determination of subjectivity [eigentliche Bestimmung der Subjektivität]”: the ‘I think’ needs to be thought as from time (aus der Zeit herausfällt) (GA21, 269). As we will see in the next chapter, this determination of the ‘I think’ in relation to time will eventually intrigue Derrida.

Heidegger shows that the need to think temporality has to do with the question of Being (Seinsfrage), which itself brings us to the question of the ‘as’ (als): how is Seinsverständnis possible as the recognition of beings as beings, something as something, i.e., that something is (something)? We already encountered the copula in the previous chapter –


102 Heidegger subsequently emphasizes that the theme of the creation of the world is discussed by Kant (in the Antinomies) by way of the “problem of time” (GA21, 270). Heidegger’s interest in Kant’s concept of freedom is also based on this view of the Antinomies (cf. GA21, 270). By discussing this notion of freedom in his Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit Heidegger continues investigating the problem of time (cf. GA9, 166/128; GA26, 210/165; GA31, 116/83, 130-131/92).
this *Verhältniswörtchen* as Kant called it –, and Heidegger transforms the question of Being into a question of the ‘as (such)’ (*als solches*).\(^{103}\) Phenomenology is concerned with things (beings, *Seiende*) insofar as they are accessible when they *show* themselves as from themselves. The relation to something *as it is*, to a being *as such* – if this is possible – constitutes for Kant objectivity, and Heidegger wishes to uncover in his *Kantbuch* the condition of possibility of this ‘as such’ (of the beings *as such*). Man is, according to Heidegger, different from the animal, not because the latter is without a world (*weltlos*) like a stone, but, rather, because it is not able to relate to beings *as beings*. The animal is, to put it briefly, poor of world (*weltarm*); man is world-forming (*weltbildend*), and this forming (*bilden*) of a world allows man to recognize beings as beings.\(^{104}\) Phenomenology as such asks for the possibility of letting something be *as it is*, and this question will be decided on the basis of temporality. A first indication of this in Kant seems for Heidegger to be when the former begins with the Transcendental Aesthetic, since, as Kant points out, this part of the *Kritik* deals with representations *as they are given* (in space and time).

First, we will try to show what the relevance of Kant’s transcendental schematism is for Heidegger. This will give us the opportunity to ask how Heidegger reads Kant and what the place of Kant is in Heidegger’s philosophy when writing *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (§2). Before uncovering the inner possibility of metaphysics that marks the originality (*Ursprünglichkeit*) of a Grundlegung Heidegger states that this *Ursprünglichkeit* can only be understood in a repetition (*Wiederholung*). Subsequently, we will deal with Heidegger’s reading of – or, as he calls it himself, *Auseinandersetzung mit* – Kant’s transcendental schematism in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (§3).\(^{105}\) Finally, we will focus on the theme of the *Ereignis* as Heidegger develops it in his later work. Special attention will be paid to his *Zeit und Sein*, which seems to be one of his most rigorous attempts to uncover the relation between Being and time. Not only will the theme discussed in this text be presented here, but we will also have to deal with the question of the image and imagination (§4).

### §2. Heidegger Reading Kant

Ever since the publication of the *Kantbuch* in 1929, scholars working on Kant’s theory of imagination and schematism have either ignored or dismissed Heidegger’s interpretation.

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103 With regard to the Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger writes: “In the disclosedness of the ‘there’, the world discloses along with it [In der Erschlossenheit des Da ist Welt miterschlossen]. [...] The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon. Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away [Entrückungen zu...]. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’[‘Wohin’] to which one is carried away. This ‘whither’ of the ecstasies we call the ‘horizontal schema’. In each of the three ecstases the ecstatical horizon is different. The schema in which *Da-sein* comes towards itself futurally [zukünftig], whether authentically or inauthentically, is the ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ [Umwollen seiner]. The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown [als geworfenes in der Befindlichkeit erschlossen ist], is to be taken as that in the face of which [Wovor] it has been thrown and that to which it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizontal schema of what has been [Gewesenheit]. In existing for the sake of itself [Umwollen seiner existierend] in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown, *Da-sein*, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present [gegenwärtigend]. The horizontal schema of the present [Gegenwart] is determined by the ‘in-order-to’ [Um-zu].” (SUZ, 365/416)

104 Following Heidegger’s fundamental ontological determination of the essence of man, he will search it in the possibility of *Weltbildung: der Mensch is weltbildend*. Dastur rightly states that the problem of the *Weltbildung* needs to be understood in relation to the role of the Kantian transcendental imagination (F. Dastur, *Heidegger et la question anthropologique*, 62; cf. AJS, 193-219/141-160).

Wolff is critical of Heidegger’s interpretation; he briefly tries to show that Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant does not present what Kant said, which was in a way, as we will see, also Heidegger’s strategy.¹⁰⁶ Daval’s *La métaphysique de Kant* makes only a brief mention of Heidegger’s book without discussing its possible validity or relevance. We can also mention Allison, Guyer, Kang, Bartuschat or Philonenko here who are all critical about Heidegger’s reading of Kant, if they even found it necessary to mention Heidegger.¹⁰⁷ Henrich’s strong reaction to Heidegger from 1955 is interesting to us in which he primarily attacks Heidegger’s suggestion that the transcendental imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding.¹⁰⁸ Henrich, however, wishes to uncover in a primarily historical approach that the unknown root is the transcendental apperception and *not* the imagination. It is remarkable that contrary to these critics, Derrida explicitly speaks in ‘Ousia et grammè’ about Heidegger’s retrieval of Kant in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* as a “generous” one. We will return to this discussion.

When Heidegger taught on Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in the winter of 1927-1928, he ends the course with stating that “Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path [zu Bestätigung der Richtigkeit des Weges] which I took for my search” (GA25, 431/292). He adds that this does not mean that what is said is true because Kant said it. Rather, Kant has “the immense significance [Bedeutung] in education for scientific, philosophical work; and one can trust him fully. In Kant as in no other thinker one has the immediate certainty that he does not cheat [er schwindelt nicht].” Does this show Heidegger’s naive trust in Kant? What is the difference between this complete trust in the importance of Kant and the grounding of a work in an authority like Kant by claiming that because Kant said this or that it is true? Heidegger continues by declaring that cheating (schwindeln) is a danger for philosophy, since philosophy cannot rely on experiments and resources as science can. However, for Heidegger, this means that in the possibility of the greatest danger in philosophy there is also the “ultimate possibility for this genuineness [Echtheit] of thinking and questioning”, which is precisely the “meaning of doing philosophy” (GA25, 431/293). We should not misunderstand Heidegger as if he has merely a naive faith or trust in this thinker. As we will see, what interests Heidegger in his reading are not so much Kant’s statements, but rather, the fact that Kant is being drawn by a compulsion of the phenomena themselves. If Heidegger recognizes a companion in Kant, if there is a reason that Heidegger agreed to follow the critical path, it is that he seemed to recognize a compulsion that was driving Kant. As we will see, for Heidegger it “is no accident that Kant […] assigns to imagination a

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¹⁰⁷ In his article ‘Transcendental Schematism and The Problem of the Synthetic A Priori’, Allison refers in a note to Heidegger, but only to emphasize that his own conception of the schematism is based “on a very different understanding of the nature of metaphysics than Heidegger’s” (H. Allison, ‘Transcendental Schematism and The Problem of the Synthetic A Priori’, 58). Philonenko states that Heidegger’s thesis cannot be considered “an objective interpretation of the transcendental schematism” (A. Philonenko, *Études kantiennes*, 11). Schaper, on the other hand, speaks of Heidegger’s “Kant book, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, [as] […] an ingenious, if not always faithful elaboration of Kant’s teaching on transcendental imagination” (E. Schaper, ‘Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered’, 282). She overtly tries to push her interpretation into a more Heideggerian position, which can give the impression of – to use Gibbons’s words – “a more Heideggerian and less Kantian position if one ignores Kant’s insistence on the atemporality of the intelligible subject” (S. Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, 62n). Mörchen also explicitly adopts Heideggerian notions to interpret Kant in *Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant*, even though he mainly refers to *Sein und Zeit*, for his study was published during the time Heidegger wrote and published his *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. In the introduction, he does point out the relevance of the courses of Heidegger on Kant for his own interpretation. The second edition of his book is even dedicated to Heidegger. Heidegger on his term refers several times favourably to Mörchen’s study as a completion of his own brief discussion of the transcendental imagination (cf. GA3, XIV/XVIII, 128n/90n).
distinctive function in explaining the objectivity of knowledge” (GA24, 150/107). This observation guides his reading of Kant.

Kant’s critical work asks: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” (KRV, A805/B833) Kant’s first responses, although they seem more like a suspension of an answer, are found in the metaphysica specialis by way of the concepts of the soul, world and God. In his Logik, Kant adds a fourth question, which, as he declares, gathers the three questions in anthropology when he subsequently asks: “What is man?” (LOG, 25/538) By posing the question of the essence of man, Kant seems to give priority to anthropology. With the determination of human beings as subjects, as a subjectum, psychology arose in Western metaphysics, and psychology, as Heidegger time and again underlines, was completely unknown to the Greeks. Heidegger goes even further: “In the completion of metaphysics [with Nietzsche, JvG], metaphysics became ‘psychology’, that is, psychology and anthropology is the last word of metaphysics.” (GA55, 130) We will come back to anthropology and the place of the metaphysica specialis in which we will try to clarify that, in Heidegger’s reading of Kant, Kant’s metaphysics is not merely an empirical anthropology, but lays the ground of metaphysics beginning with/as a metaphysics of Dasein. As Heidegger states, the “Dasein in man” is nothing human (GA3, 234/164). Then, it will be essential to uncover the role of the imagination in Heidegger’s approach of Kant’s questions.

In the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Heidegger proclaims that the problem of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) is approached by way of a certain retreat to production. In Greek ontology, this takes place by way of the notion of poièsis (Herstellen, production), that is, the productive aspect of technitès. One produces while looking ahead to an (exemplary) image in such a way that the product is created according to this anticipated look (eidos, idea). Heidegger specifies this as follows: “The anticipated look [vorweggenommene Aussehen], the proto-typical pre-image [Vor-bild], shows the thing as what it is before the production and how it is supposed to look as a product. The anticipated look has not yet been externalized as something formed, as actual [als Geprägte, Wirkliches entäussert], but rather is the image of imagination [das Bild der Ein-bildung], of phantasía.” (GA24, 150/107) Even though Heidegger relates the Greek poièsis to eidos, it is unclear whether this view of production is not also an attempt to limit or question production, just as in Kant the imagination is limited by distinguishing theoretical and practical reason, since, according to Kant, the imagination does not have any positive contribution in ethics. According to Heidegger, Being is determined by the Greeks as eidos, the (anticipated) look of something prior to its production. The imagination anticipates this Vor-bild. ‘Prior’ means that the eidos is before time as that which a being already was before the production. However, in contrast to Greek ontology, Kant related the theme of the imagination immediately to the question of time, and, as Heidegger aimed for in his Kantbuch, this will have to be uncovered in a reading or dialogue, because here Kant hits on the idea of the problem of the Grundlegung of metaphysics. In his Logik Heidegger writes that what is needed is a “phenomenological chronology”, a philosophical “logos of time” that is not concerned with the calculation or measuring of time itself, but with the “time-determinateness of the phenomena – i.e., their temporality [Temporalität] – and with that the investigation of time itself” (GA21, 199-200).

Without any doubt, Cassirer is the fieriest and best known critic of Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, and his criticisms seems to be taken up by many interpreters, or it at least can be seen as representative of much of the criticism. He initiated some of the criticism of Heidegger’s reading of Kant when he complained that Heidegger was not presenting himself as a commentator, but merely as a “usurper, who as it were enters with force of arms into the Kantian system in order to subjugate it and to make it serve his own
In 1931, Cassirer published a review of the book in the *Kant-studien* where he sums up some of the supposed problem of Heidegger’s reading. Cassirer had been reading Heidegger’s work since the late twenties, and Heidegger on his part had reviewed Cassirer’s second volume of his *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, where he questioned Cassirer’s attempt to read the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* as a theory of natural sciences (cf. GA3, 255-270/180-190). The most famous encounter between the two took place in the spring of 1929 in Davos, Switzerland, where they discussed each other’s interpretation of Kant: Heidegger explicitly emphasized the importance of finitude, while Cassirer tried to show that man is able to transcend this finitude in, for instance, art and morality. According to Cassirer, Heidegger’s emphasis on human finitude leads, therefore, to what he calls in his review a “‘monism’ of imagination”, which replaces a “dualism of the sensuous and intelligible world. For *his* [Kant’s] problem is not the problem of ‘Being’ and ‘time’, but the problem of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, of ‘experience’ and ‘Idea’”. Cassirer states that the transcendental imagination indeed forms the center of the Transcendental Analytic, as Heidegger aimed to show, but not of Kant’s system as a whole, since the completion of this system is reached much later in the book and subsequently worked out in Kant’s later critical works. The chapter on the schematism is in that process merely a portal to Kant’s main goal, namely the doctrine of Ideas, of freedom and of beauty. Hence, Cassirer asserts that Heidegger neglects the role and interest of the transcendental dialectic and its concepts that would become even more important in other books of Kant. Heidegger disregards the unconditionality of reason and the independence of thought by forcefully underlining or over-emphasizing the transcendental imagination. In response to similar problems, presented by Cassirer during the encounter in Davos, Heidegger answers that the categorical imperative as analyzed in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* still presupposes the finitude of *Dasein*, for this imperative contains an essential relation to a finite being as *Dasein*. There is no imperative for God, as Kant also stated. What Kant calls the finitude of such a being (*Endlichkeit solcher Wesen*), as a condition of possibility of feeling respect (*Achtung* for the moral law (KPV, 76/201-202), will be investigated by Heidegger in terms of finitude and the transcendental imagination. Heidegger acknowledged the force or violence used of his own reading, but does that mean that he agrees with Cassirer’s accusations? Several times Heidegger called his reading a matter of translating (*übersetzen*), indicating that the thoughts of Kant had to be “translated” in an explicating thinking (*auseinandersetzende Denken*). He asserts that this translation has to show a better understanding of a thinker than the thinker understood himself. Heidegger immediately adds that this is not a sign of weakness or a lack on the side of this thinker; on the contrary, according to Heidegger, this is a “sign of his greatness” (GA55, 63). However, Heidegger claims to be doing here what Kant did in his work with regard to the *Überlieferung*. We remember that Kant tells us of the critical path remaining when he at the same time discusses the history of philosophy; and, as we bear in mind, at the end of the ‘History of Philosophy’, i.e., of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the reader is asked to judge. But, then, in order to judge Kant, Heidegger seems to argue that we will need to judge like Kant? It needs to be said that Heidegger will not adopt Kant’s juridical vocabulary, not even that of judgment, so that the translation of the central question of the conditions of possibility for synthetic *a priori* judgments into that of Being and time still needs to take place. When

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110 Indirectly, Heidegger returns to this question in his lectures from 1930 on Kant’s work on human freedom in which Heidegger concludes that freedom is the condition of possibility for the Offenbarkeit of the Being of beings, of Seinsverständnis (cf. GA31, 303/207).

Kant asks us to judge while confronting us with the history of philosophy, as if it will indeed be a historical moment, perhaps we need to remember how Kant judged. Kant writes in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: “I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concepts sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intentions.” (KRV, A314/B370; cf. Letter to Johan Heinrich Lambert, December 31, 1765; with regard to Heidegger’s interpretation, cf. GA8, 83/77) Kant inherited the Aristotelian notion of category, and, for his own thinking and with the necessary reticence, he adopts Plato’s Idea. He does not approach history as a literary critic; rather, from an interest in thinking, in an attempt to understand these thinkers better than they understood themselves. Neither the warnings nor the quotes from Heidegger prevented Cassirer from suggesting that Heidegger’s dialogue leads to “arbitrariness, when it [the interpretation] forces the author to say something he has only therefore left unsaid, because he was not able to think it.”

Hence, Cassirer leaves us with the question of what exactly allows Heidegger to interpret Kant the way he did, namely by forcing Kant to say what he did not (intend to) say?

In a dialogue (Zwiegespräch) with Kant, Heidegger will focus on the notion of time in order to retrieve and repeat Kant’s main problem that has until then been neglected by interpreters and critics. According to Heidegger, this neglect of Kant’s main problem is also part of Kant’s own inability to free himself from tradition, leading to obscurities with regard to the central problem. The dialogue aims at the retrieval (Wiederholung) of Kant’s fundamental problem in which hidden possibilities, preserved or traceable in the text, are revealed in a translating or explicating reading. This way of reading will transform the text in a continuous dialogue wherein what Kant said is brought to light beyond the explicit statements and formulations (cf. GA3, 43/30). In his search for Kant’s basic problem,

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113 In the courses after the publication of the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger dealt in his lectures with German Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) that tried to overcome Kantian finitude. A reading of the notes tells us that Heidegger again underlines the singularity of Kant in history. Without being able to discuss it here, according to Heidegger, *Fichte* did not touch upon the original problem posed by Kant, that is, the problem of metaphysics, the *Seinsfrage* and the metaphysics of the *Dasein*. Eventually, Heidegger points out that the only way Fichte is able to save the identity of the ‘I’ and the unity of the system, is by introducing something “strange [fremdartig]”, namely the “most magnificent power [wunderbarste Vermögen] of the 1”: the imagination (GA28, 165). Heidegger adds that there “is [in Fichte] only the logical emptied and dialectical formalized characterization of the structure of the power of the imagination, which Kant has been by far more well-defined and richer as the unity of spontaneity and receptivity […]” (GA28, 169). Nevertheless, a “thorough reflection can show that the pure imagination itself is rooted in the time as temporality and imagination becomes firstly understandable from time.” (GA28, 169) *Schelling*, subsequently, puts the philosophy of nature at the core of philosophical research as an attempt to re-discover nature. Heidegger indicates that Schelling takes nature or the real as the starting-point, and not the ‘I’ or ideal as Fichte did; this ‘I’ then evolves out of the ‘non-I’, not in terms of cause and effect, but rather in terms of creation (Schöpfung). In some additional material to these lectures, Heidegger writes: “Being, Reality: capacity [Tätigkeit] not as action, but creation. Productive power: imagination.” (GA28, 256) Creation is imagination (Ein-bildung). Nature is the Absolute, and, according to Schelling, God is the pure unity in and by which everything is created, that is, imagined. He has to create, because He is God, and God has to reveal Himself. This process of creation is the creation of an image (Bild, Ebenbild) of God; his most true and proper image (Eben-Bild) is man, for it is the most independent and free of all creations. Finally, Hegel recognized the principle in Kant’s notion of transcendental apperception. He tried to overcome the shortcomings of Kant’s thinking by progressing from the particular and the general, or from the finite and the infinite, to the identity and synthesis of these two, which can be generated by reason. Heidegger then says: “And here now Hegel sees the role of the transcendental imagination more clearly than Fichte”, to which Heidegger adds that “[w]e understand the transcendental deduction only when the original synthetic unity is understood from the imagination. – Sentences about the imagination that I could have copied from Hegel!” (GA28, 200)
Heidegger picks up some traces in the text that seem to lead to an original thought that has been neglected by what Heidegger often called the philosophical or metaphysical tradition. Heidegger will transform (verwandeln) Kant’s thinking by focussing on the relevance of temporality and intuition in order to make room for a phenomenological approach to the question of Being and time. The a priori is not sought in subjectivity, but, instead, becomes a title of Being itself, that is, grounds itself in the domain of Being (cf. GA20, 101/74). In the Introduction to the Kantbuch, Heidegger remarks that a Grundlegung lets the supporting ability (Trägerschaft) of the ground become operative (Wirkungsanwerdenlassen). “Whether and how this happens [Ob und wie dieses geschieht] is the criterion of the originality and scope [Ursprünglichkeit und Weite] of the ground-laying.” (GA3, 2/2)

However, the fact that Heidegger does not very often refer to his Kantbuch in his later texts on Kant is astonishing. This is understandable when we read in the preface to the second edition (1950) of his Kantbuch that the “instances in which I [Heidegger] have gone astray and the shortcomings of the present endeavour have become so clear to me on the path of thinking […] that I therefore refuse to make this work into a patchwork by compensating with supplements, appendices and postscripts” (GA 3, XVII/XX). It seems as if Heidegger became more and more critical of his own reading, which he eventually even determines in the preface to the fourth edition (1973) as an “overinterpretation [Überdeutung]” (GA 3, XIV/XVIII). In this last preface to the book, he refers back to the preface of the third edition (1965) in which Heidegger indicated that he has attempted to retract this “overinterpretation” in two other texts on Kant, namely ‘Kants These über das Sein’ and Die Frage nach dem Ding. Even though Heidegger says that he saw errors in his interpretation, he does not tell what shortcomings he had in mind and whether they merely concern his interpretation of Kant or also his own philosophy. Does it have any consequences for the transcendental imagination, time or his relation to Kant? However, whenever Heidegger mentions Kant’s transcendental imagination again in his later work he will emphasize its relevance. For instance, in a lecture on Nietzsche, Heidegger underscores that Nietzsche was not the first to think the poetizing essence of reason; rather, “Kant first explicitly perceived and thought through the creative character of reason in his doctrine of the transcendental imagination” (GA6.1, 525-526/95-96). As of Kant, reason is understood more thoroughly as the “faculty that forms and imagines to itself everything that beings are [Vermögen, das Alles, was das Seiende ist, sich selbst zu- und einbildet]” (GA6.1, 527/96). However, for now it is only

114 Faden gives the following interpretation of the continuity of Heidegger’s thinking from 1929 to the mid-1930s, from Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik to Die Frage nach dem Ding: “The image is itself a thing, and a thing is an image” (G. Faden, Der Schein der Kunst. Zu Heideggers Kritik der Ästhetik, 92; cf. GA9, 467/353).

115 The period from Heraclitus to Nietzsche is marked by changes with regard to the thinking of the image and of the Being of beings. In his reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger repeats what he said in Die Zeit des Weltbildes when he was talking about the history of the image: “The Greek sense of ‘image’ [Bild] – if we may use this word at all – is the ‘coming to the fore’, phantasia, understood as ‘coming to presence’. With the transformations of the Greek concept of Being in the course of the history of metaphysics, the Western concept of the image changes accordingly. In antiquity, in the Middle Ages, in the modern period, ‘image’ is different not only with regard to content and name but also with regard to essence. ‘Image’ means: 1. coming to presence; 2. referential correspondence within the order of creation; 3. representational object.” (GA6.1, 455/29) Heidegger divides the history of the image into three periods; Nietzsche marks the end of the last period when he formulates the poetizing essence of reason (dichtende Wesen der Vernunft). As soon as Nietzsche states that truth is a mere illusion, ‘illusion’ here means ‘image’ or ‘schema’. “Truth is imagining [Wahrheit ist Ein-Bildung]; the word thought now in a Greek way, not ‘psychologically’, not epistemologically in the modern sense [erkennnistheoretisch-neuzeitlich].” (GA6.1, 455/30) During the courses, Heidegger puts everything he has said thus far in even more perspective in a Wiederholung by briefly confronting several thinkers: “Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche are the thinkers in whom the self-conception [Selbstahnung] of the essence of reason as a poetizing force [dichtende Kraft] takes place. Leibniz sees the furthest, albeit not far enough […]. Schelling sees it most passionately [leidenschaftlichste] […]. Nietzsche sees it most clearly, because he presents [stellt] […]
possible for Heidegger to express his wish to save Kant: “The only thing we wish to do and can do here is to concentrate on rescuing this step in Kantian thinking [that is, Kant’s theory of the transcendental imagination. JvG] by noting that it is incomparable [diesen Schritt des Kantischen Denkens ins Unvergleichliche zu retten].” (GA6.1, 527/96)

Perhaps we can say that Kant became interesting for Heidegger when Kant showed, at the beginning of his critical work, the possibility of phenomenology. We remember Heidegger’s faith and trust in Kant as he expressed it in his Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. For Heidegger, Kant did not merely impulsively or unconsciously hit upon the dimension of temporality, although it is perhaps also not purely logical either. Rather, Kant let himself be drawn by the pressure or compulsion (Zwang) of the phenomena themselves. Heidegger’s trust in Kant is based on this, what we might consider Kant’s opting for passivity. Indeed, we should not forget that phenomenology means “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (SUZ, 34/58). Heidegger does not say it, but he must have recognized in the willingness to begin with phenomena (as they show themselves) the “maxim” characteristic for phenomenology; this maxim says: “To the things themselves! [Zu den Sachen selbst!]” (SUZ, 27/50, 34/58) This maxim is not simply demanded by phenomenology; rather, it seems to be a call of the phenomena when they show themselves. If there is a law of phenomenology it is this call, and we read in the protocol to Zeit und Sein that phenomenology is not simply a kind of philosophy, but “something [etwas]” that rests (waltet) in every philosophy. “This Something can best be termed by the saying ‘Zu den Sachen selbst’. (GA14, 54/44-45) In fact, in a crucial text for Heidegger’s concepts of philosophy and metaphysics, namely Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, we read that ‘zu den Sachen selbst’ is a call (Ruf) that functions as a roadsign (Wegweiser). “It is not the matter as such [Sache als solches] that is controversial for the call [Ruf], but rather its presentation [Darstellung] by which the matter itself becomes present [gegenwärtig wird].” (GA14, 79/64)

Although we have briefly dealt in relation to the previous quotes from Sein und Zeit with Heidegger’s search to formulate the problem, we also recognize that Kant is not considered completely passive. He let himself be drawn, but, then, how does one allow oneself to be drawn? We noted Heidegger’s reinscription of Kant’s forms of intuition into phenomenology in the section ‘The Concept of Phenomenon’. Heidegger does not explicitly say it, but his section on ‘The Concept of Logos’ (i.e., the logos of phenomenology) gives us everything from the execution [Vollzug], the ‘action’ of the ‘forming’ force [‘bildenden’ Kraft] itself. Kant, however, sees it most profound [am tiefsten], because he understands the poetizing force in its essential relation to the poetized [zum Gedichteten], to the objectivity of the object [Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände], and at the same time remains surprisingly standing for this most unusual [vor diesem Ungewöhnlichsten], as what reveals the usual and everyday thinking and knowing [als welches sich das gewöhnliche und alltägliche Denken und Erkennen enthält], and so as the only one who had eyes for the abyss [Abgrund], which gaps in the essence of reason.” (GA47, 189)

116 Heidegger’s trust in Kant seems to be based on Kant’s trust in sensibility. Perhaps we can say that the phenomena present themselves first of all like a Zwang or this call. Heidegger will mainly focus on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft; in his Anthropologie Kant continues the discussion in an Apologie für die Sinnlichkeit. Here, a trial is staged in which sensibility is defended against the charges. Although sensibility is “in übhem Ruf”, the poets and the people of taste praise the “merit of sensualizing the concepts of understanding” (ANTH, 143/256). Kant’s judgments are: the senses do not confuse (verwirren), command (Verständigung) or deceive (befrügen) (ANTH, 144-146/257-259). Although it might seem that the reference to poetry is itself a praising of the art form, Kant’s defense against the first verdict points out that poetry and rhetorics are the cause of the confusions (Verwirrungen) for understanding (which Kant repeats in his discussion of geniality in the Kritik der Urteilskraft). Kant explains the last conclusion – which he considers the most important one (wichtigste) – by declaring that it is false to claim that the senses do not always judge right; rather, “they do not judge at all” (ANTH, 146/258). Heidegger never liked the juridical vocabulary used by Kant (who adopted it in the case of the Apology from Baumgarten); nevertheless, this trial in an anthropological setting called for by those who suspect sensibility continues or repeats that set out in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
some indication of the relevance of the imagination for Heidegger’s phenomenology by way of what he writes on Plato and Aristotle. First Heidegger translates logos by Rede, although this is not so much associated with the ratio but with speech. However, this Rede becomes the existential-ontological fundament of speech or language, i.e., Sprache, which, as we see in the Introduction to this book, is already anticipated by Aristotle (cf. SUZ, §34).\textsuperscript{117} Aristotle explicated logos most acutely as apophainesthai: in this speech or discourse (Rede, apophasis) “what is said [was geredet is] is drawn from what the talk is about [aus dem, worüber geredet wird], so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest [offenbar] what it is talking about, and thus makes it accessible to the other party” (SUZ, 32/56). Heidegger briefly points out that logos, Rede, have concretely the character of phoonè or speech: logos as phoonè meta phantasias, i.e., as “an utterance in which something is sighted in each case [stimmliche Verlautbarung, in der je etwas gesichtet ist]” (SUZ, 33/56).\textsuperscript{118} Here, it becomes for the first time clear what the role of the imagination – called by Aristotle ‘phantasia’ – is: something is seen or sighted (gesichtet) in stimmliche Verlautbarung. What is of interest to Heidegger is not so much whether something is seen as this or that, but, rather, that this phantasia also gives something to be seen as something that is, and, as Heidegger adds, because of this the structural form of logos can be that of a synthesis: “Here the sun [of syn-thesis, JvG] has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something – letting it be seen as something [etwas als etwas sehen lassen].” (SUZ, 33/56) The role of the Aristotelian phantasia and synthesis endorsed here in relation to speech seems to (directly or indirectly) anticipate the ascribed function of the imagination in, for instance, Kant (cf. ANTH, 192/299-300), Hegel (cf. GA21, 202; MP, 90-91/78-79)\textsuperscript{119} or Rousset (cf. ED, 15-17/6-8).\textsuperscript{120} Heidegger does not say it, but phenomenology becomes phantasiology.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{117} It should be noted that Heidegger describes in the section mentioned that hearing (Hören) is “constitutive for discourse [Rede]. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening-to… is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.” (SUZ, 163/206; for an interpretation of this passage, cf. PA, 343-365)

\textsuperscript{118} Heidegger indicates that Plato’s struggle with sophistry in his Sophistes (in which Plato also distinguishes the two kinds of mimetic arts (techne mimetike) or of image-making art (eidolopoïikes), namely the eikastike and phantastike) marked the “end of Greece” which at the same time initiated the possibility of modernity (GA50, 103; cf. GA19, 398-403/275-279). Just before Heidegger’s last words in his interpretation of Plato’s Sophistes, he briefly refers to Aristotle’s “sharp and trenchant critique” of Plato’s phantasia. According to Aristotle, imagination (phantasia) is different from both perception and thinking (eieren kai aistheseos kai dianoias), even though it implies perception and is implied by hupolephí, which Heidegger understands as “taking something for something (something as something)”) (GA19, 649/452). Phantasia is not making present (gegenwärtigend), but rather presentification of something (vergegenwärtigen von etwas) as Heidegger calls it. Presentification (vergegenwärtigen) can mean ‘to visualize’, ‘to imagine’, or ‘to conceive’ although it maintains ‘Gegenwart’. Vergegenwärtigen is to make an image of something, while in the case of Gegenwärtigen the object is immediately presented, that is, immediately in the presence of us (cf. GA34, 296). Heidegger says that phantasia is not necessarily a recollection or interiorization (Erinnerung), but a repetition of something that was experienced at one time (GA18, 202). Presentification does not necessarily mean that one is directed toward the inside (“er-innern”); rather, the presentification of a being involves bringing forward this being to the outside. Phantasia means the appearing of what was concealed, of Being. At one moment in his reading of Plato’s Theaetetus, Heidegger refers to Schlieermacher who – according to Heidegger – rightly translated ‘phantasia’ as ‘Erscheinung’, that is, appearance: “[O]ne should not misunderstand this word here in the sense of ‘Schein’. It is the true Kantian concept of ‘Erscheinung’: what shows itself [das Sich-zeigenende]. […] That is the sense of phantasia.” (GA34, 163-164)

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. J.-L. Nancy, La Remarque spéculative : (un bon mot de Hegel), 137.

\textsuperscript{120} Cf. Ch. Howells, Derrida. Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics, 31. When dealing in Logik und die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (1934) with language (Sprache) he declares that the essence of language has
However, Heidegger thinks that a transformation of metaphysics can be found in Kant’s own treatment of what presents itself in intuition, i.e., in *time*, for it is demanded by these phenomena to search for the synthesis of what shows itself (cf. GA21, 346-347; GA23, 239).

The relation between Being and time remained enshrouded in Kant’s philosophy, since he was still too much taken by the philosophical tradition. According to Heidegger, this led him to deny a possible connection between, or even identification of, the ‘I think’ and time. Heidegger will attempt to put philosophy or metaphysics in a new perspective, that is, because Kant was not able to get rid of the traditional ontological conceptions Heidegger is able to understand the philosophical tradition and ‘renew’ or retrieve (*wiederholen*) the ground-laying of metaphysics. The role of history (*Geschichte*) should not be underestimated, for when we look at the first theme from Kant that is brought up by Heidegger, namely, the observation that metaphysics is a “natural predisposition [Naturanlage]”, he interprets this by declaring that nothing takes place *ex nihilo* in a *Grundlegung*. Rather, it “arises from the strength and weakness of a tradition [Überlieferung] that sketches out the possibilities of a beginning [*die Möglichkeiten des Ansatzes*] for itself. With reference to the tradition enclosed in itself, then, every ground-laying is, with reference to what came earlier, a transformation of the same task [*Verwandlung derselben Aufgabe*].” (GA3, 2-3/2) If we have to believe Heidegger, we can only find in Kant an explicit problematization of metaphysics by way of the question of Being and time. Perhaps we can say that in that sense Kant is, as Heidegger suggested in *Nietzsche*, incomparable.

§3. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

Heidegger read the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* as an attempt to ground metaphysics, as the question (to the possibility) of ontology (*metaphysica generalis*): what is the Being of beings? What is it that makes beings into beings, into beings of which we can say that they *are*? The step towards the great metaphysical questions in the *metaphysica specialis* – about the soul, freedom or God – can only be made when one has analyzed this question of Being. In the *metaphysica specialis* one needs to ask what the conditions of possibility of a certain being are as a whole; the question of beings as a whole is eventually answered by referring to a highest being. Kant uses the traditional distinction of *metaphysica specialis* and *metaphysica generalis*, which leads, according to the Wolffian plan, to the three ‘divisions’ of the *metaphysica specialis* that are in the end united in the last and unifying Idea, namely that of God. This *metaphysica specialis*, concerned with what transcends experience as supersensible beings, is for Kant the actual metaphysics, but this analysis has to be preceded by the question of the possibility of a *metaphysica generalis* for determining the limits and possibilities of experience. Or better, it is “thrown back [*zurückgeworfen*] upon the more general question of the inner possibility of a general making-manifest [*Offenbarmachens*] of beings as such” (GA3, 10/7). The relation to beings as ontic knowledge is made possible by a preceding understanding of Being, that is, by ontological knowledge. The *metaphysica specialis* demands a decision on the possibilities of *metaphysica generalis*. As Heidegger points out, in Kant knowledge is still determined by way of judgment, which means for Kant that one judges according to fundamental principles that are not gained experientially (*erfahrungsgemäss*).

Transcendental knowledge will have to decide upon the possibility of *Seinsverständnis*. According to Heidegger, Kant formulates this question as to the possibility...
of ontological knowledge when asking the essential question of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible? Every judgment is synthetic, and every representation should be able to be accompanied by the ‘I think’. However, a synthetic *a priori* judgment is also synthetic in an other sense, namely insofar as the legitimacy of this former synthesis can be ‘brought forth’ (*beigebracht*) from beings themselves. Heidegger speaks of the grounding of the *Rechtmässigkeit* of “these material judgments [sachhaltige Urteile] on the Being of beings” (GA3, 14/9; cf. KRV, B117). This kind of judgment brings forth knowledge (of the object) that is not derived by way of experience, although, as Heidegger says, it is for experience. Hence, this ontological knowledge makes the relation to beings (objects of experience) possible. When Heidegger speaks of the problem of metaphysics, it both means that metaphysics is concerned with a problem (namely, the question of the meaning of Being), and that metaphysics has itself become a problem for Kant by asking for the conditions of possibility of metaphysics, i.e., for the *Rechtmässigkeit* of its judgments.\(^{122}\) The problem of metaphysics demands a fundamental ontology as a ground-laying of metaphysics, that is, with regard to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kant’s project of investigating the conditions of possibility for a *metaphysica specialis* is pushed back in favor of the question of the essence of *metaphysica generalis*. Hence, Heidegger will first have to show that the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* presents itself as a *Grundlegung* (§3.1). This has been his *Ansatz* for the ground-laying of metaphysics. Subsequently, Heidegger underscores that this *Grundlegung* will have to give the delimitation of, what Heidegger calls, the “inner possibilities of metaphysics” (GA3, 2/2). These possibilities need to be investigated with regard to the structure of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in which Kant develops the different faculties that are needed for cognition (§3.2). However, Heidegger will soon emphasize that the distinction between the faculties implies an original unity, and this will brings him to the question of synthesis and schematization (§3.3). This means that Kant wants to uncover the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience, and to put it in more Heideggerian terms, he asks how the Vorverständnis of Being is possible. This possibility will be sought in common root of sensibility and understanding, and, as we noted above, the question of temporality in relation to the understanding of Being (§3.4). This brings Heidegger at the end to the central question of essence of *Dasein* as man, which he approaches by emphasizing its finitude (§3.5). It is as from this finitude that the progress of carrying out the ground-laying begins, or as Kant declares in his *Prolegomena*: the investigations of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* need a reader who does not yet accept anything (i.e., “noch nichts als gegeben zum Grunde legt”) that is outside reason itself (ausser die Vernunft selbst); and without immediately accepting the truth of the positive sciences, this reader will have to unfold (*entwickeln*) *a priori* knowledge “out of its original germs [aus ihren ursprünglichen Keimen]” (PROL, 274/70; cf. KRV, A66/B91; PAD, 445/440).\(^{123}\)

\(^{122}\) Heidegger does not say it, but this became a problem for Kant when dealing with the dreams of Geisterseherei. When distinguishing a transcendental deduction of pure concepts from an empirical one, Kant points out that the latter merely concerns the Faktum from which they evolve and not their legitimacy (*Rechtmässigkeit*) as is the case in the former deduction (KRV, B118). Heidegger indicates that, in Kant, ontology is questioned for its inner possibility, and he adds that ontological knowledge cannot presuppose anything, “least of all the factum [*Faktum*] of the truth of positive sciences” (GA3, 17/11-12; cf. KRV, B128). Heidegger several times emphasizes that an appearance (*Erscheinung*) is for Kant not a phantom (*nicht ein Phantom*) (GA28, 280; GA25, 99), as if there was perhaps still the possibility – although Heidegger probably does not believe it – that time itself is “a mere phantom” (SUZ, 419/472).

\(^{123}\) On the relevance of notion of ‘*Keime*’ in Kant’s critical work, cf. Ph. Sloan, ‘Preforming the Categories: Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant’s A Priori’.
§3.1. The Stages of the Grundlegung

Heidegger announces after the discussion of the starting point (Ansatz) that he will continue with the Durchführung of the Grundlegung (Part 2 of the Kantbuch), but this progress is immediately halted by the call to inspect the “dimension of going back to the [supporting] ground [Dimension des Rückgangs zum tragenden Grunde]” (GA3, 19/13). He begins with the question of the essence of knowing in general (Wesen von Erkennen überhaupt), with a characterization (Kennzeichnung) of this dimension in which he examines “the essence of knowledge in general” and “the place and manner of its field of origin” (GA3, 20/14). As said, Heidegger is interested in finitude when he discloses Kant’s relating of the question of Being to time. According to Heidegger, the only way to understand Kant’s ideas of the human intuition is by ascribing an essential and primordial role to intuition (time). As we have seen in the preceding chapter, divine intuition (intuitus originarius) is dissociated from human, derived, finite intuition (intuitus derivativus) by the suggestion that intuition itself has created in the case of divine knowledge everything that is represented. The receptivity of intuition therefore determines the essence of the finitude of knowledge. Intuition has to be affected in order to be able to represent something. The appearances that show themselves in the intuition of a finite human being become the objects (Gegenstände) of finite knowledge. Infinite knowledge would not have an object in front of itself from which it can take a certain distance, and to which it can conform itself, since everything in intuition is its own creation. Hence, the finitude of knowledge has to be sought in the receptivity of intuition. This implies that “all thinking is merely in the service of intuition” (GA3, 22/15; cf. KRV, A19/B33). Heidegger adds that thinking is the “mark [Siegel] of finitude”, presupposed in our knowledge; thinking is a means (Mittel), which is, as Heidegger concludes, an “essential consequence [Wesensfolge]” of the finitude of intuition (GA3, 24/17). This servitude implies, according to Heidegger, that intuition and thinking have an inner relation, for which Heidegger finds confirmation when Kant states that the “genus [Gattung]” of intuition and understanding is “representation [Vorstellung] in general (repraesentatio)” (KRV, A320/B376).

Only for finite knowledge can there be an object (Gegenstand) as a being that is first of all known as something that stands opposed (Gegen-stand). An appearance (Erscheinung) is not merely an illusion (Schein). Finite knowledge reveals (offenbar macht) the beings that show themselves, i.e., that appear, while absolute knowledge merely presents a being “in its coming-into-Being [Zum-Sein-Kommen]” (GA3, 31/21). The distinction drawn by Kant between the appearance and the thing-in-itself is based on the distinction between finite and infinite knowledge (cf. GA31, 233-236/159-161), which, therefore, expresses a different relation between a being and representation instead of the difference between two objects.124 Heidegger considers the thing-in-itself as that which originates in and from the infinite

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124 A year after the publication of the Kantbuch, Heidegger lectured on Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, where he contrasted Hegel’s understanding of the appearance (Erscheinung) to that of Kant. The real and the true underlies the appearance, and this is understood as a supersensible world. Hence, what appears and shows itself at the same time removes itself. “Now, Kant has another opinion: if and because what we experience is appearance, the object of our knowledge is mere appearance. Hegel puts it the other way around: if what is accessible is appearance, then our true object must be the supersensible.” (GA32, 156; cf. GA3, 26/18) Both Kant and Hegel acknowledge that only absolute knowledge can know the thing-in-itself, but in contradistinction to Kant, Hegel considers it possible that we reach this absolute knowledge where Kant only considers practical insight into the absolute to be possible for the human mind. The section of the Phänomenologie des Geistes in which Hegel speaks about the appearance (‘Kraft und Verstand, Erscheinung und übersinnliche Welt’) is, therefore, “the systematic presentation and foundation of the passage of the metaphysics of Kant’s basis and questioning to the one of German Idealism, of the passage from the finitude of consciousness to the infinity of the spirit [Unendlichkeit des Geistes]; with regard to the specific problem of understanding [des Verstandes]: of the passage from the negative determination of the thing-in-itself to the positive.” (GA 32, 161)
subject. In Kant, the essence of the finitude of knowledge is characterized by its receptivity, which Heidegger translates by saying that finite intuition is hinnehmend of what announces itself as to be received (das Hinzunehmende). Hence, the intuitus derivativus has to be affected (affiziert) by what can be intuited. As we have seen in the previous chapter, an intuited object can only be known when we determine it as it is in general and we represent it in concepts. In a determining, conceptual representation a predicate is attributed to beings. Judgment as the capacity of understanding is therefore a “representation of a representation [Vorstellung einer Vorstellung]” (KRV, A68/B93; GA3, 28/20).

The general and the manifold presuppose two different sources of knowledge. Although Kant many times states that only these two sources (intuition and understanding) are necessary for knowledge, we also read that knowledge can only spring forth from the unification of these two sources. Heidegger concludes from this that the “unity of their unification is nevertheless not a subsequent result of the collision of these elements. Rather, what unites them, this ‘synthesis’, must let the elements in their belonging-together and their oneness [Zusammengehörigkeit und Einheit] spring forth.” (GA 3, 36/25) Whether Kant would have agreed with the interpretation or not, Heidegger concludes that the necessity of the synthesis for knowledge already presupposes an original unity of intuition and understanding. As noted, Kant speaks of a common root of intuition and understanding, and Heidegger wishes to uncover the imagination as that which roots these faculties.

Grounding metaphysics comes down to comprehending the root and the inner possibility of the a priori synthesis. Following Kant’s path, first the two aforementioned elements of knowledge have to be investigated (in the Transcendental Aesthetics and the Analytic of Concepts) before the essence and ground of the original, ontological synthesis can be clarified (Transcendental Deduction). This will not lead to a psychological or logical discipline, but reason will bring itself to light in which the genesis of the essence of human finitude is comprehended from its own ground. Here “lies the projecting anticipation [die entwerfende Vorwegnahme] of the entire inner essence of finite pure reason. […] This projecting freeing of the whole, which an ontology essentially makes possible, brings metaphysics to the ground and soil [Grund und Boden] in which it is rooted as a ‘haunting’ [‘Heimsuchung’] of human nature.” (GA3, 42/29) With regard to the method, it is not surprising that Heidegger speaks of an analysis when dealing with Dasein, that is, of a Daseinsanalytik; this refers to Kant’s use of the term ‘Analytik’ in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft when presenting the analytic of concepts and principles (cf. ZS, 148-149; GA25, 217-219). Heidegger will adopt in the Kantbuch the term ‘Analytik’ as the method for recovering the origin (Methode der Ursprungsenthüllung, cf. GA3, §8) where it is determined as the manner of research in which the origin of the essence of finite reason is investigated with regard to the possibility of synthesis (cf. GA3, 41/28).

§3.2. The Stems of Cognition

After drawing up the characteristics of the field that needs to be investigated – i.e., that of the essence of (the finitude of) knowledge, the Quellgrund for the Grundlegung –, Heidegger says that we will have to begin all over in order to carry out the projection (Entwurf) of the inner possibility of metaphysics: “At this point, the interpretation of the Critique must be revived [erneut] and the leading problem must be affirmed more precisely.” (GA 3, 42/30) The different stages of the Durchführung of the ground-laying unfold or explicate the inner possibility of ontology in which the central question becomes how transcendence is in such a way possible that this transcendence determines the essence of Dasein itself. However, what is meant by ‘erneut’ (renewed, revived)? It reminds us of Heidegger’s preface to Sein und Zeit

125 Taft translates ‘hinnehmen’ as ‘to take things in stride’. 
where he claims that we have to revive the question of the meaning of Being: “So it is fitting that we should raise anew [erneut] the question of the meaning of Being.” (SUZ, 1/19; GA66, 352)126 It is well-known that Sein und Zeit begins with an announcement of an Eleatic Stranger from Plato’s Sophistes when he requests: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’? We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.” (Quoted in SUZ, 1/19) When Heidegger lectured in 1924 on the Sophistes, he stated that the Stranger’s statement has been forgotten “in the rush”, even though the question of Being is “the genuinely central concern of this passage and of the whole dialogue” (GA19, 447/309; cf. GA20, 179/129). This does not mean that this old question of Plato (or Aristotle) will simply be asked again, but, rather, that “the question of Being is henceforth pushed in another beginning [die Seinsfrage künftig in einen anderen Anfang gestossen wird]” (GA66, 352).127 As Heidegger states in his discussion with Cassirer: “I say that Plato’s question must be retrieved. This cannot mean that we retreat to the Greek’s answer. It turns out that Being itself has been dispersed in a multiplicity and that a central problem exists therein, namely, to attain the foundation in order to understand the inner multiplicity of the ways of Being based on the idea of being.” (GA3, 295/206-207) Just before proceeding to the Grundlegung Heidegger again refers to Sein und Zeit after pointing out that time is the Grund of the Grundlegung: “This title contains the guiding idea of the preceding interpretation of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft as a laying of the ground for metaphysics. The idea, however, attested to through this interpretation, provides an indication of the problem of a fundamental ontology. This is not to be grasped as something supposedly ‘new’, as opposed to the allegedly ‘old’.” (GA3, 203/141-142) Here, Heidegger is most clear about the purpose of the Kantbuch: only in a Wiederholung of a ground-laying of metaphysics can what is essential for the ground-laying be acquired or appropriated in an original way (ursprünglich aneignen) (GA3, 203/142). Much earlier Heidegger formulates the implication: “We […] follow the inner movement of the Kantian ground-laying, but without holding to his particular arrangement and the formulation therein. It is worth going back behind these in order to be able to assess the appropriateness, the validity, and the limits of the external architecture of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft based on the most original understanding [dem ursprünglicheren Verständnis] of the inner course of the ground-laying.” (GA3, 43/30)

When dealing with the first stem (pure intuition), Heidegger wants to know how space and time manifest themselves in finite knowledge. In opposition to Kant, Heidegger states that pure intuition – characterized by its receptivity – is also in some sense creative or active, for it must give itself something that can be represented. Spatial and temporal relations represented in intuition are not beings and yet they are not nothing.128 The discovery of space as pure intuition occurs when it is asked how spatial relations are possible.129 Space is not a being, but, rather, it must be represented as that in which Vorhandenes encounter each other; space and time are the “original represented [ursprünglich Vorgestellte]” (GA25, 277/188; GA3,

127 Heidegger also refers in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik to this Preface of Sein und Zeit: “The passage from Plato’s Sophist which opens the study serves not as a decoration, but rather as an indication of the fact that in ancient metaphysics the gigantomachy over the Being of beings has broken out. In this battle, the way in which Being as such comes to be understood – however generally and ambiguously the Question of Being may have been posed there – must already be visible.” (GA3, 239/168)
128 Cf. M. Weatherston, Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant. Categories, Imagination and Temporality, 47: “In these pure intuitions, space and time are given as structural wholes, and these pure intuitions give the foundational structures of empirical intuitions. Space and time are thus both at once something intuited and forms of intuition.”
Space is not discursive, i.e., not the unity of conceptuality, since the different spaces are delimitations (Einschränkungen) of the same space. Heidegger subsequently remarks that Kant says of space that it is “represented as an infinite given magnitude [unendliche Größe gegeben vorgestellt]” (KRV, A25/B39), which first of all means that space makes it possible to speak of a determinate size or magnitude. The infinitude of space indicates that it is not simply a gradual difference between delimiting spaces, but that space as a form is essentially different from these spaces. Because it precedes the partitioning as a delimitable and unified whole (Ganze), the representing of space is a “giving intuiting [gebenes Anschauen]” (GA3, 47/33). We also saw in Kant that time is the form of the (unthematic or non-discursive) awareness of given objects, and the intuition of ourselves, while space is merely the form of outer sense. For Heidegger, this first of all means that time has priority over space. In Sein und Zeit he even states that space needs to be grounded in time (SUZ, 367/418; cf. GA3, 49/34, 199/139; Heidegger later dismissed this reduction, cf. GA14, 29/23). Heidegger makes a big deal of the priority that Kant supposedly attributed to time. “As universal, pure intuition, it [time] must for this reason become the guiding and supporting essential element of pure knowledge, of the transcendence which forms knowledge.” Hence, time is the condition of possibility by which the subject is able to transcend its subjectivity and encounter beings. However, before getting there, Heidegger will have to show that time is at the centre of the problems in the different stages of the Grundlegung; it will reveal itself more originally than the “preliminary sketches [vorläufige Kennzeichnung]” of the Transcendental Aesthetic (GA3, 49/34), which on its term forces Heidegger to determine the “essence of subjectivity in a more original way” (GA3, 51/36).

Ontological knowledge, i.e., pure knowing, is “pure intuition through pure concepts” (GA3, 52/36). Concepts as general representations are applied to many objects; hence, a conceptual representation lets the manifold (given in intuitive representation) correspond in this one representation. This process of Begriffsbildung in which the many is allowed to agree in the one (Übereinkommenlassen von Mehreren in Einen) is called reflection (cf. GA25, 217-240/148-164). Reflection forms (bildet) conceptuality when it keeps the one in view (Heraussehen) that is applicable to the many. As noted, empirical concepts are not Kant’s actual problem, but the reflective determination of pure concepts, since their content cannot be obtained from appearances. Notions are, however, not reflected concepts; rather, they are the essence of reflection: reflecting concepts are “an expression which means reflective representations such that they themselves represent a reflection and have for content such reflection – that is, concepts which in themselves not only come to exist through reflection but also grasp a reflection as such” (GA25, 250/170). A judgment in which something is determined as something entails a reflection in which the representation of unity is found, but this reflection “is only possible in this way if in itself it is already guided by the preliminary reference to a unity in light of which a unifying in general is possible” (GA3, 54/38). On the one hand, they are pure logical forms of actions of understanding (notions), and, on the other, they are original concepts (categories, Urbegriffe) of which the content originates from a pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis. Heidegger is drawing our attention to Kant’s conception

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130 Cf. D.O. Dahlstrom, ‘Heideggers Kant-Kommentar, 1925-1936’, 346. In the first version of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason Kant argues that the representation of an object in space suggests that this object distances itself from the subject (i.e., from the soul and inner sense) as it were hovering (zu schweben scheinen) outside this subject; however, Kant adds, space is itself a representation of which there is no counterpart (Gegenbild) in derselben Qualität found outside the soul (KRV, A385). We will return to the Gegenbild, a form or function of the imagination that remains unmentioned by Heidegger.

131 Heidegger does not say it, but when Kant says that pure concepts that originate from understanding are called notions, this also included the Ideas of reason (cf. M. Weatherston, Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality, 81).
that in the end the categories have to be related to intuition, and as such they cannot be pure logical concepts that solely originate from understanding (cf. GA25, 299-302/204-205).

As we have seen, pure concepts as ontological predicates are derived from the Table of Judgment; however, the origin of this table is itself unknown and remains undiscussed. Heidegger draws a comprehensive conclusion from this: the categories do not originate from this table. As Kant said, the Table of Judgment is used as guidance for the totality of pure concepts, but not for the origin (cf. KRV, A69/B94). It is even impossible to infer (ableiten) the categories from this table, for, as Heidegger writes when discussing the isolated elements of cognition, “the essence and the idea of the category in general has not yet been determined and indeed cannot even be made into a problem” (GA3, 56/40). Because of this, a notion represents one aspect of understanding. However, the subservient relatedness to pure intuition is essential for pure concepts; and here Heidegger takes leave from the notion as a purely logical function as if phenomenology exhausted its possibilities as from the beginning. The categories have a more complicated origin: they originate from reflection as to their form, and they originate from time as to their content. The servitude of understanding is the reason that Heidegger subsequently deals with the unity of pure knowledge. When one concludes that the synthesis is merely a secondary and additional act to that of intuition and understanding, Heidegger will on the contrary maintain that the unity “unites [einigt] the elements as original in such a way that even at first in the uniting, the elements as such spring forth, and through it they are maintained in their unity” (GA3, 58/41). The relation between time and pure concepts indicates that there is a prior unity of these elements. According to Heidegger, Kant gives a first characterization of this original unity in the section ‘Von den reinen Verstandesbegriffen oder Kategorien’ where Kant discusses the synthesis. Heidegger, therefore, calls this section “the key” to the reading of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA3, 59/41).

Heidegger searches for the original, ontological synthesis that expresses the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thinking. Intuition already presents a unified whole, which Kant calls the synopsis, and also the pure concepts are synthetic. The manifold must have been gone through in a certain way to be determinable for thinking. “In it [that is, in the reciprocal preparing of themselves for each other, JvG], both pure elements come together from themselves from time to time; it joins together the seams [Fugen] allotted to each, and so it constitutes the essential unity of pure knowledge.” (GA3, 62/44) Only a mediating third can do this: the transcendental imagination. Heidegger refers here to Kant when the latter writes that “[s]ynthesis in general is […] the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul” (KRV, A78/B103; quoted in GA3, 63/44). Heidegger concludes from this that everything with a synthetic structure is brought about by the imagination. However, Kant immediately adds that the function of understanding is precisely to bring these syntheses “to concepts [auf Begriffe]” because of which understanding can provide knowledge. This does not stop Heidegger from emphasizing that the synthesis of the transcendental imagination is the structural middle that finds the sameness (Selbigkeit) or belonging-together (Zusammengehörigkeit) of the pure synthesis in the Syn-haften of intuition and understanding (GA3, 64/45).132 Heidegger tries to free the interpretation from Kant’s centralization of logic by underscoring its insufficiency for explaining the origin of pure synthesis. Indeed, this pure synthesis can neither be explained within the Transcendental Aesthetic nor within the Analytic of the Concepts. The question is what part of the analysis of

132 Heidegger quotes Kant: “What must first be given to us – with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects – is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the power of the imagination is the second, but even this does not yield knowledge. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthesis, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of a proposed object [eines vorkommenden Gegenstandes], and they rest on the understanding.” (KRV, A78-79/B104)
the ‘separate’ elements – the Transcendental Aesthetics or the Analytic of the Concepts – discusses the problem of metaphysics, that is, the inner possibility of ontology? “This question remains foreign to Kant.” (GA3, 66/47) As Heidegger indicates, his interpretation of Kant will have to free itself from the Architectonics of the *Kritik* and problematize the idea of the transcendental logic; hence, it is here that the categories become themselves a problem for Heidegger when they are presented in Kant’s Analytic of the Concepts under the same heading as notions. Heidegger breaks through the collection or succession of problems raised by the *Kritik* in order to witness the “impetus intrinsic [*inneren Zug*] to the problematic that initially allowed Kant to come to such a presentation” (GA3, 68/48).

§3.3. Synthesis and Schematization

Heidegger underscores that the characterization of ontological knowledge given so far has not ended, for the *Grundlegung* will have to bring to light pure synthesis itself. Nevertheless, it is the “correct beginning [*rechte Anfang*] of the laying of the ground of ontological knowledge” (GA3, 65/46). Although itself blind, the imagination will have to be uncovered here as that which is indispensable for ontological knowledge. This is done in the transcendental deduction of the categories. As has been said in the previous chapter, Kant rewrote this Deduction because of its obscurity. Nonetheless, according to Heidegger, Kant never stopped struggling with the topic as we can also read in the Preface to the second edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in which Kant explicitly leaves it up to the following generation to perfect or complete (zu vollenden) what remained lacking with regard to the presentation (KRV, BLXIII). When Heidegger starts his discussion of the Transcendental Deduction, he emphasizes that his interpretation aims at laying bare (*freilegen*) the “original impetus of the problematic” (GA3, 70/48). Heidegger immediately protests against the juridical character of the deduction: the deduction as a *quaestio juris* transforms the central ontological question of pure synthesis into the ‘juridical’ question of the legitimacy of the categories. Instead of relating pure concepts to time as their fundamental basis, Kant made, according to Heidegger, the terrible choice of a deduction, which only led to a separation of thought and intuition, since the categories are treated as originating solely from understanding. Hence, Kant lost sight of the actual and basic problem, i.e. *transcendence*, when discussing the legitimacy of relating the categories to objects of experience.133

The possibility of being encountered presupposes ontological knowledge, for beings have to be ‘recognized’ (*’erkannt’*) as beings; this is a condition of possibility for something to be opposed to the knowing being. Finite knowledge cannot create these objects; beings that are encountered from out of themselves “can appear as that which stands-against [als Gegenstehendes]. If, however, we are not in control of the Being-at-hand of the being [des Vorhandenseins des Seiende], then precisely the dependency upon the receiving of the same [die Angewiesenheit auf das Hinnehmen desselben] requires that the beings have in advance and at all times the possibility of standing-against. […] And what is it that we, from out of ourselves, allow to stand-against? It cannot be a being. But if not a being, then just a nothing [Nichts].” (GA3, 72/51; transl. mod.)134 Heidegger makes a big deal of the meaning of the German word ‘Gegenstand’ as that which stands opposed to… or against… A letting-stand-

133 Transcendence was thought in *Sein und Zeit* in relation to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This formulation in terms of world or being-in-the-world is absent in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*; nevertheless, transcendence is described in conformity with the topic of the world from *Sein und Zeit*, and it is, therefore, no surprise to read in Heidegger’s work subsequent to the *Kantbuch* that man is Weltbildend (cf. GA29/30), or to read in Heidegger’s notes of the lectures that he gave while working on the *Kantbuch* how he searches in Kant for another notion of world than presented in the Transcendental Dialectic (cf. GA27, 248-304, 310; with regard to *bilden* and *Weltbildung*, cf. GA27, 314, 316).

134 On the *Nichts* in Kant as an *ens rationis*, i.e., an empty concept without object, or *ens imaginarium*, i.e., an empty intuition without object, cf. KRV, A292/B348.
against (Gegenstehenlassen) is therefore better characterized as a nothing; it is the condition of possibility for something as an empirical being to appear in this nothing. Before anything that is given to appear or to show itself as a being, what is given is this: the Gegenstand of pure knowledge is not an empirical being, but a letting-stand-against, so that an object opposed to Dasein presupposes a faculty that lets it stand against...

Hence, transcendence is the condition of possibility of encountering or recognizing an object as an object. Kant writes in the Transcendental Deduction: “And here then it is necessary to make understood what is meant by the expression ‘an object of representations’ [eines Gegenstandes der Vorstellungen].” (KRV, A104) The object is not created by representation itself, but, then, what is the characteristic of what stands against...? The object as Gegenstand first of all reveals itself as what opposes itself, “was dawider ist” (KRV, A104). As we have seen in the preceding chapter, pure thinking precedes this object and makes it possible, for thinking is the preliminary unification of the given by means of concepts. This preceding unity preconditions the objectivity of the object, that is, the object as object. But if these concepts as rules of understanding enable the Gegenstand to stand-against, then it is as if understanding becomes the supreme faculty. A being is only possible or accessible on the basis of a preceding Gegenstehenlassen. However, as Heidegger points out, we noted that the essence of the finitude is sought in intuition, which was underscored by the servile role of understanding. How can understanding be regarded as the supreme faculty while at the same time it is characterized by its servitude? Heidegger responds by stating that this is only correct if understanding regulates empirical intuition: “Only insofar as the pure understanding as understanding is the servant of pure intuition can it remain master of empirical intuition.” (GA3, 76/53) Understanding is superior with regard to empirical intuition when it thinks the rule or concept of what presents itself, but it will never lose its role as a servant of pure intuition, which means that understanding can only be applied to intuition. Transcendence as a possibility to let an object stand against... presupposes a unified horizon, and a union of pure understanding and pure intuition. Beings can only be encountered as beings in this horizon. Kant presents two directions of the transcendental deduction: an objective and a subjective deduction. According to Heidegger, the first proceeds from thinking to intuition, and the second from intuition to thinking, resulting in the position that the faculties presuppose each other. With regard to Heidegger’s criticism of Neo-Kantianism we can add that when the latter tries to deduce all conditions of possibility for cognition from the transcendental apperception by reducing time and space to concepts of understanding, Heidegger will eventually uncover this apperception “as a fundamental determination [Grundbestimmung] of temporality itself” (GA21, 272).

The first path of the deduction (i.e., the objective deduction), thus, focuses on the dependency of understanding on intuition by means of a mediating synthesis of the transcendental imagination. This part of the deduction begins with transcendence: “The character of Being-in-opposition that makes the standing-against possible reveals itself in an anticipatory holding of the unity [Der Charakter des Dawider, der das Gegenstehen ermöglicht, bekundet sich in einem Vorweghalten von Einheit]” (GA3, 78/55). Representing this unity implies at the same time that the act of representing binds itself to this unity as what maintains itself in this act. In Kant this representation of unity is the transcendental apperception that accompanies all representation. Heidegger comprehends this apperception as follows: “The pure understanding, in its original holding of unity before itself [ursprünglichen Sich-vorhalten von Einheit], acts as transcendental apperception.” (GA3, 79/56) Encountering an object implies that the represented unity initially awaits or anticipates (erwarten) the encounter. Heidegger emphasized earlier that the transcendental imagination brings about all synthesis – generating a unity. The presupposed unity that the imagination presents a priori is the means of relating understanding to intuition, or more specifically, to
time (the inner sense). The finitude of understanding is therefore only possible and comprehensible if it includes the transcendental imagination, since this imagination is related to time. This first way makes clear that understanding is only dependent on time by means of the synthesis of the imagination.

The second way (the subjective deduction) begins, as Kant writes, “from beneath”, that is, “with the empirical”. Here, “we will set the necessary connection of the understanding with the appearances by means of the categories” (KRV, A119). According to Heidegger, by way of the subjective deduction Kant shows that intuition cannot do without understanding. Pure synthesis will have to be revealed (offenbar werden) as intermediary or the “mediator [Mittlerin]” (GA3, 82/58). The manifold that is presented in intuition can only be encountered if there is a preceding representation of unity, that is, the connection must be understood beforehand in order to perceive the given manifold as connected. The power to form these relations is the transcendental imagination. “This [previously representing of unity, JvG], if the pure synthesis is to function a priori, must itself be a priori, so that this representing of unity constantly accompanies all forming [Bilden] of unities as invariably one and the same [als unwandelbares Eines und Selbiges].” (GA3, 83/58) This “invariably one and the same” is the transcendental apperception which Kant indeed determines as the “standing and lasting [stehende und bleibende] I (of pure apperception)” (KRV, A123). We will return to this determination of the self. What is shown in both paths of the transcendental deduction is that the transcendental imagination is given a mediating role, not as an occasional or secondary event, but as an essential aspect of experience, making a clear opposition and juxtaposition of the (other) two sources impossible. The transcendental deduction shows the relevance of the mediating and synthesizing power of imagination as a condition of possibility for the essential unity of pure knowledge, i.e., as a horizon of objectivity. That Kant spent less attention to intuition in his Deduction is, according to Heidegger, a clear sign that Kant comprehended the relevance of the transcendental imagination. The categories as rules are the conditions for constituting an objectivity by prescribing the ways in which an object can be recognized. Categories are not isolated notions, for they are essentially related to time because of the imagination.

After discussing the Transcendental Deduction, Heidegger asks for the ground of the inner possibility of ontological knowledge (i.e., of metaphysics). The Transcendental Deduction did not yet establish the foundation of metaphysics in Heidegger’s reading, and he finds confirmation of this interpretation in the fact that Kant proceeded with the transcendental schematism as a way of explicating the applicability of the categories to intuition. Heidegger locates here Kant’s attempt to ground all knowledge in time. At the end of his examination of the chapter on the schematism, Heidegger quotes from Kant’s notes: “In general, the schematism is one of the most difficult points. Even Mr. Beck cannot find his way therein. – I hold this chapter as one of the most important.” (RM, 686; quoted in GA3, 113/80) The horizon in which beings are encountered must have itself the character of an offering (Angebotcharakter) – as we also read in Kant’s Apologie für die Sinnlichkeit from the Anthropologie where he declared that the senses do not command (gebieten) but offer (anbieten) (ANTH, 145/257) – for making beings accessible. “The turning-toward must in itself be a preparatory being-in-mind of what is offerable in general [Die Zuwendung muss in sich ein vorbildendes Sich-vorhalten von Angebothaften überhaupt sein].” (GA3, 90/63) Yet this offering also involves perceivability (Vernehmbarkeit), that is, being capable to immediately receive (hinnehmen). The horizon has to be considered a perceptible offering (als vernehmliches Angebot) or as a pure look (reine Anblick) that precedes and makes possible everything that presents itself, i.e., it makes (re-)presentation itself possible. Hence, a finite creature must form (bilden) by means of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) the pure look or the offering from out of itself and make the horizon intuitable for itself. In the next chapter,
we will have to return to what is meant by Anblick. As we will see, for Heidegger, this look is, as it were, a look directed or offered to us.

But, then, what is this image if it cannot offer a being itself, but only this horizon of transcendence? “The pure power of imagination gives schema-forming [Schema-bildend] in advance the look (‘image’) of the horizon of transcendence.” (GA3, 91/64) In Kant, Heidegger finds the term Versinnlichung, and the horizon is formed in this sensibilization; schematization takes place as sensibilization. The ordinary sense of the word ‘Bild’ means aspect or look (Anblick), one that is offered from and by something. It is the immediate, empirical intuition of a this-there (Dies-da) that shows itself, or a multiplicity of these, for instance, a landscape. “This [landscape] is called a look (image), species, just as it looks to us [gleich als blicke sie uns an].” (GA3, 93/65) Heidegger then makes a distinction: it can be a likeness (Abbild as a likeness with a present thing), a copy (Nachbild as a reproduction of an absent thing), or a model (Vorbild, a model of a being to be created). As we read later in the book, this distinction is not invented by Heidegger, but it is given to him by Kant as we can read in notes from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics. Heidegger’s decision to limit himself to these three images will turn out to be crucial. Kant distinguishes the Abbildung, Nachbildung and Vorbildung without explaining them (VM, 235/53; cf. GA3, 174-175/122), but it is still unclear whether these forms of imagining are sufficient for Kant to comprehend the schematism. Indeed, Kant distinguishes in his lectures the “representations for the sense itself” from “knowledge of the forming force [Erkenntnisse der bildenden Kraft]”. Kant adds that the forces belong to this bildende Kraft des sinnlichen Vermögens (as their genus) – i.e., Abbildungskraft, Nachbildungskraft and Vorbildungskraft – and not to the “thinking power” belonging to understanding (VM, 231/50). But Heidegger continues, and leaves this unnoticed.

Next, Heidegger states that every produced image (Abbild) (like a photograph) shows the thing but should always be considered in its likeness (Abbild) “a transcription [Abschreibung] of what shows itself immediately as ‘image’” (GA3, 93/66). The emphasis is here on ‘immediately’. A photograph presents both a photographed object and the photograph as a photograph (the showing itself). Subsequently a copy (photograph) can be made of a likeness (such as a death mask) – “copy of a likeness [Nachbild eines Abbildes]” – that “is itself an image, but this only because it gives the ‘image’ of the dead person, shows how the dead person appears [aussieht], or rather how it appeared [bzw. aussah]” (GA3, 94/66). The photograph can show how a death mask appears in general, while the death mask itself shows how a face of a dead person appears. But a dead corpse can also present itself, so it is a matter of understanding how the image not only presents something, but also itself as an image.

However, there is a curious twist in the way Heidegger presents here the different imaginings, as Nancy has already pointed out. Heidegger will try to show how the horizon formed in the schematization as the synthesis of Abbildung, Nachbildung, and Vorbildung can bring us to what is primary to the image: the Anblick of what lets itself be seen or imagined. As in the case of a landscape, a look might present or show a multiplicity of Dies-da, of affections of intuition. Because the Abbild is merely a transcription, it not merely represents something else, but it also copies the showing-itself. Hence, what is essential to the image is not the copying, but, rather, the showing-itself, “just as it looks at us”. In the next chapter, we will have to come back to these examples, and the example of the death mask will become especially important insofar as it shows “how the dead person appears [aussieht], or rather how it appeared [bzw aussah]”. As Nancy points out, the Aussehen is similar to the example of the landscape as if it were looking to us, meaning that its look is directed to us. The photograph of the death mask is not merely an Abbild, but a Nachbild of an Abbild. Although

135 J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, 156.
Heidegger discusses the example of the death mask more extensively in the *Logik*, he does not use the example, and as we will see, the choice of the example is not by accident insofar as the photograph of the death mask is not merely an image or even an image of the image, but first of all the image of imagining itself. For now, the distinction between the different images is relevant for relating the imagination and temporality.

Heidegger continues: what is shown in the looks (Anblicke): “Which ‘appearance’ [‘Aussehen’] (eidos, idea) do they now give? What do they now make sensible? In the one which applies to many, they show how something appears ‘in general’.” (GA3, 94/66) A particular thing appears or looks in such a way that it shows itself as an example or possibility of this thing in general. What interests Heidegger is “the range of the possible appearances as such [Umkreis von möglichen Aussehens als solcher], or, more precisely, we have perceived that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how something in general must appear in order to be able […] to offer the appropriate look.” (GA3, 95/67) It is not a matter of mentioning all the special characteristics of a thing, but, rather, like distinguishing the whole of what is meant by the concept of this thing. Because the concept cannot be immediately put into an image as a particular representation – there is no adequate presentation of a concept in immediate intuition – the image must show how something looks in general. Heidegger calls this sensibilization the schema-image that is correlative to the schema; and the concepts are understood as rules for unification that are not solely directed to themselves. He declares on the basis of this that a concept is nothing else than the representation of a regulating unity. We saw that Kant explicitly distinguishes the image from the schema; and we also saw that Kant determines the schema as a pure image, which is irreducible to any image as a representation of a particular object. Even though Kant insists that a schema is not an image, Heidegger claims that the schema is always related to the image, for it still contains an image-character, which is the reason why Heidegger speaks of schema-image (Schema-Bild).

The schemata as products of the transcendental imagination are a priori time-determinations according to rules. “The letting-stand-against of that which is objective and which offers itself [Gegenstehenlassen des sich anbietenden Gegenständlichen], of the being-in-opposition-to [Dawider], occurs in transcendence due to the fact that ontological knowledge, as schematizing knowledge, makes the transcendental affinity of the unity of the rule in the image of time discernible [erblickbar] a priori and therewith capable of being received.” (GA3, 105/74; transl. mod.) The possibility of having an object (Gegenstand) as object – that is, to let it stand opposed to… – presupposes a transcendence as a horizon of objectivity, since ontological knowledge precedes all empirical knowledge and gives a transcendental time-determination of the pure concepts. This is because, in Heidegger’s reading of Kant, the fore-seeing (vor-bildende) procedure, understood as a schema, makes every experience of beings as beings possible. The ability to form (bilden) time in schemata is also the possibility of determining the objectivity of objects that are given to the cognizing act. Hence, a synthesis of pure intuition and pure concepts, creating a horizon of objectivity (transcendence) and enabling these objects to be determined as objects, precedes any particular presentation of an object. Or as Heidegger puts it: “The synthetic judgments a priori are transcendental time-determinations.” (GA25, 162/111)
Heidegger ends the section on the transcendental schematism by discussing one of the individual schemata, namely that of substance. The first Analogy of Experience needs to be involved in this reading: the schema of substance is permanence or persistence (Beharrlichkeit). Like in Die Frage nach dem Ding, Heidegger leaves the second and third Analogy aside. What is aimed at here is comprehending what the schematic representation (the time-determination) of substance is, and as Kant writes: “The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of the empirical time-determination in general, which therefore endures while everything else changes.” (KRV, A144/B183) Substance is what forms the ground of something, which underlies it as subsistent. The representation of this as the schema of the category ‘substance’ has to present itself in a pure image of time. Time shows its own permanence, since time – as a pure sequence of nows – is always now. For this reason Kant says of time that it lasts and does not pass itself. In Vom Wesen der Freiheit, Heidegger writes that a category expresses a “modus of being-in-time [Modus des In-der-Zeit-seins]” (GA31, 188/131). Hence, because of its immutable character, “time gives the pure look of something like lasting in general. As this pure image (immediate pure ‘look’), it presents that which forms the ground in pure intuition.” (GA3, 107/76)

However, Kant does not clarify the full content of the category ‘substance’. Heidegger, therefore, needs to continue his investigation of the determination of time as a sequence of nows. Time has to present the relation of substance – substance as a category of ‘relation’ – in the pure image. As a pure image of what lasts throughout the changes, time also gives “the image of pure change in what lasts” (GA3, 107/76). Beings pass away in time but time itself does not; this is presupposed in understanding the permanent. Only against this background of time as a means of differentiating homogeneous nows (for in the sequence of nows, time is ‘now’ at every instance of ‘now’) can substance be related in the given example to intuition as a way to reveal the presence of objects. The schematism determines the ontological characterization of knowledge by describing the use of pure concepts as a priori determinations of time, i.e., by giving the possibility for an object to be known as object, since it presents a preliminary view of the categories – such as substance – so that an object can show itself in this view as a pure image – in this case permanence – as invariable through change. Here, we recognize Heidegger’s central problem, namely the problem of the as-phenomenon. Time, then, corresponds in appearance to what is immutable, that is, time turns out to be the condition of possibility of the objectivity of objects and of knowing these objects. It defines finitude by giving a preliminary enclosedness (vorgängige Umschlossenheit) to transcendence, or, to put it differently, it is the pure ontological horizon in which a being can be given as a being. As such, time makes it possible that something stands in opposition to a finite being (Dasein) and also that this opposition is perceivable for this being. The Vorbildung will turn out to be essential and primordial here, since a category gives a representation (Vorstellung) as a foreseeing rule that makes every cognition possible.

Heidegger continues with the theme of the ontological subsumption of bringing objects to concepts, because the problem of the schematism is precisely that of subsumption. Kant never neglected the difference between the logical subsumption as an act of bringing objects under concepts (unter einen Begriffe bringen) and the pure synthetic act (performed by the transcendental imagination) of bringing to concepts (auf Begriffe bringen). The real problem of the schematism has to do with bridging the heterogeneity of pure concepts (categories) and pure intuition (time), which is not necessary in the analytical judgment

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136 Kant introduced the distinction earlier in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: “By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept (an operation of which general logic treats). On the other hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to bring to concepts, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations.” (KRV, A78/B104)
because general logic suffices for bringing two representations under one concept. Heidegger then adds that in the transcendental schematism the categories are formed (bilden) as categories, because schematization is the condition of possibility for objectivity by forming unities that represent notions. The question of the application involves the isolation of the very essence of categories from pure intuition. Herewith the problem of the application of the categories turns into the problem of the essence of the categories themselves, so that now Heidegger has to deal with the formation of categories. Representing conceptually involves a generality that has to be formed, which is for Heidegger the problem of the transcendental schematism. The generality of the pure concepts themselves, then, becomes the problem, for what character of generality do they have – as conditions for ontological knowledge – when the heterogeneity does not allow Kant to say that they are merely of another level of abstraction (as a higher degree of an ontic genus)?137

What has been reached this far is gathered together by Heidegger in an attempt to fully determine ontological knowledge. Again he bases himself on Kant, this time on the grounds of Kant’s formulation of the “highest principle of all synthetic judgments” as presented in the chapter subsequent to that of the schematism (KRV, A154-158/B193-197). This chapter shows that the highest principle is the central determination of ontological knowledge and of the essence of transcendence. First, there is the aspect of transcendence or transcending (hinausgehen) of the concept to “something entirely different [etwas ganz anderes]”. The altogether other of understanding is intuition, and the synthetic act will have to transcend the concept to what is the other of, and heterogeneous to, this concept. As Heidegger repeatedly indicates in the line of Kant’s argument (and contrary to Kant’s own use of the term ‘transcendence’), transcendence is here not the illegitimate (non-empirical) use of the categories beyond the realm of intuition, but the application of these concepts to intuition itself where time determines the field for this legitimate, empirical use. Second, as Kant points out, “a third thing [ein Drittes] is necessary in which alone the synthesis of two concepts originate” or a “medium [Medium]”, and its form can only be that of time (KRV, A155/B194). Third, as Heidegger will read it, the transcendental imagination is the originary temporality that constitutes or forms the common root of intuition and understanding. In that sense, we have seen that the transcendental schematism is a transcendental time-determination of a category. The third term is, then, not an additional faculty besides the others that subsequently gathers the heterogeneity of intuition and understanding; the imagination as the third will have to occur as the source or root of what appears to be one or a unity as from the beginning, so that transcendence is always already transcendence in/of immanence.138 However, we still have to see the identification of temporality and imagination in Heidegger.

Kant ends his chapter on this highest principle by concluding that “the conditions for the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience” (KRV, A158/B197). The possibility of experience is also what gives objective reality to all knowledge; as we have seen, this possibility is precisely transcendence. This transcendence to the wholly other is only possible if there is a third, a medium or milieu, which Heidegger then identifies as time; the horizon enables an object to be perceived as an object, as an object (Gegen-stand) that is opposed to knowing. This horizon is the horizon of objectivity. When asking for the third as the medium of all synthetic judgments, Kant responds that it “is only one totality [Inbegriff] in which all of our representations are contained, namely inner sense and it is a priori form, time. The synthesis of representations rests on the imagination, but their synthetic unity (which is requisite for

137 Heidegger adds to this that this comes down to asking: “What does the ‘generalis’ mean in the characterization of Ontology as Metaphysica Generalis? The problem of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the question concerning the innermost essence of ontological knowledge.” (GA3, 111)

judgment), on the unity of apperception.” (KRV, A155/B194) Here the triad of intuition (time), imagination and apperception reappears, indicating according to Heidegger that the initial successive constructing of the previous chapters does not hold any longer; instead, these three elements are necessary for comprehending the essential unity of transcendence in relation to finitude.

Heidegger formulates this transcendence – conceptualized by Kant as going beyond the concepts to something wholly different – in terms of “a constant standing-out-from… (Ecstasis) [ein ständiges Hinaustehen zu… (Ekstasis)]” that, “precisely in standing, forms [bilden] and therein holds before itself – a horizon” (GA3, 119/84). The formed or imagined horizon of objectivity makes experience possible as well as the encounter with a being (object). It makes it possible by letting the object stand against it in which the possibility is formed to relate to a complete other, and, because of the horizon, transcendence makes it possible to recognize this object as an object. It is first of all known for its Dawider. This transcendence that precedes the encounter of an object is formed by ontological knowledge. But, then, what is known and formed in ontological knowledge is not an object as in the case of the intuitus originarius; rather, what is formed as the known of knowing is nothing, or as Kant called it ‘X’. Kant introduces this X (Something, Etwas, the object in general or transcendental object) in the Transcendental Deduction. In order to receive, ontological knowing must give itself something beforehand that has the character of objectivity, of an object in general; it forms or imagines (bildet) a horizon in which beings can be encountered and known as objects. This transcendental object = x is not an appearance. However, Heidegger explains that what appears (das Erscheinende) is the “unknown X, the transcendent object which must underlie the appearances. Of this X, then, we say that ‘it’ appears [sofern es sich zeigt], albeit not as it is in itself [also nicht X ist]. While the object X is utterly empty, it is still, in its emptiness, not sensible nor intelligible. It is negatively intelligible and unknown in any further aspect. The X is the intelligible object. It is what is intelligible about the object [das Intelligible am Gegenstand] (this in a universal ontological sense).” (GA31, 250-251/170) We know nothing of this transcendent object besides that it “can serve only as a correlate of the unity of apperception for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that in the concept of an object” (KRV, A250). We cannot know it because it is simply not given as an object of cognition, but as an object in general, that is, as a pure horizon: “Ontological knowledge ‘forms’ transcendence, and this forming is nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the Being of the being becomes discernable [erblickbar] in a preliminary way.” (GA3, 123/87) This ontological knowing only serves the finite knowledge by making possible both experience and the showing of objects to a finite being.

§3.4. The Transcendental Imagination as Root

The last stage of founding metaphysics as metaphysica generalis has been reached in formulating the principle of all synthetic judgments a priori. Heidegger begins his next step with a brief analysis of the transcendental imagination. Because Kant comprehends the imagination as a power that belongs to the faculty of intuition, as a power to make intuitable or of sensibilization without the presence of the object, this power has no direct relation to beings. Heidegger concludes from this that the imagination gives itself the looks as a power of forming (Vermögen des Bildens) and as a power to give (Vermögen des Gebens). This power is understood as both receptive and spontaneous, as belonging to the faculty of intuition because of its receptivity, which is essentially a Hinnehmen, while it also forms images for itself. As a spontaneous power, the imagination does not lose its intuitive character. Kant situates the imagination on the side of intuition, but, nevertheless, its receptive-spontaneous character makes it the perfect power to fall between intuition and understanding as the third
term. “The productive power of imagination in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft never refers to the forming of objects, but refers instead to the pure look of objectivity in general. The pure productive power of imagination, free of experience, makes experience possible for the first time [allererst].” (GA3, 132-133/93) Hence, as from the beginning, the imagination is not dependent upon the presence of beings; rather, it pre-figures or pre-forms, i.e., it foresees in the schematization the look of the horizon of objectivity even before the encounter of a being. What the transcendental imagination forms, is not something at hand (not an object), but the horizon and the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis). This anticipates his initial attempt to determine time “as the horizon for the understanding of Being [Seinsverständnis], and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being [als Sein des seinsverstehendes Daseins]” (SUZ, 17/39).

Heidegger continues his reading of Kant by opting for the possibility of identifying the third term with the common root of the two other powers of knowledge. Several times Kant speaks about a triad of indispensable elements. The first two sources of course correspond to the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, but, then, according to Heidegger the “transcendental power of imagination is homeless [heimatlos]” (GA3, 136/95). It is remarkable that Kant does not deal with the imagination as belonging to the faculty of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic. As a power alongside the other two, the transcendental imagination is introduced, according to Heidegger, from the inner problematic of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, that is, from the need to think transcendence, not merely by means of two pure and isolated faculties, but by analyzing it in terms of the original unity of the two that go beyond themselves as drawn up by a third. The transcendental imagination is precisely this original unifying power. As stated, contrary to Kant’s own indecision, Heidegger wonders whether this power is not precisely the root that Kant mentioned in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft: “What if this original, formative centre was that ‘unknown common root’ of both stems?” (GA3, 137/96) Both this root and the transcendental imagination are described as being unknown. If the transcendental imagination is indeed this unknown common root, then both pure intuition and pure understanding lead back to the imagination; it would also explain more clearly what the original unity of the two stems is. As rooted in the structure of transcendental imagination, the two other sources are not merely imaginary, but, rather, imagination can only and for the first time form something “in structural unity with those two” (GA3, 138/97). In order to show this, Heidegger returns to the separate faculties in order to show in what sense the transcendental imagination is indeed the root. The task is not restricted to these two stems, for Heidegger will also try to explore the critical distinction between cognition and morality in relation to the question of finitude, i.e., the transcendental imagination.

§3.4.1. Transcendental Imagination and Pure Intuition

As we have seen above, pure intuition as an original representation is formative (bildend) in the sense that it represents the look of space and time as a manifold totality. Hence, pure intuition receives “the look, but in itself this receiving is the formative self-giving of that which gives itself [aber dieses Hinnehmen is in sich gerade das Bildende Sichselbstgeben des sich Gebenden]. According to their essence, the pure intuitions themselves are ‘original’, i.e., presentations of what is intuitable which allow [something] to spring forth [entspringenlassende Darstellung des Anschauhbaren]: exhibitio originaria. In this presenting, however, lies the essence of the pure power of imagination. Pure intuition, therefore, can only be ‘original’ because according to its essence it is the pure power of imagination itself which formatively gives looks (images) from out of itself.” (GA3, 141/99; transl. mod.) Pure intuition is a condition of possibility of every representation. Kant would probably disagree with Heidegger’s reading when the latter concludes that pure intuition as pure imagination
gives itself the looks or images, for he usually emphasized solely the receptivity of intuition. Heidegger on the other hand stresses the unifying act of intuition – as is more thoroughly analyzed in the Transcendental Deduction – indicating that it gives unity as a form in which experience takes place. This ‘giving’ is what relates pure intuition to pure imagination as a result of which Heidegger refuses to treat pure intuition as merely receptive.

Instead of dealing with intuition as a mere form, Heidegger discusses the synthesizing act of pure intuition: synopsis. Kant dealt with “the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense” in the Transcendental Aesthetic (KRV, A94n; cf. GA3, 142/100). In his Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Heidegger calls this kind of synthesis ‘syndosis’, a term that Kant never used but that Heidegger introduces in order to underscore that time and space – at least in his reading – “give the manifold as an original togetherness from unity as a wholeness. […] By this syndosis, which belongs to unity as wholeness, space and time are first of all given as intuitions, i.e., as what is purely intuited, while the unity that belongs to the sun of syndosis – and thus this syndosis or synopsis itself – belongs to space and time and not to the concept of understanding.” (GA25, 135/96)

Understanding does not form this synopsis or syndosis – since it is not a conceptual synthesis – but it is a unity that is only possible in the transcendental imagination. Space and time form the pure look as a horizon in which something can be intuited; Heidegger goes even further by stating that pure intueting is pure imagination. When Kant says that space and time are not themselves intuitable objects, he adds in parenthesis ‘ens imaginarium’. Heidegger concludes from this merely negative formulation (pure intuition is itself not intuited, i.e., a being of the imagination, ens imaginarium) that they are pure imagination (Imagination) itself.139 Space and time are intuited in the manner of a formative giving (Gebung). The preparatory character of the Transcendental Aesthetics can only be comprehended from the perspective of the transcendental schematism, since now it is clear to Heidegger that pure intuition is pure imagination: a preliminary forming of a pure image.

§3.4.2. Transcendental Imagination and Theoretical Reason

Contrary to the Marburg School and more explicitly Natorp, Heidegger questions the attempt to interpret space and time as categories of understanding by showing that pure understanding is also rooted in the transcendental imagination. However, as Heidegger confesses, his goal seems absurd when he aims at showing that understanding springs forth from out of sensibility, i.e., transcendental imagination, for Kant always placed the imagination on the side of the sensibility and not on that of the higher faculties (understanding, judgment and reason). His analysis initially begins with the observation that thinking and intuiting are not two separate faculties, but they belong as representations to the same genus of representation (Gattung des Vor-stellens) as ways of ‘representing of…’ Next, the dependency upon intuition (by way of the transcendental imagination) is emphasized again as the core of understanding. Even so, understanding is traditionally (and also in Kant) treated independently from both intuition and imagination by determining pure concepts as notions; but, as Heidegger constantly underscores, the essence or Being of understanding is that it has to turn to intuition, and the schemata are presented as a means for this relation. When Kant speaks about the schematism of understanding, the transcendental imagination generates these schemata, but Heidegger goes even further when stating that the schematism constitutes the essence of understanding, or better, pure understanding is itself transcendental imagination.

How does Heidegger reach this conclusion? Does the Transcendental Deduction and the Doctrine of Schematism not show that the treatment of understanding and judgment are

139 In his lecture on Hölderlin from 1942 Heidegger declares: “Is, then, space […] merely a subjective imagination [Einbildung] of human beings, nothing that is ‘as such’ ‘somewhere’ present at hand? […] We block ourselves from taking space and time as mere ‘subjective’ images [Gebilde].” (GA53, 56)
“artificially isolated elements of the pure synthesis” (GA3, 149/104)? Pure understanding is the ‘I think’ that accompanies as pure self-consciousness all the representations and can only be conceived as an Idea. Consciousness (Bewusst-sein) of the self can only be comprehended based on the Being (Sein) of self and not the other way around. The completeness of understanding can only be thought by reason by means of a regulative Idea without which a coherent application of understanding would be impossible. As we have seen, Kant explicitly denied the influence of the imagination, for this regulation acts differently “with the creatures of imagination” (KRV, A570/B598). Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes from this that this remark only applies to the empirical imagination while nothing is said about an involvement of the transcendental imagination.

Still, the essential servitude of understanding does not yet imply that pure understanding is rooted in the transcendental imagination. Heidegger has to show that pure thinking – understanding and reason as spontaneity – must have an element of receptivity. Imagination is characterized by both aspects: receptive and spontaneous. As we have seen above with regard to intuition as receptivity, Heidegger then emphasized a spontaneous moment in intuition, concluding that pure intuition is pure imagination. This time he is out to show that pure reason is always pure sensible reason because transcendence is always already sensible, and in order to do this Heidegger focuses in contradistinction to traditional logic on what he considers the essence of understanding as the power of rules; it means “to hold before us in advance the represented unities which give direction to every possible unification that is represented” (GA3, 150/105). Every representation is accompanied by the ‘I think’ of the subject: ‘I think substance’, ‘I think causality’, etc. But then how to comprehend the thought that understanding works with schemata without bringing them forth? It is clear by now that Heidegger will conclude that this schematizing act is not an additional act, but, rather, that it forms the essence of understanding as the ‘I think substance, causality, etc.’ “As representing which forms spontaneously [als spontan bildende Vorstellung], the apparent achievement of the pure understanding in the thinking of the unities is a pure basic act of the transcendental power of imagination.” (GA3, 151/106) The only way to come to this conclusion is when Heidegger can show the essential intuitive character of pure thinking, that is, the necessity of receiving. The transcendental apperception is constantly confronted with a Being-in-opposition (Dawider). “If something, such as a ruling rule, is only there in the receiving letting-be-ruled [im hinnehmenden Sich-regeln-lassen], then the ‘Idea’ as representation of the rule can only be represented in the manner of something which receives things.” (GA3, 154/108; transl. mod.) The categories are not always already present in consciousness, but are formed by the imagination as a spontaneous forming act of representing. Hence, categories replace the notions as pure logical rules and they find their basis in the transcendental imagination. Pure intuition is spontaneous receptivity; pure thinking is receptive spontaneity. The transcendental imagination forms or projects (entwirft) the totality of possibilities from which the objects in general are known.

§3.4.3. Transcendental Imagination and Practical Reason

Heidegger does not end with theoretical reason but continues his reading with the attempt to also ground practical reason in the transcendental imagination. The relevance of this chapter should not be underestimated, for, as both Derrida and Sallis underscore, traditionally the imagination “finds itself limited and once again put into question by practical reason” (T, 65).140 We already saw signs of this in the previous chapter when Kant suppressed the role of the transcendental imagination in the Dialectic, and this repeats itself in the Typik. Heidegger begins with a quote from Kant: “Everything is practical that is possible through freedom.”

140 Cf. J. Sallis, Delimitations, 12.
In later texts, Heidegger will try to show that the problem of transcendence is precisely the problem of freedom (cf. GA26, 210/165; GA9, 175/135). Understanding the relevance of the problem of freedom for the _Kantbuch_ would explain why Heidegger wrote extensively about freedom immediately after finishing this book – in _Vom Wesen des Grundes_ (1929), _Vom Wesen der Wahrheit_ (1930) and _Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit_ (1930). Instead of dealing with transcendence by way of the question of freedom, we will mainly limit ourselves to the practical as discussed in the _Kantbuch_, and, more specifically, to respect (Achtung). Derrida never explicitly dealt with the questions regarding respect and imagination in his published work, although he does point out that he has examined “Heidegger’s reading of ‘respect’ as related to the transcendental imagination” in one of his seminars. He tried to show that, though “the authority of the law seems to exclude all historicity and empirical narrativity, and this at the moment when its rationality seems alien to all fiction and imagination – even the transcendental imagination – it still seems a priori to shelter [offrir a priori son hospitalité à] these parasites” (PDL, 108/190).

As we have seen, this part is clearly a thorn in Cassirer’s side, since in discussion with Heidegger he constantly attempts to underscore the unconditional moral law. Cassirer argues that Heidegger loses sight of Kant’s central problem because of his restriction to the question of finitude. According to Cassirer, the actual problems are that of the conditions of possibility of freedom. But we have to realize that when discussing practical reason – and a year later Kant’s notion of freedom in _Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit_ – Heidegger does not want to argue against Kant for the priority of the theoretical over the practical; instead, he wants to find the common ground or root in Kant’s work from which both theoretical and practical reason can be understood, or the common root “of both intuition, theorein, as well as of action [Handeln], praxis” (GA26, 236/184). A further reason for bringing up the practical is because Heidegger finds here the actual and central characteristic of subjectivity as thought by Kant. In his reading of Kant from 1927, Heidegger claims that neither the _personalitas transcendentalis_, nor the _personalitas psychologica_ fully express the subjectivity of the ‘I’; in Kant’s philosophy the actual subjectivity is the _personalitas moralis_ (cf. GA24, 186/127). Heidegger discusses the difference between _res extensa_ and _res cogitans_ by way of an examination of Kant’s notion of the ‘I’ when he distinguishes the person from the thing. Kant considers the ‘I’ the ground of all beings as what makes all perceivedness possible. This _res_ is further defined by means of the respect of this ‘I’ for the moral law. But what Heidegger tries to make clear in his lectures of 1927 is that in the end Kant is unable to specify what the Being of this ‘I’ is, for he still holds on to the thought that the moral ‘I’ is a thing, a _res_. In radicalizing Kant’s concept of respect as the moral feeling in the _Kantbuch_, Heidegger attempts to reformulate the _Dasein_ not in terms of subject or subjectivity, but in those of a finite transcendence (both receptive and spontaneous) and the transcendental imagination.

The question for Heidegger is: what is the role of the transcendental imagination and temporality in Kant’s ethics? As we have seen, Kant deliberately tried to exclude the imagination from his ethics: “[O]ne cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all morality as the mere phantom of a human imagination overstepping itself through self-conceit [durch Eigendünkel sich selbst übersteigenden menschlichen Einbildung] than by granting them that concepts of duty must be drawn solely from experience […]” (GMS, 407/62). Here

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142 On the unconditional or unconditioned, _das Un-bedingte_, in Heidegger, cf. GA41, 8/8: “For the condition of being a thing, which conditions the thing as a thing, cannot itself again be a thing, i.e., something conditioned [Sie, die das Ding zum Ding be-dingt, kann selbst nicht wieder ein Ding sein]. The thingness must be something un-conditional [Die Dingheit muss etwas Un-bedingtes sein].”
again we see that Kant refuses to root practical reason in the imagination (Einbildung). What Heidegger then tries to elucidate is the essence of the practical self. Its essence lies in self-consciousness. In the case of the moral self-consciousness – the person – Heidegger will attempt to show the extent to which it is concerned with the transcendental imagination. Kant determines this moral self (personality) as the “idea of the moral law alone, together with the respect [Achtung] that is inseparable from it” (REL, 28/76; quoted in GA3, 156/110). Here we see that according to Kant, respect is essential for the personality and the moral law. The moral self-consciousness has to have a feeling in order to distinguish it from theoretical self-knowledge. I have to reveal myself in actions in a non-sensible determination of myself. The personalitas moralis has to manifest itself (to itself) in a moral feeling: respect. Personality is furthermore understood as a rational and accountable being that gives the unconditional, universal law to itself, submitting the individual will to it. Respect is then the willingness to be subjected to this moral law, that is, respect is always respect for the moral law.

The law in question is not a particular law, but the law as such, that is, that which makes a law into a law. Respect is the feeling (Gefühl) – a “self-produced feeling [selbstgewirktes Gefühl]” (GMS, 401n/56n) – that makes the law manifest to the moral subject. It belongs as a feeling to sensibility, although outer influences do not determine respect as a self-produced feeling; this is reserved for a concept of reason (the moral law). A phenomenological examination of feeling shows that a feeling also involves that one feels feeling: in the feeling the self is manifest as what feels (cf. GA6.1, 48/51, 99-100/98-99). Respect as a feeling therefore also involves that the respecting ‘I’ becomes manifest to itself. This does not mean that the law is grounded in this pure feeling; rather, the respecting feeling for the law is the manner in which the law can be encountered. This respect refers to the person, that is the moral self, for at the same time, the feeling of respect feels itself and reason gives itself the law for which respect is respectful. The ‘I’ becomes manifest as pure reason when submitting itself to the self-imposed law: as an autonomous creature. In respecting the law the self is authentically Being-its-self (Selbstsein), that is, the self reveals itself not merely as a general knowing of a self, but “as in each case mine, the ego as in each case the individual factual ego [das Selbst als je meines, das Ich als das jeweils einzelne faktische Ich]” (GA24, 194/137). This feeling of respect constitutes practical reason insofar as Heidegger understands this respect as the manner of being-responsible for oneself, or better, “face to face with itself [des Selbsts sich selbst gegenüber]” (GA3, 159/111; cf. GA31, 262-263/182-183). But Heidegger draws a further conclusion from this: “[I]t makes it clear that the concept of feeling in the sense of an empirically intended faculty of the soul has disappeared, and into its place has stepped a transcendental, basic structure of the transcendence of the moral self. The expression ‘feeling’ must come to be understood in this ontologico-metaphysical sense if we are to exhaust what Kant means by the characterization of respect as ‘moral feeling’ and as ‘feeling of my existence’. No further steps are now required in order to see that this essential structure of respect in itself allows the original constitution of the transcendental power of the imagination to emerge.” (GA3, 159/111-112).

In the following chapter, we will have to return to this discussion, and specify what Kant means with this ‘feeling of my existence’. For Heidegger this means that the transcendental imagination is presupposed in practical reason as the ground of finitude. Respect as a feeling should not be understood in empirical terms, but has primarily a metaphysical bearing now. It expresses the transcendence of the moral self, or rather, it shows the formative power of the imagination as the root of the practical self; the self-submitting is receptive and the law-giving capacity of reason is spontaneity.143

143 For a more extensive interpretation of this section, cf. F. Calori, “‘Le dernier pas’: Kant, Heidegger, et la question du respect”.
§3.4.4. Kant’s Shrinking Back From the Root

Even though the presentation of the transcendental schematism in Kant’s philosophy is only brief, Heidegger considers it to be the core of Kant’s work in which the essence of ontological knowledge and transcendence is determined. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Kant abandoned his theoretical analysis of the schematism – and continued the chapter with determining the individual schemata – for arbitrary reasons: it would become too dry and tedious. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s opinion is not that this is the only reason why Kant abandoned a further discussion. For Heidegger it is clear: Kant must have seen the transcendental imagination as the unknown root, but he drew back from it. ‘Unknown’ here does not merely mean to Heidegger that it is simply beyond all knowledge, but “it is what pushes against us as something disquieting [als das Beunruhigende] in what is known” (GA3, 160/112). According to Heidegger, Kant’s shrinking back (Zurückweichen) from this root is manifest in the re-written parts of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* where the role of the transcendental imagination was diminished in favor of understanding.144

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger stated that Kant still held on to the Cartesian idea of an isolated subject – *res cogitans* – when he did not clarify the phenomenon of the world, and sought for a proof for the existence of things outside the subject in a Refutation of Idealism (cf. SUZ, 204/248). Heidegger criticizes the philosophical tradition for demanding or expecting this proof without a clear analysis of what is meant by world (being-in-the-world). With Kant’s unquestioned affirmation of the distinction and unity of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (of the subject), Kant implicitly still subscribed to the Being of the ‘I’ as a thing or a reality of the *res cogitans*. Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world and, hence, fell back into the Cartesian position of an isolated subject that merely accompanies representations (cf. SUZ, 317-321/364-368). Because of his analytic of the subjectivity of the subject and the supposed continuation of the Cartesian position, Kant was unable to have insight into the problem of temporality (*Temporalität*) and to fully work out the structure and function of the schematism as a transcendental time-determination. Kant did not see the actual relation between time and the transcendental apperception (cf. SUZ, 23-24/45).

In *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Heidegger tries to show that there are some traces in the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that indicate that Kant had the transcendental imagination in mind as the original root and ground for knowledge, but he eventually shrank back from this thought – or, as Heidegger puts it, he shrank back from the “abyss” (GA3, 168/118). In the second edition the place of the transcendental imagination is revalued and reassessed in favor of understanding. First of all, Kant left out two passages in the second edition because of the re-written Transcendental Deduction in which he explicitly mentions three fundamental powers instead of two (KRV, A94, A115). Next, in his own copy of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* Kant changed the phrase with regard to the transcendental imagination, stating that it is an “indispensable function of the soul”, into “indispensable function of understanding” (KRV, A78/B103; VN, 45; cf. GA3, 161/113).145 We can wonder whether Kant’s use of the term ‘understanding’ is different from the one that is regularly used in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; instead, perhaps Kant is using the term as in, for instance,

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144 In a crucial passage from *Was ist Metaphysik?* we read that in Angst lies a Zurückweichen vor… This is not a fleeing, as Heidegger emphasizes, but, rather, “eine gebannte Ruhe” in which the Zurück vor… takes its Ausgang from the Nichts. Although we cannot continue this reading, it should be noted that Heidegger discusses here the *Nichtung* of das Nichts: “Das Nichts selbst nichtet.” (GA9, 114/91) To think or imagine “nothing” – starting with the question why beings are and not nothing – is impossible when one asks for “nothing itself”. The “formal concept of the imagined nothing [des eingebildeten Nichts]” is not “nothing itself” (GA9, 109/87), so here the question touches upon its limit. What is (Seiend) is the itself-forming-form (sich bildende Gebilde), i.e., what presents itself as such in an image, Aussehen, eidos or look (das als solches im Bilde (Anblick) sich darstellt) (GA9, 119/94).

his Über Pädagogik where he distinguishes the lower powers of understanding (senses, imagination, etc.) from the higher powers of understanding (understanding, judgment, reason). Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, changing ‘soul’ into ‘understanding’ means here that not all syntheses are any longer ascribed to the transcendental imagination, but also to understanding, that is, the imagination becomes merely a function of understanding. The synthesis generated by the imagination becomes nothing else than the synthesis related to intuition.

The reason for shrinking back from the transcendental imagination for the ground-laying of metaphysics is already present in Kant’s transcendental deduction that was first divided into a subjective and an objective deduction of the categories. The deduction asks for the inner possibilities of transcendence as a means to uncover the horizon of objectivity. The subjective side of this deduction in which transcendence is investigated as a ‘subjective’ turning towards objectivity is necessary. Hence, according to Heidegger, Kant’s main objective in the transcendental deduction is the subject as it is always already directed to the objects, as Gegenstehenlassen. But instead of actually extensively dealing with this subjective deduction or analyzing the fundamental structures of the subject, Kant merely concentrates on the objective side of the deduction. But that it is left aside does not mean that Kant had no idea of how to deal with it; on the contrary, according to Heidegger, Kant left the subjective deduction aside because of a clear insight in the essence of the subjective side of the ground-laying of metaphysics, but in this ground-laying he shrank back when he saw the abyss. Kant had problems with the newly gained insights that were clearly confronting anthropology, psychology and the traditional devaluation of the imagination to the domain of the lower faculties. As stated above, Kant never dismissed the traditional notion of subjectivity, because of which it was impossible for Kant to attribute to the transcendental imagination the role of the origin of the basic structures and faculties of the subject. A subsequent reason for shrinking back from the abyss is caused, Heidegger argues, by Kant’s wish to safeguard ethics. He wanted to avoid all empiricism on the level of morality; and Kant had to close off all influences of the imagination here in order to save the purity and sovereignty of reason.

§3.4.5. Temporality and the Transcendental Imagination

Heidegger wishes to show that the transcendental imagination is temporality in which pure sensibility as time gains a universal meaning. He, therefore, has to underscore the relation of imagination in Kant’s philosophy to time, although this is also not enough for Heidegger, since time will have to be thought in, what Heidegger considers, its original unity with the ‘I think’. Pure intuition originates from the transcendental imagination, which implies that the latter is also the source of time. Pure intuition does not merely receive a present being (now), but (also) the flux or sequence of nows; hence, pure intuition has to give itself the look of the now in order to be able to look ahead to coming nows and back to past nows. Heidegger refers again to the lectures of Kant in which a formative power (Bildungsvermögen) forms temporality when it produces representations (Vorstellungen) of the present, the past and the future (VM, 235/53; quoted in GA3, 174-175/122; cf. RA, 123, 124, 129, 133). The images or imaginings mentioned reappear here when the representation of the present is called a likeness (Abbildung), of the past a reproduction (Nachbildung), and finally of the future a prefiguration (Vorbildung). Abbildung, Heidegger underlines, is first of all form-giving (Bild-gebend) as the immediate apprehension of the look (Aussehen) of the object itself. Even though Kant is silent here about the transcendental imagination in relation to time, it is clear to Heidegger that “[p]ure imagining, […] which is called pure because it forms its fabric [Gebilde] from out of itself, as in itself relative to time, must first of all form time” (GA3, 175/123). Heidegger underlines its act of synthesis in order to be able to understand the transcendental imagination as a time-forming power. This synthetic connection is generated by means of a “threefold
synthesis, which is necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination [Einbildung]; and of their recognition in the concept” (KRV, A97). As we shall see, Heidegger underscores that the transcendental imagination is not simply the reproductive imagination.

These are the three specific modes of synthesis, for both Kant and Heidegger do not consider these as three separate syntheses, but merely as three aspects of one. They belong together in the essence of synthesis itself. Heidegger emphasizes the temporal aspect that appears in relation to the threefold synthesis (past, present, future), and he refers to Kant when the latter states that all representations are subjected (unterworfen) to time (KRV, A98-A99).

According to Heidegger, this seems to imply that Kant’s use of the concept ‘Einbildung’ in the above given quote is again not a reference to the transcendental imagination.

1) Intuition is synthetic and abbildend, for it is concerned with the present (now) itself – instead of what presents itself in time, in the now –, and first of all in the sense that apprehension is time-forming (zeitbildend): it offers the now in general, that is, pure intuition offers and forms the immediate look of the now as such, as a condition of possibility for every intuiting of the manifold in the now. Heidegger concludes that “what the pure intuition offering (forming as giving a look) produces (forming as creating) is the immediate look of the now as such, i.e., always the look of the actual present as such” (GA3, 180/126). Kant, then, explicitly states that this apprehension is a form of synthesis by the imagination: “There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension.” (KRV, A120) Heidegger’s conclusion is clear: the transcendental imagination produces an immediate Abbild as one of the modes of synthesis.

2) The mind (imagination) can represent a being without the presence of this object. It can bring forth an absent (past) being in an act of reproduction that presents a unity with the being directly apprehended. In order to retain a past being – for else it would be lost in every now –, the mind has to differentiate time in order to comprehend a certain moment as preceding another. This synthesis implies a Behalten-können. The empirical reproduction presupposes a pure reproduction as a synthesis of the pure imagination. This pure reproduction “forms the possibility of reproduction in general, namely due to the fact that it brings the horizon of the earlier into view and holds it open as such in advance” (GA3, 182/127). Hence, the imagination forms a horizon of temporal succession by means of a pure Nachbild, which includes the having-been-ness (Gewesenheit) because of which it becomes possible to reproduce past beings. These first two syntheses (apprehension, reproduction) are for Kant indeed inseparable. Pure imagination is merely reproductive in this synthesis to the extent that it makes reproduction in general possible.

Lyotard criticizes Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination and the threefold synthesis: “In short, my difference from or my ‘différend’ with Heidegger bears on the question of the synthesis. […] Please take note of how much the function of imagination is thus confined to the task of re-producing something that was already given in a previous instant, the task of an elementary remembering” (J.-F. Lyotard, Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event, 32-33).
and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise.” (KRV, A102) (Heidegger does not say it, but Kant presents here the example of the line drawn in thought; we will have to return to this example in order to question Heidegger’s notion of time and temporalization.)

3) Kant firmly denies the possibility of a temporal character of the transcendental apperception or reason (KRV, A551/B579), but he does underscore the need for a last mode of synthesis: “Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.” (KRV, A103) Contrary to Kant’s claim, Heidegger then states that recognition (as the third mode of synthesis) has everything to do with futurity. The continuity and unity of reproduction and apprehension can only be guaranteed by the unity of concepts in recognition, i.e. by the unification or synthesis in concepts that are characterized by their Vielgültigkeit; at the basis of reproduction and apprehension is, therefore, the synthesis with regard to the sameness (Selbigkeit) of beings. The last mode gives the sameness of the first two modes of synthesis, for this synthesis represents the unity that applies to many. For this reason, Heidegger argues, “what emerged as the third synthesis in the characterization of the empirical genesis of conceptual development is in fact the first, i.e., the synthesis which in the first place directs the other two […]” (GA3, 186/130). The third synthesis – which is actually the first – is recognition and it forms or presents the possibility of identification by exploring (erkunden) the horizon in which a being can be held before us (vorhalten): “As pure, its exploring is the original forming of this preliminary attaching [Vorhaften], i.e., the future.” (GA3, 186/130) This synthetic form of Zeitbildung is thought as the Vorbildung, and because of that, Heidegger considers the Bilden des Vorhaften als solchen an act of pure imagination. This Vorbildung not merely identifies or pre-figures a being that is held before it; rather, it first of all explores (erkunden) the horizon of “being-able-to-hold-something-before us [Vorhaltbarkeit]” (GA3, 186/130). Contrary to Kant, Heidegger underscores both the temporal structure of this synthesis and the imagination as the source of time, or put differently, the transcendental imagination is, or forms, original time (ürsprungliche Zeit).

Added to this last synthesis, when Kant underscored the necessity of the last mode of synthesis (recognition), Heidegger understands this as implying that the mode of the pure Vor-bildung has a priority over the others, that is, the essential structure of time comes to the fore in the future. However, as Heidegger emphasizes, pure reason and time seem to be two heterogeneous regions in Kant that are not (directly) related to each other. Heidegger, then, will have to show more forcefully than Kant that the transcendental apperception is always already temporal. First Heidegger will try to show that time is self-affection; subsequently he will be able to underscore the temporal character of the self. But in order to comprehend the temporality of the self, Heidegger reverses the method by investigating the possibility to understand time’s “character of selfhood [Selbstheit]”, i.e., by again emphasizing that time is for Kant (in the Deduction and Schematism) essential for transcendence. This transcendence determines the Selbstsein of our finite being. Therefore, the question is raised whether time as analyzed in the Transcendental Aesthetic is merely an indication of a more fundamental conception of time or not: “In the end, is not the elucidating of the temporal character of the subject first permitted on the basis of the correctly understood subjective character of time?” (GA3, 189-190/131-132)
This brings Heidegger to the central themes of his reading of Kant: time as pure self-affection and the temporality of the self. Kant claims in the second edition of the Transcendental Aesthetics that intuition (that only contains relations) “is the form of the intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind [Gemüth], can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself [mithin durch sich selbst afficiert wird], i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form” (KRV, B67-68). Or again, space and time are the receptive aspects of the mind, and because of this the mind “can perceive representations of objects [Vorstellungen von Gegenständen], and thus they must always also affect [jederzeit afficiren müssen] the concept of these objects” (KRV, A77/B102; cf. GA3, 61/43, 188-189/132). (Kant tells us that the concepts are affected by time and space, but Heidegger relates the theme of affection only to time. We will have to return to this decision in our Epilogue.) Considering the receptivity of time, Heidegger wonders how it is possible that time itself can affect concepts.

Beginning with what the concepts of the representation of objects imply, Heidegger remarks that what characterizes every object is the Gegenstehenlassen von… Affectivity is determined as the “Von-sich-aus-hin-zu-auf…”, or put differently, time will have to pre-figure (vorbilden) from out of itself the look of the one-after-the-other (Anblick des Nacheinander). Time is here not the affection of something present-at-hand (Vorhanden); rather, Heidegger states, “if it belongs to the essence of the finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity” (GA3, 189/132). This allows us to comprehend that the self has to rely on reception (angewiesen auf Hinnahme). Here we notice how Heidegger re-inscribes finitude and the servitude of understanding. The self (‘I think’, transcendental apperception) is opposed here by the Dawider of the Gegenstand. This is what is meant by the Gegenstehenlassen von… and pure affection, and time as self-affection forms (bildet) finite selfhood and the possibility of the self as self-consciousness.

Heidegger quotes in the Logik from Kant’s Antropologie when the latter writes that the “inner sense only sees the relations of its determinations in time”, from which Kant concludes that this sense is empirical apperception, that is, empirical self-consciousness, in which self-consciousness merely sees the self as object and not as subject (ANTH, 135/246; cf. GA21, 297). However, from the observation that reines Hinnnehmen (temporality) is primarily self-affection (for it is independent of experience), i.e., the affecting of time from the self (as we saw in the above given quote; cf. KRV, B67-68), Heidegger concludes: “Sense [Sinn] means finite intuition. […] Inner sense does not receive ‘from outside’, but rather from the self. In pure receiving [Hinnahmen], the inner affectation must come forth from out of the pure self; i.e., it must be formed in the essence of selfhood as such [im Wesen der Selbstheit als solcher sich bilden], and therefore it must constitute this self in the first place. Pure self-affection provides the transcendental, primal structure [Urstruktur] of the finite self as such.” (GA3, 191/134) Time is then the ground of the transcendental apperception, i.e., of the self as such. In Heidegger’s Logik we read that time is the unthematic “vorgängige Sichgebenlassen”, and that which this Sichgebenlassen gives itself is time, “that is, the subject affects itself with itself [affiziert sich mit ihm selbst]” (GA21, 341). This reminds us of Heidegger’s phrase from 1924: “Time is Dasein.” Unsurprisingly, then, time and the ‘I think’ are for Heidegger the same (dasselbe).

Because the self is time, Kant is, according to Heidegger, completely right to state that the transcendental apperception does not entail a temporal character since time is itself also not in time. In the Kantbuch Heidegger focuses on the recurrence of essential predicates in

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147 Cf. M. Weatherston, Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality, 147.
Kant’s Deduction when dealing with time and the apperception. Both time and the transcendental apperception are treated as perduring (bleibend; cf. KRV, A123, A143/B183). Neither time nor apperception are in time (Innerzeitlich) or temporal, unless with ‘temporal’ one means that the ‘I’ is time itself. Time perdures and does not change, since everything changes in time; the transcendental apperception (as what makes transcendence possible) is fixed and perdures when it accompanies representations. Instead of understanding the fixity and perduring of the ‘I’ in ontic terms such as an immortal and unchanging soul or substance, Heidegger opts for an ontological approach according to which the ‘I’ forms (bildet) or represents before itself something like standing and enduring (Stand und Bestand) as such. “The ‘fixed and perduring’ I goes so far as to mean: the I, in the original forming of time, i.e., as original time, forms the letting-stand-against of… and its horizon.” (GA3, 193/135) The ‘I’ is perduring because it holds this perduring in front of itself. In that sense, time is Dasein, or more related to Kant, the ‘I’ as the finite subject is temporal (zeitlich).

Original time as the threefold-uniting forming (bilden) of future, past and present is the condition of possibility for transcendence. The three modes of synthesis are not merely three separate syntheses, but are “originally unified [ursprünglich einig] in themselves, as time-forming, they constitute the ripening of time itself [zeit-bildend die Zeitigung der Zeit selbst ausmachen]” (GA3, 196/137). Human existence is essentially temporal, as long as with temporal is meant that this existence takes up its past at the moment in which it is thrown and projects from a finite future. “This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as ‘temporality’ [Zeitlichkeit].” (SUZ, 326/374)

Relating the theme of the transcendental imagination to the Zeitigung der Zeit as the original unity of time’s ecstatic structure shows the essential role that the imagination plays in Heidegger’s philosophy. Sein und Zeit ended with questions of which the last two are: “Is there a way which leads from primal time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (SUZ, 437/488) The unity of the temporal syntheses will later be discussed by Heidegger in terms of Es gibt and Ereignis (cf. GA21, 385).

§3.5. Retrieving the Ground
When the “image [Bild]” of the Wurzel reappears in the Introduction (1949) of Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger emphasizes that thinking does not tear up the root of philosophy, since, as Kant emphasized, metaphysics belongs to the nature of man (GA9, 367-368/279). A change (Wandel) in human essence will bring about a transformation (Verwandlung) of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{148} Kant wished to distinguish transcendentality from transcendence (cf. KRV, A296/B352-353), for the latter concept indicates an exceeding or transgressing of the limits of experience by a principle. However, the “meta-physical of metaphysics”, i.e., the concept of transcendence itself, changes in Heidegger, disturbing the distinction between immanence and transcendence (cf. GA9, 398/300). This allows Heidegger to state that Dasein’s reason (Vernunft, ratio) appears first of all as “the sensible-supersensible being [das sinnliche-übersinnliche Wesen]”, i.e., “man is […] the meta-physical itself [der Mensch is […] das Meta-Physische selbst]” (GA8, 61-62/58; transl. mod.). Heidegger refers to Descartes who uses the metaphor of the tree to imagine philosophy, but Heidegger immediately adds that the

\textsuperscript{148} We might ask again what takes place when Heidegger reads Kant? In a text on Heraclitus Heidegger interprets the German ‘legen’ (to lay, to place) by way of ‘lesen’ (to read, to gather). Or as Heidegger writes: “Legen ist lesen” (GA7, 215; cf. GA8, 211/208). In the Introduction to Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger calls this change of metaphysics the ‘overcoming’ or ‘Überwindung’ of metaphysics. In his text ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik’ from the period between 1936-1946, Heidegger presents two different ways of overcoming metaphysics. The first is the overcoming of metaphysics by itself as “metaphysics of metaphysics” presented in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik; the second way is the attempt of Nietzsche to overcome or inverse Platonism, that is, metaphysics. Even though it is considered a higher change (höhere Verwandlung), it still remains trapped in metaphysics (cf. GA7, 77-78; GA6.1, 202-213/200-210).
actual problem is that of the *ground* in which the root takes hold. “The tree of philosophy grows out of the soil in which metaphysics is rooted [*dem Wurzelboden der Metaphysik*]. The ground and soil [*Grund und Boden*] is the element in which the root of the tree lives [*wächst*], but the growth of the tree is never able to absorb this soil in such a way that it disappears in the tree as part of the tree [*Baumhaftes im Baum*]. Instead, the roots, down to the subtlest tendrils, lose themselves in the soil. The ground is ground for the roots, and in the ground the roots forget themselves for the sake of the tree.” (GA9, 365/277) Heidegger’s image of this rooting of metaphysics draws philosophy away from the ground without losing the ground. From the point of view of metaphysical thinking (that thinks beings as beings), “what appears as ground [*als Grund erscheint*] […] is presumably something else [*ein Anderes*], once it is experienced in its own terms – something as yet unsaid [*und noch Ungesagtes*], and accordingly the essence of metaphysics, too, is something other [*etwas anderes*] than metaphysics.” (GA9, 367/279)

As we have seen, Kant deals in turn with each of the constituent elements of cognition, but to leave it at that would be a clear misreading of Kant for Heidegger if one were to presume an underlying heterogeneity. *A priori* understanding of Being is synthetic. According to Heidegger, Kant seems to hint at this when he suggests that the two stems for cognition have a common root. The *Kantbuch* ends with “The Ground-laying of Metaphysics in a Retrieval [*Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik in einer Wiederholung*]”. The need for a retrieval was already announced in relation to some other aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy, namely that of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and temporality (cf. SUZ, §66). The necessity of dealing with historicity here is also given in brief remarks from, for instance, *Beiträge zur Philosophie: (vom Ereignis) or Besinnung*. Before Heidegger wrote the second preface to his *Kantbuch*, he stated in his *Beiträge* (on which Heidegger worked between 1936 and 1938) that his reading of Kant in the *Kantbuch* is historically (*historisch*) incorrect. Regardless, in another historical sense (*geschichtlich*) his ground-laying is essential (*wesentlich*) as a prelude to future thinking or a thinking to come (*künftige Denken*) (cf. GA65, 253/179; GA66, 76-77, 88-89, 377). This remark has been overlooked many times when interpreters of Heidegger simply refer to the later prefaces of the *Kantbuch* and claim that the later Heidegger rejected his early interpretation of Kant as an “overinterpretation”.149 It is therefore no surprise to read in studies about Heidegger’s *Kantbuch*, such as that of Steffen, that “the Heideggerian interpretation can only be of very limited use [*Nutze*] for a better understanding of Kant’s philosophy.”150 As Heidegger already indicated in *Sein und Zeit*, the *Leitfaden* for his reading or *Destructuon* of the history of ontology is the *Seinsfrage* itself (SUZ, 22/44). He always attempted to interpret and retrieve Kant’s original problem as a way to re-open concealed possibilities. Because of this, the “thinking that is to come [*künftige Denken*] is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics – a name identical to philosophy” (GA9, 364/276). The decisive connection “between time and the ‘I think’” in a reading of Kant needs to be formulated for the first time as the condition of possibility for transcendence (SUZ, 24/45; cf. SUZ, §64).

In 1924 and again in 1939-1940 Heidegger writes: “*Dasein ist Geschichte*” and “*Dasein ist die Geschichte*” (GA64, 86; GA69, 101; cf. SUZ, 322/381). In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger advocated a distinction between *historisch* and *geschichtlich* in which he tried to show that the historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of *Dasein* is based on temporality, which is a preparation of the *Destructuon* of the history of ontology in the (unfinished) second volume of the book (SUZ, 392/444). Historicity makes it possible for *Dasein* to retrieve the past, but this retrieval (*Wiederholung*) is not a bringing back of a past event, but, rather, a way of

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responding to possibilities of the Dasein that has-been. “Repeating [Wiederholung] is handing down explicitly [ausdrückliche Überlieferung] – that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there [im Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins].” (SUZ, 385/437) Hence, a thoughtful attention to the philosophical tradition is not a devotion to the past; rather, it considers the present. As said, Heidegger’s Kantbuch is an explicit attempt to retrieve a fundamental problem: “By the retrieval of a basic problem [Wiederholung eines Grundproblems], we understand the opening-up, long-concealed possibilities, through the working-out of which it is transformed. In this way it first comes to be preserved in its capacity as a problem.” (GA3, 204/143) The retrieval is not merely a repetition of a past event or actualization of what has been, but the iteration of itself, that is, of concealed possibilities that enable Heidegger to open up possibilities in the present. Heidegger uses the notion of Wiederholung to designate the authentic form of the past, since the retrieval or repetition – in a Destruktion of the ontological tradition – is necessary for posing the question of Being concretely (cf. SUZ, 26/49). Heidegger’s Destruktion, then, is not a clear disowning of the tradition, but an original appropriation (Aneignung) of it.

This brings us closer to what Heidegger hoped for: his reading of Kant is essential for future thinking. Heidegger’s Destruktion is a way to think the conditions of possibility of metaphysics, that is, the means to uncover what has remained unthought and unsaid from which another beginning can arise (as Heidegger formulated it as from the mid-1930s). Heidegger already described the characterization of the essential unity of ontology as a beginning (Anfang) for the Grundlegung and not as a closing or conclusion (Abschluss) (GA3, 65/46). Another beginning arises from a more original understanding of the first beginning. History is an occurrence (Geschehen) of Being, and not merely a cumulation of facts in a linear sequence. Hence, the other beginning is not a second beginning, but a beginning that is other in relation to the first beginning. The other beginning arises from a more original understanding or interpretation of the first beginning; it arises only in thinking and, therefore, it is not present before us. The problem of metaphysics (the question of the ground or essence (Wesen) of metaphysics) has been concealed for metaphysics. In order to be able to uncover this ground, Heidegger has to take a step back in order to transcend metaphysics without completely leaving it behind either, for the “essence [Wesen] of metaphysics always remains […] the most memorable [das Denkwürdigste] for thinking” (GA11, 63). The unthought remains to be thought. Essence can only be found in what has already been thought and handed over to the present; and only what has been thought gives access to what has to be thought.

Even though Heidegger emphasized the “overinterpretation” of his reading, the Kantbuch “remains an introduction, attempted by means of a questionable digression, to the further questionability which persists concerning the question of Being set forth in Sein und Zeit” (GA3, XV/XVIII). Then, what is the result of the Kantian ground-laying? “Nothing less than this: the grounding of the inner possibility of ontology is brought about as an unveiling of transcendence, i.e. of the subjectivity of the human subject.” (GA3, 205/144) This inevitably leads to the question of anthropology, for the ground-laying asks for the essence of human being. Kant declares in his Logik that the essential question for him is “What is man?” This question is added to three others – What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? –, but it is not identical to the questions of the psychologia rationalis that is considered as one of the branches of metaphysica specialis. Rather, Kant claims that these three questions refer to the forth question (cf. LOG, 25/538), which he subsequently understands as a philosophical anthropology. To understand this, Heidegger repeats this question of the essence of the human being (das Wesen des Menschen) and the actual results of Kant’s ground-laying related to it. How these three questions relate to the last and central question
has to be analyzed, not by reading exclusively what Kant said, but, Heidegger underlines, by looking at what happens in the ground-laying.

The three questions are essentially related to the finitude of human beings, for else there was no need, nor perhaps even possibility, of asking them. Asking these questions attests to the fact that reason is finite, since an all-powerful being does not need to ask these questions. “But human reason does not just disclose finitude in these questions; rather, its innermost interest is with finitude itself. [...] [F]initude does not depend simply upon pure human reason, but instead its finitude is finitisation [Verendlichung], i.e. ‘care’ about the potentiality-to-be-finite ['Sorge’ um das Endlich-sein-können].” (GA3, 217/152) This of course refers back to the theme of the care from Sein und Zeit, but what is essential for us is the thought that according to Heidegger the ability to ask these three questions is based on finitude. Finitude is not disclosed in Kant’s three questions; rather, it “is a question of becoming certain of this finitude in order to hold oneself in it [um in ihr sich zu halten]” (GA3, 217/152). Because these questions ask for the finitude of beings, it is possible to summarize them as the question of the essence of a human being. Or better, the forth question is not the last, supplemented question, but actually it changes itself (wandelt sich) into the first and most original from which the other three have to be understood. Heidegger was of course aiming at these thoughts during the discussion with Cassirer. The retrieval “must develop this question, which we call the question of Being for short, as a problem. This development has to show the extent to which the problem of the finitude in human beings and the investigations it prescribes necessarily belong to the mastering of the question of Being.” (GA3, 221/155) Hence, what has to be cleared up in the retrieval is the relation between “Being as such (not the being) and the finitude in human beings” (GA3, 221-222/155).

Knowing that Being gives itself in different ways, what is meant by Being? This question of Being presupposes a preconceptual comprehension or understanding of Being. The possibility of comprehending Being – the question of Being itself – is given by the fact that human beings always already have a certain understanding of Being. This demands a further elucidation of the possibility of this preconceptual understanding based on the finitude of human beings. “Man is a being in the midst of beings in such a way that for man the being which he is himself and the being which he is not are always already manifest. We call this mode of the Being of human beings existence [Existenz]. Existence is only possible on the grounds of the understanding of Being.” (GA3, 227/159) The understanding of Being is the ground and essence of human finitude; hence, the ground-laying of metaphysics finds its ground in the understanding of Being formulated in terms of finitude. Put differently: this ground-laying is grounded in the metaphysics of Dasein, that is, the most inner ground and essence of human beings. According to Heidegger, this is also Kant’s aim as is clear from a remark of Kant in a letter to Herz, where he calls his search for the conditions of possibility of metaphysics “the metaphysics of metaphysics” (Letter to Marcus Herz, After May 11, 1781; quoted in GA3, 230/161). Indeed Kant was concerned with the problem of the possibility of metaphysics, and because Kant implicitly renews the theme of time and transcendence in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, he is, according to Heidegger, able to problematize metaphysics for the first time since Aristotle. This metaphysics of metaphysics is the ground-laying of ontology (metaphysics), but also the metaphysics of Dasein.

In the ground-laying of metaphysics one needs to put into question the essence of Dasein in order to unravel, what Dastur calls, the “essential overlapping [imbrication] of Being as such and of the finitude in man”.[151] As Heidegger indicated, the metaphysics of Dasein is ambiguous, for it might mean that metaphysics deals with the question of the essence of Dasein, but for Heidegger it primarily means a “metaphysics which occurs

[151] F. Dastur, Heidegger et la question anthropologique, 44.
necessarily as Dasein [als Dasein notwendig geschehende Metaphysik]”, that is, Dasein’s question to the Being of beings (GA3, 231/162). Heidegger calls this metaphysics a fundamental ontology in the sense of the revealing of the modes of Being of Dasein. As from the theme of temporality Heidegger tries to abstract time in such a way that it shows itself as the horizon in which Being means (heisst) “permanence in presence [Beständigkeit in Anwesenheit]” (GA3, 240/168). We will return to the matter of Anwesen and Anwesenheit on the basis of Zeit und Sein. For now, it seems clear that a finite being, unable to create that which is intuited, implies that the possibility to recognize an object (Gegenstand) is made possible because of an ontological horizon of objectivity. This fundamental ontology is ontological insofar as the constitution of the Being of Dasein is uncovered; and it is fundamental insofar as metaphysics is grounded in this constitution. The goal of this ontology is to show that every relation of Dasein to beings presupposes a finite transcendence (being-in-the-world and Sorge) in relation to temporality, or better, as temporality.

The metaphysics of Dasein does not ask for Dasein as one being among many others; rather, it is concerned with the relation between the question of human being and the question of Being. Although Kant begins with an indirect determination of finitude by distinguishing human intuition from the intuitus originarius, Heidegger begins with the ‘giving’ in which he searches for the Seinsverständnis that shows itself as Dasein. “More original than man is the finitude of the Dasein in it” (GA3, 229/160). The question of Being as the question to beings as beings – the Being of beings – presupposes the question of Being as such, that is, the unity of the different ways of beings to be. This question is posed by way of Dasein’s understanding of Being, since the question arises from this being. It is not an arbitrary or secondary question for Dasein, for its preconceptual understanding of Being is what determines Dasein as Dasein. Dasein is the fundament of metaphysics; and again the metaphysics of Dasein is fundamental ontology. As is the case in Sein und Zeit, this fundamental ontology is only a first step in the right direction; nevertheless, the essential question remains the question of Being that has to be understood from within the horizon of temporality. The fundamental-ontological analysis in the Kantbuch stops when the conclusion is drawn that metaphysics occurs as Dasein, and with Sein und Zeit in mind we can say that the analysis of historicity – related to this metaphysics that occurs (geschieht) as Dasein – presents a first understanding of the mode of Being of this precise event (Geschehen) of metaphysics. However, when this event itself is brought forward, fundamental ontology falls short of words.

§4. Another Beginning

Already in Sein und Zeit Heidegger indicated that the interpretation of time is a “provisional aim [vorläufiges Ziel]” for the understanding of Being (SUZ, 1/19, 17/38; GA15, 372-373). This provisionality anticipates the authentic way of understanding Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself (Vorlaufen) or anticipation of what may be. Here, Dasein is on the way to its own existential and authentic being, and Dasein can only be authentically near itself in this provisionality (cf. GA64, 117-118/13). For Kant, the question of metaphysics is given as a natural predisposition (Anlage), and in Sein und Zeit we recognize something similar when

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152 Derrida emphasizes that in Heidegger we “can see then that Dasein, though not man, is nevertheless nothing other than man” (MP, 151/127). In a footnote that remains only partially translated in the English translation of Marges, Derrida refers to Kant when the latter declares that one cannot deduce any principles of morality from the nature of man while man’s essence announces itself “on the basis of thinking the end in itself; it announces itself to itself as the end in itself” (cf. MP, 144n-146n/121n-122n). Derrida’s brief reference to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in which he underlines the finitude of the intuitus derivativus is absent in the English translation.

153 Cf. R. Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being, 92: “The word provisional does not mean only that Heidegger’s thinking is prepatory (vorbereitend), but that it is, through the step back into the essence of metaphysics, anticipatory.”
Heidegger mentions the factuality or fact of a “vague average understanding of Being [durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständnis]” (SUZ, 5/25). This understanding is a fact (Faktum), and the (unresolved) exposition of the problematic of the Temporalität des Seins (in the second volume of Sein und Zeit) was supposed to give the answer (Antwort) to the question of the meaning of Being (cf. SUZ, 19/17). Heidegger later indicated that his thinking is provisional because his language is provisional; this also has to do with holding back the third division of the first volume of Sein und Zeit where Heidegger was supposed to make the turn (Kehre) in Sein und Zeit to “Zeit und Sein” (cf. SUZ, 39/64). As Heidegger writes, the “division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [im zureichende Sprache der Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics [Sprache der Metaphysik]” (GA9, 328/250). This has been haunting him for the most part of his work, even up to the lecture Zeit und Sein from 1962 where we read in the brief preface that we have to give up “any claim to immediate intelligibility. However, we would still have to listen [zuhören], because we must think what is inevitable [Unumgängliches], but preliminary [Vorläufiges].” (GA14, 5/2; cf. GA14, 44/35) This will bring us to the theme of the Ereignis. He asks us to focus on what shows itself (sich zeigen) without holding on to his declarative statements. In the preface to Zeit und Sein, Heidegger tells us that (in the text) a small hint is given: “Ein kleiner Wink für das Hören sei gegeben. Es gilt, nicht eine Reihe von Aussagegesätzen anzu hören, sondern dem Gang des Zeigens zu folgen.” (GA14, 6/3) What is perhaps most essential is not to listen to the statements but to follow the course or motion of that which shows itself. Heidegger remarks that Kant’s proofs of the fundamental principles of all synthetic judgments are circular; they move in a circle (sich im Kries bewegt) (GA41, 243/241; cf. MP, 127/164) It is, therefore, not surprising that Heidegger has to unravel the possibilities of a vulgar or unauthentic understanding of Being by way of the vulgar notion of time as formulated in metaphysics. For a critical reception of this Faktum, cf. S. Critchley, ‘Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’. Because of this, Derrida concludes that “the sense of Being is literally neither ‘primary’, nor ‘fundamental’, nor ‘transcendental’, whether understood in the scholastic, Kantian, or Husserlian sense. The restoration of Being as ‘transcending’ the categories of the entity [i.e., of beings], the opening of the fundamental ontology, are nothing but necessary yet provisional moments. From Die Einführung in die Metaphysik onward, Heidegger renounces the project of and the word ontology.” (GR, 36/22) This Ereignis related to the giving of Being involves another beginning. It is in this context that Heidegger’s Kehre has been discussed as a turn in Heidegger’s thinking. This Kehre itself also has to be explained in terms of the Ereignis (cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: zu Heideggers ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’, 5-84). Heidegger’s search for another beginning does not mean that he dismissed his early philosophy, or as Heidegger writes: “Fundamental-ontological” mindfulness [Besinnung] (laying the foundation [Grundlegung] of ontology as its overcoming) is the crossing [der Übergang] from the end of the first beginning to the other beginning.” (GA65, 228; cf. GA65, 169) Briefly stated: fundamental ontology as a ground-laying and questioning of metaphysics in which the relation between Being and time is examined ends when Heidegger reminds us that ground-laying is a passing or crossing for the search for another beginning within or at the limit of the first beginning, i.e., as an uncovering of hidden possibilities in the first beginning. Sein und Zeit is a preparation of, or passage to, this Überwindung as a remembrance of Being itself (Andenken an das Sein selbst), where it is announced in Sein und Zeit as a Destrucktion of the history of ontology. In Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, we read that ‘Winke’ are not ‘Dichtungen’, but words of a thinking that is more than merely making statements (Aussagen). When thinking thinks beings, this thinking cannot rely on thoughts, i.e., these thoughts are no Vorbild for thinking: “Das Sagen des Denkens ist im Unterschied zum Wort der Dichtung bildlos. Und wo ein Bild zu sein scheint, ist es [...] nur der Notanker der gewagten, aber nicht gegluckten Bildlosigkeit.” (GA13, 33) Heidegger’s interest stays with the Dichtung insofar as it “has no content, but is image [Gebild]” (GA13, 172). The poem is as a saying image (Sagendes Gebild) that shines in itself (in sich selber scheint). In one of his poems, Heidegger brings this together in the following verses: “Erst Gebild wahrts Gedicht. / Doch Gebild ruht im Gedicht.” (GA13, 79, 180) What is given first is the image (Gebild), and it carries or saves a look; however, this image finds its place or rests in the Gedicht.
The principles of judgment merely express a circle or circular motion (Kreisbewegung, Kreisgang, Zirkel). The proof merely indicates that these principles of pure understanding are possible by what they make possible, i.e., experience. Kant was well aware of this when he wrote near the end of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that a principle “possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being the condition of possibility of its own ground of proof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary presupposition in all empirical observation” (KRV, A737/B765; cf. GA41, 244/242). Heidegger adds that this obvious circle (offenkundiger Zirkel) is inevitable or necessary (notwendig); these principles lay the ground of the essence of experience, although it is itself not a thing present-at-hand (kein vorhandenes Ding); experience is an in itself circular happening (ein in sich kriesendes Geschehen) because of which what lies in the circle is opened up (was innerhalb des Kreises liegt, eröffnet wird). The opening (Offene) is the “between – between us and the thing” (GA41, 244/242; cf. SUZ, 374/427). Here, the pure auto-affection of time is thought more explicitly in terms of an unavoidable circularity. The Analytic has to show the principles as grounding the possibility of the experience of objects (Gegenständen). What is finally shown (zeigen) in the Analytic shows that the conditions of possibility are themselves only possible by that which they make possible (ermöglichen), i.e., experience.

These principles are only possible on the basis of the unity and unification (Einheit und Einigung) of the pure concepts of understanding and (space and time as) the forms of intuition: “The unity of thought and intuiting is itself the essence of experience.” (GA41, 244/241) One of the crucial themes for Heidegger when dealing with the work of art is das Mitte, the middle, which reappears several times throughout Heidegger’s work from the 1930s (cf. GA40, 42). We might add that the ‘middle’ is for Heidegger the above mentioned ‘between’ (Zwischen) to which he returns quite often, notably in Die Frage nach dem Ding (1935-1936, published in the beginning of the 1960s). This would not be as relevant if Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes did not start with a discussion on the thing: “Ding=res=ens=ein Seiendes” (GA5, 6/5; cf. GA41, 210/207-208). He concludes that the thing-ness of the work – belonging to the Werksein of the work, to its reality (Wirklichkeit) –, i.e., the dinghaften Wirklichkeit des Werkes, demands that one approaches the work in such a way that its characterization as a thing is revealed in it, from the work to the thing in order to ‘remove’ the metaphysical determination of the thing: “über das Werk zum Ding” (GA5, 25/18; cf. VEP, 324-325/286). Hence, the question of the thing is also at work in Heidegger’s text on the origin of the work of art. However, it is surprising that both texts mostly exclude the imagination. For instance, when Heidegger determines human intuition in his reading of Kant in Die Frage nach dem Ding, he again declares that intuiting is not a matter of creating, for the latter activity is at most possible (möglich) “in a kind of imagination or phantasy [in einer Art Einbildung, Phantasie]” (GA41, 145/142). Heidegger again emphasizes that intuiting is a

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158 It should be noted that Heidegger does not simply discuss a twofold division of thing and work in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, but a ‘distinction’ between thing, product (Zeug) and work. According to him, the couple form/matter has dominated every theory of art and aesthetics, and it is in relation to this coupling that Heidegger proposes to situate the Zeug in between the thing and the work. As Derrida writes: “The product (Zeug) seems to be situated between the thing and the work (the work is always a work of art in this context: Werk). It shares in both, even though the work resembles (gleicht) the ‘simple thing’ more than does the product. The example of the shoes [Derrida is discussing Heidegger’s use of a “bildliche Darstellung”, a “pictorial presentation” (GA5, 18/13), namely Van Gogh’s painting Old Shoes with Laces, JvG] guides the analysis of this schematism when it is first set in place.” Because of this guidance, Derrida speaks of “an essential schema” when Heidegger mentions the product by situating it (as a Zwischenstellung) between the thing and the work: “I call it a schema: basically and in a barely displaced Kantian sense, it’s hybrid, a mediation or a double belonging or double articulation.” Not much further, Derrida states: “The intermediate mode is in the middle of the other two, which it gathers and divides in itself according to a structure of envelopment which is difficult to spread out. Here, first of all, is the schematism of the product. For example: shoes in general.” (VEP, 339-340/297-298)
“giving representing [gebendes Vorstellen]” and not a creating (machen) one or one that forms through combining (durch Zusammensetzen bildet) (GA41, 200/197). Furthermore, he declares that his reading of Kant in Die Frage nach dem Ding makes up for (holt nach) what the Kantbuch lacked (fehlt) (GA41, 127/125), but he does not tell us what was lacking.159

It leaves us wondering about the relative effacement of the imagination in Heidegger’s work after the Kantbuch. Richardson interprets this change in the light of Heidegger’s Kehre so that it marks “the whole turning in Heidegger’s way. Yes, the turning does affect a change in his interpretation of Kant.” Even though Heidegger’s Kehre indeed shifts from Dasein to Ereignis, what does this mean for the transcendental imagination? It might be conceivable that Heidegger was confronted with an immediate problem, namely that of the distinction between the inner and outer. In Kant we notice that time is an inner sense, and insofar as fundamental ontology – beginning with the transcendence of Dasein as a being outside-itself – remains stuck in this opposition, i.e., the opposition of space and time, the problem of transcendence perhaps remains unresolved. The opening is the ‘between’ (Zwischen) of the between-man-and-thing. Here, we note that everything takes place in the circle even though Heidegger tries to formulate it in such a way that this interiority does not become self-enclosed. He wishes to uncover a space of a ‘between’ in which there is an opening, i.e., a transcending (although he does not formulate it this way), in which the experience of objects becomes possible. As Heidegger remarks, this will demand an Übersprung; Kant’s question of the thing opens up a dimension between man and thing “which reaches out beyond things and back behind man” (GA41, 246/244). At the same time, the imagination seems to be replaced by a Dichtung that projects (vorauswirft) “the open [das Offene]; poetry allows this open to happen [geschehen läßt] and in such a way, indeed, that now, for the first time, in the midst of beings [inmitten des Seienden], it brings them to shine and sound”. Subsequently, Heidegger writes that the essence of Dichtung (and with that the essence of projection (des Entwurfs)) is not sufficiently thought from “Imagination und Einbildungskraft”. Hence, poetry is “no flight of mere representations and fancies [Einbildungen] into the unreal [in das Unwirkliche]” (GA5, 60/45). After Heidegger uncovered the transcendental imagination at the core of Kant’s critical work, it seems that Heidegger lost faith in the possibilities of the imagination; perhaps Heidegger realized that the imagination in Kant can, as Goethe formulated, only be introduced to reality and truth through sensibility and understanding. Would this be possible when the imagination is itself at the root of the other faculties and is limited to pure auto-affection? (Later, we will notice that Derrida asks ‘what if time has gone mad, is out of joint?’)

A circle appears to be set in which, according to Heidegger, we have to learn to situate or move ourselves (cf. DT, 36/22). What shows itself (Anwesen) shows itself as Anwesenlassen, as that which lets Being say or denote (besagen) Anwesen, so that the temporality found in this lassen of Anwesenlassen will have to turn out to be the authentic time in which Being lies or rests as Anwesen.161 The question of an excess of temporality – as inner sense – cannot be raised within fundamental ontology itself. Because of that, the problem of space and time, outer and inner, remains to a large extent unsettled (if not

159 Heidegger ends his ‘Kants These über das Sein’ with the following observations: “But what is most worthy of thought […] remains, nevertheless, that we consider whether ‘Being’, whether the ‘is’, can itself be, or whether Being never ‘is’ and it yet remains true that Being is given [oder ob Sein niemals ‘ist’ und dass gleichwohl wahr bleibt: Es gibt Sein]. […] And Kant’s thesis about Being as pure positing? If positedness, objectivity, proves to be a modification of presence, then Kant’s thesis about Being belongs to that which remains unthought in all metaphysics.” (GA9, 479/362-363)
160 W.J. Richardson, ‘Kant and the Late Heidegger’, 142.
161 Although Derrida briefly refers to Heidegger in Donner le temps: I. La fausse monnaie, he points out in a footnote, that he will return to Zeit und Sein in the second volume of this book (DT, 34n/20n). This volume has not been published (yet).
Heidegger does not say it, but if we might add that the lassen of Anwesen-lassen also involves a kommen lassen of Being and time, what would this mean? In H.C. pour la vie, c’est-à-dire... Derrida writes about the complexity of translating ‘kommen lassen’, meaning both faire venir and laisser venir, i.e., making something come or allowing/letting something come (cf. HC, 61-62). Just as for Kant, time is, according to Heidegger, not a product (Gemächttes), since it merely gives the giving (es gibt nur das Geben) (GA14, 21/16). What Vermögen, if there is any, who or what is able to do precisely this: give? In Zeit und Sein this comes down to the question of the Es (gibt). Is it (es) the imagination? When Being has to be thought in itself (eigens), then, Heidegger suggests, we will have to let go (fahren zu lassen) of Being as the ground of beings. This ‘sacrifice’ will not be in vain, since something will be gained or given here: the Es gibt. Because of this Heidegger can write that Being will have to be thought differently for the sake of the Es gibt (“zugunsten des im Entbergen verborgen spielenden Gebens, d.h. das Es gibt”) (GA14, 10/6).

It seems that this favor in the history of philosophy is decisive here as if the play (spielen) of Es demands from us that it (Es) is given a chance. However, it is still unclear how this Es has to be determined, but Heidegger wants ‘us’ to place our bet on the Es for there to be any giving at all (cf. DT, 36/22). Every history of Being (Seinsgeschichte) brings along a sending of Being (Geschick von Sein), and the epochs in history have obscured the giving or the Es gibt by way of fixing Being as a being: idea, energie, position, absolute concept or will-to-power.163 This giving of Being shows itself as a Schicken, but thinking the Es demands that we return to what lets (lassen) itself be found in the determination of Being as Anwesen and Anwesenlassen (GA14, 14/10). This brings us back to the history of philosophy that has characterized Anwesenheit as Gegenwart. “[A]s soon as [kaum]” we say Gegenwart, we have already implicated the past and the future in our thinking, but not much later Heidegger declares that not every Anwesen is necessarily “Gegenwart, eine seltsame Sache” (GA14, 14/10, 18/13).

In 1919, Heidegger already showed an interest in the Es gibt. Es gibt is not merely one event (Vorgang) among others, but rather the event (Ereignis) that refers to the eventness of what is given. This eventness of what is given is not a being itself, but is expressed in the Vorverständnis of beings as beings, and as we know, this preliminary understanding has to be explicated in philosophy. That beings are, or that a being is, is usually taken for granted, but the question of whether the Es gibt is given “decides actually about the life or death of philosophy in general [über Leben oder Tod der Philosophie überhaupt entscheidet]”. Here, he poses a question: “Gibt es das ‘Es gibt?’” (GA56/57, 62) Although Heidegger will use the term ‘philosophy’ differently throughout his work, the stakes are apparently high, and even for Zeit und Sein we might say that the matter of deciding about the Es will be a decision for...

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162 Levy’s criticism of Heidegger’s Kantbuch seems to touch upon this point when he asks: “Has not finite pure intuition and finite pure understanding [...] obtained the structure of the Kantian infinite intellectual intuition and the infinite intuitive understanding – and indeed as completely as possible?” (H. Levy, ‘Heideggers Kantinterpretation’, 35) Weatherston, who quotes this passage in his Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant, adds to this that Heidegger “has failed to grasp that Kant’s solution, which places receptivity as such outside of our synthetic powers, is truer to human finitude. By losing sight of receptivity, Heidegger has lost touch with his crucial insight.” (M. Weatherston, Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality, 175)

163 Heidegger points out that this refers back to section 6 of Sein und Zeit where he dealt with the theme of a Destruktion of the history of ontology, and not to the chapter on temporality and historicity. It should be noted that Heidegger mentions in this section for the first time the exceptional place of Kant in this history. Wood says: “The reason is surely this: Heidegger has taken his own expression – ‘the destruction of the history of ontology’ – and thought it through more deeply. The result of that pondering is the attempt first to eradicate any sense of linear chronology or teleology in ‘history,’ and second, to think through the double genitive of the ‘of’ in the history of ontology, through the implications of the Es gibt (Sein).” (D. Wood, ‘Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time’, 153; cf. GA14, 13/9, 35-37/33-34)
thinking itself. Although Heidegger asked “Gibt es das ‘Es gibt’?” in 1919, he declares in 1962 that there is not much more to do than to answer affirmatively: “Was bleibt zu sagen? Nur dies: Das Ereignis ereignet.” (GA14, 29/24) The question deciding about the life or death of philosophy is answered, but does this answer not at the same time announce the death of philosophy, for nothing else remains to be said? In Zeit und Sein Heidegger describes his brief presentation as a “grundsätzlicher Überlegung”. Just as Kant endeavoured in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Heidegger begins his brief reflection with the observation that the grammatico-logical explanation of a statement uncovers the attribution of a predicate to a subject (hupokeimenon); this subject is then first of all determined as das Anwesende. Because of this, a statement shows itself as that which presences-with (zeigt sich als das mit dem Anwesenden schon Mit-Anwesende). However, a grammatico-logical reflection on the statement ‘Es gibt Sein’ will, then, inevitably lead to the statement ‘Sein ist Sein’, which itself will throw us back (zurückwerfen) to an earlier observation, namely that neither time nor Being are. The problem of the tautology is reversed when what was said merely seemed to repeat the subject (das Anwesende) of a judgment; when the predicate expressing a Mit-Anwesende is the same, then the Aussage indeed does not say much. Following Kant: it would merely be analytical. Unsurprisingly, then, Heidegger will have to return to the question of time, just as Kant introduced time in order to comprehend the conditions of possibility for all synthetic a priori judgments.

Heidegger begins Zeit und Sein with Being in order to think it in itself, as it ‘is’ in itself, on its own, in ihr Eigenes. The task will, therefore, be to think Being without beings (Sein ohne das Seiende). This first of all means that one thinks how it is possible that Being (and time) is given: “wie es Sein, wie es Zeit gibt” (GA14, 9/5). In this giving, Being and time belong together, and they evolve from this belonging-together. The task will be to think Being without having recourse to a metaphysical language that prioritizes the ‘now’, ‘Jetzt’. Instead, Heidegger says: “Sein besagt Anwesen”. The question of why Being is justifiably determined as presencing (Anwesen) is already too late, Heidegger writes, since Being has been determined as such as from the beginning of Western thinking. As Derrida points out, for Heidegger it has never been a “question of proposing that we think [Being and time] otherwise”, i.e., differently than in the form of the present; rather, “it is thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise” (MP, 42/38). Determining Being as Anwesen implies that there is a temporal aspect. But, then, how to understand this reciprocity of Being and time? As if he is again adopting the Kantian terminology of ‘bleiben’, Heidegger declares in Zeit und Sein that time is not a thing or a being, and therefore it is not temporal; rather, it is (like Being) a Sache des Denkens insofar as “time […] remains constant in its passing away [Zeit […] bleibt […] in ihrem Vergehen ständig]” (GA14, 7/3). Bleiben means anwesen, and because of this, Being determines time, although Heidegger will soon add that Being and time determine each other reciprocally (wechselweise) by way of the Es gibt insofar as it lets itself be experienced (erfahren) and seen (erblicken). In for instance the lectures on Kant from 1927/1928, Heidegger already claimed that time and space as pure forms of intuition are not merely ways of intuiting: “Space and time are a single whole and as such given. Given – this obviously means here: intuited in a pure intuiting.” (GA24, 121) It does not come as a surprise, then, that Heidegger moves from Being as Anwesen to the question of Anwesenlassen. Introducing the ‘lassen’ here will turn out to be crucial for Heidegger, and in Zeit und Sein it reappears in different shapes: Anlass, einlassen, überlassen, ablassen, etc. “To let presence means [Anwesen lassen heisst]: to unconceal [Entbergen], to bring to openness.

164 The Ereignis, as it appears in the later works of Heidegger, is hard to translate, for it can be an event, appropriation or propriation, and because of that it will remain largely untranslated here. Heidegger relates it to what is proper (eigen), which reminds us of course of the discussion about authenticity (eigentlichkeit) in Sein und Zeit. However, as we will see, added to this is the Enteignis.
In unconcealing prevails a giving, the giving that gives presencing, that is, Being, in letting-presence [Im Entbergen spielt ein Geben, jenes nämlich, das im Anwesen-lassen das Anwesen, d.h. Sein gibt].” (GA14, 9/5)

This implies that there is a law that prohibits us from saying that the future, the past and the present are at the same time (zugleich) present-at-hand (vorhanden); this remains forbidden to say (bleibt uns verboten zu sagen) (GA14, 18/14). Time is not present at hand. Heidegger emphasizes that time has traditionally been thought as a succession of a now-moment to another in a span of time. We recognize Heidegger’s search for authentic time that he opposed to the inauthentic, vulgar, metaphysical understanding of time. In the late 1920s, Heidegger sought the unity of this ecstatic time in the horizontal schema.165 In 1962, he declares that the three dimensions of time – the ecstatic structure of time as past, present and future – form a “unifying unity”. This “can be determined only by what is their own; that they offer themselves to one another [dass sie einander sich reichen]” (GA14, 18/14). The absence (Abwesen) as a presencing (Anwesen) of, for instance, what is to come does not coincide with the immediate present as Gegenwart. How should we understand the reichen (extending, handing, offering, or as Dastur describes it, “donation à distance”166) in the case of, for instance, the future when its Anwesen is offered? What is coming offers itself at the same time (zugleich) to the past. In this offering of the not-yet presence to the has-been, they can appear or present themselves and thereby bring us to the Gegenwart. The Wechselbezug of the future and the past that are said at the same time (zugleich) brings Heidegger to the present, so that all three dimensions offer each other their proper mode of Anwesen.

As Dastur pointed out, man is for Heidegger only man because “Being addresses itself to him in deploying presence and it is not because of his ecstatic essence that he is the ‘place’ [‘lieu’] of the auto-addressing of Being […]. The future [avenir] is, therefore, no longer thought as the coming to itself of a Dasein, but as the coming of Being to man.”167 However, this does not yet explain the unity of the three dimensions. Their unity rests in a Zuspiel jeder für jeder (i.e., in the reciprocity of the past, present and future), and the authentic time of this Zuspiel proves to be, according to Heidegger, a fourth dimension; authentic time is not merely three-dimensional, but quadridimensional.168 It seems that Heidegger needs to invoke this forth dimension in order to avoid the reduction of any of these dimensions to a single dimension, such as has been done in the philosophical prioritization of the now. The three dimensions are grounded in a Zuspiel or interplay between them that is established by their reciprocal offerings. The giving of Es gibt Zeit belongs to a properness of temporality that is best considered a forth dimension in which the counting (Abzählung) is disturbed. It might appear that it concerns a forth dimension here, but this dimension is in accordance with the Sache (der Sache nach) the first (das Erste) that determines all Reichen of time. Hence, it might appear as if this dimension is the forth (gleichsam als die vierte Dimension), but Heidegger immediately adds that this is not merely a matter of speaking, but, rather, follows from the Sache (nicht nur gleichsam, sondern aus der Sache) (GA14, 20/15).

The circle is closed; at least it seems so. What does this mean? Just before reintroducing the notion of Ereignis, Heidegger draws his conclusion: “Thus authentic time appears as the ‘Es’ of which we speak when we say: Es gibt Sein. The destiny in which it gives Being lies in the extending of time. [Somit erscheint die eigentliche Zeit als das Es, das

166 F. Dastur, Heidegger et la question du temps, 116.
167 Idem, 115; cf. GA14, 28/23.
168 When Heidegger tries to uncover the quadridimensionality of time, he criticizes Kant for declaring in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft that time has merely one dimension. Also in the lectures on anthropology (Reflexionen zur Anthropology) Kant points out that time has one dimension, but he immediately adds in the section on the Einbildungskraft that “in der Kraft der Vorstellung” time actually has three dimensions (RA, 145-146).
wir nennen im Sagen: Es gibt Sein. Das Geschick, darin es Sein gibt, beruht im Reichen von Zeit.” (GA14, 22/17) Heidegger rushes to deny that this would imply that time is the Es. On the contrary, time remains itself a gift (bleibt selber die Gabe) because of which the Es remains undetermined. We remain desperate (wir selber bleiben ratlos). However, when the Es puzzles us, when one hits upon something rätselhaftes, Heidegger tells us that it is advisable (ratsam) to determine the Es “in terms of the giving that we have already described. This sending proved to be the sending of Being, as time in the sense of an opening up which extends [des lichten Reichens].” (GA14, 22/17) Heidegger indicates that in both givings (the Schicken of Being, the Reichen of time) what shows itself is an appropriation (Zueignen) or a surrendering (Übereignen), i.e., a dedication or deliverance to the proper (eigen) of Being and time. What Heidegger calls ‘Ereignis’, then, determines both givings and holds them together. Being is not the Ereignis, but as Bernasconi formulates, “Ereignis is the word that arises from the experience of the lack of a word for Being. [...] Within metaphysics, Being went unheeded; the words of Being were not recognized as such. Being can thus be thought in terms of Ereignis, but not vice versa”. Heidegger introduces the term ‘sagendes Nichtsagen’ in Identität und Differenz as a possible, nonmetaphysical alternative to language, and what remains to be thought is the experience from which Sein und Zeit arises: the oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit).

Because of the need for a “saying not-saying”, or the need to speak provisionally (to adopt the language developed in Sein und Zeit), it is clear that we should not take Heidegger’s many references in Zeit und Sein to his own language and the declarative statements (Aussagegesätzen) of his lecture lightly. Just before Heidegger introduces the notion of Entsagen that belongs to Ereignis, he writes that the Ereignis has been thought more explicitly on the way, although not said authentically (eigens gesagt). Giving as Schicken belongs to Ansichhalten, keeping-back, which shows itself in a Verweigerung (i.e., the denial of the present in the reaching of the has-been) and a Vorenhalten (i.e., the withholding of the present in the reaching of the coming). It seems that the absence (Abwesen), essential for the past and the future, needs to be thought in the giving as Schicken in terms of this denial and withholding: for instance, what has-been (the past) presences (west an) in its absence (Abwesen). Because of the denial (of the past) and withholding (of the future), Heidegger introduces the notion of Entzug, withdrawal, as belonging to what is authentic (Eigentümlich) for the Ereignis. However, Heidegger concludes that the Erörterung of what the Ereignis allows (lässt) to be said of itself, i.e., the situating, placing or explicating of it, is not what his lecture is aiming at (Sache dieses Vortrags). This specifies that the characteristic (Eigentümlichkeit) of the Ereignis might not be expressed in a lecture that presents mere statements (GA14, 27/22). However, the Ereignis is not itself Heidegger’s final answer, which is also clear when we notice the negations in Heidegger’s text: “Ereignis ist weder, noch gibt es das Ereignis” (GA14, 29/24). Heidegger introduces the notion of Entsagen (ex-
or de-propriation) when referring to what is precisely authentic for or proper to the Ereignis. Indeed, besides the words ‘das Ereignis ereignet’ there does not seem a lot to say, especially when we realize, after reading in one of the last and long parenthetic remarks in Zeit und Sein that Enteignis belongs to Ereignis, and that the Es (of Es gibt) seems to be affirmed as the name for the Anwesen von Abwesen.172

Near the end Heidegger suggests that if (wenn) an Überwindung is still necessary this depends on the thinking that lets itself be authentically involved (einlassen) in the Ereignis. What is presented, thought or said would in that case be insufficient (unzureichend), and – while also considering Heidegger’s play with the giving of time as a Reichen – it seems that one does not accept (übernehmen) the concern for the Anwesen that reaches (erreicht) us as quadridimensional authentic time. In Unterwegs zur Sprache Heidegger gives the following revealing answer that again underscores the role of language for Heidegger: “[T]he word gives… [Es, das Wort, gibt…]. The whole ghost [der ganze Spuk] about the ‘Es’, which many people rightly fear, is blown away [verfliegt]. But what is memorable remains [das Denkwürdige bleibt], indeed only now does it come to radiant light [kommt erst zum Scheinen].” (GA12, 183) The word does not relate itself to a thing or being, but it is this relation (Verhältnis) itself. Heidegger’s saying becomes perhaps insufficient when the Reichen of time does not reach us. Constantly Heidegger warns us that when one merely pays attention to the propositions in his lecture, then it is obvious that a statement such as ‘Das Ereignis ereignet’ only says the Same about the Same in terms of the Same (vom Selben her auf das Selbe zu das Selbe) (GA14, 29/24). Heidegger, on the other hand, seems to hear in this tautological formula a formal structure for getting involved with the Ereignis and from which thinking needs to proceed: “um Es aus ihm her auf Es zu – zu sagen” (GA14, 30/24). As Heidegger finally suggests, maybe one should begin with the obstacles handed to us while lecturing: “The lecture has spoken merely in propositional statements.”

We note that Heidegger asks, immediately after the preface of Zeit und Sein, what gives occasion (Anlass) to mention Being and time together; he responds by referring to the history of Western thinking of Anwesen when it first of all understood this as Gegenwart: “According to current representations [geläufigen Vorstellungen], the present [Gegenwart], together with past and future, forms [bildet] the character of time.” (GA14, 6/2) Although the notion of forming (bilden) does not seem essential to Heidegger’s presentation (cf. GA14, 26/21), this bilden has determined time as presence (Anwesenheit). Heidegger eventually writes: “Wir behalten jedoch im Blick: Das Es nennt, jedenfalls in der zunächst verfügbaren Auslegung, ein Anwesen von Abwesen.” (GA14, 23/18) What seems to be held back is first of all something that needs to be held in vision (im Blick); and what needs to be envisioned is not so much the Es, but, rather, what Es (“Es, das Wort […]”) names: a presencing of absence, ein Anwesen von Abwesen. We already saw that Heidegger associates this Es with the word, but we also encountered Kant’s definition of the imagination as “das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen” (KRV, B151). We

172 The Ereignis neither is, nor is it given; rather, das Ereignis ereignet. The step or jump from negating (‘neither, nor’) to the ereignen of Ereignis is affirmed in what Heidegger writes after mentioning his negations (‘neither, nor’). ‘Das Ereignis ereignet’ does not appear to say much (dem Anschein nach sagt dies nichts). As Heidegger indicates, maybe it is not even something new that is being said; rather, one picks up what has been said, unceasingly (unablässig), in order to hear in these words “the oldest of the old in Western thinking”, namely what hides itself in the name of unconcealment, a-letheia (GA14, 29/24).172 Heidegger will soon end his text by telling us of the things still to be done. First of all, one needs to think Being in its ownness (in sein Eigenes) as from the Ereignis by way of authentic time. This implies that one does not regard the relation of Being to beings, and to think Being without a being means or calls for (heisst) a thinking without regard to metaphysics. However, this does not mean that one has to overcome metaphysics, as has been suggested so often. Rather, it is matter of ceasing (ablassen) all Überwinden and leaving metaphysics to itself (sich selbst überlassen).
are, therefore, maybe not amazed to read in Heidegger’s *Beiträge zur Philosophie* that “Dasein is the highest actuality in the domain of the imagination [Das Dasein ist als die Entwurufend-geworfene Gründung die Höchste Wirklichkeit im Bereich der Einbildung], granted that by this term we understand not only a faculty of the soul and not only something transcendental (cf. Kantbook) but rather Ereignis itself, wherein all transfiguration [Verklärung] reverberates. ‘Imagination’ as occurrence of the clearing itself [Die ‘Einbildung’ als Geschehnis der Lichtung selbst]. Only, ‘imagination’, imaginatio, is the name that names from within the perspective of the direct receiving [Vernehmen] of [the Greek noun] on, a being. Reckoned from this perspective, all Being [Seyn] and its enopening [Eröffnung] is a product [Gebilde] added to what is supposedly stable. But everything here is the other way around: What is ‘imagined’ in the usual sense is always the so-called ‘actually’ extent – imagined-into [hereingebildet], brought into the clearing to shine, brought into the Da.” (GA65, 312)

Is there another notion of imagination at work in Heidegger? With regard to the previously described theme of the *Seinsgeschick*, we note that Heidegger relates Hölderlin’s word ‘schiket’ in his ‘…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch…’ to the imagination. In Hölderlin’s ‘In lieblicher Bläue blühet…’ we read: ‘[…] Jemehr ist eins / Unsichtbar, schiket es sich in Fremdes […]’. Heidegger interprets the context by saying that the poet speaks in such a way of the looks (Anblicke) that he fits (fügt) the appearances (Erscheinungen) as those of the strange (Fremden) (GA7, 204). We have already briefly seen how Heidegger transforms Kant’s notion of synthesis into that of a Fuge, and here he notes that schicken – which Heidegger reserves for the gift of Being (schicken, Geschick, Geschichte) – takes place in the Fuge of appearances as those of what remains strange or foreign to every Anblick. However, instead of continuing with the schicken or the related Geschick, Heidegger picks up his line of reasoning by declaring that the usual name for Anblick is Bild. We note that for Heidegger this look (Anblick) perhaps first of all shows itself as a face, countenance or visage. He mentions in 1955 Raffael’s portrait of Madonna in the Sistine Chapel to which he adds that image means here the “Antlitz im Sinne von Entgegennblick als Ankunft” (GA13, 119). An Anblick is the look that looks back, that returns a look. We will have to return to this characterization of the image in the next chapter when we will focus more extensively on portraiture. Poetic images are, for Heidegger, imaginings (Ein-bildungen) in the sense of “erblickbare Einschlüsse des Fremden in den Anblick des Vertrauten” (GA7, 205). These perceivable inclusions of the strange are products of the imagination, but is this the same imagination as Kant’s transcendential imagination? What is unknown or strange in a look precisely estranges (befremdet) herein. For Heidegger, the estrangement of what Hölderin describes as the unknown God, appearing in the face (Angesicht) of its heaven testifies of a proximity (Nähe) (GA7, 205). Bilden is a production in which something is brought-out-to-the-fore (Her-vor-bringen). The meaning of the word ‘bilden’ is not sought in the Latin imago, for this would imply that an image is merely imitating, Nachahmen, Nachbilden, which are, together with Abbilden, merely derivatives of an “original image [ursprüngliche Bild]”. There is perhaps a (more) original meaning of ‘Bild’, a (more) original image that precedes the distinctions made in Kant’s lectures (Abbild, Nachbild, Vorbild). Bilden is first of all Her-vor-bringen in the sense that what is imagined is brought fore (vor) in the unconcealed, in the revealed or openness and out of (her aus) what conceals itself (Sichverbergenden) (GA13, 171). What does this mean for the image as a look? This question will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next chapter.

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Chapter 3
A Portrait of Derrida

§1. Introduction
Rousseau writes: “As soon as his potential powers of mind begin to function, imagination, more powerful than all the rest, awakes, and precedes all the rest. It is imagination which enlarges the bounds of possibility for us, whether for good or ill, and therefore stimulates and feeds desire by the hope of satisfying them.” (Quoted in GR, 264/186) The imagination is no longer simply the faculty of illusion, i.e., of dreams, but awakes desire in us by presenting the image of a future possibility or by enlarging the bounds of possibility. One of the ways to understand this would be along the lines of Heidegger who wishes to approach the question of Being by way of temporality and self-affection. But, then again, one can wonder whether Heidegger’s analysis of the transcendental imagination does not lose sight of what is essential for the imagination, namely that the imagining of the image retreats itself in the depth of the human soul. Perhaps we should say that the imagination is the power which metaphysics has never been able to grasp. As Sallis writes, “[d]rawing upon this power, putting it in service to the highest interests, philosophy was always compelled also to exclude imagination, to set it at a distance, and even to reserve a refuge in which finally there would be protection from the threat of imagination.” This observation of a “dynamics of the relation of philosophy to imagination”, as already indicated in Chapter 1, puts us at the edge of metaphysics itself, for, following Rousseau to a certain extent, the imagination can perhaps present what will have remained impossible. This will bring us to the theme of the apocalypse as discussed by Derrida. Derrida constantly confronted – without ascribing to eschatological conclusions drawn in philosophy – the question of the end or death of philosophy, and this will have consequences for our discussion on the imagination and time.

Derrida writes: “We have already begun to become interested in imagination and in time, that is, in the structure of auto-affection that Heidegger will have analyzed so powerfully in his Kant book.” (T, 54) As is known, Derrida’s interest does not mean a complete acceptance of Heidegger’s reading (cf. POS, 18-19/9-10), and Derrida gives us many interesting indications for his reservations when it comes to the (transcendental) imagination. As indicated, the question of the imagination leads us to the end of metaphysics, and because of that we have to return to Kant (our “exemplary ‘critical reader’” (PAS, 23/8)) and Heidegger. However, related to this is the problem of the power of the subject, for, as Sallis points out, imagination “exceeds individuality and determinate character. It is in excess of the self.” Is this excess something else or something more than the Heideggerian transcendence founded in or as self-affection and temporality? How, then, if we turn to Derrida, do we have to approach the question of the image and imagination? Derrida indicates: by way of the self-portrait. Why portraiture? Derrida gives the following answer:

The portrait is not one fiction or figure, one face of the figure, among others. Not only because it represents at once the gaze that gazes at us and the head that governs the body and the chief or head who governs the social body [Derrida discusses here the work of Marin who wrote Portrait du roi, JvG]. [...] But especially because, like the photographic portrait, its relation to the referent appears (and it is this appearance that counts even if one must not trust it) irreducible.

175 J. Sallis, Force of Imagination. The Sense of the Elemental, 43.
176 Idem, 21.
This fiction of the figure, of the face, is given as essentially nonfictive, and it claims to give us [...] what once was and could not have been present before the gaze or before the lens. What the portrait says, the title ‘portrait’ (and it is because a title is of the order of discourse that we are here in a gloss), is that what is shown, portraiture, is what was (supposed to have been) real, really present. (CFU, 193-194/155-156)

A portrait is, according to Derrida, not just any image. The apparently paradoxical characterization of portraiture – both fiction and (supposed and acclaimed) non-fiction – brings us closer to the reasons behind this interest. In this chapter, we will pay special attention to what Derrida calls here “the gaze that gazes at us”, especially when Derrida speaks of fascination and mourning, and, as will be made clear, this touches upon the theme of the image and imagination. The question of the self in relation to self-affection and self-portraits will then be relevant. Like in portraits, an image of me, my image is not my own, “it’s the image of the other, a phantasm, for a spectator I do not even know” (TS, 90).

This would surely upset Heidegger’s project of formulating the ground-laying of metaphysics when he searches in the imagination and self-affection for the possibility of the ‘as such’. This “small word, as [comme], is then everywhere the name of the very issue, not to say the target” (USC, 74/53-54). In contrast to Heidegger, Derrida directs our attention to the ‘as if’ as it is operative in Kant’s work, this “‘as if’ that regulates, orders, and makes time (fiction is what figures but also what makes [fait])” (USC, 62/48). Then again we have to ask what it means to speak of metaphysics and, above all, the history of metaphysics? First, we will focus on what Derrida called ‘the Apocalypse without Apocalypse’; by way of a reading of Kant, Derrida tries to “imagine” a tone within philosophy that calls for something altogether differently to come. What if there is not the metaphysics, and what does this mean for Kant and Heidegger (§2)? This will bring us to the question of the unrepresented or unrepresentable, and because of this we will have to return to Kant: “It is a matter of Kant’s situation. Apparently, at least, the Kantian moment, along with everything that is inherited from that moment, is defined by a double gesture”, namely, the “release of the suppressive repression of the imagination.” (T, 61-62) This seems to have been, more or less, of secondary importance to Heidegger, and, here, we will approach the question by way of the theme of respect, since the law does not allow a direct representation of itself (§3). By way of the theme of respect, the matter of the limits of the imagination and the ‘as if’ announce themselves, and, as we will see, the theme of the success and failure of mourning allows us to discuss the imagination and image (§4). What if everything said about the self (self- or auto-affection, psyche) is already always handed over to the discourse of the other? Added to this, we have to ask: what if there is not the concept of the imagination? We are also confronted with the facets of the imagination, namely, on the one hand, the imagination is the production or reproduction (i.e., invention) of the image (copy, representation, double) by reflecting on what the imagination already finds ‘there’, and, on the other hand, the imagination invents or produces that which was never present (“and thus hesitating between fiction and event”) (cf. T, 56). As stated above, according to Derrida, this question of the image can best be approached by way of portraiture (§5). As we will see, the theme of mourning will turn out to be a guiding thread throughout our reading of Derrida, which will bring us to the question of the end of mourning (§6). Derrida writes: “This tableau condenses the narrative ellipsis of an allegory. Psyche is exposed, surrendered to the world of the other around her – and about her. For Psyche, for a psyche altogether exposed to the outside and the other, there is no


178 Cf. R. Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, 38; G. Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, 151.
autobiography […] Mourning autobiography is not just any mourning among others, any more than Psyche’s mourning lets itself be preceded or properly figures by any other. One might as well say that, being unimaginable, it can only give rise to images, phantasms, and spectres, that is, figures, tropes, allegories, or metonymies opening a path to technics.” (LT, 66/52) In the end, we will see that the Kantian ‘as if’ is essential here, and Derrida will turn it into a question: ‘What if…?’ What if what gives rise to the image is (the) unimaginable? What if time finds its origin in mourning, or time is a time of mourning?

§2. The Apocalypse without Apocalypse

The question of the imagination brings us to that of the end of philosophy. It is here that we will pick up the first attempt to recall Derrida’s interest in Kant when the latter struggled with what he calls the “death of philosophy”. Derrida always distrusted the discussion of this death when he maintained a distinction between clôture and fin (cf. GR, 14/4, 25/14), which he repeats in his D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie of which the title echoes Kant’s Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie (1797). As we have seen in Chapter 1, in an early letter from Kant to Lambert he wrote that the death of philosophy has to be performed by philosophy itself when it merely sticks to pranks, and in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant continues this thought by claiming that skepticism is the death of healthy philosophy and more precisely its euthanasia (cf. KRV, A407/B434). It is from here that (a) philosophy can or has to arise anew (leaving only the critical path open), although it should be noted that in 1797 Kant approaches this same topic by adopting a sarcastic and polemical tone, and it is this time directed against the mystagogues. It turns out that, according to Kant, these mystagogues use a vonnehmen Ton by authorizing themselves to speak of a secret (Geheimniss) to which they alone have access, and as Kant mentions in the text, they call for the death of philosophy (VTP, 398/438, 405/444) (§2.1). Because Derrida is concerned with the apocalyptic tone, it is surprising that he avoids a reading of Kant’s Das Ende aller Dingen in which Kant dealt with the Biblical Apocalypse. We cannot avoid a reading of this little text here, since the theme of time is reintroduced in the pamphlet and placed within a context that is not without relevance (§2.2). Finally, we will have to return to Heidegger, whose thinking of the Seinsgeschick and Seinsgeschichte Derrida tried to translate into that of sendings (envoi, renvois), a notion that is also discussed in his D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie (§2.3).

§2.1. The Death of Philosophy

The elite of mystagogues gets involved in a private initiation for knowing the supersensible, which will have to rely on what Kant calls an “intellectual intuition of the object”. For Kant there is knowledge of the supersensible from a practical perspective and not from a theoretical one, so he can only conclude that the supersensible is the “true mystery [Geheimniss], from the theoretical viewpoint” (VTP, 389/431). It suffices for these mystagogues to listen to “the voice of the oracle in themselves” which Kant soon hopes to dissociate from the voice

179 In the introductory remarks of Derrida and Ferraris to A Taste for the Secret, they pose the question of “why thought resembles not only what is called the ‘life of the mind’, but also reality” which demands that one questions “the schematism that regulates this ‘strange resemblance’” (TS, viii). To introduce the subsequent interviews with Derrida, they add that an interview is traditionally seen as an “iconography” that illustrates thought by way of “full phenomenalization”, and “to the objection that thought, any thought, is hypotyposis, i.e., sensibilisation and phenomenalization, one might reply, with perfectly tranquil ingenuousness, that interviews are all the more iconographic and picturesque because they expose what is hidden in essays, novels or poems” (TS, vii).

180 Cf. POS, 14/6: “I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and not death, for I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple death of whatever – the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know, what is dead yields a very specific power).”
(Stimme) of reason; the voice of the oracle is, then, first of all a derangement or Verstimmung of the voice. This voice is out of tune when it turns out that what the voice of the oracle supposedly says to the mystagogues remains interpretable in many different ways, while the voice of reason is clear in what it says or wants to say, that is, its meaning or Bedeutung is deutlich. They rely on what Kant calls a salto mortale, an Übersprung from concepts to what cannot be directly represented, because of which the distinction between theoretical and practical reason is annulled by sensing, anticipating or foreseeing the secret coming from beyond the senses. For Kant practical reason does not describe anything, for it only prescribes, so that Derrida can subsequently point out that this voice of (practical) reason dictates autonomy and a law that is not flexible or susceptible to “free interpretation” (TA, 36/132). The sublimity of the moral law – to which we will return later – is misunderstood by the mystagogies, although the voice of practical reason is, as Derrida writes, “nearer, and therefore more auto-affective, more autonomous than the mystagogic oracle” (TA, 37/133).

A brief excursus is needed here, for Heidegger refers to this same text in his Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. He presents the example or model (Vorbild) of Kant in which Heidegger hears a call for Nüchternheit und wirkliche Arbeit. Just before the ending, Heidegger concludes that the a priori is what precedes or what comes before… (das Frühere), which introduces a temporal element in all ontological statements. It is, then, a matter of comprehending this temporality itself. Heidegger states that what originally makes possible (as “the origin of possibility itself”) is time, so that “time temporalizes itself as what precedes absolutely [als das Früheste schlechthin],” What precedes every possible preceding is time, although this does not mean that time is a being. Phenomenology does not dress itself in any illusions. In order to uncover phenomenology as the method of ontology it has to secure itself of “the object of philosophy” (GA24, 461-469/323-330). For Heidegger this also implies that phenomenology has to free itself from the Gefühlsphilosophie, and it is here that Kant is taken as the Vorbild when he opposed himself to this last philosophy by taking sides with a certain Plato, namely with Plato the academic and not Plato as the writer of his letters (GA24, 468/329; cf. VTP, 398-399/438-439). Plato is for Kant the father of all Schwärmerei, and yet, Plato also needs to be excused since this happened through no fault of his. Plato presents himself in his letters as a Schwärmer, and in that sense Plato is (as the writer of these letters) the father of what Kant has always struggled with. Kant’s distinction between the writer and the academic is merely quoted by Heidegger without commenting on, or even considering, Kant’s response to the conflict between the mystagogues and enlightenment. Why does Heidegger leave this aside? It is as if Heidegger wishes to get rid of the mystagogues while Kant precisely tried to resolve the conflict. The need of this excursus is implicitly announced in the words of Derrida previously quoted when he wrote of the “more auto-affective” voice of reason. Taking into account Derrida’s constant interest in Heidegger’s discussion on auto-affection, one needs to ask what is meant by the words “more auto-affective” as if this auto-affection fails to close upon itself and can never be as pure as Heidegger hoped. Indeed, Derrida spoke of a “nearer, and therefore more auto-affective, more autonomous [voice] than the mystagogic oracle”. We will have to return to this theme.

Kant presents “Plato the writer” in a reference to a certain Schlosser who published the letters of Plato; Kant also accuses him for abusing poetic metaphors. However, Schlosser condemns the philosophical tradition for remaining prosaic. Kant’s positive interest in another Plato has to do with, as Derrida summarizes, Plato’s presentiment of “the problematic of the a priori synthesis”, which again underscores the need to discuss the theme of auto-affection (TA, 41/135; cf. VTP, 391-394/432-435). Kant points out that the mystagogues (as the new Platonists) also have a presentiment (Ahnung), although they merely have recourse to sensibilizations or imaginary expressions (bildlichen Ausdrücken), contaminating or detoning (verstimmen) the voice (VTP, 399/439). This Verstimmung is foreign to the essence of the
voice, and as Derrida writes, these Verstimmungen are “poetic schemas” (TA, 45/138).\footnote{181} In their theatrical representations – for example, when the mystagogues speak of a Theatersonne instead of the real sun –, Kant underlines that everything is merely based on analogies and probabilities (Analogieen, Wahrscheinlichkeiten), and Derrida invokes the classical confrontation between philosophy and literature: “All that [ça] is so much literature” (TA, 45/138). As might be expected, Kant subsequently responds by saying that there is also the prosaic philosopher Aristotle who sealed – together with a certain Plato – Antiquity, and Kant then concludes: “At bottom, indeed, all philosophy is prosaic; and a proposal to now begin philosophizing poetically again [wiederum poetisch zu philosophieren] might well be received as one would a suggestion that the merchant should henceforth write his catalogues, not in prose, but in verse.” (VTP, 405n/445n) The conflict is, therefore, between belief in an open future for philosophy and the end or death of philosophy by obscurantism.

Kant ends with an attempt to settle the conflict when alluding to the voice of reason telling of the moral law in us. However, “on listening [we] are in doubt whether it comes from man himself, out of the absolute authority of his own reason, or whether it proceeds from another being, whose nature is unknown to him, and which speaks to man through his own reason” (VTP, 405/444). Kant proposes that the law transcends not only the person, but also personification itself as an aesthetic mode of presentation (ästhetische Vorstellungsart). Derrida, then, points out that not only the mystagogues proclaim the death of philosophy, since, with and after Kant, philosophy also held on to an eschatological proclamation (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc.). “[I]n 1789 Kant denounced those who proclaim that philosophy has been at an end for two thousand years, he has himself, in marking a limit, indeed proclaimed the end of a certain type of metaphysics, freed another wave of eschatological discourses in philosophy. His progressivism, his belief in the future of a certain philosophy, indeed of another metaphysics, is not contradictory to this proclamation of ends and of the end [des fins et de la fin].” (TA, 58/144-145) Kant’s interest in the Aufklärung, therefore, is at the same time an unveiling of a future of another metaphysics that calls for an end and demystification of (the old) metaphysics. It would be a clear mistake to presume that Derrida is merely concerned with Kant’s Aufklärung as a way to return to Schwärmerei (or literature) resulting in another Verstimmung or image, even though, for Derrida, there are also possibilities in the Verstimmung.\footnote{182} Despite Kant’s attempt to prescribe a delimiting of the imagination in the name of philosophy, Derrida summons the imagining of one or the apocalyptic tone as a unity of this tone. Although there is perhaps not one apocalyptic scene or paradigm – for this would

\footnote{181} Unsurprisingly, then, Derrida indeed says of the secret (“il y a là du secret”) that it “would not […] be a matter of that psycho-physical secret, the art hidden in the depths of the human soul, of which Kant speaks in connection with the transcendental schematism, and of the imagination (eine verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele)” (PAS, 56-57/24; cf. J.D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 107).

\footnote{182} As noted, this does not mean that Derrida is taking sides of the mystagogues as if he also claims to have a private foresight or insight; rather, the theme of foreseeing itself becomes a problem, which is also analyzed in another text of Derrida with which we cannot deal here extensively, namely ‘Telépathie’. Although the text – which consists of a collection of letters – deals with Freud, Derrida several times refers to the Kantbuch in which he seems to underline that telepathy as an “outside-the-subject [hors-subject]” first of all implies that touch or pathein involves a distance (tele-); “And the other – one will never know what he wrote – there are others and it is always like that. there is only tele-analysis, they will have to draw all the conclusions like us, get their concepts of the ‘analytic situation’ to swallow a new metrics of time (of the multiplicity of systems, etc.) as well as another reading of the transcendental imagination (from the Kantbuch and beyond…. up to the present [jusqu’à present] as one dares to say in French)” (PSI, 243/501; like Heidegger, Freud links imagining (phantasieren) to three dimensions of time but, then, wishes to uncover that phantasies underlie neurosis, psychosis and dreams; with regard to the theme of time in Freud and Heidegger, cf. CP, 382/359, 435/407). When Freud “says ‘receptive and passive’ without raising any further questions, one regrets that he hasn’t read a certain Kantbuch which was being written just at the time that he himself was changing his views on the possibility of telepathy, between ‘Dreams and Telepathy’ and the New Introductory fake Lectures” (PSI, 264/518; cf. N. Royle, After Derrida, 61-84).
still be a philosophical, eschatological and teleological modeling of apocalyptic strategies – Derrida has recourse to “the temptation of a fiction” when he declares to “imagine this fundamental scene. Let us imagine that there is one apocalyptic tone, a unity of the apocalyptic tone, and that the apocalyptic tone is not the effect of a generalized derailment, of a Verstimmung multiplying the voices.” (TA, 67/150) There are in the Verstimmung perhaps possibilities, and, as we shall see, these possibilities are perhaps that of another tone or the tone of another to come.

Kant searches for the solution to the conflict between enlightenment and the mystagogues, starting with the demand not to personify or sensibilize the moral law any longer, so that this law is placed above and beyond personification. Hence, the truce proposed entails an exclusion and something inadmissible (irreceivable), an “excluded middle” of schematization; Derrida then concludes that this “will be enough for me” (TA, 55/143). The law demands the suppression or repression of imagination. As noted, an end or limit is marked here in the name of light, i.e., an Aufklärung. But, then, what is the apocalyptic tone that Derrida tries to uncover? In the name of light, the apocalyptic tone states the unveiling or truth of an end, where truth unveils itself as the coming of the end. The structure of truth, then, that signifies the beginning of the end would be apocalyptic. For Derrida, the apocalyptic word par excellence is ‘Come’ (Viens) that calls for the coming of an event without directing itself to anything specific; what it uncovers is the announcement of the truth. This word ‘Come’, if it is a word at all, indeed resounds in Derrida’s work, and this is not one apocalypse among others, but an apocalypse without (sans) apocalypse or an apocalypse of this without (sans). The apocalyptic tone does not reveal anything, except a polytonality that cannot be sealed or closed up without always allowing the other (voices) to come; it calls for a change or event without knowing or foreseeing who or what is coming. It also tells us of Derrida’s need to speak of a “more auto-affective” voice instead of pure auto-affection.

One does not know to whom or what the ‘Come’ is directed, one does not know who or what is coming. “The event [événement] of this ‘Come’ precedes and calls the event. It would be that starting from which there is any event, the coming, the to-come of the event that cannot be thought under the given category of event.” (TA, 91/164) Later we will see that Derrida speaks of a quasi-event as if he wishes to underscore that one perhaps never recognizes an event as such. The apocalypse without apocalypse does not reveal a last truth or judgment; it does not seal off or close, but, rather, opens up to a diversity of sendings (envois). It says or gestures ‘Come’ without revealing anything; the event of ‘Come’ – said to the other or to others before defining these as persons, subjects or equals – is that through which there is perhaps (the coming of) the event. This ‘Come’ as the opening of a scene is not a theme or representation, it is not “subsumable under a category, even were it that of coming or event” (TA, 92/165). It precedes and calls for an event, the event that is always yet to come; the ‘Come’ cannot be reduced to something that is, i.e., to the present or presence, since the question of ‘what is’ belongs to the space or horizon that is opened by the ‘Come’ coming from the other. “‘Come’ does not address itself to an identity determinable in advance. It is a drift [une derive] undervisible from the identity of a determination. ‘Come’ is only derivable, absolutely derivable, but only from the other, from nothing that may be an origin or a verifiable, decidable, presentable, appropriable identity, from nothing not already derivable and arrivable without rive [bank, shore].” (TA, 94-95/166-167) What this ‘Come’ announces is an apocalypse without apocalypse, without truth, revelation, destination, message, sender, decidable addressee or last judgment. As an apocalypse without apocalypse, the ‘Come’ does not announce a specific apocalypse, although it resounds in every apocalypse with a certain tone, namely it is the apocalypse of apocalypse. “Come is apocalyptic.” (TA, 95/167)183

183 Derrida’s apocalypse of ‘Come’ follows a curious syntax, namely that of the ‘without’ (sans): apocalypse without apocalypse, X without X, with which Derrida dealt, for instance, when reading Kant’s third Kritik where
§2.2. The End of All Things

Although Derrida refers to two other books of Kant in which the latter incidentally mentions the Apocalypse (cf. REL, 134/161; SF, 62/282), he leaves aside the most obvious reference: Kant’s Das Ende aller Dinge from 1794. Taking into account Heidegger’s interest in the transcendental imagination and temporality for the ground-laying of metaphysics, we need to return to Kant when he asks how one can think the end of all things as the end of time and, more importantly, how to regard all the representations made of the eternity after this time? Kant calls the last day the youngest day that still belongs as a point of time (Zeitpunkt) to time even though it closes all times. It is still Innerzeitlich (as Heidegger might have said) insofar as this youngest day is Judgment Day, that is, what happens (geschieht) on this youngest day is the youngest judgment. However, Kant constantly indicates that this youngest day should not be thought as from the physical duration of the world but as from its moral course, and, because of this, a passage (Übergang) from time to eternity is only allowed for practical reason. Hence, Kant concludes that “the representation of these last things that are supposed to come after the last day are to be regarded only as a way of making sensible [Versinnlichung]” the last day (EAD, 328/222). Here again we notice Kant’s underlining of the impossibility of imagining of what lies beyond experience. The idea that there will be an instant in time (Zeitpunkt) when there is no more change (Veränderung), and where there is no more time (wo es keine Zeit gibt) and, henceforth, no end, is a representation that outrages the possibilities of the imagination (eine die Einbildungskraft empörende Vorstellung) (EAD, 334/227). Although a representation, it is conflicting with the imagination; it revolts, rises up against the imagination. We do not know what is beyond time in the future world, for as the second Analogy of Experience teaches us, there is no change (Veränderung) without time, and as Kant adds in Das Ende aller Dinge, thinking is reflecting and reflection can only occur in time (nur in die Zeit geschehen kann). Kant, therefore, tells us that it is wise (weise) to act “as if another life – and the moral state in which we end this one, along with its consequences in entering on that other life – is unalterable [unabänderlich]” (EAD, 330/224). Perhaps also with the earthquake in Lisbon in mind, Kant writes that the imagination usually finds signs (Vorzeichen) of the youngest day in events of a horrific kind (schrecklichen Art), although it is reason that creates (schaffen) the Idea of this end because of which we have to say that the objects are beyond the sensible world. This does not mean that these concepts (Ideas) are empty; at least they are not empty for practical reason. If there is no schema of this Idea, how can these concepts have any content? Insofar as it is possible to speak of meaning, the Idea demands an ‘as if’-representation that postpones every sensibilization and schematization. Without this analogy of the schematism, the concept of the law would remain empty. There is a rule (Regel) for the practical use of reason, namely, we have to chose our maxims as the guiding rules of our own actions “as if, in all alterations from good to better going into infinity, our moral condition, regarding its disposition [Gesinnung] (the homo noumenon, ‘whose change takes place in heaven’) were not subject to any temporal change [Zeitwechsel] at all” (EAD, 334/227). Kant is again guarding us from Schwärmerei, although now called mysticism (Mystik); reason has its secrets (ihre Geheimnisse) when it takes its chances in the “transcendent” (EAD, 335/228).

Daval interprets the Kantian ‘as if’ (or the Typik of practical reason) as a substitute for the failure of an immediate representation, i.e., of the transcendental schematism. Indeed, as we have seen in the first chapter, Kant always advocated that the gift of the law (Gesetzgebung) has nothing to do with the schematism of the transcendental imagination. Even the symbol is not suitable for the law itself, for the moral law is heterogeneous to the

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184 Cf. R. Daval, La métaphysique de Kant, 97-99.
symbol.\textsuperscript{185} Kant writes in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* that, although inexplicable for theoretical reason, the moral law directs us to a pure intelligible world (*Verstandeswelt*). It gives evidence to (erkennen lässt) the law that has to (soll) give the sensible world the form of a supersensible world, allowing the supersensible world to be perceived as the *urbildliche* (*natura archetypa*) of the sensible (i.e., *nachbildende* *natura ectypea*). The latter domain can present the consequences of what is demanded by the former, which is the determining ground of the will (Bestimmungsgrundes des Willens). Then, the *urbildliche* has, what Kant calls, a counterpart or –image (*Gegenbild*) in the sensible world (KPV, 43/174). All subjective principles of actions are subjected (unterworfen sind) to a law “as if a natural order must at the same time arise from our will [als ob durch unseren Willen zugleich eine Naturordnung entspringen müsste]” (KPV, 44/175). Subjecting these maxims and also nature to the will implies that the will is the cause of objects, while the inverse – the will subjected to nature – means that an object is the cause of representations (*Ursachen der Vorstellungen*) determining the will. What has the imagination to do with this *Gegen-bildung* when it is precisely the transcendental schematism that needs to be excluded here? Can we perhaps say that the “*Einbildungskraft empörende Vorstellung*” a *Gegen-bildung* is?

Kant, then, asks in *Das Ende aller Dinge* how one is supposed to think the possibility that there is no time (as the time of the sensible), i.e., that there is a place “wo es keine Zeit gibt”? This eternity is not an eternal continuation insofar as there is no possibility of going beyond time. Because of this, Kant describes the end of all times (*Ende aller Zeit*) as a *duratio noumenon*. It is the only recurrence of this noumenal duration in Kant’s published work, which he immediately describes as “a magnitude [Grösse]” that is “wholly incomparable with time” of which there is no other concept than a purely negative one (EAD, 327/221). How to comprehend the ethical time of the *duratio noumenon*; how to think that there will eventually be a no-time-left as predicted in St. John’s Apocalypse (cf. EAD, 333/226)?\textsuperscript{186} This question remains unanswered by Kant who only thought time as pure intuition, unless one has to conclude that the transcendental imagination is not identical to time. The Idea of the end of all things, which exceeds the power of grasping (*Fassungskraft*), is useful for the satisfaction (*Zufriedenheit*) that should not be related to continuous changes, for the condition in which one finds oneself (in time) will remain “an ill compared with a better one [ein Übel vergleichungsweise gegen den bessern]” (EAD, 335/227). From this perspective, one only has an infinite set of *Übeln* ahead of oneself, so that the *Zufriedenheit* (that cannot be gained here) is only thought as the final end (*Endzweck*). The time of the noumenal duration or this time of the law is not another time that doubles or supplements the temporal series of *Zeitpunkten*. Rather, as Rogozinski states, the “gift of the law […] would be the offer of time [l’offrande du temps] and the law itself would have to be thought as pure temporality, the law of times [loi du temps]” and it will be necessary to think “that time as such is not (intra-)temporal, does not pass, does not expire ‘in’ time, without being therefore un-temporal [in-temporel]”.\textsuperscript{187} The law gives itself, then, as the condition of possibility for time, even though it retreats from time.

Kant ends his text on the end of all things with a second possibility of an unnatural ending: besides the supersensible end there is also the counter-natural (widernatürliche) one (termed *Torheit*) where the means to reach certain ends (*Zwecken*) are precisely opposed (zuwider) to these ends. Here, the ends are not thought as ungraspable (as is the case with the above discussed supersensible end), but rather misunderstood (missverstehen). What is crucial


\textsuperscript{186} As Rogozinski indicates, this *duratio noumenon* is introduced in relation to the eternity of life after death, but it should be possible to “apply it to the temporality of the intelligible character” (J. Rogozinski, *Le don de la loi. Kant et l´énigme de l´éthique*, 321n).

for Kant is that the consequences of the means to reach the final ends (i.e., wisdom as a practical prospect in the conformity of the means to the highest good) are considered as part of Providence (Vorsehung). It is impossible to foresee with certainty the results of the means chosen on the basis of merely human wisdom, so that (divine) wisdom has to be related to morality and not to the natural course of things. Kant is implicitly opposing himself to the ruling of the Prussian government, under guidance of Wöllmer, when enforcing a censorship with regard to writings on Christianity, as if the love of which Kant will speak, at the same time comes along with hatred. Kant refers to what is worth loving (Liebenswürdig) in Christianity, namely the “moral constitution which he founded [der sittliche Verfassung, die Er stiftete]” (EAD, 337/229). Similar to his discussion on friendship in Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant introduces the couple of respect (Achtung) and love (Liebe) (cf. MS, 470/585; PA, 282-294/252-263). He points out that there is no true love without respect, although respect is possible without love: “Respect is without doubt what is primary [das Erste]” (EAD, 337/230). Respect is first of all respect for the moral law, but nobody can be forced to love (because the feeling of love is not a matter of willing), so that the couple ‘respect-love’ demands a distinction between the subjective ground of an action and the objective one. This subjective ground gives us insight in the future insofar as it teaches us what someone is likely to do (was der Mensch tun werde), while the objective ground tells us what might be expected insofar as it teaches us what has to be done (was er tun soll). Kant determined in Die Metaphysik der Sitten love as “the complete and free surrender [Ergebung] of all one’s ends to the ends of another (even a supernatural [übermenschlichen]) being” (MS, 401/530; cf. EAD, 338/230). Although (or perhaps because) love is merely secondary, Kant writes in Das Ende aller Dinge that love is “an indispensable complement [Ergänzungsstück] to the imperfection of human nature (of having to be necessitated to that which reason prescribes through the law)” (EAD, 338/230). Love is indispensable for this completion of human nature based on respect, for one cannot count on duties alone (cf. MS, 449/568). Here, Christianity becomes interesting for Kant when it speaks with the quality of a philanthropist (Menschenfreund) and not in that of a commander who enforces his own will onto others, for the Christian Absicht is this: to promote love “out of concern for the observance of duty in general [Geschäft der Beobachtung seiner Plicht überhaupt]” (EAD, 338/230). The dimension of freedom involved is promoted by advocating this essential complementary love, and this is what the evangelic gift of law (Gesetzgebung) makes worth loving (Liebenswürdig). Before deciding on the possible wrongful end of all things, Kant declares that what Christianity makes worth loving still (immer noch) shines through in – and despite of – all the changes of opinions and the many coercions; this is no justification for, for instance, Wöllmer’s ruling, as is clear when Kant writes that it is remarkable (merkwürdig) that this shows itself “in all the brighter light [in einem nur desto hellern Lichte] in an age of the greatest enlightenment [der grössten Aufklärung]” (REL, 339/231).

188 In his Politique de l’amitié, Derrida discusses the Kantian union of love and respect in friendship. He points out that friendship in its perfection, i.e., as an Idea, is here structured on the basis of fraternity, or, as Kant writes, “as if all were brothers under one father who will the happiness of all [gleichsam als Brüder unter einem allgemeine Vater, der Aller Gelückseligkeit will]” (MS, 473/587). Derrida adds that this Vorstellung is an “image or a schema of the imagination in view of the idea of equality and in view of responding to the obligation attached to it, responding to it and answering for it responsibly. […] [O]n the one hand, the schema of this presentation has become indispensable. One cannot and must not dispense with it. One should no longer be able to. On the other hand, qua sensible or imaginal schema, in its very necessity, it remains to sensible or imaginal fraternity, to the virility of the congeneric” that “does not wish to be conventional, or arbitrary, or imaginary. […] The anthropological schema of the family is doing all the work here. It is the desire for one family. […] At the centre of this familial schema, at the centre of what can again be called oikeiotes, the brother occupies the unique place, the place of the irreplaceable.” (PA, 293-294/262)
The wrongful ending would begin with the end of Christianity itself when it ceases to be worth loving, which announces the coming of the reign of the Antichrist. This coming not only announces the end of Christianity, but also “the (perverted) end of all things, in a moral respect” (EAD, 339/231; cf. REL, 136/163; SF, 80/298). Kant fears this wrongful ending and the coming of the Antichrist while Christianity is determined as or destined to be (bestimmen) the “world religion [allgemeine Weltreligion]” (EAD, 339/231). Apparent Kant is able to judge about this ending as if he is the final judge, and his apocalyptic proclamation of this wrongful end of both Christianity and all things betrays Kant’s pietistic background. The end of Christianity is for Kant the loss of something worth loving (etwas Liebenswürdiges) that takes place when Christianity is armed (bewaffnet würde) with a commanding authority (mit gebieterischer Autorität). However, we notice that Kant’s pamphlet not only describes the love of Christianity; Christianity itself is worth loving, which implies for Kant that the pamphlet has to present itself as if it were a public love-letter for (true) Christianity (and its wisdom). Kant at the same time wishes to resist the coming of a wrongful ending because of the lack of love. Kant does not propose a new project (Entwurf) for re-installing Christian faith among the people; at least, he tells us that he is “aware of his own inability [meines Unvermögens...bewusst]” and, because of that, he advises (whom? Wöllmer?) to leave things (Sachen) as they were. While writing about this love, Kant forbids himself to teach others “what they would have to do”; rather, he tells them “what they will have to take care that they will be up against [wogegen zu verstossen sie sich ja in die Acht zu nehmen hätten]” (EAD, 337/229). Realizing that for Kant love cannot be enforced or coerced, how else to tell others that they should not forget about Christian love than by writing something that might be called a love-letter for Christianity? Then, how to write out of love and about love when there is always the danger that this love is lost, that is, when the destination – and also the destination determined for (and by) Christianity – can be missed? We remember another love-letter, not send by Kant, but found in Derrida’s La carte postale (1980) – in which the writer already spoke of “my post card apocalypse” and “my small library apocalypse” (CP, 17/13, 16/11; cf. TA, 38/134) – when we read: “I’m taking notes for the preface. In it I would have (practically, effectively, performatively) to make, but for you, my sweet love, my immense one, the demonstration that a letter can always – and therefore must – never arrive at its destination. And that this is not negative, it’s good, and is the condition (the tragic condition, certainly, and we know something about that) that something does not arrive – and that I love you.” (CP, 133/121)

For Kant, the only authentic moral religion is Christianity. Morality and Christianity are, therefore, essentially and conceptually indistinguishable for Kant; the alternative is an unnatural end of all things, so it is clear that what is at stake for Kant when he deals with morality is (the existence of) the world itself, and the unconditional universality of the moral law is evangelic. The paradoxical conclusion is that when he gives us the principle of the moral religion, i.e., the religion of the good life path (Religion des guten Lebenswandels), prescribing us to become better human beings, “[i]t is not essential, and hence not necessary, that every human being know what God does, or has done for, his salvation [Seligkeit]”; but it is essential to know what a human being has to do himself in order to become worthy of this

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189 What justifies Kant’s speaking of Christianity as a universal world religion? As Rogozinski points out, one might ask whether Kant is not doing precisely what he has warned us about, namely giving a schematization of the moral law when only symbolization is allowed. However, it is only in a footnote in his Religion that Kant gives his argument when dealing with the characteristics (Eigenthümlichkeit) of Christian morality: the moral good (Sittlich-Gute) is not distinguished from the moral evil (Sittlich-Böse) as the heaven is distinguished from earth, but as heaven is distinguished from hell. “[A] figurative [bildlich] representation and, as such, a stirring one [empörend], yet not any the less philosophically correct in meaning” (REL, 60n/103n; cf. J. Rogozinki, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’énigme de l’éthique, 293-299).

assistance [dieses Beistandes]” (REL, 52/96). As Derrida concludes, to act morally implies that one acts “as if God does not exist or is no longer concerned with our salvation” (FS, 22). This is moral/Christian: to act as if God has left us, and by allowing us to think God and therefore to suspend it in theory becomes the meaning of God as a postulate for practical reason. The Christian calling in history is, then, the persistence of the death of God. Christianity is perhaps nothing else than this death of God, announced and brought to remembrance by Kant in the time of enlightenment (cf. FS, 22). The moral law remains here like the veiled Isis: impossible to sensibilize immediately, and because of this Kant proposes that aesthetic presentation should be avoided altogether. Kant wishes to protect himself from this danger when he writes that it is “in falsely attributed empirical properties (which are, for this exact reason, unfit for universal legislation) that reason is emasculated and crippled [entmannt und gelähmt wird]” (VTP, 400; cf. TA, 45-49). Kant presents the emasculation (Entmannung) of reason as one of inadmissible analogies that abuses the Platonic mysticism, but, as is clear from the quote, what is at stake in metaphysics itself is what Kant calls here the emasculation of reason. We will have to return to this theme, taking into account that, for Freud, decapitation means castration; Kant will direct his reason against all Isises by opposing the “superior” tone adopted in philosophy, and philosophy, in the end, will not have to speak with another tone but without any tone at all.

§2.3. Renvois

We already noticed that Kant’s attempt at the reconciliation with the mystagogues started with the uncertainty of deciding about the origin or source of the voice of reason. In his reading on the apocalyptic tone, Derrida concludes that “as soon as we no longer know very well who speaks or who writes, the text becomes apocalyptic. […] [W]ouldn’t the apocalyptic be a transcendental condition of all discourse, of all experience itself, of every mark or every trace? […] In that case, if [si] the apocalypse reveals, it is first of all the revelation of the apocalypse, the self-presentation of the apocalyptic structure of language, of writing, of the experience of presence, in other words, of the text or of the mark in general: that is, of the divisible envoi for which there is no self-presentation or assured destination.” (TA, 77-78/157) We note that the theme of the apocalypse brings Derrida not only to a preceding call to ‘come’ but also to the theme of (r)envoi. Derrida deals with it more extensively in ‘Envoi’ and La carte postale. In both texts, the term ‘envoi’ seems to be a translation of or confrontation with the Heideggerian Geschick (des Seins).

We have seen that Heidegger approaches the problem of the Geschick more explicitly in the later works, and thinking itself begins for him with the sending or destining (Schicken) in the Geschick des Seins. By way of this Geschick, the Geschichte des Seins is thought as a gift, namely that of the Es gibt, which for Heidegger also indicates a unity of this destiny. As Marrati points out, there is for Heidegger “no real gap” between “sending and destination, the destinal, destiny, etc.”, while for Derrida nothing is certain “between sending and destiny”, for “already between sending and destination (unless we speak of a destination without destiny, a destination that would never be assured, a destination of which one retains only the dimension of the address), there is a necessary gap.”192 We have already noticed this in relation to the previous remark on the love-letter, and Derrida will extend his argument to the envoi, turning the singularity of sending into a multiplicity of envois and renvois. Multiple sendings can only refer or send back to other renvois. However, Derrida approaches this problem by way of the post-card, and as is clear from his text on the Apocalypse, it concerns the thinking of technology (telephony, post service), especially when we read that the

apocalyptical involves “so many sendings, envois, so many voices, and this puts so many people [beaucoup de monde] on the line” (TA, 75/155). For Heidegger this reintroduction of technology seems to involve a fall back in the metaphysical tradition, i.e., the epoch of technology, because of which the question of Being is reduced to a technological epoch (as a moment in the history of metaphysics that follows a more originary epoch or sending of Being) and not to the matter of the Es gibt. But, then again, as we read in La carte postale:

Tekhnè (and doubtless he would have considered the postal structure and everything that it governs as a determination (yes, precisely, your word), a metaphysical and technological determination of the envoi or of the destinality (Geschick, etc.) of Being […] ); now tekhnè, this is the entire – infinitesimal and decisive – différance, does not arrive. No more than metaphysics, therefore, and than positionality; always, already it parasites that to which he says it happens, arrives, or that it succeeds in happening to [arrive à arriver]. This infinitesimal nuance changes everything in the relation between metaphysics and its doubles or its others. (CP, 206-207/192; trans. mod.)

As Marrati interprets this passage, this does not mean a simple replacement of the Geschick des Seins (in terms of the Es gibt) by the postal service; rather, “what is in question is precisely the idea of beginning and of origin.” If the arrival at the destination is merely a matter of time (which it indeed also is), and presuming that the arrival always succeeds, then nothing would ever happen in this time. However, for Derrida, the possibility that the destination or destiny is missed or missing, and that which is sent does not arrive at its destiny, is not simply accidental, but belongs to the ‘essence’ of telecommunication, post-cards, telephony, etc. Speaking of the post-cards, telephony or the tele-systems, Derrida will constantly emphasize that it does not concern a clear distinction between thinking and metaphysics; rather, Derrida will try to disturb any discourse that wishes to install a new opposition or determination on the basis of which technology is excluded from thinking, since if “I take my ‘departure’ from the destination and the destiny or destining of Being (Das Schicken im Geschick des Seins), no one can dream of then forbidding me to speak of the ‘post’, except on the condition of making of this word the element of an image, of a figure, of a trope, a post card of Being in some way. But to do it, I mean to accuse me, to forbid me, etc., one would have to be naively certain of knowing what a post card or the post is.” (CP, 72/65) We might add: not only what a post-card is, or telephony (cf. UG, 84-85), but also an image (or a figure, a trope), and it is with this question that we will have to proceed.

With regard to the theme of the image, Heidegger interprets modernity in his Die Zeit des Weltbildes (1938) as the epoch of the image or picture (Gebild). An epoch (epoché) entails for Heidegger a withdrawal (Entzug) (GA12, 13/9), and, as we have seen in Zeit und Sein, Heidegger declared that there is no Ereignis without Enteignis. It is from here that Derrida will try to show that there is not one sending of one history (Geschichte) or one metaphysical epoch; rather, there are sendings of which the destination or destiny is never assured. The divisibility of the sending is not a lack, but rather a condition of possibility for there to be a sending: “If the post (technology, position, ‘metaphysics’) is announced at the ‘first’ envoi, then there is no longer A metaphysics [LA métaphysique], etc. (I will try to say this one more time and otherwise), nor even AN envoi [L’envoi], but envois without destination.” (CP, 73-74/66) What is at stake is that there is for Derrida no pure beginning of history; rather, “[e]verything begins by referring back [par le renvoi], that is to say, does not begin” (PSI, 141/127), so that “[r]eferences refer to references [renvois renvoient aux renvois]” (GR, 421/298). He will try to come to this conclusion by way of the complexity of

194 P. Marrati, Genesis and Trace. Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, 103.
representation and the determination of modernity (the post-Cartesian epoch) as the time when, in Heidegger’s view, the world picture (Weltbild) was dominated by science and technology.

Derrida’s interest in Heidegger starts with the latter’s translation of the Latin repraesentatio by Vorstellung (cf. GA41, 139/136). We already saw the relevance of the Vorstellung in Heidegger’s reading of Kant when Heidegger uncovered that, for Kant, both intuition and conceptuality belong to the genus of Vorstellung. However, Heidegger’s translation of repraesentatio is not unproblematic for Derrida. Heidegger emphasizes that Vorstellung implies that something is set before oneself, and unsurprisingly he, then, became interested in emphasizing that the Kantian object (Gegenstand) first of all implies that something is set against. Derrida subsequently underlines that this is already at work in the Latin praesentatio and the present, so that the repetitive aspect of re- in repraesentatio is left aside by Heidegger; repraesentatio is not only what is set before oneself, but, as Derrida indicates, also a “power-of-bringing-back-to-presence” (PSI, 120/105). The power (pouvoir) of repetition is at work both in the re- of representation and in the Stellen of Vorstellen (as in the technological reproduction). However, Derrida adds, in the case of representation, the rendering present can be understood in two senses, namely that of bringing into presence (or coming to presence) and – indissociable from this first sense – that of coming back or again in presence.195 Then, what is the need for Derrida to emphasize this matter? First of all because Heidegger thinks of the meaning of repraesentatio in terms of Vorstellung as determinative for our contemporary world:

In distinction from the Greek apprehension [Vernehmen], modern representing [Vorstellen], whose signification is first expressed by the word repraesentatio, means something completely different. Representation [Vorstellen] here means: to bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against [als ein Entgegenstehendes], to relate it to oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm-giving domain. (GA5, 91/69)

It is essential for the modern epoch that the essence of man has changed, that is, man has become a subject or subjectum (GA5, 88/66). As Derrida summarizes Heidegger’s statements: “In re-presentation, the present, the presentation of what presents itself comes back, returns as a double, effigy, an image, a copy, an idea in the sense of picture of the thing henceforth at hand, in the absence of the thing, available, disposed and predisposed for, by and in the subject.” (PSI, 120-121/106)

Heidegger points out that this shift is not merely accidental nor a fault, for it is only in the modern epoch that man becomes subject. The modern time as an epoch is considered by Heidegger as one sent or anticipated by the Greek world, but not in the sense that the determination of man as subject began in Greece, since, as Heidegger time and again underlines, there was no subject for the Greeks. For them, “man is the one who is looked upon by beings [der vom Seienden Angeschaute], the one who is gathered by self-opening beings into presencing [Anwesen] with them” and not the one who lets something come to be by looking upon it (GA5, 90-91/68). We will need to come back to this determination, for it echoes Heidegger’s brief definition of Bilden from the Kantbuch before immediately continuing Kant’s division of the image into Abbild, Nachbild und Vorbild. In Die Zeit des Weltbildes, Heidegger, subsequently, determines that the essence of humanity “in the great age of Greece” is “to be looked at by beings, to be included and maintained and so supported by their openness, to be driven about by their conflict and marked by their dividedness [Zwiespalt]” (GA5, 91/68). Here, Heidegger emphasizes that for the Greeks the world was

195 Cf. L. Marin, Le portrait du roi, 10.
first of all *Anwesen* that seizes man instead of being seen or intuited (*angeschaut*) by him. This does not mean that there is a clear breach between the Greek and modern epoch, between the determination of *Seiendheit* as *eidos* and as representation; rather, as Derrida states, the “determination of the being of what is as *eidos* is not yet its determination as *Bild* but the *eidos* (aspect, look, visible figure) would be the distant condition, the presupposition, the secret mediation which would one day permit the world to become representation” (PSI, 123/109; cf. GA5, 91/69).

In modernity, representation is an image in and for the subject; an object affects a subject as a copy or a painting. Representation as this image entails that the world is constituted by the subject as visible. In that sense, the *Weltbild* in modernity – and modernity determined as the *Weltbild* – is first of all the world as an image, picture, *Bild*. Hence, Heidegger writes, where “the world becomes picture [*Bild*], beings as a whole are set in place as that for which man is prepared; that which, therefore, he correspondingly intends to bring before him, have before him, and, thereby, in a decisive sense, place before him” (GA5, 89/67). In modernity, the subject is determinative insofar as beings as a whole are first situated as *seiend* by “*vorstellenden-herstellenden Menschen*”, so that the Being of beings is found in the being-represented (*Vorgestelltheit*) of beings, and the “fundamental event [*Grundvorgang*] of modernity is the conquest of the world as picture. From now on the word ‘picture’ means: the collective image of representing production [*das Gebild des vorstellenden Herstellens*].” (GA5, 94/71) As stated, this was impossible for the Greeks, and Heidegger explains this by focusing on the Greek *phantasia*, which has too often been translated in terms of representation as if a *subjectum* was thinkable for the Greeks. Being is understood then as presence, *Anwesen*, or appearing in presence (instead of: in representation). Heidegger concludes: “In unconcealment, *phantasia* happens [*In der Unverborgenheit ereignet sich die phantasia*]: the coming to appearances, as a particular something, of that which presences [*des Anwesenden*] – for man, who himself presences [*anwesenden Menschen*] to what appears. Man as the representing subject fantasizes [*phantasiert*], however: he moves in *imaginatio* in that his representation imagines the being as object into the world as picture [*er bewegt sich in der imaginatio, insofern sein Vorstellen das Seiende als das Gegenständliche in die Welt als Bild einbilder*].” (GA5, 106/80) *Phantasia* comes to its own, or to what is proper to it, in the unconcealment, which is subsequently understood by Heidegger as the coming-to-appearance of *Anwesendes* for man who presences on his term to what appears. In the modern epoch (i.e., in *die Zeit des Weltbildes*) man as a representing subject delivers itself to *imaginatio*, which marks a first step to the world of representation and *Bild*. Man’s *Vorstellen* imagines beings as the *Gegenständliche* in the world-picture (or the world as image or *Bild*).

The additional question for Heidegger is how this representing and reproducing subject becomes *itself* a representative (*Repräsentant*) of something; not only of himself, but also of something else than himself, i.e., of the other. Man stages himself as if translating (*übersetzen*) himself on stage, or as Heidegger writes, “man sets himself forth as the scene in which, henceforth, beings must set-themselves-before, present themselves – be, that is to say, in the picture [*der Mensch [setzt] sich selbst als die Szene, in der das Seiende fortan sich vorse- stellen, präsentieren, d.h. Bild sein muss*]” (GA5, 91/69). Man stages himself in the openness of what is (publicly and openly) representable. However, it should be noted that man represents himself here as *the scene* of representation itself. It is here, at this stage or as this

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196 It is curious to read in Fóti’s interpretation of Derrida’s ‘*Envoi*’ that “Derrida takes for granted that a representation is a posited image or picture, and, furthermore, that such an image may also be understood as a copy, substitute, scene, painting […]” (V.M. Fóti, ‘*Representation and the Image: between Heidegger, Derrida, and Plato*’, 66).
scene that man becomes a representative (Repräsentant) of the objective (des Gegenständigen).

Derrida does not discuss Heidegger’s important appendix 6, but he does remark that when phantasia directs itself to presence (i.e., “the presence of the what-is for the presence of man” in the sense that it remains “unmarked by the values of representative reproduction or of the imaginary object”, as Heidegger indeed always tried to underscore) this brings along the enormous philosophical question of the imaginary, of the productive and reproductive imagination, even when it assumes once more, for example, in Hegel, the Greek name of Phantasie. Thus, it is a question that “does not belong to the Greek world but comes up later, at the epoch of representation and of man as a representing subject” (PSI, 126/112). We will have to deal now with two traits in Derrida’s ‘Envoi’, namely the notion or figure of ‘envoi’ itself and subsequently the theme of the imagination as alluded to in the quote. Hence, first we will have to address Heidegger when he assigned to Plato the role of destining the epoch of representation in thinking the Being of beings as eidos (aspect, look). Furthermore, we will need to address the question raised by Derrida with regard to the unrepresentable or irrepresentable, which will bring us to Kant’s thinking about the moral law.

With regard to the first trait, Derrida observes that the sendings of the epochs are not representations of Being, for this reduces Being to a being that is subsequently represented; history is understood as from the Geschick des Seins. Although not subjected himself to this epoch, Plato destined from afar the metaphysical determination of Being in terms of representation, which Derrida, therefore, qualifies as “a representational pre-interpretation of representation, [...] a representation of representation” (PSI, 134/120). Put differently, it is by looking back as from the epoch of representation that the original sending of destining can be gathered within (the unity of) the history of metaphysics (even when this is done without having recourse to a system, teleology, identity or totality). For “the epoch of representation to have its sense and its unity as an epoch, it must belong to the assembled gathering [rassemblement] of a more original [originaire] and more powerful envoi. And if [Et si] there had not been the gathering of this envoi, the Geschick of Being, if [si] this Geschick had not announced itself from the start as the Anwesenheit of Being, no interpretation of the epoch of representation would come to order it in the unity of a history of metaphysics.” (PSI, 135/121)

Heidegger’s geschichtliche interpretation of modernity (i.e., of representation, Gebild, subjectum, etc.) starts with an original envoi of Being as Anwesenheit (subsequently translated in history as presence and as representation) “as if [comme si],” Derrida writes, “the couple Anwesenheit/repraesentatio still dictated the law of its own interpretation, an interpretation that does no more therefore than redouble and recognize itself in the historial text it claims to decipher” (PSI, 136/122). In Heidegger, the epoch of representation conceals or withdraws presence as Anwesenheit, although this presence has sent, as from the Greek epoch, presence as representation, as if the couple mentioned by Derrida – Anwesenheit/repraesentatio – structures Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger determines the unity of this history by suggesting that behind the epoch of representation there is hidden the Anwesenheit that the last epoch forgets or covers over. Then, Derrida asks, has the envoi of

197 In this appendix to Die Zeit des Weltbildes Heidegger declares that the system belongs to the essence (Wesen) of the image or picture; with system is meant “the unfolding, developing unity of structure within that which is set-before, represented as such, which arises from the projection of the objectness of beings”. Because this essence of the Bild belongs to the system, it is impossible to speak of a Greek or Medieval system. He adds that the “greatness of the systematic of these thinkers consists in the fact that it does not unfold, as with Descartes, out of the subjectum as ego and substantia finite. Rather, it unfolds either, as with Leibniz, out of the monad or, as with Kant, out of the transcendental essence of finite reason rooted in the imagination, or, as with Fichte, out of the infinite ‘I’, or, as with Hegel, out of the spirit of absolute knowledge, or, finally, as with Schelling, from out of freedom as the necessity of every particular being which, as such a being, remains determined through the distinction between ground and existence.” (GA5, 100-101/76)
Being not been divided as from the beginning? For there to be history, the sending has to divide itself, but this divisibility disrupts the very notion of a destination, while, for Heidegger, an original sending or *Geschick des Seins* uncovers itself as presence or *Anwesenheit* that subsequently gathers or groups the mutations in a “grouped indivisibility”. However, Derrida argues, when thinking tries to disentangle itself from the epoch of representation it cannot rely on the beginning of presence; rather, it has to take into account the divisibility of the history of Being that dislocates the very notion of a beginning or original sending. It only gathers itself by dividing, deferring and differentiating itself. There is no presence (subject, object) preceding a sending, so that everything ‘begins’ by referring back (par le renvoi) to other traces and traces of others. This divisibility is not a lack, but, rather, the condition of possibility for there to be a sending and perhaps a sending (envoi) of Being, for the gift of Being and time. The need to think the ‘renvoi’ is not only created by Heidegger’s determination of modernity as the epoch in which the world became an image, but also by the “figure of the renvoi” itself which has to be thought, according to Derrida, by way of the “schema of space and of time”, that is, a “spacing [espacement] as the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space” (VOY, 60). We will return to this spacing in the Epilogue.

The second trait that we will have to follow more thoroughly introduces itself when Derrida briefly deals with two examples of “sendings of the other, of others [des envois de l’autre, des autres]”, i.e., of “inventions of the other [inventions de l’autre]”. As soon as Derrida relates the envoi to invention, the question of the imagination is not far away. The first example is that of psychoanalysis, but we will limit consideration here to the second example, namely the limit-question of the unrepresented and unrepresentable. Heidegger tried to reach to a thinking (Denken) beyond representation, but Derrida immediately indicates that what is ‘foreign’ to the structure of representation is not simply that which cannot be represented, but (also) that which must or ought not (ne doit pas) to be represented as, for instance, raised by the prohibition in the Bilderverbot (cf. PSI, 140/126). The theme of the unrepresentable seems to be secondarized in Heidegger, as indeed appears to be the case in his reading of respect and the moral law in Kant; where Kant installed a substitute for the practical synthesis of the moral law by way of the Typik of practical reason that has to be distinguished from the transcendental schematism – which means that there is no direct representation, no history, no fictionalization (or imagining) of the law as such – Heidegger uncovered the receptive-spontaneous structure of respect which allowed him to conclude that the transcendental imagination emerges in an original constitution. However, what if there is the irrepresentable, the law of the unrepresentable or the prohibition to directly represent the law that transcends the figure of representation? The question of the law takes us to ‘something’ that “exceeds every representation, perhaps it is never before us, as that which poses itself in a figure or composes a figure for itself”, that is, as Derrida writes, “perhaps the law itself arrives, perhaps, arrives to us only by transgressing the figure of all possible representation. Which is difficult to conceive, just as it is difficult to conceive anything at all that would be beyond representation, but that perhaps commits us to think everything altogether differently [engage peut-être à penser tout autrement].” (PSI, 142-143/128) The relation between the sending and the law perhaps exhausts itself when we no longer represent the law to ourselves, because of which the law is not presentable, and the access to the law (beyond representation) is suspended unless we perhaps commit ourselves to (imagining or) “thinking […] altogether differently”.

Soon, we will address this by way of the theme of respect. The unrepresentable (or unimaginable), then, is something to which we will have to return. For Hegel the alterity of the unrepresentable needs to be interiorized into a dialectical progress. As Derrida formulates, the operation of the Hegelian dialectics of *Aufhebung* proposes the following: “[W]hat is
destroyed preserves itself, what dies can be reborn. Miraculous and admirable, Aufhebung is the productive imagination.” (GL, 228/203) However, every time we hear the name of Hegel in Derrida’s work, we will have to take into account Kant, and Hegel’s criticism of Kant (cf. VP, 114/101-102; ED, 380/327-328). This criticism has often to do with Kant’s inability to find the third term or a mediating schema, as Kant expressed at the end of the Transcendental Dialectics (cf. KRV, A670/B698) and the Typic of Practical Reason. For Kant as well as for Judaism,198 the irruption of the infinite or unconditional is merely abstract, and, as Derrida summarizes, it “does not incarnate itself, does not concretely, actually unite itself to the forms of understanding, of imagination, or of sensibility” (GL, 57/47). Hegel, on the contrary, does find a passage when dealing with the passage from the infinite to the finite, as exemplified by the relation between the father and the son, between God and Christ; this “mediating schema of incarnation is wanting [fait défaut]” for both Kant and the Jews (GL, 58/48). For Hegel, the son of God gives an image of/to Him; the infinite is incarnated, imagined or schematized in the finite (cf. GL, 39/31, 57-58/47-48, 64/54, 76-77/65, 98/84-85, 242/216; TDA, 12).199

Although Derrida never mentioned it, it seems to concern a schematization of which St. Paul spoke in the Letter to the Philippians when mentioning the incarnation: “Schemati heuretheis hos anthrōpos [in outward appearance as man]” (2:8). Following Hegel’s writings, Derrida states: “God knows and recognizes himself in his son. He assists (in) his death, burial, his magnification, his resurrection. The knowledge relation that organizes this whole scene is a third, a third term, the element of the infinite’s relation to itself: it is the holy spirit.” (GL, 39/31; cf. SM, 200/123) God incarnated himself, became finite in such a way that He eventually re-appropriated His infinity. The son is not the other of God, although he is, as man, separated from God, appearing as the passage from the infinite to the finite, and vice versa. In the end, the Holy Spirit as mediating third term gives Christianity, for Hegel, an exceptional place by forming the holy trinity (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit), and, because of this, Christianity is elevated above the other religions.200 The Hegelian (concept of) schema or schematization is understood as the singularity that is itself the proper passage from the concept to an exterior reality, or as Hegel writes, this singularity “is the pure

198 As Derrida points out, the passage from Judaism to Christianity in Hegel is thought of as the coming of love and the family, that is, “the relief [relève] of formal and abstract morality (Moralität) (in this respect Kantianism is, structurally a Judaism)” (GL, 42/34; cf. IAW, 269/58, 279-280/68-69).

199 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 183; C. Malabou, L’avenir de Hegel, 33-34; C. Malabou, La plasticité au soir de l’écriture, 34.

200 Cf. J.D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 242. One should not misunderstand Hegel here as if he merely invents or imagines a third, an additional instance where there actually is, as the Jew might say, no third possible. The problem with Judaism for Hegel is not so much that it considers a Götterbild a mere image, since they might argue – as Kant indeed did – that it is only an image. Rather, as Derrida points out, the self-identification of Christ with God is understood by Judaism “in terms of numeric equality, what Hegel never stops renouncing, even concerning the Trinity. […] They consider the family nomination of the relation God to men or to Jesus as images (Bilde), in the most external sense, as ways of speaking or imagining. […] Understanding the father/son relation at once as purely conceptual and as purely imaginative, they miss its schema and are doubly mistaken.” (GL, 97-98/84) Hegel objects to the Jewish or Kantian attempt to oppose the (dominant) concepts of understanding to the imaginary, so that it becomes for them evident to consider playful everything that has to do with the imagination. Derrida continues his reading of Hegel: “The Jew stands by this objectivism that, incapable of leaving the finite closure of the understanding or the imagination, also remains a subjectivism. […] More precisely, what the Jew does not understand is neither this or that, but the commensurability or the passage between the two, the presence of the immeasurable in the determinate, the beauty and the immanence of the infinite in the finite.” (GL, 98-99/85) Although Derrida does not mention it, this also seems to be Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s transcendental schematism, when Hegel emphasizes that – although describing the chapter on the schematism as “eine der schönsten Seiten der Kantischen Philosophie” – “Denken, Verstand bleibt ein Besonderes, Sinnenlichkeit ein Besonderes, die auf äussere, oberflächliche Weise verbunden wird, wie ein Holz und Bein durch ein Strick” (G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III, 346-347).
schema” (cf. TDA, 12). Because Kant understood nothing of the revelation or incarnation, and he declared that the law has no schematization, Derrida can conclude from Hegel’s interpretation that “Kant is Jewish: he believes in a jealous, envious God, who hides and guards his Da” (GL, 238/213). However, for Derrida, the schematic passage as the “between-two [entre-deux]” also puts us “between [entre] Kant and Hegel” insofar as Kant still maintained a clear distinction between the schematism and the symbolism (cf. TDA, 13).

§3. A Respectful Distance

The need for delimiting imagination becomes most cutting in Kant when he discusses the theme of the Typic of Practical Reason. The question is, then, what the law is, and what the implications are for the question of representation. The law is only a law (i.e., its lawfulness) as the obligation of which the content is imposed as a ‘du sollst’. Before this or that law, before the political, ethical, juridical laws, there is the law of laws that obliges. This law of laws is without history, without fiction, without imagination, since it is unconditional and imposes itself as (if the law were) universal. It obliges without being reducible to, or derivable from, any of the singular, historical inscriptions of the law. Because of this, Kant declared that the law is never directly present, i.e., there is no schematization of the law of laws. Yet, Heidegger had no problems uncovering finitude, and, for him, it seemed then quite easy to conclude that the transcendental imagination is also at work at the foundations of Kant’s practical reason (apparently contrary to Kant’s own findings). However, he seems to ignore the aspect of spacing or distancing involved in Kant’s treatment of respect when the latter associates respect with the mechanical movement of repulsion (Abstossung), and the limits set when it concerns the ‘relation’ between imagination and the (unimaginable) law.

In this section, we will return to Kant’s notion of ‘I think’ as he presents it in the Paralogisms. Here, we will see that Heidegger’s reading of Kant seems quite limited when Kant in the end describes the transcendental apperception as a feeling (§3.1). Subsequently, and although Kant never explicitly said it, we will understand this feeling as that of respect in order to set out what role respect plays in Kant’s philosophy (§3.2). Taking into account Heidegger’s interpretation of Kantian respect, we will have to return to it in order to see what Derrida has to say about it when it concerns the imagination. Although Derrida never dedicated a text on the notion of Kant’s respect, he did write about the admiration of Mandela. However, it should not surprise us that Kant reappears several times in texts of Derrida when mentioning the theme of respect. How to respect the law when the law forbids a direct representation, i.e., when the laws tells us not to touch (it)? Can the imagination present the law without touching upon the law? “[T]his enjoins us to respect, and above all to respect in the Kantian sense, so to speak, where it is first of all respect for the law, respect for which is precisely the cause of respect, that is to say, in the first place, to respect the law rather than the person. This only gives an example of it. Respect commands us to keep our distance [de nous tenir à distance], to touch and tamper neither [de ne pas toucher à] with the law, which is respectable, nor – therefore – with the untouchable [à l’intouchable]. The untouchable is thus kept at a distance by the gaze, or regard [par le regard], in French (meaning respect in its Latin provenance), or in any case at an attentive distance, in order to watch out carefully, to guard [prendre garde] (as in achen, Achtung, in German) against touching, affecting,

202 When Malabou discusses Hegel’s “reine Schema”, she refers in a footnote to the Kantian hypotyposis as a Versinnlichung that can either be schematic or symbolic (cf. C. Malabou, L’avenir de Hegel, 33n; J.-P. Martinon, On Futurity. Malabou, Nancy, Derrida, 36). However, in her presentation of plasticity she only focuses on the schematic hypotyposis and leaves aside the possibility of symbolization.
203 On the prohibition to touch, cf. S. Freud, Totem und Tabu, 37.
corrupting. One is not to touch the law commanding that one not touch.” (LT, 82/66-67) (§3.3)

§3.1. The Feeling of ‘I think’

As we have seen, the transcendental apperception opens the horizon in which it recognizes beings as beings, at least, this is where Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant brought us. However, Heidegger declares several times in Sein und Zeit that Kant’s notion of ‘I think’ confirms or restores the Cartesian subject as substance or res. As we have seen, the question of the subject – if it can still be called a subject – is problematized in the Transcendental Dialectic, and the relevance of the paralogisms for this subject should not be underestimated. The ‘I think’ is that which is able to accompany all ‘my’ representations; it is the final synthesizing power as a necessary condition for knowledge. The concept of this ‘I think’ can only qualify as a transcendental concept that belongs to thinking when it remains independent of the phenomenal. It constitutes the phenomenal world without being reducible to it, or, as Heidegger wrote, it is time itself without being intratemporal. Heidegger reached this conclusion by way of Kant’s remarks on the permanence (Beharrlichkeit) of the transcendental apperception in the Deduction, and, because of this, the identification of time and the ‘I think’ needs to be thought on the basis of auto-affection. However, what happens to the transcendental illusion that Kant confronts in the Dialectic when the empirical self has to be distinguished from the transcendental apperception? As we will see, there is not much left of the (synthetic) powers of the subject when Kant deals with the paralogisms of pure reason; the ‘I’ is, then, merely an empty representation devoid of every content of which one can only say that it accompanies all concepts. Hence, the ground-laying of the “science of pure reason” presupposes a “wholly empty representation [Vorstellung] I” (KRV, A345-346/B404). Even the Beharrlichkeit as dealt with in the Analytic is questioned in the Dialectic when Kant underlines that the proposition ‘I think’ does not contain the perception of existence – as is the case in Descartes’ Cogito, ergo sum – but has to be regarded as problematic when observing the possibility of attributing properties (predicates) to this simple proposition (cf. KRV,

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204 In the Anthropologie im pragmatischer Hinsicht, we read that only the sense of touch (Sinne der Betastung, tactus) (as one of the outer senses, besides sight and hearing, which is more objective (mehr objektiv) than the inner ones for the “knowledge of outer objects”) is the sense of “immediate external perception [unmittelbarer äusserer Wahrnehmung]”, and, because of this, it is also the most important sense (der wichtigste) (ANTH, 154-155/266; cf. LT, 55/41). For Kant, touch is immediate, since only in touch can one touch what one touches and let oneself at the same time be touched. Kant ends his brief section on the sense of touch by underlining that we cannot have any concept of a corporal form or figure (von einer körperlichen Gestalt) without this “sense organ [Organsinn]”, so that the other outer senses are inevitably and originally related to this sense for providing knowledge of experience (um Erfahrungserkenntnis zu verschaffen) (ANTH, 155/266). Since Kant will eventually reverse the order of space and time, how far is one from concluding that the sense of touch (as self-touching, se toucher) “is the being of every sense in general, the being-sense of sense, the condition of possibility of sensibility in general, the very form of space and time”, i.e., “the sense of all the senses, that is, of all sensitive or sensible presentation, of all that makes sense by presenting itself thus” (LT, 309-311/274-275)? In that sense Kant’s example of the extension of a body (Körper) as a synthetic a priori judgment is not merely arbitrary; here, in this exemplary case, the imagination has to touch upon something that is not of the order of pure conceptuality (cf. KRV, A156/B196). However, is this also the case when one thinks of what is often considered the exemplary case of self-touching or even a pure self-feeling, which Heidegger determines as respect? Does one not need to think this immediacy otherwise, as Derrida suggests, which will imply that there is in the end “no pure concept, nor pure intuition, of course, nor any immediate intuition of the haptical” (LT, 145/126; with regard to the table of categories, cf. SM, 226/142). Touch as tact is “to break with immediacy, with the immediate given wrongly associated with touch and on which all bets are always places, as on self-presence, by transcendental idealism (Kantian or Husserlian intuitionism) or by ontology, the thinking of the presence of beings or of being-there as such in its Being” (LT, 328/293)?

205 We will mainly follow here Rogozinski’s reading of the Dialectic as presented in his ‘Je suis l’être même’ (in Kanten. Esquisses kantiennes).
A347/B405). This subject even seems to lose all its subjectivity when Kant writes that by “this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept” (KRV, A346/B404).

In his treatment of the paralogisms, Kant points out that the illusion in the syllogistic reasoning concerns the subject itself, namely an illusion with regard to what it is or that it is. Since there is only an empirical use of the categories, one is not allowed to attribute these concepts directly to the subject or ‘I think’; rather, this ‘I think’ can accompany all representations, as in the case of ‘I think substance, etc.’ The transcendent use of the categories has been prohibited, for understanding is restrained by time. In the general remark at the end of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason Kant writes that he wishes to become conscious of himself as a thinking being, although this demands that he thinks his own self in intuition (without considering it as what thinks) and this is merely an appearance for him; subsequently, Kant makes the curious observation that “in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being itself [das Wesen selbst], about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me for thinking” (KRV, B429). Rogozinski concludes from this that if I am this being itself, “then being is not a Subject.” But, then, what is meant by this Wesen selbst when it is neither a subject, nor an object, when the I is not thought in terms of substance, simplicity, personality or ideality? Because the ‘I think’ only lends itself for analytical judgments, Kant will conclude from the second paralogism that the statement ‘the I is simple (einfach)’ expresses a tautology, namely the absolute, logical unity of the subject without knowing the actual or real (wirkliche) simplicity of it. The third paralogism even states that it cannot be said of the ‘I’ (as a logical unity) that it remains the same throughout the changes in time: “The identity of consciousness of Myself in different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection”, and because of this Kant even writes that despite the logical unity there is a “change [Wechsel]” and “replacement [Umwandlung] of the subject” possible that does not allow us to hold on to the unity or identity of the subject (KRV, A363). Yet, throughout these changes and transformations, there is still the thought of a “previous subject [vorhergehenden Subjekts]” that is transmitted to the next instant (or subject) in time. However, we already observed that the transcendental apperception is not a multicolored self, and, added to this, it seems to be a matter of homophony or univocity here, for we make out a “identical-sounding ‘I’ [gleichlautende Ich]” or at least assign this to it. As Kant argues in a footnote, analogous to the case of the causal relation between balls of which one “elastic ball” communicates (mittheilen) its movement to another, the “last substance” (of the subject) would have to be aware or conscious of all the states (Zustände) of the changing subjects (as substances) “as its own states, because these states would have been carried over [übertragen] to it, together with the consciousness of them; and in spite of this it would not have been the very same person in all these states” (KRV, A364n). This communication and transmittance upsets the possibility of an identity of the self or subject. Who is the ‘I’ when it can be ‘He’ or ‘It’? Who am I or how can I be an ‘I’ when there is no possibility of identifying this ‘I’ as the ‘I think’?

In the rewritten version of the paralogisms Kant tries to clear up some of the problems related to these questions, although we might wonder whether he succeeds in doing so. In a general remark at the end of the exposition of the paralogisms, Kant states that the proposition ‘I think’ is an “empirical proposition” grounded on empirical intuition; it appears (scheint) that the soul is transformed into appearance (in Erscheinung verwandelt würde), and to that extent “our consciousness itself, as mere illusion [als blosser Schein], would in fact come

206 Cf. J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 85.
207 J. Rogozinski, Kanten, Esquisses kantiennes, 79.
down to nothing” (KRV, B428). Kant has already discussed in a footnote the need to think the existence of the subject in the ‘I think’. My existence cannot be derived from the proposition ‘I think’; rather, saying ‘I exist’ is identical to ‘I think’. ‘I think’ is an empirical proposition that already contains the existence of this ‘I’, and although this proposition refers to an “indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception”, it is still a purely intellectual power (for it belongs to thinking in general). This indeterminate perception designates something real that is given (and only given for thinking in general), while it is neither an appearance, nor a noumenon, but “something that in fact exists and is indicated as an existing thing in the proposition ‘I think’”. Kant finishes this footnote by stating that empirical representations give matter (Stoff) to thinking, and there would be no “act I think” without this giving (angeben), because of which the empirical is the condition for the application or use (Bedingung der Anwendung oder des Gebrauchs) of the pure intellectual power of the ‘I think’ (KRV, B422n-B423n). In his Prolegomena, Kant even adds that the ‘I’ as “a representation of apperception” is “nothing more than a feeling of an existence [Gefühl eines Daseins] without the least concept” (PROL, 334n/125n).

We already saw Heidegger’s phenomenological appropriation of feeling in the previous chapter when he uncovered a receptive-spontaneous moment in respect as a moral feeling; however, as Rogozinski points out, the ‘I think’ is “[n]either subject, nor object, neither phenomenon, nor noumenon, at the same time analytic and synthetic, sensible and intelligible”. How to speak of a self-affection when the ‘I think’ – this “singular [einzeln] representation” as Kant writes so often – upsets all oppositions within Kant’s system? To anticipate Derrida, we note that he declares, in accordance with Heidegger’s reading of Kant, that “[a]uto-affection is the universal structure of experience. All living things are capable of auto-affection. And only a being capable of symbolizing, that is to say of auto-affecting, may let itself be affected by the other in general.” Contrary to Heidegger, then, the ‘I think’ (as traced in Kant) is “another name for ‘life’” (GR, 236/165).

In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the perspective of the other – of the “outer spectator [äussere Beobachter]” – is briefly dealt with in relation to the third paralogism (on the question of the personality and identity of the soul). However, Kant merely considers the occasion of perceiving the other that shows what is in time. While introducing the paralogisms, Kant has already indicated that every representing of a thinking being by way of outer experience is only possible by way of transference (Übertragung) of my consciousness onto other things (auf andere Dinge) (KRV, A347/B405). Only by way of this transference can something else be represented (vorgestellt) by me as a thinking being (als denkende Wesen). As Rogozinski indicates, Kant also mentioned the Übertragung in the previously discussed footnote that was added to the first version of the third paralogism when he discussed the indefinite transformations of the ‘I’ gliding from one situation to the other – like the balls that communicate their movement – because of which the identity of the self seems to be lost. But, then, how is this transference possible in which something is represented as a thinking being? How does it communicate (with) itself? Does this not precisely presuppose the other of me that is irreducible to the ‘I’? Since the illusion in the paralogisms with regard to the ‘I think’ is always already my own illusion, perhaps the revelation of the ‘I’ comes from the other, from the outside.

However, has Kant not excluded this possibility by closing the subject (insofar as it is a subject) in on itself as pure auto-affection? Although the Analytic uncovered the Beharrlichkeit of the transcendental apperception, which Heidegger used to identify time and

208 Cf. J. Rogozinski, Kanten. Esquisses kantiennes, 84-85: “It is, then, ‘being itself’ that reveals itself – as feeling”.
'I think', here, in the third paralogism, we notice how Kant tries to question this conclusion: we cannot "judge whether we are as soul permanent [beharrlich] or not, because we only give account of our identical self by way of that of which we are conscious" (KRV, A364). Hence, the identity of the person is inevitably present in self-consciousness, and, in order to uncover the illusion inherent in this reasoning, we need to take the "perspective of the stranger [Fremden]". It is the ‘I’ as time or the temporality of the ‘I’ that thinks for itself this identity, while it is the other or stranger who disrupts this linear temporality; this other will not come to the conclusion that the ‘I’ needs to be thought in terms of an objective permanence, although he might say that this ‘I’ accompanies all ‘my’ representations. Who is this stranger and how does this stranger interrupt the continuity of linear time? "The Kritik der reichen Vernunft does not give any satisfactory answer to this question." It hardly matters whether the other or stranger questions the identity of the ‘I’ or the line of time, for the transcendental illusion remains for this ‘I’ untouched. For Kant, it all depends here on the “time in which the spectator poses me [in welche der Beobachter mich setzt]” and this time "is not the time that is found in my own sensibility but in that of his” (KRV, A363). Then, what does this mean for time? Heidegger briefly remarks in Der Begriff der Zeit that “[i]n so far as time is in each case mine [je meineig ist], there are many times [gibt es viele Zeiten]. Time itself [Die Zeit] is meaningless; time is temporal" (GA64, 124/21) But more importantly, Kant concludes that “the identity that is necessarily combined with my consciousness is not therefore combined with his consciousness, i.e., with the outer intuition of my subject [nicht darum mit dem seinigen, d.i. mit der äusseren Anschauung meines Subjects, verbunden]” (KRV, A363). We note the relevance attributed by Kant to space for understanding that the unity connected with my consciousness is not that of the other, that is, not of the outer intuition of my subject in which I present myself to the other.

How to think the alterity of the other that might uncover the divisibility of the ‘I’? Can this still be thought within time as pure auto-affection? What is the feeling of the existence (Gefühl des Daseins) that constitutes the very essence or the being itself of the ‘I’, or, more precisely, that constitutes the ‘I’ as das Wesen selbst? Kant seems to look for an answer in the practical domain, and, as we know, it is in the practical use that the transcendental Ideas can have a meaning; in this domain Kant deals with the feeling of respect that is not a motivation or incentive to morality, but “morality [Sittlichkeit] itself subjectively considered as an incentive [subjectiv als Leitfaden betrachtet]” (KPV, 76/202). We already observed how the ‘I think’ functions for Kant like the highest judge in the critical tribunal appointed in the Transcendental Deduction. We also read in Kant that respect for the law is always mediated by a respect for the person, which Heidegger immediately transforms into a responsibility for the self. We will have to return to the relevance of the example for Kant’s practical philosophy where we will see that Mandela, as a trained jurist, knew that the profession and vocation (Beruf) of a jurist, as Derrida writes, demands to be “an expert in respect or admiration”, i.e., “he judges himself or submits to judgment with added rigor. Or in any case he should.” (PSII, 85/80) For Kant, love (Wechselliebe) would sink into nothing (Nichts) without this feeling of respect. One would lose oneself in the other, so that respect is needed for a distance or distancing from one and another (analogous to a mechanical rejection or repulsion (Abstossung) of objects) (cf. MS, 449/568, 470/585). However, since Kant only thought time in terms of a pure intuition, he did not manage to think or imagine an ethical

211 Cf. J.-L. Nancy, Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus, 13: “The same undecides itself [s’indécide]: it undoes itself as it constitutes itself, fissures itself in the very gesture and instant in which it seals, repairs, and effaces its fissures. At the same time: […] therein lies the whole structure of Kantian scheme. […] Thus, what one calls consciousness never allows itself to be apprehended without doubt as an identity other than when it evanesces [s’évanouit]: it is the syncope.”

§3.2. Respecting the Other

We noted that the doubts raised regarding my identity by the other are not my doubts, since I am stuck with the illusion, which is not further discussed in relation to theoretical reason. As noted, for Kant, the ‘I think’ is first of all a feeling (Gefühl), but when the other is necessary for uncovering the transcendental illusion as an illusion in the paralogisms, then this other also has to appear, as Rogozinski concludes, “as a feeling in the originary domain of the affectivity that constitutes the being itself of the Ego”. In Kant the feeling that has precisely this ability is the moral feeling, i.e., respect. In the previous chapter, we saw how Heidegger searches in Kantian respect for a way to conclude that practical reason is still based on the structure of pure self-affection, and, because of that, on the structure of the transcendental imagination. Heidegger limited himself to the respect for the person, which soon became self-respect and responsibility for the self. However, when it concerns respect for a person, we notice that Kant deals with respect as directed towards others. We read for instance that “[a]ctions of others [Handlungen anderer]” can be praised as “noble and sublime” when “traces [Spuren]” allow us to conjecture (welche vermuten lassen) that the other has only acted “from respect for duty” (KPV, 85/208-209). How to recognize these traces? Kant adds that the other (as a person and not as a thing) exhibits the law to me that crushes (niederschlägt) my self-conceit when I compare the example presented by the other with myself. This other represents the law in which I see the possibility of following this law and of its practicability (Tunlichkeit). Although Heidegger does not want anything to do with this other, we might read Kant as saying that it is as if the other is able to do the impossible, namely schematize the law. This demands respect, and this respect remains (bleibt) when I see in myself the same degree of rightfulness (Rechtschaffenheit). The law that is made intuitable (anschaulich) crushes my pride (Stolz) as soon as “the man I see before me [der Mann, den ich vor mir sehe]” gives the standard (Massstab). This Massstab seems to function for Kant as a ruler (as one might say in English) that the other gives (abgiebt) for determining one’s own degree of rightfulness. We might say that the shame or modesty is never overcome while being observed and while being respected and kept at a respectful distance, since the impurity (Unlauterkeit) of the other is not as well known to me as my own, so that the other “appears to me in a purer light [mir…in reinerem Lichte erscheint]” (KPV, 77/202; cf. MDA, 74/70).

Despite Kant’s optimism, we note that the other appears to be doing the impossible, and this means that the law of laws is not in conformity with this example or any other example. It is, for Kant, impossible to derive this law from these examples, since “every example of it represented to me must itself first be appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether it is also worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model […]. Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral

213 Cf. J. Rogozinski, Kanten. Esquisses kantiennes, 91; J. Rogozinski, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’éénige de l’éthique, 198-199: “If the Law can, thus, be presented as the analogon of a subject, it is without any doubt that it is ‘subject’, not in the sense of a subjectivity but of a subjectivity [subjectivité], of a hypokeimenon, of the underlying [sous-jacent] that supports, carrying the subject in its being [soutient le sujet dans son être]: in this sense the Law is the ‘subject’ of the subject. […] It would admit to understanding the Unterwerfung in a strict sense […] as a transcendental subjection that constitutes the subject and coincides with its ethical subjection to the Law.”


...perfection [unserm Ideal der sittlichen Vollkommenheit] before he is cognized as such; even he says of himself: why do you call me (whom you see) good? none is good (the archetype [Urbild] of the good), but God only (whom you do not see).” (GMS, 409/63) Kant refers here to Matthew 19: 17, Mark 10: 17 and Luke 18: 18 in order to show with the example of Christ that one should never consider oneself an example of the good. There is no room for imitation (Nachahmung) when it concerns moral matters, so that examples can only serve as encouragement, stimulation or instruction (nur zur Aufmunterung). The moral law forbids this imitation, and even though the encouraging or instructive examples put the practicability of the moral law beyond question (ausser Zweifel) – since they make intuitable (anschaulich) what this law expresses (ausdrückt) more generally – they can never be a justification for mere imitation. Taking these examples as mere guidance means that one sets aside the “true original [wahres Original]” of the practical rule that lies in reason; the concept of God as the invisible and highest good comes from the Idea of moral perfection as formulated a priori by reason. When Kant speaks of the imperative of morality (Imperativ der Sittlichkeit) he writes that “it must not be overlooked that it cannot be shown by means of any example [durch kein Beispiel], and so empirically, whether there is any such imperative at all [ob es überall irgend einen dergleichen Imperativ gebe]” (GMS, 419). Hence, we can conclude, experience can never give us any evidence of what is given in the example; although it might testify to the practicability of the practical rule, the ‘es gibt’ of this imperative is never assured (cf. PAS, 87n/141n).

Kant continues this point in his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft where he again writes that the universal human duty is to lift oneself to moral perfection. Because the origin of this ideal of moral perfection (Urbild der sittlichen Gesinnung) remains a secret (cf. REL, 142-143/168), Kant suggests that it is best to say that this Urbild has come to us from heaven, taking the shape or form of humanity (Menschheit). For Kant, the descending (herablassen) from the Ideal of Holiness as well as the transcending (erheben) to this Ideal cannot be represented; because of this, he suggests that the descending unification (Vereinigung) with us is considered (eingesehen) as the happening of the humiliation (Erniedrigung) of the son of God (cf. REL, 61/104). Kant implicitly refers here to the above-mentioned letter from St. Paul when the latter describes, what can be called, the schematization of Christ in/as his incarnation, and it is precisely in the appearance of or schematization as man that Christ humiliated, abased, humbled himself and obeyed until his death on the cross. (St. Paul writes: “kai schemati heuretheis hos anthropos etapeinosen heauton, genomenos hupekoos mechr thanatou, thanatou de staurou [although he was discovered in outward appearance as a man, he humbled himself by having entered into obedience to the point of spiritual death even death on a cross]” (Phil. 2:8).) Kant also speaks of a “force [Kraft]” of the sittliche Besinnung that reason gives us, which implies for Kant that one can only have a concept of the grade and strength when one struggles with the obstacles and overcomes the greatest possible seductions (größtmögliche Anfechtungen). How to think this resistance? The case of Christ is exemplary for Kant, and only in the practical faith (im praktischen Glauben) in the son of God can one hope (hoffen) to fall in the grace of God (“Gott wohlgefällig (dadurch auch selig) zu werden”) (REL, 62/104). But, then, what kind of schematization is it? For Kant, we cannot do here without a “schematism of analogy” as an illustration or a means of elucidation (Erläuterung); one cannot do without “a certain analogy” with a natural being (Naturwesen) when trying to grasp the supersensible qualities (REL, 65n/107n). *This* schematism is not the “schematism of the determination of objects” that merely serves for the expansion of knowledge and, when used for practical purposes, it leads, as we have seen in Chapter 1, to a dogmatic anthropomorphism. It is against (wider) the
analogy when one were to conclude that what is attributed to a sensible being can also be applied to a supersensible one.216

How is the resistance possible? If we return to Derrida, we see that for him resistance implies an “analysis of the presence of the present that cannot not render itself to the necessity and the affirmation of a hetero-affection in the system of the auto-affection and of the living present of the conscious” (RES, 43). This analysis is not that of the Kantian Analytic, and also not that of a Hegelian critic of Kant; it resists both of them by way of the affirmation of a hetero-affection, and because of this, we might say, it is also irreducible to a Daseinsanalytik that relies on pure self-affection. “[F]ollowing a Heideggerian move”, hetero-affection will eventually have to displace (déplacer) “the accent of the Kantian critique” by emphasizing the role of “the transcendental aesthetic or […] the theory of the schematism” at the expense of the analytic (RES, 43). As Derrida constantly indicates, this does not mean that he fully agrees with the Heideggerian reading, even when there is no respect without the phenomenon of the other as other, and when it turns out that “phenomenology is respect itself” (ED, 178/151). For instance, for Derrida, Kantian finitude is not an originary finitude as in the case of “the Heideggerian interpretation” of Kant; rather, as we recognize more clearly in Kant, finitude is “derived, as the intuition of the same name”, that is, intuitus derivativus (RES, 136; cf. PSI, 415/406-407; AP, 102-103/55). But, in that case, finitude needs to be thought according to a “schema” that posits itself at the same time in “the tradition, the memory of the Kantian critique or the knowing that roots itself in it [des saviors qui s’y enracinent] and the end [fin] of this finite man” (RES, 137). Hetero-affection has to be understood as from the affirmation of (the phenomenon of) the other as other, so that auto-affection will always already have been an auto-hetero-affection.

This does not mean that the other is reduced to the same, since Derrida will try to understand the analogical representation (‘as if’) as what “confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity [nécessité indépassable] of (non-objective) mediation”. It entails a respect for the other as other, where respect is a “non-violent respect for the secret: the contrary of the victorious assimilation” (ED, 182/154-155). The inadequacy of the example, as formulated by Kant, seems to rely on the suggestion that the example is, as Derrida concludes, “the only visibility of the invisible.” There are only figures or images of the legislator as the one giving the rules; but never is anyone able to provide “an economy of these figures” (PAS, 87n/141n). God (as an Idea of reason) cannot serve as an example here, and Kant’s most radical conclusion even questions the assurance of the ‘es gibt’ of the categorical imperative for experience. This is how Kant portrays Christ, and one cannot avoid approaching the question of respect by way of an example. Respect is first of all respect for the moral law, but an example (given by a person) mediates this respect.217 Then again, the person is only an example of the moral law and, because of that, it is itself mediated by a respect for the law. The example is presented both as a singular example (one showing respect) and as an exemplary case, an example of something else (i.e., respect for the law).

Because of the role of the example for practical reason (in Kant), it would not be misguided to say that Derrida’s text ‘Admiration de Nelson Mandela ou les lois de la réflexion’ (1986) is to a large extent an attempt to re-inscribe Kant’s practical philosophy and, more precisely, his notion of respect. We might say that, for Derrida, one can find an example of the law or an universalizable and rational “respectful attention paid to singularity” (VOY, 216), i.e., respect par excellence, in Mandela. Derrida asks: “how can one be Mandela?” (PSII, 69/63) Be Mandela? We should not misunderstand this question as saying that one has to be as this particular other by imitating him. Rather, and more generally, the question is how one can be (as if one were) the other where the alterity of the other is respected and not assimilated. It

216 For more on Kant and respect, cf. J. van Gorkom, ‘Kant, Kafka, Josef K.’
217 Cf. LT, 178/154: “‘Transcendentalism’ is always guided by a more or less surreptitious ‘exemplarism’.”
calls for a respect that offers or demands “new recourses of analysis” and “it activates our critical or ethical vigilance. It permits us to say: ‘Careful [Attention] […]’.” (DT, 29/15-16)

Taking into account that ‘Admiration de Nelson Mandela ou les lois de la réflexion’ was written during the time that Mandela was still imprisoned, it appears that Derrida wished to show that a respectful attention has recourse to the coldness of an analysis and begins with a reflection on the respect, admiration and fascination of Mandela himself.

§3.3. An Image of Mandela

In Derrida’s ‘admiration of Mandela’ we hear the double genitive: it concerns an admiration that Mandela inspires and feels. As Derrida writes, the “two have the same focus [foyer], they are reflected in it” (PSII, 71/65). Mandela becomes admirable or respectable for having admired or respected, for showing a respectable admiration and having made a force of this admiration. As the focus or focal point that directs us or forces us to direct our reflection, it appears, as Kant might have called it, as a focus imaginarius or an imaginary focal point where the lines of reflection, i.e., the rules of understanding, converge, even though they lead to an indefinite approaching of each other (cf. VOY, 124). It is the word of ‘force’ that is of interest to us here – to which we will have to return later – and when paying attention to Mandela we notice that this force also entails or presumes a resistance; or as Derrida states: “If [Si] his most hateful persecutors secretly admire him, this proves that, as one says, he compels [il force] admiration.” (PSII, 69/64)

Then, what is the focus imaginarius of this force? The line of Mandela’s reflection is a force of reflection. Mandela never stopped reflecting on history, culture and jurisprudence; this gave a direction to the struggle against apartheid, but in the struggle his reflection was not so much directed towards his own reflections alone, but mainly “toward the specular paradoxes in the experience of the law. There is no law without mirror.” (PSII, 70/64)

The admiring look begins with/as a questioning or a call. Derrida informed us of the responsibility for the “[c]ommunity of the question as to the possibility of the question. It is not much – almost nothing – but in it today an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision take refuge and sum themselves up. An unbreachable responsibility.” (ED, 118/80; cf. DP, 27-29) Later Derrida emphasized that the ‘question’ should perhaps be considered a call (appel). The questions do not merely demand a response within the philosophical framework – since these questions perhaps do not lie in the reach of an answer –, but are first of all a call to acknowledge responsibility. Admiration begins with reflection, and reflection reasons. The mentioned responsibility is a responsibility or responding to the possibility of the question or call, i.e., to the other (cf. PA, 280-282/250-252). The questions raised above need to testify to a space or distance, insofar as responsibility and, Derrida adds, (Kantian) respect invoke a temporalization and spacing: “There is no respect, as its name connotes, without the vision and distance of a spacing. No responsibility without response, without what speaking and hearing invisibly say to the ear, and which takes time.” (PA, 282/252) The questions need to be asked (again) and guarded as questions in order to hear the call that resounds in them. When reading Derrida’s text on/for Mandela, we should therefore pay special attention to the questions raised. As we will see, it is not by accident that many of the questions in Derrida’s work begin with “What if [Et si]…?” It is here that a question is received or raised, and this question shines through in an admiring or fascinated look, so that the “ray [of a question, JvG] comes from the very thing that forces admiration [rayon provient

220 Derrida’s interest in, for instance, Kant’s voice of reason that calls upon us and that gives us the law or in Heidegger’s discussion of the Ruf and the voice of a friend in Sein und Zeit is therefore not surprising (cf. PA, 341-419).
de cela même qui force l’admiration]; it thus splits [partage] admiration into a specular movement that seems strangely fascinating” (PSII, 70/64).

Mandela becomes admirable and fascinating for having known how to admire, for having admired or for being fascinated. What takes place in this give-and-take is a question, and this experience of give-and-take is a “reflected passage [traversée réfléchie]” (PSII, 70/64). Is the *focus imaginarius*, in the end, nothing else than pure auto-affection and schematization? Is this an auto-affection of give-and-take (spontaneity and receptivity) or is something else at work here that cannot immediately be appropriated in the mirror of reflection? But, then, what did Mandela admire and respect? The law of laws, the law itself above and beyond other laws. Mandela admired the law. Indeed, he admired the *Magna Carta*, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights and British political institutions, and he made a force of this admiration. Was Mandela, then, not undertaking a struggle against apartheid by relying on an imported law and in the name of a law that the white population violently installed? In this case, the principles and laws for the struggle against apartheid would be Western. Does Mandela, then, merely reproduce and does he merely figure or imagine himself reproducing the Western parliamentary democracy? However, there is, according to Derrida, also another possibility of inheriting in the sense that Mandela “respects the logic of the legacy even to the point of turning it on occasion against those who claim to be its guardians, to the point of revealing, against the usurpers, what has never been seen in the inheritance: to the point of giving birth, by the unheard-of [inouï] act of a reflection, to what had never seen the light of day” (PSII, 72/66). It will be matter of working with what it means to inherit.

If Mandela did not want to align with the white minority, he does recognize that the establishment of every constitutional law presupposes a singular coup de force, a forceful constituting of law. This coup de force at the same time produces (as a *performative* act) and presupposes (as a *constative* act) the unity of the people. “The simulacrum or fiction then consists in bringing to the light of day, in giving birth to [en lui donnant le jour], that which one claims to reflect so as to take note of it, as though [comme si] it were a matter of recording what will have been there, the unity of the nation, the founding of a state, whereas one is in the act of producing that event.” (PSII, 73/67) In a contract founding an institution, there is, according to Derrida, a *schema* of the destination at work that is irreducible to a program, theme or system (cf. DP, 586/14, 593/19, 596/22). This schema should, therefore, not receive the status of an ontology or all-encompassing theory in which the “schematic” is admitted as “a new *organon*” (DP, 590/17). Rather, Derrida states that the schema itself always already has to be one of the problems, since the contract remains a historical, singular and paradoxical contract – a coup de force –, which Derrida expressed by using an ‘as if’. Does this not transform the contract or, within Kant’s critical thinking, the regulative Idea into a mere fiction or an ‘as if’ when we act as if this community were possible? Does the ‘as if’ not influence this engagement, as Derrida wonders, by giving it a touch of the simulacrum (*indice de simulacra*) (cf. DP, 590-591/17)? We will often return to the ‘as if’ (cf. §6 of this Chapter), but we already get the impression that much is at stake here for Derrida. Mandela contested the authority and constitutionality of the Constitution (installed by a coup de force of a white minority, leading to an indefinite repetition of the violence of the origin in/as state racism) in such a way that, while reflecting against the white minority, the ‘entire nation’ is included in the democracy. Without annulling the founding act of the law, one will have to re-find it, since the principles of the white minority were betrayed by themselves.

Although one might see in this re-founding of a parliamentary democracy a continuation of an imported law and model, Derrida immediately points out that “there would be no importation, no simply assignable origin for the history of law, only a reflecting apparatus, with projections of images, inversions of trajectories, *mises en abîmes*, effects of
history for a law whose structure and whose ‘history’ consists in carrying off [emporter] the origin” (PSII, 75-76/70). This apparatus for the projection of images as an apparatus of imagination cannot itself become, to use Heidegger’s vocabulary, a standing-against (Gegenstand), since it cannot be “represented in objective space”. The law tends towards universality, so that in every (historical, institutional, national, etc.) exposition of the law the law exceeds the delimitations, since these limits (as images of the law) could be disseminating what they (claim to) represent. Therefore, when it concerns the law,

[everything should begin by uprooting [par le déracinement]. […] It [the reflection in and on the struggle against apartheid, JvG] obliges us to see what was no longer seen or was not yet to be seen. It tries to open the eyes of the whites; it does not reproduce the visible, it produces it. This reflection makes visible a law that in truth it does more than reflect, because this law, in its phenomenon, was invisible: had become invisible or was still invisible. By bringing [En portant] the invisible into the visible, this reflection does not proceed from the visible; rather it passes through understanding [elle passe par l’entendement]. More precisely, it gives us to understanding what exceeds understanding and accords only with reason. (PSII, 76/70-71)221

Later we will see that when the invisible is brought or transported (porter) into the visible, this also means a carrying, bearing or enduring (of the other, of ‘you’). Although the white minority claims to be referring or appealing to the essence of its principles, they at the same time covered this essence, this law of laws (the universality) by privatizing or appropriating it. Hence, in the struggle against apartheid, reflection aimed at making visible what remained invisible in the practices of the whites, what was held impossible and remained covered.

The West has presented an example of democracy, but not an exemplary one. Mandela was fascinated by a revolutionary democracy that “he sees being reflected in advance, what is not yet to be seen, what he fore-sees: the really revolutionary democracy of which the Anglo-American West would, in sum, have only given an image at once incomplete, formal, and thus also potential. Potentiality against potentiality, power against power.” We will return to this power-against-power in order to relate it to the imagination, which will turn out to be crucial for Derrida’s appreciation of the schematism. Here we note that there is a passage

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221 Derrida’s explanation for being occupied with the apparatus of reflection uncovers here a passage to reason, that is, it concerns “reason itself”, and we see that Derrida adopts the Kantian vocabulary (visible, invisible, understanding, reason, reflection, etc.). However, contrary to a Heideggerian interpretation of Kant, one also notices the notion of “uprooting”. When Heidegger thought to find the root of intuition and understanding in the imagination, he searched for an original finitude. However, it seems that finitude needs to be thought, according to Derrida, as from an uprooting demanded by reason and the law; this does not mean that it becomes illegitimate to speak of a root, but, rather, it always demands an uprooting when it concerns the law, i.e., universality (cf. J. Sallis, Spacings – Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Ficht, Hegel, 80-81). Nancy writes: “That which founds, that which supports, must it not ‘itself [lui-même]’ be insupportable [insoutenable]?” This necessity is that of all metaphysical onto-logic, and, it is at the same time [en même temps] the radical deterioration – or rather, it is the deterioration of the root itself [racine même]. […] The undecidable is the sameness of the produced by the same as its alteration. This alteration does not have the fertile negativity of the dialectical Other in the Same: it is the impossibility ‘itself’ of the same [l’impossibilité même du même].” (J.-L. Nancy, Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodaedalus, 13) In De la Grammatologie, Derrida says of the “common root” that it is “not a root but the concealment of the origin” and also not “common because it does not amount to the same thing except with the unmonotonous insistency of difference, this unnameable movement of difference-itself”. Subsequently, he advocates the notion of “thought” outside “of the economic and strategic reference that Heidegger justifies himself in giving to an analogous but not identical transgression of all philosophemes”; “thought is here for me [pour nous] a perfectly neutral name, the blank part of the text, the necessarily indeterminate index of a future epoch of difference [différence]. In a certain sense, ‘thought’ means nothing [ne veut rien dire]. Like all openings, this index belongs within the past epoch by the face that is open to view [par la face en lui qui se donne à voir]. This thought has no weight [Cette pensée ne pèse rien]. It is, in the play of the system, that very thing which never has weight [qui ne pèse pas]. Thinking is what we already know we have no yet begun […]” (GR, 142/93; cf. GR, 150/101-102)
from parliamentary democracy to revolutionary democracy, but it should be noted that this passage was only “already virtually accomplished”. It is as if the passage were accomplished. Here we see the role of the ‘as if’ being transformed by Derrida in terms of virtuality or already-virtuality; it does not designate a pure fiction of practical reason, but it underscores that the law of laws can only be represented with this ‘already-virtuality’ of the passage. The ‘already’ seems to indicate that a passage has been accomplished, but this accomplishment is only virtually foreseen instead of (directly) seen; as Derrida so often writes, the passage will have been made, enabling that the visible bears the invisible, and what is not yet seen is considered a possibility or potentiality. The determination of the formality of democracy will have taken place in a past that is not the past of Western society. This revolutionary democracy is what Mandela sees reflected in advance as what the “figures of African society prefigures; they give one to see in advance what still remains invisible in its historical phenomenon” (PSII, 78/73). We again note the virtuality of the passage made between two democracies, as if this passage is foreseen without actually taking place, although already foreseen as a potentiality. This passage is only already accomplished in a virtual manner by foreseeing the potentiality of a revolutionary democracy, but it opposes this potentiality or power to the one installed by the white minority who claim to give a complete and rightful image of democracy. What is not yet seen, i.e., that which has not been imagined completely and only formally by the Anglo-American West is at the same time a potentiality.

Mandela became admirable for having admired, and he made a force of his admiration by directing us in a double focus to the invisible; he became fascinating for having known what it means to be fascinated. How to be Mandela? How to give an image of Mandela? It is fascination (that of the other as soon as this other takes fascination as its object when looking at it) that fascinates, and as Derrida writes, (the apocalyptic) ‘Come’ “would be the word for this fascination, of this attraction without attraction [attrait sans attrait], of this identification without identity” (PAR, 93-94). For Derrida, fascination is a “fixed attention of the gaze transfixed, as if petrified [médusé] by something that, without being simply a visible object, looks at you, already concerns you, understands you, and orders you to continue to observe, to respond, to make yourself responsible for the gaze that gazes at you and calls you beyond the visible: neither perception nor hallucination” (PSII, 76-77/71; cf. HC, 88-89). We will have to return to this petrifying Medusa-effect; Derrida describes Medusa’s head, this possibility of being petrified or of being turned to stone, as “the potential for death that fascinates and redoubles the gaze of the other, leading to its perdition” (MDA, 88/87). It is essential for now that fascination is guided or lets itself be guided by something that looks at you, concerns and understands you, and, henceforth, petrifies one’s look. It turns the heart to stone, and – like the Jew – it makes one insensible (cf. GL, 57/47). (We note here that Derrida started off with the coldness of an analysis.) However, this does not mean for Derrida that one is purely insensible; rather, what interests Derrida is a “disturbing paradox” that inhabits the a priori feeling of respect: respect needs to be inscribed “in the heart of a morality” that is incapable of giving an account of being inscribed in an affect (Gefühl) or being inscribed “in a sensibility” unless it enjoins “the sacrifice of everything” that obeys sensible inclinations. What Derrida searched – and what he perhaps saw (being reflected) in Mandela – is a concept or feeling of the “non-'pathological' in Kant’s sense” (PAS, 40/16; cf. GL,

222 We notice the future anterior that Derrida often used, and of which Critchley says: “The importance of the future anterior is that it is a tense that escapes the time of the present. It simultaneously points towards a future […] and a past” and “it is perhaps the time of ethics” (S. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas, 115-116).

223 Cf. G. Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, 196. Following Kafka’s story on the gate and guard in Vor dem Gesetz, Didi-Huberman writes here: “Such will therefore be the image, in its economy: guard of a tomb (guard of the repression) and of its opening (authorizing the luminous return of the repressed). Petrifying [pétrificatrice] and attractive at the same time. Will the gate be there like a Gorgon’s mouth?”

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For this reason, Derrida can say of the sacrifice that it is dictated here – by the unconditionality of the moral law – as the sacrifice of self and as “the violence that is exercised in self-restraint (Selbstzwang) and against one’s own desires, interests, affections, or drives. But one is driven to sacrifice by a sort of practical drive, by a sort of motivation that is also instinctive, but an instinct that is pure and practical, respect for the moral law being its sensible manifestation.” (DM, 128/93) A respectful attention is needed that seems to surrender impatience by way of reflection and attention. Here, we come back to the theme of respect: Mandela remains a man of the law, always appealing to the law (by vocation and profession as a lawyer), and, eventually, appealed to the law or appeared before the law of the court that sentenced him to prison. During the trial against him, Mandela seized the opportunity to speak aloud and speak “virtually universal” – as if it were a law of nature – in which he addresses himself in a double manner, that is, in a double focus (double foyer). The judges have to represent a universal instance, but by speaking to them Mandela at the same time speaks “over their heads” focusing on “behind them, rising high and far above them, the universal court” (PSII, 85/81). Here Mandela is able to speak of the white man and show or reflect a contempt or scorn for the law. However, this scorn is not that of Mandela, but that of the white man who no longer respects his own law. This scorn is “the symmetrical inverse of respect for the moral law, as Kant would say: Achtung/Verachtung” (PSII, 82/78; cf. KPV, 74/200; MS, 441/562, 462-463/579). Mandela’s reflection shows what phenomenality hides, and this reflection is not a reproduction, but, rather, the production of the visible and of light. “This production of light is justice – moral or political.” (PSII, 84/79-80) By holding a mirror before the adversaries when speaking of contempt of the law, Mandela forces them to recognize their own contempt for the law. “But with this supplementary inversion: on Mandela’s side, the apparent contempt signifies an added respect [un surcroît de respect] for the law.” (PSII, 85/81) We saw that Kant tells us that respect for the law is first of all addressed to the law given by the person as an example of this law (cf. ED, 142n/400n-401n; PDL, 108/190). However, it is only the law that one respects as its cause, while we must respect the other as the other. Then, one is perhaps inclined to say that Mandela let himself be imprisoned and captured in the Western (i.e., Rousseauist, Kantian, etc.) mechanisms of the reflecting apparatus by interiorizing the law and the principle of interiority. What Mandela showed was merely a reflection. However, the case of Mandela shows more in his reflection, namely the promise of what has not yet been visible. He testifies to this promise, and as an exemplary case of someone who makes us think about the law that is reflected by him, he is in certain situations the one who does not respect laws. Out of respect for the law, he did not respect and knew how not to show respect, “(no) more respect [plus de respect]”, i.e., “[r]espect for the sake of respect [respect pour le respect]” (PSII, 87/83).

The fascinating look of “the look that looks at you” brings us back to the image, since this look cannot be thought in terms of a pure auto-affection. It demands respect, although it is not a visible object; it forces us to pay attention, to be attentive and respectful. For Derrida, then, this seems to be related to the imagination: “The fact is, production of the new – and imagination – are only productions: by analogical connection and repetition, they bring to light what, without being there, will have been there [sans être là, aura été là].” (AF, 53/71) The possibility of the cogito sum is no longer pure auto-affection; rather, being able to say cogito sum means that I am an image for the other, looked at by this (mortal) other as a

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224 Cixous mentions what Derrida said of the Algerian call Regarde!, which, as a call to look, is first of all a call to listen: “écoute, écoute, list, list, o list, pay attention, regarde avec tes oreilles, paie de l’oreille […] ah oui, c’est comme si sans cesse, de phrase en phrase, tu me disais: regarde!”. (H. Cixous, Insister. À Jacques Derrida, 24)
This other is the law before which I have to appear, that is, before his words and gaze. He is “in me before me, stronger and more forceful than I” (CFU, 199/160). The example of respect, as formulated by Kant, means that the example is the effect of the law, due to the law, when it appears to respond to or before the law. Instead of presenting the law in an image, instead of personifying the law by schematizing it, it revolves, for Derrida, around an indecision, or perhaps not so much the indecision itself, but the respect for an indecision, since this indecision keeps the attention forever in suspense, i.e., alive and awake, by letting the voice of the other come (cf. BEL, 37-38). One is never immediately before the law or its representatives, and the detour may be infinite, since the law, i.e., its universality and unconditionality, exceeds every limit and conditioning. The origin of the law is not an ordinary event, since nobody sees its taking place and nobody is faced with its happening. “Everything happens as if”, Derrida writes as if he paraphrases Kant here, and this “quasi-event” both denies and demands the bearing of “fictive narrativity” (PDL, 116-117/198-199). Kant merely underlined the need to deny any fiction when it concerns the law. We hear Mandela’s life story in his testimony or testament, and Derrida, subsequently, underlined a virtuality; this is the origin of the law, “[w]hether or not it is fantastic, whether or not it has arisen from the imagination, even the transcendental imagination, and whether it states or silences the origin of the fantasy, this in no way diminishes the imperious necessity of what it tells, its law”. Because of this, Derrida can infer that if the law is fantastic, the law “remains essentially inaccessible even when it, the law, presents or promises itself. In terms of a quest to reach the law, in order to stand before it, face to face and with respect, or to introduce oneself to it and into it, the story becomes the impossible story of the impossible. The story of prohibition is a prohibited story.” (PDL, 117/199) The law of ‘il faut’ (one must, one ought to) comes from a past that has never been present and that “remains therefore immemorial [immémorable]”; it obliges respect, and there is no “respect for the law (the only ‘cause’ of this respect) in the strictly Kantian sense” without the forecoming, obligingness or attentiveness (prévenance) of the trace or inscription (PSII, 169/166-167).

§4. The Image In Us/Me

What does this mean for the self when a look looks at me, when the other looks at me? Derrida responds: “Mourning does […] not wait anymore.” (BEL, 22) We note that for Derrida the theme of death and imagination are related by way of this mourning. This will be the central issue for this section, and the question of the image of mourning will take us back to Heidegger when he introduces the example of the death mask. How to understand the question of the possibility of death (and death as possibility) and can I pose this question when it concerns my death? In his Anthropologie Kant writes – just before dealing with the power of imagination – about the impossibility of the thinking self to say of and to itself that it is not. This does not mean that there is no death; rather, according to Kant, death appears only as that of others (nur an andern wahrnehmen), for the experience of death presupposes life, that is, the life of the one experiencing or perceiving death. The possibility of death can be experienced as that of an other, while only a quasi-death can take place for thinking, that is, an apparent death (Scheintod). The subject, then, thinks of his corpse or cadaver (Kadaver)

226 Cf. B. van Roermund, Recht, verhaal en werkelijkheid, 245; R. Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, 34-35.
227 In another context, Derrida remarks in passing: “In every situation where the possibility of narration is the condition of the story, of history [de l'histoire], of the historical event, one ought to be able to say that the condition of knowing or the desire to know (épistémé, historia rerum gestarum, Historie) gives rise to history itself (res gesae, Geschehen, Geschichte), which could complicate, if not contradict, finally, many arguments of the Hegelian or Heideggerian type that always seem to require the inverse order (no Historie without Geschichte), although it is true they do so only after having first integrated the possibility of narration or of the relation to knowing into that of the event.” (DT, 155-156/122)
“which is no longer himself, as still being himself in a dark grave of somewhere else [was
nicht mehr Er selbst ist, doch als sich selbst in düstern Grabe, oder irgend sonst wo denkt]”
(ANTH, 167/278). It is clear to Kant that it concerns a failing of the nature of thinking
when one thinks of oneself as being dead. The nature of thinking (as a way of speaking of and
to oneself) is affected, and this “illusion cannot be pushed aside [die Täuschung ist hier nicht
zu heben]”. Death is not natural to thinking, so that the natural fear of death is “not a horror
[Grauen] of dying but, as Montaigne rightly says, horror at the thought of having died (i.e., of
being dead) [vor dem Gedanken gestorben (d.i. tot) zu sein]” (ANTH, 167/278). What is most
frightening when it comes to death is not the prospect of dying but of being dead. However,
when death is always perceived as that of the other, how do we decide when there is death,
when there is apparent or suspended death?

If death is only to be perceived as that of the other, how is it possible to think one’s
own (proper, actual) death? Or inversely, how do we speak of the dead when, as Derrida
suggests, “the cadaver is perhaps not as dead, as simply dead as the conjuration tries to delude
us into believing” and the “one who has disappeared appears still to be there, and his
apparition is not nothing” (SM, 160/97)? Kant never asked this question unless we should
conclude from the previous discussion that it is merely a deceit to say of and to oneself that
one is dead, with which Kant seems to reaffirm a pure and lively auto-affection of hearing-
one-oneself-speak. However, according to Derrida, the theme of death is related to that of the
image. He refers then to Heidegger’s analysis of death without immediately ascribing to it in
which Derrida wishes to uncover the role of the work of mourning. Although Heidegger never
directly related the theme of death and the imagination, he does write in Sein und Zeit that
essentially “this possibility [i.e., that of death as the most extreme or outer (äusserste)
possibility of Dasein, JvG] offers no support for becoming intent on something [um auf etwas
gespannt zu sein], ‘picturing’ to oneself [sich ‘auszumalen’] the actuality which is possible,
and so forgetting its possibility” (SUZ, 262/307). When thinking of death as a possibility,
Heidegger declares that there is nothing to (re-)present, auszumalen, i.e., to imagine. The
imagination reaches a limit, in (‘my own’) death.229 Because of this, we will have to deal with
(Derrida’s reading of) Heidegger’s analysis of being-toward-death. As will turn out, what is
most difficult for Derrida to hold on to in Heidegger is the latter’s emphasis on the ‘as
such’,230 and precisely this discussion allows Derrida to problematize these words when it
concerns the possibility of the impossible or possibility as impossibility (§4.1). We already
mentioned the theme of mourning, and here one will have to relate this theme to that of the
image (§4.2), which subsequently allows us to return to the Kantbuch where Heidegger
presents us with the example of the death mask; it will be made clear that the death mask is
not just any example insofar as it shows the image imagining itself (§4.3).

§4.1. Imagining Death
It is essential for Heidegger’s analysis of death that Dasein finds its mineness (Jemeinigkeit)
in its being-toward-death. Death is for Dasein ‘something’ that essentially belongs to itself as
its own, and although the death of others can be perceived (as Kant formulated it) or
experienced (to use Heidegger’s vocabulary, cf. SUZ, §47), for Heidegger the ontological
meaning of death is not sought in this experience or perception. Hence, according to
Heidegger, the experience of mourning never gives us access to the experience of Dasein’s

228 Cf. G. Didi-Huberman, Devant l’image. Question posée aux fins d’une histoire de l’art, 265; M. Blanchot,
The Space of Literature, 256: “The image does not, at first glance, resemble the corpse, but the cadaver’s
strangeness is perhaps also that of the image.”
229 Cf. J. Sallis, Echoes. After Heidegger, 132. It should be noted that although the theme of imagination seldom
reappears in Heidegger’s later work, he never stopped discussing death and mortality (or the mortals).
230 Cf. R. Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, 118-120.
being-toward-death, since it is impossible for anyone to genuinely experience the dying of others as such. Heidegger is interested in the possibility-of-Being (Seinsmöglichkeit) belonging properly to Dasein, and in order to think this possibility Heidegger argues that there can be no substitution when there is death: “No one can take the other’s dying away from him. [...] Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all [Der Tod is, sofern er ‘ist’, wesensmässig je der meine]. And indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown that mineness [Jemeinigkeit] and existence are ontologically constitutive for death.” (SUZ, 240/284) Although one might perceive death or mourn the death of others, these deaths occlude the Jemeinigkeit; death happens only once, and it happens every time as a singular event. The impossibility of properly dying for the other, to take the place of this dying other (even when sacrificing one’s own life for the other and offering one’s own place to this other), is essential for the analysis of death (as such). The analysis of death demands, for Heidegger, an existential context, and in such a way that Dasein essentially shows itself as being-possible (Möglichsein), since this being-possible, the possibility and the having-to-be is proper to Dasein. Here, Dasein is or exists insofar as it is always already its not-yet (cf. SUZ, 244/288). Hence, one might suspect the relevance of the theme of the imagination here insofar as this power is able to present what is absent. However, this is not the path that Heidegger takes. Dasein remains incomplete insofar as it projects ahead to what is not yet, that is, to what is possible; death would be the last not-yet or the most extreme or outermost possibility of Dasein in which it gathers itself as a whole (if possible). This does not mean for Heidegger that Dasein finds its fulfillment in the death that is proper to it, since its proper ending is the annihilation of its possibilities. Hence, when death is proper to Dasein, then it is not something that simply happens or occurs at the end (as an external event) when life ceases. Dasein as Dasein will always have to relate to its proper death as its own possibility that is inscribed within the existence of as Dasein, but as we shall see, this relation will have to be analyzed in terms of imagination. Therefore, Heidegger writes that the ontological sense of death is first of all a being-towards-the-end (Sein zum Ende) rather than a being-at-the-end (Zu-Ende-sein), meaning that “just as Dasein is already its ‘not yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. [...] Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over [übernimmt] as soon as it is.” (SUZ, 245/289)

For Heidegger what does it mean to die properly? First, Heidegger distinguishes different ways of ending (enden): dying (sterben), perishing (verenden) and the demise or deceasing (ableben). Only the first form of ending will be attributed to Dasein as Dasein: only a Dasein can die (sterben). Verenden (perishing) is of no importance to Heidegger, since it has merely to do with the biological or physiological end of life, and since Dasein should not be understood in terms of life (since a metaphysics of life presupposes the metaphysics of Dasein), the ontological sense of death cannot be formulated in terms of verenden. All scientific approaches to death exhaust themselves by considering it a phenomenon of life or of a living being, thereby leaving the ontological questions regarding death and Dasein aside while always presupposing them. This is where Heidegger invokes the ableben of Dasein; insofar as Dasein has a physiological death, its dying is not a perishing (verenden) but a deceasing or demise (ableben). It is not an ending in the proper ontological sense of sterben, but it is also not a perishing (verenden): “Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon (Zwischenphänomen) as its ‘demise’ [ableben]. Let the term dying stand for the way of being in which Dasein is toward its death. Thus we can say that Dasein never perishes. Dasein can only demise as long as it dies.” (SUZ, 247/291) Here Heidegger summarizes the different forms of ending, and throughout his work he will maintain that only
Dasein or man as Dasein dies. Dasein can demise in the medico-logical sense when his death has been certified according to certain criteria, and, although demise (ableben) is not properly dying (eigentlich sterben), only a being-toward-death can demise. Heidegger might affirm that there are different histories and cultures of death, different sciences treating or dealing with death, but the existential analysis precedes (liegt vor) and founds (fundiert) biology, anthropology, psychology; it wishes to uncover what is presupposed by every history and culture of death. Derrida concludes from this that there “is therefore no limit to the universality of this analysis” (AP, 97/52).

As stated, the essence of Dasein is possibility (Möglichsein), where this possibility both entails expectancy (as the virtuality or proximity of the future) and ability (as potentiality). When this Möglichsein is proper to Dasein then this will also have to be made clear in the existential analysis of death. Death is the possibility that annihilates all possibilities, and arrives and appears, if possible, as non-relational (unbezüglich). As such death is at the same time the ownmost and outermost (äusserste) non-relational possibility (Möglichkeit). Heidegger gathers the essentials of the analysis of death in a few brief sentences: “Death is a possibility-of-Being [Seinsmöglichkeit] which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself [steht sich…bevor] in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen]. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [die Möglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-könnens].” (SUZ, 250/294) Derrida translates bevorstehen by s’attendre (to await or to expect); this way he tries to show that the solitude of the Jemeinigkeit in proper death cannot be as rigorously maintained as Heidegger hoped for. First, s’attendre can mean that one awaits oneself (and nothing else than oneself in oneself, s’attendre soi-même à soi-même). Second, it might mean that one awaits or expects something that is perhaps completely different (tout autre). Third, we can await one another (on peut s’attendre l’un l’autre), and Derrida pays extra attention to this possible meaning where a more heterological reference to death is found “where we wait for each other knowing a priori, and absolutely undeniably, that, life always being too short, the one is waiting for the other there, for the one and the other never arrive there together, at this rendezvous (death is ultimately the name of impossible simultaneity and of an impossibility that we know simultaneously, at which we wait each other, at the same time, ama as one says in Greek: at the same time, simultaneously, we are expecting this anachronism and this contretemps)” (AP, 117-118/65). Here, in awaiting one another, an anachronism of time remains irreducible, since in the case of death ‘we’ both know that we will never arrive there together; ‘we’ simultaneously know the impossibility of simultaneity.

As the quote from Heidegger indicates, death is for Dasein also the possibility of an impossibility. It is essential, according to Derrida, that Heidegger explicitly writes of the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there, which emphasizes the possibility of not-being-there or of no-longer-being-able. Hence, being-toward-death is in no way the impossibility of being-able-to. Properly dying as being-toward-death is not an inability or simple impossibility, but, rather, the possibility of the impossible, of no-longer-being-Dasein. Dasein cannot cross or surpass this limit or this border, although the logical form of the paradox of the possibility of (the absolute) impossibility remains largely unthematized by Heidegger. Instead, Heidegger considers death as Dasein’s ownmost possibility to be both the absolute or closest proximity (nächste Nähe) and nothing actual or real, or at least, as far away as possible from something actual (einem Wirklichen so fern als möglich) (SUZ, 262/306-307). Subsequent to this observation, Heidegger remarks that death is not only the possibility of impossibility, but also the manifestation of the possible as impossible: “The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all [Je unverhüllter
Diese Möglichkeit verstanden wird, um so reiner dringt das Verstehen vor in die Möglichkeit als die der Unmöglichkeit der Existenz überhaupt.” (SUZ, 262/242) Derrida interprets this ‘als’ as saying that the possibility is unveiled and penetrated as impossibility. Here, the possibility of impossibility determines itself as possibility as impossibility. This last possibility (as impossibility) is unveiled (unverhüllt) and ‘advanced-into’ (vordringen) (cf. AP, 125/70).

We already observed in the previous chapter the relevance of the ‘as’ or ‘as such’ for Heidegger; his project is the uncovering of the conditions of possibility of the ‘as such’ which he thought to have found in rooting pure intuition and pure understanding in the transcendental imagination. Heidegger continues this when dealing with the theme of Weltbildung which he reserves for man as Dasein (cf. AJS, 218/159). How, then, can death be experienced or appear as such? As Derrida states, “we will have to ask ourselves how a (most proper) possibility as impossibility can still appear as such without immediately disappearing, without the ‘as such’ already sinking beforehand and without its essential disappearance making Dasein lose everything that distinguished it” (AP, 125-126/71). Derrida will try to show that perishing and demise always already contaminate properly dying, something Heidegger tried to prevent by focussing his method on Dasein as Dasein for which he wished to reserve an authentic or proper dying. Contrary to Heidegger, Derrida declares that the ownmost possibility as impossibility cannot appear (and announce itself) as such without disappearing, and because of this, the ‘as’ is not yet the phenomenological ‘as such’. The loss of the ‘as such’ as such also implies the loss of properly dying and Dasein’s own death, for here appearing and disappearing go together, causing the contamination of a proper death by perishing and the demise. Although Dasein opens onto the meaning of Being, this is only announced in the authentic presumption “by which Dasein would take upon itself the possibility of this impossibility that the aporia as such [expressed in the formula of the possibility of impossibility, JvG] would announce itself as such” (AP, 131/74).231

Hence, for Derrida, the impossibility of existence, as discussed by Heidegger, becomes the disappearance of the ‘as such’ (of the phenomenological ‘as such’ and of phenomenology as such). The impossibility possible for Dasein is that there is no longer Dasein, i.e., that what is possible no longer appears as such and becomes impossible. Taking into account that man as Dasein is essentially weltbildend, one can conclude with Derrida: “It is the end of the world [rien de moins que la fin du monde], with each death, each time that we expect no longer to be able to await ourselves and each other [à chaque fois que nous nous attendons à ne plus pouvoir nous attendre]” (AP, 131/75). At the end of phenomenology, what remained unthinkable for or unthought by Heidegger is that if (si) the impossibility of the ‘as such’ is precisely what it is said to be, then this impossibility cannot appear as such. However, as Derrida indicates, this is the common trait in all experiences of death (dying, perishing, the demise) so that it cannot be reserved solely for Dasein. This does not make Heidegger’s analysis homogenous to any of the disciplines or histories dealing with the theme of death, but, rather, it means the impossibility of a pure and unsurpassable limit between the existential analysis of death and the other disciplines of which Heidegger complains that they merely situate themselves on an ontic level. Man as Dasein (which is a formula to which Derrida will not hold on to without reservations) has no relation to a proper or pure death or to death as such; only to perishing and to the demise, that is, “to the death of the other, who is not the other”, and who is no longer the other as such:

231 Cf. P. Marrati, Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, 172. Derrida writes: “Heidegger would thus say that for Dasein impossibility as death – the impossibility of death, the impossibility of the existence whose name is ‘death’ – can appear as such and announce itself; it can make itself awaited or let itself be awaited [se faire attendre ou se laisser attendre] as possible and as such.” (AP, 130/74)
“The death of the other thus becomes again ‘first’, always first. It is like the experience of mourning that institutes my relation to myself and constitutes the egoty of the ego as well as every Jemeinigkeit in the différance – neither internal nor external – that structures this experience. The death of the other, this death of the other in ‘me’, is fundamentally the only death that is named in the syntagm ‘my death’, with all the consequences that one can draw from it. This is another dimension of awaiting [s’attendre] as awaiting one another [s’attendre l’un l’autre], awaiting oneself at death and expecting death [s’attendre soi-même à la mort] by awaiting one another [s’attendant l’un l’autre], up to the most advanced longevity in a life that will have been so short, no matter what.” (AP, 133/76)

Heidegger needed to distinguish authenticity and inauthenticity (to which we will return later), and the proper death and the other endings. However, Derrida responds, these distinctions become impracticable when the most extreme possibility will always be the possibility of impossibility. Death as the ownmost possibility of Dasein becomes its most improper possibility, which entails an inevitable contamination of the proper of Dasein.

§4.2. Mourning
In Apories, Derrida briefly states that if (si) “the Jemeinigkeit, that of Dasein or that of the ego […] is constituted in its ipseity in terms of an originary mourning, then this self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as different from itself. And reciprocally: the relation to the other (in itself outside myself, outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved apprehension [une appréhension endeuillée].” (AP, 111/61) For us it is matter of unraveling what Derrida means with mourning and what this says of the relation to the other that is neither inside nor outside, but outside-me-in-me. As we shall see, mourning has commonly been imagined as interiorization and introjection (cf. CFU, 197/159). This characterization or image of mourning has consequences for the problem of the image itself; the other who has passed away only appears in us as an image, that is, this other only leaves images in us. But is mourning primarily interiorization (introjection)? Does the image of mourning or the mourning over the image of the other in us mean that one has to interiorize this other? Derrida discussed it several times, for instance when he mentioned a necessary “aborted interiorization”; the relation to the other is only possible as “half-mourning [demi-deuil]” (CIR, 156/166-167). When Derrida speaks of this ‘aborted interiorization’ can one still speak of the imagination as purely auto-affective? Does Derrida agree with Rousseau when he writes, based on the latter’s work, that the “[i]magination alone has the power of giving birth to itself” and that it cannot be awakened or produced by any (other) faculty? Derrida adds that, for Rousseau, the imagination “creates nothing because it is imagination. But it receives nothing that is alien or anterior to it. It is not affected by the ‘real’. It is pure auto-affection. It is the other name of différance as auto-affection.” (GR, 265/186-187) These remarks clearly repeat Heidegger’s reading of Kant, so it is not surprising that Derrida refers to Kant and Heidegger in a footnote: “The entire chain that makes possible the communication of the movement of temporalization and the schematism of imagination, pure sensibility and the auto-affection of the present by itself, all that Heidegger’s reading has strongly repeated in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik could, by way of a carefully staked out path, lead us back on to Rousseauist ground.” (GR, 265n/342n-342n; cf. VP, 93/83)

Rousseau relates the imagination by way of pity to death, “the master-name of the supplementary series” (GR, 261/183). Pity is the identification with the other as an alter ego, with the suffering of the other and even with death, and this pity is not awakened or revealed

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without the work of the imagination “which wrenches it [pity] from its slumbering inactuality”; then, the imagination is “that power of anticipation that exceeds the givens of the sense and takes us toward the unperceived” (GR, 259/182; cf. GR, 262/185). Death is perhaps not the right word for Derrida (“death is nothing”), and he immediately declares that it actually concerns an anticipation of, or better, a relation to death: “Imagination is at bottom the relationship with death.” (GR, 261/184) Pity only awakens of itself with the help of the imagination in order to come to an identification with the suffering of the other, so that the imagination is basically a relation to death, and the imagination is, like death, “representative and supplementary” (GR, 262/184). The “image is death [la mort]” or “the image is a death or (the) death is an image [l’image est une mort ou la mort est une image]. Imagination is the power that allows life to affect itself with its own re-presentation.” (GR, 261/184) How to understand this? Derrida relies here on the supplementary function of the imagination in Rousseau: the image does not represent (re-present) when the presence of what is re-presented is not already marked by a lack, and marked in such a way that this presence is folded back upon (pliée sur) itself by referring to this lack, “to its wish for a supplement”; this presence of the re-presented is, therefore, “constituted with the help of the addition to itself of that nothing which is the image, announcement of its dispossession within its own representer and within its death” (GR, 261/184). Hence, there is an “ambivalence of the power of imagining: it surmounts animality [since, animals, according to Rousseau (and Heidegger), do not know what it is to die, and are unable to live their suffering as that of another or as a threat of death, JvG] and arouses human passion only by opening the scene and the space of theatrical representation [which Rousseau will eventually condemn in his theory on the theatre as a perversion, JvG]” (GR, 262/185). If there is perversion, the imagination is also the subject of this.

The Rousseauist ground of Heidegger’s reading of Kant – whether Heidegger acknowledged this ground or not – is not without relevance, since we need to ask here whether the imagination is still the same in Kant, i.e., the same affection: pure self-affection. According to Derrida, the life of the imagination has a history in which the “status of the imagination shifts [se déplace], we know, in and after Kant”, and here Derrida also mentions Schelling and Hegel (PSI, 55/41; cf. DP, 373-387). Although the imagination remains “in and after Kant” supplementary, something seems to take place here, “an event and a sort of invention, a reinvention of invention” when it is the philosopher who has to invent forms: “No one had said before that a philosopher could and should, as a philosopher, display originality by creating new forms.” (PSI, 56/42)233 Heidegger’s reading of Kant uncovers a pure auto-affection, which means that it merely invents what has been, is, or will be possible according to the Abbildung, Nachbildung and Vorbildung. But, then, for Derrida this implies that nothing happens, and this also became clear for him in Rousseau: the imagination, we just saw, then “receives nothing that is alien or anterior to it”. But, then, how to receive what is alien and anterior to it, i.e., the other that comes and arrives as the other? The only possibility to let this other come is by doing (imagining, inventing) the impossible; this coming invention of the other will have to announce itself or appear as impossible. We, therefore, have to ask ourselves whether and how this is possible for Kant, since “we cannot say that nothing happens here, and that the event of the other is absent from it” (PSI, 56/41).

233 Derrida also writes that “whether or not Plato condemns imitation, he poses the question of poetry by determining it as mimesis, thus opening the field in which Aristotle’s Poetics, entirely subsumed under that category, will produce the concept of literature that reigned until the nineteenth century, up to but not including Kant and Hegel (not including them at least if mimesis is translated as imitation)” (DIS, 159n/138n-139n). With regard to Kant, Derrida writes: “Mimesis is not the representation of one thing by another, the relation of resemblance or of identification between two beings, the reproduction of a product of nature by a product of art. It is not the relation of two products but of two productions. And of two freedoms.” (EC, 67/9) With regard to the theme of invention in Kant and Derrida, cf. J. van Gorkom, ‘Kant and the Invention of Literature’.
First, however, it should be clear that the imagination finds its limits in Rousseau because of the “paradox of the relation to the other […] the more you identify with the other, the better you feel his suffering as his: our suffering is that of the other. That of the other, as itself, must remain the other’s. There is no authentic identification except in a certain non-identification.” (GR, 269/190) Not much further, Derrida writes: “In the experience of suffering as the suffering of the other, the imagination, as it opens us to a certain nonpresence within presence, is indispensable: the suffering of others is lived by comparison, as our nonpresent, past or future suffering. Pity would be impossible outside of this structure, which links imagination, time, and the other as one and the same opening into nonpresence” (GR, 270/190-191). In a complete identification with others, one would let oneself be annulled. Hence, a “certain non-identification” is necessary, just as in the couple of love and respect in Kant, and Derrida does not hesitate to underline its role for morality and for the “respect for the other”. It implies that the paradox of the relation to others presupposes the “paradox of the imagination and of time”. Identification should not become complete interiorization as the ‘normal’ mourning prescribed by psychoanalysis. Respect for the other demands that this (moral) identification, presupposing non-identification or aborted interiorization, needs to be produced in the element of conceptuality, formality and universality (which, although Derrida does not say it, relates the topic to the Kantian categorical imperative): “The condition of morality is that through the unique suffering of a unique being, through his presence and his empirical existence, humanity gives itself up to pity [se donne à plaindre]. Imagination and temporality therefore open the reign of concept and law. One may say that already for Rousseau, the concept – which he also calls comparison – exists as time. It is for him, as Hegel will say – Dasein.” (GR, 271/191) Contrary to Kant, we note that the imagination here opens up to the other, and to the law.

Identification is for Rousseau not immediate; Kant, however, tried to exclude the role of the transcendental schematization from the practical realm – perhaps we can add: in order to come to the fullest expression of what was just called ‘non-identification’ –, but Heidegger subsequently took the risk of taking the “last step” of “the unveiling [Enthüllung] of the ‘originality’ of the […] laid ground” in the provocative §30 of the Kantbuch on respect (GA3, 155/109). We can now only briefly refer to the role of time in this discussion, but, as we will see, contrary to Heidegger, the theme of respect invokes for Derrida an anachrony of time that does not rely on pure auto-affection, and he adds that this anachrony does not let itself be organized in “the good schematics of a constitution of time”; rather, an “other transcendental imagination is the law of an invincible anachrony” (SM, 184/112). Derrida seems to approach the problem of respect by way of the work of mourning, for which, as is known, Derrida often uses the psychoanalytical lexicon that tries to oppose mourning as introjection to the melancholy of incorporation. Introjection allows the reappropriation of the lost object because of which the ‘I’ identifies itself with it; hence, introjection is an idealizing and interiorizing memorization. For psychoanalysis this has been the normal situation of mourning in which the dead are taken up (digested, assimilated, idealized, interiorized) by taking them ‘in me’. Incorporation, however, expresses the failure of mourning – as a “mime of introjection” – by merely imposing itself “fantasmatically, immediately, instantaneously, magically, often hallucinatory” (F, 17-18).

Incorporation, then, implies a certain pathological denial of the dead, and because of that, it marks a failure of mourning at the limit of introjection. The ‘I’ cannot interiorize the dead, so it keeps the other in itself as a “living dead”. Instead of dealing with the dead by introjecting and overcoming the loss, Derrida argues that incorporation maintains the other as other ‘in me’. Where interiorization (considered by psychoanalysis as the normal or true work of mourning) is faithful in bearing the other as part of us or in bearing this other in us, this other no longer seems to be the other; however, Derrida writes, an “aborted interiorization”
seems to testify to “a respect for the other as other” (MPM, 54/35; cf. SM, 160/97). One takes account of this respect not in the image of introjection of the other as an image in us, but when this interiorization fails and is aborted (but by what or whom?). What does this mean for the image and the possibility of relating the imagination to respect? Does incorporation, then, not also testify to a limit of the imagination? What would the (other) image of mourning be when one tries to imagine the dead, that is, when one imagines the other as other? Can it still be called an image?

However, there is an additional problem involved, namely that of the force of the imagination, of the Einbildungskraft as a bildende Kraft. The question regarding the force of the imagination is given to us as soon as, following Derrida, “force itself would trouble, disturb, dislocate the very form of the question ‘what is?’, the imperturbable ‘what is?’, the authority of what is called the ontological question” (CFU, 180/145; cf. ED, 46/33). The ontological question of ‘what is force?’ or ‘what is the force of the image or imagination?’ is immediately problematized by the very force of the imagination itself, since “the powers of the image lead back perhaps in the last resort to his power, to the force of an image that must be protected from every ontology”, that is, the force of an image “protests itself from them; it begins, and this is precisely the force of its force, by tearing itself away from an ontological tradition of the question ‘what is?’” (CFU, 180/145) If we continue this line of thought it also demands that the image is perhaps not to be thought as a being, as something that is or is not.

As from the time of Plato’s struggle with the sophists (in order to come to true philosophy), metaphysics has sought a way to treat and regulate the image and its force or power, but, as already became clear to Plato, the question of the image does not let itself be appropriated by the question of presence. Also in Aristotle the imagination (phantasia) is not so much presented as a dynamis but first of all all questionned insofar as this phantasia is not simply a power of the soul (cf. GA19, 649-650/453). In broader perspective, Heidegger often states that for the Greeks there is no subject, and because of this, the Greek imagination – reduced by Heidegger to phantasia (leaving aside here the Platonic eikasia) – implies, as we have seen, that “man is the one who is looked upon by beings [der vom Seienden Angeschaute]”. Without wishing to return to the Greeks, is this not what takes place when we can no longer say that the subject is in control of the imagination, or that the imagination is simply a function, power, faculty of the subject: the image looks at us? How to respect the other that looks at/in me? How to respond to or respect the dead that haunt us (as specters) and give us the law, i.e., that look at us before we see (them)? What if time is always a time of mourning?

With regard to temporality as we will discuss later, we can add the following questions: how to respond to what “de-synchronizes” and “recalls us to anachrony” (where “anachrony makes the law”) by way of a “visor effect [effet de visière]: we do not see who looks at us [qui nous regarde]” (SM, 26-27/6-7)? The need to raise these questions is given by the psychoanalytical acceptance that introjection is true or normal mourning; but the other is not respected as an other in introjection. Is mourning, then, only possible in the acceptance of the schemata of mourning and a beyond of these schemata, i.e., in the acceptance of a mourning

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236 Cf. SM, 165/100-101: “The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains epekeina tes ousias, beyond the phenomenon and beyond being. The specter is also, among other things, what one imagines, what one thinks one sees and which one projects – on an imaginary screen where there is nothing to see. […] The perspective has to be reversed, once again: ghost or revenant, sensuous-non-sensuous, visible-invisible, the specter first of all sees us. From the other side of the eye, visor effect, it looks at us even before we see it or even before we see period. We feel ourselves observed, sometimes under surveillance by it even before any apparition.” With regard to the ‘visor effect’, cf. P. Kamuf, ‘The Ghosts of Critique and Deconstruction’, 210-211.
where “success fails” and “failure succeeds”? Or as Derrida asks: “Can we accept this schema? I do not think so, even though it is in part a hard and undeniably necessity, the very one that makes true mourning impossible.” (MPM, 54/35)

What if the force of the image – and the ‘essence’ of the image is this force (cf. CFU, 182-183/147) – means that this force is not a being? It comes close to that which is not forceful, not a force, i.e., the without-force, so that, as Derrida writes, the “greatest force is to be seen in the infinite renunciation of force, in the absolute interruption of force by the without-force. Death, or rather mourning, the mourning of the absolute of force.” (CFU, 183/147) As soon as the image annuls its representative presence, there is death (as the disappearance of the present); here, the present loses its presence in the re- of representation, though the image gains or re-gains in power. Taking Heidegger’s reading of Kant into account, one might say that the imagination as the third is a power, and it gives its power to – it empowers – faculties by helping to produce knowledge. However, as a resource for the problem of metaphysics, we also notice that Kant limits the imagination (and it finds or touches upon its limit in the sublime, as we shall see), i.e., the imagination is repressed, excluded or expunged as a parasite. Metaphysics divides itself when it tries to circumscribe a field for the imagination (as a resource and a parasite), and perhaps “metaphysics is only this rapport divided in itself, this partition in itself” (T, 57). Metaphysics suppresses the power from which it derives its power, and, thus, it turns “back upon its own proper power. It would be a power worked by a counterpower. But a counterpower that it would bear within itself. Thus a counterpower that it itself is and on the basis of which it will ultimately be instituted.” (T. 58) This does not mean that the image only presents or represents what is real or present, but that the image or its “nonessential essence” entails the possibility as such to be a “virtual work”, and we already noted how crucial this virtuality is for Derrida. The thinking of the image begins with the phenomenon of death, i.e., with mourning as this phenomenon, since there is only mourning in the absence of (or with the impossibility to experience) death as such (cf. CFU, 184/148; T, 59). The image uncovers here a potentiality or potentialization of a power that cannot be simply thought in terms of reproduction, unless representation regains presence by intensifying it, that is, by allowing “lack to be thought, the default of presence or the mourning that had hollowed out in advance the so-called primitive or originary presence, the presence that is represented, the so-called living presence” (CFU, 185/149). If the force of an image has any force at all, it is still on intimate terms with the without-force. However, Derrida writes, the image is not an imitation or simple reproduction of something existing; rather, the increase of the force of the image finds its “paradigm, which is also its energeia, in the image of the dead”, since “it would be from death, from what might be called the point of view of death, or more precisely, of the dead, the dead man or woman, or more precisely still, from the point of view of the face of the dead in their portraiture, that an image would give seeing, that is, not only would give itself to be seen but would give insofar as it sees, as if it were seeing as much as seen” (CFU, 183-184/147-148). Although Derrida states that this

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237 This is perhaps because it is a “weak force [force faible]” as Derrida briefly mentions it in the beginning of Voyous: “This vulnerable force, this force without power [force sans pouvoir] unconditionally exposes to what or who comes [(ce) qui vient] and comes to affect it.” (VOY, 13) “The weak force […] refers to the interpretation of Benjamin, but it is not exactly mine. It is what I call ‘messianicity without messianism’: I would say that today, one of the incarnations, one of the implementations of this messianicity, of this messianism without religion, may be found in the alter-globalisation movements. Movements that are still heterogeneous, still somewhat unformed, full of contradictions, but that gather together the weak of the earth, all those who feel themselves crushed by the economic hegemonies, by the liberal market, by sovereigntism, etc. I believe it is these weak who will prove to be strongest in the end and who represent the future. Even though I am not a militant involved in these movements, I place my bet on the weak force of those alter-globalisation movements, who will have to explain themselves, to unravel their contradictions, but who march against all the hegemonic organisations of the world.” (FJC, 268)
“being-toward-death” or “being-to-death” of the image is not simply Heideggerian, we already saw in the previous chapter that Heidegger presents us with the example of a photograph of a death mask in order to differentiate between the different images. We will come back to this example shortly. Where the image does not insist in being, or living presence, it has a force “to resist, to consist, and to exist in death” (CFU, 183/147).

The question of death brought us to the central theme brought up by Heidegger when dealing with the transcendental imagination, namely that of the ‘as such’. In *Apories*, Derrida addresses the question of the ‘as such’, and we might say that what is of interest to Derrida is perhaps not so much death, if there is any, but the ‘as if’ (comme si). In Derrida’s ‘Un ver à soie’ he asks what ‘as if’ means “at the moment [...] that I would determine the as if beginning from the exemplary phrases such as, for example: ‘it is as if I were alive’ or ‘it is as if I were dead’? What would, then, ‘as if’ want to say [Que voudrait dire alors ‘comme si’], I ask it. To whom can I ever address such phrases?” (UVS, 30) For whom does it appear that this ‘I’ is dead? For the other or for this ‘I’? Derrida declared:

I would like to see what it looks like as if I were dead, listening to what people are saying, listening and being among them, while not playing the pathetic role of the dead person. [...] But what does it mean to be dead, when you are not totally dead? It means that you look at things the way they are as such, you look at the object as such. [...] So, to relate to an object as such means to relate to it as if you were dead. (AID, 16-18)

How to think, imagine or fantasize “being ‘quasi-dead’”, for, as Derrida states, “when you are supposed to be absent or dead, you think that it is a fantasy” (AID, 18)? What does the ‘as if’ have to do with fantasy or imagination? The look of the image seems to be directed to us – when it looks *in us* – and here the dead person is looking at us in such a way that we become or are an image for it. Again, where I can say cogito sum, I know that I am an image for the other and am looked at by the (mortal) other. This other is infinitely other, for death will always already have distanced itself in an infinite alterity. In the distance in us – far away in us, *au loin en nous* – the gaze of the dead is always singular and it comes from the other, the dead other. We bear or carry (portons) this gaze *in* us that the dead person bears or carries *on* us (*porte sur nous*) (cf. CFU, 200/161). The other speaks “in me before me [en moi avant moi]” (MPM, 50/29). These bearings of ‘porter’ refer to the Celanian ‘tragen’; as briefly noted above, death each time declares or announces, according to Derrida, the end of the world, of every possible world, of the world in totality, of *Weltbildung* as such, and because of this Derrida became interested in Celan’s line ‘Die Welt is fort, ich muss dich tragen’ (cf. CFU, 11; BEL, 22-23). We are (here and now) for the ones who are absent and yet who look at us in us; it would be the power or force of the image to open the ‘au-loin-en-nous’, and it comes to open in us “the being-far-away” (CFU, 200/161). This force does not exist; it is not a being and never attains the presence of the present. This does not mean that it gathers itself in terms of absence, but rather, that it exceeds a clear opposition of presence and absence. But, then, is this still the transcendental imagination of which Heidegger spoke in his *Kantbuch*? A law is set by Derrida when he writes that “one ought [and here we encounter the law, JvG] to imagine not only that which is not, not yet and no longer, but also that which no longer bears any relation to the ‘is’, to the meaning of Being” (T, 50). How to avoid speaking when one is obliged to have recourse to a relation with the ‘is’ and the meaning of Being?

The theme (or work) of mourning introduces itself here. As Derrida points out, mourning has most often been characterized by way of the image of interiorization

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239 With regard to comme si and quasi, cf. HC, 33; PM, 112, 114, 298; EC, 67/9.
(introjection). However, as he argues, if (sí) the interiorization is and even has to be impossible or incomplete (i.e., aborted, for else it would annul the memory of the other as other) this means that “another organization of space and of visibility, of the gazing and the gazed upon” needs to be thought. The failure is not caused by a border or limit that cannot be trespassed, but by the image itself that needs to be thought differently. Interiorization is inevitable, for the dead only remain in us as if we can reduce what is in us to images (memories, monuments). The one who has passed away can only leave traces, i.e., images in us. However, the topological description used here (inside-outside) fails to take into account “that the force of the image has to do less with the fact that one sees something in it than with the fact that one is seen there in it. The image sees more than it is seen [L’image est voyante, plus que visible]. The image looks at us.” (CFU, 199/160) What does this mean for the imagination when what shows itself appears as if it were looking at us? Derrida states that, in the case of the dead whose traces are left in memory as images, the dead person “looks at us. In us. He looks in us.” (CFU, 200/161) He who is no longer – but what does this mean when it concerns the wholly other? – looks at us in us. He sees without being seen.

Hence, for Derrida, the theme of memory appears to begin with death, namely the death of the other or of oneself; if it happens (every time only once, chaque fois unique), then the dead person can only exist “in us, between us. […] He lives only in us. But we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a ‘self’ [un ‘moi’] is never in itself or identical to itself.” (MPM, 49/28) Although we cannot deal here with the theme of spectrality, it should be noted that it is at work in the schematization: “The ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, appears only by means of figure or fiction, but its appearance is not nothing, nor is it a mere semblance. And this ‘synthesis as a phantom’ [Derrida here refers to De Man’s interpretation of Baudelaire, JvG] enables us to recognize in the figure of the phantom the working of what Kant and Heidegger assign to the transcendental imagination and whose temporalizing schemes and power of synthesis are indeed ‘fantastic’ – are, in Kant’s phrase, those of an art hidden in the depths of the soul.” (MPM, 76/64) It is therefore not surprising that Derrida describes a schema as a “schème fantomal” (SM, 240/150). The other as other who leaves a trace or image of himself in us cannot be appropriated in the same (self); it defies interiorization, that is, the image is interiorized in mourning and beyond mourning. For Kant, death is first of all something that I perceive as that of the other, and an inadequacy of the self means for Kant that we are deceiving ourselves as if we are thinking of ourselves as cadavers, corpses. However, what interests Derrida is the relation to death “even before the death of the other actually happens” (MPM, 49/29).

“[T]he signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave” is indispensable and unavoidable, since the ‘I’ never closes on itself; the auto-affection of a “specular reflection” (that never succeeds to fully close on itself) “does not appear before […] [the] possibility for mourning” (MPM, 49/28). This finitude (of memory) is not the limit of a faculty or mental capacity of the soul; rather, finitude needs to be thought as a trace or image of the (irreducibility of the) other in us. Again, finitude is thought as derived, and not, as Heidegger formulated, originary. Memory does not orient toward one of the three modes of the present (the past present). Rather, memory “projects itself toward the future, and it constitutes the presence of the present”, so “it remains to be seen whether the Husserlian and Heideggerian analyzes of the movement of temporalization would provide any essential help” (MPM, 69/57). Auto- or self-affection is as from the beginning affected by the other, a hetero-

240 “There is […] an acute thought of mourning [in the work of Louis Marin, JvG] and of the phantom that returns, of haunting and spectrality: beyond the alternative between presence and absence, beyond negative and positive perception even, the effect of the image would stem from the fantastic force of the specter, and from the supplement of force.” (CFU, 190/153) Derrida also relies here on the fact that ‘phantom’ has a reference to phainesthai and phantasma (LT, 337/300), and also to phantasia (MP, 93/81).
affection, by traces of the other, i.e., the finitude of memory; in being affected by the other, the same (self) becomes the other of the same (cf. VP, 95/85). We can interpret the very finitude of memory, “what affects its experience of discontinuity and distance, as a power, as the very opening of difference, indeed of an ontological difference (ontic-ontological: between Being and beings, between the presence of the present and the present itself). If this were the case [S’il en était ainsi], what would happen when this ontological difference, is translated into the rhetoric of memory? Or vice versa.” (MPM, 70/57-58) Mourning is not simply interiorization in which the other is reduced to me, since here the success or completion of mourning would precisely be the failing of it. Here, “success fails” when the interiorization means that we carry or bear (porter) the other in us as a part of us, that is, when the other is no longer the other; and “failure succeeds” when interiorization is not fulfilled or completed, indicating “a respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over there, in his death, outside of us”. The failure of mourning – in incorporation, as Abraham and Torok formulated it – does not make of the other an image in us when this means that the ‘in us’ is only possible by way of the fulfillment of introjection. It is “this schema” of a failing success and successful failure that makes (true) mourning impossible, leaving the image of the other in me (or in us) to hover between an inside and an outside (MPM, 54/35). Memory is not essentially oriented, then, toward the past (present) of which the existence is deemed to be real. Rather, memory stays with traces that are irreducible to the form of presence and that remain always to come (“from the future, from the to come [venues de l’avenir, venue du future]”) (MPM, 70/58). The past that will have been present is not, and yet, there is only memory and mourning (memory as mourning, mourning as memory).

§4.3. The Death Mask

We have to ask ourselves what the previously described problems for phenomenology mean for the imagination, since, as stated above, the transcendental imagination became for Heidegger at one time the condition of possibility for the ‘as such’ as such. We also saw how death marks the limit of the imagination, for in death there is nothing to represent, to picture or to imagine; it withdraws itself as possibility from presence and representation.241 It has been noted several times by commentators on Heidegger that the choice of the example of the death mask in his Kantbuch is perhaps not indifferent, accidental or arbitrary, since it illustrates the schematism itself by imagining the imagination (if possible).242 In his Kantbuch Heidegger gave a brief, first characterization of Anblickverschaffen and Bildgeben; the gift or giving of the image is first of all known as what shows itself, i.e., das Sichzeigende: “The best-known way of creating a look (giving an image) is the empirical intuiting of what shows itself.” (GA3, 93/65)243 The gift given in/as an image is the look, i.e., the aspect offered by something. It is not simply that of an imagination as a faculty of the soul or subject that gives us something to be seen by the subject or because of the subject; rather, what shows itself has

241 Cf. J. Sallis, Echoes. After Heidegger, 134: “In the analysis of death as coincidence of being and nonbeing in their opposition, as both ownmost and othermost, doubling is thought in the most concentrated configuration. Indeed, the very structure of doubting is said directly in the conjunction: coincidence and opposition. It is said, too, in imagination.”

242 Cf. J. Rogozinski, “Chasser le héros de notre âme”, 172n; J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, 52, 163-164. We will follow here Nancy’s reading of the death mask as presented in Au fond des images.

243 Cf. J. Sallis, Echoes. After Heidegger, 116: “The question is whether imagination, which fundamentally ontology has thought in its identity with temporality, to the point of effacement – whether imagination might not also be overturned onto this side [i.e., “a site at which transcendence would exceed temporality”, as Sallis writes, JvG]. One might then undertake to reinscribe imagination by determining it, for instance, in correlation with what Heidegger explicates in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics as the primary sense of image prior to its assimilation to the problem of transcendental schematism – viz., image as the manifest look in general.”
the character of ‘Dies-da’, i.e., the immediately seen singular (unmittelbar gesehenen Einzelnen), or, along the lines of Aristotle, töde ti (cf. GA41, 48/49). As Heidegger points out, this does not exclude the possibility of a manifold showing itself (as a richer Dies-da), and the singular whole of a landscape seems to be a suitable example for Heidegger. What is presented or grasped in presence is here always one, i.e., a unity. Heidegger adds that the look (Anblick, Bild, species) of an intuitable ‘this-there’ shows itself “just as it looks at us [gleich als blicke sie uns an]” (GA3, 93/65). We also encountered this in Derrida when he spoke of the look of the image: the image looks at us, that is, the image is an Anblick or look directed towards us.

However, Heidegger swiftly continues with a derivative form (Abschreibung) of this imagining, namely the likeness of a photo (“Abbild, z.B. eine Photographie”). The image is always an intuitable Dies-da, so that, Heidegger concludes, every Abbild (copy) is merely derivative (Abschreibung) (as in the case of photography) of what shows itself immediately as an ‘image’. An Abbild always also shows the Bild, that is, it also shows that it shows, that it is something that shows. In the case of the photograph, it shows itself as a photograph (an image) and as the showing-itself of what is photographed (the imagined). Hence, in this Abschreibung of the image in the likeness (Abbild) the first aspect of the image – that it shows itself – is not lost. Hence, the Aussehen, the giving-itself-to-be-seen or the likeness that also shows itself, maintains in the reproduction its originary sense of image. As Heidegger indicates, this is not different when one reproduces the reproduction, i.e., when there is a Nachbild of an Abbild.244 It is curious to see how Heidegger – when precisely dealing with the image in a book that wishes to uncover the role of the transcendental imagination – moves from the image as showing-itself to its derivatives. But this is perhaps not all that surprises us while reading these essential pages of the book. The example that Heidegger subsequently gives is the photograph of a death mask; the photograph in that case shows itself and the death mask, while the death mask shows, as Heidegger writes, “how the dead person appears, or rather how it appeared [aussieht bzw. aussah]” (GA3, 94/66). Why this example of the death mask? It should be clear that Aussehen not only means ‘look’ but literally ‘seeing- or looking-outward’, which again underlines that the appearance of the dead person in the death mask involves a gaze directed towards us. An image becomes an image by resembling a gaze or look (or as Heidegger wrote: “gleich als blicke sie uns an”)245 There is – opposed to one’s gaze – something that opens like a gaze.

Why the example of the death mask and why is it singular? As Nancy writes, the “original showing-itself is exemplified by the showing-itself and outward-seeming [l’avoir-l’air] of a dead person, which by definition does not show itself, but essentially retreats itself [se retire] of every monstration”246 Following Kant’s ideas about the schemata, Heidegger of course searches for what lies beyond or at the basis of every image, and, as Kant declares, a schema needs to be distinguished from every empirical image. Now, the example of the death mask does not (simply) present us an example of a formed or imagined image, but (also) of the image imagining, presenting or showing itself. It comes as a surprise that the thinker of being-toward-death does not consider the example of an image of the dead person; but what is

244 Nancy speaks in his reading of this passage of a “tableau” (picture, photograph) of a “portrait” in an attempt to translate the Nachbild of the Abbild (J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, 155, 158; cf. J.-L. Nancy, Le Regard du portrait, 34n). Nancy also remarks that everything that presents itself has first of all brought itself to presence (porter à la presence) as a person (comme une personne) (J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, 157). Kant’s remark in his Opus Postumum that persona means ‘mask’ is noteworthy (OP, KGS 21, 142).

245 Nancy translates this ‘gleich als’ with ‘comme si’ which he subsequently interprets as implying a faithful resemblance. Because of this resemblance, there is in the ground of the (au fond de) Bild, an Abbild of the Bild itself, that is, a showing-itself that shows itself as a gaze directed towards us (cf. J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, 158).


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maybe even more surprising is that Heidegger leaves aside that the *Aussehen* – both as what shows itself and as that which looks (a gaze) at us – of the death mask entails, as Nancy remarks, “the *Gesicht* of the dead, his face” in such a way that it “forms a face-to-face that is blind [un vis-à-vis aveugle].”\(^{247}\) When Heidegger declares that this image of the dead presents itself to us with regard to how it looks or appears (*aussieht*), or rather – Heidegger writes here “*bzw.*” meaning “respectively” or “accordingly” – how it looked or appeared (*aussah*), perhaps one can conclude from this that the death mask shows the past look in the present or presented non-look. The *intuitus derivativus* was installed at the place of the death of God (*intuitus originarius*), and parallel to this we saw in Heidegger that one cannot posit oneself in the place of the other’s death. However, when it comes to the example of the death mask, we are faced with a blindness that should be considered as a condition of possibility of the image; at the same time, we have to ask ourselves what this means for the access to the dying of the other. The task will therefore be of un-imagining that which both precedes and discloses vision and the image.

The last moment of imagining (which forms actually the first of the schemata) is for Heidegger the *Vorbild*. Since it fore-sees the image or the look, it does not have an image or a look itself; *Vor-bildung*, then, is the imagining of the generality of imagining or imagining in general. Nancy concludes: “It imagines the image or, if we can say, the general imaginary of the image. That is to say, it *vor-bildet* the one of the image. It imagines the one [le un].” It models or pre-forms the one without itself being reducible to a look or image; it is a *Vor-bild* (conditioning the one, the same, the ‘as such’) and because of this Nancy states that it is “the focal point where an image lights itself up”, i.e., “the empty look imagines itself one [le regard vide s’imagine un], that is to say, carries itself ahead of itself as what succeeds itself to itself [se porte en avant de soi comme se succédant à lui-même]”.\(^{248}\) For Heidegger, what is most essential when he discusses the image and the schema is the self-showing. However, the example of the death mask adds to this – something that Heidegger does not mention when he puts aside the example of the death mask without noticing that this look is a blind or dead look – that there is always already a withdrawal or hiding involved here. Further on, this will allow us to thematize the disappearance or *Unvermögen* of the imagination when Kant deals with the sublime – which has never been explicitly discussed by Heidegger – that calls for “its disappearance […] in what one might call a symbolizing beyond-the-schema. In the ground of every image, there is the imagining unimaginable: there is dying as the movement of self-presenting”\(^{249}\). Invoking the symbolization here implies that there is perhaps an opening unto the unimaginable, promised in an image although not yet fulfilled by the image itself. This must have consequences for what it means to speak of the same, the ‘as such’ or the one, since – as Nancy writes – if the one of the image only holds itself in the *Vor-bild*, i.e., if it “originates in death [provient de la mort] as the non-seeing look face-to-face with my own look sinking into its withdrawn image [plongeant dans son image retirée], then this means that the ‘one’ comes from the ‘other’, and not from an auto-intuitive self, that it comes from the other, by the other and as other, in order to return to the other”.\(^{250}\) The image as look or gaze is first of all that of the other and from the other, giving the other that does not show itself as such; rather, what is presented or given to be seen is the same (visible, imaginable). This is why the death mask becomes so essential for our discussion: the imagination veils, hides or *masks* itself as such – or, as Nancy writes, the “imagination remains unimaginable.”\(^{251}\)

\(^{247}\) Idem, 168.

\(^{248}\) Idem, 173.

\(^{249}\) Idem, 175.

\(^{250}\) Idem, 176.

\(^{251}\) Idem, 177.
while showing a masking to which Kant might have alluded when he pointed out that the transcendental imagination is blind, a hidden art of which we are only seldom aware.

§5. The Art of Imagining

As noted, for Derrida, the imagination has to be understood, to a certain extent along the lines of Hegel’s *Nürnberger Schriften*, as a creative or productive memory: “The theme of the fantastic and of the arts of ‘productive memory’ is common, moreover, despite many differences, both to Kant and to Hegel. It is intrinsically a question of an art and of the origin of the arts, the productive source of symbols and signs.” (MPM, 76/64; cf. GR, 41/26; MP, 90-91/78-79, 101n/87n; DR, xiv, xviii, xxxi)²⁵² The reference to Kant is clear: it concerns the transcendental imagination as an art. Besides this reference to the transcendental imagination, we note that the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is also essential for us as a third, since Kant, then, tries to resolve the oppositions set by the first two books. As Derrida points out, the role of art has always been that of mediation in the history of philosophy; philosophy determines and masters art by assigning it “a job as medium”, i.e., a third that “ensures circulation, regulates the encirclement” (VEP, 40-41/34). This third operates between opposites by participating and by touching the edges. The role of the imagination as an art seems to be taken up again by Kant in the third *Kritik*, but we soon notice that it is aesthetic judgment that will have to bridge the abyss that stretches out of sight (*unübersehbare Kluft*), that is, the abyss between the domain of the concept of nature (the sensible) and that of the concept of freedom (the supersensible). The theoretical use of reason cannot be the source for bridging this abyss, since Kant has already tried to show in the second *Kritik* (as well as in the Dialectics of the first *Kritik*) that this domain should have no influence on the practical use of reason. However, the use of the latter (i.e., practical reason) must (*soll*) have an influence on the former, and, consequently, “there must still be [muss es] a ground of the unity [Grund der Einheit] of the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically” (KU, Einl. I, 176/63; cf. VEP, 42/36). Eventually, Kant will have to have recourse to the analogy in order to set or make the bridge itself, which comes down to saying that there must be an analogy between the two investigated domains and this has to be a third term for crossing the abyss. As is known, the analogy of the bridge is more than one analogy among others, since the bridge itself will have to be an analogy. There will again be an intermediary member involved in the process and as the title of the book already specifies, this *Mittelglied* is judgment (*Urteilskraft*).

Derrida’s observation regarding the philosophical positioning of art as the medium also concerns Heidegger. The latter’s most famous text on art deals with the work of art (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*), which occupied Heidegger as from 1934. Heidegger begins the text by underlining the co-originality of the artist (*Künstler*) and the work (*Werk*). The work is only work because of the artist; the artist is only an artist because of the work. “Neither is without the other. Nonetheless neither is the sole support of the other. Artist and work are are each, in themselves and in their reciprocal relation, on account of a third thing, which is prior to both [in ihrem Wechselbezug durch ein Drittes, welches das erste ist]; on account, that is, of that from which both artist and artwork take their name, on account of art.” (GA5, 1/1) Art is, then, according to Heidegger, a third (that is actually the first) between the artist and the work of art. During almost the same period, in his first course on Nietzsche, Heidegger

²⁵² Cf. J.-L. Nancy, *La Remarque spéculative: (un bon mot de Hegel)*, 137; P. de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology*, 48: “In the second *Discours*, Rousseau […] concludes that the particular representation that any general concept necessarily engenders is a psychological epiphenomenon related to memory and to the imagination and not a conceptual trope that belongs to the realm of language and knowledge. What Kant calls the schematic hypotyposis would, then, not be a cognition at all but a mere mnemotechnic device, the equivalent of the mathematical sign in the area of the psychological perception rather than of language.”
lectured on the history of aesthetics in which he tries to rescue Kant’s notion of ‘disinterested pleasure’ from Nietzsche’s misinterpretation in which Heidegger showed a profound understanding of this Kantian disinterest when formulating it in terms of letting-be. Now, for Nietzsche, the Kantian disinterest in the judgment of beauty – to which we will return shortly – merely means indifference, while for Heidegger, it is the possibility of relating oneself to an object (Gegenstand) (i.e., the possibility of letting the object be or letting it stand-against). This letting (lassen) allows the object to come forth of itself. Taking this defense into account one might see an overlap between Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes and the first part of Heidegger’s book on Nietzsche. By then, the themes of truth (as aletheia), beauty and appearing (Schönheit, Scheinen) have already become essential in Heidegger’s work. We read in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes:

In the work truth is at work – not, that is to say, merely something that is true. The picture [Bild] which shows the peasant shoes [i.e., Van Gogh’s painting of shoes from 1887, JvG], the poem that says the Roman fountain [...] allow unconcealment [Unverborgenheit als solche] with regard to beings as a whole to happen [geschehen]. [...] In this way self-concealing being becomes illuminated. Light of this kind sets its shining into the work. The shining that is set to work is the beautiful. Beauty is one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to presence [Schönheit ist eine Weise, wie Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit west]. (GA5, 43/32)

As Heidegger writes in reaction to Nietzsche’s misunderstanding: “The misinterpretation fails to see that now for the first time the object comes to the fore [zum Vorschein kommt] as pure object and that such coming forward into appearance [dieses inden-Vorschein-kommen] is the beautiful. The word ‘beautiful’ means appearing in the radiance of such coming to the fore [Das Wort ‘schön’ meint das Erscheinen im Schein solchen Vorscheins].” (GA6.1, 110/110) Heidegger does not elaborate on this, although he does state in his Nietzsche that beauty is what we dignify and honor (würdigen und verehren) as the model or pre-image of our essence (Vor-bild unseres Wesens) (cf. GA6.1, 112/112). Heidegger does not really specify what he means, and we note that for Kant beauty is eventually considered a symbol of morality, which will become essential for our reading of Kant.254

Although the imagination is largely absent (or suppressed) in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, the imagination reappears in 1790 when another function is attributed to it than the one prescribed or described in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Heidegger was in 1929 only interested in the Kritik der Urteilskraft insofar as it might have confirmed his observations regarding the transcendental imagination as the fundamental power for the ground-laying of metaphysics. He writes that it cannot be said in the Kantbuch in which sense “the pure power of imagination recurs in the Kritik der Urteilskraft and above all whether it still recurs in express relationship to the laying of the ground for metaphysics” (GA3, 161/113; cf. GA3, 160n/112n). Nevertheless, as is well-known, it is clear from Heidegger’s Nietzsche that he returns to Kant’s analysis of beauty, although the sublime is not a word that one will find in Heidegger’s work (but without any doubt there are many traces in his work that allow us to retrace it).255 We will have to deal here with Kant’s analysis of the beauty and the sublime; as we shall see, Derrida will try to expose a hetero-affection inhabiting the auto-affection of the judgment on beauty, and the analysis of the sublime upsets or disrupts the whole functioning of the imagination and schematization. Everything depends in the Kritik

254 Although Heidegger takes some distance from the imagination in his later work, he writes that the “truth of the image is its beauty [Schönheit]” (GA13, 121). Cf. G. Faden, Der Schein der Kunst. Zu Heideggers Kritik der Ästhetik, 91.
The Urteilskraft on a reflection, on reflective judgment, but Nancy does not hesitate to describe this judgment as “the reflexive play of the imagination”\textsuperscript{256}. It is here, in this form or reformulation that we will have to continue our investigation to see whether the imagination can still be understood the same way as Heidegger hoped. First, we will discuss briefly the theme of beauty as presented by Kant and Heidegger, and we will focus on the relevance of the hetero-affection (§5.1). Kant wishes to bridge the gap in the \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft} between theoretical and practical reason, as left open in the previous two critical books. However, since beauty eventually does not give Kant the passage, we will have to continue with the sublime. Since our central interest is the imagination, we will see here how Kant discloses a new or more ‘essential’ possibility of the imagination, or better, the possibility of the impossible (§5.2). As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, for Derrida, the theme of the image needs to be approached by way of portraiture, since a portrait is not simply one image among many others. As we have seen several times, what fascinates Derrida is the look-at-us, and this forces us to return to the theme of portraiture, which Derrida addresses by way of two hypotheses: the transcendental blindness (§5.3) and the sacrificial one (§5.4).

\textbf{§5.1. Beautiful Image}

In this section, we shall deal with the beautiful as discussed by Kant. First it should be noted that Kant constantly emphasizes in his analysis of beauty, in contradistinction to the \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft}, the free play of the imagination. He does this by way of delimiting or circumscribing the domain of aesthetic (reflective) judgment. For Kant this demands a critique of taste where taste is understood as the power to judge the beautiful (cf. KU, §1, 203n/89n), i.e., the power to judge \textit{(Beurteilungsvermögen)} an object or a mode of representation \textit{(Vorstellungsort)} by way of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction \textit{(Wohlgefallen oder Missfallen)} that takes place when there is no interest involved (cf. KU, §6, 211/96). Beauty is the object of satisfaction. When a given representation is a concept that would lead to some knowledge of the object, then the consciousness of this relation – presented in judgment and formed by the unification of imagination and understanding – would be intellectual “as in the objective schematism of the power of judgment [wie im objectiven Schematism der Urthelksraft], which was dealt with in the [first] \textit{Kritik}” (KU, §9, 218/104). Then, Kant immediately adds, this would not be a judgment of taste with regard to the beauty or sublimity attributed to an object. In order to circumscribe a field for the \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft} – between the \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft} and the \textit{Kritik der praktischen Vernunft} – Kant has to distinguish judgment of taste from judgments analyzed in the previous two books, namely logical (cognitive) and moral judgments. Beauty is inscribed in a place that is, as Derrida reads it, “neither theoretical nor practical or else both \textit{à la fois} theoretical and practical” (VEP, 45/38; cf. KU, Vorrede, 168/56).\textsuperscript{257}

We already saw how the question of judgment involves that of the function of the copula, and it is no different in the \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, although now with regard to aesthetic judgments and not to logical judgments. One is immediately inclined to ask what this precisely means for the imagination; does this mean that the mediating function shifts from the transcendental imagination to judgment that says ‘this is beautiful’ or ‘this is


\textsuperscript{257} Derrida concludes: “Within a critique of pure reason, of our faculty of judging according to \textit{a priori} principles, the part must be detached and examined separately. But in a pure philosophy, in a ‘system of pure philosophy’, everything must be sewn back together. The critique detaches because it is itself only a moment and a part of the system. It is in the critique that, precisely, the critical suspension is produced, the \textit{krinein}, the in-between, the question of knowing whether the theory of judgment is theoretical or practical, and whether it is then referred to a regulatory or constitutive instance.” (VEP, 47/39)
sublime’? This question is not raised by Derrida, and when he briefly discusses Kant’s distinction between reflective and determinant judgment, Derrida remarks that he recalls it “in its poorest generality” (VEP, 59/51). One might wonder whether this is not another indication that the imagination is subordinated in the later work of Kant. However, as we shall see, nothing is this easy in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, especially with regard to the imagination; the imagination can be overwhelmed (in the sublime) and overwhelming (in geniality).258

In the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the schema is an image that precedes every image, i.e., the image without image. This condition of possibility for every representation and figuration is taken up again in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, but then Kant speaks of a free image by relating it to reflective judgment, i.e., the free play of the imagination that “schematizes without concepts [ohne Begriffe schematisirt]” (KU, §35, 287/167). How to appreciate this schematization without concepts? A passage has to be made from pure theoretical reason to pure practical reason, but this demands that nature is itself purposive enough to let the supersensible be inscribed within it.259 It is in relation to this passage that we need to discuss the themes of the beautiful and the sublime, but it might already be pointed out here that, for Kant, beauty is not able to bring us to the possibility of bridging the gap. The schema is a forming as the imposition of a figure or form, and the transcendental imagination forms the horizon in which beings are to be understood as beings by delimiting and synthesizing, i.e., schematizing. With regard to beauty, one can say that for Kant the imagination functions before every conceptualization – in a free play –, so that it becomes a preceding schematism whose power gives a form or figure. Again, this imagination is not simply (that of) a subject, but, rather, it is the form forming itself or the image imagining itself, i.e., as Nancy writes, “unity happening upon manifoldness, coming out of the manifoldness, in the manifold of sensibility, simply as unity without object and without subject – and thus without end”.260 But there is a difficulty here in formulating a theory of judgment as the intermediary part or member (Mittelglied), for how do we come to an *a priori* principle when one can only find *a priori* concepts in understanding that will subsequently be used and applied in/by (determinant) judgment, i.e., by the imagination in the synthesizing operation? Judgment cannot rely on other faculties for its *a priori* principle or concept – and its principle turns out to be the purposiveness, i.e., the conformity or harmony (*Angemessenheit*, *Einstimmung*, *Zusammenstimmung*, *Übereinstimmung*) of the (representation of an) object to the faculties of cognition –, so the rule that judgment has to give itself here is at the same time subjective (insofar as it does not contribute to cognition) and lays claim to objectivity (since the rule is applied to judgments that assert by their structure, i.e., by the copula, to be objective). This possibility of laying a claim to objectivity is also found in *aesthetic* judgment, which constitutes the conditions of possibility of aesthetic judgments (and aesthetic objectivity) in general.

Why is this judgment called aesthetic? Since the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* does not have to do with knowledge and does not give us any knowledge, it is concerned with a relation to the subject and not to the object, i.e., to pleasure and displeasure (*Lust und Unlust*). An aesthetic judgment is subjective and not logical or moral, since it relates itself to the subjective affect of (dis)pleasure. As stated before, this also entails a disinterestedness in order to be able to judge something as beautiful. Interest means here that the existence of something matters to me (as in the case of knowledge, morality, etc.) The condition of possibility of saying that something is beautiful has nothing to do with the interest that I might have in its existence. This absolute lack of interest with regard to the existence, i.e., this pure and disinterested pleasure determines, as Derrida states, “the judgment of taste and the enigma

258 On the topic of geniality in Kant and Derrida, cf. J. van Gorkom, ‘Kant and the Invention of Literature’.
of the bereaved [endeuillé] relation – labor of mourning broached in advance [travail du deuil d’avance entamé] – to beauty” (VEP, 52/44). This mourning is caused by the retreat of the object, since, with regard to its quality, beauty is not defined as the relation of the representation to its object, but, rather, to the entire faculty of representations. The question of whether something is beautiful implies the question of whether it pleases me without there being any interest with regard to the existence of this thing (as is still presupposed, according to Kant, in the agreeable and the good) (cf. KU, §2, 205/91). Although Kant does not say it, this brings us back to the theme of auto-affection, since what pleases for aesthetic judgment – i.e., in the reflective play of the imagination – is not what comes from the object; rather, in pleasure “I please myself [je me plais]” when we understand this without relying on something that interests (in) myself: The I-please-myself first of all means that I-please-myself-in (je-me-plais-à), or better, “I-please-myself-in pleasing-myself-in – that which is beautiful [Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à – ce qui est beau]. Insofar as it does not exist.” Since this pleasing-oneself-in (se-plaire-à) is subjective, Derrida does not hesitate to describe this in terms of auto-affection: “The role of imagination and hence of time in this whole discourse would confirm this.” (VEP, 55/47) 261 This beauty forms itself in an auto-affection that finds pleasure in giving forms, and nothing in intuition (time and space) produces this affect of pleasing-oneself-in, this affect that affects itself with itself (s’affecte donc lui-même de lui-même).262

Kant points out in the first footnote of the Analytic of the Beautiful that the relation to understanding is still (immer noch) essential in aesthetic judgment (cf. KU, §1, 203n/89n), while in the first section he underlines that, in the case of beauty, “we do not relate the representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding [vielleicht mit dem Verstande verbunden]) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or unpleasure” (KU, §1, 203/89). Only a ‘this here’ in its singularity (independent, detached, vague, free, pulchritudo vaga, without signaling to anything determinable) is beautiful, and the paradoxical situation of the Kritik der Urteilskraft is that it has to deal with singularities that must (in a reflection) give rise to universalizable judgments (cf. VEP, 106/93). There is still/perhaps something of the understanding left here, and the imagination that works freely has to schematize without concepts; nevertheless, there is a reference to universality here, although one that does not depend on concepts, as the definition of beauty tells us on the basis of the category of quantity: “That is beautiful which pleases universally without a concept [was ohne Begriff allgemein gefällt].” (KU, §9, 219/104) The argument for this is one of the crucial moments in the book; Kant will again speak of the analogy and the ‘as if’ – and we remember that the analogy aims at maintaining an irreducible abyss between the terms –, namely aesthetic judgment will have to resemble (without imitating, without concepts) a logical judgment,263

261 Cf. J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, p. 40: “Beauty, that is the sensible representation of time, or the apprehension of the time of apprehension”.
263 In parenthesis, Derrida writes of the analogy operative in the Kritik der Urteilskraft: “(according to the analogical mode of the as if which governs this whole discourse on nature and on art)” (VEP, 97/85; cf. EC, 75/13-14). The analogy in Kant is governed by what Derrida calls, “an anthropological principle” (VEP, 133-134/117) insofar as Kant formulates a human centre between nature and God, between animality and pure rationality, when claiming that there is only beauty for man (as both animal and rational) (cf. KU, §5, 210/95). The centrality of the human or humanity – i.e., the subject (and not the object) of both aesthetic and teleological judgments – is eventually formulated in the last part of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (the Critique of Teleological Judgment) where man ‘regains’ its privileged place in nature. This limits the free play of the imagination (cf. VEP, 118/104). Also, in Kant the “analogical process is […] a refluence towards the logos. The origin is the logos. The origin of analogy, that from which analogy proceeds and towards it returns, is the logos, reason and word, the source as a mouth and as an outlet [embouchure].” (EC, 74/13) As Derrida tries to show, this results in an “auto-affection, since it takes nothing from the outside and takes pleasure in what it puts out” (EC, 80/17).
and whoever takes a disinterested pleasure in beauty “will speak of the beautiful as if [als ob] beauty were a property of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation [Beziehung] of the representation of the object to the subject, because it still has the similarity Ähnlichkeit] with logical judgment that its validity for everyone can be presupposed. But this universality cannot originate from concepts.” (KU, §6, 211/97; quoted in VEP, 88/76)

Derrida tries to uncover that there is a hetero-affection at work in the pleasing-oneself-in, even though the ‘in’ of pleasing-oneself-in indicates that the auto-affection goes outside its inside; there is a movement of transcendence that presupposes hetero-affection as well. To understand this hetero-affection that inhabits auto-affection, one will have to return to the difficulty that Kant confronted in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. There is a discourse on art and on beauty, i.e., judgment has to lay claim to a universal objectivity, while aesthetic judgment remains subjective. We already noticed the subjectivity of the pleasing-oneself-in, and this purely subjective affect is provoked by the beautiful thing, outside, without being dependent on its existence. This again explains the role of the imagination, since intuition is first of all receptive, while the imagination can present even when that which it imagines is absent. However, the imagination is here no longer understood in terms of pure auto-affection, unless it inhabits the entirely-other of hetero-affection that both provokes and delimits “the labor of mourning, labor in general as labor as mourning” (VEP, 92/79-80).264 Derrida declares: “Whence the critical and indispensable character of this recourse to judgment: the structure of autoaffection is such that it cathects itself [s’affecte] with a pure objectivity of which one must say ‘it is beautiful’ and ‘this statement has universal validity’. Otherwise, there would be no problem – and no discourse on art. The entirely-other [tout-autre] cathects me with pure pleasure by depriving me both of concept and enjoyment [Genuss, jouissance, JvG]. Without this entirely-other, there would be no universality, no requirement of universality […]” (VEP, 55/47) Derrida immediately adds to this that the entirely-other is also the condition of possibility for the concept of knowledge, and here the need to discuss the topic of hetero-affection in confrontation with Heidegger’s limited focus on pure auto-affection introduces itself. Indeed, in the introduction to the third *Kritik* Kant briefly recognizes that – although he wishes to distinguish between the science and beauty, and argues that there is no science of beauty or beautiful science – pleasure was at one time at the origin of knowledge; he writes that this pleasure “must have been there in its time [ihre Zeit gewesen], and only because the most common experience would not be possible without it has it gradually become mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer specially noticed” (KU, Einl. VI, 187/74). If in this “immemorial time” (as Derrida describes it) a pleasure of cognition and science was indistinguishable from beauty, then one is perhaps no longer able to hold on to the exclusion of knowledge or science from all relation to beauty and pleasure (cf. EC, 65/8; VEP, 129/113).265 A hetero-affection inhabits and affects “the most closed auto-affection”, and it is here that the complexity or complications arise, for this couple is no longer reducible to a clear opposition or setting aside of subject-object. Pleasure is not what I give to myself, but pleasure is what it gives (es gibt, ça donne, il y a).

What does this have to do with the imagination? To answer this question, we need to return to the theme of judgment, which is in general the power or faculty to subsume or

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264 Elsewhere Derrida declares that one “cannot hold a discourse on the ‘work of mourning’ without taking part in it, without announcing or partaking in [se faire part de] death, and first of all in one’s own death. In the announcement of one’s death, which says, in short ‘I am dead’, ‘I died’ […] one should be able to say […] that all work is also the work of mourning. All work in general work at mourning. In and of itself.” (CFU, 177-178/143; cf. GL, 99-100/86, 140/122; SM, 160/97; for a critical reading of Derrida’s mourning, cf. J. Rogozinski, *Faire part. Cryptes de Derrida*, 18-45)

contain the particular under the general (law, concept, principle). In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant, then, distinguishes between two operations of judgment, namely determinant (bestimmend) and reflective (reflektierend). The former operation takes place when the generality of a concept (found in understanding) is given and judgment has to subsume or determine the particular. The latter operation of judgment first encounters the particular and has to turn toward the general, so that the form/image given by the imagination is first at our disposal, which gives us the opportunity to find or discover the law or concept. Here, scientific or logical judgments are opposed to aesthetic ones, insofar as the former proceeds by determining a law where the example follows to exemplify or illustrate it, while in the case of reflective or aesthetic judgment the example comes first or precedes the concept (law) that one does not yet have. Although Derrida limits himself to the generality of these operations of judgment, we will have to dwell on it some more in order to notice the relevance of the imagination for reflective judgment.266 With regard to aesthetic judgment, everything depends on a free play of the imagination (the synthesis (Zusammensetzung) of the manifold of intuition) and understanding (the unity of the concepts that has to unite the representations) (cf. KU, §9, 217/102-103). When Kant writes that the imagination schematizes without concepts – where the without-concepts underscores a certain freedom or free play of the imagination that is not guided or ruled by concepts of understanding as was the case in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft –, one should perhaps understand this as a reflective play of the imagination itself, in the sense that, as Nancy writes, “the world […] forms itself, […] manifests itself, is not a universe of objects but merely a schema (skema, ‘form’, or ‘figure’), merely a Bild that makes a ‘world’ on its own, because it forms itself, because it designs itself”.267 Kant emphasizes that in pure aesthetic judgment the imagination is productive and self-active (productiv und selbstthätig) (“as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions”), and not reproductive (reproductiv) according to the laws of association (cf. KU, §22, 240/124; VEP, 116/102; EC, 62/6). This imagination does not form or imagine anything specific; it imagines or figures nothing – without concepts. Put differently, it is the image imagining itself, the figure figuring itself, the form forming itself, so that the world – of which Nancy and Rogozinski speak – is not something on which a form or image is imposed, but this image makes/forms the world.268

The schematization without concept is, then, a form forming itself in allocating itself a form or schema and in granting itself this unity of a schema. As soon as judgment works without concepts it “is the unity that precedes itself, anticipates itself, manifests itself, free

266 Derrida writes in La vérité en peinture (when relying on certain passages from Kant’s work): “Since (receptive) intuition alone relates immediately to the object, the understanding does so by the intermediary, precisely, of judgments. Judgment is the mediate knowledge of an object. […] The power to think as power to judge. One will thus find the functions of the understanding by determining the functions of unity in judgment. Concepts relate, as predicates of possible judgments, to the representation of an object.” (VEP, 80/68) However, it should be noted that Derrida repeats these Kantian thoughts in order to question Kant’s importation of the table of categories from the Analytic of Concepts (of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft) to the Analytic of the Beautiful (of the Kritik der Urteilskraft), while this importation fits badly, since, as Derrida writes, “a logical frame is transposed and forced in to be imposed on a nonlogical structure, a structure which no longer essentially concerns a relation to the object as object of knowledge. The aesthetic judgment, as Kant insists, is not a knowledge-judgment.” (VEP, 80-81/69)


268 As Rogozinski writes: “Form, says Kant, is not merely Gestalt; it does not designate the arrested contour of a figure but the movement of its figuration, the tracing of its limit, the unification of its diversity. This information of what is formless in finitude is what is most beautiful: it is beauty itself, where the imagination exults in the organization of chaos. The aesthetic schematization of beauty would be then the originary schematism of imagination: functioning before all conceptualization and all representation of objects, its figurative power here figures itself in the self-affection of a subject, a tiny all-too-human god, whom it pleases to give form to the world.” (J. Rogozinski, ‘The Gift of the World’, 135)
This form of schematization, this aesthetic schematization of the imagination, uncovers the schematism of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that remained by then a hidden art in the depth of the human soul. The schema is in any case the non-conceptual rule or image (without image) of representation, and although a hidden art, the imagination will have shown, presented or figured itself. This is not only clear from Kant’s words when he writes that we are seldom aware of it, but especially from the reflective operations in aesthetic judgment: the imagination that schematizes without concepts freely schematizes *itself* in its reflective play. Following Nancy’s reading of Kant, we can indeed say that the imagination presents itself (to itself) as a unity in aesthetic judgment, i.e., as “nothing other than itself, presenting the faculty of presentation in its free play, that is, again, presenting the one presenting, or representing, absolutely. Here, the presenting one – the subject – is the presented.” Although the image is not the object, not a representative image given by a subject – since aesthetic judgment is concerned with the image imagining itself –, judgment finds pleasure in the presenting by the imagination that there is an image, which Derrida formulates by stating that pleasure is what it gives (*es gibt, ça donne, il y a*) – it gives (*ça donne*) the beautiful (cf. VEP, 103/90).

§5.2. The Sublime Imagination

Since, for Kant, there is either the schematic or the symbolic hypotyposis, we eventually have to conclude that Kant does not succeed in bridging the gap between nature and freedom in his analysis of beauty. Near the end of the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant writes that beauty can function as a symbol of morality (*als Symbol der Sittlichkeit*) and not as a schema. Indeed, there is no sensible intuition adequate to the infinity of the Ideas, and, because of that, Kant had to rely time and again on symbols, the *Typik* or the ‘as if’, which all describe an analogy between relations (and not between objects). The scope of the ‘as if’ is not the imitation of products but the (mimetic) relation of productions; however, always in such a way – at least, this seems to be demanded – that the symbol manages to preserve the abyss between the terms that it tries to relate. Indeed, at the beginning of the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant tried to distinguish beauty from the good, so it is not surprising that he will have to have recourse to the symbol. Hence, as Rogozinski writes, by “erecting the beautiful into a symbol of the Good, one re-opens the abyss in the very gesture through which one claims to surmount it.” If, then, Kant hopes to discover a direct presentation of the supersensible in order to make the passage from nature to freedom, from the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* to the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, this cannot be found in beauty. Kant seems to

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270 Idem, 30. Not much later, Nancy asks: “How can I trace any figure at all, if I did not anticipate its unity, or more precisely, if I did not anticipate myself, the one who presents this figure, as its unity? There is a kind of fore-sight or pro-vidence at the heart of reason. The schema is reason which fore-sees and pre-figures itself. It is thus of the nature of the schematism, this artistic *coup de main* [Kant uses the word ‘Handgriff’ in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, cf. KRV, A141/B181] of reason, to be ‘hidden in the depths of the soul’: the prefiguration escapes in its anticipation.” (J.-L. Nancy, ‘The Sublime Offering’, 31)
271 Derrida finds in the ‘as if’ or analogy a ‘true’ *mimesis*, for the analogy formulates the *mimesis* “between two producing subjects and not between produced things. Implied by the whole third *Kritik*, even though the explicit theme, even less the word itself, never appears, this kind of *mimesis* inevitably entails the condemnation of imitation, which is always characterized as being servile” (EC, 68/9). “The product is not the given, and production seems to exclude donation. But is not the *pheuin* of *phusis* first of all the donation of what gives birth, the originary productivity that engenders, causes to grow or increase, brings to light and flowering? [...] How is one to behave with regard to this originary productivity, chance and necessity of donating nature? [...] This elaboration makes sense only when referred to a scheme, or as Kant might say, to a schema that relates productive nature to moral nature by the intermediary of the gift.” (DT, 164/128)
realize that there is perhaps a possibility here for the sublime, since, as we will see, at times he mentions that the sublime might offer this schematic passage.

Kant does not present the sublime as a clear separate section or part of the book that is distinguished from the Analytic of the Beautiful. Although he writes an Analytic of the Sublime, Kant soon notes that the treatment of the sublime is “a mere appendix [einen blosse Anhang] to the aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature” (KU, §23, 246/130). Kant begins by sketching some similarities between the beautiful and the sublime: they please on themselves, they are not judgments of senses or logical judgments, they claim universal validity when it concerns pleasure, they both arise from a reflective judgment and appeal to concepts (viz. of understanding and of reason). However, as Derrida emphasizes, it is hard to speak of an opposition between the two, since this presupposes a limit while delimitation gives form to beauty itself. In the feeling of the sublime, the imagination will have to be related to reason, since the feeling is (also) found in a formless object that gives the limitless totality – or the “totality of the without-limit”, as Derrida writes – to be thought (cf. VEP, 145-146/127). The sublime concerns a relation to Ideas. Although the sublime is better presented by/in examples of (raw) nature, the feeling of the sublime in nature always takes place by way of subreption (Subreption) (KU, §27, 257/141), i.e., by way of the projecting of the sublime on nature on the basis of an inadequacy in us between several faculties and powers. Nothing in the sensible world is sublime. For Kant, then, the sublime always concerns ourselves, and never an object of nature (and because of this, he writes, it does not need a separate deduction, since the exposition of the sublime is at once (zugleich) its own deduction (KU, §30, 280/161)).

As Kant points out, beauty is concerned with the form of the object, i.e., the limitation (Begränzung) by this form, while sublimity has to do with the unlimited or unlimitation (Unbegränztheit) that can also be found in formless objects (auch an einem formlosen Gegenstande zu finden) (cf. KU, §23, 244). According to Kant, if there is anything sublime, it exists in an effusion (Ergiessung) that is more potent than what is found in the beautiful, and there are no good ‘sublime’ examples found in either the products of human art or natural objects with a determinate destination. However, this effusion is only indirect, that is, it comes after a retention, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung). The idea of the sublime can only be brought to light or announced at the level of raw nature (an der rohen Natur), hence, a nature that cannot be immediately grasped or comprehended. This raw nature can challenge all measure when one is unable to grasp by hand or eye, and, hence, it is “in its chaos [Chaos] or in its wildest and most unruly disorder and devastation [in wildesten und regellosesten Unordnung und Verwüstung], if only it allows a glimpse of magnitude and might, that it excites the Ideas of the sublime” (KU, §23, 246/130). Raw nature can, therefore, present the prodigious, enormous, excessive, the unheard-of, monstrous, i.e., das Ungeheuere (as Kant calls it). Ungeheuer is an object that destroys or annuls (vernichtet) by its size the end

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constituting its concept (cf. KU, §26, 253/136; VEP, 141-143). However, the object would not be (subreptiously) considered sublime but prodigious (ungeheuer), and Kant emphasized this even more strongly in his Anthropologie where he successively deals with the beautiful, the sublime and the prodigious. The prodigious (magnitude monstrosa, das Ungeheuere) is a counter-purposive magnitude. We also read that the beautiful and the sublime are not each other’s opposites (Widerspiel) but, rather, each other’s counterweight (Gegenwicht); they depend on each other, and the sublime needs beauty insofar as it needs to frame itself or needs to be framed, that is, “the artistic presentation of the sublime in the description or embellishment [Beschreibung und Bekleidung] (in secondary works [Nebenwerken], parerga) can and should be beautiful, since otherwise it is wild, coarse, and repulsive [wild, rauh und abstossend], and, consequently, contrary to taste [so dem Geschmack zuwider]” (ANTH, 243/347; cf. KU, §48, 312/190). Taste is delimited by das Ungeheuere. Sublimity holds itself at the border of the beautiful and das Ungeheuere (which is purely counter-purposive, zweckwidrig), and it is at the limit of chaos that the sublime maintains or preserves the sketch or schema of a form. This does not mean that the sublime should be thought as a presentation of the infinite (an Idea) analogous to the beautiful image, but, rather, one starts investigating the sublime where presentation becomes questionable, problematic, de-limited, i.e., in the un-limitation at the limit of presentation.

To begin we need to focus on Kant’s claim that there is a first or fundamental measure or evaluation (erstes oder Grundmass) of size, and the imagination has two successive procedures (apprehension and comprehension) (cf. KU, §26, 251/135). If we were to surrender ourselves completely to mathematical measuring (by way of the concepts of numbers and their algebraic signs), then there would be no more fundamental measure. The reason for this is that, besides the mathematical measure, one can proceed aesthetically by intuition or the eye (Kant speaks of an Augenmass), which consists in an immediate grasping (fassen) that can be used for the presentation of concepts by the imagination. The fundamental measure is formed in an instant (Augenblick), for the eye forms the measure (Augenmass), or as Garrido writes, the “eye and its cast [coup], therefore, form [font] the absolute unity of that which intuition contains in the synthesis of apprehension”. For Kant, this means that “all estimation of the magnitude [Grössenschätzung] of objects of nature is [in the end] aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively determined)” (KU, §26, 251/135). Here, we measure not with an objective standard but a subjective one; it cannot be used for a mathematical judgment dealing with magnitude, for the fundamental measure is subjective. Every appearance is spatially and temporally extended, i.e., has an extensive magnitude, and because of this, Kant seems to argue, the fundamental measure for the aesthetic evaluation is pure intuition (space and time). This fundamental measure is never reached by mathematical comprehension, which is quite well possible for aesthetic evaluation (that starts with the eye), and this subjective maximum of aesthetic evaluation entails the possibility of a sublime feeling. As Derrida remarks, this fundamental and subjective measure “proceeds from the body. And it takes the body as its primary object. […] It is the body which erects itself as a measure. […] Everything is measured here on the scale of [à la taille de] the body. Of man.” (VEP, 160/140)

Hence, the imagination has two different operations: apprehension (Auffassung, apprehensio) and comprehension (Zusammenfassung, comprehensio aesthetica). Apprehension can proceed to the infinite without difficulty, while comprehension has a hard time catching up, since it is – Derrida concludes – “finite, subjected to the intuitus derivativus and to the sensory” (VEP, 162/140). Comprehension quickly reaches a limit, namely the

277 J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 50.
maximum of grasping, which, then, becomes the (aesthetically largest) fundamental measure of the evaluation of size. “For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses that were apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones, then it loses as much on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot go.” (KU, §26, 252/135) Kant immediately chooses examples of stone in the relation of body to body: the pyramids and Saint Peter’s in Rome, and as a consequence, the relation is first of all that of the body to stone. Because of this, Derrida writes, “it will be of stone, stony, petrified or petrifying [pierre, pierreux, pétrifié ou pétrifiant]” (cf. VEP, 162/141). With regard to the pyramids, Kant refers to the letters of Savary who expressed the view that one should neither stand too close to the pyramid nor too far away. In the latter case, the apprehension of the stone does not result in the aesthetic judgment of the subject, while in the former case, one needs time to finish apprehending the whole of the pyramid – “the eye requires some time [so bedarf das Auge einige Zeit]” –, so that the first perceptions have already fainted away when the imagination has reached the end. The imagination lacks time when comprehension reaches its limit, for one tries to grasp an apprehended series in one glance or instant (in einem Augenblick). When getting too close, “comprehension is never complete [nie vollständig]” (KU, §26, 252/136). As said, the other example mentioned by Kant is Saint Peter’s in Rome, and, Kant writes, the spectator entering the church is “lost” and struck with “stupor”; Derrida adds, one “would almost say turned to stone [médusé]” (VEP, 163/142). As said before, we will have to return to this Medusa-effect.

The sublime will alter the very motive of presentation, and the role of the imagination changes.278 Lyotard briefly formulates what happens to the imagination in the sublime experience: “Imagination at the limits of what it can present does violence to itself in order to present that it can no longer present.”279 Or as Nancy writes, in the sublime, “presentation itself is at stake: neither something to be presented or represented nor something that is nonpresentable (nor nonpresentability of the thing in general), nor even the fact that it [ça] presents itself to a subject and through a subject (representation), but that fact that it presents itself and as it presents itself: it presents itself in unlimitation, it presents itself always at the limit”.280 Kant reserves for the presentation in the sublime the name of a “merely negative presentation [bloss negative Darstellung]” (KU, §29 Anm., 274/156), and even though the presentation is negative, it is a pure, soul-elevating (seelenerhebende) presentation. When sublime enthusiasm is comparable to a degree of delusion of sense (Wahnsinn), Kant does not hesitate to add that Schwärmerei is comparable to the delusion of mind (Wahnwitz). Much is at stake here for Kant, as he makes clear when mentioning that the negative presentation “carries with it no risk of visionary rapture [Schwärmerei], which is a delusion [Wahn] of being able to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility”; Kant wishes to control this danger when he points out that “the presentation in this case is merely negative” (KU, §29 Anm., 275/156). The negative presentation is, then, not the absence of presentation or an empty presentation (that is, of nothingness). The imagination that was initially halted at the limit of a fundamental measure has in the sublime the feeling of being unbounded (unbegränzt) when it thrusts aside (Wegschaffung) its borders (Schranken). A presentation of the infinite (Darstellung des Unendlichen), however, remains a negative presentation, that is, a presentation that remains negative from the perspective of sensibility, and yet, it is a mode of presentation (Darstellungssart) (namely one that removes or withdraws (abgezogene) from the fundamental measure of the imagination) (KU, §29, 274/156).281 However, as Rogozinski

points out, this distinction between Wahnwitz and Wahnsinn is, although essential, obviously "a precarious one".  

Hence, comprehension has a maximum, that is, there is a limit on the imagination, and this limit is reached or felt in the encounter with large ‘objects’. For Kant, only what is absolutely great (schlechthin gross) can be called sublime, and this in contrast to what is simply large (eine Grösse sein, quantitas). Absolute largeness or greatness is not larger or greater than what is large or great, but, rather, it is a magnitude (Gröss-sein) beyond all comparison (über alle Vergleichung), for it is absolutely inadequate to anything measurable and exceeds every measure. The sublime is that "in comparison with which everything else [alles andere] is small" (KU, §25, 250/134).  

A quantitas can be measured, but in comparison to the magnitudo the former is just small. The sublime is incomparable, but it is because of this – the sublime greatness – that there is comparison. In the sublime, Garrido writes, ‘something’ ‘reveals itself, to intuition itself, as no longer being pure and simple of the order of intuition’.  

It is neither of the order of that which is given in time and space, nor of pure intuition itself. When one wishes to formulate that nothing is sublime, one will have to think this, following Garrido’s observation, as a “nothing in excess of the no-thing that time and space are [un rien en excès du né-ant que sont l’espace et le temps]”.  

It is not space or time (ens imaginarium). Rather, as Nancy writes: “Sublime greatness is: that there is such a thing as measurable, presentable greatness, such a thing as limitation, hence such a thing as form and figure. A limit raises itself or is raised, a contour traces itself, and thus a multiplicity, a dispersed manifold comes to be presented as a unity.” Indeed, the judgment of the sublime presupposes that what presents itself must not be completely deprived of form or unity, since “it is also thought as a totality [Totalität...hinzugedacht wird]” added to unlimitation (KU, §23, 244/128). From the Kritik der reinen Vernunft we know that totality (Allheit, Totalität) is “nothing else than plurality considered as unity [die Vielheit, als Einheit betrachtet]”, i.e., unified plurality (KRV, B111). Without this totality of form, i.e., without presentation or limitation, there would be no purposiveness remaining, and what is left is prodigious (ungeheuer).  

The sublime unlimitation, to which thought adds totality, is beyond everything that is small when we compare every form to what is felt or experienced as sublime. Reflective judgment proceeds from unlimitation, i.e., the exceeding of form, to a totality of the object of which the unlimitedness is represented. This totality is added by thought, and as we know, for Kant this is an Idea of reason. Every figure, every delimitation, every image is small when compared to sublime greatness. Any form can function as a maximum for the imagination, that is, when the imagination presents or represents something to itself, then the maximum (magnitudo) is there, for everything is small compared to the sublime greatness and the sublime is beyond every form, i.e., everything. Put differently, the imagination can do nothing else than that which determines or defines it: “the Bildung of the Bild”, as Nancy writes. 

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283 Although Kant first refuses any comparison (Vergleichung), he finally does introduce one. Derrida responds on this matter: “Kant in this way lets a comparison be introduced, a Vergleichung, the site of all figures, analogies, metaphors, etc. between two orders that are absolutely irreducible to each other, absolutely heterogeneous and without likeness. He throws a bridge across the gulf, between the unrepresentable and presentation. In fact he claims not to throw it but to recognize it, to identify it: the bridge, like the symbol, throws itself. Hence it is the whole of nature, the totality of presences and dimensions which is and appears as small in the eyes of magnitude. And that is the sublime.” (VEP, 158/138)
284 J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 52.
286 J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 54.
And yet, even when the imagination is defined by this imagining of the image or forming of the form, the imagination is confronted in the sublime with something else, which is not a (new) power, but the possibility to feel its powerlessness, its “own incapacity [das eigne Unvermögen]” (KU, §27, 259/142). A multiplicity is presented as a unity by way of delimitation, and yet the fact or event that there is unity or delimitation is not grasped in it, for totality is not the gathering of parts but the totality of form that presents nothing else than itself. What happens or takes place here is presentation itself, i.e., the imagination that feels its powerlessness (i.e., its limit) in the encounter with unlimitation to which thought adds the concept of totality; it feels (as Nancy formulated) that presentation or limitation takes place. As Nancy concludes, this is not an object nor something represented but “the formless form or the form of the formless, the setting-off of the limit’s external border from the limit itself, the motion of the unlimited”.290 The imagination does not imagine anything beyond this maximum or limit – and there is no form, no image at the limit –, since imagination is delimitation, and yet it discloses or touches upon something, namely the Idea of a whole.291

After presenting the example of St. Peter’s in Rome, Kant writes: “For here there is a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the Ideas of a whole, in which the imagination reaches its maximum and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction [in sich selbst zurück sinkt, dadurch aber in ein rührendes Wohlgefallen versetzt wird].” (KU, §26, 252/136) The imagination exhibits its limit in the striving toward the comprehension of the whole; it touches this limit, or touches itself in an experience of limitation. The imagination presents the inadequation of presentation, and it does this in such a way that the infinite as an Idea of reason is inadequately presented and delimited in the finite (cf. VEP, 151/131).

The feeling of the sublime, thus, entails a feeling of displeasure that arises from the inadequation between the aesthetic evaluation of the imagination and the estimation by reason. However, there is at the same time (zugleich) also pleasure that arises from the correspondence (Übereinstimmung) of this judgment of inadequacy with rational Ideas, “insofar as striving for them is nevertheless a law for us [für uns Gesetz]” (KU, §27, 257/141).292 It is a law for us: our (supersensible) destiny or destination (Bestimmung) to consider everything that nature presents as an object of the sense is or has to be evaluated small in comparison with the Ideas of reason. When the imagination reaches its maximum or touches its limit, it sinks back into itself where it will find ‘a pleasing-oneself-in’, that is, in the “movement of the impotent imagination [imagination impuissante]” it feels pleased “at this collapse which makes it come back to itself” (VEP, 163/142). The greatest striving of the imagination in the presentation of unity is the relation to “something absolutely great”, i.e., the moral law, and here the imagination finds its destiny, although what it finds is not presented or presentable; rather, the imagination testifies at the limit of the unimaginable. As Nancy writes, the “imagination is thus destined for the beyond of the image”, and this ‘beyond’ “is not ‘beyond’, but on the limit, […] in the Bildung of the Bild itself, and thus at or on the edge of the Bild, the outline of the figure, the tracing, the separating-uniting incision”.293

290 Ibid.
291 Cf. J.-L. Nancy, ‘The Sublime Offering’, 41: “At the limit, one does not pass on. But it is there that everything comes to pass, it is there that the totality of the unlimited plays itself out, as that which throws into mutual relief the two borders, external and internal, of all figures, adjoining them and separating them, determining and unlimiting the limit thus in a single gesture.”
292 Cf. J.-F. Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 228. It is not surprising then that Kant evokes the theme of respect in the Analytic of the Sublime, which does not mean that the sublime feeling is the feeling of respect.
Nancy describes the imagination’s (re-)presentation of its limit in terms of touching, namely, the “sublime imagination” touches its limit when it feels its powerlessness. The imagination is indeed sensible; however, Nancy detaches the imagination from the eye, from the mere perception of a figure, so that sensibility consists of the arrival of the limit: that presentation takes place. The presentation of the limit is only possible when it is touched. Although we cannot elaborate here much further on the theme of touching, Derrida interprets this as follows:

If it ‘feels’ ‘its own powerlessness’, then the imagination touches upon its powerlessness. The imagination encounters that which it cannot, the impossible for it; it comes into contact with what remains impossible for it. It encounters, therefore, that which it cannot encounter; it accedes, as such, to the inaccessible as such; it attains and reaches there; it falls, upward, and comes onto that which it cannot touch, where it touches (tangentially) what it cannot attain or touch: the point or the line, the flimsy, unsubstantial limit, here, there, whither and whence it can no longer touch. The imagination attains a limit, reaches a shore to which it never arrives. It becomes what it is by essence, imagination, possibility of the impossible, possibility without power, possibility auto-affecting its essence of non-essence. It is not what it is – the imagination. (LT, 124/105-106; cf. GR, 221-223/154-155)

This touches upon many of the themes analyzed above, and here Derrida writes, along the lines of Nancy’s interpretation, that touch is that of the imagination, and for Derrida the Analytic of the Sublime expresses the imagination’s “possibility of the impossible”. Even though Derrida discusses here the theme of the imagination in the broader context of touching – and the touching is here that of the imagination – Derrida eventually mentions the related topics with which we have already been dealing. The touching of the imagination (“sensible presentation or transcendental schema”), then, touches upon many other themes, gathered by Derrida in a list: “imagination, presentation, sensibility, passivity/activity, internal sense/external sense, time/space, intuitus derivativus, thus finitude, ‘finite thinking’, schematism, transcendentality, and so forth” (LT, 125-126/108). However, for Derrida, the ‘place’ to begin discussing the (sublime) imagination is by way of the theme of the possibility of the impossible, the “power of powerlessness” or, as Kant wrote, its “own incapacity” (LT, 151/131). The reason why Derrida finds here the ‘essence’ of the imagination is that experience in general would begin there, through it, alongside it or because of it (par là), that is, “it would begin by feeling itself touching a limit, feeling touched by a limit, its own limit [elle commencerait à se sentir toucher une limite, à se sentir touchée par une limite, et sa propre limite]” (LT, 129/111).

§5.3. A Ruined Self-Portrait

The above-mentioned “petrified or petrifying” relation of “body to stone” that provokes the feeling of the sublime is not without relevance to our discussion of the imagination. As Nancy writes, “[p]etrified [médusé], one can want to exhibit oneself as well – perhaps one only ever exhibits oneself petrified [médusé], and not without counting on becoming oneself petrifying [medusant]. Perhaps Kant thought that the sublime of the Kritik lies in taking your breath away.” Both Kant and Hegel reflect on the line between the finite and infinite as the place of the sublime, and it is therefore, as Derrida states, not “surprising that they both consider a

294 Cf. J.-L. Nancy, ‘The Sublime Offering’, 44. As Derrida writes: “To touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline.” (LT, 121/103)
certain Judaism as the historical figure of the sublime irruption” (VEP, 153/134). Indeed, when dealing with the sublime Kant mentions the Jewish ban on any graven image (Bildnis, Gleichnis) (KU, §29 Anm., 274/156). The theme of the stone is related (by Hegel and Derrida) to the Jew; we already observed how the Jew (i.e., Kant or Kantianism) is unable to figure or imagine (as a Jew) for himself the infinite without immediately pointing out that it merely concerns an image or that it is merely imaginary. The Jew is a stranger to the concrete or felt unity between the infinite and the finite, and because of this, Hegel observes that he can only speak of freedom in an abstract, cold, rhetorical and artificial way. The Jew is unable to concretely represent for himself the infinite because of the gap between the infinite and the finite; when confronted with the task, he only sees in the sensible representations “wood and stone – matter” that he easily rejects as idols. “They are preoccupied only with the invisible (the infinite subject is necessarily invisible, insensible), but since they do not see the invisible, they remain in the same stroke [du même coup] riveted to the visible, to the stone that is only stone.” Insofar as the Jew deals with invisible and visible, he is at the same time or in the same stroke unable to see the invisible or to feel (“such is the mediatising, agglutinating function of feeling”) the invisible in the visible (GL, 58/48). Unsurprisingly, Derrida found an interest in the paradoxical feeling of respect in Kant that he transforms into a passion, fascination or admiration.

As noted, Derrida relates the “petrified or petrifying” to the Medusa-effect, and when considering the imagination (in terms of memory) we can say that metaphysics has always declared that the life of memory is hypnotized or put to sleep when one has recourse to techniques, to unnatural organizations of memory (such as writing, drawing or the archive, i.e., all the mnemotechnics that Plato would have dismissed). When one merely relies on supplementary techniques of memory, there is always the danger that one gets lazy and loses sight of the original life of memory, that is, there is the danger of forgetting. Derrida interprets this idea as follows: “Confident of the permanence and independence of its types (tupoi), memory will fall asleep, will not keep itself up, will no longer keep to keeping itself alert, present, as close as possible to the truth of what is. Letting itself be stoned [médiaisée] by its own signs, its own guardians, by the types committed to the keeping and surveillance of knowledge, it will sink down into lèthe, overcome by non-knowledge and forgetfulness.” (DIS, 119-120/105) However, in his reinterpretation of memory, Derrida does not hesitate to call the hypnosis by the ‘unnatural’ memory a fascination, and when dealing with Mandela, we already noticed that the attentive, long stare of fascination signifies being petrified (médiaisé); hence, to fascinate means to take something “out of itself by putting it to sleep in a monument” (DIS, 119/105). This monumental sleep or long stare of fascination is for Derrida, then, being petrified, turned to stone like a monument. In the possibility of death (Medusa), Derrida recognizes the possibility of a fascination; when memory is confident of “the permanence and independence” of its figures (the figures or forms it has monumentalized in/by itself), memory falls to sleep, it reflects the figure (type) it erected: a monument, stone. We noted that the Medusa-effect is also associated by Derrida to fascination and the look that looks at you, and it is the relation between form and force that is at stake here: “Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself. That is, to create.” (ED, 11/3) The inability to understand force from within itself means that one does not know how to force or enforce, that is, how to create.

What is the stone or stoniness of stone? Derrida paraphrases Freud without immediately subscribing to it: “Stone is the phallus.” (DIS, 47n/40n)296 Like Ferenczi, Freud

296 Medusa is mentioned several times in Derrida’s work, and he often additionally refers to Freud’s text ‘Medusenhaupt’ (cf. DIS, 47n-48n/40n-41n; GL, 55-56/45-47; VEP, 138/121; MDA, 84n/73n). Furthermore, in his discussion with Lacan, Derrida writes: “This is the strict definition of the transcendental position: the privilege of one term within a series that it makes possible and which presupposes it. Thus a category is called
relates Medusa to castration insofar as the terror of Medusa is the terror of castration, and what turns to stone does so in front of Medusa’s severed head (symbolizing the mother who reveals her genitals, i.e., her lack of a penis). Freud begins his brief reading of the myth with the statement that “to decapitate = to castrate.” The sight of Medusa’s head stiffens the spectator with terror, i.e., turns him to stone. As the myth tells us, Medusa sees in order to turn to stone whoever looks face to face at her, so that this Gorgon kills whatever is alive by looking at it. This stiffening means for Freud an erection, but because of this, there is also a consolation, since the male spectator is able to show and reassure himself that he has a penis (cf. VEP, 160/140; CIR, 225/242). Similar to the feeling of the sublime where pleasure (Lust) immediately succeeds the feeling of displeasure (Unlust), for Freud the Medusa-effect entails an anxiety (for castration) and a consolidation (namely, an erection). Although it might seem as if we are far removed from the theme of imagination, Derrida writes that the autograph of drawing always entails or shows a mask, to which he adds that when someone wears, shows or draws a mask, “one repeats Perseus’s heroic deed” of decapitating Medusa. “Perseus could become the patron of all portraitists. He signs every mask.” (MDA, 84/73) The reason for this is that, as we hear Derrida say, Perseus managed to confront the petrifying looks of Medusa without facing her, without directly looking at her (in her eyes) when he remained invisible. “He looks to the side when he decapitates the monster”, i.e., “there is no direct intuition, only angles and the obliqueness of the gaze.” (MDA, 84/73) Everything depends

transcendental (transcategorial) when it ‘transcends every genus’ (transcendit omne genus), i.e., the list of the categories of which it is nevertheless a part while accounting for it. This is the role of the phallus in the logic of the signifier. […] This omnipresence of a condition of possibility, this permanent implication, in every signifier […] can have as its element of presence only a milieu of ideality: hence the eminence of the transcendental eminence whose effect is to maintain presence, to wit phonê.” (CP, 505n-506n/477n-478n; cf. DT, 74-75/52-53) 297 Cf. S. Freud, ‘Medusenhaupt’, 47-48. One will have to relate this to the theme of castration in Freud’s text Das Unheimliche where he discusses the theme of the doppelganger (Doppelgänger), and, as Derrida indicates, we “find ourselves constantly being brought back to that text [i.e., Das Unheimliche, JvG] by the paradoxes of the double and of repetition, the blurring of the boundary lines between ‘imagination’ and ‘reality’, between ‘symbol’ and the ‘thing it symbolizes’ […] , the references to Hoffman and the literature of the fantastic, the considerations on the double meaning of words” (DIS, 249n/220n; cf. DIS, 300n/268n; POS, 121/87; MDA, 65n-66n/62n-63n). We will see Derrida’s reaction when asked what he experienced while being confronted with a portrait made of him: “it is strange, uncanny, unheimisch.” Derrida’s problem with his image and his dislike of seeing his face come forth from an anxiety about seeing his image in public, i.e., a narcissistic anxiety for death that is implied when taking a picture. For a critical examination of the Freudian phallogocentric analysis, cf. H. Cixous, ’Le rire de la Méduse’ and her ‘Le sexe ou la tête?’.

298 Cf. D. Arasse, La guillotine et l’imaginaire de la terreur, 168-169, 172-173. Derrida briefly summarizes the myth of Perseus: “Let us not forget that all these, once again, are scenes of prediction and filiation, scenes of the seer. The oracle had announced to Danaë that if she had a son he would kill his grandfather. This latter, Acrisius, king of Argos, had his daughter locked up, but Zeus turned into golden rain in order to visit her. The resulting birth is thus heroic, half-divine, half-human – like Dionysus’. Dionysos, whom Perseus hates, and whose father – their common father – had shown himself as such, for once, at the moment of coupling. To sever the Medusa’s head following Polydectes’ challenge, the hero has to multiply the steps or tasks, and each time it is a story of the eye. He must receive from the Nymphs the helmet of Hades, the kunê that renders him invisible. But in his search for the Nymphs, he must first pay a visit to [se rend chez] the female elders, the Graiae, sisters of the Gorgons. Between the three of them they have but one eye and a single tooth. One of them stays on the lookout, keeping the eye always open, the tooth ready to devour. Perseus steals this eye and tooth during the changing of the guards, as it were, at the moment they are passed from one hand to another and thus belong to no one. He thus steals a sort of subjectless vigilance. (Once again, the lone, unique eye stands out, is detachable, it circulates between subjects like an instrumental organ, a fetishized prosthesis, an object of delegation or representation. Moreover, by making it a partial object, all the representations of the eye dissociated and worked over by a graft are inscribed in this scene. This is as much the case in all anatomical and ‘objective’ representations of the eye as it is, for example in Odilon Redon’s The Eye with Poppy). After having severed the head of Medusa, after having hidden in his bag this potential for death that fascinates and redoubles the gaze of the other, leading to its perdition, Perseus escapes from the other Gorgons, thanks to the helmet of invisibility.” (MDA, 84-88/73-87)
here on Perseus’ act of seeing Medusa in his shield without himself being seen; he catches her image in a reflection. This gives him the possibility of decapitating her, and, then, of controlling her, of using her, that is, of becoming (like) her, of petrifying others (like Phineus or Polydectes). Reflection does not only protect Perseus; his shield is also his weapon. The heroic deed begins with the possibility of seeing without being seen, as if Perseus shows us how to imagine, form, make sensible, a monument, a memory; and Perseus’ decapitation of Medusa is an event, a sacrifice, the possibility of the impossible. “Consequently, the story of this heroic son does not only give rise to the narrative of an event. The myth also illustrates or rather figures an index, the finger of a draftsman or the trait of a structure. Without directly facing the fatal gaze of Medusa, facing only its reflection in the bronze shield polished like a mirror, Perseus sees without being seen.” (MDA, 84/73)

We have already dealt with Heidegger’s example of the death mask, and here the theme of the mask appears in Derrida’s work (without alluding to Heidegger) where he distinguishes three values of the mask. First, “the mask dissimulates everything save (whence the blind and jealous fascination it exercises) the naked eyes, the only part of the face at once seeable, therefore, seeing, the only sign of living nakedness that one believes to be shielded or exempt from [soustrait] old age and ruin” (MDA, 84/72-73). Everything of the body ages except the eyes. Because the eyes are the same throughout one’s life, the eyes have no age, that is, the act of looking is ageless. Although one can look into the mirror (for which Derrida often uses the notion ‘psychè’) to see oneself and to have some understanding or an image of what one looks like, this does not immediately give us a concrete image of the act of looking itself. The role of memory will be essential here. For Derrida, it first of all means that it is the other who knows what this looking looks like, i.e., the other sees my act of looking better than me. The second value that Derrida mentions, and which tells us of the importance of Heidegger’s choice of examples, is death, meaning that “every mask announces the mortuary mask, always taking part in both sculpture and drawing” (MDA, 84/73). Thirdly, as a consequence of the first two values, Derrida mentions the “Medusa” effect [l’effet ‘médusant’]: the mask shows the eyes in a carved face that one cannot look in the face without coming face to face with a petrified objectivity, with death and blindness” (MDA, 84/73).

Although Derrida does not discuss the stone in his texts on portraiture, he does point out that “one can just as well read the pictures of ruins as the figures of a portrait, indeed, of a self-portrait” (MDA, 72/68). Why these ruins, and what does this tell us about the image? An immediate answer would be: the self-portrait is a ruin. Derrida reaches this conclusion by way of what he calls the “hypothesis of sight” or “of intuition”. We will return to this hypothesis, but briefly stated, we can say that, according to Derrida, there is no seeing that sees itself (directly) seeing. This complicates or disturbs every self-portrait, since determining a portrait as a self-portrait implies some faith, that is, when a drawing is called or entitled a self-portrait, then we have to hypothesize that the artist is looking or staring at a mirror or a picture, or relying on his memory. But, then, the spectator takes the place of this mirror or any of the reflective instruments, that is, he will have to gouge out the eyes of the artist by looking at the artist as a visible object. This loss of vision and of the seeing eyes is not simply done by all spectators with the exception of the artist; rather, it is something that the artist will have to undergo if he sees and draws himself. If there is a self-portrait, it consists in assigning a place to the spectator whose seeing blinds and gouges out the seeing eyes. The gaze of the draftsman directs the spectator to place himself in the place of the mirror, i.e., to replace the

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300 Cf. L. Marin, Pascal et Port-Royal, 278-279, 302; D. Arasse, La guillotine et l’imaginaire de la terreur, 173-174.
mirror when facing the draftsman. Derrida writes: “Presence is never present. The possibility – or the potency – of the present is but its own limit, its inner fold, its impossibility – or its impotence. Such will have been the relation between presence and castration in play and at stake.” (DIS, 336/303) (It should be remembered here that for Freud Oedipus’ self-blinding is a mitigated form of the punishment of castration.) One will always be able to dissociate the one who is called the signatory of a self-portrait from whatever or whoever is called the subject of the self-portrait, so that the identification remains uncertain, i.e., everything in what is called a self-portrait depends on the juridical effect of the title and the verbal event of calling it a self-portrait. This effect calls “a third [tiers] to witness, calls on him to give his word, calls upon his memory more than upon his perception” (MDA, 68/64). In Kant, it is the transcendental schematism that is called upon to verify or install the objective validity of pure concepts, and, as we will see, it becomes essential here to understand this schematism as a productive memory.

It is here that Derrida invokes the ruin or ruination of the self-portrait. When speaking of self-portraits, one will always have to wonder if such a thing is or remains possible. Put differently, there is always the possibility of asking ‘What if...?’, ‘Et si...?’: what if there is no self-portrait and there remains nothing of it? “It is like a ruin that does not come after the work but remains produced, already from the origin, by the advent and structure of the work. In the beginning, at the origin, there is ruin. At the beginning comes ruin; ruin comes to the origin, it is what first comes and happens to the origin, in the beginning. With no promise of restoration.” (MDA, 68-69/65) The theme of the ruin is not only invoked by the inevitable collapse of the self-portrait, as just sketched; rather, the petrifying aspect of turning to stone and gouging out of the eyes is constantly at work. The spectator is the condition of the sight of the artist, that is, of his own image, but this entails that we rub or gouge out his eyes in order to replace them and become the eyes of the artist, i.e., the double of his eyes. Derrida writes: “A bottomless debt, a terrifying prosthesis, and one can always detect this fear in the draftsman’s gaze, though the hypothesis is just as petrifying [médusante] for us as for him.” (MDA, 65-66/63) The ruin is announced here, that is, as from the beginning there is this Medusa-effect (cf. AF, 121/135). One never knows that when observing the work alone, the artist shows himself or something else – “or even himself as something else, as other [comme autre]” (MDA, 69/65). (Later, this dissociation will turn out to be essential for Derrida: he always did as if he were an other.) The instant (Augenblick) that the artist tries to capture himself, the thing has already slipped away and all that remains is to rely on memory. What remains is the ruin or is ruined as from the beginning; this is a transcendental condition of self-portraits:

Ruin is that which happens to the image from the moment of the first gaze. Ruin is the self-portrait, this face looked at in the face as the memory of itself, what remains or returns as a specter from the moment one first looks at oneself and a figuration is eclipsed. The figure, the face, then sees its visibility being eaten away; it loses its integrity without disintegrating. [...] [O]ne can just as well read the pictures of ruins as the figures of a portrait, indeed, of a self-portrait. Whence the love of ruins. [...] How to love anything other than the possibility of ruin? Than an impossible totality? Love is as old as this ageless ruin – at once originary, an infant even, and already old. Love doles out his traits; he sights, he comes on site, and sees without seeing – this blindfolded love [...]. The ruin is not in front of us; it is neither a spectacle nor a love object. It is experience itself [...]. (MDA, 72/68-69)

303 Cf. SM, 248/155-156: “There is a mirror […], but since all of a sudden it no longer plays its role, since it does not reflect back the expected image, those who are looking for themselves can no longer find themselves in it. […] It is as if they were becoming ghosts in their turn. The ‘proper’ feature of specters, like vampires, is that
Memory is ruinous, but ruin as memory lets see without showing anything at all or of the all. The draftsman who looks at himself, fascinated and fixed on the image, withdraws before his own eyes, and the attempt to recapture himself is always already an act of memory. But, then, this memory is not simply in the service of drawing, but it “is the very operation of drawing and precisely its setting to work” (MDA, 69/68). Hence, the ruin is not a lack or a weakness on the side of the artist, spectator or model, but forms a chance of the work itself. It is a memory of love itself in mourning, i.e., it is “experience itself”, since, as we remember, for Derrida work is always a work of mourning. “There is nothing of the totality that is not immediately opened, pierced, or bored through: the mask of this impossible self-portrait whose signatory sees himself disappearing before his own eyes the more he tries desperately to recapture himself in it. Thoughtful memory and ruin of what is in advance past, mourning and melancholy […]” (MDA, 72/69) The role of the mask tells us that the face does not show itself naked, but, then, “this, of course, unmarks nakedness itself. This is what is called showing oneself naked, showing nakedness – a nakedness that is nothing without modesty, the art of the veil, the window pane, or the piece of clothing” (i.e., it shows nothing without parergon) (MDA, 75/72; cf. AJS, 76-77/50-51).

It is from here that we will turn to the hypothesis of sight. Derrida remarks that the central analysis of drawing entails two hypotheses that will intersect in a conjecture, that is, in the above announced “hypothesis of sight” (MDA, 9/2). First, Derrida analyzes a transcendental blindness: drawing is blind. If we briefly return here to Kant, the synthesis in general (Synthesis überhaupt) is at times described as a function (Wirkung) of the imagination, determined by Kant as a blind but indispensable function (Funktion) of the soul. We also noted how crucial the aspect of drawing or tracing (zeichnen, verzeichnen, bezeichnen, beschreiben) is for the imagination, and we will have to return to this when we discuss the theme of time and space. Understanding will have to give sight, insight or a rule, i.e., as Heidegger concludes, a Vorbild; it is the faculty of recognition. The transcendental blindness is a lack, although Derrida wishes to “transcendentalize, that is, to enable an infirmity or an impotence” (MDA, 60/55). Blindness becomes a condition of possibility for drawing.

The second hypothesis of Derrida is that “a drawing of the blind is a drawing of the blind. Double genitive. There is no tautology here, only a destiny [fatalité] of the self-portrait.” (MDA, 10/2) Derrida calls the portraits made of the blind – every time a draftsman lets himself be “fascinated by the blind” – allegorical self-portraits of the origin of drawing itself, since drawing is every time done in blindness. There is no look that looks at the other looking, straight in the eyes, since it always escapes from the objective (cf. DR, xxviii). As noted, Perseus as the patron of portraits decapitated Medusa with the “obliqueness of the gaze”, i.e., without direct intuition, only angles.304 This entails for Derrida a hesitation they are deprived of a specular image, of the true, right specular image (but who is not so deprived?). How do you recognize a ghost? By the fact that it does not recognize itself in a mirror.”

304 How did Derrida respond to portraits made of him, for example, to Presa’s Breath, Cixous’ Portrait de Jacques Derrida en jeune juif or Adam’s Jacques Derrida – portrait allegorique? In the documentary Derrida by Dick and Kofman, we see Derrida standing in front of a portrait made of him. When asked what he thinks when looking at it, Derrida states: “This portrait of me? […] I have already spoken about my image, about the difficult rapport I have with my image. So I arrived here quite worried [inquièt].” Subsequently, Derrida indicates that, outside any aesthetic evaluations, he can only say “‘I accept’ [‘J’accepte’]. I accept. […] In every way, it’s strange [bizar], it’s uncanny [Derrida uses the English here, JvG], it’s unheimisch. But there are strange things against which one revolts, and others which one accepts, an image one accepts.” It is well-known that in the beginning of his career Derrida refused to let any picture of him be taken and used for the publication of his books. Later, when it became impossible to resist, he commented that during “the fifteen or twenty years that I tried […] to forbid photographs, it was not at all in order to mark a sort of blank, absence, or disappearance of the image; it was because the code that dominates at once the production of these images, the framing they are
between two ‘blindnesses’, or better, between two paradoxes or logics of blindness (and invisibility) at the origin of drawing: the transcendental and the sacrificial. We notice that the essence of transcendality itself is at stake, for here it depends on the ‘relation’ between the condition of possibility (a structure, a form) and the event. The transcendental blindness would be the “invisible condition of the possibility of drawing, of drawing itself, the drawing of drawing. It would never be thematic. It could not be posited or taken as the representable object of a drawing.” What is impossible to represent, to portray, to imagine is the invisible ‘origin’ of drawing, “the drawing of drawing”. Hence, this ‘origination’ will have to be an event that blinds. The sacrificial blindness, then, is the thematic representation of the blind, which, “in becoming the theme of the first, reflect[s], so to speak, this impossibility. It would represent this unrepresentable.” (MDA, 46/41) Derrida begins his observations with the transcendental blindness as the condition of possibility for drawing – and in the next section we will continue with the sacrificial blindness –, but how to think blindness as a condition?

To illuminate this, Derrida distinguishes three “aspects” of transcendental blindness (cf. CFU, 201/162). First, blindness inheres in the representation of presence (and the power of the image is its representation). The origin of drawing or painting is not sought in perception, but rather, in memory, which Derrida also traces in the “[c]reative memory, schematization, the time and schema of Kant’s transcendental imagination, with its ‘synthesis’ and its ‘ghosts’” (MDA, 51/47). Here we notice that Derrida shifts from perception to representation and memory, allowing him to say that blindness inheres in drawing. As soon as the pen touches a surface, the eyes move away from the model, because of which the draftsman has to rely on his memory. The eyes have to hand themselves over to the pen when losing sight of the model, when withdrawing from the presence of the visible. Memory (anamnesis) is at work here as “the visionary vision of the seer who sees beyond the visible present, the overseeing, sur-view, or survival of the view”, as if (directly) seeing has to be forbidden for drawing (MDA, 51/47). There is also forgetting (amnesis), because the invisible can lose memory, hidden in the depth of the soul, that is, an invisibility inhabits the visible, so there is no visible as such that is not invisible. This nonvisible is not something to be imagined somewhere else as imaginary, something hidden or past (cf. MDA, 57/52); rather, it ‘appears’ as an absolute invisibility that, as Caputo summarizes, “cannot in principle become visible, the aperspective blind spot that launches vision while remains itself out of sight, forgotten and invisible, in retrait”.305

The second aspect has to do with the withdrawal (retrait) of the trace, line, mark, stroke (trait). After the previously discussed act of tracing or drawing, Derrida now asks what has to be thought of the trait once traced, i.e., of what remains of it when it has been traced or drawn. These lines must become invisible, they must withdraw in favor of the visible beings that shine through the traces, so that these traces show something other than themselves, that is, they make something visible besides or between themselves. “The trait joins and adjoins only in separating. […] The outline or tracing separates and separates itself; it retraces only

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borderlines, intervals, a spacing grid with no possible appropriation.” (MDA, 58/54) This spacing grid marks spacing itself, a spacing that is neither intelligible nor sensible, and here we encounter a position or positioning of the trace, *trait*, or line that is impossible to distinguish from the transcendental schematism: what if the imagination or the power of the imagination is the power of spacing? The schematization that traces the lines or drawings withdraws from images. For Kant, the role of the transcendental imagination – this hidden art – is limited to theoretical reason, but this delimitation is not negative. It is an indispensable condition of possibility for experience and cognition, but, then, this limit also marks an impossibility or an impotence: the imagination as delimitation or spacing gives space by withdrawing, since it can never possess the phenomenality of a gaze or look.

Finally, Derrida mentions the third aspect, that is, “the rhetoric of the trait. For is it not the withdrawal [*retrait*] of the line – that which withdraws the line back, draws it again [*retire*], at the very moment when the *trait* is drawn, when it draws away [*se tire*] – that which grants speech? And at the same time forbids separating drawing from the discursive murmur whose trembling transfixed it?” (MDA, 60/56) For Kant there is a ‘clear’ border between the intuitive of knowledge and the discursive; the first is either schematic or symbolic, and it is a fallacy to oppose the symbolic presentation to the intuitive way of representation (*intuitive Vorstellungsart*), for the symbolic is a mode of the intuitive (*Art der intuitiven*) (cf. KU, §59, 351-352/226). With regard to the self-portrait, Derrida remarks that there is nothing internal to the portrait that confirms the identity of the signatory and the subject of the self-portrait, if there is such a thing. The eye is fixed on the image (in the mirror, in reflection), but this is so because the eye observes its “prey” that “necessarily eludes it, making off with the lure. The *traits* of a self-portrait are also those of a fascinated hunter. The staring eye always resembles an eye of the blind, something of the eye of the dead, at that precise moment when mourning begins: it is still open, a pious hand should soon come to close it; it would recall a portrait of the dying.” (MDA, 61/57) Again, the seeing sees itself disappear when drawing attempts to recapture this vision, i.e., it sees nothing and the draftsman sees itself blinded in reflection. To point this out, Derrida refers to the self-portraits of Fantin-Latour, where we see the draftsman although one eye is at times veiled or withdrawn in a shadow as if he not only observed himself and his blindness, but has others observe this blindness (MDA, figs. 21-27). This observation by the self or others brings us back to something that Derrida invoked when presenting his image of Mandela: fascination, attention, respect, for in the observations mentioned these are associated. In observation, attention is associated with respect as an association with “the attention of a gaze or look that also knows how to look after, with the contemplative gathering of a memory that conserves or keeps in reserve” (MDA, 61/60).

To form the hypothesis of the self-portrait that is seen full face, the spectator or interpreter must imagine that the draftsman is fixed on one point, staring at a focal point so that he stares from a place that the spectator occupies. There are two eyes then: one eye is seen by the draftsman (in the mirror) or by us (in the portrait) but that does itself not see, and another eye that sees (namely that of the draftsman as well as of us) but that remains unseen. As said above, and following the law of this impossible, blinding reflexivity, the spectator replaces the mirror staged in the center by occupying the focal point of the self-portrait, that is, by gouging out the eyes of the self-portraitist or making him rub out his own eyes in order to see and represent himself at work. The self-portrait is ruined as from the beginning. As Derrida writes: “The telos of the image is its own perceptibility. When the perfect image ceases to be other than the thing, it respects the thing and restores originary presence. Indefinite cycle: represented source of representation, the origin of the image can in turn represent its representers, replace its substitutes, supply its supplements [*suppléer ses supplements*]. Folded [*pliée*], returning to itself [*revenant à elle-même*], representing itself,
sovereign, presence is then – and barely – only the supplement of the supplement.” (GR, 420-421/298)

§5.4. Sacrifice

With regard to the theme of the sacrifice and sacrificial blindness, Derrida remarks that it seems to refer more to an event than a structure (as the transcendental blindness), and related to this, the sacrifice implies a certain violence (of mistake, of punishment, of conversion, cf. MDA, 96-119/94-117) as we indeed saw with regard to the gouging out of the eyes. Derrida’s question, then, is whether the structure as discussed above precedes the event or the other way around; does pure transcendentality precede the event, as seems to be the case according to Heidegger (cf. FS, 26-28)? The violence inflicted is at the origin of the narrative or revelation that opens one’s eyes and that brings one from the sensible light to that of the intelligible. Because of this, the event of the sacrifice can easily “annul itself in the structure, which is to say, in the circle of exchange” (MDA, 96/94). Or as we read in Donner le temps: “The sacrifice proposes an offering but only in the form of a destruction against which it exchanges, hopes for, or counts on a benefit, namely a surplus-value or at least an amortization, a protection, and a security.” (DT, 174/137) One will read quite a few times in Kant’s practical philosophy that one has to sacrifice sensible incentives out of respect for the law (cf. KPV, 158/266; FS, 80; DQD, 239), and also in his Analysis of the Sublime one notices the necessary violence, but in the latter case the imagination inflicts the violence (again in the name of or at the service of reason) upon itself. However, as might be expected, Derrida critically remarks that “the sublime is not the absolute other of the beautiful. It still provokes a certain pleasure. […] The movement of reappropriation is even more active. […] Sacrifice [Aufopferung] and spoliation [Beraubung], through the experience of a negative Wohlgefallen, thus allows for the acquisition of an extension and a power greater than what is sacrificed to them. […] Economical calculation allows the sublime to be swallowed […], and the work of mourning is consequently not absolutely blocked, impossible, excluded.” (EC, 88-89/22) Indeed, with regard to the sublime, Kant writes that because of its violent deeds, thefts, and sacrifices, the imagination “acquires an enlargement [Erweiterung] and power which is greater than that which it sacrifices, but whose ground is hidden from it, whereas it feels the sacrifice or deprivation [die Aufopferung oder die Beraubung] and at the same time the cause to which it is subjected” (KU, §29 Anm., 269/152).

306 With regard to Mandela, Derrida writes that we have to observe him or look at him through words (such as the words of his testimony), and although these words can become “devices of observation if [si] we are not careful”, we will have to speak of him (and his future) by way of “what does not allow itself to be anticipated, caught, captured by any mirror”. It demands that we install a historical watchtower or observation post (mirador) that at the same time forbids us “to rest assured of the unity, still less of the legitimacy of this optic of reflection, of its singular laws, of the Law, of its place of institution, of presentation or of revelation” (PSII, 89/85).

307 For Kant, the sacrifice always needs to be done in the name of a higher law, or better, for and in the name of the pure law itself, and access to pure duty demands for Kant the sacrifice of all “pathological” interests. For this reason, Derrida can say of this sacrifice that it is dictated – by the unconditionality of the moral law – as the sacrifice of self and as “the violence that is exercised in self-restraint (Selbstzwang) and against one’s own desires, interests, affections, or drives. But one is driven to sacrifice by a sort of practical drive, by a sort of motivation that is also instinctive, but an instinct that is pure and practical, respect for the moral law being its sensible manifestation” (DM, 128/93).

308 Why this violence and what does this have to do with the imagination? The sublime renders, by way of subreption, as it were “intuitable [anschaulich] the superiority of the rational vocation [Bestimmung] of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility [i.e., imagination, JvG]” (KU, §27, 257/141). A “straining of the imagination” will allow it to “use nature as a schema” for the Ideas of reason (KU, §29, 265/148). As Sallis interprets this passage, “the reflection is a schematizing; it consists in taking the difference between nature and the sensible powers of man as a schema for the difference between the sensible and the supersensible within man, letting the excess of nature, its exceeding of man’s sensible powers, reflect the excess of reason, the superiority of the supersensible over the sensible” (J. Sallis, Spacings – Reason and Imagination in
However, what if “there is neither pure transcendentality nor pure sacrifice” (cf. MDA, 96/92)? This must have consequences for the way to conceive the relation between event and structure, between the sacrificial blindness and the transcendental blindness. Let us return to the sacrificial blindness and the violence as Derrida discusses it in relation to self-portraiture. As said, this logic of sacrificial blindness has to do with a violence that inscribes itself within an economical circulation of exchange in which the ‘gift’ of one’s sight is traded off for another sight (an intelligible light, clairvoyance, etc.) To exemplify this first violence Derrida mentions the blind man who becomes the subject of mistake or a subject deceived (by deceiving himself or being deceived by others), so that, first of all, the “fall or the mistake lies in wait for him. The other can take advantage of him: in order to make him fall, or in order to substitute one thing for another, making him thus take something for something else” (MDA, 97/94). But this might always turn blindness into a providential clairvoyance, so that blindness is no longer simply the effect of a sacrifice, as the case of Rebecca’s deception of Isaac exemplifies.

Second, Derrida points out that sacrificial violence is a matter of restitution and restoration, i.e., of retribution or compensation in a punishment: an eye for an eye. To understand this, Derrida returns to the “Freudian axiom” of castration – when translating blindness – as presented, for instance, in the story of Samson (and portrayed in Samson Blinded by the Philistines, attributed to Hoet, cf. MDA, fig. 63). Samson loses “every phallic attribute or substitute, his hair and then his eyes, after Delilah’s ruse had deceived his vigilance” (MDA, 109/104). Although a figure of castration, Samson is presented (in the story, in the portrait) as “a sort of phalloid image” that “stretched towards the invisible and threatening place of his desire in an energetic, determined, but uncontrollable movement, being sheer potential, potentially violent, at once groping and sure, between erection and fall, all the more carnal, even animal, in that sight does not protect him, most notably, from shameless gestures”. The punished Samson gets to pay off a debt. In the gouging out of the eyes as presented in the castration-figure of Samson, one sees the eye itself although, at the same time, the body of the eye (that sees) “disappears in the gaze of the other”, dissimulating

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*the Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 115). What is essential for Kant is that the imagination testifies in its reflectivity to the superiority or greatness of reason, and the imagination has to present this by presenting (to itself) its own inadequacy, i.e., by touching its limit. The sublime serves for Kant to uncover within the subject (if one can still speak of a subject here), within man, the metaphysical field – or metaphysics as such – circumscribed by the distinction between sensible and supersensible. As Kant writes, the feeling of the sublime seems to violate the purposiveness for judgment (zweckwidrig für unsere Urtheilskraft), to be inadequate (unangemessen) for our faculty of presentation (Darstellungsvermögen), and the feeling may even appear to be violent (gewaltthätig) for the imagination (cf. KU, §23, 245/129). Kant even adds that it will have to be like this in order to be all the more sublime. The ‘pleasing-oneself-in’ of the sublime is, therefore, purely negative when one experiences at the same time an alteration of attraction (Anstossen) and repulsion (Abstossen) of the object. The negativity of the ‘pleasing-oneself-in’ has to do with the seriousness demanded in the sublime (in contrast to the playfulness in beauty), and this seriousness is derived from being occupied with the moral law. However, eventually Kant points out that the imagination has to violate itself. As Derrida writes: “It has an essential relation to morality (Sittlichkeit), which presupposes also violence done to the senses. But the violence is here done by the imagination, not by reason. The imagination turns this violence against itself, it mutilates itself, ties itself, binds itself, sacrifices itself, and conceals itself, gashes itself [s’entaille] and robs itself.” (VEP, 148-150/130-131) The violence of the imagination that it imposes on itself is in service of reason, Kant writes, and because of this, the sublime is reappropriated in terms of the classical distinction between sensible and supersensible (cf. KU, §29 Anm., 269/152). For Derrida, the question is why Kant speaks of greatness or largeness when he discusses the sublime: “Why would the absolute excess of dimension, or rather of quantity, be schematized on the side of largeness and not of smallness? Why this valorization of the large which thus still intervenes in a comparison between incomparables?” (VEP, 155-156/136)  

309 With regard to the *lex talionis* (an eye for an eye), cf. MS, 332/473; DQD, 240, 245-246. For Freud, when Oedipus blinds himself he is following the principle of *lex talionis* and this act is, therefore, a extenuated form of the punishment of castration (cf. MDA, 65n-66n/63n).
this gaze for me. What Derrida abstracts from this is that perhaps “the eye of the blind man, the blind man himself, derives its strange familiarity, its disquieting strangeness, from being more naked” (MDA, 109/106). Derrida explains this by way of the experience of staring into the eye of a blind man; it is much easier to stare into the eye of this man, even up to the moment of indecency, while when looking at someone who sees, the gaze of this other dissimates for me the body of the eye.

It follows from this that as a general rule – a most singular rule, appropriate for dissociating the eye from vision – we are all the more blind to the eye of the other the more the other shows themselves capable of sight, the more we can exchange a look or gaze with them. This is the law of the chiasm in the crossing or noncrossing of looks or gazes: fascination by the sight of the other is irreducible to fascination by the eye of the other; indeed, it is incompatible with it. This chiasm does not exclude but, on the contrary, calls for the haunting of one fascination by the other. (MDA, 109-110/106)

However, as a victim of punishment – which also explains Derrida’s interest in Freud here – Samson’s sacrifice is not without some restitution, for he is – providentially – chosen. Hence, in this logic of the sacrifice there is always recompensation, benefit or profit. Ruination will give much more to see than there is sacrificed, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the sacrifice of the eyes has so often been considered a gift of visionary prophecy.

Lastly, there is the conversion for which a man has to pay by becoming or being struck blind, and here he becomes a witness to faith. “In fact, a witness, as such, is always blind. Witnessing substitutes narrative for perception. The witness cannot see, show, and speak at the same time, and the interest of the attestation, like that of the testament, stems from this dissociation. No authentication can show in the present what the most reliable of witnesses sees, or rather, has seen and now keeps in memory.” (MDA, 106/104) How, then, is a testimony possible? Derrida writes: “Without God, no absolute witness [témoignage]. No absolute witness whom we can make a witness in the testimony [témoignage]. But with God, with a present God, with the existence of an absolute third (terstis, testis) every attestation becomes superfluous, insignificant and secondary.” God as the witness is the “‘unnamable-nameable’”, the “absent-present witness of every possible oath and every engagement” (FS, 45; cf. CIR, 56-58/56-57). With regard to the self-portraits, we can say that for Derrida, if the self-portrait depends on being called a ‘self-portrait’, this allows us to call “just about anything a self-portrait, not only any drawing (‘portrait’ or not) but anything that happens to me, anything by which I can be affected or let myself be affected” (MDA, 68/65).

The self-portraitist does not show himself in his work; it does not lead to any knowledge, but, rather, he confesses a fault and asks for forgiveness. The desire for self-presentation is never met, and, because of this, what takes place is the allegory or the memory, and this shows an apocalypse. “As its name indicates, the apocalypse is nothing other than a revelation or a laying bare, an unveiling that renders visible, the truth of truth: light that shows itself, as and by itself. […] Yet a second meaning of apocalypse does not come as a secondary grafting onto the first, for if revelation or contemplation (Hazôn) brings to light what was already there from the beginning, if the apocalypse shows this there, then it also unveils in accordance with the event of a catastrophe or cataclysm.” (MDA, 123/121-122) At the origin of drawing – imagination, memory – one is no longer able to dissociate order and ruin, the transcendental structure and the sacrifice, i.e., the condition of possibility for drawing and the coming of the event (a work). As at once ruin and order, in drawing “these weep for one another. Deploiring and imploring veil a gaze at the moment that they unveil it.” (MDA, 123/122) And here – at the moment of veiling and unveiling – something

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310 Cf. G. Didi-Huberman, *Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde*, 141.
takes place, comes or is made to come as the production of an event. “It is performative, something vision alone would be incapable of if it gave rise only to representational reporting, to perspicacity, to theory or to theater, if it were not already potentially apocalypse, already potent with apocalypse. By blinding oneself to vision, by veiling one’s own sight – through imploring, for example – one does something with one’s eyes, makes something of them. One does something to one’s own eyes.” (MDA, 123/122)

Derrida seeks the origin of drawing where the tears come to well up without reducing it to knowledge or vision. Here, then, Derrida searches for another way to think the conditions of possibility for vision or representation. Instead of reducing the eye to vision, Derrida underscores a blindness in weeping that is perhaps not immediately taken up in the above-mentioned exchanges. As we remember, the only possible mourning for Derrida is the impossible mourning. He writes: “One should not develop a taste for mourning, and yet mourning we must. We must, but we must not like it – mourning, that is, mourning itself, if such a thing exists: not to like or love through one’s own tear but only through the other, and every tear is from the other, the friend, the living, as long as we ourselves are living, reminding us, in holding life, to hold on to it.” (CFU, 141/110) Carrying the other in me after his death means that the world is suspended by a single tear, since it is through this unique tear that everything, i.e., the world itself, is reflected trembling. This trembling, then, reflects the disappearance of the world, of “the whole world, the world itself, for death takes from us not only some particular life within the world, some moment that belongs to us, but, each time, without limit, someone through whom the world, and first of all our own world, will have opened up in a both finite and infinite – mortally infinite – way. That is the blurred and transparent testimony borne by this tear, this small, infinitely small, tear, which the mourning of friends passes through and endures even before death, and always singularly so, always irreplaceably.” (CFU, 137-138/107) The tear welling up in the eye veils sight, causing the world to tremble or quiver, but if it veils this vision, it is perhaps to show something else, that is, to show in mourning another essence of the eye. Derrida suggests that the eyes are perhaps not ordained to see but to weep. The truth (aletheia) or essence of the eye would be that it has to implore or appeal rather than see and look. “The blindness that opens the eye is not the one that darkens vision. The revelatory or apocalyptic blindness, the blindness that reveals the very truth of the eyes, would be the gaze veiled by tears. It neither sees nor does not see: it is indifferent to its blurred vision. It implores: first of all in order to know from where these tears stream down and from whose eyes they come to well up”. As an organic function to see, the eyes can be dissociated and detached, but, Derrida concludes, it is only the whole (of the) eye that weeps (MDA, 128/127). The ultimate destination or truth of the eyes is perhaps not vision but “to have imploration […] , to address prayer, love, joy, or sadness rather than a look or gaze. Even before it illuminates, revelation is the moment of the ‘tears of joy [pleurs de joie].’” (MDA, 125/126)

§6. Jacques’ Last Words

Imagination’s passivity-activity (receptive spontaneity, spontaneous receptivity) as presented in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft recalls nonpresence, but it begins by inscribing within itself – although it all revolves around the question of this ‘within’ – an inadequacy, i.e., “a sort of unpower [impuissance] that is nothing other than a division within self-presence” (T, 60). The imagination is both passive (by rendering sensible images) and active (by helping produce knowledge), and, above all, the imagination recalls non-presence to self as soon as it “inscribes inadequacy into the center” of the self (T, 60). This has indeed been Kant’s aim when he liberated the imagination in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft – as we remember Derrida saying: the “status of the imagination shifts, in and after Kant” – while eventually suppressing, repressing or excluding this ‘same’ power in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.
However, Derrida writes that one “cannot imagine what a law would be in general without something like tact: one must touch without touching” (LT, 81/66). Identification and non-identification. One will have to invent or imagine “something like tact” for there to be the law. As Zammito summarizes, having the “experience of the sublime with an object of intuition in fact demonstrated our capacity to symbolize, i.e., to take an actual object, however inadequate, as an illustration, a metaphor, for a supersensible idea. The sublime is, in that measure, the warrant for the possibility of art. But in just that measure it brings the supersensible subjectivity of our moral sense together with the ostensibly merely sensible experience of beauty, and demonstrates that aesthetic feeling in general is grounded far more deeply than any merely sensible experience.”

Unpower is not pure powerlessness; it produces, it produces the power or counterpower of metaphysics to exclude and suppress: “power-against-power”. Metaphysics uses this unpower to create its “superpower” (T, 60). Metaphysics, then, does not begin by clearly circumscribing its limits (end, telos), but by delimiting or bordering itself in “a labor of antagonistic forces traversing the ‘inside’ (which is thus no longer an ‘inside’)” (T, 60-61). The very identity of metaphysics is (as from the beginning, or as a beginning, but we already know what this means for Derrida) dislocated, destabilized, existing in its ruinous state, i.e., (like a self-portrait) a ruin (cf. T, 61). Here, the possibility of the impossible, or the possibility as impossibility needs to be thought, where the imagination touches its limit.

As we noticed, the conflict between philosophy and Schwärmei never left the stage in Kant’s work, and it is not a mistake to say that the conflict kept haunting him. Although Kant might have looked for a new and definite installment or stabilization of metaphysics, one can still wonder whether he succeeds in doing precisely that. Where Heidegger searched in the imagination the possibility of possibilities – i.e., a horizon of the understanding of Being, of what may be, of possibilities – Derrida stresses that the “sublime imagination” uncovers imagination’s ‘true’ essence. Derrida emphasizes the need to think the possibility of/as impossibility, for the ‘within’ of metaphysics is not so much the clear delimitation of itself, but the “power-against-power, which presupposes ‘within’ itself a difference of force” (T, 63). The experience of impossibility is, then, that of the unpower or im-potence of the imagination (cf. T, 61). A schema has to present itself a priori, but when the philosopher withdraws himself from the petrifying fascination of Medusa, this testifies to the law that prescribes that an a priori schematization of the system is a priori forbidden. The philosopher can only maintain ‘itself’ because of the inadequation of nature and “second (supersensible) nature” (the moral law) (KU, §29 Anm., 275/157). This second nature (morality as the foundation of autonomy) is not a substitute for nature, but, rather, it signifies the inadequation and the impossibility of the self-presentation of the law of reason.

If auto-affection needs to be thought of as auto-hetero-affection, how are we to imagine temporality or “another process of temporalization”, as Derrida writes, unless by making something (else) come? To make something come always comes back to letting it come, that is, to make it come there where it was not. As we have seen, “the modern notion of imagination, notably in its Kantian or post-Kantian provenance, remains deeply tied to the value of production or to the opposition between the productive and the re-productive”, but one has “to imagine not only that which is not, not yet or no longer, but also that which no longer bears any relation to the ‘is’, to the meaning of Being as determined by the grammar of this verb, in particular by its temps (tense)” (T, 50) What would this “phantastic or phantasmatic temporality, fictive temporality, and by that very fact the virtual temporality of the poetic or literary, and so on” be? Is this time the time of a dream (or of imagining), heterogeneous to that of Dasein, or is it still regulated by the time of self-presence? “It is a

certain phantasticity [...] that is misunderstood or reduced every time. And yet the great thinkers of time (Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, for example) were also thinkers of the imagination (as productive and reproductive or of the transcendental fancy [phantastique])" (T, 51). Was there, then, a misunderstanding? To answer these questions, we have returned to or reproduced the place of the imagination – if it has any – and above all the Kantian transcendental imagination (“this place of time”, as Derrida interprets) and the Heideggerian generous ‘repetition’. If there is metaphysics, it would be the attempt to preserve and exclude the third. The imagination is a source, it gives power, and yet, it needs to be erased at a certain point. In this contradictory movement, metaphysics divides itself, and perhaps “metaphysics is only this rapport divided in itself, this partition of itself” (T, 57). Power-against-power.

For Derrida, imagination “not only breaks self-presence but also the originality of the present as the absolute form of temporality”, for it speaks in the “order of time, or rather like time itself” of “the movement by which the presence of the present separates from itself, supplants itself, replaces itself by absencing itself, produces itself in self-substitution” (GR, 436/309). The imagination is not a faculty among (or simply between) others, since it is at work in all powers, and the least we can say is that it is there in order to supplement them, to aid them. “It renders power possible; it is able; it is capable of power. [...] It is not what it is, is not totally present to itself. In itself it is lacking; it fails to find itself. It is able not to be able; it is able (on the basis of its) being unable.” (T, 59) The imagination is affected by a lack that it cannot interiorize, even when this lack causes it to show up or emerge. Metaphysics – or the unity of metaphysics – will only consist of moments of “more or less stable stabilization” when it is, without definite beginning or end, a conflict of powers and counterpowers, of a release and repression of the imagination (T, 64). A certain repression seems inevitable, and, as we have discussed previously, there is, for Derrida, no pure end or death of philosophy or metaphysics. There is only “a new stabilization of the suppression and a new structure of the metaphysical field. [...] Once liberated, hypothetically, from metaphysical ‘repression’, imagination can and should no longer be the same, have the same status [...]. Should not its relation to time – for example, to the present, and to the presence of the present – be altogether other?” (T, 68)

What future is there to come or how to imagine (invent, let come) a future that perhaps arrives while remaining unforeseeable, unpredictable, and which turns tears into tears of joy? The question of the imagination brought Kant as well as Heidegger to the “problem of metaphysics” for reinstalling metaphysics on a ground, this ground laid by the imagination as time. For Heidegger, the question of time as pure auto-affection encloses a field for the meaning of Being, and throughout his work Heidegger maintained the idea that time needs to be thought by way of the present (Anwesenheit). It is in this sense that one can perhaps conclude from Heidegger’s reading of Kant that the imagination is the meaning of Being.313 When responding to this suggestion, Derrida emphasized that “[p]erhaps is doubtless the most important word here” (T, 63). This ‘perhaps’ questions, or will have to affect, the pure auto-affection. It lets this auto-affection be affected by something else than the same or the self. However, what does this mean for the imagination – the transcendental imagination as the pure productivity of schemata that make possible? We already stated briefly that Derrida acted or wrote as if he were an other, and this other affects the pure auto- or self-affection. Here, in this auto-affection, “the same is the same only in being affected by the other [en s’affectant de l’autre], only by becoming the other of the same” (VP, 95/85). Pure auto-affection, then, becomes, ‘in’ Derrida, an auto-hetero-affection, where an irreducible hetero-affection inhabits auto-affection, or pure auto-affection is thought as pure hetero-affection (cf. VEP, 56/47).

What if Derrida merely meant to ask this: what if (et si)...? Perhaps one will say that Derrida had much more to say, but what if the ‘form’ of everything he wanted to say or ask can be summarized in these words: what if...? 314 One notices this throughout Derrida’s work, and it would be impossible to give a full overview of his questioning here. It seems that Derrida displaces or questions the ontological question, i.e., ontology itself, when he formulates it this way. The ontological question (what is...? ti esti...?) is itself questioned: what if...? et si...? For Derrida, the conditions of possibility designate the conditions of impossibility, that is, these first conditions “define or produce the annulment, the annihilation, the destruction” (DT, 24/12). 315 For instance, when repeating his questions concerning Heidegger’s notion of temporality in Apories – in which he discusses the Heideggerian being-toward-death, as we have previously dealt with –, Derrida adds that he recalls them “because I may make a similar, albeit different, gesture today on the subject of death according to Heidegger. The simple question from which I was trying to draw the consequences (and from which one may never finish drawing them) would be this: What if [et si] there was no other concept of time than the one that Heidegger calls ‘vulgar’? What if [Et si] it was the same for death, for a vulgar concept of death? What if [Et si] the exotic aporia therefore remained in a certain way irreducible, calling for an endurance, of shall we rather say an experience other than that consisting in opposing, from both sides of an indivisible line, an other concept, a nonvulgar concept, to the so-called vulgar concept?” (AP, 34-35/14) We will return to these themes in the Epilogue.

What do these words ‘et si’ have to do with temporality itself? What is the law given to/by Derrida for inventing or imagining the future? Then, in a few words, if there is any law for Derrida when it concerns the imagination, this might be it: “[O]ne must imagine the unimaginable [il faut imaginer l’inimaginable]” (GR, 363/256). This is more than Kant said in the sense that the unimaginable (the law) should never be imagined. It is also more or something else than what Heidegger wrote for whom the unimaginable has not been a topic or perhaps only of secondary concern. Then, what is (the) unimaginable? Can one still ask this (ontological) question, for, perhaps, the unimaginable does not let itself be reduced to the horizon of possibilities? Indeed, “[n]egativity [...] comes from without. Presence is surprised by what threatens it.” (GR, 363/256) Later, Derrida writes that what “passes (comes to pass) always and (yet) never properly take place [ce qui (se) passe toujours et (pourtant) n’a proprement jamais lieu]. It is always as if [...].” (GR, 377/267; cf. GR, 143/95; PM, 105) The ‘as if’ not so much tells us what always already has taken place, but, rather, it annuls or denies this at the same time as if it says “if there is any”: it arrives as a quasi-event. It says of the passage that it has “(yet) never properly taken place”, or better, that the passage is not a passage but “a point, a pure, fictive and unstable, ungraspable limit. One crosses it in attaining it. [...] Beginning, it begins to decay [à se degrader].” (GR, 377/267) The beginning is here described as a beginning-to-decay, which we also saw when we discussed the “self-portraits

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314 We should take into account Derrida’s on-going use of the phrase “if there is any”, “s’il y en a”, in which we hear a similar ‘si/If. We already noticed this with regard to the self-portrait, but these words reappear time and again, which he relates to many of the topics: “‘if there is any’ (the pure and unconditional in so many forms: event, invention, gift, forgiving, witnessing, hospitality, and so on – ‘if there is any’)” (LT, 323/288).

315 “For there to be a gift, it is necessary [il faut] that the donnee not give back, amortize, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he never have contracted a debt. [...] It is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not recognize the gift as gift [le don comme don]. If he recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to him as present [S’il reconnaît comme don, si le don lui apparaît comme tel, si le present lui est present comme present], this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent. [...] It is as if [Tout se passé comme si], between the event or the institution of the gift as such and its destruction, the difference were destined to be constantly annulled. At the limit, the gift as gift ought not to appear as gift: either to the donnee or to the donor.” (DT, 26/13-14)
and other ruins”; the passage is already-virtual. The ‘as if’ has been one of the focal points of Derrida’s thinking to which he returned time and again. As Cixious writes in her portrait of Derrida: “There is the key: this as. I am as if I was an other. He is as if, as (if he was) an other. [Voilà la clé: ce comme. Je suis comme si j’étais un autre. Il est comme si, comme (s’il était) un autre.]”

Derrida’s interest in or fascination for Kant’s ‘as if’ touches upon the limits of phenomenology, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, the condition of possibility for the ‘as such’ (instead of the ‘as if’) is of central concern to Heidegger when writing *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Many times Derrida returns to this phenomenological ‘as such’ in order to question it (i.e., to question phenomenology as such): “The presentation of the other as such, that is to say the dissimulation of its ‘as such’, has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it.” (GR, 69/47) “It is the *as such* which precisely, and as such, evades us forever [*se dérobe à jamais*].” (MP, 77/67) Representation is, according to Kant, either schematic or symbolic (‘as if’), and Kant constantly tries to tell us how to distinguish them. A clear line should be drawn for the different faculties to work properly (healthy, sanely) when they have been assigned their proper function. Everything depends on avoiding skepticism and *Schwärmerei*, and, to do this, we need to sail between these two cliffs (*Klippen*) (cf. KRV, B128). A symbolic hypotyposis makes accessible to the senses what is not reliable from an epistemological perspective, which explains Kant’s need to distinguish the two hypotyposes. Both the schema and the symbol present to the senses what is too abstract for the senses themselves although both are not purely conceptual. How is such a decision made when it comes down to this distinction? Is it *a priori* or is it something that is assumed by the critical thinker? The schema, that is, the “Kantian schema” is – like Merleau-Ponty’s “corporeal schema” – both unifying and synthesizing (*aussi unificateur et synthétique*) in which the self is in direct contact with itself; here, the self is (supposedly) pure self-affection (LT, 241/214). A symbol is itself an assumed or “underlying” similarity between the symbol and the symbolized. As a form of representation, however, and more precisely, as an indirect representation, the symbol does not represent anything present, a thing or object of experience (at least *perhaps* not always). The difference between the schema and the symbol perhaps depends on the difference between immediate and mediate, even though both are representations. Can one still hold on to a clear distinction? Here, Derrida’s “if there is any” comes into play insofar as it does not say “there is none [*il n’y en a pas*]”, but “there isn’t anything [*il n’y là rien*] that could make [qui puisse donner lieu] for any proof, knowledge, constative or theoretical determination, judgment – especially not any determining judgment” (LT, 323/288). The reference to the Kantian determinant judgment is clear, and it is from here that Derrida will change the Kantian ‘as if’ (but not only that of Kant) into something else, that is, into a way of thinking that perhaps allows something else to come.

Derrida writes with regard to painting – “writing as painting” – that “the thing fully represented is already no longer properly present. […] One transports the thing within its double (that is to say already within an ideality) for an other, and the perfect representation is always already other than what it doubles and re-presents. Allegory begins there. ‘Direct’ painting is already allegorical and impassioned. […] The duplication of the thing in the painting, and already in the brilliance [*éclat*] of the phenomenon where it is present, guarded and regarded, maintained [*présente, gardée et regardée, maintenue*], however slightly, facing the regard and under the regard [*en regard et sous regard*], opens appearance as the absence of the thing in its self-sameness [*proper*] and its truth. There is never a painting of the thing

317 Cf. USC, 76n/57n: “This ‘as if’ is no longer simply philosophical. It is thus, for all these reasons, not that of *The Philosophy of the As If* (*Die Philosophie des Als ob*) by Vaihinger.”
itself \[la chose même\] and first of all because there is no thing itself.” (GR, 412/292) Putting quotation marks around ‘direct’ in “‘direct’ painting” does not imply that Derrida opts for something called indirect painting or mediacy as such, for this distinction still relies (in Kant) on a specific understanding of time and a metaphysics of presence (cf. GR, 410-411/290); but, as we read, “[i]mmediacy is derived”, and “all begins through the intermediary” as the “mid-point \[milieu\] and the mediation, the middle term between total absence and the absolute plenitude of presence” (GR, 226/157).\(^{318}\) What Derrida wishes to uncover is that an absence both “shapes and undermines the truth of the phenomenon; produces it and of course substitutes it. The original possibility of the image is the supplement; which adds itself without adding anything to fill an emptiness which, within fullness, begs to be replaced.” (GR, 412-413/292) To show this, one will have to be as if one were an other, which is as such impossible for the reasons given, namely, it also undermines the phenomenon.

When writing about the ‘as’ (‘comme’), Derrida mentions the philosophical or ‘ana-onto-logical’ pretension to know the object as such (comme tel) (cf. PM, 311-312). The very possibility of philosophy depends on this ana-onto-logy, but Derrida wants to emphasize the possibility that not everything appears as such, or better, he holds on to the possibility of the impossible, the possibility as impossibility, power as un-power, power-against-power. According to Derrida, it is impossible to predict the coming of an event, for the eventuality of the event is precisely its unexpected and uninvited arrival. Subsequently, Derrida tries to relate the ‘as if’ to an (unconditional independence of the) thinking of the event. The traditional opposition between fact and fiction is, because of this, questioned, and, in contrast to Kant, Derrida emphasizes that the ‘as if’ destabilizes classical dichotomies between fact and fiction, phusis and technê, natural law and moral law, or philosophy and the novel (Roman). He endeavors to understand the arrival of the event, not as the recognition of the event as such (for this would immediately annul the interruption and resistance of this singular event), but in the already-virtuality of the event, i.e., in the quasi-event. Everything happens as if… To know the event as such would imply that nothing happened. And if (Et si) the ‘as if’ declines itself “according to the verbal mode of the conditional, it is also for announcing the unconditional, the eventual or the possible event of the unconditional impossible, the complete other” (USC, 76/55). Derrida wants to give the future a chance, even though it is always uncertain whether an event indeed takes place. Hence, the (quasi-)event is always characterized by a ‘perhaps’, and, as Derrida tells us, “the experience of the impossible […] can only be a radical experience of the perhaps.” (SM, 65/35)

This ‘perhaps’ is interrelated with the ‘if’ of the ‘as if’. Without the uncertainty and the opening of some undetermined possibility marked by a perhaps, there would be no event, nothing would come or arrive, and, as Derrida states, “there is no more just category for the future than that of the ‘perhaps’” (PA, 46/29). “To think perhaps is to think ‘if’ [‘si’], ‘what if?’ [‘et si’]” (USC, 76/54). The question ‘and what if this or that happens?’ leaves open the future, and the ‘as if’ turns into the “‘what if’ of the event [‘et si’ de l’événement]” (EAP, 83). The uncertainty leaves open the possibility for an event to come, that is, for the invention of something altogether different. It should be remarked here that Derrida does not want to maintain a radical difference between inside and outside, rather, the ‘as if’ questions this distinction without annulling the arrival of the event. To give the event a chance means that this distinction between inside and outside has become problematic as long as this distinction is understood as a dialectical opposition. Instead of a pure ana-onto-logical representation, Derrida emphasizes the suspense of this representation when this object as such is understood as a simple thing that is not already doubled and dislocated. As long as ana-onto-logy cannot

\(^{318}\) For Derrida’s interpretation of immediacy and intuition in Kant and Heidegger, cf. LT, 228-229/202: “It is when – and insofar as – thinking is thought as a means that intuition is dominant – and with it, therefore, seeing, and more precisely still, an optical intuitionism of the immediate.”
guarantee the thing as such, it is always as if an event can take place; as Derrida formulates, the “alterity of the other does not appear as such. It appears with the analogy, but the other does not appear as such.” (RE, 80; cf. ED, 182-183/155; VP, 5/7)

Fascinated by the last verse of Celan’s Grosse, Glihende Wölbung (cf. BEL, 46), Derrida paid extra attention to these words: “Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dich tragen.” The world is gone, out of sight, the world has left us, there is no more world, the world has deceased, and when the world is gone, far away, fort, then I will mourn and carry (tragen, porter) you, you in me. Derrida soon inverses the order and “consequence of the if, then [si, alors]: if [si] (there where) it is necessary or obligated towards you, if [si] (there where) I have to, me, carry you, you, well, then [alors], the world tends to disappear, it is no longer there or no longer here, die Welt ist fort” (BEL, 68). There is no world or ground that can serve as mediation as soon as I am obliged to carry you, and when there is an event, this happens to time and not in time (cf. SM, 129/77); time has gone mad, is out of joint. Derrida emphasizes that the carrying (tragen, porter) consists in carrying an “unborn child”, i.e., carrying what is coming, and in mourning (although this mourning has to entail a melancholy in order to respect the singular alterity and resist ‘normal’ or ‘true’ mourning). The one in the other, and the world “remains a virtually excluded third [reste un tiers quasiment exclu]” (BEL, 72), since the world is gone (fort) for the one carrying the other. Carrying carries itself to the infinite inappropriability of the other, i.e., it carries itself in itself beyond itself. The sensible place (lieu, place) of mourning is both “invisible and untouchable” “for what one not only keeps committed in memory, not only in itself [en soi], but in yourself in myself [en toi en moi], when you are greater still [tu es encore plus grande], a heart in me greater than my heart, more alive than I, more singular and more other than what I can anticipate, know, imagine, represent, and remember [me rappeler]” (LT, 325/290).

Cixous understood very well what was at stake for Derrida when she wrote in Insister à Jacques Derrida: “‘Imagination’, what is it? It is as if. As if he [Derrida] had already in advance in reality lost the world. ‘Imagination’, c’est quoi? C’est commesi. Comme si déjà d’avance il avait en réalité perdu le monde.”319 As noted, when it is as if the world is in reality and beforehand lost, this meant for him that he was as if he were (in secret) an other (cf. PM, 397), “as if I were written by someone unknown [par un inconnu]” (VP, 107/96). However, at one moment, he asks us not to mourn, a moment that would turn out to be one of his last, or perhaps he asks us to mourn over mourning. During the funeral of Derrida, his son Pierre read a brief note, and we recognize Derrida’s handwriting when we read the note. Here, it is no longer as if Derrida were an other, but as if an other speaks for Derrida, portrays him and speaks of/for him by calling him by his first name. In this self-portrait, if there is any, he lets the other speak for him.

“Jacques wanted no rituals and no orations. He knows from experience what an ordeal [quelle épreuve] it is for the friend who takes on this task. He asks me [Il me demande] to thank you for coming and to bless you [de vous bénir]. He beseeches you not to be sad, to think only of the many happy moments you gave him the chance to share with him.

Smile for me [Souriez-moi], he says, as I will have smiled for you until the end [comme je vous aurai souri jusqu’à la fin].

Always prefer life and constantly affirm survival…

I love you and am smiling at you from wherever I might be [Je vous aime et vous souris d’où que je sois].” (FW, 244; transl. mod.)

The words are written between quotation marks, but who is citing whom or what? Is it a quote? We listen to a voice of which we are never sure whose it is, who the “me” is that is asked (“He asks me”) to address the gratitude and blessing. When the note or voice cites Jacques’s last words, we are told that we have to smile for/at Jacques as he will have smiled for us. As we read in another portrait of Derrida – Circonfession – he underlined that he did not want to fail in transforming himself through and through, he did not want to fail “by playing at success as a failure in which only losing means salvation”; he wanted a failure that could give him “a divine smile in the face of death [le sourire divin devant la mort], my own and that of loved ones”, and this would help him “to love life even more [à aimer plus encore la vie]” (CIR, 76/77). Invisible but facing us; he haunts us with his words, and (finally) Jacques tells us not to mourn, or else mourn over mourning, and always “prefer life” and “affirm survival” (cf. SM, 13-15/xvii-xix). An end of mourning, a mourning of mourning, when the voice commands us to “prefer life and constantly affirm survival”. From that unknown place it is as if he looks at us in us, although this is perhaps not an experience of the gaze, but, rather, as Derrida wrote a few year earlier, “the painfully ironic discourse of the confession that mimics the appropriation of the unappropriable, you, my Echo, when you ruse, as do I, with the divine interdiction, when you deceive it in order to speak in your own name and to declare untranslatably your love while pretending to repeat the end of my sentences” (LT, 327/291). Here, he tells you – like an echo – that he loves and that he loves you. Love is not without an “(impossible) auto-affection, without the reflected experience of impossible auto-affection, without the ordeal of the possibility of this impossibility”, for, without these, “there would be no love [il n’y aurait pas d’amour]” (LT, 327/291).

How to put an end to mourning, “[m]ourning as [comme] im-possible mourning” when it comes down to the work of the imagination as the work of “pre-originary mourning” (LT, 218/192)? The success of mourning is its failure; the failure of mourning is its success, so that full-mourning (deuil entière) is “half-mourning”. How to be done with mourning, and mourn over mourning (“faire son deuil du deuil”)? “How can one go through the mourning of mourning [deuil du deuil]? But how to do otherwise, when the mourning has to be finished? And the mourning of mourning has to be infinite? Impossible in its very possibility?” (DLH, 101/11-113) Mourn! (as) if that is possible. How to respect the alterity of the other when there is introjection or incorporation, or, else, how to mourn between introjection and incorporation? “What intermediary schemata?” (F, 51) For Abraham and Torok the emphasis is constantly on introjection, which Derrida interprets as auto-affection (F, 55), but there is maybe also a “[b]eyond of these intermediary schemata [au-delà de ces schèmes intermédiaires]” (F, 52). We are no longer able to decide whether it is all the work of the imagination or something else (and unimaginable), especially when we realize that the essence of the imagination is its non-essence. Derrida confesses in an ungraspable way what the ‘as if’ means to him: “(I have often said ‘as if’ on purpose, as if I did not want to say what I say [comme si je ne voulais pas dire ce que je dis], and this would be the entrance of the revelation in literature)” (DM, 199-200). We cannot decide, but we will perhaps not be
surprised when someone says that this was at stake for Derrida, and it is perhaps all he has been telling us when adopting the ‘as if’ or adding ‘if [si] such a thing is possible’. We will never be able to decide upon the true meaning of the doublings or reflections of the asifs in Derrida’s work, even when they appear in the question of ‘et si/what if’. Writing purely philosophical, then, means to write without writing, power-against-power, but the engagement of thought with form and of philosophy with literature implies, as Nancy states, “an ineluctable disengagement of thought, not in relation to ‘form’ that would remain extrinsic to it, but in relation to its own form, to its own presentation.”323 Perhaps this was also what Derrida wanted to say. Et si…? Et si, yes, he did, perhaps… (cf. DT, 17/5)324

[n’a pas lieu], if there is none [s’il n’y en a pas] (es gibt nichts), there is the image [il y a l’image], each time only once [le chaque fois une seule fois] […].” (SCH, 26)
324 Cf. CS, 1985n/193n: “I would say that I am sometimes tempted to make ‘as if’ I had no objections to Kant’s ‘as if’s’.”
Epilogue

The imagination as the third one occurs as the root of what appears to be one or a unity, and transcendence is always already transcendence in/of immanence. Because Heidegger unravels the importance of temporality in his reading of Kant, we return here to the Transcendental Aesthetics. We noted how Derrida transforms Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein into the question of the possibility of the impossible, and we also observed what consequences this has for the imagination. Heidegger proposes that for Kant time has a priority. However, as Derrida writes with regard to Kant: “Time, the form of all sensible phenomena, internal and external, seems to dominate space, the form of external sensible phenomena; but it is a time that one may always represent by a line and the ‘refutation of idealism’ will reverse that order.” (GR, 410/290) Here we will have to analyze more thoroughly the role of the line in Kant’s philosophy, and we have to take Heidegger’s early neglect of spatiality into account.

As will turn out, the imagination is first of all the power of spacing. Kant’s initial question in the Transcendental Aesthetics seems clear: “What are space and time?” (KRV, A23/B37) This way Kant wishes to unravel in a “metaphysical exposition” what is a priori given to the concepts of space and time. Heidegger, however, immediately shifts the ontological question of ‘what’ to the question of ‘who’, leaving aside the question of space: “Who is time?” (GA64, 125/22) Time is Dasein. As is known, for Heidegger, the question of imagination and finitude was discussed in order to formulate an original, authentic, non-vulgar temporality as an opening to the question of the meaning of Being. In the history of ontology, the Being of beings is comprehended as presence (Anwesenheit), and Being is synonymous with permanence in presence (cf. GA3, 240/168; MP, 34n/32n). This entails a privilege of the present that has not been questioned, so that non-presence (past, future) has always been thought in the form of the present (past present, future present).

With regard to Kant, a difference in time never appears without being delimited by instants (Augenblicken), and, analogous to the temporal linear flow, spaces appear only when marked between points (Punktien). Kant will try to avoid an absolute idealism by working on a transcendental idealism. However, as Derrida states, this transcendental idealism as “a thinking of finitude (intuitus derivativus, etc.)” still gives evidence of a (transcendental) “subjectivism” (LT, 60/46). Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetics remains trapped in metaphysics insofar as it still begins with the strict distinction between pure activity and pure passivity. Space is for Kant a pure intuition that is found “a priori in us, that is, before every perception of an object” (KRV, B41). Space remains for Kant in the interiority of the mind (Gemüth) as one of its qualities or properties. This interiority is precisely the problem that Derrida has with Kant, which he expresses when he calls for a “new transcendental aesthetic” that “in spite of its reference to a form of fundamental passivity, ought no longer to call itself a transcendental aesthetic, neither in the Kantian, nor in the Husserlian, sense of those words” (GR, 410/290). Space merely allows us to represent an object “as outside us”, although space is in us as an original representation. Derrida does not want to guide this transcendental space-

326 When it comes down to the question of passivity or receptivity, the “Kantian moment has some privilege here, but even before the intuitus derivativus or pure sensibility has been determined as receptivity, the intuitive or perceptive relation to intelligible sense has always included, in finite being in general, an irreducible receptivity. It is true a fortiori for sensory intuition or perception.” (KH, 61-62/110-111; cf. PSII, 174/171, 175/173)
327 Following Sallis’s reading of the Platonic khôra, we can say that this new aesthetics is perhaps better termed as a ‘chorology’.
time by mathematical idealities as both Kant and Husserl do, but by the possibility of inscription, the trace (grammē, line), i.e., by the possibility of memory, the trace as memory (cf. MPM, 56/38; ED, 299/253). First, then, we will have to analyze the role of the line for Kant (§1). As Derrida remarked, space eventually becomes for Kant even a condition of possibility for time or temporality, and the latter argues for this in his Refutation of Idealism; as we will see, space manifests itself here as the space of “the impossible coexistence” of instants (§2). This brings us to our final question, namely whether the imagination needs to be thought of differently; we will focus then again on the role of the analogy and ‘as if’ in Kant, and relate these notions to the Gegenbildung that Kant developed in his courses from the 1770s (§3).

§1. Imagining Time

Kant wrote in the margin of the chapter on the schematism: “The schema of time a line.” (VN, 27) Is Kant implying that schematization as the time-determination of a category is first of all a spacing? Time has for Kant initially one dimension, because different times (verschiedene Zeiten) are not given at the same time (zugleich), but only one after another (nach einander); different spaces are only at the same time (zugleich). Kant analyzes the characterizations of time and space more extensively in the Analogies of Experience. Time and space are only determined in opposition to each other, and not in their appearing-together. Although time is the formal a priori condition of all phenomena, there is always the possibility of representing or expressing time in space. As Derrida underlines, Kant remarks that when one has detached from space everything “which comes from understanding (substance, force, divisibility)” and “which comes from sensation (impenetrability, durability, colour)”, then there is still something of empirical intuition, namely extension (Ausdehnung) and figure (Gestalt) (LT, 59/45; cf. KRV, A20-21/B35). In contrast to space, time does not have a figure or location (Gestalt oder Lage, etc.), and Kant introduces the analogy with the infinitely progressing line (ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie) to compensate for (ersetzen) this lack (Mangel) (KRV, A33/B49). Apprehension merely grasps an instant (Augenblick) that the imagination subsequently relates to another time or instant that has passed away; it is necessary that one is aware that “what we think is also the same [eben dasselbe sei]” for the reproduction of what we thought one instant ago (einen Augenblick zuvor) to have any meaning. All temporal relations let themselves be expressed (ausdrücken) in outer intuition because of an imagined, temporal one-dimensionality. Hence, one can derive all properties of time from this spatial expression, but not what is necessary for time: succession.

The line (Linie) represents time, or better, “when I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next”, then I “must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts” (KRV, A102; cf. KRV, B137-138; MP, 55-56/49). The line is not time, but it is necessary to draw or trace a line in order to ‘see’ time. This time is the time of the forming of the line, of spacing (cf. KRV, B154-155).Spacing as the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space is here the production of the imagination. As Kant draws out, I cannot represent for myself a line “without drawing it in thought, i.e., successively generating all its parts from one point, and thereby sketching this intuition”, since every appearance forms an extensive magnitude, “as it can only be cognized through successive synthesis [of the imagination, JvG] (from part to part) in apprehension” (KRV, A163/B203). Time is represented as a line because of the successive synthesis of the

328 To come to a better understanding of spacing, “one will have to turn to the (metaphysical and transcendental) exposition of the concept of time […]. And there, following in the footsteps of Heidegger [Derrida refers here to Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, JvG], among others, we would find again the great question of pure auto-affection, pure ‘self-touching’, in the movement of temporalization.” (LT, 61/46)

imagination, and yet one has to add that, for Kant, time is not a line. Although all appearances are intuited as aggregates (Aggregaten), i.e., as a set of previously given parts (Menge vorhergebener Theile), Kant emphasizes that appearances are not things-in-themselves, and that empirical intuition is only possible through pure intuition (space and time). Different times are never at the same time, so that (one) time passes, passes away and disappears, but all this takes place in time. One can say that time has been anticipated by Kant – as well as by Aristotle and Hegel – on the basis of the now (as its element, Bestandtheil, part, Theil). No part of space or time can be given without being delimited by either points or instants that are themselves a space or a time (ein Raum oder eine Zeit). Space then consists of spaces, and time consists of times. Points and instants are the limits (Grenzen, Stellen) for delimitation (Einschränkung), and both presuppose (voraussetzen) the intuitions (i.e., space and time) that they delimit or determine. However, Kant immediately adds that space and time cannot be put together (zusammengesetzt werden) by points or instants, since these limits are not given before space and time (KRV, A169/B211). The original representation of time is therefore given (gegeben) as unlimited (uneingeschränkt); Kant is concerned with the infinitude of time (Unendlichkeit der Zeit), which means for him that every determined measurement of time is only possible because of “one single time grounding it [einer einigen zum Grunde liegende Zeit]” (KRV, A32/B47-48).

As Derrida pointed out, time is for Aristotle perhaps not a being, and the latter suspends a definite answer, that is, Aristotle evades the question by immediately asking for the physis of time; and this evasion takes place when Aristotle contends that the now is not a part of time – the now is a limit (peras, Grenze), accidental to time – and that time is not composed of these parts. The need for making this observation is that, as Derrida writes, metaphysics “may be posited by this omission. In repeating the question of Being in the transcendental horizon of time, Sein und Zeit thus brings to light the omission which permitted metaphysics to believe that it could think time on the basis of a being already silently predetermined in its relation to time.” (MP, 53/47) For Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, time needs to be thought as a pure form of sensibility (as non-sensuous sensuous) because time does not belong to beings and is not part of beings. As Kant writes, “[t]ime is not something that would subsist for itself [was für sich selbst bestünde] or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them” (KRV, A32/B49). Hence, Derrida concludes, a “profound metaphysical fidelity is organized and arranged along with the break that recognizes time as the condition for the possibility of the appearance of beings in (finite) experience, i.e., also along with that in Kant which will be repeated by Heidegger. In principle, therefore, the text of Aristotle could always be submitted to what might be called the ‘generous repetition’, the repetition from which Kant profits, but which is denied Aristotle and Hegel […] At a certain point, then, the destruction of metaphysics remains within metaphysics, only making explicit its principles.” (MP, 54/48) Aristotle prepared the road for Kant’s Copernican revolution, also when in the latter’s work “elements of the transcendental imagination […] seem to escape the domination of the present” (MP, 56/49), and this applies to Heidegger’s repetition of Kant as well. Aristotle, then, already anticipated the possibility of transgressing what Heidegger calls the vulgar notion of time.

Thus Derrida writes, “every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called ‘vulgar’ concept of time and the resources that will be borrowed from the system of metaphysics in order to criticize that concept” (MP, 70/61). Without being able to repeat

330 With regard to space, cf. KRV, A25, B39-40.
331 In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger proposed to reread Aristotle and Hegel in such a way that the latter becomes a “paraphrase” of Aristotle and at the end gives the most radical formulation of the vulgar notion of time (cf. SUZ, 432n/500n). This will have to be done in order to make the distinction between fundamental ontology and
Derrida’s reading of Aristotle and Hegel here, Derrida eventually wonders whether we are “not justified here, Heidegger notwithstanding, in placing Kant in the direct line which, according to Heidegger, leads from Aristotle to Hegel” (MP, 49/44). Time remains for Kant the form of all appearing, and this drew Heidegger’s attention, but as Derrida underscores in a thorough reading of Aristotle and Hegel, the “purely sensory, the formal sensory free from all sensuous matter, without whose discovery no Copernican revolution would have taken place”, “reproduces the ‘paraphrase’ of Aristotle” (MP, 49/44). Aristotle hinted at the originality of Kant insofar as the former already formulated that the now is no part of time and the now is not an unproblematic unity and identity. However, does this not mean that there is perhaps only a vulgar notion of time? For Derrida, who tries to show that the history of metaphysics has indeed developed what Heidegger called a ‘vulgar’ notion of time, adds that there is perhaps no other notion of time. Time begins to dismantle the distinction between receptivity and activity, between being-affected and the affecting of every affection (cf. DT, 14/3). Perhaps one can hold on to this along the lines of a Kantian thinking where there is, what Derrida calls, “an intelligible extension and without body [une étendue intelligible et sans corps]”, i.e., “there where understanding passes [passe] imagination and sensibility” (LT, 28/16). As Kant concludes at the end of the Transcendental Aesthetic, we possess pure a priori intuitions that enable the restraining of concepts in a priori judgments, since that which we do not analytically find in these concepts can correspond with what is intuitable, which, then, can be discovered a priori and be synthesized with the concept of understanding (cf. KRV, B73). However, then, the additional question will be whether one (the imagination) can imagine a touching that would touch upon ‘something’ (a limit or a border) that cannot be touched; but this precisely touches upon the theme of the possibility of the impossible. As noted, this will be of main concern here when it concerns the imagination as the “power of spacing”. As soon as there are only images, and there is no image for the place of spacing (i.e., for khôra), the imagination as “the power of spacing” finds in this place “its ultimate recourse and its ultimate limit, its condition of possibility and of impossibility, its possibility as impossibility, its power as un-power” (T, 71). What if the imagination, then, does no longer let itself be inscribed in the system of oppositions and can no longer be described as both-this-and-that, both-sensible-and-intelligible?

Time is anticipated in the now, the apprehended Augenblick, and, therefore, time is thought in its divisibility. However, time is not reducible to, and is not composed of, these parts. Time is a pure form of sensibility since time does not belong to beings (does not subsist for itself) and is not part of them. That time as pure intuition breaks with the privilege of the present and the now has indeed been Heidegger’s aim in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, for, as he emphasizes, “[s]trictly speaking, in the mere receiving of a ‘present moment’ [Gegenwärtigen] it is not possible to intuit a single now [Jetzt] insofar as it has an essentially continuous extension in its having-just arrived and its coming-at-any-minute [in sein Soeben und Sogleich]” (GA3, 174/122). The now, as an element of time, is only a vulgar understanding of ontology even more clear. The similarity between Aristotle and Hegel is quickly summarized by Heidegger as soon as the latter reprises certain notions used by Aristotle: the essence of time is for Aristotle in the nun, and for Hegel in the now (Jetzt); Aristotle’s nun is understood as oros, and Hegel takes the now as a boundary or limit (Grenze); Aristotle sees the nun as a stigma, and Hegel indeed understands the now as a point. As Derrida writes, “it is well known that he [Heidegger] considered Hegel to have covered over and erased Kant’s audaciousness in many respects” (MP, 49/44).

The same for Hegel when he interprets Kant’s pure intuition as the “non-sensuous sensuous [das unsinnliche sinnliche]” (cf. MP, 49/44; SM, 240/151, 246-247/155; LT, 28/16, 59/45).

It is easy to see similar traits in Aristotle, for instance when he writes that time “either does not exist at all, or exists barely and obscurely […]”. One part of it has been and is no longer [gogone kai ouk esti]; another part will be and is not yet [meliei kai ouapò estin]. Such are the components of time – of infinite time [apeiros] and of time
temporal insofar as it becomes temporal, that is, in passing over to the nothingness or absence of “Soeben” or “Sogleich”. Time overtakes this part of/in time by affecting it with no-thing, and this overtaking is done by the transcendental imagination, for the forming or imagining (Bilden) is in itself related to time (zeitbezogen). Pure imagining, then, is the forming of form from out of itself (sein Gebilde von sich aus bildet). Time is not present, it is a non-being, and this thought is only accessible on the basis of the Being of time, that is, its nothingness can only be thought on the basis of the modes of time (past, future). We recognize this move in Kant’s Analogies of Experience that discuss the three modes of time, corresponding to categories of relation (substance, causality, reciprocity): permanence (first Analogy), succession (second Analogy), and coexistence (Zugleichsein) (third Analogy). The three Analogies present the three basic principles for the determination of the existence of appearances in time, corresponding to the three modes of time: the relation to time as magnitude (the magnitude of existence, i.e., the duration), the relation in time as a successive series or chain (Reihe), and the relation in time as a whole of coexistence (cf. KRV, A215/B262). The Analogies together will have to present the unity of nature in such a way that nature (understood in empirical sense) is the connection (Zusammenhang) of the appearances according to laws; put differently, the Analogies have to show the unity of nature by showing that there are a priori laws that make nature (experience) possible. As Heidegger reminds us, all the principles of judgment are “conditions for the objectivity of the object [Gegenständlichkeit des Gegenstandes]” (GA41, 196/193). Kant understands Being as this objectivity, and, as soon as they are determined as synonymous, time cannot be perceived as a being, as an object of experience. Derrida writes: “As for the meaning of time […] its determination according to presence is as determining as it is determined: it tells us what time is (nonbeing as ‘no longer’ or as ‘not yet’), but can do so only in order to let itself be said, by means of a concept implicit in the relation between Being and time: that time could be only a (in) being, that is, following this present participle, only a present. Consequently, time could be a (in) being only in not being what it is, that is, being-present. Thus, because time, in its being, is thought on the basis of the present, it is also strangely thought as nonbeing (or as an impure, composite being).” (MP, 59/52)

Kant’s first Analogy showed that permanence (as the schema of substance) is a necessary condition for determining appearances in possible experience as things or objects (cf. KRV, A189/B232). Kant discusses in the second Analogy the principle of the succession in time in accordance to the law of causality: every alteration (as the succession of appearances) takes place according to the law of the connection of cause and effect (cf. KRV, B233). He states that alteration presupposes the same subject (dasselbe Subjekt) existing with two contrary determinations while remaining permanent (throughout the changes or alterations). “I perceive that appearances succeed one another”, i.e., “I really connect two

considered in its incessant return [aei lambanomenos]. Now it seems impossible that which allows non-beings in its composition participates in beingness [ousia].” (Quoted in MP, 57-58/51)

In the last two Analogies, Kant will have to elaborate on the relation between time and (temporal and spatial) change (Veränderung, Bewegung). The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time begins, similar to Aristotle, with the relation of time to alteration and motion while maintaining a distinction (cf. MP, 55/49). The relation and distinction between time and alteration (and movement) takes off with the possibility of an analogy: the drawing, tracing or expressing of a line (grammé, Linie). Time does not exist of itself; time is not a being, even though it does not subsist for itself without beings, i.e., it does not pre-exist as a pure form. Else, time “would be something that was actual yet without an actual object [etwas sein, was ohne wirklichen Gegenstand dennoch wirklich wäre]” (KRV, A32/B49). Kant introduces this remark so that he is able to state that alteration (Veränderung) and motion (Bewegung) are only possible through and in the representation of time, and, when Kant underscores the one-dimensionality of time, this is always in order to emphasize that “[o]nly in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely successively [nach einander]” (KRV, B49). As stated, Kant finally returns to the relation between time, alteration and motion, when discussing the last two Analogies of Experience.

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perceptions in time”. This connection (Verknüpfung) is not the work of the senses or intuition, but “the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations [in Ansehung des Zeitverhältnisses]”. The imagination can relate or connect these two states in two different ways: the one can precede the other, or the other way around. Hence, perception leaves the objective relation undetermined, and the concept containing the necessity of the relation can only be the concept of the relation of cause and effect. Experience is only possible because we submit the succession of appearances (i.e., every alteration) to the law of causality, and all appearances are, as objects of experience, only possible conforming to this law (KRV, B233-234). Between two instants, there is time or a time span (eine Zeit), and there is a difference (Unterschied) between two states of alteration. Change does not consist of these moments but is generated as an effect (sondern wird dadurch erzeugt als ihre Wirkung). This means for Kant that there is no creatio ex nihilo, no origination out of nothing (Ursprung aus Nichts), since there is only the alteration as the passage from the non-being of a state to that state (KRV, A206/B252). The imagination is here always successive (jederzeit successiv), and representations always follow one another in the imagination (in ihr), so that the conditions of something taking place are always already given (d.i. notwendiger Weise) in what precedes this event (KRV, A200-201/B246). However, as we have seen, Derrida underscores contrary to Kant the unpredictability of a future to come (avenir), of the event.

The time of the one-after-the-other loses the possibility of coexistence out of sight, for one cannot perceive or think at once (at the same time) a complication of nows such that each now negates the previous one. Time is distinguished from space insofar as the former is a matter of succession and not that of coexistence. An instant cannot coexist with itself, that is, with the same of itself, with another instant. Different times cannot coexist. Coexistence in space is only recognizable when the organizing of the synthesis of apprehension does not depend on the flow of time (cf. KRV, A211/B258). The apprehensive synthesis is in the case of coexistence not concerned with the necessity of the sequence of successively perceived instants but with reciprocity, for reciprocity is not simply causality (cf. KRV, B112). Hence, Kant is forced to analyze the third mode of time: coexistence according to the law (category) of reciprocity or community (cf. KRV, B111). “Things are simultaneous [Zugleich] if in empirical intuition the perception of one can follow the perception of the other reciprocally (which in the temporal sequence of appearances […] cannot happen).” (KRV, B256-257) Things coexist (Zugleich sind Dinge) when the perception of one thing can reciprocally follow another, which is impossible in the temporal succession of appearances. Coexistence means the existence of the manifold at one and the same time, but the synthetic operation of the imagination would only show in apprehension that the perception of one thing is in the subject when the other is not (wenn die andere nicht ist), and, alternately, that the other is when the former is not. There is a concept of understanding necessary to determine the reciprocity as objective, and this is, then, the “condition of the possibility of the things themselves as objects of experience” (KRV, B258).

Hence, Kant seems to distinguish time and space on the basis of a classical rejection.336 Derrida will state on the basis of this rejection that the “now, presence in the act of the present, is constituted as the impossibility of coexisting with an other now, that is, with an other-the-same-as-itself. The now is (in the present indicative) the impossibility of coexisting with itself: with itself, that is, with an other self, an other now, an other same, a double.” (MP, 63/55) The coexistence of nows (instants) is impossible, but, as Derrida writes, this impossibility “is experienced as the possibility of the impossible. This impossibility implies in its essence, in order to be what it is, that the other now, with which a now cannot

336 Derrida points out that Aristotle also formulated this; his “argumentation even then was traditional, and it remained so” (MP, 62/54).
coexist, is also in a certain way the same, and that it coexists with that which cannot coexists with it.” (MP, 63/55) The impossible coexistence is posited as a certain coexistence, where this impossibility appears as a synthesis (which is for Kant that of the imagination), holding together (maintaining, maintenent, as Derrida writes) several nows (maintenants) of which is said that the one comes after the other, i.e., one is past and the other future (Soeben and Sogleich). “The impossible comaintenance of several present nows [maintenants] is possible as the maintenance of several present nows [maintenants]. Time is the name for this impossible possibility.” (MP, 63/55) For Kant, the forming of a line – where the nows are represented as if they coexist as points – always presupposes the synthetic work of the imagination, so that, one might say, there is no drawing of the line without temporalization that holds together or synthesizes two instants as if they were two points. No time is contemporary with itself (cf. SM, 182/111).

§2. The Reversal of Space and Time

This is not where Kant ends his critical investigations. Time is not change or alteration; time is unlimited, and no delimitation given of time is time itself. As Derrida noted, Kant’s Refutation of Idealism reverses the order of space and time. Kant will try to show that “the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me” (KRV, B275). Heidegger ridiculed this Refutation when Kant calls the lack of a proof beyond doubt of the existence of things outside us a “scandal of philosophy and of universal human reason” (KRV, BXXXIXn). However, for Heidegger, the scandal is that these proofs are still expected (cf. SUZ, 205/249). Heidegger’s whole point in ridiculing Kant’s undertaking is based on his reading of the transcendental apperception as a res, which he will try to avoid or dismantle by writing in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that time and ‘I think’ are identical. In the name of transcendence. At the expense of space or spacing. Heidegger does not mention that Kant reverses the order of time and space, which allows the former to hold on to a primacy of temporality. Space as the outer sense is a property of our mind (Eigenschaft unsres Gemüths); it gives us the possibility to represent an object “as outside us [als ausser uns]” (KRV, A22/B37). Time on the other hand is the inner sense through which (vermittelst) the mind (Gemüth) intuits itself or its inner state (Zustand), and even though time does not give an intuition of the soul as an object, it does give a determined form (bestimmte Form), so that everything that belongs to the inner can be represented in temporal relations.

Although Kant seems to hold on to the Cartesian undubitability of the ‘I am’, he immediately sets out to explain that this entails a distinction between two forms of self-consciousness, namely apperception and inner sense. However, as said, this implies for Kant a reversal of space and time, for the Refutation wishes to show that our “inner experience, 337 Cf. R. Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, 33: “For one cannot think at one and the same time the coimplication of nows, such that each now both supersedes the previous one (for time to pass) at the same time as retaining the past now and future now (for time to be recognized as the passage of time). If Derrida in this essay suggests that the concept of the ‘trace’ presents the way to think this coimplication, then the trace does not amount to the ‘concept’ of a ‘thought’. For the coimplication is nothing but the impossibility of the coexistence of nows.”

338 Kant leaves aside the discussion with the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley for whom the things in space are merely imaginary (blosse Einbildungen) (KRV, B274), because he has already dealt with “good Berkeley” in the Transcendental Aesthetic (KRV, B71). However, as we shall see, the attempt to diminish the role of the imagination is crucial for the Refutation.

339 Heidegger already implicitly announced this possibility when he ridiculed Kant’s Refutation. Heidegger concludes that the ‘consciousness of reality’ is a mode of being-in-the-world, i.e., of transcendence, so that the question of reality brings him back to this existential phenomenon. Because of this, the existential analysis of Dasein that begins with the ‘cogito sum’ will have to reverse the formula: the first statement is ‘sum’, ‘I am’, in the sense of transcendence and being-in-the-world (cf. SUZ, 211/254).
undoubtedly by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience [nur unter Voraussetzung äussere Erfahrung möglich sei]” (KRV, B275). Incorporating the theoretical suspense of the existence of God, i.e., to think finitude, implied for Kant the need to additionally prove a reversal of time and space. Kant concludes that the consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination, and now he adds that this means that consciousness is also necessarily connected with the existence of things ‘outside me’ “as the condition of time-determination”. Kant explains this by saying that the consciousness of my existence – being conscious that I am – is at the same time (zugleich) “an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me [des Daseins anderer Dinge ausser mir]” (KRV, B276). Hence, for Kant it became essential to prove the possibility of experiencing outer things without reducing them to the imagination (Einhaltung).

In a footnote, Kant suggests that one can perhaps argue that there is a “merely outer imagination [bloss äussere Einbildung]” and no pure outer sense (space), but this is immediately refuted on the basis of the spontaneity of the imagination. There is no space for this imagination when there is not first the receptivity of space. Kant argues that one can only imagine something as outer (etwas als äusserlich einzubilden) when there is the form of outer intuition, which means for Kant that the “receptivity of an outer intuition” needs to be distinguished from “the spontaneity that characterizes every imagining [die jede Einbildung characterisirt]” (KRV, B276n-277n). Here we see that the argument of the Refutation still presupposes an opposition between receptivity and spontaneity, and although Kant attributes spontaneity to every imagination (Einhaltung), we remember Heidegger’s interest in showing that pure spontaneity always already presupposes a pure receptivity, and vice versa. He found the mediating function between receptivity and spontaneity in the transcendental imagination, since this function cannot be appropriated as either spontaneous or receptive. As Derrida repeats, the movement of the transcendental imagination is “the movement of temporization” that consists in “the contradictory predicates of the receptive spontaneity and of the spontaneous receptivity” (MP, 91/79). Indeed, Kant maintained in the Transcendental Aesthetic that the a priori character of space can be gained by moving from things spatially differentiated to the representation of space. This is why the drawing of the line became crucial to Kant’s argument, for not only a representation is given here, but first of all the representing (spacing) of a representation itself.340

How do we distinguish the representation of something (as) outside me from “a thing outside me”? Kant does not give an answer; this is not even his problem. Kant moved in the Aesthetics from the space of different places – the representation of things as spatially separated from one and another – to the space in us as a representation, and Kant wishes to go back to that place in space in the Refutation that is different from the place in which I find myself.341 The existence of outer objects is demanded by the possibility of a determined

340 Cf. J. Sallis, Spacings – of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 15: “In other words, the entire demonstration hinges ultimately on a certain reflective presence to one’s own representational powers, a reflective presence to which it could become manifest that certain representational activities are grounded on others, that, specifically, the representation of things as spatially distinct is grounded on the representation of space as such. In the end, the demonstration of the order of grounding is itself grounded on the subject’s presence to itself.”

341 Space is for Kant primarily “in us”; the curious aspect of the Refutation of Idealism is that it seems to appeal to another space when trying to prove the space of the other (than us). As noted, Kant tries to prove the “existence of objects in space outside us [das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum ausser mir]” (KRV, B275). What or where is this space? Kant began the metaphysical exposition of space with this place: space is not an empirical concept, for, Kant argued, “the representation of space must be presupposed [dazu muss die Vorstellung des Raumes schon zum Grunde liegen]” “in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me [auf etwas außer mir bezogen werden]” (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which

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consciousness of ourselves, but, as Kant points out at the end of the Refutation, this does not mean that every intuitive representation of an outer object at the same time entails its existence, for the latter can be the work (blosse Wirkung) of the imagination in dreams or in madness (in Träumen sowohl als im Wahnsinn). This representation might merely be a reproduction, but reproduction in itself is only possible through the actuality of outer objects. Keats’s question – “Surely I dreamt to-day, or did I see / The winged Psyche with awaken’d eyes?” – does not have to be answered by Kant (just as Keats himself postpones a final answer), for the Refutation of Idealism had to prove “that inner experience in general is possible only through outer experience in general” (KRV, B278-279). Kant’s Refutation wishes to show that, as Sallis writes, “consciousness of oneself, and hence of ideas in the mind, is not more certain than, nor even possible without, consciousness of things existing outside us, of the things that would be represented in ideas. Through this demonstration Kant thus shows that the identity that Berkeley posits between ideas and things, or rather, the assimilation of things to ideas, must be undone in such a way that ideas or images are reconfigured as opening onto things as such, as presenting sensible things to the mind, as the means by which the sensible becomes present to sense.” Unsurprisingly, then, Kant will have to continue his investigation on the limits of pure reason with his Dialectics, for the question of how one sails between the cliffs of scepticism and Schwärmerei cannot be answered on the level of the fundamental principles of judgment. Kant presents only at the end of the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment the distinction between the phaenomena and noumena. Swedenborg will have to be confronted on another level, for here we are only gathered on an “island”, “the land of pure understanding”, i.e., “the land of truth”, and a stormy ocean (as the seat of illusion) surrounds this land (KRV, A235/B294).

Space as a condition of possibility for time brings us to the coimplication of time and space. What the Refutation expresses is perhaps that space and time cannot be naively distinguished. Rather, it says the appearing-together of space and time as the condition of possibility for all appearing of Being. We should realize that, for Kant, time and space are inseparably joined in or by experience: “This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically [identisch verbunden] with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins [unzertrennlich verknüpft] the outer with the inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me.” (KRV, BXLn) Time is the possibility of an impossible coexistence, and, as Derrida states, space as the “possible coexistence” is the “space of the impossible coexistence. In effect, simultaneity can appear as such, can be simultaneity, that is, a relating of two points, only in a synthesis, a complicity: temporally.” Put differently: no spacing without temporalization, and (taking into account that time can be expressed in the drawing of a line) no point can be with another point without this temporalization. Knowing that Kant (as well as Aristotle and Hegel) has recourse to a

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342 Heidegger implicitly alluded in his Die Frage nach dem Ding to Kant’s Refutation when he points out that the concept of reality as operative in Kant’s work is only a condition of possibility for the givenness (Gegebenheit) of something actual (Wirklich), and not for the actuality of something actual (Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen) (cf. GA41, 241-242/239). Besides a brief reference to “the misunderstanding of the concept of reality”, he leaves aside a discussion on the reversal of time and space. But does this not mean that pure auto-affection is affected by something outside itself, something heterogeneous to it, i.e., that one needs to take into account a hetero-affection inhabiting auto-affection? Is this what Kant tried to prove? Kant declares that “my existence” in time in which all changes take place demands something permanent and that every determination of time presupposes something persistent in perception; the perception of this permanent or persisting thing “is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me” (KRV, B275).

supplement of the time that lacks figure and location, there “is a with of time that makes possible the with of space, but which could not be produced as with without the possibility of space” (MP, 63-63/55). Is this not what Kant tried to show in his Systematic Representation of All Synthetic Judgments (the Axioms, Anticipations, Analogies and Postulates)? However, as Derrida confesses, this only seems to imply that one holds on to a distinction between time and space, while it cannot be a question of relating space and time anymore when they merely determine each other by what they are not.

Contrary to Heidegger, perhaps we need to think temporalization differently; perhaps time is not identical to the transcendent time. Kant has recourse to a supplement by representing time as a line, and, as Rogozinski argues, this

supplementary figuration already presupposes the violence of the imagination: for one must do violence to time to keep it present, to represent the nonrepresentable ‘instance’ of originary temporality by means of an external intuition. It is only at the cost of this violence that the synthesis of the imagination can constitute ‘fundamental representations’ of time, notably this spatial representation, time would remain a formless form, a pure nothing […], and no phenomenon would be able to find its place in time. The violence inflicted on time belongs to the very movement of temporalization: it forms a spatialized and homogeneous time, the de-temporalized time of phenomena, which can be schematized by the imagination in order to found objective knowledge.  

The imagination engenders continuity and a linear time by setting the limits in/for sensibility of what is possible (for experience). “The schematism of the categories thus operates a restriction, a contraction, which narrows the horizon of the possible.” Hence, what the schemata do not allow us to conceive is the possibility of the interruption of the temporal sequence, and Kant will reaffirm this in the Dialectics where the causality of freedom can be thought but not be allowed in the process of schematization. Then, we might ask, what if the critical work presupposes, as Derrida suggests, a “precritical time”? Derrida states that the Kantian “analogy leads back to this precritical time, anterior to all the disassociations, oppositions, and delimitations of critical discourse, ‘older’ even than the time of the transcendental aesthetic” (EC, 69/10). It calls for the anachrony of time in which, as we will see, the event is thought differently than in Kant’s critical work. “We are dreaming, in French, of inventing […] an autre temps. […] The moment it is a matter of imagining time, imagining may perhaps mean something altogether different from what we generally believe it to mean. Unless imagining, in whatever sense, is always a matter of time.” (T, 49-50)

Instead of maintaining a clear opposition between inner and outer that is synthesized by the imagination, Derrida will emphasize “the paradox of the imagination” which implies for him the thinking (imagining) of the “imaginable [inimaginable]”. Derrida writes that, as a “[f]unction of representation, imagination is also the temporalizing function, the excess of the present and the economy of what exceeds presence. There is no unique and full presence (but is there presence then?) except in the imagination’s sleep.” (GR, 438/311) For it to be repeated within another presence, presence has to open within itself the structure of representation. In Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, this meant that time as the formal condition of phenomena is the condition of receptivity within the horizon that the imagination (auto-affectively) forms, but, as Garrido states, this is only possible “at the price of a suppression of sensibility as receptivity”; in that case, time and space are nothing else than schemata. Receptivity is, then, a possibility given for sensibilization, i.e., for something

346 Ibid.
347 J.-M. Garrido, La Formation des formes, 60.
sensible to be given, and following Heidegger we will have to conclude that the ground-laying decides that sensibility is founded on the synthesis of imagination. However, what if there is the unimaginable that commands us not to imagine (it), not to touch (it), although “not without tact [non sans tact], from a respectful distance” (LT, 157/135)\(^\text{348}\)

Derrida asked: “What happens if time is mad [i.e., out of joint, JvG]? And what if what time gives us is first of all the measureless of all madness?” (TOJ, 15; cf. SM, 42/18) A mad time resonates with an essential pathology of mourning, and mourning becomes the ‘origin’ of time, that is, there is perhaps no other time than that of mourning (cf. TOJ, 23). “One must indeed know when: at what instant mourning began. One must indeed know at what moment death took place, really took place […]. Now, when and if one does not know when an event took place, one must wonder if it indeed took place.” (TOJ, 20-21) Everything depends perhaps on another analogy (‘as if’) that takes us back to a precritical time. As Derrida writes: “It all seems to happen [se passer] as if – and the as if is important to us here – […].” (KH, 68/112) What happens here is the passage as a quasi-event. It might mean that – to use Derrida’s appropriation of the “Kantian language” – there will have to be “intermediate schemas”, although “in an approximate and analogical way, since in a strict sense they [the schemata, JvG] are in fact excluded in every case, and this exclusion needs to be thought about [et il faut méditer cette exclusion]” (DLH, 131/147; cf. AEL, 162/91; TS, 22). We have already noted that this exclusion can become a power, a superpower, a counterpower, power-against-power. As Derrida writes, it is “as if the stranger or foreigner held the keys”, “as if (and an as if always sets down [faut] the law here) the stranger […] could save the master and liberate the power of the host”. It is “as if the master, qua master, were prisoner of his place and his power, of his ipseity, of his subjectivity” (DLH, 109-111/123). Derrida argues that the host will (virtually) have to come inside, will have to enter because of (or like) the guest or stranger coming from the outside: “The master thus enters from the inside as if he [the master, JvG] came from the outside.” (DLH, 111/125) This impossibility only takes place instantaneously; and this instant is the occurrence or happening, i.e., the event of the ‘at the same time’ of entering and being inside, that takes a “duration without duration, this lapse, this seizure, this instant of the instant that is cancelled out [qui s’annule]” (DLH, 113/127). It will be a matter of thinking of this time as if in time or in the interval of time there is no time anymore; there is no time in the interval or Augenblick that distances or spaces time (cf. HC, 57-58).

§3. Gegenbildung

As we have seen, Kant thinks the moral law analogous to the natural law, that is, analogous to the synthesis in theoretical knowledge, and here the ‘as if’ turned out to be essential for the practical use of reason. He tries to formulate the possibility of a practical synthesis analogous to the transcendental deduction of the categories without solely relying on the release and success of the transcendental imagination. One should not mistake a symbol for a schema, for an analogy expresses the identity of a relation between two heterogeneous determinations, and this transference remains legitimate as long as it respects the interspace between the two domains and as long as the analogy presents itself openly as an analogy, i.e., as a mere formal identity of relations instead of a real identity of objects. The analogy between the laws in the theoretical and practical domain demands objective, universal principles of which the source or origin is found in the subject. The objectivity has to do with the necessary relation

\(^{348}\) Cf. E. Escoubas, ‘The Simplicity of the Sublime’, 66: “The imagination is thus, strangely, the faculty of the production of the unimaginable; it is this unimaginable instance, as an effect of imagination, that the sublime designates. The unimaginable, or the sublime, is the effect of a game of ‘whoever loses wins’ played by the imagination; this game is ruled by the ‘fundamental measure’ (Grundmass), which Kant determines as the unit of measurement and as the maximum: it is the opening of Being-together.”
expressed in the law, and the universality means that the law goes for all cases (for either the cases of appearance, or the will of every reasonable being); finally, autonomy implies that the laws of nature and the moral law find their source in the subject.350

As noted in Chapter 3, Kant introduces the notion of a Gegenbild in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. It is one of the rare occurrences of this notion in Kant’s published work, and as soon as Kant wishes to show that pure reason can be practical, he poses the reality of autonomy as a fact of pure reason. The fact states that the law is given. This fact (Factum) is inseparably (unzertrennlich) connected with the consciousness of the freedom of the will, if not identical (einerlei) to it. In the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure Practical Reason of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, this is the starting point, and as if the failure of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten has been forgotten, Kant points out that it has been sufficiently proven that freedom situates us into an intelligible order of things (in eine intelligible Ordnung der Dingen) (KPV, 42/174). In contrast to pure speculative reason (as examined in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft) for which the principles are based on pure intuition (as is given first for a priori knowledge), the moral law does not give us any prospect, outlook or perspective (Aussicht). Nevertheless, it does offer us an inexplicable fact (unerklärliches Factum), i.e., a fact that gives us notification of an intelligible world (Verstandeswelt), allowing us to determine the law positively in the sense that we know something of it. “This law is to furnish the sensible world, as a sensible nature (in what concerns rational beings), with the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a supersensible nature, though without infringing upon the mechanism of the former.” (KPV, 43/174) We saw that the law of autonomy, i.e., the moral law, is the law of the supersensible nature (ubildliche, natura archetypa), and this law has to exist (soll existiren) in the sensible world (nachbildete, natura ectypa) as a counter-image or counterpart (Gegenbild) “as if a natural order must at the same time arise from our will [als ob durch unseren Wille zugleich eine Naturordnung entspringen müsste]” (KPV, 44/175).

How are we to determine the law or respect the impossibility of (directly) determining it? How to imagine the unimaginable? What remains of archetypical nature is its form, the form of the law or the law as pure form. The law only gives itself as form or, as Rogozinski concludes, the “form is the gift of the law”.350 How to think or imagine this “schema of a law itself (if this word is still appropriate [schicklich] here)” as the determination of the will (Willensbestimmung) through the law and not as “the schema of a case in accordance with laws” (KPV, 68/195)? Kant opts that only understanding (and not imagination) can be the mediating faculty of cognition (vermittelnde Erkenntnisvermögen) for the employment (Anwendung) upon objects of nature, and, because of this, the schematism is excluded from this process, and this exclusion or lack is substituted by the type (Typik).351 All sensible

349 J. Rogozinski, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’éénigme de l’éthique, 64-65. The practical synthesis has to take place analogously with the functioning of the transcendental imagination, and Kant will try to offer us the key (Schlüssel) to the practical application of the concept of law and freedom analogous to the transcendental deduction. One of the demands for the analogy is that it entails a transcendence in immanence, but the type (Typik) seems to lose on both ‘sides’. It does not serve as a mediating third and, because of this, it does not suffice to think the law in terms of immanence, so that there is always the danger of the Verstimmung of the voice of reason; it fails on the ‘side’ of transcendence insofar as the content of the symbol under discussion (that of the law) is fixed by the logical determination of the law of nature, that is, the principle of non-contradiction (cf. J. Rogozinski, Le don de la loi. Kant et l’éénigme de l’éthique, 161; J. Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, 54).


351 Because the deduction of the synthesis of the moral law and the will lacks a third term – analogous to the third term found for theoretical reason – Kant is only able to have recourse to the type of practical judgment on the basis of which one will have to ask oneself whether a certain action were to take place by a law of nature of which one is a part (Teil), and this has to be done in such a way that this does not damage or even destroy (ohne Abbruch) the sensible world. This type will have to guard us against (bewahren vor) a mysticism of practical
powers are dispossessed of the ability to give the law. However, in the mid-1770s, Kant examined more extensively the forming force (bildende Kraft). Heidegger refers to these passages from Kant’s lectures (Vorlesungen über Metaphysik) when dealing with the temporal dimension of the ontological synthesis. Here Kant indeed discusses the forming force in general as a genus, and Heidegger subsequently singles out the distinction between Abbildung, Nachbildung and Vorbildung. Although Kant remarks here that the present is given in/by the sense, he points out that an Abbildungsvermögen belongs to the appearance of the sense, since an observer (Beobachter) sees more than others: “One has to learn to see [Man muss sehen lernen]”. However, for Kant, this does not seem to imply that sense is reducible to the power of copying (Abbildungsvermögen), as every copying entails “as it were a basis [gleichsam eine Grundlage]” in which this copying takes place, namely time and space (RA, 130). Although Heidegger never mentions it, Kant immediately adds to the list of imaginings that there is another distinction (noch einen andern Unterschied) or other functions of the forming force. Kant opposes the representations that are connected by (durch) or in (in) time according to the form – the present given in the sense (Sinn), the past (Nachbildung) and the future (Vorbildung) – to the representations handed over by the free acts of the mind (durch freye Handlung des Gemüths): comparison (Vergleichung, comparatrix), designation (Gegenbild, signatrix) and fiction (Erdichtung, fictrix) (RA, 128-129). The other forming or imagining powers are the Vermögen der Einbildung (or Phantasie), Vermögen der Gegenbildung, and Vermögen der Ausbildung (as the power to imaginatively complete something). The Gegenbildung is (similar to Baumgarten’s facultas characteristica) the power of characteristics (Vermögen der Charakteristik) (VM, 238/56).352 A Gegenbildung is always already imagination, but then what is a Gegenbild? A Gegenbild is a “symbolum” (RA, 123; VM, 238/56), “designation [Bezeichnung, signatrix]” (RA, 129).353 Heidegger never mentioned the Gegenbildung when he explores the threefold synthesis of imagination. The schematism concerns cognition and synthesis, but, as we read in the Vorlesungen über Metaphysik, a “characteristic” is a counter-image of something else (Gegenbild des andern), introduced as a means for bringing forth (hervor zu bringen) the image of this other thing. A counter-image belongs to sensibility as to its form, but it is not the result of the influence of objects. On the contrary, the counter-images come from ourselves (aus uns selbst kommen) (VM, 237/55). In order to present a Gegenbild, everything takes place here “per analogiam, that is, through an agreement of the relationships [durch die Uebereinstimmung des Verhältnisses]”. Knowledge of understanding is symbolic when it is indirectly intellectual (indirecte intellectual) and brought forth by an analogy with sensible knowledge (although still known or cognized by understanding). Kant emphasizes in these lectures that the Symbolum is merely a means to move or promote (befördern) the intellect, and, because of this, with time (mit der Zeit) it will have to be omitted (VM, 238/56). We might add that the question of Being would not take place without the disruption, interruption, i.e., the disjoining of time. Derrida writes with regard to Hamlet’s phrase “The time is out of joint’ that it “says at least and first of all this, by folding the proposition back on itself in advance: that time itself, the present indicative of the verb to be in the third person singular,

352 Cf. R. Makkree, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, Ch. 1.

353 We have already dealt with this theme in Chapter 1 when discussing Kant’s symbolism, so it is no surprise to see that a similar example is being used in the Vorlesungen über Metaphysik and the Kritik der Urteilskraft to exemplify the symbol: the republic or monarchy that can symbolically be represented as a human or animated body (VM, 238/56; KU, §59, 352/226). Added to this, we need to point that these forces or powers are not unrelated to time; what Kant seems to say is that time is not used to distinguish these different bildende Kräfte.
the ‘is’ that says what time is, this tense of time is out of joint, itself and by itself out of joint” (TOJ, 29).

What does the form of the law as the gift of the law have to do with this forming force or imagination? How do we imagine or schematize through de-figuration? For Heidegger, every production presupposes a model (eidos, Vor-bild) as the look of an object that is to be produced, and, as both Heidegger and Rogozinski emphasize, Kant remains trapped in this paradigm or “horizon of the poiesis” when causality from freedom is still thought in terms of the faculty of the creation of objects (cf. GA31, 28-29/20-21). How to dissociate the eidetic Vorbildung from the Gegenbildung? Will the Gegenbildung, then, give us the possibility of imagining the unimaginable without immediately falling back into an eidetic formation? Heidegger’s question of the meaning of Being has been, as Derrida declares, “limited by the imposition of the form which, in its most overt value and since the origin of philosophy, seems to have assigned to Being, along with the authority of the is, the closure of present, of form-of-presence, presence-in-form, form-presentation” (MP, 206/172). Here, Derrida adds a footnote in which he refers to Plotinus: “In a sense – or a non-sense – that metaphysics would have excluded from its field, while nevertheless remaining in secret and incessant relation with this sense, form in itself already would be the trace (ikhnos) of a certain nonpresence, the vestige of the un-formed, which announces-recalls its other, as did Plotinus, perhaps for all of metaphysics. The trace would not be the mixture, the transition between form and the amorphous, presence and absence, etc., but that which, by eluding this opposition, makes it possible in the irreducibility of its excess.” (MP, 206n/172n) Although Derrida translates ikhnos here in terms of trace, in another context he uses the German Gebild from which he subsequently concludes that the form or image is the bearer of a secret. How then does the form of the law give itself to the sensible world when the form of this latter world is pure intuition, i.e., the form of intuition (ens imaginarium)? It will be a matter of thinking or imagining within the immanence of pure auto-affection a hetero-affection that cannot be reduced to the immanence, but that has to be ‘imagined’ as a transcendence in immanence. As Nancy writes: “The voice of the law is not present to itself: it is inscribed as a receiving [un recevoir].” It is essential for the receptivity of/in this auto-hetero-affection that it is a receptivity for the law that cannot be schematized.

Just before speaking of reason itself in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant remarks that the transcendent and transcendence are not one and the same (nicht einerlei) (cf. KRV, A296/B352). A principle is called transcendent when it exceeds and even orders (gebietet) the exceeding of the limits (Schranken) of experience. Immanent principles are those of the empirical use. As soon as Kant speaks of reason in general (von den Vernunft überhaupt), he emphasizes that there is an ancient wish (ein alter Wunsch) that, although nobody knows how long it will take (wer weiss wie spät), perhaps (vielleicht) one day will be fulfilled, and “that in place of the endless manifold of civil laws, their principles may [möge] be sought out; for in this alone can consist the secret [Geheimniss], as one says, of simplifying legislation [Gesetzgebung]. But here the laws are only limitations of our freedom to conditions under which it agrees thoroughly with itself; hence they apply to something that is wholly our own work, and of which we can be the cause through that concept. But that objects in themselves [Gegenstände an sich selbst], as well as the nature of things, should stand under principles and be determined according to mere concepts [nach blossom Begriffen bestimmt werden soll].

355 Derrida often quoted Plotinus: “Form is a trace of the formless […]” (quoted in TS, vii, 3; cf. MP, 77n/66n, 187/157, 206n/172n). Derrida and Ferraris interpret this as saying that every Gebild (image, form, trace, picture) is the “bearer of the secret”, so we might say that the imagination becomes here a forming or tracing of the formless.
356 J.-L. Nancy, L’impératif catégorique, 137.
is something that, if not impossible \([\text{nicht etwas Unmögliches}]\), is at least very paradoxical \([\text{Widersinnliches}]\) in what it demands.” (KRV, A301-302/B358) Subsequently, Kant emphasizes that reason is not first and foremost \((\text{zunächst})\) oriented toward experience, but towards understanding, which again underscores the role later ascribed to the analogy. The old wish from an immemorial time is inherited by Kant and the critical work, and perhaps one day, but who knows when, we will find the self-subsisting principles of the limitations of our freedom, that is, of the limitations in general. However, Kant only seems to find a passage in the sublime, where the imagination touches upon its own limits when it is unable to present an image, a form or figure. The imagination can still present insofar as it can present the impossibility of imagining. As soon as this sublime imagination has uncovered the possibility of the impossible, that is, the possibility as its own impossibility, there is room (and time) to say “perhaps”: perhaps one day the old wish will be fulfilled. This ‘perhaps’ presents a foresight as to the possibility of something that might appear to go against the senses, to be “\([\text{Widersinnisches}]\)”, that is, to be an impossible representation for the senses, but still, for reason \((\text{Vernunft überhaupt})\), it has to be considered possible as impossibility.

The schematization is a sensibilation because of which images are possible, but there is no sensible image of the pure image, and, because of this, the imagination oscillates between two types of oscillation (cf. KH, 19/91). The schematism, as a sensible figuration or sensibilization, and placed between understanding and sensibility, is limited to sensibility, but this does not preclude that it borders on \((\text{toucher à})\) understanding (cf. LT, 56-57/42). The schema is \(\text{at the same time}\) inside and outside, intelligible and sensible, the same and the other, but as an in-between it is neither the one nor the other, neither this nor that. It participates \(\text{(both-this-and-that)}\) and it doubly excludes \(\text{(neither-this-nor-that)}\). As neither-this-nor-that, the transcendental imagination can easily evolve into a both-this-and-that, both sensible and intelligible \(\text{as if the third – like Plato’s \text{khôra} (T, 73)}\)\(^{357}\) – is a mixture of both (cf. PSII, 174/171). However, what if there is an “other transcendental imagination” as Derrida asks, or put differently, an imagination characterized by an other neither-this-nor-that that is – contrary to what Heidegger claimed (cf. GA3, §28, §29) – no longer transformable into a both-this-and-that? What if the “neither this nor that” is “neither sensible nor intelligible, neither positive nor negative, neither inside nor outside, neither superior nor inferior, neither active nor passive, neither present nor absent, not even neutral, not even dialectizable in a third term \([\text{ni même dialectisable en un tiers}]\)” (PSII, 146/144)? What if spacing – similar to \(\text{khôra} \text{– cannot be rearticulated in any philosopheme by way of dialectics, a “participationist schema \text{[schème participationniste]}” or “analogy” \text{(PSII, 175/172)?}}\ With regard to Kant’s Refutation of Idealism, Sallis writes: “One will perhaps insist that this critique has its limits \[…\]. Yet, whatever its limits, the Kantian project does succeed in establishing a prohibition against conflating the object of consciousness with what occurs in consciousness, whether the occurrence be called image, idea, \text{Vorstellung}, or whatever.”\(^{358}\) It demands not so much a productive, transcendental imagination as the pure auto-affection of time, but an auto-hetero-affection in terms of spacing (a becoming-space of time and a becoming-time of space). Time passes, and when it passes, it disappears, it passes away, it ceases to take place, and it “recalls mourning to the chronological paradox of its economy” (TOJ, 23). It calls for an anachrony, the “very anachrony of spacing” (PSII, 174/172; cf. KH, 25/94). This does not mean that Derrida underwrites the figure of time as a line, or that he wishes to return to the thought of time in terms of circularity (auto-affection). Rather, Derrida is interested in what cannot be represented by a line, namely “the relationship of representation to so-called originary

\(^{357}\) Cf. J. Sallis, \textit{Chorology}, 155: “Thus, even though remote from the Timaean discourse, even though constrained within the exigencies of modern thought, transcendental schematism is a reinscription of the chorology.”

presence. The representation is also a de-presentation. It is tied to the work of spacing.” (GR, 289/203)

Eberhard tried to gain access to the realms of rational psychology and theology when he attempted to prove the objective reality of a concept without having recourse to intuition. This is of course an absurdity for Kant, as he tells us in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and, according to Kant, Eberhard tried to open the path to rational psychology and theology where the “Medusa head of the Kritik [das Medusenhaupt der Kritik]” endeavored to recoil or deter (zurück schrecken wollte) (ENTD, 199/293). Kant wishes to present the Medusa head to Eberhard, and in order to catch this head, to decapitate it, he needs to capture it in its reflection, and look at it indirectly. Medusa petrifies. Her look petrifies the body and the soul. Kant had to appropriate the head of Medusa, repeat the heroic act of Perseus: see without being seen. While interpreting Hegel’s appropriation of Kantianism as Judaism, Derrida writes: “The Jew could secure himself mastery and carry death everywhere in the world only in petrifying the other by becoming stone himself. Playing so not too badly, he has become Medusa to himself [médusé]. But he does not exist, that one (he), the Jew, before having become Medusa to himself.” (GL, 56/47) 359 Only a Perseus, the patron of self-portraits, knows how to decapitate her after beholding the image of Medusa; he knows how to confront the petrifying look, the look that turns to stone, that fascinates, for as we know fascination means for Derrida to take something “out of itself by putting it to sleep in a monument”. Perseus saw without being seen. What does this have to do with the imagination? Perhaps this: no full presence is turned to stone, petrified and petrifying, fascinated and fascinating, “except in the imagination’s sleep”.360

Perhaps Beckett was aiming for this when he wrote in his Mirlitonnades from the late 1970s:

\[
\text{imagine si ceci}
\text{une jour ceci}
\text{un beau jour}
\text{imagine}
\text{si un jour}
\text{un beau jour ceci}
\text{cessait}
\text{imagine}^{361}
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359 Later, Derrida adds: “In every logic it is necessary to be stone in order to transform the other into stone. Like the Gorgon, the Jew petrifies the other. Hegel said this; now he marks that the Jew is stone himself.” (GL, 65/55; cf. VEP, 126/110)
361 S. Beckett, Poèmes, suivi de mirlitonnades, 37.
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De derde instantie
De verbeeldingskracht in Kant, Heidegger en Derrida

Meer dan ooit tevoren dringen beelden zich aan ons op. Tevens beseffen we meer dan ooit tevoren dat beelden zich onderwerpen aan vormen van censuur en manipulatie. De vraag is dus wat het voor ons betekent om geconfronteerd te worden met beelden, wat het betekent om voor een beeld te staan, welke status en rol beelden vandaag de dag spelen. Deze vraag richt zich niet louter op de manier waarop de verbeeldingskracht zich verhoudt tot kennis, ervaring en objectiviteit, maar tevens op de morele aspecten die verbonden zijn aan de kwestie van de verbeeldingskracht. Dit proefschrift richt zich op deze vragen waarbij het vanuit een schets van het werk van Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) en Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) een ontwikkeling van het begrip van verbeeldingskracht in de Westerse filosofie probeert te laten zien. De rol van Kant is essentieel in deze discussie. Juist hij probeerde de verbeeldingskracht in zijn werk op zodanige wijze te positioneren dat deze van fundamenteel belang is voor kennis. Waar veel voorgaande filosofen zich nog beriepen op een magische, goddelijke instantie om de brug te kunnen slaan tussen het zintuiglijke en het intelligibele besefte Kant dat deze weg voor de filosofie inmiddels door het scepticisme was afgesloten. Vandaar dat Kant de toevlucht nam tot een ander klassiek thema: de verbeeldingskracht. Dit vermogen of deze kracht stelt hem in staat om voor de bemiddeling te zorgen die nodig is voor ervaring en kennis. Kennis betekent dan allereerst de synthese van het zintuiglijke en het intelligibele, van de aanschouwing (ruimte, tijd) en het verstand (begrippen).

Deze verschuiving in de filosofie is niet onopgemerkt gebleven, zoals te merken is in het werk van de Duitse en Engelse romantici, het Duits idealisme, de fenomenologie en de Franse denkers van de differentie. De verbeeldingskracht krijgt bij Kant een uiterst ambigue status, aangezien zij tegelijkertijd moet bemiddelen tussen het aanschouwelijke en het verstandelijke – en dus begrepen wordt als een derde instantie (noch het een, noch het ander) – maar uiteindelijk slechts gekarakteriseerd lijkt te worden door eigenschappen van zowel de aanschouwing als het verstand – receptief/spontaan, zintuiglijk/verstandelijk. Het concept van het verstand is hier een universele en noodzakelijke regel die als functie heeft om de menigvuldigheid van feiten te begrijpen als een toepassing van een regel. Hoewel Kant allereerst de heterogeniteit van de aanschouwing en het verstand benadrukt, kan hij in het verloop van de *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* niet anders dan wijzen op een mogelijke overeenkomstigheid of homogeniteit van beide vermogens. De mogelijkheid van deze homogeniteit vindt Kant in de verbeeldingskracht. Anders gezegd, als derde instantie participeert de verbeeldingskracht in het verenigen van de twee andere kenvermogens, maar het blijft hierbij de vraag in hoeverre dit vermogen ook te reduceren is tot zowel het een als het ander.

Bekend is Kants poging om de grenzen van het menselijke kenvermogen op kritische wijze bloot te leggen. In dit onderzoek richten we ons dan in het bijzonder op de verbeeldingskracht. De verbeeldingskracht omschrijft Kant als het vermogen om dat aanwezig te stellen wat afwezig is. Dit onmisbare, bemiddelende vermogen moet Kant in zijn kritische project een plek toewijzen. Het is vooral vanuit de tijdsproblematiek dat deze positionering mogelijk is. De verbeeldingskracht dient ertoe om een procedure (schematisme, een tijdsbepaling) op te stellen volgens welke de menigvuldigheid in de aanschouwing begrepen kan worden volgens de regels (beprijzing, categorieën) van het verstand. Echter, deze positieve rol van de verbeeldingskracht, die zich vooral laat kenmerken door de bijdrage die het levert voor het kennen (de theoretische rede), wordt de verbeeldingskracht in Kants praktische filosofie ontzegd. Fundamenteel hierbij zijn de vele onderscheidingen die Kant aanbrengt: theoretische en praktische rede, natuurwet en morele wet, heteronomie en...
autonomie, categorie en Idee, etc. Waar de verbeeldingskracht onmisbaar is voor het theoretische aspect dient de invloed van dit vermogen zo veel mogelijk ingeperkt te worden als het gaat om het morele handelen en de verhouding tot de wet. De reden waarom Kant zich genoodzaakt voelt om grenzen te stellen aan de verbeeldingskracht als het gaat om de praktische filosofie heeft vooral te maken met zijn poging om zijn denken vrij te weren van de waanzin, de droom, Schwärmerei, etc. Centraal voor het begrip van de ontwikkeling van Kants filosofie is zijn discussie met Emmanuel Swedenborg uit 1766. Hierin vinden we Kants eerste stappen tot het formuleren van de mogelijkheid en noodzakelijk van het kritische pad van de filosofie zoals hij dit in 1781 zal uitwerken in zijn Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In plaats van een beeld te geven van zaken waar het kenvermogen geen toegang toe heeft, zal Kant zich in zijn kritische werk beroepen op omleidingen: de analogie, het ‘alsof’, het symbool. Om zich te kunnen verzetten tegen een fantas als Swedenborg is het voor Kant van belang dat bijvoorbeeld het symbool zich laat onderscheiden van het schematisme van de verbeeldingskracht. Dit is het onderwerp van het eerste hoofdstuk.

Zoals reeds aangegeven hebben meerdere filosofen na Kant gewezen op het belang van de verbeeldingskracht in zijn werk. Van al deze filosofen is Heidegger zonder enige twijfel het meest innovatief en provocerend. In 1929 publiceerde hij zijn Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik waarin hij probeert te laten zien hoe innig de kwesties van de verbeeldingskracht en tijd in het werk van Kant met elkaar verbonden zijn. Uitgangspunt voor Heidegger is de eindigheid van het menselijk kenvermogen, en door deze eindigheid te analyseren vanuit de problematiek van de tijd hoopt hij een stap te zetten in de uitwerking van de meest fundamentele filosofische vraag: de zijnsvraag. In deze lezing van Kant, waarin Heidegger opzettelijk allerlei aspecten aandikt, vervormt of forceert, wil hij nieuwe mogelijkheden ontdekken voor de metafysica. Op deze wijze kan hij een analyse geven van het Dasein als dat het zijnde dat toegang heeft tot de zijnsvraag, tot de vraag naar het zijn van de zijnen. Dit Dasein kenmerkt zich hiermee allereerst vanuit het zijnsverstaan. Als Kant de mogelijkheden van het synthetisch a priori oordelen bloot wil leggen, en daarmee van de ervaring, kennis en objectiviteit, herformuleert Heidegger dit in termen van de zijnsvraag. Hoe is het begrip van het zijnde als zijnde mogelijk? Het zijn van de zijnen laat zich op menigvuldige wijze zeggen; Kant begrijpt het volgens Heidegger allereerst als objectiviteit. De mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van deze objectiviteit vindt Kant in de samenwerking tussen de aanschouwing, de verbeeldingskracht en het verstand. Dit betekent ook dat de verbeeldingskracht een centrale rol moet gaan spelen in Heideggers analyse.

De kwestie die Heidegger voor de uitwerking van de zijnsvraag allereerst moet behandelen is die van de verhouding tussen de verbeeldingskracht en de tijd. Kant hoofdstuk over het schematisme – de schemata als de procedures en producten van de verbeeldingskracht – speelt hierin de sleutelrol. De verbeeldingskracht dient men dan allereerst te begrijpen vanuit de mogelijkheid om dat aanwezig te stellen wat afwezig is: het verleden en de toekomst. Zodoende is volgens Heidegger tijd in eerste instantie uitgestrekt over de verschillende dimensies (verleden, heden, toekomst) waarbij de verbeeldingskracht in staat is om deze met elkaar te verbinden en te synthetiseren. Deze kracht zorgt voor een procedure om datgene wat zich in de aanschouwing geeft te begrijpen volgens een begrip, model of voorbeeld (Vor-bild). Nog fundamenteler betekent dit volgens Heidegger dat de verbeeldingskracht het zijnsverstaan mogelijk maakt. Hieruit volgt niet dat de verschillende kenvermogens naast elkaar blijven staan en de verbeeldingskracht als derde instantie slechts een onmisbaar hulpstuk is voor de twee andere kenvermogens. Voor Heidegger wijst de Kritik der reinen Vernunft, misschien tegen Kants intenties in, vooral op een oorspronkelijke eenheid van de verschillende vermogens, en deze eenheid kan niet anders begrepen worden dan vanuit de verbeeldingskracht. Dit vermogen komt daarmee aan de basis te liggen van het hele Kantiaanse kritische project. Dit geeft Heidegger alle ruimte om de rol van de tijd en
tijdelijkheid in Kant te analyseren, want zodra de verbeeldingskracht begrepen is vanuit de tijdelijkheid kunnen de andere vermogens (verstand, transcendentale apperceptie, praktische rede) zich hier niet meer aan ontworstelen. Echter, uiteindelijk zullen we zien hoe Heidegger in zijn latere werk steeds meer afstand lijkt te nemen vanuit deze thema’s? Speelt de verbeeldingskracht hier nog een rol, en zo ja, is dit nog steeds dezelfde als Kants “transcendentale verbeeldingskracht”? Deze vragen staan centraal aan het eind van hoofdstuk 2.

In het derde hoofdstuk richten we ons hoofdzakelijk op het werk van Derrida. Men treft reeds in zijn vroegste werken verwijzingen aan naar het werk van Kant en Heidegger als het gaat om hun uiteenzettingen over de verbeeldingskracht (De la grammatologie, L’écriture et la différence). Hoewel Derrida gedurende zijn filosofische carrière vaak heeft verwezen naar deze problematiek (Spectres de Marx, Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy) heeft hij hier nooit een afzonderlijke verhandeling aan gewijd. In dit proefschrift richten we ons op deze verwijzingen om aan de hand hiervan en de context een idee te krijgen van de verschillende thema’s die voor Derrida hierbij een rol spelen. De toegang tot een uitwerking hiervan ligt in de portretkunst. Meer dan enige andere vorm van representatie, figuur of fictie zegt het portret dat de verhouding tot de referent onherleidbaar is, dat wil zeggen, dat het portret van een figuur of een gezicht is gegeven als iets dat in essentie geen fictie is. Het claimt dat te geven wat eens was. Vandaar dat het portret voor Derrida niet één beeld is naast vele andere. Echter, we zullen zien dat andere thema’s uit het werk van Kant – naast de verbeeldingskracht – voor Derrida van fundamenteel belang zijn: het smaakoordeel (het schone, het sublieme) en de achting voor de wet. In tegenstelling tot Heidegger legt Derrida uiteindelijk de nadruk op het Kantiaanse ‘alsof’. Waar Heidegger de verbeeldingskracht en de tijdelijkheid ziet als de horizon van waaruit de mogelijkheid van het zijnsverstaan (het begrijpen van het zijnde als zijnde) geanalyseerd moet worden hoopt Derrida de rol van de fictie (literatuur) voor filosofie te benadrukken. Het Heideggeriaanse ‘als (zodanig)” (het zijnde als zijnde, het zijnde als zodanig, het Dasein als zodanig, etc.) wordt hiermee geconfronteerd met het Derridiaanse ‘alsof”. Voor ons is het dan de vraag of de verbeeldingskracht nog wel begrepen kan worden zoals Heidegger dit in 1929 nog dacht. Deze vraag zal behandeld worden vanuit Kants poging om grenzen te stellen aan de verbeeldingskracht; zo benadrukt hij meermalen dat er geen directe verbeordering van de morele wet is. Hoe om te gaan met dit onvermogen van de verbeeldingskracht? Wat als tijd niet volledig begrepen moet worden vanuit de mogelijkheden die de verbeeldingskracht aaneenreikt? Zoals we zullen zien heeft dit grote consequenties voor het denken van Heidegger.

In de Epiloog keren we terug naar de centrale Heideggeriaanse problematiek: de verhouding tussen de verbeeldingskracht en de tijd. Wat als het begrip van tijd dat Heidegger denkt te vinden in Kant niet de oorspronkelijke tijd is? Heideggers poging om een primaat toe te kennen aan de tijdelijkheid is door Kant zelf reeds geproblematiseerd omdat hij zijn begrip van tijd afhankelijk wil maken van het begrip van ruimte. Aangezien Heidegger de verbeeldingskracht verbindt aan de kwestie van de tijdelijkheid kan de Kantiaanse omkering van de verhouding tussen ruimte en tijd niet onopgemerkt blijven. Kant begrijpt tijd allereerst vanuit de opeenvolging van ogenblikken. Een ogenblik kan daarmee niet tegelijkertijd zijn met het voorafgaande of dat wat erop volgt. Dit neemt niet weg dat er een voorstelling van deze tijd gemaakt kan worden. Deze mogelijkheid vindt Kant in de analogie met de lijn, en dus in een ruimtelijk beeld. Datgene wat voor de tijd onmogelijk is – het tegelijkertijd aanwezig zijn van ogenblikken – vindt zijn mogelijkheid in de ruimte, of beter gezegd, in de verruimtelijking (espacement), het trekken van een lijn door de verbeeldingskracht. In deze
ruimte zal de verbeeldingskracht tegelijkertijd haar mogelijkheden en haar onmogelijkheden vinden. De vraag is dan of we ons hier een beeld van kunnen vormen.