

Mirror, mirror on the wall

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Mirror, mirror on the wall ...

Procedural Fairness as an Evaluative and Regulatory

Looking-glass Self

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UNIVERSITEIT VAN TILBURG

Mirror, mirror on the wall...
Procedural Fairness as an Evaluative and Regulatory
Looking-glass Self

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Tilburg
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
Prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander

In het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van
een door het college van promoties aangewezen commissie
in de Aula van de Universiteit van Tilburg
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Door

Lieven Georg German Brebels

geboren te Leuven, België

Promotores: Prof. Dr. David De Cremer
Prof. Dr. Constantine Sedikides
Prof. Dr. Patrick Kenis

"Many painters, sculptors, and writers have loved to withhold their work from the world, fondling it in seclusion until they were quite done with it; but the delight in this, as in all secrets, depends upon a sense of the value of what is concealed."

Cooley, *Human Nature and Social Order*, 1902

*"The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides
by the inequities of the selfish
and the tyranny of evil men*

*Blessed is he who, in the name of charity and good will,
shepherds the weak through the valley of darkness
For he is truly his brother's keeper
and the finder of lost children*

*And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger
those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers*

And you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee"

Samuel L. Jackson, *Pulp Fiction*, 1994

Contents

Chapter 1	Introduction	9
Chapter 2	Retaliation as a response to procedural unfairness: A self-regulatory approach	19
	<i>Study 2.1</i>	26
	<i>Study 2.2</i>	30
	<i>Study 2.3</i>	36
	<i>Study 2.4</i>	38
	<i>Study 2.5</i>	43
Chapter 3	Procedural fairness and the self-absorption paradox: How does rumination versus reflection influence the psychology of procedural fairness	55
	<i>Study 3.1</i>	63
	<i>Study 3.2</i>	66
	<i>Study 3.3</i>	69
	<i>Study 3.4</i>	74
Chapter 4	All levels of the self matter! Towards a self-definition model of the procedural fairness – OCB relationship	89
	<i>Study 4.1</i>	96
	<i>Study 4.2</i>	105
Chapter 5	General discussion	120
	References	130
	Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)	156
	Dankwoord	162
	Curriculum Vitae	164

Introduction

Fundamental to being human, is to be treated as a human being. Indeed, how others treat us often influences how we see ourselves and, hence, it influences how we behave. A key humanitarian and ethical standard of how we should treat others and expect others to treat us is fairness (Miller, 2001; Rawls, 1971). Fairness is a pervasive concern in our daily encounters with others. As social animals, the core of our (well-)being is to develop and maintain relationships with others whom we are dependent on to evaluate, define, and pursue our goals. Therefore, we interact with different people on a regular basis, and across a variety of settings. In teams, groups, and organizations, for instance, we often depend on authorities who are in charge of making decisions that affect us in many ways. Whether we think they do this fairly or unfairly, then, often determines how we subsequently behave. For instance, perceived (un)fairness might motivate us to cooperate or retaliate, whether we go that extra mile or just do what is strictly required, whether we commit or leave, and so forth. Hence, a great part of our behavior in social situations is guided, at least in part, by how fairly we think others treat us.

Procedural fairness

What do people generally consider as fair or unfair? To a certain extent, perceived fairness is a matter of subjective judgment, which has frequently led researchers to conclude that “fairness is in the eye of the beholder.” Most people, however, consensually distinguish between the fairness of their results and the fairness of how their results were obtained. In the social justice literature, this fundamental distinction is often referred to as the difference between distributive fairness (Deutsch, 1985) and procedural fairness (Tyler, 1988). More specifically, with respect to the same event, one could perceive fairness and unfairness at once if procedures and outcomes were judged separately. For instance, management might decide to pay a higher salary to your colleague, who does exactly the same job as you do (i.e., an unfair outcome), but when this decision was based upon very accurate comparisons

of experience, education, skills, and performance between you and your colleague (i.e., a fair procedure), chances are high that you might overall consider this decision to be relatively fair. Although distributive and procedural fairness sometimes may influence each other (e.g., the negative impact of unfair outcomes is often reduced by the use of fair procedures; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), research has demonstrated that procedures have greater explanatory value in fairness considerations than outcomes do (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Cockran, 1979; Tyler, 1994; Tyler, 1987). Moreover, even in the absence of any knowledge about decision outcomes, procedural fairness significantly influences a variety of people's reactions (Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). Not surprisingly then, researchers have increasingly devoted attention to the psychology of procedural fairness. The current dissertation aims to further develop our understanding of the effects that procedural fairness reveals.

Procedural fairness includes both formal and informal aspects of decision making. Evaluations of procedural fairness, on the one hand, are based upon the extent to which certain rules or principles are followed (Leventhal, 1980). For instance, decisions are generally considered as procedurally fair (versus unfair) when they are based on all (versus not all) aspects relevant to the decision (i.e., the *accuracy*-rule), when they do (versus do not) allow input (i.e., the rule of *voice*), and when they are applied in the same manner across all involved persons, parties, or situations (i.e., the *consistency*-rule). Enactment of these decision-making rules, on the other hand, also has important interpersonal consequences because it significantly affects the quality of interactions and relationships. Therefore, procedures – regardless of whether they are seen as formal or informal, and regardless of whether they occur among equals or un-equals – can be conceptualized as important features of social interactions (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Skitka, 2003).

Why do people care so much about procedural fairness? Traditionally, concerns with procedural fairness were mainly attributed to instrumental concerns, based on the assumption that people ultimately are motivated to attain positive outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). From this perspective, people value fair procedures because it enables them to have a sense of control over the outcomes

they receive. Over the last 20 years, though, researchers have emphasized and demonstrated that people care about procedural fairness for reasons that go beyond the aspect of outcomes or instrumentality per se. That is, concerns with procedural fairness are driven to a large extent by relational concerns (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). More specifically, people derive a symbolic and self-relevant message from how they are treated. From this perspective, people value procedural fairness because it has implications for how they see themselves. This view has inspired recent justice theory and research in a very profound manner (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, in press; Skitka, 2003; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).

Procedural fairness as an evaluative looking-glass self

“As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be, so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.”

Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and Social Order*, 1902

Relational models of procedural fairness, such as the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), argue that procedural fairness effects occur because people are concerned about their relationship to the authority and the group that the authority represents. People react positively to fair treatment because it indicates that they have a high level of inclusion in the group, that they are respected by the authority, and that they have a relatively high status in the group (De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b; Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007; Lind, 2001; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2004). In sum, people value fair procedures because it provides positive self-regard, and, hence, positively influences an individual's self-esteem (Brockner et al., 2008; De Cremer, 2003; Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Koper, Van

Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Vermunt, Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenber, Blaauw, 2001). Thus, from a relational model's perspective, procedural fairness has implications to people when they are motivated to evaluate the self.

What exactly happens when people evaluate themselves in terms of how fairly they are treated? From a social psychological perspective, the self, as an object of evaluation, can be seen both as a unitary (stable) construct, and as a multifaceted (unstable) construct (for a more detailed discussion, see e.g., Baumeister, 1998). According to self-theorists, the cognitive structure of the self begins as a tabula rasa in early childhood and then gradually fills up as a function of an interaction between personal choice and social validation. Indeed, people develop, maintain, and change the self-concept via information that they receive through social interactions with others (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). More generally, this reasoning is consistent with the symbolic interactionism perspective that interpersonal appraisals reflect on, and can change, one's self-image (Mead, 1934; Tice & Wallace, 2003). More than a century ago, Charles Horton Cooley, a student of William James, described this process of reflected appraisal as a *looking-glass self*, thereby contributing greatly to modern social psychology and sociology (Cooley, 1902). I wish to make the argument that it is this process of reflected appraisal that also drives people's concerns with procedural fairness information. That is, people derive evaluative information regarding the self from others' actions and decisions, which in turn affects how they see themselves and, subsequently, how they behave. In everyday organizational life, perceived procedural fairness in authorities' decision-making represents one of the most prevalent and impactful interpersonal appraisals that employees encounter. Thus, when people strive to evaluate the self, as is often the case in organizational life, procedural fairness information reflects on, and can change, one's sense of self. In other words, procedural fairness operates as an evaluative looking-glass self in social interaction situations.

Procedural fairness as a regulatory looking-glass self

“The ideas that are associated with self-feeling ... and the content of the self cannot be covered by any simple description, ... but will vary indefinitely with particular temperaments and environments.”

Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and Social Order*, 1902

Given that procedural fairness affects how people evaluate and think of themselves, it can also be expected that procedural fairness influences how they subsequently behave. Indeed, research has revealed that procedural fairness predicts a variety of positive and negative behavioral reactions including cooperation (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002), organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Moorman, 1991), retaliation (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) and turnover (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991). Meta-analyses performed at the beginning of the millennium, however, revealed inconsistencies in the relation between procedural fairness and specific behavioral reactions (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). It appears, then, that researchers lack a clear understanding of when people engage in specific behavioral responses toward (un)fairness. In fact, as Greenberg pointed out, one of the major challenges in contemporary justice research is to tell exactly what form behavioral responses to perceived (un)fairness might take (Greenberg, 2001). The second important aim of the present dissertation is to examine self-processes as possible moderators of the relation between procedural fairness and specific behavioral responses.

In the Accessible Identity Model of justice reasoning (AIM), the role of the self is emphasized in the justice process (Skitka, 2003). Within this model, it is argued that fairness and justice concerns will become more pronounced when the self or any relevant aspect of it is salient. According to the AIM, people should also become more concerned about justice in contexts that activate self-relevant concerns than in contexts that do not. The AIM, thus, emphasizes self-salience in fairness perceptions, but does not sufficiently address what form exactly behavioral responses to perceived fairness might take, and which self-aspects are responsible for what kind of behavioral responses. Furthermore, building upon the AIM, some theorists have

even suggested self-salience as a sufficient condition for procedural fairness effects to emerge. (Miedema, 2003). This raises the additional question whether self-salience always enhances the impact of procedural fairness, regardless of its antecedents and examined outcome variables. In the present dissertation, ideas emerging from this focus on self-salience will also be tested.

Recently, De Cremer and Tyler (2005a) proposed a self-based model of procedural fairness, in which they discuss specific self-relevant variables that enhance the impact of procedural fairness on cooperation. Based upon an integration of insights from the uncertainty management model (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) and the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), the self-based model proposed that motives associated with relational aspects of the self, such as high belongingness and social reputation needs (cf. Tyler & Lind, 1992), and motives associated with uncertainty of the self, such as high self-doubt, self concept unclarity and self-esteem instability (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; cf. Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) increase people's sensitivity to procedural fairness. In addition, it is also proposed that fair treatment by the group's representative serves to satisfy these needs, which in turn motivates people to see own and other's goals as interchangeable in a group setting, as such promoting cooperation. An important implication of the self-based model for the purposes of the current dissertation is, thus, that it emphasizes the role of procedural fairness in how people self-regulate their goals, and ultimately also the behavior that they engage in. More specifically, the self-based model suggests that procedural fairness influences cooperation because it speaks to the core aspects of the self: its motives, goals, and strategies (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Tice & Wallace, 2003).

In this dissertation, I argue that, in order to know how exactly the self plays a role in the impact of procedural fairness on specific behavioral reactions, researchers should examine what is at the core of a salient self. That is, people's motives, goals, and strategies during interactions with others. Also, I build upon theories of self-regulation to propose that specific characteristics of the situation, the action itself, and the actor's personality play a pernicious role in determining what form exactly reactions might take (e.g., Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Thus, I introduce a self-regulatory perspective on how procedural fairness information

translates into action. More specifically, I emphasize the importance of examining fundamental motivational processes underlying the self. I focus on the motives, goals, and coping strategies that underlie the self that is salient at the moment of the relationship to examine when procedural fairness perceptions predict positive and negative behavioral outcomes. As such, I aim to provide an answer to the following questions: Does it matter whether people attend to the self for evaluative or non-evaluative reasons when processing and reacting toward procedural fairness? Does it matter how people pursue their goals in how they cope with procedural unfairness? Does it matter how people define themselves to know how they might respond to procedural fairness?

Overview of the Dissertation

To test the self-evaluative and self-regulatory functions of procedural fairness, I conducted several studies in which a variety of motivational sources of the self were examined as a moderating mechanism of a variety of positive (commitment, citizenship) and negative (retaliation, withdrawal) behavioral outcomes of procedural fairness. More specifically, I looked at goal-pursuit strategies (Chapter 2), motives for focusing attention toward the self (Chapter 3), and levels of self-definition (Chapter 4). Also, across studies and chapters, I employed different methodologies to test these relationships (i.e., vignettes, laboratory-based experiments, and a field study). In the following sections, I will briefly outline the three empirical chapters that comprise this dissertation.

Chapter 2

In Chapter 2, I focus on retaliation as a response to procedural *un*fairness, and investigate whether retaliation occurs as a function of how people pursue their goals. In particular, two questions are addressed: (1) when will unfair treatment result in retaliation, and (2) why retaliation sometimes is pursued and other times inhibited as a response to unfair treatment. The when-question is addressed in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. I test whether (dispositional and temporarily activated) promotion versus prevention strategies for goal-pursuit determine the extent to which a decision-

maker's unfair (versus fair) procedural treatment results in stealing more resources (Study 2.1) and more antisocial offers in an ultimatum bargaining game (Study 2.2). The why-question is addressed in Studies 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. I test whether self-activation drives retaliatory responding to perceived unfairness as a function of different regulatory strategies for goal-pursuit. More specifically, Study 2.3 tests whether priming promotion (versus prevention) more strongly activates the self, and Studies 2.4 and 2.5 test whether self-activation eliminates differences in retaliatory responding between promotion and prevention strategies for goal-pursuit.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 aims to investigate the motivational properties of the self in responding to procedural fairness feedback. Although self-salience is generally considered to increase the impact of procedural fairness, research has overlooked the possibility that this effect might be due to specific motives for self-focused attention rather than self-focused attention per se. People focus attention toward the self and self-relevant information either for the purpose of rumination (i.e. evaluative self-focus) or for the purpose of reflection (i.e., non-evaluative self-focus; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Research suggests that people attend and respond to procedural fairness information particularly for self-evaluative purposes (e.g., Koper et al., 1993). Studies 3.1 and 3.2 test whether (dispositional or temporarily activated) rumination (versus reflection) is uniquely associated to relevance attributed to procedural fairness information. Furthermore, Studies 3.3 and 3.4 test whether rumination moderates withdrawal and commitment responses as a function of actual voice-granting versus voice-denying procedures in a group-task situation. Finally, Study 3.4 also tests whether rumination enhances the voice effect or reflection reduces the voice effect, by comparing these conditions to a low self-focus control condition.

Chapter 4

In Chapter 4, I further scrutinize the motivational basis of the self by looking at different levels of self-definition in differentially referenced organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) as a function of procedural fairness. The collective, relational, and individual self each comprise a different set of motives, goals, and

action-preferences (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Moreover, procedural fairness effects have been localized at different levels of the self-concept (Brebels, De Cremer, & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Therefore, salience of different levels of the self should enhance the effects of procedural fairness on self-level corresponding actions. Interestingly, types of OCB can be considered as being differentially referenced at the collective, relational, or individual level (e.g., Williams & Anderson, 1991). Studies 4.1 and 4.2 test whether fair treatment is reciprocated by an engagement in the kind of OCB that fits the recipient's self-definition. More specifically, it is expected that the collective self interacts with procedural fairness to predict collective OCB, the relational self interacts with procedural fairness to predict relational OCB, and the individual self interacts with procedural fairness to predict individual OCB. These expectations are tested in a laboratory-based experiment (Study 4.1) and in a large-sized field study among working employees (Study 4.2).

Chapter 5

In Chapter 5, I summarize the results of the different studies that are reported in this dissertation. In addition, in this chapter I will provide an integration of these findings and discuss implications.

In concluding, I would like to note that the Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are each based on individual papers that have been published, submitted for publication, or prepared for submission. This means that each chapter can be read independently of the other chapters, but also that there can be overlap between different chapters. I hope you will enjoy reading this dissertation as much as I enjoyed writing it.

Retaliation as a Response to Procedural Unfairness: A Self-Regulatory Approach¹

For many people, unfair treatment in group or organizational settings is a recurrent experience; it is also an aversive experience (Mikula, 1986; Miller, 2001; Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse, & Williams, 2007). Aversion would be expected to result in retaliation (e.g., revenge, stealing, antisocial resource allocation). Indeed, justice researchers have considered perceived unfairness a key predictor of retaliation in employee-supervisor relationships, and they have carried out field studies to test this idea (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997; Blader, Chang, & Tyler, 2001; Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). When these studies were meta-analyzed (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), however, a rather surprising conclusion emerged: perceived unfairness was an inconsistent predictor of retaliation. This conclusion was echoed by subsequent bodies of research (Bembenek, Beike, & Schroeder, 2007; Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006; Posthuma, Maertz, & Dworkin, 2007). In the words of Colquitt et al. (2006), “a substantial amount of variation exists in these relationships, and ... moderators could explain much of that variation (p. 111).” It appears, then, that researchers lack a clear understanding of *when* perceived unfairness translates into retaliation and *why* unfairness recipients pursue or inhibit retaliation.

Some justice research has looked into affect as an explanation for the inconsistent relation between unfair treatment and retaliation (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Bembenek et al., 2007; Bies & Tripp, 1996; De Cremer, 2007). This research has shown that negative emotions (e.g., anger, disappointment) accompany retaliation as a response to perceived unfairness, but it has not addressed when and why people sometimes pursue and sometimes inhibit retaliation. This is what we set to do in the present article. We addressed the

¹ This chapter is based on Brebels, De Cremer, & Sedikides (in press). Retaliation as a response to procedural unfairness: A self-regulatory approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.

“when” question by examining the moderational role of regulatory focus in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. We address the “why” question by examining the correlational or causal role of self-activation in Studies 2.3-2.5. We now turn to a discussion of regulatory focus and self-activation.

On Regulatory Focus and Self-activation

Procedural fairness refers to the degree to which the process on which enacting authorities rely to make decisions is perceived as fair by group members or employees (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 2007). Procedural fairness is typically operationalized in terms of the implementation of transparent and valid decision-making rules (e.g., accuracy) and in terms of providing group members or employees with an opportunity for input into the decision-making process (i.e., voice). Despite the fact that procedural *unfairness* threatens recipients' needs for control, self-esteem, certainty, and belongingness (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, in press; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), while challenging their values and moral beliefs (Folger, 2001; Lerner, 2002; Skitka, 2002), responses to it have been rather inconsistent (Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001; Posthuma et al., 2007). We propose that the manner in which recipients regulate the pursuit of their goals (i.e., regulatory focus) provides an explanation for the inconsistency in retaliatory responses to procedural unfairness.

According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998; Higgins et al., 2001; Idson & Higgins, 2000), there are two functionally distinct motivational systems that guide goal pursuit. Nurturance concerns (e.g., accomplishments, hopes, aspirations) activate and are best met through a *promotion focus*, whereas security concerns (e.g., duties, responsibilities, obligations) activate and are best met through a *prevention focus*. Importantly, promotion and prevention foci are associated with different strategies for goal pursuit. Promotion-focus strategies involve goal pursuit in a willful or approach-oriented manner, and involve achievement through immediate action rather than reflective deliberation. These strategies are pronounced among persons who have an independent self-

construal (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), are guided by autonomous goal setting (Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004), and are attuned to intrinsic needs (Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). In contrast, prevention-focus strategies involve goal-pursuit in a vigilant or avoidance-oriented manner, and involve careful assessment of the social context and action consequences. These strategies are pronounced among persons who have an interdependent self-construal, are guided by situational goal-setting, and are susceptible to social pressure (Lee et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 2004; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). In the context of the present research, we generally expected that the behavior of promotion-focus (vs. prevention-focus) persons would be guided more strongly by their inner states and less strongly by normative expectations.

Despite a burgeoning literature linking regulatory focus to intrapersonal behavior and task performance (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Higgins et al., 2001; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Seibt & Förster, 2004), relatively little research has examined the role of regulatory focus in interpersonal relationships. This point is particularly relevant to the scope of the present research, given that procedural fairness is generally portrayed as an interpersonal or social interaction phenomenon (Greenberg, 1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Skitka, 2003). Thus, examining the role of regulatory focus in the procedural fairness arena promises not only to inform when and why retaliatory responses to unfair treatment emerge but also to increase understanding of how regulatory focus works in a social interaction context.

The available evidence, albeit in short supply, forms the backbone of our claim that regulatory focus moderates responses to unfair treatment in social interactions. First, recent research has shown that approach rather than avoidance motivation is involved in perceptions of procedural fairness (i.e., provision of voice; Van Prooijen, Karremans, & Van Beest, 2006), suggesting that attainment strivings (e.g., enhancing self-esteem) rather than evasion strivings (e.g., reducing fear of exploitation) affect judgments of procedural fairness. These findings are generally consistent with a possible moderational role for regulatory focus. At the same time though, this research, contrary to ours, (a) has conceptualized and operationalized procedural fairness as a dependent rather

than an independent variable, (b) has been concerned with approach and avoidance motivation rather than self-regulatory focus, and (c) has not examined how people cope with procedural unfairness as a function of goal regulation (i.e., regulatory focus). Second, both approach motivation and promotion focus are related to greater left-prefrontal cortical activity (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Sutton & Davidson, 1997; for an exception, see Friedman & Förster, 2005), which, in turn, is associated with retaliation following provocation (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). These findings suggest a link between promotion-focus and retaliation. Third, prevention-focus strength is positively related to self-silencing, withdrawal, and inhibition of hostile behavior in the face of unfairness or rejection (Ayduk, May, Downey, & Higgins, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2007, Study 3). Although this research (a) was concerned with unfair treatment (i.e., social rejection, stereotype threat) rather than *procedural* unfairness, and (b) pertained to anticipation rather than actual experience of unfair situations, it nevertheless raises the possibility that prevention-focus individuals favor withdrawal rather than retaliation as an immediate response to unfairness. In all, based on insights from the above-reviewed research, we hypothesized that promotion-focus participants would be more likely to retaliate against an authority's unfair treatment than prevention-focus participants. This is the "when" question that we addressed in Studies 2.1 and 2.2.

Somewhat more direct evidence for the role of promotion focus in social interaction comes from face-to-face negotiation research (Galinsky et al., 2005). Participants with dispositional or temporarily-activated promotion (relative to prevention) focus made more aggressive opening offers. Interestingly, these participants reported that they paid increased attention to their personal target prices. Relatedly, in a self-evaluation study, promotion focus led to higher accessibility of self-esteem relevant words (Leonardelli, Lakin, & Arkin, 2007). Finally, participants who fail to attain their promotion (but not prevention) goals report lower self-esteem (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Promotion focus, then, is associated with, or heightens the accessibility of, personal interest or self-esteem. Stated otherwise, promotion focus is associated with, or heightens, the

accessibility of the individual self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001a).

The individual self refers to the set of traits and characteristics that are unique to the person. These attributes differentiate the person from close others and, more generally, from ingroup members (Gaertner & Sedikides, 2005; Gaertner, Sedikides, Luke, & Iuzzini, 2008; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001b). The individual self is associated with self-enhancement and self-defense motivation (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, 2008; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). When this type of self is accessible, the person is likely to construe social interactions in a competitive than cooperative manner, to be attuned to available gains, and to behave spontaneously and opportunistically in a way that safeguards or maximizes short-term (rather than long-term) interest (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002; Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006). Indeed, accessibility of the individual self has been linked to self-based or opportunistic responding in the area of justice as well (Miedema, Van den Bos, & Vermunt, 2006; Skitka, 2002, 2003; Skitka & Bravo, 2005; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000).

Based, then, on findings that link (a) promotion focus to the individual self (Galinsky et al., 2005; Leonardelli et al., 2007; Moretti & Higgins, 1990), and (b) accessibility of the individual self to short-term and opportunistic behavior (Gaertner et al., 2002, 2008; Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006), and (c) accessibility of the individual self to opportunistic responding in justice settings (Miedema et al., 2006; Skitka & Bravo, 2005), we hypothesized that a reason why promotion-focus participants would behave in a retaliatory manner would be the relatively high (chronic or temporary) accessibility of the individual self. This is the “why” question that we addressed in Studies 2.3-2.5.

The Present Research

The present research consists of five studies and addresses three waves of programmatically-driven issues. As a *first step*, we proposed that retaliation to unfair treatment is moderated by regulatory focus. Evidence suggests that

promotion-focus strategies are associated with a direct, whereas prevention-focus strategies with a conformist, behavioral style. Thus, we hypothesized that promotion-focus, but not prevention-focus, participants would retaliate against an authority who is perceived as enacting unfair procedures. We tested this hypothesis in Studies 2.1 and 2.2.

As a *second step*, we drew on insights from the regulatory focus literature to identify and test a mechanism deemed responsible for the moderational role of regulatory focus in retaliatory responding to unfairness. We have reviewed research showing that promotion-focus strategies are adopted by persons who pursue their goals in a relatively independent, autonomous, and intrinsic manner (Lee et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 1998; Van Dijk & Kluger, 2004). This aligns well with other research indicating that promotion (relative to prevention) focus is associated with personal concerns (Galinsky et al., 2005), accessibility of esteem-related words (Leonardelli et al., 2007), and variations in self-esteem (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). The cumulative body of evidence, then, suggests that promotion focus is associated with, or heightens, the accessibility of the individual self (Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001a). We tested this idea in Study 2.3.

As a *third step*, we examined whether heightened accessibility of the individual self differentially predicts retaliation to unfair treatment among promotion-focus and prevention-focus persons. Evidence suggests that, when the individual self is accessible, the person perceives social interactions as competitive and behaves opportunistically so that she or he maximizes short-term personal interest (Gaertner & Sedikides, 2005; Gaertner et al., 2008; Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006). On the basis of this evidence, we hypothesized that the accessibility of the individual self would be a reason why promotion-focus participants opt for retaliative action (Miedema et al., 2006; Skitka, 2003). We tested this hypothesis by rendering the individual self accessible through heightened self-attention (Study 2.4) and uniqueness/authenticity feedback (Study 2.5).

Central to regulatory focus theory is that people not only differ in the extent to which they are dispositionally predisposed to promotion-focus versus

prevention-focus goals (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), but also that situational or priming cues can induce distinct regulatory foci (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Idson et al., 2000; Oyserman et al., 2007). Therefore, we assessed regulatory focus either as a dispositional difference (Studies 2.2 and 2.4) or as a momentarily-activated construct (Studies 2.1, 2.3, and 2.5).

The dependent variable of interest was retaliation towards the unfairness enacting authority. This variable took the form of stealing from the authority's earnings (Greenberg, 1993) in Study 2.1, and fairness violations in resource allocations at an Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in Studies 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5.

Furthermore, we operationalized procedural fairness in terms of the accuracy rule. As mentioned previously, accuracy refers to whether organizational procedures (e.g., task assignments, hiring or promotion practices) are perceived as transparent and valid in the use of information available for decision-making (Leventhal, 1980). Recipients perceive inaccurate procedures as more unfair than accurate ones (De Cremer, 2004; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Van den Bos, Bruins, Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999). Moreover, accuracy violations indicate a lack of recognition for recipients' performance or effort, which represents one of the most frequently reported unfairness experiences in daily life (Mikula, 1986).

Participants in all studies were undergraduate students at Tilburg University. They were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Cell sizes were approximately even. Also, at the end of each study session, participants were thanked, debriefed, and remunerated where relevant. Given that prior research (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996) has suggested a link between gender and retaliation, we included gender as a covariate in all reported analyses. A gender main effect was obtained only in Studies 2.1 and 2.2: Men behave more retaliatorily than women. However, in none of our studies did gender interact with the independent variables or predictors. Therefore, we will omit further discussion of gender effects.

Study 2.1 is the first test of the hypothesis that regulatory focus moderates retaliation to unfair treatment. Participants became involved in a laboratory-based social interaction. In particular, they engaged in a screening task for a role assignment in their group. Next, they received procedural feedback from the decision-making authority. Finally, they were presented with an opportunity to steal from the authority's earnings.

We induced regulatory focus with a priming technique pioneered by Idson et al. (2000). To ascertain that regulatory focus could not interfere with effort or performance on the screening task, we primed participants after this task and before the procedural fairness manipulation. We hypothesized that retaliation (i.e., stealing from the authority's earnings) would generally be a function of procedural fairness, but this effect would be localized among promotion-focus participants.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred sixteen persons (72 females, 44 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.73$, $SD = 2.63$) were each paid €7 (\$10) for their participation. The design was a 2 (regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (procedural fairness: accurate vs. inaccurate procedure) between-subjects factorial.

Experimental procedure. Participants signed up for an alleged study on "group dynamics." They were placed in adjacent cubicles containing a table, a chair, and a six-page booklet. At the beginning of each session, the experimenter explained via an intercom that participants would form a dynamic group in order to carry out a decision-making task. A dynamic group was said to consist of members taking on different roles. In order to form such a group, participants became involved in a screening task that occupied them for approximately 20 minutes. The task consisted of a test-battery, with five tests. The task was said to be a valid and accurate method to determine which role would best suit each group member. Next, participants were instructed to start reading the booklet.

On the first page of the booklet, participants read a short description of group roles. They learned that these roles would differ only according to content and not status or personal privileges. They also learned that someone else in the laboratory was assigned to grade their tests and, subsequently, to decide how the group roles would be allocated. This person was referred to as Manager A. The five remaining pages contained the actual test-battery: a Management Assessment Inventory, a Self-Assessment Tool, a test assessing Closeness to Others in General, a Self-Perception Questionnaire, and an Organizational Sociogram Structure Task. Upon completion of these tests, participants contacted the experimenter via an intercom, who then went to each cubicle, collected the responses, and ostensibly handed them over to Manager A.

While waiting for feedback, participants received a new, three-page booklet. This booklet, allegedly a filler task, was actually the regulatory focus manipulation. In the promotion-focus condition, participants described three accomplishment, hopes or aspirations and, following each description, listed several strategies they were using or planned to use in order to attain these goals. Participants in the prevention-focus condition completed a similar task, but for three responsibilities, duties or obligations. Next, participants contacted the experimenter via the intercom who collected the responses.

The procedural fairness manipulation ensued. The manipulation was based on the accuracy rule and modeled after prior studies that manipulated this aspect of procedural fairness (De Cremer, 2004; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). More specifically, each participant was given an envelope, which contained the manager's feedback in handwritten form. In the *accurate procedure* condition, participants read:

Hi, I received your test battery and looked it over. I have read and graded all parts. I will soon decide, based on all five parts, to which group role I will allocate you

Best, Manager A

In the *inaccurate procedure* condition, participants read:

Hi, I received your test battery. I have read and graded only one part. (I did not look at the other four parts.) I will soon decide, based on the single part I read and graded, to which group role I will allocate you.

Best, Manager A

We proceeded to collect the manipulation checks and dependent measures. Participants responded to all items on 7-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*). To check the perceived accuracy of the procedural fairness manipulation, we asked participants: "To what extent did Manager A make the decision in an accurate manner?". To check whether the manipulation affected perceived fairness, we asked participants: "To what extent were you treated fairly by Manager A?".

Lastly, to assess retaliation, participants were told that, at the end of the study, Manager A would be paid for his or her time. The research budget included a maximum wage of €25, but every participant had the opportunity to take away a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 200 eurocents (i.e., €0-2). It was made clear to them that their decisions would be taken into account to calculate the manager's actual earnings. Then, each participant indicated how many eurocents, if any, they took away from the manager's payment.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. Two judges independently coded participants' goal descriptions as either promotion focus or prevention focus (The constructs were defined for them.). The judges agreed on 92 % of the descriptions ($Kappa = .84$). Disagreement was low and virtually equal in the promotion focus (7 %) and prevention focus (9 %) conditions. This indicates that participants followed the instructions, as intended. Disagreements between judges were resolved with discussion and the resolutions were included in the analyses.

A 2 x 2 ANOVA on perceived accuracy yielded a procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 111) = 224.61$, $p < .001$, $r = .81$, 95% CI[-3.74; -2.52]. Participants in the accurate procedure condition ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.12$) considered

the enacted procedure as more accurate than those in the inaccurate procedure condition ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.18$). No other effect was significant.

Likewise, the 2 x 2 ANOVA on perceived fairness yielded a procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 111) = 168.78$, $p < .001$, $r = .77$, 95% CI[-4.04; -2.66]. Participants in the accurate procedure condition ($M = 5.49$, $SD = 1.25$) reported that they were treated more fairly than those in the inaccurate procedure condition ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.33$). Again, no other effect was significant. The procedural fairness manipulation was effective.

Retaliation. A 2 x 2 ANOVA on stealing yielded a procedural fairness main effect, $F(1, 111) = 21.22$, $p < .001$, $r = .39$, 95% CI[55.95; 134.94]: Participants in the inaccurate procedure condition ($M = 160$, $SD = 66$) stole more money from the manager than those in the accurate procedure condition ($M = 99$, $SD = 86$). Importantly, the hypothesized interaction emerged, $F(1, 111) = 5.15$, $p < .01$, $r = .20$, 95% CI[-118.46; -8.00] (Figure 2.1). Simple effects tests revealed that the procedural fairness main effect was significant in the promotion-focus condition, $F(1, 111) = 22.55$, $p < .001$, $r = .41$, but not in the prevention-focus condition, $F(1, 111) = 2.42$, $p > .12$, $r = .14$. Participants in the promotion-focus condition were more likely to steal from an unfair manager than participants in the prevention-focus condition. Alternatively, the regulatory focus main effect was significant in the unfair, $F(1, 111) = 4.20$, $p < .05$, $r = .19$, but not in the fair procedure condition, $F(1, 111) < 1$, $p > .32$, $r = .09$. Stealing was predicted by regulatory focus in the case of unfair treatment.

Summary. These findings provide preliminary evidence that regulatory focus moderates retaliation to unfair treatment. Participants generally behaved more retaliatorily when they were treated unfairly than fairly, but this effect was localized in the promotion-focus condition. Importantly, these results were obtained with momentarily-activated (instead of dispositional) differences in regulatory focus and by assessing one specific type of retaliation (i.e., stealing).




Figure 2.1. Retaliation as a function of procedural fairness and regulatory focus in Study 2.1.

Study 2.2

In Study 2.2, we attempted to replicate Study 2.2.1 findings with a dispositional rather than momentarily-activated measure of regulatory focus. Also, in Study 2.1, we operationalized retaliation as stealing from the enacting authority's earnings. A possible limitation of this measure is its relative ambiguity. All participants took away at least some money, arguably indicating that there was no clearly defined norm as to exactly how retaliatory this behavior was. We addressed this potential limitation in Study 2.2 by using a normatively established measure of retaliation.

In particular, we examined offers in an UBG. In this game, the prosocial offer or normative allocation is a 50-50 split, whereas the antisocial offer is lower

than the equal split (e.g., 60-40 distribution; Güth et al., 1982; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003). In the UBG that we used, participants made an offer to the supervisor, who had previously treated them either in an unfair or fair manner. This supervisor was the recipient and had the option of either accepting or rejecting the proposed offer. If the supervisor accepted, the offer would stand; if the supervisor rejected, neither party would get anything. Thus, making the supervisor an antisocial offer would be clearly regarded as retaliation toward him or her. We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to make antisocial offers when treated unfairly than fairly. However, this effect would be driven by promotion-focus participants.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy one persons (40 females, 31 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.62$, $SD = 2.46$) were paid €2 (\$2.85) for participation. We assessed individual differences in regulatory focus, manipulated procedural fairness (accurate vs. inaccurate procedure), and assessed behavior (i.e., UBG offers).

Material and procedure. Participants completed the regulatory focus scale ($M_s = 4.99$ vs. 3.81 ; $SD_s = .75$ vs. $.88$ for the promotion and prevention focus subscales respectively). The two subscales were uncorrelated ($r = .08$, $p > .48$). We created a dominant regulatory focus scale by subtracting the prevention-focus ($\alpha = .75$) from the promotion-focus ($\alpha = .75$) subscale. The resulting scale was correlated with both the promotion focus ($r = .61$, $p < .001$) and the prevention focus ($r = -.74$, $p < .001$) subscales. High scores reflected a promotion focus, low scores a prevention focus.

The procedural fairness manipulation ensued. This manipulation was modeled after Van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke (1997). Participants imagined the following scenario:

Synalco Medics, a large medical logistics company, has many employees working for them. You are also an employee at this company. This week, you learned that there will be a possibility for job promotion in your own

department for employees who have the same expertise as you do. To find out if you qualify for promotion, you were required to go through a company procedure. This selection procedure consists of a 9-part test-battery: an intelligence test, a personality test, a mathematical test, a test measuring your technical skills, a test assessing your calculation skills, a language test, a test for presentation skills, a motivation test, and, finally, an interview with the supervisor.

Next, participants received different information, depending on the procedural fairness condition to which they were assigned. Participants in the *accurate procedure* condition read:

Today, you find out that your supervisor graded all nine parts of the selection procedure. Based on these grades, your supervisor will soon decide who gets the promotion.

Participants in the *inaccurate procedure* condition read:

Today, you find out that your supervisor graded only one of the nine parts of the selection procedure. Based on this grade, your supervisor will soon decide who gets the promotion.

Then, we collected the manipulation check measures. Participants responded to these items on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*). To check for the effectiveness of the accuracy manipulation, we asked participants: "To what extent do you consider the decision-making procedure as accurate?". To check for fairness perceptions, we asked participants three questions: "How fairly were you treated by the supervisor?", "How respectfully were you treated by the supervisor?", and "To what extent were you treated justly?". We combined these items to form a fairness perceptions scale ($\alpha = .94$).

Then, we introduced the UBG. Participants learned that they would negotiate with the supervisor on how to distribute financial resources for future company-related research. They were to decide how many units (value: €100.000 each), from a pool of 100 units, they would offer to the supervisor and how many

they would keep for themselves. The contingencies of this task were made clear to participants. If the supervisor accepted their offer, both would benefit from it as stated. However, if the supervisor rejected the offer, neither would benefit from it. Next, participants were asked how many units (ranging from 0-100) they offered the supervisor. Lower offers reflected more retaliatory (i.e., antisocial) behavior.

Results and Discussion

We conducted regression analyses with the main effects in Step 1 (regulatory focus, procedural fairness) and the interaction term in Step 2 (regulatory focus x procedural fairness). In order to reduce collinearity, we centered scores on regulatory focus and effect-coded (-1, 1) procedural fairness (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The interaction term was based on the product of the centered regulatory focus scores and the effect-coded procedural fairness. There was no evidence of collinearity: tolerance > .99; variance inflation factor = 1.

Manipulation checks. A hierarchical regression analysis on perceived accuracy revealed that the equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R = .91$), $F(4, 66) = 35.89$, $p < .001$. This analysis yielded only a procedural fairness main effect, $\beta = .78$, $p < .001$, *partial r* = .81, 95% CI[1.25; 1.78]: Participants in the accurate condition ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 1.19$) regarded the procedure as more accurate than those in the inaccurate condition ($M = 2.15$, $SD = 1.23$).

A hierarchical regression analysis on fairness perceptions also revealed that the equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R = .87$), $F(4, 66) = 22.26$, $p < .001$. This analysis yielded only a procedural fairness main effect, $\beta = .74$, $p < .001$, *partial r* = .75, 95% CI[1.07; 1.66]. Participants in the accurate condition regarded the scenario as fairer ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 1.28$) than those in the inaccurate condition ($M = 2.07$, $SD = 1.23$). The procedural fairness manipulation was effective.

Retaliation. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on antisocial offers are displayed in Table 2.1. This regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R = .57$), $F(4, 66) = 7.76$, $p < .001$. Antisocial

offers was predicted by regulatory focus, $\beta = -.23$, $p < .05$, *partial r* = $-.25$, 95% CI[-7.57; -.29]. Promotion-focus participants made lower offers than prevention-focus participants. In contrast to Study 2.1, there was no procedural fairness main effect, $\beta = .11$, $p > .30$, *partial r* = $.13$.

Table 2.1. *Retaliation as a function of procedural fairness and regulatory focus in Study 2.2.*

	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	R^2_{change}	<i>Df</i>
Dependent Variable	Retaliation				
Step 1		.26	.23	.26	3, 67
gender	.41 ^{***}				
proc. fairness	.11				
regulatory focus	-.23 [*]				
Step 2		.32	.28	.06	4, 66
procedure x	.24 [*]				
regulatory focus					

Note. Total $F(4, 66) = 7.76$, $p < .001$.

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

More important to our hypothesis, however, was that the interaction significantly predicted antisocial offers, $\beta = .24$, $p < .05$, *partial r* = $.28$, 95% CI[.66; 7.69]. We proceeded with computing the relation between procedural fairness and antisocial offers at a high (1 SD below the mean) and a low (1 SD above the mean) level of regulatory focus, respectively signifying promotion and prevention focus (Figure 2.2). Simple slope analyses revealed that the relation between retaliation and unfair treatment was significant among promotion-focus, $\beta = .37$, $p < .05$, *partial r* = $.29$, 95% CI[1.31; 12.55], but not among prevention-focus participants, $\beta = -.13$, $p > .36$, *partial r* = $-.11$. Promotion-focus (compared

to prevention-focus) participants were more likely to behave in a retaliatory manner. Alternatively, regulatory focus was related to antisocial offers in the unfair, $\beta = -.38$, $p = .01$, *partial r* = $-.43$, 95% *CI*[-13.38; -1.90], but not in the fair procedural fairness condition, $\beta = .03$, $p > .87$, *partial r* = $.03$. Retaliation was predicted by regulatory focus in the unfair treatment condition.




Figure 2.2. Retaliation as a function of procedural fairness and regulatory focus in Study 2.2.

Summary. Study 2.2 conceptually replicated the theoretically-relevant findings of the first study, using a different measure of retaliation (i.e., an UBG-offer) and with dispositional (rather than momentarily-activated) differences in regulatory focus. In particular, participants with a promotion (vis a vis prevention) focus were more retaliatory (i.e., made more antisocial offers) to a procedurally

unfair (as opposed to fair) authority. Taken together, the results of the first two studies converge in supporting the hypothesis that regulatory focus moderates retaliation to unfair treatment in such a way that this effect emerges more frequently among persons with a dispositional or momentarily-activated promotion focus.

Study 2.3

Why is retaliation to unfair treatment localized in promotion-focus persons? What drives such persons toward retaliatory responses? Promotion-focus strategies vary along with independence and autonomy of the goal pursuit process (Lee et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 2004; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Moreover, relative to their prevention-focus counterparts, promotion-focus persons appear to be influenced behaviorally by personal interest (Galinsky et al., 2005), have self-esteem concerns accessible in their minds (Leonardelli et al., 2007), and report lower self-esteem following failure (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Is, then, promotion focus associated with a chronically accessible individual self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001a)? Does situationally-activated promotion focus heighten the accessibility of the individual self? The objectives of Study 2.3 were to address these questions.

We first examined the relation between dispositional regulatory focus and an indicator of chronic individual-self accessibility, private self-consciousness (PrSC; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1976). In particular, PrSC reflects awareness of inner aspects of the self, such as beliefs, values, and moods. People high as opposed to low in PrSC are more likely to value individual over collective identity (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). We hypothesized that promotion focus is associated with chronic individual-self accessibility. A pilot study ($n = 76$) confirmed this hypothesis. Promotion focus and PrSC were positively correlated, $r = .31$, $p < .01$, whereas prevention focus and PrSC were uncorrelated, $r = .07$, $p > .57$.

We wanted to provide a more compelling assessment of the association between promotion focus and individual-self accessibility. Thus, we manipulated regulatory focus (in a different way than Study 2.1) and measured individual-self accessibility. We induced regulatory focus with a visual technique developed by

Friedman and Förster (2001). These researchers implemented an instruction-free manipulation in the form of a simple maze. In one version of the maze, participants attempt to find the way for a cartoon mouse (trapped inside the maze) toward a piece of cheese lying outside the maze. Completion of this version corresponds to the promotion-focus strategy of seeking nurturance. In the other version of the maze, participants also attempt to find the way for the cartoon mouse, but now there is an owl flying above the maze, presumably ready to fly down and capture the mouse. Completion of this version corresponds to the prevention-focus strategy of seeking security.

Participants completed the maze and subsequently engaged in a 3-minute open-ended thought-listing task, thought to assess the momentary accessibility of individual self (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Gaertner et al., 1999; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). We were interested, in particular, in the relative frequency of first-person pronouns. We hypothesized that the induction of regulatory focus would influence the accessibility of individual self: participants in the promotion-focus condition would list more first-person pronouns than participants in the prevention-focus condition.

Method

Participants and design. Forty seven persons (31 females, 16 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 22.50$, $SD = 6.36$) were paid €7 (\$10) each for participation. We used a one-factor design: regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention).

Procedure. Participants were seated in separate cubicles, containing a table, a chair, and a pencil. First, they received either the cheese (promotion-focus) or owl (prevention-focus) version of the maze. All participants completed this task successfully. Subsequently, they received the following instructions for an ostensibly unrelated thought-listing procedure: "Write down everything that crosses your mind right now. There is no need to reflect upon your writings; anything is good, as long as you write with full sentences. You have three minutes for this task." An independent judge counted the total number of first-person pronouns used. We proceeded to create relative scores for each participant by dividing the amount of first-person pronouns by the total amount of words

generated. We took the relative score for first-person pronouns as an index of personal concerns. Finally, as a manipulation check, we asked participants to recall and describe the maze drawings.

Results and Discussion

Five participants did not recall successfully the content of the maze drawings, thus casting doubt on whether they processed accurately the nurturance- or security-related cues. We excluded these participants from further analyses.

Thought-listing. We conducted a one-way ANOVA on the amount of first-person pronouns listed, with regulatory focus as the independent variable. As hypothesized, participants generated significantly more first-person pronouns after completing the cheese maze ($M = .12$, $SD = .03$) than the owl maze ($M = .07$, $SD = .03$), $F(1, 39) = 34.38$, $p < .001$, $r = .69$, 95% CI[-.07; -.03].

Summary. Promotion focus reflects individual-self accessibility. A pilot study indicated that dispositional promotion focus is positively associated with chronic individual-self accessibility, operationalized in terms of PrSC. Moreover, an experiment demonstrated that temporarily-induced promotion focus led to higher individual-self accessibility, operationalized in terms of first-person pronouns.

Study 2.4

What are the implications of the association between promotion focus and individual self for retaliation? We have shown that promotion focus covaries with, or heightens the accessibility of, the individual self. Might it be possible, then, that the accessibility of the individual self is a reason why promotion-focus participants respond retaliatorily to unfair treatment? We tested this idea by manipulating individual-self accessibility in both promotion-focus and prevention-focus participants.

Particularly intriguing would be the behavior of prevention-focus participants. How would they be affected by the manipulation of individual-self

accessibility? These persons respond to unfair treatment in a relatively non-retaliatory manner. However, activation of the individual self may transform their behavior. There is evidence that activation of the self fosters opportunistic responding (Gaertner et al., 2008; Miedema et al., 2006; Skitka, 2003; Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006). If so, prevention-focus participants would become less inhibited in defending themselves and might respond to unfairness as retaliatorily as their promotion-focus counterparts. (We assume that activation of the individual self in promotion-focus participants would be inconsequential—i.e., a ceiling effect). We will refer to this possibility as the *transformation hypothesis*.

Alternatively, activation of the individual self could simply augment the dominant behavioral tendencies of both prevention-focus and promotion-focus persons. There is evidence that, when the self is activated, behavior becomes more consistent with values that are internalized or central (Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978; Utz, 2004; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). If so, promotion-focus participants would behave even more retaliatorily, and prevention-focus persons even more non-retaliatorily, to unfair treatment. We will refer to this possibility as the *amplification hypothesis*.

In Study 2.4, we carried out a comparative test of the transformation and amplification hypotheses. We assessed regulatory focus, rendered the individual self accessible, and recorded retaliation. To simplify our design, and given the findings of Studies 2.1 and 2.2, we only used an unfair procedure condition.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy eight persons (49 females, 29 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.12$, $SD = 2.82$) participated voluntarily, receiving a snack at the end of the study. Following the assessment of regulatory focus, participants were assigned to one of the two individual-self condition: high accessibility (i.e., I-prime), low accessibility (i.e., neutral-prime).

Material and procedure. Participants were seated at different tables and given a stimulus booklet ostensibly containing several unrelated studies. Participants began by completing the regulatory focus scale ($M_s = 5.05$ vs. 3.55 ; $SD_s = .70$ vs. $.83$, for the promotion and prevention focus subscales respectively).

The two subscales were uncorrelated ($r = .12, p > .30$). We proceeded to subtract the prevention-focus ($\alpha = .74$) from the promotion-focus ($\alpha = .75$) subscale. The resulting scale was correlated both with the promotion-focus ($r = .59, p < .001$) and prevention-focus ($r = -.73, p < .001$) subscales.

Next, participants engaged in a writing task, which in actuality was the individual-self accessibility manipulation. They wrote a short paragraph on an assigned topic. In the *high individual-self accessibility (I-prime)* condition, they wrote a story about themselves. They were instructed to record “how they behave and feel at this university,” while including at least one of ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘my’, or ‘mine’ in every sentence. We borrowed this technique from Fenigstein and Levine (1984; see also: Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006). In the *low individual-self accessibility (neutral-prime)* condition, participants wrote a story about the characteristics of a chair. We checked the effectiveness of this manipulation by computing the number of first-person pronouns in each condition.

Subsequently, participants received the same scenario as in Study 2.2. In brief, they imagined that, as employees in a large company, they completed a 9-test screening task that would determine professional advancement. All participants were informed that the supervisor used an inaccurate procedure (i.e., grading only 1 of 9 tests). We checked the effectiveness of the manipulation with the question “How accurate was the decision-making process?” (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*) and assessed retaliation with an UBG, also as in Study 2.2.

Results and Discussion

We conducted regression analyses with the main effects in Step 1 (individual-self accessibility and regulatory focus), and the interaction term in Step 2 (individual-self accessibility x regulatory focus). In order to reduce collinearity, we effect-coded individual-self accessibility (–1, 1) and centered participants’ scores on the regulatory focus scale. The interaction term was based on the product of the effect-coded manipulation and the centered regulatory focus scores. There was no evidence for collinearity: tolerance > .99; variance inflation factor = 1.

Table 2.2. *Retaliation as a function of individual self-activation and regulatory focus in Study 2.4.*

	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	R^2_{change}	Df
Dependent Variable	Retaliation				
Step 1		.10	.06	.10	3, 74
gender	.15				
self-activation	-.19				
regulatory focus	-.20				
Step 2		.17	.12	.07	4, 73
self-activation x regulatory focus	.26*				

Note. Total $F(3, 74) = 3.13$, $p < .05$.

* $p < .05$

Manipulation check. We submitted the first-person pronouns to a hierarchical regression analysis. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R = .92$), $F(4, 73) = 86.85$, $p < .001$. Moreover, the number of first-person pronouns was predicted significantly by the individual-self accessibility main effect, $\beta = .92$, $p < .001$, *partial r* = .92, 95% *CI* [.08; .10]. As intended, participants in the I-prime condition used a higher number of first-person pronouns ($M = .18$, $SD = .05$) than participants in the neutral-prime condition ($M = .01$, $SD = .02$). Neither the regulatory focus main effect nor the interaction term predicted use of first-person pronouns (both $ps > .14$, *partial rs* > -.18). The manipulation was effective. In general, participants considered the decision-making process as relatively inaccurate ($M = 1.93$, $SD = 1.06$). A one-sample t-test revealed that the mean differed significantly from the mid-point (i.e., 4) of the scale, $t(77) = -17.87$, $p < .001$.

Retaliation. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R = .41$), $F(4, 73) = 3.13$, $p < .01$. As shown in Table 2.2, the interaction was significant, $\beta = .26$, $p < .05$, *partial r* = .27, 95% CI [.45; 6.37]. We computed the relation between regulatory focus and antisocial offers at both levels of individual-self accessibility (Figure 2.3). In the low level (i.e., neutral-prime condition), regulatory focus significantly predicted retaliation, $\beta = -.46$, $p < .01$, *partial r* = -.46, such that promotion focus was related to more antisocial offers than prevention focus. However, in the high level (i.e., I-prime condition), regulatory focus did not predict antisocial offers, $\beta = .08$, $p > .66$, *partial r* = .08. As such, offers did not vary as a function of regulatory focus. Alternatively, among prevention-focus participants, individual-self accessibility influenced antisocial offers, $\beta = -.45$, $p < .01$, *partial r* = -.33, such that high (compared to low) accessibility led to more antisocial offers. Among promotion-focus participants, however, individual-self accessibility had no influence on antisocial offers, $\beta = .06$, $p > .69$, *partial r* = .05.

Summary. The findings were consistent with the transformation hypothesis at the expense of the amplification hypothesis. When the temporary accessibility of the individual self was low, prevention-focus participants behaved less retaliatorily than promotion-focus participants toward an unfair authority. This pattern replicates the unfair procedure condition findings of Studies 2.1 and 2.2. On the other hand, when the temporary accessibility of the individual self was high, prevention-focus participants were as retaliatory as promotion-focus participants. This pattern is novel and intriguing. It is also preliminary and in need of replication.




Figure 2.3. Retaliation as a function of regulatory focus and self-activation in Study 2.4.

Study 2.5

Study 2.5 attempted to replicate the Study 2.4 findings with temporarily-induced regulatory focus, a different manipulation of individual-self accessibility, and in a social interaction setting. Participants first engaged in a screening task for their assignment to a group role (as in Study 2.1). Also, participants were primed not only with promotion or prevention focus referring to their lives in general (as in Study 2.1; Idson et al., 2000) but also with promotion or prevention focus referring to the group problem-solving task in which they expected to engage (Galinsky et al., 2005).

Study 2.5 also used a different manipulation of individual-self accessibility, namely high versus low uniqueness or authenticity. Specifically, participants received performance feedback that either emphasized their uniqueness/authenticity or not. Next, participants learned that the authority enacted an unfair (i.e., inaccurate) decision-making procedure. We assessed behavior with an UBG, as in Studies 2.2 and 2.4.

In the low individual-self accessibility (i.e., no feedback) condition, we expected to replicate the unfair treatment findings previously observed in Studies 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4: Promotion-focus participants would be more retaliatory than prevention-focus participants. However, in the high individual-self accessibility (i.e., uniqueness/authenticity feedback) condition, we expected for this effect to be cancelled out, as in Study 2.4: Promotion- and prevention-focus participants would not differ in degree of retaliatory behavior.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy eight persons (58 females, 20 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.34$, $SD = 2.49$) were paid €7 (\$10) for participation. As in Study 2.4, all participants received unfair (i.e., inaccurate) treatment. We used a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The first factor was regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention). The second factor was individual-self accessibility, split into high (uniqueness/authenticity feedback) and low (no feedback).

Experimental procedure. Participants completed a 3-page booklet, cast as the Self-Inventory Scale (SIS). The SIS was said to be a standardized personality test that generated different personality profiles depending upon one's percentile scores. Participants were told that they would receive feedback about their profile, but it was not specified when this would occur.

Then, the actual experiment started. The experimental procedure was very similar to that of Study 2.1. Participants completed the screening task and proceeded to work on the 5-test battery that would ostensibly help Manager A assign them to a group-role. Upon completion, participants contacted the experimenter. He entered the cubicle, collected their test results, announced that he would hand them over to Manager A, and gave participants another task. This

was the manipulation of regulatory focus, in which half of the participants listed promotion-focus goals and the other half listed prevention-focus goals. Participants completed this task twice: once for a current promotion/prevention goal in their lives (ex-context goal; Idson et al., 2000) and once for a promotion/prevention goal about the upcoming group task (in-context goal; Galinsky et al., 2005). When finished, participants again contacted the experimenter.

The individual-self accessibility manipulation followed. Participants in the *high individual-self accessibility* condition received a standard form with a handwritten indication of the percentile that corresponded to their scores on the SIS and also an accompanying profile description feedback that they were allowed to keep. Each participant was informed that she or he had scored very highly (i.e., 95th percentile) compared to the reference sample. The profile feedback read as follows:

Few others (only 5 %) have such a unique and specific way of handling things as you do. You are always true to yourself and you are never guided by others. Whether you're dealing with family, friends or business relationships, you always maintain your true self, which generally makes you feel good. Also, as a unique person, you know yourself remarkably well. It must be very important to you to always keep in mind your own goals. Otherwise, you risk losing yourself in life.

Participants in the *low individual-self accessibility* condition were given no self-relevant feedback.

Next, as in Study 2.1, participants received handwritten feedback in an envelope from Manager A. All participants learned that the manager used an inaccurate procedure (i.e., grading only 1 of 5 tests) to allocate them to group-roles. Before leaving the cubicle to commence the group-decision task, participants responded to the perceived accuracy ("To what extent do you think Manager A will make the decision in an accurate manner?") and perceived fairness ("To what extent does manager A treated you fairly?") manipulation checks (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*). Finally, as in Studies 2.2 and 2.4, we recorded the UBG offers that participant made as a measure for retaliation.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks. As in Study 2.1, two judges independently coded goal-descriptions as either promotion or prevention focus. Both judges rated every goal-description and agreed on 90 % ($Kappa = .79$) of them. Disagreement was equally low for promotion (10 %) and prevention-focus (10 %) conditions. This indicates that participants followed the instructions, as intended. Disagreements between judges were resolved with discussion, and resolutions were included in the analyses.

Participants perceived the decision-making process as relatively inaccurate ($M = 2.19$, $SD = .93$). A one-sample t-test showed that the mean differed significantly from the scale mid-point (i.e., 4), $t(77) = -16.99$, $p < .001$. Also, participants perceived the decision-making process as relatively unfair ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.59$). A one-sample t-test revealed that the mean was significantly different from the scale mid-point (i.e., 4), $t(77) = -3.35$, $p < .001$.

Retaliation. A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of individual self-accessibility, $F(1, 73) = 4.13$, $p = .05$, $r = .22$, 95% CI[-10.97; 6.82]: High than low individual self-accessibility resulted in more antisocial offers. More important to our hypothesis, this effect was qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 73) = 7.23$, $p < .01$, $r = .29$, 95% CI[4.40; 29.63] (Figure 2.4). Simple effects analyses yielded a significant regulatory focus effect in the low individual-self accessibility (i.e., no-feedback) condition, $F(1, 73) = 4.64$, $p < .05$, $r = .25$, such that promotion-focus participants ($M = 44.52$, $SD = 13.87$) made more antisocial offers than prevention-focus participants ($M = 53.74$, $SD = 17.38$). However, the regulatory focus effect was not significant in the high individual-self accessibility (i.e., uniqueness/authenticity feedback) condition, $F(1, 73) = 2.76$, $p > .10$, $r = .19$, such that promotion-focus ($M = 46.67$, $SD = 10.98$) and prevention-focus ($M = 40.25$, $SD = 14.28$) participants did not differ in the extent to which their offers were antisocial.




Figure 2.4. Retaliation as a Function of Regulatory Focus and Individual-Self Accessibility in Study 2.5.

Alternatively, in the prevention-focus condition, individual-self accessibility had a significant impact on behavior, $F(1, 75) = 11.07, p = .001, r = .36$, such that offers were more antisocial in the high ($M = 40.25, SD = 14.28$) than low ($M = 55.61, SD = 15.87$) individual-self accessibility condition. In the promotion-focus condition, however, individual-self accessibility had no impact on retaliation, $F(1, 75) < 1, p > .66, r = .05$, indicating that offers were equally antisocial in the high ($M = 46.67, SD = 10.98$) and low ($M = 44.52, SD = 13.87$) accessibility conditions.

Summary. The results of Study 2.5 replicated those of Study 2.4 in providing further evidence for the transformation hypothesis. When individual-self accessibility was low (i.e., no feedback), prevention-focus participants responded less retaliatorily to unfair treatment than their promotion-focus counterparts. However, when individual-self accessibility was high (i.e., uniqueness feedback),

prevention-focus participants were as retaliatory toward an unfair authority as promotion-focus participants.

General Discussion

First, we will summarize the main objectives and findings of our research. Then, we will discuss the implications of our findings. These implications involve broad considerations for the literature, practical implications, possible limitations, and suggestions for future research.

Summary of Objectives and Findings

Although unfair treatment would be expected to lead to retaliation in group or organizational settings, the findings, when meta-analyzed, proved to be inconsistent (Colquitt et al., 2001). A call for moderators ensued (Colquitt et al., 2006). In this article, we responded to this call by addressing two issues: When unfair treatment results in retaliation, and why the recipients sometime pursue and other times inhibit retaliation.

When will unfair treatment result in retaliation? We addressed the “when” issue by exploring the moderational role of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998) in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. Promotion focus reflects nurturance concerns (e.g., hopes, aspirations) and is associated with goal-pursuit strategies that are willful, approach-oriented, and direct. Prevention focus, on the other hand, reflects security concerns (e.g., duties, responsibilities) and is associated with goal-pursuit strategies that are vigilant, avoidance-oriented, and deliberate. How would these regulatory foci and goal-pursuit strategies play out in a procedural (un)fairness setting?

Given evidence that promotion-focus is associated with neural correlates of retaliation (Amodio et al., 2004; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001) and evidence that prevention-focus is associated with self-silencing, withdrawal, and inhibition of hostility in the anticipation of unfairness or rejection (Ayduk et al., 2003; Oyserman et al., 2007, Study 2.3), we hypothesized and found that promotion-focus (compared to prevention-focus) participants were more likely to

retaliate against an authority who enacted unfair procedures. Moreover, we obtained this pattern across momentarily-induced (Study 2.1) and dispositional (Study 2.2) regulatory foci, and across different retaliatory responses (i.e., stealing in Study 2.1, UBG offers in Study 2.2).

Why do procedural unfairness recipients sometime pursue and other times inhibit retaliation? We addressed the “why” issue in Studies 2.3-2.5. When engaging in face-to-face negotiation, promotion-focus participants concentrate on their personal target prices (Galinsky et al., 2005). The self-esteem concerns of such participants are relatively accessible (Leonardelli et al., 2007) and their self-esteem reportedly drops in the case of failure (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). It is likely, then, that promotion focus is associated with, or heightens the accessibility of, the individual self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001a). This type of self is characterized by enhancement or defense motivation (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Accessibility of the individual self is linked with construal of social interactions as a zero-sum game and with competitive behavior (Stapel & Van der Zee, 2006), a pattern that has been observed in procedural (un)fairness settings (Miedema et al., 2006; Skitka, 2003). In summary, (a) promotion focus might be associated with heightened accessibility of the individual self, which, in turn, (b) would influence retaliatory responding. If so, it would be interesting to explore how accessibility of the individual self influences the behavior of prevention-focus participants.

Study 2.3 examined the idea that promotion focus is associated with heightened accessibility of the individual self. A pilot study showed that promotion focus is positively related to private self-consciousness, an indicator of chronic individual-self accessibility. Prevention-focus was uncorrelated with private self-consciousness. More importantly, an experiment provided evidence that induction of promotion (but not prevention) focus leads to higher individual-self accessibility, as indicated by the use of first-person pronouns.

Studies 2.4 and 2.5 examined the idea that heightened individual self-accessibility influences retaliatory responding by exploring the influence of individual-self accessibility on retaliation toward unfair treatment. In particular, these studies tested two competing hypotheses. According to the transformation hypothesis, high (vs. low) individual-self accessibility would transform the

behavior of prevention-focus participants in such a way that they would behave as retaliatorily as promotion-focus participants. According to the amplification hypothesis, high (vs. low) individual-self accessibility would reinforce dominant responses in such a way that prevention-focus participants would behave less retaliatorily, and promotion-focus participants would behave more retaliatorily. The results were consistent with the transformation hypothesis. Prevention-focus participants were as retaliatory as promotion-focus participants under conditions of high individual-self accessibility. The results were replicated across temporarily-induced (Study 2.5) and dispositional (Study 2.4) regulatory foci, and across individual self-accessibility manipulations (i.e., self-activation in Study 2.4, uniqueness/authenticity feedback in Study 2.5).

Implications

Broad considerations. Our research falls in the general tradition of emphasizing the role of self and identity in the justice process (Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, in press). This tradition is reflected in such theoretical models as the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000), and the self-based model of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). In particular, our research is more compatible with theoretical and empirical accounts that view procedural unfairness as a threat to the self (Miedema et al., 2006; Skitka, 2003; Skitka & Bravo, 2005). Our research expanded this knowledge base by identifying an important moderator: regulatory focus. Promotion-focus persons respond more directly or retaliatorily to procedural unfairness than prevention-focus persons. Furthermore, our research pinpointed the locus of such behavior: self-activation. In fact, when the individual self of prevention-focus persons was activated, they responded as retaliatorily to the enactor of the unfair treatment as promotion-focus persons did.

These findings have implications for research on both procedural fairness and regulatory focus. With respect to the procedural fairness literature, our research, first of all, stresses the importance of studying the psychology of unfairness along with the psychology of fairness (De Cremer & Ruiter, 2003; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Van Prooijen et al., 2006; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos,

Lind, & Wilke, 2006). Research to date has mainly been involved with understanding how procedural fairness influences a variety of positive reactions or responses such as self-esteem, satisfaction, cooperation, and legitimacy. It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that many effects are driven by the unfairness rather than fairness component. Moreover, most of these effects have been documented on affective, cognitive, or attitudinal measures, but less so on behavioral ones: The effects of procedural unfairness on behavior are rather poorly understood. An example is the effect of unfairness on retaliation (Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001; Posthuma et al., 2007), which has produced inconsistent findings. Our research has helped clarifying this effect by addressing the role of regulatory focus.

Relatedly, our findings illustrate the usefulness of the regulatory focus construct in the context of social interactions. As noted by Galinsky et al. (2005), this is an under-investigated topic. Procedural fairness settings constitute such a promising social interaction paradigm within which to explore regulatory focus effects. In addition, our findings inform the specifics of promotion-focus in social interactions. Such a focus is more strongly associated with individual-self concerns than a prevention-focus is. This difference offers an explanation for why promotion-focus persons are more likely to retaliate in the face of unfair treatment.

Practical implications. Organizations often adopt an economic perspective in which virtually only outcomes matter, implying that the process through which outcome allocation is decided (i.e., procedural fairness) does not make a difference (Korsgaard & Sapienza, 2002). After all, if employees were bothered by unfair procedures, they should react to them, something that often does not happen, as employees keep quiet. Our findings and the regulatory focus literature suggest that employee acquiescence is a function of disposition and situation. First, prevention-focus employees (or group members) would be less likely to react to unfairness than promotion-focus employees. Second, organizational environments that foster safety, security, and conformity are less likely to encourage and evoke reactions to unfairness than organizational environments that foster comfort, accomplishment, and aspiration (cf. Werth & Förster, 2007).

Good management, then, would aim both to identify employees with different regulatory foci and also change accordingly the organizational environment.

We have referred to non-retaliatory behavior as constructive, and to retaliatory behavior as destructive. As implied by the above paragraph, the terms constructive and destructive can often resume alternate meaning, depending on organizational environment and organizational (or individual) goals. Retaliation, for example, could sometimes be interpreted as a call to institute changes in organizational or leadership practices (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Tripp & Bies, 1997).

Limitations and suggestions for future research. Prior research has suggested that promotion-focus is associated with more immediate, more active, and less deliberative responding than prevention-focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). Does this proclivity generalize both to negative (e.g., retaliatory) and positive (e.g., prosocial) responding? For theoretically-relevant reasons, we focused exclusively on negative responding in our studies. Future research would do well to assess positive responding (e.g., cooperation, reconciliation, forgiveness) as well (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006). Such research would rely on the assumption that both promotion- and prevention-focus can predict active coping in interpersonal situations (Ayduk et al., 2003; Grant & Higgins, 2003). Indeed, promotion-focus persons need not necessarily be considered as across-the-board more active or reactive problem-solvers than their prevention-focus counterparts. Instead, the specific characteristics of the situation and the problem-solving activity may interactively determine whether promotion- versus prevention-focus persons cope more or less actively with social feedback.

On a related note, our research assessed retaliatory behavior in a decision-making paradigm. Although many situations in groups and organizations can be characterized by a conflict of interest, as operationalized by the UBG, the ecological validity of the UBG may not be particularly high. Despite the fact that the allocation decisions respondents make in an UBG are usually referred to as behavioral responses (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000), these decisions reflect a somewhat narrow focus on behavior. This reflection may be one explanation for the relatively weak effect sizes in our studies. Future research would do need to

replicate the present findings in real-life contexts, such as organizational or household conflicts, in which a wider range of behaviors can be assessed.

Our research showed that, all else being equal, promotion-focus persons are more likely than prevention-focus ones to retaliate against perceived unfair treatment. However, our research also identified a condition under which those with a prevention focus retaliate, that is, when the individual self was accessible. A profitable direction for future research would be to explore additional conditions under which prevention-focus persons are likely to take retaliatory action. For example, rather than directly responding in a negative way, prevention-focus persons may show indirect retaliation such as gossiping, passively undermining the enacting authority, or omitting to perform positive acts.. This line of reasoning is in accordance with social cognitive theories of aggression, which posit that displaced or indirect aggression emerges when people experience a lack of opportunities for direct action or when they fear counter-retaliation from the unfairness source (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vazquez, & Miller, 2005). Might it be, then, that prevention-focus persons manifest indirect retaliation when the offender is relatively powerless or when circumstances allow for covert action? Research on power-asymmetry, for example, has shown that downward retaliation (i.e., when the offender is less powerful) is greater than upward retaliation (i.e., when the offender is more powerful), but only under circumstances that allow for covert action (Kim, Smith, & Brigham, 1998). Indirect forms of retaliation may also be influenced by a group context such that prevention-focus persons may be likely to engage in retaliation in an effort to protect the interests of their ingroup when the unfairly-enacting authority belongs to an antagonistic outgroup (Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007). These suggestions fit within a rational choice perspective, in which retaliation is more likely when cost-expectancies are low or when it represents a means to avoid losses. Retaliation, then, can be seen as resulting from a hedonistic calculus—an idea originating from classical views on criminology (Beccaria, 1764/1986; Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006).

Finally, future research would benefit from an attempt to reconcile empirical inconsistencies pertaining to the role of regulatory focus in intra-

individual (e.g., task-performance) versus inter-individual settings (e.g., procedure-based feedback). Particularly relevant to this point is recent research suggesting that regulatory focus effects may reveal contrasting patterns in situations in which people anticipate versus react toward negative feedback (Friedman & Förster, 2005, Study 2.3). Relying on left versus right hemispheric activation patterns, this research shows that motivational mechanisms operate differently when people perform a task in order to avoid (approach) negative (positive) feedback in intra-individual settings than when people cope (react) as recipients of negative (positive) feedback in inter-individual settings. Other research in the same tradition has demonstrated that, when actual feedback is given, a promotion-focus is associated with greater left hemispheric activation, which in turn is associated with retaliatory responding toward interpersonal provocation (Amodio et al., 2004; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001)—a pattern consistent with our findings.

In Closing

The current investigation establishes self-regulatory focus as a moderator of retaliation in response to perceived unfairness. It is promotion-focus that is associated with, or leads to, retaliation. Furthermore, it is chronic or temporary accessibility of the individual self that drives retaliatory responding. We hope that our investigation will spark additional forays into the relation between self-regulation, procedure-based feedback, and behavior.

Procedural Fairness and the Self-Absorption Paradox: How Rumination versus Reflection Influences the Psychology of Procedural Fairness²

Fairness considerations have a profound impact on people's attitudes and behaviors in group and organizational settings (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). In this article, we are interested in procedural fairness; a particular type of fairness concern that refers to the perceived fairness in supervisory decision-making procedures (e.g., resource allocation, policy-making; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988). The most widely investigated rule in experimental procedural fairness research is voice or the possibility to provide input into a decision-making process (Folger, 1977). Over the last three decades, it has become clear that the fairness of enacted procedures has powerful effects on a variety of reactions (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), and these effects even go beyond the impact of the outcomes that people receive (Lind & Tyler, 1988). A popular explanation of the unique effects of procedural fairness holds that the fairness of procedures communicates to recipients a symbolic message of being valued and respected, from which people derive important self-evaluative information (Tyler & Lind, 1992).

As a matter of fact, contemporary justice theories and research have increasingly emphasized the role of the self in when and why justice information reveals such powerful effects on reactions in general (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, 2008; Holmvall & Bobocell, 2008; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006; Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Wiesenfeld, Brockner, & Martin, 1999), and behavioral reactions in particular (Brebels, De Cremer, & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). More specifically, recent theoretical arguments have suggested that fairness considerations become more impactful when a focus on the self is salient (Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003),

² This chapter is based on Brebels, De Cremer, & Sedikides. (in preparation). Procedural fairness and the self-absorption paradox: How rumination versus reflection influences the psychology of procedural fairness.

suggesting a relation between self-focus and fairness. It is fair to note, however, that this line of research has not addressed how exactly self-focused attention works in the justice process. This is an important question to address because (a) justice research usually conceptualizes self-focus in a rather broad manner, using a variety of self-measures, (b) direct examinations of self-focus are scarce and have revealed inconsistent results (e.g., Greenberg, 1983; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999), and (c) this inconsistency may depend on the use of divergent types of self-focused attention. Indeed, a frequent observation in the self-focus literature is that focusing attention to one's thoughts and feelings results in two apparently contradictory outcomes: increased psychological distress *and* well-being. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the self-absorption paradox (Anderson et al., 1996; Cramer, 2000; Creed & Funder, 1998; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Wheeler, Rios Morrison, DeMarree, & Petty, 2008). We argue that justice research lacks a clear understanding of *how* self-focus relates to procedural fairness because it has not addressed the seemingly paradoxical nature of self-focus.

Trapnell and Campbell (1999) resolved the self-absorption paradox by claiming that two independent motives for engaging in self-focused attention (i.e., rumination and reflection) explain most of the variance in the effects that self-focus convey. In the present article, we build upon this reasoning and introduce the idea that these self-focus motives affect the impact of procedural fairness feedback differently. In doing so, we examine the correlational and causal role of self-focus motives in importance attached to procedural fairness (Studies 3.1 and 3.2). Subsequently, we examine the moderating role of self-focus motives on reactions to actual procedural fairness feedback (Studies 3.3 and 3.4). We will begin with a brief review of the literature on procedural fairness and the self, then we turn to a discussion of how the notion of self-focus is incorporated, and finally we address the motivational duality in self-focused attention.

Procedural Fairness and the Self

In the 1970s, procedural fairness effects were accounted for in a theoretical framework arguing that procedures are valued so much because they allow control over the outcomes that one can receive (i.e., procedures have instrumental value; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Alternative theoretical frameworks were put forward to account for the observation that procedures even have a greater explanatory value than outcomes do (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler, 1994). More specifically, the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987), the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000), and the self-based model of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005), have in common the emphasis on non-instrumental reasons for valuing procedural fairness. Moreover, this primacy of non-instrumental concerns allowed clarifying the link between procedural fairness and the self-concept on a theoretical level. That is, the common idea in these so-called relational models is that procedural fairness communicates important information indicating people's standing and inclusion within the relationship with the enacting authority and the group (Tyler, 1994). This relational information is assumed to signal one's value to the group and as such impacts on the recipient's self-concept. A vast amount of studies has indeed shown that procedural fairness is used as a standard for self-evaluation, as is evidenced from its impact on recipients' self-esteem, belongingness, identification, self-uncertainty and reputation concerns (Brockner, De Cremer, Van den Bos, & Chen, 2005; Brockner et al., 1998, 2008; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, 2008; Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, in press; Tyler et al., 1996; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Besides having an impact on these important motives and needs, procedural fairness also affects how people pursue their goals, consequently motivating specific behaviors (Brebels et al., 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005).

Building upon these insights, scholars have argued that fairness considerations become more important when people's attention is focused more

on the self (Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006; Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003). Nevertheless, the idea of a close connection between the motivational dynamics of self-focus and procedural fairness has not yet been explored in depth. That is, adequate empirical evidence in support of such a relation is lacking. We will now briefly review how the self-focus concept has been incorporated in procedural fairness research.

The notion of Self-focus in Procedural Fairness

The justice literature to date usually talks about the notion of self-focus as covering almost any type of self, regardless of whether it pertains to self-esteem (Koper et al., 1993), self-construals (e.g., Brockner, De Cremer, Van den Bos, & Chen, 2005), levels of self-definition (Johnson et al., 2006), or self-regulatory mechanisms (Brebels et al., 2008). As a result, most justice studies have defined the notion of self-focus in a very broad manner and, as a consequence, a variety of self-concept measures have been employed.

A scarce amount of justice research employed self-focus in a more direct and relevant manner. These studies, however, revealed inconsistent results (Greenberg, 1983; Kernis & Reis, 1984; Reis & Burns, 1982; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999). Wiesenfeld and colleagues, for example, revealed in a field study on organizational downsizing that procedural fairness influenced commitment more strongly among individuals high than low in private self-consciousness (Wiesenfeld et al., 1999). Privately self-focused attention, thus, increased the effect of fairness versus unfairness. Research conducted by Greenberg (1983), however, revealed exactly the opposite pattern. That is, privately self-focused participants revealed a reduced tendency (a) to perceive overpayment to themselves as more fair than overpayment to others, and (b) to perceive underpayment to themselves as more unfair than underpayment to others; a phenomenon called the egocentric bias. As such, Greenberg's findings (1983) suggested that privately self-focused attention decreased the effects of fairness versus unfairness.

A possible reason for the scarce and inconsistent findings on the role of self-focus in procedural fairness is that research has not addressed the motivational mechanisms underlying self-focused attention. This is a relevant question to address because the role of the self in explaining procedural fairness effects has particularly demonstrated strong motivational implications of procedural feedback (for overviews, see Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocell, & Rupp, 2001; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Briefly, procedural feedback determines need satisfaction and guides goal-pursuit (Brebels et al., 2008; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Van Prooijen, in press). Therefore, it makes sense that if there would be a relationship between self-focus and procedural fairness, then motives underlying self-focused attention may moderate this relationship.

On the Motivational Duality of Self-focused Attention

Self-focused attention has been the subject of considerable psychological research since the self-consciousness scales were developed (Fenigstein, Buss, & Scheier, 1975). Private self-consciousness has received the lion's share of attention. In part, this has to do with the intriguing paradoxical nature and consequences of private self-focus. That is, private self-focus is associated with both adaptive (e.g., more accurate self-knowledge; Nasby, 1985) and maladaptive outcomes (e.g., greater fear of negative evaluation; Monfries & Kafer, 1994). In trying to resolve this paradox, some researchers developed a model in which the original private self-consciousness items were divided in two subscales (i.e., self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness; Anderson et al., 1996; Cramer, 2000; Creed & Funder, 1998; Wheeler et al., 2008, for a recent example). Like generalized private self-focus, however, these subscales are equally confounded with diverging motives for self-attention (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

Trapnell and Campbell (1999) reasoned that motivational confounds are central to the self-absorption paradox. Building upon the observation that private self-focus correlates equally with two unrelated personality dimensions: *Neuroticism* and *Openness to experience* (McCrae, 1983), they proposed that the

effects of private self-focus result from the reason why people focus attention to themselves rather than from self-attention per se. That is, two diverging self-focus motives are responsible for the paradoxical effects of private self-focus: rumination and reflection. *Rumination*, on the one hand, concerns neurotic dwelling on negative, unwanted, or threatening self-aspects. This type of self-focused attention is motivated by a need to evaluate the self. *Reflection*, on the other hand, concerns an open, experiential, and epistemic approach to the self. This type of self-focused attention is motivated by a need to explore the self. Although these diverging types of self-focused attention are moderately correlated, they relate to a clearly distinct set of traits (see Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

The construct validity of the distinction between rumination and reflection was tested using a multi-trait multi-sample method. Traits originally associated to both private self-consciousness and neuroticism (e.g., anxiety, repression-sensitization) or openness to experience (e.g., need for cognition, right-wing authoritarianism), no longer correlated significantly with private self-consciousness when controlled for the corresponding self-focus motive (i.e., either rumination or reflection; see Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, study 3.3). Moreover, these findings were confirmed across five different samples. Also, the rumination-reflection distinction (or conceptually related distinctions) was validated in a number of studies examining relevant topics including affect regulation, empathy, repetitive thought, and comparative thinking (McFarland, Buehler, von Rütli, Nguyen, & Alvaro, 2007; Joireman, Parrot, Hammersla, 2002; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003; Silvia, Eichstaedt, & Philips, 2005).

We argue that the self-focus motive distinction helps to shed further light on the precise workings of self-focus in procedural fairness. People engage in self-focused attention for different reasons and search for different kinds of information, which in turn may relate to a differential concern with procedural fairness information. Building upon the relational models, procedural fairness is rather used as a standard for self-evaluation than as an object for self-exploration

and, thus, according to relational models, procedural fairness will be considered more self-relevant in a ruminative than in a reflective focus.

Prior research firmly, but indirectly, supports our claim that rumination rather than reflection is responsible for the close connection between self-focus and procedural fairness. As mentioned before, a large body of evidence demonstrated the impact of procedural fairness feedback on recipients' self-esteem, belongingness, reputation and self-uncertainty evaluations (Brockner et al., 1998; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Koper et al., 1993). This suggests that procedural fairness effects run via self-evaluation mechanisms, in turn suggesting rumination rather than reflection as a moderator of procedural fairness effects. Further support for this prediction can be found in Colquitt and colleagues' assertion that likely moderators of justice effects most ideally include, among others, mechanisms of deliberate rumination on justice information (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006). Also, prior large-sized longitudinal research, in which Neuroticism moderated the effect of procedural fairness perceptions on withdrawal reactions (i.e., absenteeism; Elovainio, Kivimäki, Vahtera, Virtanen, & Keltikangas-Järvinen, 2003). This finding on the moderating role of Neuroticism was recently mirrored in an examination on the role of individual differences in procedural fairness effects, showing Neuroticism as the primary organizing dimension (Van Hiel, De Cremer, & Stouten, in press). These results are interesting in light of the observation that rumination correlates most strongly with Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

The Present Research

The present research consists of four studies and addresses two issues. As a *first step*, we propose that procedural fairness information is more self-relevant in case of a self-ruminative orientation. Evidence indeed suggests that rumination is associated with a need for self-evaluation, whereas reflection is associated with a need for self-exploration (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Procedural fairness communicates self-evaluative rather than self-explorative information (Brockner et

al., 1998; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Koper et al., 1993). Thus, procedural fairness will be self-relevant as a function of dispositional rumination. Similarly, procedural fairness information will be considered more self-relevant when rumination than reflection is made salient. We test these hypotheses in Studies 3.1 and 3.2.

As a *second step*, we propose that the actual impact of procedural fairness on behavioral regulation is moderated by self-focus motives. More specifically, we argue that if rumination makes procedural fairness information more self-relevant, then rumination should drive behavioral reactions toward actual procedural feedback. We test this hypothesis in Studies 3.3 and 3.4, in which we will use the voice paradigm. The behavioral reactions that will be assessed in these studies are turnover (Study 3.3) and commitment to the enactment source (Study 3.4); both frequently employed outcomes in procedural fairness research (see e.g. Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).

Besides replication of the Study 3.3 findings, the objectives of Study 3.4 will also concern the ruling out of possible alternative explanations. First, relying on evidence that privately self-focused attention may either increase (Wiesenfeld et al., 1999) or decrease (Greenberg, 1983) the impact of fairness versus unfairness, we will test the alternative hypothesis that the process of reflection attenuates the effect of procedural fairness rather than that the process of rumination promotes the effect of procedural fairness. In doing so, we will incorporate a low self-focus control condition in study 3.4. Second, we will also control for the possibility that two correlates of rumination are responsible for the observed effects. Specifically, because rumination has been associated to greater negative affect (e.g., Mor & Winquist, 2002) and fairness accessibility in thought content (e.g., Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), we will include assessments of these variables in Study 3.4.

Participants in all studies were undergraduate students at a Southern Dutch University. They were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Cell sizes were approximately even and no effects of gender emerged. Also, at the end of each study session, participants were thanked, debriefed, and remunerated where relevant.

Study 3.1

Method

Participants and design. Seventy students (42 females, 28 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 18.74$, $SD = 1.21$) participated voluntarily in exchange for course credit. This study used a correlational design.

Procedure and materials. Participants responded to several questionnaires on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all characteristic of me*) to 9 (*extremely characteristic of me*). First, participants completed the 24-item Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). This scale purports to disentangle rumination and reflection as distinct motivational tendencies underlying self-focused attention. The rumination subscale consists of 12 items ($\alpha = .88$), such as “I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with” and “I don’t waste time rethinking things that are over and done with” (reverse-coded). The reflection subscale also consists of 12 items ($\alpha = .85$), such as “I love exploring my “inner” thoughts” and “I don’t really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking” (reverse-coded). The two subscales were moderately correlated, $r = .25$, $p < .05$, as in Trapnell and Campbell (1999).

Subsequently, participants completed a 9-item Procedural Fairness Importance Questionnaire (PFIQ; Factor Structure and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.1), assessing the importance and self-relevance of procedural fairness. We developed this questionnaire based on items from several existing scales in the literature: the victim subscale of the justice sensitivity scale (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005), the procedural fairness subscale of the organizational justice questionnaire (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and a scale assessing procedural justice world belief (Lucas, Alexander, Firestone, & LeBreton, 2007). The PFIQ revealed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$). Moreover, a principal components factor analysis showed that all items loaded on a single factor with an Eigenvalue > 1 , $EV = 4.37$. This factor explained 48.59 % of the total variance in the scores.

Table 3.1. *Factor Structure and Descriptive Statistics of the Procedural Fairness Importance Questionnaire in Study 3.1 (PFIQ).*

items	loadings	statistics	
		means	SDs
When decisions have consequences for me, I find it very important that they are based upon a fair process	.85	7.06	1.20
I find it very difficult when procedures are not applied in a consistent manner	.79	6.30	1.31
I find it very important that most things in my life come about fairly	.73	6.90	1.33
I have difficulties with decisions that are biased with prejudice	.69	6.59	1.92
I find it very important that decisions are preceded by impartial procedures	.69	6.30	1.91
I have difficulties with decisions that are based solely upon one small aspect of the total picture	.66	7.06	1.26
It is important to me to express my ideas and feelings before decisions are made	.64	6.80	1.49
I find it important that things occurring to me are due to a fair process	.61	6.74	1.10
I find it important to be treated equally fair as others are	.57	7.69	.99

Results and discussion

We conducted a regression analysis to examine the influence of dispositional rumination and reflection on importance of procedural fairness information (assessed with the PFIQ). Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken's (2003) recommendations, we centered rumination and reflection scores. In the first step, we entered the main effects of rumination and reflection. Finally, in step 2 we entered the interaction term (the product of the centered rumination and reflection scores).

The results of this regression analysis are displayed in Table 3.2. The regression equation accounted for a marginally significant amount of variance in Step 1 which contained the test of our hypothesis, ($R^2 = .10$), $F(2, 67) = 3.81$, $p <$

.05. PFIQ was predicted by participants' rumination scores, $\beta = .27$, $p < .05$, $r = .52$, 95% CI [.03; .39], in such a way that higher levels of rumination led participants to consider the fairness of enacted procedures to be more important. In contrast, PFIQ was neither predicted by reflection scores nor by the interaction term (both $ps > .24$).

Table 3.2. PFIQ as a function of self-focus motives in Study 3.1.

	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	R^2_{change}	df
Dependent Variable	PFIQ				
Step 1		.10	.08	.10	2, 67
rumination	.27*				
Reflection	.14				
Step 2		.10	.06	.00	3, 66
rumination x	.01				
reflection					

$p < .05$

Summary. In line with predictions, results reveal that the self-relevance of procedural fairness information is uniquely associated with dispositional rumination. Neither dispositional reflection nor the interaction between self-focus motives yielded significance. The results in Study 3.1, thus, provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that self-relevance of procedural fairness information varies along with dispositional rumination. Nevertheless, because the current design was correlational, it is unclear whether rumination arouses increased procedural fairness importance or vice versa. Study 3.2 was designed to address this limitation.

Study 3.2

In Study 3.2, rumination and reflection will be temporarily activated between participants by using a self-developed thoughts recall task. In addition, we will also control for a possible alternative explanation of the findings in Study 3.1. The distinction between rumination and reflection may vary as a function of thought content in general, and fairness-related thinking in particular (i.e., temporarily activating a ruminative self-focus may indirectly also activate fairness concerns, because fairness is implicitly present in the concept of rumination; see Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Study 3.2 rendered us the opportunity to control for a possible alternative explanation in terms of fairness accessibility in thought content, as such suggesting an unintended overlap in the present study. In line with study 3.1, we expected procedural fairness information to be more important when self-focus is motivated by rumination than reflection.

Method

Participants and design. Thirty-nine undergraduate students (35 females, 4 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 19.49$, $SD = 1.72$) participated voluntarily for partial course credit. They were randomly assigned across the rumination and the reflection conditions in a between-subjects design.

Experimental procedure. Participants signed up for a series of studies on “people and decisions” and when they arrived to the laboratory, they were seated in separate cubicles, containing a table, a chair, a pencil and several booklets. Two consecutive booklets contained the materials for our study. Participants were introduced into a ‘thought recall task’ wherein they were asked to think of a recent situation or event that caused them to think in a manner closely resembling the subsequently given description. These descriptions contained our self-focus manipulation. In the *rumination* condition, participants were given a description based upon Trapnell and Campbell’s rumination scale (1999):

You are in a state in which things you did or said in a previous situation keep brooding through your head. Not only you think over and over again about how you behaved in that situation; you also find yourself re-

evaluating the things you did. Even though you would rather want to focus your attention away from these unwanted thoughts about yourself, you fail at banning them from your mind.

In the *reflection* condition, participants were given a description based upon Trapnell and Campbell's reflection scale (1999):

You are in a state in which you look in a philosophical way upon yourself and the things around you. You are very curious about yourself and fascinated about your own feelings and beliefs. Proceeding from this feeling, you carefully look at why exactly you do things the way you do them. This brings you closer to a clearer look upon your "inner" self.

Subsequently, all participants described the situation or the event that caused them to think as was described. In a supposedly unrelated part, participants responded to the PFIQ (including the same 9 items as the ones employed in Study 3.1), which was answered to on scales ranging from 1 (*not at all important/difficult for me*) to 9 (*extremely important/difficult me*). Again, the PFIQ attained high internal consistency ($\alpha = .84$), and a factor analysis revealed one factor with an Eigenvalue > 1 ($EV = 4.61$). This factor explained 51.22 % of the total variance in the scores. All 9 items loaded $> .50$ on this factor.

Results and Discussion

Control measure. To control for an alternative explanation of our results in terms of accessibility of fairness in thought content due to the self-focus motive manipulation, participants' descriptions of the situations and events that made them think as requested by the manipulation were coded for the extent to which these referred to fairness or some related aspect of it (low, medium, high). More specifically, their descriptions were coded according to the following fairness accessibility scale: (1) no reference to fairness at all (low accessibility); (2) reference to some form of interpersonal conflict (medium accessibility); (3) explicit reference to fairness (high accessibility). On average, descriptions revealed low justice accessibility ($M = 1.28$, $SD = .51$). Moreover, a one-way ANOVA on fairness accessibility scores revealed no significant effect of self-focus, $F(1, 37) < 1$, $p > .66$.

Procedural Fairness Importance. First, we performed a one-way ANOVA on the PFIQ-scores with self-focus orientation as the independent variable. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant effect of self-focus orientation, $F(1, 37) = 8.51, p < .01, r = .43, 95\% CI[-1.30; -.23]$, such that participants in the rumination condition reported higher scores ($M = 7.74, SD = .79$) than participants in the reflection condition ($M = 6.98, SD = .85$).

Additionally, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the PFIQ-scores with fairness accessibility in Step 1 (effect-coded as -1, 0, and 1 respectively for low, medium, and high accessibility), and self-focus in Step 2 (effect-coded as -1 and 1 respectively for the reflection and rumination conditions) (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

Table 3.3. *PFIQ as a function of self-focus motives and the control measure in Study 3.2.*

	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	R^2_{change}	df
Dependent Variable	PFIQ				
Step 1		.08	.06	.08	1, 37
fairness content	.29 [°]				
Step 2		.25	.21	.17	2, 36
self-focus motives	.41 ^{**}				

Note. Total $F(2, 36) = 6.08, p = .005$.

[°] $p < .10$, ^{**} $p < .01$

The results of this regression analysis are displayed in Table 3.3. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance in Step 2, which contained the test of our hypothesis, ($R^2 = .25$), $F(2, 36) = 6.08, p = .005$. As displayed in Table 2, accessibility of fairness content was a marginally significant predictor of PFIQ in Step 1, $\beta = .29, p = .08, r = .53, 95\% CI[-.05; .89]$,

but this effect was rendered non-significant when the self-focus motives manipulation was included in Step 2. Important to our predictions, PFIQ scores were significantly and positively related to self-focus motives, $\beta = .41$, $p < .01$, $r = .64$, 95% CI [.11; .63]. As such, the regression results mirror the ANOVA-results, indicating that self-focus has a significant impact on PFIQ above and beyond the effects of fairness accessibility in thought content.

Summary. As predicted, Study 3.2 revealed that people attach more importance to procedural fairness information when rumination rather than reflection is reinforced. Moreover, these findings suggest that it is possible to arouse greater importance of procedural fairness information by placing participant in a self-ruminative than self-reflective mindset. Study 3.2, thus, replicates and extends the findings of Study 3.1 and suggests a causal relation between rumination and procedural fairness importance. Studies 3.1 and 3.2, however, do not tell us whether rumination, not reflection, moderates reactions to perceived fairness in actual procedural feedback. In Study 3.3, we addressed this issue.

Study 3.3

To test our second hypothesis, we manipulate delivery of procedural feedback information by making use of the voice paradigm. Voice clearly relates to procedural fairness perceptions (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1996) and it is the most commonly used experimental procedural fairness manipulation (e.g., Van den Bos, 1999). As in Study 3.1, we assess dispositional rumination and reflection. We assessed turnover as a response measure. Turnover is a common behavioural outcome in procedural fairness research (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Specifically, studies have revealed that an individual's tendency to leave a group should be reduced significantly when procedures are fair as opposed to unfair (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991). In the current study, we predict that participants' preference to leave their group would depend upon whether they are granted or denied voice, but only when they are high rather than low in dispositional rumination.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy-two undergraduate students (60 females and 12 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 18.61$ years, $SD = 2.44$) participated in exchange for course credit. Voice was experimentally manipulated in a between-subjects design (voice, no-voice) and participants were randomly assigned across these experimental conditions.

Experimental procedure. Upon entry to the laboratory, participants were led to separate individual cubicles. Participants found computer equipment which was used to present the stimulus information and to register the data. Participants first completed a set of individual difference questionnaires, among which the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). As in Study 3.1, the rumination ($\alpha = .91$, $M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.01$) and reflection ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 4.58$, $SD = .92$) subscales revealed high internal consistency, and were positively correlated ($r = .48$, $p < .001$).

Next, participants learned that the upcoming group-task consisted of participating in a discussion in groups of four participants on a topic about recurring problems that students at this university encounter for several years now. It was explained that groups providing good arguments in a constructive discussion can receive something extra in return. Ostensibly, in each group a randomly chosen leader would be appointed by the experimenter, who was in charge of communicating the chosen topic to the experimenter. Of course, participants always ended up being normal group members. Then the different topics for discussion were presented (lack of student rooms at the university; campus code of conduct; computer support for students; general university policies). Next, Participants received a short message of their leader, containing the voice manipulation. In the voice condition, the leader communicated the following:

Hi, I would like to hear your opinion before deciding which topic we will discuss. In other words, I decided to grant you voice about this, so could you please indicate your topic of preference (the topics were then listed again). Do not forget to do this, please.

Immediately afterwards, all participants in the voice condition actually filled in their preferred topic.

In the no-voice condition, the leader communicated the following:

Hi, I do not need to know your opinion to decide which topic we will discuss. Since I will do this myself, I do not have to grant you voice about this. This way, you don't have to indicate your preference to me.

Before commencing the group-task, participants responded to the dependent measures. All questions were responded to on 7-point scales. To assess the effectiveness of the voice manipulation, participants were asked, "To what extent were you given an opportunity to voice your preference on the discussion topics" (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*) . Subsequently, we assessed global perceptions of procedural fairness (taken from ...) by asking participants how "correct" (1 = *very incorrect*, 7 = *very correct*), "fair" (1 = *very unfair*, 7 = *very fair*), "respectful" (1 = *very disrespectful*, 7 = *very respectful*), and "just" (1 = *very unjust*, 7 = *very just*) they were treated. Answers to these four questions were highly correlated ($p < .001$), and thus we combined them into a highly reliable procedural fairness perceptions scale ($\alpha = .97$).

Finally, we assessed our main dependent measure (i.e., turnover) by first explaining to participants that right before the group-task phase would start, they would be given the opportunity to leave their current group and join another group to perform the group-task. After this information was provided, they were asked to make a decision by indicating the extent to which they wanted to leave their group on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*definitely stay*) to 7 (*definitely leave*). After participants indicated their preference, the experiment ended. Participants were thoroughly debriefed, and at the end of the session they were thanked, remunerated and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

We conducted regression analyses with the main effects in Step 1 (the rumination scale, the reflection scale, and the voice manipulation), the 2-way interactions in Step 2 (rumination x voice, reflection x voice, and rumination x reflection), and the 3-way interaction in Step 3 (rumination x reflection x voice). Following the

recommendations of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we effect-coded the no-voice and voice conditions (i.e., as -1 and 1 respectively) and we centered participants' scores on the rumination and the reflection scales. The interaction terms were based on the products of the centered rumination and reflection scores and the effect-coded voice manipulation.

Manipulation checks. A hierarchical regression analysis on the voice manipulation check question revealed that the regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .82$), $F(6, 65) = 49.00$, $p < .001$. Participants' answers on this item were significantly predicted by the voice main effect, $\beta = .90$, $p < .001$, $r = .95$, 95% CI[2.00; 2.54]. Participants in the voice condition perceived to have more opportunities to voice their preferred discussion topic ($M = 5.81$, $SD = 1.28$) than participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.25$, $SD = .94$). No other effects were significant ($ps > .31$). We concluded that the voice manipulation was perceived as intended.

An additional hierarchical regression analysis on the procedural fairness perceptions scale indicated that the regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .81$), $F(6, 65) = 47.10$, $p < .001$. Perceived procedural fairness was significantly predicted by the voice effect, $\beta = .89$, $p < .001$, $r = .94$, 95% CI[1.76; 2.25]. That is, participants in the voice condition evaluated the decision-making process as fairer ($M = 5.80$, $SD = 1.16$) than participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.76$, $SD = .85$). No other effects were significant ($ps > .09$). We concluded that the voice manipulation also manipulated perceived procedural fairness.

Turnover. A hierarchical regression analysis on turnover decisions indicated that the regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .42$), $F(6, 65) = 7.78$, $p < .001$ (taken from Step2; see Table 3.4). Turnover was significantly predicted by the voice effect, $\beta = -.59$, $p < .001$, $r = .77$, 95% CI[-1.32; -.67]. Participants in the no-voice condition more strongly preferred to leave the group ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 1.56$) than participants in the voice condition ($M = 1.78$, $SD = 1.20$). More importantly, the results also revealed that the predicted voice x rumination interaction effect was significant, $\beta = -.27$, $p < .05$, $r = .52$, 95% CI[-.84; -.06] (see Figure 3.1). No other effects were significant.

Table 3.4. *Turnover as a function of voice, rumination, and reflection in Study 3.3.*

	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	R^2_{change}	df
Dependent Variable	Turnover				
Step 1		.36	.33	.36	3, 68
Voice	-.59***				
rumination	.13				
reflection	-.16				
Step 2		.42	.36	.06	6, 65
voice x rumination	-.28*				
voice x reflection	.07				
rumination x reflect	-.09				
Step 3		.42	.35	.00	7, 64
Voice x rum x refl	.01				

Note. Total $F(7, 64) = 6.56, p < .001$.

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

To further explore this interaction effect, we conducted simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Results revealed that voice predicted turnover among individuals high in rumination, $\beta = -.87, p < .001, r = .93, 95\% CI[-1.96; -.96]$, but not among individuals low in rumination, $\beta = -.29, p > .09, r = .54, 95\% CI[-1.02; .04]$.

Summary. The findings of Study 3.3 provided preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis that rumination is a moderator in responding toward actual procedural feedback. Being granted versus denied voice in the decision-making process predicted the extent to which participants chose to leave their current group among those with strong rather than weak dispositional rumination. Individual differences in reflection did not affect the voice effect. The current

findings, thus, provide preliminary support for the moderating role of rumination on the impact of procedural fairness feedback. Although intriguing, this finding is in need of replication and consolidation.




Figure 3.1. Turnover as a Function of Procedural Fairness and Rumination in Study 3.3.

Study 3.4

In Study 3.4, we wanted to replicate the Study 3.3 findings, but now with temporarily induced self-focus motives. Another objective of Study 3.4 is to rule out possible alternative explanations. First, we have repeatedly compared between self-focus motives the relative impact or relevance of procedural fairness information. Until now, though, we remain uncertain as to how these relate to circumstances under which self-focused attention is low or even absent. This is an interesting issue because prior research has suggested that, under some conditions, self-focus can increase fairness-based responding (e.g., Wiesenfeld et

al., 1999), but under other circumstances self-focus can also decrease fairness-based responding (e.g., Greenberg, 1983). Study 3.4 put these ideas to the test by including a low self-focus control condition. Second, as in Study 3.2, we control for the possibility that manipulating self-focus motives may at once induce differential concerns with fairness (e.g., Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), in turn suggesting an alternative route to the predicted effect. Third, rumination has also been strongly associated to greater negative affect (e.g., Mor & Winquist, 2002) It is possible, then, that our self-focus motive manipulation implicitly also manipulates negative affect. Negative affect, in turn, has been associated to increased responding to procedural fairness (Van den Bos, 2001, 2007), and, therefore, it represents another alternative route to the predicted effect. To address these issues, Study 3.4 included assessments of thought content and negative affect. Finally, Study 3.4 also differed from Study 3.3 in the use of commitment instead of turnover as a response measure. Similar to turnover, commitment is a frequently employed outcome measure in procedural justice research (for an overview, see e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students (83 females and 51 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 21.03$ years, $SD = 4.42$) participated in exchange for course credits. Participants were randomly assigned across a 3 (self-focus: rumination vs. reflection vs low self-focus control) x 2 (procedure: no-voice vs. voice) between-subjects design.

Experimental procedure. Upon entry to the laboratory, participants were guided to separate individual cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found computer equipment which was used to present the stimulus information and to register the data. The experiment consisted of two ostensibly unrelated parts. The first part consisted of a performance task which actually contained the manipulation of self-focus. As in Study 3.2, participants in the experimental conditions were engaged in a “thoughts recall task”, in which they were asked to think of a recent situation or event that caused them to think in a manner closely resembling the subsequently given description. Then, they were exposed to either

the rumination or reflection stimuli (these were the same as in Study 3.2), and finally they described the situation or the event that caused them to think as described. Participants who were assigned to the low self-focus control condition were engaged in a “color comparison task”, in which they were asked to assess the extent to which the colors presented on the screen were (dis)similar. After they judged the similarity of 10 pairs of colors, participants briefly wrote down what they had been doing.

Immediately after the self-focus manipulation and before the procedure manipulation, participants completed the state-version of the negative affect scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This 10-item scale ($\alpha = .91$) measured participants’ current affective state by asking them to what extent they felt irritated, tense, nervous, etc. on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*). To control for possible effects of presentation order, we randomized the order in which the affect questions appeared on the screen.

As a manipulation check for the induction of self-focus, we recorded the time that it took participants to respond to the negative affect scale. Access to one’s inner feelings and moods is a central aspect of self-focus and, thus, it can be expected that answering these items will be facilitated when attention is strongly versus weakly focused toward the self (e.g., Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

Next, participants were introduced to the second, ostensibly unrelated, part of the experiment. It was explained that they would be working in a group of 4 participants on a task about thinking styles, which had been rated as “fun, interesting, and informative” by their predecessors. As in Study 3.3, a group-leader was ostensibly assigned to decide whether their group would be working on a task about thinking styles in children, consultants, sports coaches, medical scientists, or lawyers. The voice manipulation ensued, which followed the same procedure as described in Study 3.3. As in Study 3.3, participants were actually granted (versus denied) an opportunity to indicate their task-topic preferences. Before leaving their cubicle to commence the group-task, participants responded to the dependent measures. All questions were answered on 7-point scales. To assess the effectiveness of the voice manipulation, participants were asked “to what extent did you receive an opportunity to voice your preference in the

decision process" (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*). Subsequently, we assessed global perceptions of procedural fairness by asking participants how "correct" (1 = *very incorrect*, 7 = *very correct*), "fair" (1 = *very unfair*, 7 = *very fair*), "respectful" (1 = *very disrespectful*, 7 = *very respectful*), and "just" (1 = *very unjust*, 7 = *very just*) they were treated. Answers to these four questions were highly correlated ($p < .001$), and thus we combined them into a highly reliable procedural fairness perceptions scale ($\alpha = .97$).

Finally, commitment to the enacting leader was measured. Participants were first explained that they had to make a decision concerning the next task after the group-task. More specifically, participants' were asked to decide whether they wanted to perform this task in a duo with the participant that performs the leader-role in the current task or in a duo with one of the participants that perform a member role in the current task. Participants then marked their preference on a scale from 1 (*strong preference for a member*) to 7 (*strong preference for the leader*) with the midpoint of the scale indicating no particular preference. Then the experiment ended and participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

Control measures. To control for the possibility that fairness accessibility in thought content influenced the present results, participants' descriptions in the experimental and control conditions were subjected to a content analysis. Specifically, an independent judge coded each description for the extent to which it referred to fairness, according to the following scale: (1) no reference to fairness or justice at all; (2) reference to some form of interpersonal conflict; (3) explicit reference to fairness or justice. On average, descriptions only weakly referred to fairness ($M = 1.19$, $SD = .43$). Nevertheless, a 3 (self-focus) \times 2 (voice) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of self-focus only, $F(1, 128) = 16.59$, $p < .001$, $r = .45$. To further explore this main effect, we conducted simple effect tests (see Table 3.5). As expected, fairness was more accessible in thought content among participants in the rumination condition than among participants in the reflection condition, and also more than among participants in the control condition. The

difference between the reflection and control condition was not significant. To control for the extent to which the self-focus motive manipulation primed fairness concerns, as such suggesting an alternative explanation for the predicted effects, we included fairness accessibility as a covariate in all analyses reported below.

Subsequently, we performed a 3 x 2 ANCOVA on the state *negative affect* scale. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of self-focus only, $F(1, 127) = 3.35, p < .05, r = .22$. To further explore this main effect, we conducted simple effect tests (see Table 3.5). As can be seen in Table 3.5, results revealed that the rumination condition produced somewhat more negative affect than the reflection condition, but clearly more than the low self-focus control condition. The difference in negative affect between reflection and low self-focus control was not significant. To control for differences in negative affect, this variable was included as a covariate in all analyses reported below. .

Manipulation checks. To control for the effectiveness of our self-focus inductions, we performed a 3 x 2 ANCOVA on participants' response latencies for completing the affect questions with fairness accessibility and negative affect included as covariates, revealed a significant self-focus main effect only, $F(1, 126) = 4.09, p < .05, r = .24$. To further explore this main effect, we conducted a simple effect tests (see Table 3.5). As can be seen in Table 3.5, results revealed that participants in the low self-focus control condition showed higher response latencies than participants in both the ruminative and the reflective self-focus conditions. The difference in response time between both types of self-focus, however, was not significant. No other significant effects emerged. This suggests that people had better access to their personal feelings and moods in the self-focus conditions than in the control condition.

To check the effectiveness of voice as a procedural fairness manipulation, we first performed a 3 x 2 ANCOVA on the item checking the effectiveness of the voice manipulation with fairness accessibility and negative affect as covariates. This analysis revealed a significant voice main effect only, $F(1, 126) = 891.74, p < .001, r = .93, 95\% CI[-5.20; -4.09]$. Participants in the voice condition indicated having received more opportunities to voice their preferences ($M = 6.08, SD = .97$) than participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.25, SD = .90$). No other

effects were significant ($ps > .21$). These results showed that participants perceived the voice manipulation as intended.

A second check was to assess whether voice also affected global perceptions of procedural fairness. Thus, we performed a 3 x 2 ANCOVA on the procedural fairness scale with fairness accessibility and negative affect included as covariates. Results again revealed a significant voice effect only, $F(1, 127) = 651.50$, $p < .001$, $r = .91$, 95% CI[-4.57; -3.52]. Participants in the voice condition evaluated the decision-making process as more fair ($M = 5.58$, $SD = .86$) than participants in the no-voice condition ($M = 1.68$, $SD = .91$). No other effects were significant ($ps > .16$). These results reveal that the manipulation of voice also manipulated procedural fairness.

Commitment. A 3 x 2 ANCOVA on leader commitment with fairness accessibility and negative affect included as a covariate first yielded a main effect of procedural fairness, $F(1, 127) = 116.70$, $p < .001$, $r = .67$, 95% CI[-2.40; -1.13]. Participants showed greater commitment when the leader granted ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.04$) than denied ($M = 2.12$, $SD = 1.14$) them an opportunity to voice their preferences during the decision-making process. Importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant voice x self-focus interaction effect, $F(1, 127) = 4.21$, $p < .05$, $r = .18$, 95% CI[-1.87; -0.07]. No other effects were significant.

To further explore the procedural fairness x self-focus interaction effect, we conducted simple effect tests (see Figure 3.2). As expected, fair versus unfair procedural treatment was more strongly related to commitment among those in the rumination condition, $F(1, 127) = 79.19$, $p < .001$, than among those in the control condition, $F(1, 127) = 29.58$, $p < .001$, and also than among those in the reflection condition, $F(1, 127) = 21.02$, $p < .001$. Moreover, the voice effect also was a significantly better predictor of commitment in the rumination condition than in the reflection condition, $F(2, 128) = 9.68$, $p < .01$, and than in the low self-focus control condition, $F(2, 128) = 5.06$, $p < .01$. On the other hand, voice was not a better predictor of commitment in the control than in the reflection condition, $F(2, 128) > 1$, $p > .60$.

Table 3.5
Means and Standard Deviations of Fairness Accessibility, Negative Affect, and Response Latencies as a function of the Self-focus manipulation in Study 3.4.

DVs	Self-focus		
	Rumination	Reflection	Low self-focus control
Fairness Accessibility	1.5 (0.6)	1.1 (0.3)	1.0 (0.0)
Negative Affect	2.6 (1.1)	2.2 (1.0)	2.0 (0.8)
Response latency	62 (31)	53 (22)	72 (49)

Note. Fairness accessibility was rated on a 3-point scale, Negative Affect on a 7-point scale, and response latencies are presented in seconds.

Summary. The results of Study 3.4 replicated those of Study 3.3 in providing further evidence for the hypothesis that self-focus moderates the procedural fairness effect. Furthermore, the Study 3.4 findings provide closure with respect to the direction of this moderating effect. Reflection does not attenuate the impact of procedural fairness. Instead, results reveal that rumination promotes the impact of procedural fairness. In addition, these findings ruled out alternative explanations in terms of fairness accessibility in thought content or negative affect produced by the employed self-focus manipulation.




Figure 3.2. Commitment as a Function of Procedural Fairness and Self-focus in Study 3.4

General Discussion

First, we will summarize the main objectives and findings of our research. Then, we will discuss the implications of our findings. These implications involve broad considerations for the literature, possible limitations, and suggestions for future research.

Summary of Objectives and Findings

Although it seems to be a common understanding in the justice literature nowadays that fairness considerations have more impact when a focus on the self is reinforced or salient (Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003), research has not addressed how exactly self-focus processes play a role because (a) self-focus has typically been operationalized in a broad manner, using a variety self-concept

measures, (b) direct examinations of self-focus are scarce and have revealed inconsistent results, and (c) this inconsistency may depend on the use of divergent types of self-focused attention. We drew on evolutions in the self-focus literature and argued that justice research lacks a clear understanding because self-focus is intrinsically paradoxical in nature (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996; Cramer, 2000; Creed & Funder, 1998; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Two underlying self-focus motives (i.e., rumination and reflection) are expected to be responsible for the paradoxical effects that self-focused attention conveys (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). What we set to do in the present article was to delve into the motivational properties of self-focus and examine their respective influence on (a) procedural fairness importance (Studies 3.1-3.2), and (b) behavioral regulation as a function of actual procedural feedback (Studies 3.3-3.4).

How do self-focus motives relate to procedural fairness importance?

We addressed the “how” of the relationship between self-focus and procedural fairness in Studies 3.1-3.2 by exploring the extent to which rumination and reflection guide differences in importance attached to procedural fairness information. Whereas reflection refers to self-focused attention driven by a need to explore the self, rumination refers to self-focused attention driven by a need to evaluate the self. How would these distinct motives relate to procedural fairness information?

Given theoretical suggestions that procedural fairness conveys a relational message about one’s value to the group and its representatives (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and empirical evidence that procedural fairness affects recipients’ self-esteem, belongingness, identity, and reputation evaluations (Brockner et al., 1998; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2008; Koper et al., 1993), we hypothesized and found a clear relation between rumination and procedural fairness importance. More specifically, Study 3.1 showed a unique relation between dispositional rumination and procedural fairness importance, regardless of dispositional reflection. Study 3.2 showed that, relative to temporary salient reflection, temporary salient rumination aroused greater procedural fairness importance. Moreover, this finding was significant

beyond the accessibility of fairness in thought content as a function of the implementation of rumination versus reflection.

When does self-focus influence reactions to actual delivery of procedural feedback?

We addressed the “when” issue in Studies 3.3-3.4. Likely moderators of justice effects, at least, include deliberative rumination on justice information (Colquitt et al., 2006). Some prior personality studies suggested neuroticism, a correlate of rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), as a moderator of reactions towards procedural fairness (Elovainio et al., 2003; Van Hiel et al., in press). Moreover, Studies 3.1-3.2 revealed that rumination makes people consider procedural fairness information as more important and self-relevant. Based upon this, in Studies 3-4 we hypothesized and found that the effect of actual procedural fairness feedback (i.e., granting versus denying voice in a group decision-making process) is moderated by rumination. The results were replicated across dispositional (Study 3.3) and temporary salient (Study 3.4) self-focus motives, and across reactions typically associated with procedural fairness (i.e., turnover in Study 3.3, commitment in Study 3.4; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).

Study 3.4 also allowed controlling for possible alternative explanations of the present findings. First, including a low self-focus control condition provided further closure on the directionality of the self-focus processes involved in procedural fairness effects. Specifically, compared to low levels of self-focus, the process of rumination increased the effect of procedural fairness. Alternatively, reactions to procedural fairness in the reflection condition were not different from reactions in the control condition. This ruled out the possibility that temporary salient reflection might have attenuated the impact of procedural fairness (e.g., Greenberg, 1983). Second, Study 3.4 (like Study 3.2) controlled for the possibility of overlap between the manipulations of self-focus motives and fairness considerations (cf. Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Different Accessibility of fairness considerations in participants’ thought content as a function of the self-focus manipulation could not explain the obtained results. Third, because associations exist between rumination and negative affect (e.g., Mor & Winquist), and negative affect and procedural fairness (Van den Bos, 2001, 2007), Study 3.4 controlled for

an alternative explanation in terms of negative affect. Negative affect, due to self-focus motive inductions, could not explain the obtained results.

Implications

Broad considerations. The present research runs into the tradition of emphasizing the importance of the self-concept in the justice process, as reflected in theoretical models like the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), the group-engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000), and the self-based model of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). More specifically, it highlights recent claims that fairness is more impactful when focus on the self is salient (Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003). The present research extends this view by showing that the effects of self-focus on procedural fairness are qualified by the underlying motive for engaging in self-focused attention. More specifically, a focus on the self increases the effects of procedural fairness, but only when this self-focus is motivated by rumination and not reflection regarding the self. This pattern was evidenced across individual differences in rumination versus reflection, and situations fostering rumination versus reflection. The current research, thus, identified the conditions under which self-focus does (i.e., rumination) and does not (i.e., reflection) impact procedural fairness effects, and calls for a more careful use of the relation between procedural fairness and the self-focus concept.

This finding has implications particularly for research on procedural fairness. Our research, first of all, stresses the importance of accounting for different motivational aspects when studying different aspects of the self in the psychology of procedural fairness (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, in press; Van Prooijen et al., 2008; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, in press). From the self-literature, it is clear that the motivational basis of the self is extremely multifaceted (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tesser & Cornell, 1991) and that self-focused attention exerts paradoxical effects on (social) psychological outcomes as fundamental as well-being, performance, and social influence (Anderson et al., 1996; Cramer, 2000; Creed & Funder, 1998; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Wheeler, Rios Morrison, DeMarree, &

Petty, 2008). Justice research to date has conceptualized self-focused attention in a broad manner via the use of a variety of self-concept measures like self-esteem level and maintenance, self-construal, levels of self-definition, and self-regulatory mechanisms. As a result, it is difficult to incorporate this bulk of findings in a consistent way to deepen our understanding on the role of the self in procedural fairness. Moreover, evidence on the relation between fairness and direct assessments of self-focus is scarce and rather poorly understood. For example, the impact of privately self-focused attention revealed inconsistent results (Greenberg, 1983; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999). At the same time, though, little is known about the role that different motives associated with self-focused cognition play. Our research provided a first effort to resolve the self-absorption problem in the psychology of procedural fairness by addressing the role of different self-focus motives (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

Our findings also illustrate the usefulness of accounting for the impact of self-focus motives. Many studies have revealed that procedural fairness effects are more pronounced in the presence than in the absence of self-threatening conditions like unfavorable outcomes, uncertainty, and mortality salience (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005; Miedema, Van den Bos, & Vermunt, 2006; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999). From the perspective of our findings, these studies all involve situations that foster a ruminative focus on the self among individuals. Generally, people strive to maintain a positive sense of self via the process of self-evaluation (e.g., Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Procedural fairness affects self-evaluation by validating the self in the case of fair treatment and by devaluating the self in the case of unfair treatment. This mechanism of reflected appraisal is characterized by seeing the self in a way that a relevant or significant other does (e.g., the enactment source in the present studies; Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; McAllister & Bigley, 2002; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). Under conditions of threat or failure, people thus attend more closely to self-evaluative information, and, as a consequence, display inflated reactions toward procedural fairness. In line with this view, recent research suggested that in situations of threat, procedural fairness operates as a tool for

self-affirmation (Hart, Sedikides, & De Cremer, 2008). In turn, self-affirmation via fair procedural treatment may neutralize the maladaptive functioning typically associated with rumination (Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Steele, 1988; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).

Our findings also provide insights into the self-regulatory qualities of procedural fairness feedback. Based upon goal-discrepancy accounts of rumination (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996), the present results suggest that procedural fairness conveys information relevant to how people evaluate the pursuit of their goals. This can be derived from our findings that fair procedures reduce withdrawal (as shown in Study 3.3) and increase commitment (as shown in Study 3.4) in the case of a ruminative focus on the self. The detrimental effects on goal-pursuit and performance that result from a strong need to be valued and respected by others (e.g., fear of negative evaluation in the case of rumination) can be efficiently reduced under conditions of fair treatment, but worsened under conditions of unfair treatment. This reasoning is in line with recent findings that the self-evaluative aspects of self-focused attention have a negative impact on task performance, but only when there is no expectation for improvement (Silvia, 2002; Silvia & Philips, 2004).

Limitations and objectives for future research.

Although Trapnell and Campbell (1999) implicitly suggest that self-focus conveys its effects via a combination of motivational and self-attention processes, the present findings only provide evidence for the motivational component. Because in the present research there were no direct assessments of self-focused attention, we cannot draw conclusions about whether self-focused attention represents a necessary condition for the present results to emerge. Paul Silvia and colleagues, however, collected critical findings suggesting that neither rumination, nor reflection predict self-focused attention (Silvia et al., 2005). This suggests the possibility that the moderating impact of rumination on reactions toward perceived procedural fairness stems from a unique relationship with self-relevant motivation, regardless of self-attention per se. In Study 3.4, however, we checked the induction of differential self-focus motives and compared these against a low self-focus control condition. Results revealed that both rumination

and reflection generate relatively more self-focused attention than a low self-focus control condition. Nevertheless, one may question whether assessing the time people need to evaluate their current mood, represents a *conclusive* indication of the extent to which self-attention is more or less involved. Therefore, we suggest that future research may do well in further examining the status and relevance of the self-focus concept in procedural fairness research and findings.

Our findings were observed in experimentally created groups. Therefore, they may be particularly applicable to newcomers in groups. An interesting question may be whether existing groups with more enduring supervisor-employee relationships may represent situations in which procedural fairness may be, at least, equally informative to those with a reflective focus on the self. Reflection is characterized with a better articulated self-schema, and more accurate self-knowledge (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Recent research has suggested that people may search for procedural fairness information to confirm their existing self-views in situations with more enduring supervisor-employee relationships (Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, & Bartel, 2007). More specifically, procedural fairness information may attest to people's efforts to inspect whether their supervisor treats them with the respect and dignity they believe they deserve.

Another condition under which procedural fairness effects may particularly apply to those with a reflective focus on the self is when the recipient of procedural fairness concerns another person (e.g., group-member) rather than the self. Prior research demonstrated that reflection is positively related to perspective taking and empathic concern (Joireman, 2004; Joireman et al., 2002). In addition, there is evidence that information about others being treated fairly or unfairly affects one's own emotional and behavioral reactions (De Cremer & Van Hiel, 2006). An interesting direction for future research, then, may be to explore the possibility that whereas rumination promotes procedural fairness effects among recipients (as revealed in the present studies), reflection may promote procedural fairness effects among observers or representatives. This suggests the interesting possibility that although victims (i.e., recipients) and attorneys (i.e.,

representatives) in courtroom justice may attach equal importance to judges' procedural fairness, they do so for different reasons.

The present research restricted examinations on the impact of actual procedural feedback to manipulations of a specific procedural rule (i.e., voice). As noted earlier, besides voice, procedural fairness consists of other procedural elements like consistency, accuracy, bias-suppression, ethicality, representativeness, and correctability (Leventhal, 1980). Therefore, in order to generalize the present findings to the whole range of procedural rules, more research is needed that examines the relationship between self-focus motives and the other rules (also see Brockner, Ackerman, & Fairchild, 2001 for a similar argument).

In closing

To conclude, our present findings clearly show that the motivational underpinnings of self-focus determine the extent to which people consider procedural fairness information important and are affected by it in their behavioral responses toward the enacting authority and the group. We hope that future research on the important and intrinsic role of the self-concept in procedural fairness effects will zoom in more on the motivational strategies that are fulfilled by fair treatment

All levels of the self matter!

Towards a self-definition model of the procedural fairness-OCB relationship³

The perceived fairness of the procedures that are used to derive outcome allocation decisions (i.e., procedural fairness; Leventhal, 1980) is viewed as effective in promoting positive and pro-social behaviors within organizations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Moorman, 1991; Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Skarlicki & Latham, 1996; Tepper, Lockhart, & Hoobler, 2001). Indeed, the enactment of fair procedures by organizational authorities motivates employees to engage in voluntary behaviors as diverse as performing one's own tasks with extra dedication, helping and motivating coworkers, and being good citizens overall; all actions believed to benefit the group or organization (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Graham, 1989; Organ, 1988; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005). A key psychological determinant in the relation between procedural fairness and these positive behaviors is the self-concept and its associated self-regulatory mechanisms (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; De Cremer, Tyler, & den Ouden, 2005).

In fact, recent efforts to explain the effect of procedural fairness (beyond the effect that outcomes reveal) have particularly emphasized the importance of the self in regulating fairness-based reactions (Brebels et al., 2008; Brockner, De Cremer, Van den Bos, & Chen, 2005; Holmvall & Bobocel, in press; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006; Skitka, 2003; Van Prooijen, in press). Although the evidence clearly supports that self-related processes explain much of the

³ This chapter is based on Brebels, De Cremer, & Van Dijke (submitted). All levels of the self matter! Towards a self-definition model of the procedural fairness – OCB relationship.

Moreover, this paper received the Best Paper Award at the WAOP-conference 2008 (Dutch association for Work and Organization Psychology), Open University, Heerlen.

variance in procedural fairness effects, at the same time inconsistencies exist in pointing out how exactly the self, and more precisely, which type of self, plays a role (see also Johnson et al., 2006). It is nowadays accepted that the self-concept can be seen as consisting of three levels of self-definition at which employees alternately rely in seeking or achieving identity: collective, relational, and individual (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Drawing upon this self-definition framework, procedural fairness research led to divergent conclusions regarding the level at which procedural fairness operates. Most models consensually agree that procedural fairness operates at the level of the collective self (Johnson et al., 2006; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Tyler, 1999). Other models, however, argued and showed that procedural fairness operates at the level of the relational self (Brockner et al., 2005; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, in press). Recent models even argued and showed that procedural fairness operates at the level of the individual self (Brebels et al., 2008; Ham & Van den Bos, 2008; Van Prooijen, in press).

In the present research, we argue and propose that rather than focusing on which level of self-definition explains procedural fairness effects, theory and research would benefit more from a focus on which type of positive behavior is predicted by procedural fairness as a function of the level of self salient (see also Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, in press). This proposition (a) implies that all three levels of self-definition matter in explaining the positive effects of procedural fairness, and (b) relates to suggestions in the literature on organizational citizenship behavior (i.e., OCB) that empirically distinct types of OCB can be considered as being differentially referenced at the collective, relational, or individual level (Lavelle et al., in press; LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002; Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Williams & Anderson, 1991). Building on these assumptions, we argue that the positive effect of procedural fairness on behavior is a process of social exchange in which employees' self-definition determines how exactly fair treatment is reciprocated (cf. Flynn, 2005). In the present research, we test how procedural fairness affects citizenship performed at collective, relational, and individual levels as a function of the salience of the corresponding self-level. First, we will outline the relations between self-levels and procedural fairness. Then, we

turn to a discussion of these relations and their relevance in predicting collective, relational, and individual OCB.

Procedural Fairness and Levels of the Self-concept

An important observation in the organizational justice literature is that procedural fairness makes organizational and group members act more cooperatively and display voluntarily citizenship behaviors (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Using a social exchange perspective (Blau, 1963), scholars have argued that the enactment of fair procedures induces a social exchange relationship in which fair treatment is reciprocated via an engagement in citizenship behavior (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Tepper et al., 2001). According to recent research, an important psychological process underlying this reciprocation is employees' sense of self and self-regulation (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a, for an overview). More specifically, the self is an organizing principle because it activates goals and regulates actions towards others (e.g., enacting authorities). The pursuit of these goals and social actions, however, is contingent upon information that one receives through social interactions with others (e.g., procedural fairness; De Cremer, 2003; Leary, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). This suggests that the self-concept plays a key role in the relation between procedural fairness and positive behavior.

Theoretical arguments have indeed linked self-accessibility to enhanced justice concerns in general (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Skitka, 2003), and procedural fairness concerns in particular (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Miedema, 2003). Given the multifaceted motivational nature of the self-construct, however, significant conceptual and empirical clarity will be obtained if the self would be trichotomized in terms of three levels of self-definition (see Sedikides et al., in press, for a similar argument). Indeed, each level of the self comprises specific motives, goals, and actions (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Moreover, the idea of different levels of the self can also be recognized in the empirical evidence available on the role that the self plays in relationship to

procedural fairness effects. We will now briefly outline how each of these levels is suggested to impact procedural fairness effects.

A well-documented body of evidence shows that procedural fairness effects operate at the *collective* level. The collective self-concept involves self-definition based on memberships in groups or organizations (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). As a result, a salient collective self increases employees' reliance on internalized collective goals and norms. The collective self account on procedural fairness is based on the idea that procedures represent the more formal aspects of organizational decision-making (Johnson et al., 2006; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), and on findings that procedures reveal information that is particularly self-relevant to group and organizational members when they define themselves in terms of the collective (e.g., pride and inter-group status; Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & DeGoey, 1995).

More recent research, however, moved away from the primacy of the collective self in explaining procedural fairness effects, showing that procedural fairness effects operate at the *relational* level. The relational self-concept involves self-definition based on dyadic connections and role relationships with others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). As a result, accessibility of this type of self increases employees' reliance on relational goals and role expectations. The relational self account on procedural fairness is based on findings that procedural treatments particularly affect evaluations about one's relationships with others within the group or organization (e.g., Brockner et al., 2005), and reveal information that is particularly self-relevant to group and organizational members when they define themselves in terms of their relationships with others (e.g., belongingness and respect; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a, b; De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008).

A relatively new body of evidence emphasizes the primacy of the *individual* self in procedural fairness effects. The individual self-concept involves self-definition based upon interpersonal comparisons and a sense of uniqueness (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). As a result, this level is characterized by employees' reliance on control and self-enhancement beliefs. The individual self account on procedural fairness is based on findings that

procedural treatment affirms (or threatens) the self and its worldviews, and reveal information that is particularly self-relevant to group and organizational members when they define themselves in terms of their unique set of traits (e.g., uncertainty reduction and personal status; Brebels et al., 2008; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2005; Van Prooijen et al., in press).

It is fair to note, however, that examinations of the moderating role of self-accessibility in procedural fairness have been restricted to either the collective, or the relational, or the individual self, instead of simultaneously examining all levels of self-definition. In addition, the focus of attitudinal and behavioral reactions examined in these studies primarily corresponded to the level of self examined. For instance, whereas some studies showed a procedural fairness by collective self interaction effect when predicting group-focused behavior like cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2000), other studies showed a procedural fairness by individual self interaction effect when predicting self-focused behavior like retaliation (Brebels et al., 2008). This practice of zooming in on single dimensions of self-definition makes that theory and research lack an integrative perspective on outcomes of procedural fairness. As mentioned earlier, we contend that all three levels of self matter, but that each level will affect the influence of procedural fairness on positive behaviors in different ways. That is, depending on the level of self salient, procedural fairness will promote different displays of positive behavior as each level of self will bring with it a different focus in terms of social exchange relations.

Procedural fairness, Levels of Self, and Different Positive Displays

The use of fair procedures creates a social exchange relationship (see Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998; Pillai et al., 1999), which motivates the recipient of fair treatment to reciprocate via a positive display. The kind of social exchange that people develop when being treated fairly will be influenced by the level of self that is accessible at the moment of the relationship (cf. Flynn, 2005). More precisely, we argue that depending on the level of self salient, people will construe their social exchanges in specific ways leading them

to pursue different goals and engage in different positive displays. We focus on organizational citizenship behaviors as positive displays. The concept of OCB refers to a variety of different behaviors that contribute to the “maintenance and enhancement of the social and psychological context that supports task-performance” (Organ, 1997, p. 91). A recent meta-analysis revealed that different types of OCB can be identified in terms of different relationships with important predictors, suggesting different types of social exchange relationships (LePine et al., 2002).

A common distinction in the OCB literature emerges from people’s tendency to meaningfully distinguish between different levels at which OCB is performed (e.g., Bentein, Stinglhamber, & Vandenberghe, 2002; Lavelle et al., 2008; Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Skarlicki & Latham, 1996). Research typically discriminates between OCBs that are primarily performed at the organizational or collective level (often referred to as OCB-O) and OCBs that are primarily performed at the relational level, affecting specific individuals (often referred to as OCB-I; LePine et al., 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991). In addition, some forms of OCB even are primarily performed at the individual level, affecting one’s own actions (e.g., job dedication, personal industry; Graham, 1989; Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996).

This idea of different levels at which OCB is targeted is particularly interesting in the context of self-definition. More specifically, whether people define the self in terms of the collective, their relationships with others, or their individual achievements affects the kind of goals that they pursue (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). In turn, different goals result in different forms of reciprocating an authority’s fair treatment. Based upon this, we argue that differences in reciprocation of an authority’s fair treatment depend on the use of diverging levels of self-definition and the measurement of diverging levels of OCB. Therefore, it is our contention that to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between the self and procedural fairness effects on OCB, researchers need to distinguish between, and examine simultaneously, different levels of self-definition and different foci pertaining to OCB.

Taken together, following from the idea that procedural fairness communicates information that is relevant to the self at three different levels, we suggest that procedural fairness may affect OCB in different ways as a function of the level of self salient. Indeed, depending on the type of self that is salient, people will bring different goals and attitudes into the relationship with the enacting authority, which will shape the type of behavior aimed at reciprocating the fair treatment of the authority. More specifically, fair treatment will be reciprocated by pursuing the welfare of the collective (e.g., showing pride when representing the organization in public), but particularly so among those with a strong (versus weak) collective self-definition.

Hypothesis 1: Procedural fairness predicts collective OCB, but only among those with a strong collective self-definition.

Similarly, fair treatment will be reciprocated by pursuing the welfare of individuals in the group/organization (e.g., voluntarily helping new employees settle into the job), but particularly so among those with a strong (versus weak) relational self-definition.

Hypothesis 2: Procedural fairness predicts relational OCB, but only among those with a strong relational self-definition.

Finally, fair treatment will be reciprocated by pursuing high levels of individual performance (e.g., performing one's tasks well beyond normative expectations), but particularly so among those with a strong (versus weak) individual self-definition.

Hypothesis 3: Procedural fairness predicts individual OCB, but only among those with a strong individual self-definition.

Overview of Studies

We conducted two studies to test the abovementioned predictions. Study 4.1 is a laboratory-based experiment in which we assessed chronic level of self-definition using the recently developed levels of self-concept scale (LSCS; Selenta & Lord,

2005). We manipulated procedural fairness by having a group-leader decide on task allocation based upon a procedure that either allowed participants to voice their task-preferences or not. Voice is, by far, the most commonly used procedural fairness manipulation in experimental research (Van den Bos, 1999). Finally, various citizenship intentions relevant to the group task were assessed.

Although experimental studies are high in internal validity and, thus, allow drawing conclusions regarding the suggested causal relationships, they lack external validity, throwing doubt upon the extent to which they generalize to organizational life. Therefore, we also conducted a cross-sectional field study. In this large-sized study, we assessed the LSCS (Selenta & Lord, 2005), Colquitt's procedural fairness scale (2001) which taps into the different procedural elements as suggested by Levental (1980), and finally also various OCBs as employed in Moorman and Blakely (1995; originally developed by Graham, 1989). Combining laboratory-based experiments with field research allows us to benefit from the strengths of each method and to compensate for the weaknesses of each method with the strength of the other method (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; Dipboye, 1990).

Study 4.1

Method

Participants and design. One-hundred and sixteen Tilburg University undergraduate students participated voluntarily in exchange for course credit (91 females, 25 males; $M_{\text{age}} = 19.99$, $SD = 3.65$). Participants were randomly assigned across the fair and unfair procedure conditions.

Measures and experimental procedure. Participants registered to participate in a study entitled "task-performance in a group-context". Upon arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter explained to participants that they would be divided in groups of four people to work on several tasks. Also, it was told to them that they first were required to respond to some questions. Subsequently the experimenter led them to separate cubicles. In the cubicles, they found computer

equipment that was used to present all stimulus information and to register the data.

First, participants completed the Levels of Self-Concept Scale (LSCS; Selenta & Lord, 2005; also see Johnson et al., 2006). Participants responded to the LSCS (and all of the following scales) on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). In line with the approach of Johnson et al. (2006), only the five most indicative items for each self-concept level were used. Also, because the original items were developed to measure working professionals self-concept levels, we slightly adapted some items to fit into the world of undergraduate students (e.g., 'co-workers' was replaced by 'classmates' and 'organization' was replaced by 'group'). The *collective* self-concept was measured using a Dutch translation of the Group Achievement Focus Scale, which revealed sufficient internal consistency ($\alpha = .66$). An example-item is: "Making a lasting contribution to groups that I belong to, such as my practicum group or fraternity/sorority, is very important to me." The *relational* self-concept was measured using a Dutch translation of Concern for Others Scale, which revealed good internal consistency ($\alpha = .71$). An example-item is: "Caring deeply about another person such as a close friend or relative is important to me." The *individual* self-concept was measured using a Dutch translation of the Comparative Identity Scale, which revealed sufficient internal consistency ($\alpha = .69$). An example-item is: "I have a strong need to know how I stand in comparison to my classmates."

The group-formation phase ensued. It was explained that each group would have to perform four tasks: solving logical problems, solving anagrams, solving pictograms, and solving mathematical problems. Not only do these tasks require different competencies, they also differ in the time required to solve them. However, it was made clear that all group-members would be able to help each other to solve the tasks. In every group, the computer randomly assigned one leader who had to divide each of these tasks to each of them. All participants were told that someone else in the group was assigned to the leader position and that they were member number two. Also, it was explained that the group with the best performance would be awarded € 40, which equals € 10 for every group-

member. To further coordinate the task-allocation process, the leader of the group then contacted them to explain how he or she planned to decide upon who would be working on which task. This communication contained the procedural fairness manipulation. In the *fair* procedure condition, the group-leader explained the following:

Hi, I just looked at the different tasks and purposes of the group assignment. I took some time to think it over. I think it is important that tasks are distributed based upon your preferences. So, here is what I plan to do: first, I want to hear from you which task you would like to perform. Based upon this input, I will make a decision and later, things can always be re-evaluated.

Subsequently, participants in the fair procedure condition indicated their preferences. In the *unfair* procedure condition, the group-leader explained the following:

Hi, I just looked at the different tasks and purposes of the group assignment. I made a choice for myself right-away. I still have to distribute the rest of the tasks to you, but I will ask each of you which one you would like to perform. Actually, you know what? Let me just distribute them and then we'll keep it like that.

Subsequently, the manipulation check measures were solicited. All items were responded to on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). We began with the manipulation checks. First, two questions directly assessed perceived voice by asking participants the extent to which they perceived having an opportunity to express their preference in the task-allocation procedure, and the possibility to appeal the resulting allocation of tasks. These two items were highly correlated ($r = .89, p < .001$), and combined into a single scale. Second, three items assessed global perceptions of procedural fairness by asking participants how fairly, how appropriately, and how justly their group-leader enacted the decision-making process. These three items were combined into a highly reliable procedural fairness scale ($\alpha = .92$).

The main dependent measures ensued. Participants were asked to indicate on 7-point scales their willingness to engage in several positive behaviors that would be relevant during the upcoming group task. Participants did this for 11 different kinds of behavioral intentions, which varied according to the level at which they would be performed: collective, relational, or individual. These items were adapted from Moorman and Blakely (1995; also see Graham, 1989) and made relevant to the present group situation. Also, to control for possible effects of presentation order, we randomized the order in which the items appeared on the screen. Collective OCB was assessed by asking participants the extent to which they intended to “show pride when representing the group in public”, “promote their group’s style of working to others”, “volunteer working longer than planned on the tasks if that helps the group”, and to “alert the group when things go wrong”. These four items were combined to form a sufficiently reliable collective OCB scale ($\alpha = .61$). Relational OCB was assessed by asking participants the extent to which they intended to “motivate other group-members to express their opinions and ideas about how to handle the group-task”, to “encourage hesitant or quiet group-members to voice their opinions when they otherwise might not speak up”, and to “refuse helping other group-members with their assigned tasks” (reverse-coded). These three items were combined to form a sufficiently reliable relational OCB scale ($\alpha = .67$). Individual OCB was assessed by asking participants the extent to which they intended to “avoid errors in performing their task”, to “work with extra dedication”, to “work as productive as possible”, and to “finish their assigned task in due time”. These four items were combined to form a sufficiently reliable individual OCB scale ($\alpha = .74$). After completing this, the experiment ended and participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results & Discussion

We conducted regression analyses with the main effects of gender and age in the first step, the main effects of the three self-levels and procedural fairness in the second step, and three self-level by procedural fairness interaction effects in the third step. To minimize problems of multi-collinearity, we effect-

coded procedural fairness (as -1 and 1 for the unfair and fair procedure conditions respectively), and centred the three self-levels scores. The interaction terms were based on the product of the effect-coded manipulation of procedural fairness and the centered self-level scores (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Table 4.1 presents the results of the main analyses, which will be discussed in the following sections. Before proceeding with the main analyses, however, we analyzed the items checking the manipulation of procedural fairness perceptions.

Manipulation checks. A hierarchical regression analysis on the voice scale showed that the regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance in Step 2 ($R^2 = .91$), $F(6, 109) = 175.16$, $p < .001$, and revealed a significant main effect of procedure only, $\beta = .95$, $p < .001$. Participants perceived more voice in the fair ($M = 5.45$, $SD = 1.01$) than the unfair ($M = 1.04$, $SD = .27$) procedure condition. None of the other effects in all three steps of the regression analysis were significant, $p > .12$.

An additional regression analysis on the procedural fairness scale revealed virtually identical results in Step 2, ($R^2 = .46$), $F(6, 109) = 15.32$, $p < .001$, with a main effect of procedural fairness only, $\beta = .65$, $p < .001$. Participants perceived higher procedural fairness in the fair ($M = 5.51$, $SD = 1.14$) than in the unfair procedure condition ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.43$). Again, none of the other effects in all three steps of the regression analysis were significant, $p > .10$. We concluded that the procedural fairness manipulation was effective.

Collective OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the collective OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.1. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .37$), $F(9, 106) = 7.01$, $p < .001$. First of all, there were main effects of procedure, $\beta = .30$, $p < .001$, and of collective self-definition, $\beta = .42$, $p < .001$, indicating respectively that a fair procedure leads to higher collective OCB levels than an unfair procedure and, also, that a strong collective self-definition leads to higher collective OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition.

More important and in line with hypothesis 1, these main effects were qualified by a significant procedure x collective self interaction effect, $\beta = .19$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 4.1). To illustrate the nature of this interaction, we computed the

relation between procedural fairness and collective OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of collective self-definition. As expected, simple slopes analyses revealed that procedural fairness significantly and positively predicted collective OCB among individuals with a strong collective self-definition, $\beta = .52$, $p < .001$, whereas procedural fairness did not predict collective OCB among individuals with a weak collective self-definition, $\beta = .08$, $p > .43$.

Table 4.1. *Beta-weights and variance explained in OCBs by Procedural Fairness and Self-definition in Study 4.1.*

Dependent Variables	Collective OCB	Relational OCB	Individual OCB
<i>Step 1</i>			
gender	-.22*	-.27**	-.14
Age	.08	.08	.14
R^2	.05	.07	.04
<i>Step 2</i>			
procedure	.30***	.26**	.09
individual self	.02	.02	.12
relational self	.00	.06	.19*
collective self	.42***	.41***	.43***
R^2_{change}	.27	.26	.27
<i>Step 3</i>			
procedure x individual	.03	-.08	-.21*
procedure x relational	.09	.19*	-.05
procedure x collective	.19*	.01	-.01
R^2_{change}	.05	.04	.04

Note. $N = 116$; Beta weights correspond to the step in which they were entered.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$




Figure 4.1. The relation between procedural fairness and collective OCB as a function of collective self-definition in Study 4.1.

Relational OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the relational OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.1. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .38$), $F(9, 106) = 7.18$, $p < .001$. First of all, main effects of procedure, $\beta = .26$, $p = .001$, and collective self-definition, $\beta = .41$, $p < .001$, emerged, indicating respectively that a fair procedure leads to higher relational OCB levels than an unfair procedure and, also, that a strong collective self-definition leads to higher relational OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition.

More important and in line with hypothesis 2, a significant procedure \times relational self interaction effect emerged, $\beta = .19$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 4.2). To illustrate the nature of this interaction, we computed the relationship between procedural fairness and relational OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of relational self-definition. As expected, simple slopes analyses revealed that procedural fairness significantly and positively

predicted relational OCB among individuals with a strong relational self-definition ($\beta = .52, p < .001$), whereas procedural fairness did not predict relational OCB among individuals with a weak relational self-definition ($\beta = .03, p > .80$).




Figure 4.2. The relation between procedural fairness and relational OCB as a function of relational self-definition in Study 4.1.

Individual OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the individual OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.1. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .45$), $F(9, 106) = 6.36, p < .001$. First of all, there were significant main effects of collective self-definition, $\beta = .43, p = .001$, and relational self-definition, $\beta = .19, p < .05$, indicating respectively that a strong collective self-definition leads to higher individual OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition and, also, that a strong relational self-definition leads to higher individual OCB levels than a weak relational self-definition.

More important but contrary to hypothesis 3, the procedure \times individual self interaction effect was significant but not in the predicted direction, $\beta = -.21, p < .001$ (see Figure 4.3). To explore this interaction, we computed the relation

between procedural fairness and individual OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of individual self-definition. Simple slopes analyses revealed that contrary to hypothesis 3, procedural fairness did not predict individual OCB among individuals with a strong individual self-definition ($\beta = -.08, p > .58$), whereas procedural fairness significantly and positively predicted individual OCB among individuals with a weak individual self-definition ($\beta = .31, p < .05$).




Figure 4.3. The relation between procedural fairness and individual OCB as a function of individual self-definition in Study 4.1.

Summary. The results of Study 4.1 provide preliminary support for two of the three self-definition hypotheses. Procedural fairness effects on collective and relational OCB were moderated by collective self-definition and relational self-definition respectively, in such a way that procedural fairness predicted OCB only when participants' corresponding dispositional level of self-definition was strong. That is, whereas the use of fair procedures was reciprocated by pursuing the

welfare of the collective as a function of collective self-definition, it was reciprocated by pursuing the welfare of others as a function of relational self-definition. These findings are in line with hypothesis 1 and 2 respectively. Contrary to hypothesis 3, however, the moderating effect of individual self-definition on the relation between procedural fairness and individual OCB was in the opposite direction, in such a way that procedural fairness predicted OCB only when participants' corresponding dispositional level of self-definition was weak.

The overall pattern, thus, seems to provide partial support for a self-definition model of the relation between procedural fairness and OCB. More generally, in terms of social exchange theories, the Study 4.1 findings suggest that fair procedures create different social exchange relationships depending on collective or relational self-definition, as evidenced by the reciprocation by means of either collective or relational OCB. Taken together, the Study 4.1 findings are promising, but preliminary and in need of replication in an actual organizational context.

Study 4.2

The Study 4.1 findings were observed in a controlled laboratory setting with groups that are relevant only within the scope of the experimental situation. Although the results show that even within such a short-term group-context, procedural fairness communicates self-relevant information and affects participants' reactions (also see Smith, Thomas, & Tyler, 2006), it is important to examine whether the suggested processes are also applicable to contexts that play a more relevant and central role in people's (professional) lives. Another shortcoming of Study 4.1 is that perceptions of procedural fairness were based upon one single procedural aspect (i.e., voice). In real organizational life, however, employees' perceptions of procedural fairness are based upon other procedural aspects as well (e.g., accuracy, consistency, ethicality; Leventhal, 1980). In Study 4.2, we addressed these shortcomings by having participants evaluate the fairness of different procedural aspects in determining the salary they receive in their current organization.

Method

Respondents and Procedure. Respondents consisted of a representative sample of 440 Dutch employees (60.1 % females and 39.9 % males; $M_{age} = 37.7$; $SD = 10.68$). On average, they worked 31.49 hours a week ($SD = 10.39$) and had an average tenure of 7.67 years ($SD = 8.45$) at their current organization. Furthermore, 70.7 % of the respondents were employed in private service, 24.4 % in public service, and 4.9 % worked temporary or stand-by.

Levels of the Self-concept. Chronic Self-concept was measured using the Levels of Self-Concept Scale (LSCS; Selenta & Lord, 2005; also see Johnson et al., 2006). We included the five most indicative items to each self-concept level, as such mirroring the items used in Study 4.1. Given that the sample now consisted of working professionals, we used a regular Dutch translation of the original items (Selenta & Lord, 2005). Respondents responded to the self-concept scales (and all of the following scales) on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). As in Study 4.1, all self-level scales revealed good internal consistency (individual self: $\alpha = .71$; relational self: $\alpha = .78$; collective self: $\alpha = .65$).

Procedural fairness. Procedural fairness was measured using a Dutch translation of Colquitt's seven-item procedural fairness scale (Colquitt, 2001). An example-item is: "The procedures used to determine my salary were based on accurate information". These seven-items were combined to form a highly reliable procedural fairness scale ($\alpha = .91$).

Organizational Citizenship Behavior. OCB was assessed via self-reports using a modified version of the four-dimensional scale developed by Moorman and Blakely (1995), which in turn was based on Graham's (1989) dimensions of OCB (interpersonal helping, individual initiative, personal industry, and loyal boosterism). However, in order to create separate dimensions in terms of collective, relational, and individual OCB, we dropped some of the original items and combined items that originally belonged to distinct subscales (see appendix). The resulting collective OCB scale consisted of three items (e.g., "I show pride when I represent the organization in public"), which were combined into a reliable

composite scale ($\alpha = .77$). The resulting relational OCB scale consisted of five items (e.g., "I voluntarily help new employees settle into the job"), which were combined into a reliable composite scale ($\alpha = .75$). Finally, the resulting individual OCB scale consisted of four items (e.g., "I perform my job duties with extra-special care"), which were combined into a reliable composite scale ($\alpha = .65$). Scale means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations are reported in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the measures in Study 4.2

Variables	<i>M (SD)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. PF	3.55 (.99)	(.91)						
2. coll. self	3.70 (.44)	.00	(.65)					
3. rel. self	4.02 (.46)	.05	.39**	(.78)				
4. ind. self	2.84 (.57)	-.14**	.15**	-.01	(.71)			
5. coll. OCB	3.45 (.62)	.18***	.31***	.07***	.04	(.77)		
6. rel. OCB	3.82 (.48)	.02	.39***	.18***	.05	.38***	(.75)	
7. ind. OCB	3.82 (.52)	.06	.15**	.05	.09	.30***	.31***	(.65)

Note. Reliabilities for each scale are listed on the diagonal

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4.3

Overview of Fit Indices for Study 4.2 Measurement Models

Model	<i>df</i>	χ^2	χ^2/df	<i>TLI</i>	<i>CFI</i>	<i>PCFI</i>	<i>RMSEA</i>
1 Factor	53	538.19	10.16	.57	.66	.53	.14*
3 Factor	50	138.91	2.77	.92	.94	.71	.62

Notes: * indicates *RMSEA* is significantly $> .05$. The three factor model showed a significant decrease in χ^2 , relative to the one factor model (χ^2 diff = 399.28, $df = 3$, $p < .001$).

Results and discussion

To test whether the three factor model shows acceptable fit, we first conducted confirmatory factor analyses. We compared a one factor model in which all OCB items loaded on a single dimension with the three factor model (collective OCB, relational OCB, and individual OCB). As can be observed in Table 4.3, the one factor model showed unacceptable fit, whereas the three factor model showed acceptable and indeed significantly improved fit⁴. Therefore, we proceeded with analysing the three factors separately.

We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical multiple regression analyses. To minimize problems of multicollinearity, all predictor variables were centered and interaction terms were calculated using the centered scores (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). In all analyses, we first controlled for the effects of gender, age, education level, tenure in years, and work status in hours a week. We employed these demographic variables as covariates in the first step because these variables relate to one's status in the organisation, which is known to influence reactions to procedural fairness (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006). Subsequently, in the second step, we entered the main effects of procedural fairness and all three self-levels (individual, relational, and collective). Finally, in the third step, we entered the focal interactions between procedural fairness and each of the self-concept levels. Table 4.4 presents the results of these analyses, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Collective OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the collective OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.4. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .17$), $F(12, 428) = 7.15$, $p <$

⁴ Additionally, we compared the 3-factor model to the original 4-factor model of this scale (i.e., helping, initiative, industry, and boosterism; Graham, 1989; Moorman & Blakely, 1995). Although the 4-factor model revealed a significantly better fit than the 3-factor model, separate regressions on the first two factors of the former model revealed similar results compared to a single regression on the factor combining both dimensions in the latter model. Therefore, for reasons of parsimony and despite improved fit of the 4-factor model, we proceeded with the 3-factor model.

.001. First of all, there were main effects of procedural fairness, $\beta = .20$, $p < .001$, and of collective self-definition, $\beta = .30$, $p < .001$, indicating respectively that a high procedural fairness was associated with higher collective OCB levels than low procedural fairness and, also, that a strong collective self-definition was associated with higher collective OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition.

Table 4.4. *Beta-weights and variance explained in OCBs by Procedural Fairness and Self-definition in Study 4.2.*

Dependent Variables	Collective OCB	Relational OCB	Individual OCB
<i>Step 1</i>			
age	.03	.02	.17**
education	.05	-.05	-.07
work-status	.15**	.08	.01
tenure	.08	.15*	.04
gender	-.03	-.01	.09
R^2	.04	.04	.05
<i>Step 2</i>			
procedure	.20***	.04	.08
individual self	.03	.01	.11*
relational self	-.04	.07	.01
collective self	.30***	.37***	.15**
R^2_{change}	.12	.16	.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
procedure x individual	.00	.00	-.10*
procedure x relational	-.02	.10*	-.02
procedure x collective	.10*	.01	.08
R^2_{change}	.01	.01	.01

Note. $N = 440$; Beta weights correspond to the step in which they were entered.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

More important and in line with hypothesis 1, there was a significant procedure \times collective self-definition interaction effect, $\beta = .10$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 4.4). To illustrate the nature of this interaction, we computed the relation between procedural fairness and collective OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and at a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of collective self-definition. As expected, simple slopes analyses revealed that procedural fairness significantly and positively predicted collective OCB among individuals high in collective self-definition, $\beta = .30$, $p < .001$, whereas procedural fairness was not a significant predictor of collective OCB among individuals low in collective self-definition, $\beta = .10$, $p > .14$.




Figure 4.4. The relation between procedural fairness and collective OCB as a function of collective self-definition in Study 4.2.

Relational OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the relational OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.4. The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .20$), $F(12, 428) = 9.14$, $p < .001$. First of all, there was a significant main effect of collective self-definition, $\beta =$

.39, $p < .001$, indicating that a strong collective self-definition was associated with higher relational OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition.




Figure 4.5. The relation between procedural fairness and relational OCB as a function of relational self-definition in Study 4.2.

More important and in line with hypothesis 2, a significant procedure \times relational self-definition interaction effect emerged, $\beta = .10$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 4.5). To illustrate the nature of this interaction, we computed the relation between procedural fairness and relational OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of relational self-definition. As expected, simple slopes analyses revealed that procedural fairness significantly and positively predicted relational OCB among individuals high in relational self-definition ($\beta = .14$, $p < .05$), whereas procedural fairness was not a significant predictor of relational OCB among individuals low in relational self-definition ($\beta = -.07$, $p > .33$).

Individual OCB. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis on the individual OCB scale are displayed in Table 4.4. The regression equation

accounted for a significant amount of variance ($R^2 = .10$), $F(12, 428) = 3.99$, $p < .001$. First of all, there were significant main effects of collective self-definition, $\beta = .15$, $p < .01$, and of individual self-definition, $\beta = .11$, $p < .05$, indicating respectively that a strong collective self-definition was associated with higher individual OCB levels than a weak collective self-definition and, also, that a strong individual self-definition was associated with higher individual OCB levels than a weak individual self-definition.




Figure 4.6. The relation between procedural fairness and individual OCB as a function of individual self-definition in Study 4.2.

More important but contrary to hypothesis 3, the procedure \times individual self-definition interaction effect was significant in the opposite direction, $\beta = -.10$, $p < .05$ (see Figure 4.6). To illustrate the nature of this interaction, we computed the relation between procedural fairness and individual OCB at a high (1 *SD* below the mean) and a low (1 *SD* above the mean) level of individual self-definition. Simple slopes analyses revealed that procedural fairness significantly and positively predicted individual OCB among individuals low in individual self-

definition ($\beta = .19, p < .01$), whereas procedural fairness was not a significant predictor of individual OCB among individuals high in individual self-definition ($\beta = -.02, p > .79$).

Summary. The results of Study 4.2 further consolidate the Study 4.1 findings and show that hypotheses 1 and 2 are also confirmed when tested among employees working in a variety of organizations. As in Study 4.1, strong (versus weak) collective or relational self-definition increased the effects of procedural fairness effects on the corresponding OCB dimension (in line with hypotheses 1 and 2), whereas weak (versus strong) individual self-definition increased the effect of procedural fairness on individual OCB (contrary to hypothesis 3). Combining the results of the present survey with those of the experimental study provides us strong evidence for the proposition that fair procedures shape different forms of OCB as a function of collective versus relational self-definition. However, both experimental and survey data do not support our hypothesis with respect to the moderating effect of individual self-definition.

General Discussion

First, we will summarize the main objectives and findings of our research. Then, we will discuss the implications, strengths, and limitations of our findings.

Summary of Objectives and Findings

The relationship between procedural fairness and OCB is often considered to be one of social exchange (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002; Tepper et al., 2001). A key psychological determinant in the reciprocation of fair treatment is the self (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a). The self consists of three levels of self-definition: collective, relational, and individual (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). In the literature on procedural fairness, there has been a debate concerning the level at which procedural fairness effects operate. We reviewed literature suggesting (1) that different self-levels relate to different goals and behaviors (Sedikides & Brewer,

2001), and (2) that procedural fairness perceptions contain self-relevant implications influencing the pursuit of goals and behavior at the collective (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000), the relational (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a), and the individual level of self-definition (e.g., Brebels et al., 2008).

In line with this evidence, we argued that all levels of the self should matter in explaining procedural fairness effects, but that the level of self that is salient determines at which level the impact of procedural fairness emerges. Interestingly, types of OCB can be considered as being differentially referenced at the collective, relational, or individual level (Lavelle et al., in press; LePine et al., 2002; Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Williams & Anderson, 1991). Based upon this reasoning, we predicted that procedural fairness creates different types of social exchange relationships as a function of self-definition. More specifically, we tested whether fair treatment is reciprocated via an engagement in the kind of OCB that fits the recipient's self-definition.

Results from a laboratory-based experiment and a survey among employees from a variety of organizations provided strong, but incomplete support for the idea that self-level salience enhances the impact of procedural fairness on OCB, but only the type of OCB that corresponds to the level of self-definition. This pattern was consistent and in the predicted direction for collective and relational levels of self-definition across both studies. These findings thus suggest that different types of social exchange develop in which fair treatment is reciprocated in ways that fit a person's salient self-level (i.e., collective OCB when the collective self is salient, and relational OCB when the relational self is salient).

With respect to individual self-definition, results were also consistent across studies, but the pattern was opposite to our predictions. More specifically, findings reveal that strong versus weak individual self salience reduced the impact of procedural fairness on our measure of individual OCB. In other words, the positive impact of procedural fairness on individual OCB was stronger for those with a weak than those with a strong individual self-definition. This finding may result either from specific characteristics of the employed individual OCB measure or from different social exchange preferences among individuals with

strong individual self salience. We will address these possibilities in a separate section below.

We will now turn to a discussion of the theoretical implications, strengths and limitations of these findings for research in procedural fairness, OCB, and social exchange.

Theoretical implications

Self-definition salience in procedural fairness. Our findings complement recent arguments that justice considerations in general (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Skitka, 2003) and procedural fairness considerations in particular (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Miedema, 2003), become more impactful when the self is salient. More specifically, our findings show that the positive influence of procedural fairness on OCB becomes stronger when collective or relational levels of the self are salient. By looking at the interaction effects between procedural fairness and all three levels of self-definition on corresponding levels in OCB, our findings go beyond contributions in which procedural fairness is examined only in interaction with collective self-definition to predict system-referenced OCB (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006). In doing so, we accounted for recent developments in procedural fairness research that moved away from the primacy of the collective self by also addressing the role of the relational self and the individual self in the effects that procedural fairness conveys (Brebels et al., 2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Van Prooijen, in press).

A central aspect of our research is the argument that a better understanding of different organizational dynamics requires that researchers look at outcome variables that correspond to participants' self-concept when social interactions take place. This is important because the self-concept determines how employees pursue their goals and regulate their actions in social situations. Whereas people who define themselves in terms of group-membership use procedural fairness information for the regulation of collective actions, people who define themselves in terms of their relationships with specific others use procedural fairness information for the regulation of relational actions. Self-definition, thus, determines the level at which the impact of procedural fairness is referenced.

The puzzle of the individual self. The individual self by procedural fairness interaction term consistently revealed a pattern opposite to the predicted interaction effect. Instead of an increased impact of procedural fairness, results revealed that procedural fairness exerts a reduced impact on individual OCB when the individual self is more (versus less) salient. Given the consistency of this pattern across experimental and organizational contexts, we feel it is worth considering post-hoc explanations. One possible explanation for this finding may lie in the voluntary nature of individual OCB. Voluntary displays of effort on behalf of the group need not be motivated by a desire to contribute to the group, or to improve one's relationships with others (Sleebos, Ellemers, de Gilder, 2006). People with a strong individual self-definition derive their self-worth from individual achievement and superiority (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). As such, they strive to excel and stand out via individual citizenship. If we look at our findings from this perspective, a possible explanation is that employees with a strong individual self-definition strive to establish their personal self-worth or even look for ways to get out by maintaining high levels of individual OCB despite relatively low levels of procedural fairness. At the other end, those with a weak individual self-definition are not by themselves motivated to perform well. Instead, as suggested by our findings, their level of engagement in individual OCB may well be contingent upon the extent to which they are treated fairly.

Another possible explanation for the obtained pattern may also result from the specific nature of the employed individual OCB scale (which was adapted from the personal industry dimension of OCB; Moorman & Blakely, 1995). The items in this scale typically concern actions that might relate to motives of impression management (Bolino, Turnley, & Niehoff, 2004; Rioux & Penner, 2001). Indeed, self-referenced actions sometimes stem from a motivation to make the self look good relative to others (Shepherd & Arkin, 1991). It is possible that high scores on this measure reveal other factors than citizenship that do not necessarily relate to procedural fairness or exert positive effects on organizational functioning. It can be expected that particularly those with strong individual self-definition rely on strategic motivations for engaging in OCB (e.g. impression management) because they strongly value actions that are under

personal control. An interesting perspective for future research would be to test whether individual forms of OCB that include more of a risk of exploitation and other personal costs (e.g., initiative; Bolino & Turnley, 2005) vary more strongly as a function of procedural fairness among those with a strong individual self-definition. Such a measure of individual OCB would be less prone to impression management and make the possibility of social exchange more plausible, because fair treatment then helps overcoming the potential personal costs.

Strengths and limitations

The present findings are interesting and compelling, they are also premature and in need of further examination. A possible limitation of the current research concerns that self-definition was examined as a dispositional factor in both studies. Employees, however, alternately rely on their collective, relational, and individual self-levels depending upon contextual cues and perceived changes in organizational environment (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Given that both dispositional and contextual factors represent important sources of variance in OCB (Rioux & Penner, 2001), further examinations should include both dispositional and contextual self-definition to see how they combine with procedural fairness in predicting different types of OCB.

A major strength of the present research, however, is that the interaction effects between different levels of self-definition and procedural fairness were obtained using different research methods. Most studies examining the justice-OCB relationship were correlational in nature (for an exception, see De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002), and therefore remained elusive with respect to a causal relation between justice and OCB. Study 4.1, however, yielded experimental evidence with high internal validity. A potential criticism of Study 4.1 may be that it might be relatively low in external validity. However, the fact that Study 4.2, for which concerns about external validity pose less of a problem, yield results consistent with the Study 4.1 findings, counters this potential criticism. Conversely, Study 4.2 might be criticized for being correlational in nature (i.e., rendering it mute in matters of causality). Yet, in combination with the experimental design of Study 4.1, with random assignment of participants across fair and unfair procedure conditions, this potential concern also is countered.

In Closing

The current investigation provides a first step in developing a self-definition model of the extent to which leader's procedural fairness predicts different kinds of OCB depending upon employees' level of self-definition. Whereas strong (versus weak) collective self-definition enhances the impact of procedural fairness on collective OCB, strong (versus weak) relational self-definition enhances the impact of procedural fairness on relational OCB. We hope that our investigation will spark additional forays into procedural fairness, OCB, and levels of self.

General discussion

In this dissertation, I aimed to take a step towards understanding how the self plays a role in when and why procedural fairness translates into action. Procedural fairness has been of particular interest to social psychologists because it affects people for reasons that go beyond a concern with outcomes. I have argued, along with others, that these reasons concern the self (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Miedema, 2003; Sedikides et al., in press; Skitka, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Existing social psychological accounts have argued that procedural fairness influences reactions more strongly when the self or any relevant aspect of it is salient (Skitka, 2003). Some researchers even suggested that self-salience is a *sufficient* condition for the occurrence of procedural fairness effects (Miedema, 2003). In my opinion, however, a focus on self-salience per se is incomplete and, at times, even reductionistic for several reasons. First, it does not distinguish between evaluative and non-evaluative reasons for self-salience. This distinction, however, may prove to be a crucial one, as it determines how procedural fairness information is processed and also how it impacts upon the self that is salient. Second, a focus on self-salience per se does not address the multifaceted motivational basis of the self-concept (Tesser & Cornell, 1991; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Saliency of a particular type of self, however, includes a different set of motives, goals, and strategies than saliency of another type of self (e.g., the individual self versus the collective self). Knowing this, it can be expected that the occurrence and strength of procedural fairness effects may depend upon which self is salient. Third, a focus on self-salience per se does not explain prior inconsistencies in behavioral responses as a function of procedural fairness (e.g., Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001).

In the present dissertation, I took a motivational and self-regulatory perspective to examine the self as a guide in when and why people attend and react to procedural fairness information. More specifically, I examined the different motives, goals, and strategies for goal-pursuit that underlie the self that is salient

among recipients of procedural fairness. I have done so by looking at chronic individual differences and temporary accessibility of these self-relevant factors. This approach has led me to consider evaluative and non-evaluative motives underlying self-salience. It has also led me to consider whether self-definition and self-regulation contribute to a better understanding of when procedural fairness influences specific behavioral reactions. In particular, I have focused on specific negative and positive outcomes of procedural fairness. I will now turn to a brief discussion regarding the importance of self-salience and the importance of motivational and self-regulation processes.

Only, at least, or beyond a matter of self-salience?

Across a variety of studies recently conducted by Joost Miedema and colleagues, manipulations of mortality salience, uncertainty salience, ego threat, and self-affirmation yielded enhanced reactions to variations in fairness (Miedema, 2003). Miedema argued that the one factor that all these manipulations have in common may be self-salience. Based upon this and the assumptions of Linda Skitka's Accessible Identity Model of fairness reasoning (Skitka, 2003), Miedema argued that recipients' self-salience may very well be a sufficient condition for fairness effects to emerge. Given that the available evidence on self-focus in justice research almost exclusively focused on the perspective of the actor enacting fairness, a focus on the perspective of the recipient of fairness proves to be interesting. The scarce available evidence, however, revealed inconsistent results regarding the direction of the effect of self-focus on reactions toward fairness information. That is, whereas some have observed that self-focused attention enhances fairness effects (e.g., Wiesenfeld et al., 1999), others have observed the exact opposite finding that self-focused attention decreases fairness effects (e.g., Greenberg, 1983). Examining recipients' underlying motives for focusing attention to the self, therefore, should help to gain more insight in the precise workings of self-focus on reactions toward procedural fairness. This is exactly what I intended to do in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

The four studies I reported in Chapter 3 illustrate that different motives underlying self-focused attention also relate to a different engagement with procedural fairness information. That is, whereas chronic evaluative self-focused attention (i.e., rumination) positively related to importance attributed to procedural fairness information, chronic non-evaluative self-focused attention (i.e., reflection) did not relate to procedural fairness importance (Study 3.1). Moreover, temporary accessibility of evaluative (as compared to non-evaluative) self-focused attention also led to greater importance assigned to procedural fairness information (Study 3.2). In addition, Studies 3.3 and 3.4 replicated these findings on participant's turnover intentions and commitment as a function of actual procedural feedback using the voice paradigm. Importantly, the inclusion of a low self-focus control condition in Study 3.4 allowed me to conclude that, whereas evaluative self-focused attention enhances the impact of procedural fairness, non-evaluative self-focused attention does not affect the impact of procedural fairness. This seems to contradict the view that self-salience would represent a sufficient condition for the occurrence of procedural fairness effects (Skitka, 2003; Miedema, 2003). From these findings, I conclude that procedural fairness is self-relevant to the extent that it provides evaluative feedback regarding the self.

This observation, however, still leaves open the question whether self-salience may qualify as a *necessary* condition for the occurrence of procedural fairness effects. In Chapters 2 and 4, where I examined chronic or temporary accessibility of specific levels of self-definition, I collected some evidence in support of such a proposition. To begin with, the findings in Chapter 2 show that procedural unfairness influences retaliation only when the individual self is salient. More specifically, where Studies 2.1 and 2.2 revealed that procedural unfairness impacted retaliation particularly among promotion-focused (as compared to prevention-focused) individuals, Study 2.3 showed that a promotion (as compared to prevention) focus relates to a more accessible individual self. Subsequently, in Studies 2.4 and 2.5, I demonstrated that making the individual self salient significantly enhanced retaliatory responding to procedural unfairness particularly among those whose individual self was relatively de-activated (i.e., prevention-focused individuals). More generally, thus, the findings in Chapter 2 suggest that

reactions occur as a function of procedural fairness only when the self is salient or activated.

To continue, the findings in Chapter 4 also, be it only partially, support enhanced procedural fairness effects under conditions of high versus low self-salience. More specifically, on different measures of citizenship reactions to procedural fairness and across a laboratory-based experiment (Study 4.1) and a large-sized field study among working employees (Study 4.2), it is shown that procedural fairness effects occur only when the relational or the collective self is more (versus less) salient. These two findings, again, seem to support the importance of self-salience. Nevertheless, the studies reported in Chapter 4 also shed some doubt upon this conclusion. More specifically, instead of a strong individual self, it was a weak individual self-definition that enhanced citizenship behavior as a function of procedural fairness. This effect was consistently replicated across laboratory-based interactions (in Study 4.1) and real-life interactions between organizational authorities and employees (In Study 4.2), and it emerged beyond the interactive effects of procedural fairness by self-salience of the other two levels of self-definition. At minimum, this finding casts some doubt upon the instrumentality of self-salience for the emergence of procedural fairness effects.

When comparing the individual self accessibility findings from Chapters 2 and 4 together, it seems that individual self accessibility represents a necessary condition for the emergence of procedural unfairness effects on retaliation, but it rather seems to inhibit an effect of procedural fairness on organizational citizenship behavior (at least the kind of citizenship behavior we measured in these studies). Although I do not intend to draw strong conclusions from these observations regarding the self-salience idea, I do take these opposing results as evidence for the argument that, rather than looking at the effects of self-salience per se, research on justice and self would bear more fruit from a focus on which behavioral outcomes more readily are affected by procedural fairness as a function of the type of self that is salient.

Behavioral effects of procedural fairness: The importance of self-regulation

A core assumption in theories on self-regulation is that the emergence of specific behaviors is a function of characteristics of the situation, the actor's personality, and the action itself (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). That is, engagement in specific actions will be facilitated if the actions itself represent suitable means or strategies to the end of satisfaction, pursuit, or achievement of needs and goals that are either chronically accessible or temporarily activated. To put it in a more simple fashion, behavior depends upon the motives, goals, and strategies of the salient self. As argued earlier and shown in Chapter 3, procedural fairness information (as communicated in the social arena) reflects upon these underlying motivational self-processes in the form of social appraisals. As a consequence, when considered self-relevant, fair (or unfair) procedural treatment also regulates behavior that is part of the motivational and strategic repertoire associated with a salient type of self. Therefore, it is imperative to look at whether the underlying motives, goals, and strategies fit with the specific behavior under examination. Procedural fairness has revealed somewhat inconsistent effects with respect to predicting certain behavioral responses (e.g., retaliation, turnover, citizenship; Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001; LePine et al. 2002; Posthuma et al., 2007). I argue that these inconsistencies were, at least in part, due to different motives, goals, and strategies that were salient across studies, settings, and people. I have tested this line of reasoning by considering the moderating roles of individuals' goal-definition levels (Chapters 2 and 4) and goal-pursuit strategies (Chapter 2) on the relationships between procedural fairness and specific types of behavior.

To begin with, in Chapter 2, I focused on retaliation as a response to procedural unfairness. Prior research has revealed that, in social interactions, people sometimes pursue and other times inhibit retaliatory responding when they feel treated unfairly (Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001). Retaliation is considered to be a will-full, approach-oriented response rather than a vigilant, avoidance-oriented response to perceived unfairness in social interaction (e.g., Crocket, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman, & Robbins, 2008). As such, retaliation should be a more likely response when dispositions or situations foster an individual's motivation to pursue goals in an eager than in a vigilant manner; a

distinction often referred to as promotion versus prevention regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997; 1998). Studies 2.1 and 2.2 confirmed this line of reasoning by showing that particularly those with a chronic (Study 2.2) or temporarily induced (Study 2.1) promotion-focus retaliated as a function of procedural unfairness. Furthermore, in correspondence with prior research (Galinsky et al., 2005; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Moretti & Higgins, 1990), Study 2.3 revealed that a promotion-focus varies along with accessibility of the individual self. In turn, Studies 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrated the individual self as the driving process behind retaliatory responding to procedural unfairness. Chapter 2, thus, confirmed that a motivational approach to the self increases insight in when and why procedural (un)fairness translates into specific actions like retaliation.

To proceed, in Chapter 4, I focused on yet another regulatory aspect of the self in predicting specific positive reactions toward procedural fairness. The self can be trichotomized based upon whether its defining motivational characteristics are collectively-oriented, relationally-oriented, or individually-oriented (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Interestingly, different bodies of evidence have suggested that procedural fairness effects are referenced either at collective, relational, or individual outcomes. Conform the self-regulatory function of procedural fairness then, it is predicted that people reciprocate fair treatment via an engagement in collective, relational, or individual levels of OCB depending upon the type of self that is salient. Results from a laboratory-based experiment and a field study consistently confirmed this reasoning by showing (1) that collective OCB related more strongly to procedural fairness perceptions when the collective self was strong (as compared to weak), and (2) that relational OCB related more strongly to procedural fairness perceptions when the relational self was strong (as compared to weak). Results concerning individual OCB, however, were disconfirmed. In fact, individual OCB consistently related to procedural fairness perceptions, only among those with a weak (as opposed to strong) individual self. I suggest that this finding may result either from specific characteristics of the employed individual OCB measure or from different social exchange preferences as a function of different levels of self-definition (see general discussion in Chapter 4).

To conclude, in this dissertation I provided evidence showing that research on procedural fairness effects in general, and specific behavioral responses toward procedural fairness in particular, benefits in various ways from a focus on the particular motives, goals, and strategies that underlie the self that is salient in social interaction situations. I hasten to say, though, that this approach does not contradict prior theoretical arguments made in the AIM (Skitka, 2003) or the self-based model of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a). Rather, it can be considered of as a further elaboration of these works and a next step toward a better understanding of the psychology of procedural fairness.

Implications

The power of the dependent variable in procedural fairness reactions

An important evolution in the justice literature is the shift from simply examining whether justice relates to outcomes to a focus on when and why such effects are likely to occur (Cropanzano et al., 2001; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Mayer, Shteynberg, & Bardes, 2006; Skitka, 2003). Scholars thereby have increasingly devoted attention to understanding the underlying motives behind justice effects and examining boundary conditions of such effects. The present dissertation aims to contribute to this evolution by emphasizing that researchers need to focus on which outcomes relate to justice and fairness as a function of the underlying motives. More specifically, an important implication of the current research pertains to the idea that different outcomes of procedural fairness emerge as a function of different underlying processes. That is, people are interested in procedural fairness for different reasons and, depending upon these different reasons, people make different inferences from being treated procedurally fair or unfair. As such, procedural fairness serves different functions depending upon the specific motives and goals people have.

A recent set of studies illustrated the variability of procedural fairness effects on different outcomes (De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008). De Cremer et al. focused on the process of uncertainty reduction by means of procedural fairness information (cf., Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). On the one hand,

results demonstrated that people are interested in whether or not they are granted voice in a decision-making process for the sake of gauging how fair organizational authorities (i.e., the University Board in this study) are and whether or not decisions can be expected to be fair when they are focused on thoughts and feelings of uncertainty in general, but not when they are focused on thoughts and feelings of belongingness uncertainty. This was evidenced by the observation that voice impacted fairness judgments, but only when being focused on uncertainty in general. On the other hand, results also demonstrated that people are interested in whether or not they are granted voice in a decision-making process for the sake of gauging how they are looked upon and whether or not they belong to the relevant organization when they are focused on thoughts and feelings of belongingness uncertainty, but not when they are focused on thoughts and feelings of uncertainty in general. This was evidenced by the observation that voice impacted organizational identification (i.e., identification with Tilburg University in this study), but only when being focused on belongingness uncertainty. These findings were replicated in a second study, wherein general uncertainty was contrasted to belongingness uncertainty either concerning familiar others or concerning unfamiliar others. Whereas the general uncertainty condition revealed identical results to the first study, only in the belongingness uncertainty concerning familiar others condition, results revealed that voice influenced organizational identification, but not fairness judgments.

These findings are particularly interesting not only because they suggest that people attend to instances of procedural fairness for different reasons, but also because they reveal that different (uncertainty reduction) motives impact differently upon different outcomes of procedural fairness. More importantly, they reveal that whereas self-relevant uncertainty salience makes individuals evaluate themselves in terms of their belongingness to an organization by means of whether they receive voice or no-voice, general uncertainty salience makes individuals evaluate the enactment source or the decision-making process itself as being fair or unfair by means of whether they receive voice or no-voice. This suggests that the self is particularly an important source in how people react toward procedural fairness information, and less so in how people form judgments

of fairness. In procedural fairness research, however, one tradition has been to focus on procedural fairness as a main dependent variable. Another tradition has been to focus on procedural fairness as a factor in predicting a variety of interpersonal and organizational phenomena. Although both traditions share a focus on investigating underlying motivational processes, it stands to question as to whether the same processes are addressed (and thus whether they will reveal the same consequences or not).

Procedural Fairness as a Dependent or an Independent Variable

In the justice literature, many studies assess judgments or global perceptions of procedural fairness as a main dependent variable. Indeed, the formation of judgments about fairness and justice can be understood as being a “hot cognitive” process (Van den Bos, 2007). Moreover, fairness judgments have an impact on a variety of outcomes, such as worldview defenses (Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005), positive and negative affect (Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), and litigation claims (Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000). In social interaction situations, however, forces other than personal judgment compete to impact the extent to which people engage in particular behavioral displays. Indeed, a fundamental psychological principle is that people’s judgments need not match their actions in social interaction (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2004; Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006; Regan & Fazio, 1977).

Let us consider, for instance, retaliation as a response to perceived unfairness. A common observation is that employees sometimes do not engage in any form of retaliatory action, even when they feel treated unfairly by a decision-making authority (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Leung & Tong, 2003). From a victim’s point of view, on the one hand, inaction or self-silence does not necessarily mean acceptance of unfair treatment. Instead, employees may often feel constrained by a perceived lack of power, a fear for counter-retaliation, or a presupposed unavailability of the offender. As a consequence, victims often choose to suppress judgment-based responding. From an offender’s point of view, on the other hand, recipients’ inaction often is interpreted as acceptance. Indeed, offenders may

often lack awareness of the possible constraints that recipients experience or imagine. As such, when recipients remain silent, offenders may often conclude that they agree with how decisions are made and move on from there, making victims especially vulnerable to possible further exploitation. The results in Chapter 2 of this dissertation have shown that regulatory focus, a motivational aspect that is particularly concerned with how individuals regulate goal-pursuit, is responsible for the manner in which recipients cope with perceived unfairness, but less so with how perceptions of fairness or unfairness emerge.

Most justice research has not recognized the important distinction between the processes involved in how people's perceptions of fairness are construed and the processes involved in how people's reactions toward fairness are developed. Often, judgments of procedural fairness are considered as an indication of people's responses following procedural treatments (e.g., being granted or denied voice). Nevertheless, an important implication from findings in this dissertation, along with other findings (De Cremer et al., 2008; also see Miedema, 2003), is that, more than judgments of fairness, people's responses to procedural fairness information are shaped by motivational processes that concern the self. More specifically, the present results illustrated that procedural fairness conveys evaluative and regulatory self-feedback, as such shaping subsequent interpersonal and organizational behavior. Particularly in social interaction situations, people are concerned with how they are looked upon by others, and whether they are respected or valued by others. It is in social situations, then, that people use procedural fairness information (1) to evaluate how they are doing, and (2) to regulate their responses to others. These insights thus corroborate the conclusion that, research aimed at knowing exactly how people react toward fairness information in social interaction situations, should move beyond paradigms in which only judgments of fairness are considered. Furthermore, research may do well in focusing on various behavioral displays, and on when and why people engage in these kinds of behaviors as a function of perceived (un)fairness. In the current dissertation, I have done so by emphasizing the role of underlying motives of the self in when and why specific reactions toward fairness or unfairness emerge.

Concluding Remarks

This dissertation has taken a step toward understanding procedural fairness as an evaluative and regulatory *looking-glass self*. Procedures represent an important aspect in social interaction situations. That is, perceptions of procedural fairness impact behaviour by influencing how people see and evaluate the self through the process of reflected appraisal. This process is often described as the looking-glass self (Cooley, 1902). The enactment of fair or unfair procedures thus operates as a mirror reflecting how people see themselves, which in turn affects how they react. I have reported about research suggesting that procedural fairness is not just a regular mirror. Procedural fairness is a mirror that provides evaluative and regulatory self-feedback.

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Spiegeltje, spiegeltje aan de wand...

Procedurele rechtvaardigheid als evaluatieve en regulatieve weerspiegeling van het zelf

Dat mensen veel belang hechten aan rechtvaardigheid, behoeft maar weinig betoog. De mens is een sociaal dier, en dat laat zich merken in de doorslaggevende rol die rechtvaardigheid speelt in hoe we relaties aangaan en onderhouden met andere mensen. Deze relaties zijn voornamelijk belangrijk in situaties waarin we, minstens gedeeltelijk, afhankelijk zijn van anderen om dingen te bereiken. In dit proefschrift richt ik me op dit sociale aspect van rechtvaardigheid: namelijk procedurele rechtvaardigheid of de mate waarin anderen ons op een eerlijke manier behandelen bij het maken van beslissingen die ons aangaan (e.g., taakverdelingen, loononderhandelingen, etc). Anders dan bij distributieve rechtvaardigheid (i.e., de rechtvaardigheid van beslissingsuitkomsten), gaat het bij procedurele rechtvaardigheid over het proces; de manier waarop men tot die uitkomsten komt. Percepties over procedurele rechtvaardigheid leiden we af uit verschillende informatiebronnen tijdens het beslissingsproces in sociale interacties. Zo beoordelen we procedures waarin onze mening wordt gevraagd of waarin informatie over onze persoon accuraat wordt weergegeven als rechtvaardiger dan procedures waarin onze mening niet wordt gevraagd of waarin informatie over onze persoon slechts selectief wordt weergegeven.

Procedurele rechtvaardigheidsinformatie omvat naast formele ook informele aspecten van het beslissingsproces. Meerbepaald is het zo dat er belangrijke interpersoonlijke consequenties verbonden zijn aan procedures die een invloed uitoefenen op de kwaliteit van sociale interacties en relaties. In die zin kan men beslissingsprocedures, onafhankelijk van hun formele of informele kwaliteiten, opvatten als cruciale eigenschappen van sociale interacties (Skitka, 2003). Traditioneel dacht men dat de interesse in procedurele rechtvaardigheid uitsluitend ingegeven is door instrumentele overwegingen. Dit perspectief vertrok vanuit de assumptie dat mensen uiteindelijk voornamelijk positieve resultaten

voor henzelf willen bekomen (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Eerlijke procedures en het gevoel van controle dat deze verschaffen, werden dan aanzien als een middel om betere uitkomsten te bekomen. De afgelopen 20 jaar echter, heeft heel wat onderzoek aangetoond dat mensen procedurele rechtvaardigheid ook belangrijk vinden om redenen die verder gaan dan pure instrumentaliteit of bekommernis om uitkomsten. Pionierswerk van Alan Lind en Tom Tyler lag aan de basis van deze evolutie. Zij argumenteerden dat, in grote mate, ook relationele overwegingen achter het belang van procedurele rechtvaardigheid schuilgaan (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Volgens deze visie hechten mensen belang aan hun relaties met de autoriteit en de groep die hij/zij vertegenwoordigt. Mensen reageren dus positief op eerlijke behandeling omdat dit een relatief hoge graad van inclusie in de groep, een zekere vorm van respect, en een relatief hoge status in de groep symboliseert. In die zin biedt procedurele rechtvaardigheid een evaluatieve standaard voor hoe men zichzelf ziet in de context van sociale interacties.

Wat gebeurt er dan precies wanneer mensen zichzelf evalueren aan de hand van procedurele rechtvaardigheid? Onderzoekers en theoretici in de sociale psychologie zijn het er min of meer over eens dat de cognitieve structuur van het zelf begint als een tabula rasa in de vroege kindertijd, om zich vervolgens gradueel op te bouwen aan de hand van een combinatie van persoonlijke voorkeur enerzijds en sociale validatie anderzijds. Aan de hand van informatie verkregen via sociale interacties met verschillende anderen zal het zelfconcept zich inderdaad geleidelijkaan ontwikkelen, maar ook onderhouden en veranderen (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Deze redenering is consistent met het meer globale perspectief van het symbolisch interactionisme waarin gesteld wordt dat interpersoonlijke waarderingen iemands zelfbeeld mee vorm geven en kunnen veranderen (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Tice & Wallace, 2003). In dit proefschrift neem ik de stelling in dat bekommernissen om procedurele rechtvaardigheid gedreven worden door dit mechanisme van evaluatieve zelfweerspiegeling.

In hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift werd aan de hand van enkele experimenten aangetoond dat de impact van procedurele rechtvaardigheid niet

zonder meer groter wordt als de aandacht op het zelf gericht is, maar dat dat slechts het geval is wanneer de reden voor zelfgerichtheid gestoeld is op evaluatieve (versus non-evaluatieve of exploratieve) motieven. Deze resultaten kwalificeren daarmee eerdere onderzoeken en argumentaties die suggereerden dat een grotere saillantie van het zelfconcept (of een aspect daarvan) zonder meer gepaard zou gaan met een grotere invloed van procedurele rechtvaardigheid (Miedema, 2003; Skitka, 2003). De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 3 zijn daarom interessant te noemen, minstens vanwege de implicaties die gesuggereerd worden voor het begrijpen van de toegenomen bekommernis met procedurele rechtvaardigheid in de moderne westerse maatschappij. Op basis van deze bevindingen lijkt het immers niet zozeer te gaan om een grotere zelfbekommernis an sich, maar veeleer om een specifieke bekommernis om zelfevaluatie in termen van status, affiliatie, respect, en reputatie.

Gegeven de impact op hoe men zichzelf ziet en evalueert, lijkt het voor de hand te liggen dat procedurele rechtvaardigheid ook invloed uitoefent op het gedrag dat men in sociale interacties stelt. Heel wat studies hebben inderdaad aangetoond dat procedurele rechtvaardigheid een sterke samenhang vertoont met een amalgaam aan positieve en negatieve gedragingen, zoals coöperatie (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002), OCB (e.g., Moorman, 1991), wraakacties (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), en personeelsverloop (e.g., Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991). Recente meta-analyses, echter, benadrukten inconsistenties in de (vaak op veldstudies gebaseerde) relatie tussen procedurele rechtvaardigheid en specifieke gedragingen (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). Er blijkt dus vooralsnog geen helder begrip te bestaan met betrekking tot de vraag wanneer mensen zich ook gedragsmatig engageren als een functie van procedurele (on)rechtvaardigheid. Jerald Greenberg noemde een beter inzicht in de specifieke gedragingen die volgen op percepties van (on)rechtvaardigheid zelfs een van de belangrijkste uitdagingen van het hedendaagse rechtvaardigheidsonderzoek (Greenberg, 2001).

In dit proefschrift neem ik de stelling in dat onderzoekers, wanneer zij specifieke reacties op procedurele (on)rechtvaardigheid beter willen verklaren, er goed aan doen om te kijken naar de fundamenten van het actieve zelfconcept:

namelijk de onderliggende motieven, doelstellingen, en strategieën. Conform de prominente zelfregulatie theorieën, ga ik er daarbij van uit dat specifieke kenmerken van zowel de situatie, de persoonlijkheid van de actor, als de handeling zelf van doorslaggevende invloed zullen zijn op de manier waarop reacties op procedurele (on)rechtvaardigheid tot uiting komen (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Meerbepaald, specifiek gedrag wordt gefaciliteerd wanneer de actie zelf als efficiënt wordt gezien om specifieke motieven en doelen die chronisch of tijdelijk saillant zijn te bevredigen, verder te zetten, of bereiken.

Kortom, gedrag in reactie op procedurele rechtvaardigheid hangt af van de motieven, doelen, en strategieën van het saillante zelf. Zoals eerder al vermeld en aangetoond in hoofdstuk 3, zorgt procedurele rechtvaardigheidsinformatie in de sociale arena voor een evaluatieve weerspiegeling van het saillante zelf. Met andere woorden, procedurele rechtvaardigheid geeft feedback over hoe men zich verhoudt tot saillante doelen en motieven. Bijgevolg kunnen we verwachten dat eerlijke (of oneerlijke) behandeling, wanneer deze als zelf-relevant wordt beschouwd, ook het gedrag beïnvloedt dat men in sociale situaties vertoont. Tenminste, als het gaat om gedrag dat tot het motivationele repertoire van het saillante zelf behoort. In hoofdstukken 2 en 4 heb ik deze redenering getoetst door te kijken naar de modererende rol van het niveau waarop individuen zichzelf en hun doelen definiëren (hoofdstukken 2 en 4) en strategieën voor het nastreven van doelen (hoofdstuk 2). Aan de hand van enkele empirische studies werd onderzocht wanneer en waarom procedurele rechtvaardigheid leidt tot specifiek negatief (hoofdstuk 2) en positief gedrag (hoofdstuk 4).

In hoofdstuk 2 werd gekeken naar wraak als een reactie op procedurele onrechtvaardigheid. Eerder onderzoek had laten zien dat men, in sociale interactie situaties, soms geneigd is om wraak te nemen, terwijl men soms ook veeleer geneigd is om wraakreacties te onderdrukken (Bembenek et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001). Recent nog werd sterke evidentie gevonden voor het idee dat wraak veeleer een wilsgestuurd en toenaderingsgericht type gedrag is dan een voorzichtig en vermijdingsgericht type gedrag (e.g., Crockett et al., 2008).

Dus, wraak is een respons die waarschijnlijker wordt van zodra de persoonlijkheid van de actor of de situatie de motivatie voedt om op een gretige dan wel waakzame manier doelen na te streven. In de literatuur worden deze motivatiemechanismen respectievelijk omschreven als promotiefocus en preventiefocus. Bevindingen uit verschillende studies ondersteunen het idee dat wraak zich voornamelijk voordoet wanneer persoonlijkheid of situatie gekenmerkt wordt door een promotiefocus. Bovendien werd in deze studies evidentie gevonden voor de idee dat bekommernissen met het individuele (i.e., competitieve) niveau van het zelf-concept verantwoordelijk is voor dit effect. Deelnemers in een preventiefocus gingen even vaak over tot wraak wanneer het individuele zelfconcept experimenteel geactiveerd werd. Deze onderzoekslijn toont dus onder meer aan dat het bestuderen van zelf-regulatie processen het causale verband tussen procedurele rechtvaardigheid en specifiek gedrag inzichtelijker maakt.

In hoofdstuk 4 werd gekeken naar een ander regulerend aspect van het zelf in de mate waarin specifieke positieve responsen op procedurele rechtvaardigheid zich voordoen. In de literatuur is men het erover eens dat het zelfconcept onderverdeeld kan worden op basis van de mate waarin haar bepalende motivationele kenmerken gericht zijn op het collectieve, relationele, of individuele niveau (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Interessant vanuit dat opzicht is de huidige polemiek in de literatuur waarin de effecten van procedurele rechtvaardigheid nu eens gesitueerd worden op het collectieve niveau, dan weer op het relationele, en recent zelfs ook op het individuele niveau. Overeenkomstig de zelfregulatieve functie van procedurele rechtvaardigheid kan men echter verwachten dat de manier waarop mensen eerlijke en positieve behandeling beantwoorden (collectief, relationeel, of individueel) afhankelijk is van het type zelf dat saillant is. De resultaten van de uitgevoerde studies (een experiment en een veldstudie) die in dit hoofdstuk staan beschreven bevestigen deze redenering op het collectieve en relationele niveau, maar niet op het individuele niveau (waarover toekomstig onderzoek verder duidelijkheid zou kunnen scheppen). Procedurele rechtvaardigheid heeft dus een sterkere impact op gedrag dat overeenkomt met het zelfdefinitie niveau.

Belangrijk is onder meer dat deze bevindingen verder steun bieden aan de doorslaggevende rol van zelfregulatie processen in gedragseffecten van procedurele rechtvaardigheid.

In dit proefschrift hoop ik de lezer overtuigd te hebben van het evaluerende en gedragsregulerende belang van rechtvaardigheid. Meerbepaald, hoop ik dat ik een licht heb kunnen werpen op hoe procedurele rechtvaardigheid kan begrepen worden als een evaluatieve en regulatieve weerspiegeling van het zelf-concept. Procedures omvatten belangrijke aspecten van sociale interactie situaties. Percepties van procedurele rechtvaardigheid sturen immers het sociale gedrag door invloed uit te oefenen op hoe mensen zichzelf zien en evalueren via het mechanisme van evaluatieve zelfweerspiegeling. Hoe rechtvaardig men wordt behandeld wanneer belangrijke beslissingen worden genomen, heeft dus het effect van een spiegel waarin men zichzelf ziet. Ik heb verslag uitgebracht van onderzoek waarvan de resultaten suggereren dat het echter niet zomaar om een spiegel gaat. Procedurele rechtvaardigheid is een spiegel die evaluatieve en regulatieve feedback over onszelf geeft.

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Curriculum Vitae

Op 3 juni 1979 in Leuven zag ik mijn eerste levenslicht. Toen ik in 1998 de studie psychologie aanvatte aan de Katholieke Universiteit van Leuven, was dat voor mij al enkele jaren een uitgemaakte zaak. In het derde jaar koos ik theoretische psychologie als afstudeerrichting met een specialisatie in de sociale en differentiële psychologie. Naast het schrijven van een afstudeerthesis over de waarheidsassumptie in deductieve rationaliteit (onder begeleiding van Walter Schroyens), doorliep ik in 2003-2004 ook een stage aan het Leuvense Laboratorium voor Experimentele Sociale Psychologie, waarin ik, onder begeleiding van Norbert Van Beselaere en Filip Boen, onderzoek deed naar sociale identiteit voor en na een fusieproces. Ik raakte er begeistert en geïnspireerd door de esthetiek en mogelijkheden van het onderzoeksproces. Bij mijn afstuderen in 2004, besloot ik mijn kans te wagen en solliciteerde op een interessant promotieproject onder begeleiding van David De Cremer aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, dat een samenwerking inhield met Constantine Sedikides van de Universiteit van Southampton. In januari 2005 startte ik op dat project en ging er opnieuw een hele nieuwe wereld voor mij open. Het resultaat van deze ervaringen heeft u nu in handen. Sinds januari 2009 werk ik als onderzoeker aan de Rotterdam School of Management (Erasmus Universiteit van Rotterdam).

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