Tilburg University

Antidumping

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Publication date:
2005

[Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Zanardi, M. (2005). *Antidumping: A Problem in International Trade*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-85). Microeconomics.

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No. 2005–85

ANTIDUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

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June 2005

ISSN 0924-7815

Antidumping: A Problem in International Trade

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June 2005

Abstract

When in 1923 Jacob Viner wrote the book “Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”, he probably did not imagine that the system put in place to eliminate the effects of dumping (i.e. antidumping) would surge to be a problem. However, as we celebrate the 100th anniversary of the first antidumping law, the situation is quite different from what Viner could observe at the beginning of last century. And if his economic analysis on the nature and causes of dumping is still valid, since the early 1990s the debate has centered on the widespread use and consequences of antidumping, which is just a modern protectionist tool used by many countries. This paper documents the evolution of antidumping from its early days by looking at the number of countries adopting antidumping laws and various statistics pertaining to the total caseload. One striking result is the important role of new users of antidumping, with negative consequences not only for traditional users.

Keywords: Antidumping; trade liberalization; GATT; WTO

JEL classification: F13; F14

*This paper has been prepared for the conference “The 100th Anniversary of Anti-Dumping Regulation” organized by the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy (GEP) at the University of Nottingham (UK) in June 2004. I would like to thank my discussant, Jim Durling, and all the conference participants for very useful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are solely mine. Financial support from Università Cattolica of Milan (Italy) is gratefully acknowledged. Contact information: Department of Economics & CentER, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: M.Zanardi@uvt.nl

*“Export dumping on a continued and systematic scale
has been a common practice of American manufacturers
since at least the late eighties of the last century.”*

Viner (1923, page 80)

1 Introduction

When in 1923 Jacob Viner wrote the book “Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”, he probably did not imagine that the system put in place to eliminate the effects of dumping, i.e. antidumping (AD), would surge to be a problem. However, as we celebrate the 100th anniversary of the first AD law, the situation is quite different from what Viner could observe in his days. In fact, AD has gone from a mostly unused and cumbersome trade policy instrument to become the preferred way in which industries in many countries seek and obtain protection from their governments.¹ And if Viner’s economic analysis on the nature and causes of dumping is still valid, since the early 1990s the debate has centered on the widespread use and consequences of AD.

Indeed, the issue has dramatically evolved so that the discussion on AD is now independent from the one about dumping, as a the result of an increasingly long literature that points out that the occurrence of dumping is not anymore the defining aspect in the application of AD duties and in the industries’ motivations in filing such petitions. Indeed, in a recent survey on AD, Blonigen and Prusa (2003) emphasize how AD “is simply a modern form of protection” since “all but AD’s staunchest supporters agree that AD has nothing to do with keeping trade “fair”...” and as such it has lost its connection with the dumping literature. For this reason, the academic debate on AD is now almost completely disjoint from the discussion about the motives and extent of dumping although AD’s supporters advocate its use in order to discourage unfair (i.e., dumping) business practices.

The literature on the effects of AD is long both in its theoretical and empirical dimensions. At the risk of simplification, the theoretical analysis reaches the conclusion that there are very few instances where AD is supported by sound economic motives

¹AD duties or other arrangements are often enforced to eliminate the dumping margin (i.e., the fact that exporters sell cheaper, or below cost, in the exporting market than in their domestic market).

(i.e., in the case of predatory dumping). Given that the empirical occurrence of these cases is very rare (Shy, 1998), the general presumption is that AD is nowadays used to the advantage of industrial interests with negative impacts on consumers' welfare and competition.

The theoretical conclusion that AD is (almost always) welfare reducing is supported by various estimates of these costs. Gallaway et al. (1999) present the results of a computable general equilibrium model and conclude that the removal of all AD and countervailing duty orders in 1993 in the United States (US) would have increased welfare in US by almost \$4 billions.² Studies on specific AD cases by the US International Trade Commission (1995), DeVault (1996), and Anderson (1993) reach the same qualitative conclusions that the net effect of removing AD orders would greatly benefit the US economy, as AD duties result in a gain in producers' welfare that is smaller than the consumers' loss. Together with these results, many other papers illustrate the distortions generated by the existence and use of AD laws where a non-trivial role is played by the political influences in the application of these trade remedies.

Given the concern for the welfare implications of AD, many studies provide various statistics on the use of AD. In this paper, a comprehensive dataset on the worldwide use of AD taken from Zanardi (2004) is used to illustrate the extent and the historical development of the problem posed by AD. By looking at the number of countries with an AD law and the time profile of such adoptions, a pattern emerges that points to possible explanations in the widespread enacting of these laws. The data on the caseload of initiations and impositions from the perspective of initiating and targeted countries does show the incidence of this protectionist tool and how it has been transformed from an elitist instrument used by very few countries to a common device easily applicable by developed and developing countries alike. Statistics on import and export intensities of AD (i.e., extent of use per US dollar of imports and exports) allow to conduct more reliable cross-country comparisons, which once again reveal the important role of the new users of AD.

For completeness, it should be mentioned that AD might serve an important role

²The countervailing law offsets export subsidies but is much less frequently used than the AD law.

by allowing further trade liberalization where otherwise countries would not agree on tariff concessions in multilateral negotiations. This is the view put forward by various developed countries like the US in its communication to the WTO (1998) where it says that AD is “a critical factor in obtaining and sustaining necessary public support for the shared multilateral goal of trade liberalization” and that it is “necessary to the maintenance of the multilateral trading system.” Although there is no study that tries to quantify the impact of AD on liberalization, the long literature on the negative consequences of AD puts in doubts that such positive effects do exist.³

In summary, this paper is focused on the assessment of the AD phenomenon and its historical development. It is not intended to be a survey of dumping, nor of AD as the long literature would take too much space. Moreover, recent surveys by Niels (2000) and Blonigen and Prusa (2003) already nicely summarize the contributions in these two fields. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Next section discusses the time pattern of adoptions of AD laws and its correlation with legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions. Section 3 presents some data to quantify the use of AD and its outcomes. The analysis and comparisons with import and export intensities are discussed in section 4. Conclusions follow in section 5.

2 The Reality of Antidumping

The very first AD law was passed in Canada in 1904. After a century, the count of countries with an AD law reached 98 by the end of 2003 with the list including developed and developing countries as well as countries in transition.⁴ And this number is certainly destined to increase as Georgia, Macedonia, and Vietnam are drafting an AD law. What was an instrument of protection for industrialized countries has now turned into a common protectionist tool that is widely applied across a broad range of countries.

Figure 1 probably describes best the extent and development of the AD phenomenon.

³Miranda et al. (1998) provide anecdotal evidence for Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil where trade liberalization was accompanied by an increased use of AD. However, it is not clear that the causal link goes from AD to trade liberalization.

⁴The fifteen members of the European Union are counted individually. See the Appendix for the definitions of the various categories of countries.

It shows the cumulative number of countries with an AD law together with the number of countries that are member of the GATT/WTO.⁵ A few observations are in place.

Only few countries immediately followed Canada's example in adopting an AD law: Australia in 1906, South Africa in 1914, United States in 1916, Japan in 1920, and France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 1921. This first wave of enactments is sometimes attributed to the fear of German dumping, as German manufactures were supposed to be ready to dump goods in the aftermath of World War I to win an economic war after they lost on the military battlefields. However, Viner (1923, page 61) warns that "[s]uch sweeping accusations are to be regarded with skepticism until convincing evidence is presented in confirmation. They are in large part merely one phase of the wartime plague of mendacious propaganda. It is significant that prior to 1914 capable foreign students of the export policies of the German kartells made no such sweeping charges against them." Following Finger (1993), it is likely that this first surge of adoptions is due to a combination of factors including the supposed German threat but also "trust-busting" atmosphere of the period,⁶ the general high tariffs of the period and, possibly, the fact that AD was a new way to protect domestic industries with the flavor of fairness as an objective.⁷ Indeed, this last explanation may be quite relevant since, as summarized by the opening quote, dumping had been occurring already for a while by the time that this first group of countries enacted an AD law.⁸

As shown in Figure 1, the thirty years that followed did not see any new adoption and only in the early 1950s new countries started enacting AD laws. As other coincidences that will be pointed out, this surge overlaps with the establishment of GATT in 1948; indeed, the countries that signed into law AD procedures in the beginning of the 1950s (i.e., Germany, Norway, and Greece) were also members of the GATT.⁹ Moreover, in

⁵These graphs update the data presented in Zanardi (2004) for the years 2002 and 2003. In particular, Armenia and Estonia implemented an AD law in 2002 while Jordan and Mauritius did so in 2003.

⁶In Canada, a first law about market dominance was enacted in 1889; in the US, the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890.

⁷Interestingly, Canadian manufacturers initially opposed this law since it was eliminating one of the reasons to invoke higher tariffs but they soon started to support it and ask to make it more effective.

⁸Viner (1923) discusses various instances of dumping even prior to 1890 and suggests that AD laws enacted prior to 1914 were mostly the answer to American dumping.

⁹See Zanardi (2004) for a full list of countries with an AD law and the year of its implementation.

1956 the contracting parties to the GATT decided to have a “systematic study” of AD legislation (see GATT, 1958) and ten more countries adopted an AD law between 1956 and 1960 (although not all of these countries were part, at the time, of the GATT).

The list of coincidences continues with legal developments in the GATT treatment of AD leading to a peak in adoptions. During the Kennedy Round of the GATT the first AD Code was negotiated and entered into force in 1967. In that same year, five countries added AD to their legal code (four of these countries adopted the law as a result of the common European Economic Community -EEC- AD regulations) with two more countries following in 1971 and 1972. Figure 1 shows that the following decade was very quiet with some more activity taking place in the beginning of the 1980s and this correlates with the Tokyo Round AD Code that dates to 1980. The Kennedy and Tokyo AD Code were not part of the GATT Agreements and as such they required specific approval by each country in order to be valid. Instead, the Uruguay Round AD Code that entered into force on January 1st 1995 departs from this rule since it is an integral part of the WTO Agreement. This implies that each member country is automatically bound but its provisions although this does not necessarily imply that a member country has to have an AD law. This last twist in the legal procedures goes together with an explosion of AD enactments as represented by the steep slope in Figure 1 detectable from the early 1990s.

The apparent correlations between GATT/WTO memberships, change in legal dispositions, and adoptions of AD law do not necessarily imply causation and do not shed light on the possible direction of such causation. However, they do suggest that more and more countries are adopting AD laws as the number of member countries in the GATT/WTO increases. Although there is no legal requirement that a country member of the WTO adopts such a law, the impression is that the two aspects go together, as it appears from various document detailing the process of countries accessing to the WTO and the fact that 22 countries (i.e., 25% of the total) enacted their AD law in the period from 3 years before to 3 years after joining the GATT/WTO.¹⁰ It may simply be that new accession countries try to adopt as many as possible of the GATT/WTO

¹⁰Ten countries (i.e., 11%) implemented it in the three years before joining the GATT/WTO.

regulations. The concern is that once these laws exist, the governments may fall victims of pressure groups and start (ab)using these laws. At the same time, a more optimistic interpretation of the facts may be that the standardization imposed by the WTO requirements is able to limit the protectionist bias that may otherwise be incorporated in the laws.

The 98 countries with an AD law cover the vast majority of the trade flows. Africa represents the only geographic exception but, at the same time, it counts very little in terms of total trade flows. As a comparison, the last decade has been a catch-up for Asian and some Central and South American countries, as most of the industrialized world already had AD laws by 1990. What this means is that more than 90% of worldwide imports in 2003 were potentially subject to AD action, while the comparable figure was around 71% in 1990.¹¹

3 The Use of Antidumping

Although AD protection has been available for many decades in many countries, there has been no reliable accounting system in place until 1969. In fact, after the systematic study prepared by the GATT in 1958, which also details the AD measures taken by member states, only the Kennedy AD Code required signatories countries to notify changes in the AD law and AD activity on an annual basis.¹² However, these reports only summarize the overall activity without providing information on the countries targeted in each action. It is only the Tokyo AD Code of 1980 that required all the parties to submit detailed semiannual reports on any AD action. For this reason, a detailed analysis on the use of AD will be carried out only for the period 1981-2001, which is the most recent for which a comprehensive dataset on the worldwide use (i.e., not only covering WTO member countries) of AD has been assembled (see Zanardi, 2004).

¹¹Intra-EU trade is excluded from these figures, as AD does not apply among member countries.

¹²In 1960, the GATT AD Group recommended, without success, “contracting parties to transmit to the GATT secretariat any information relating to changes in their legislation concerning anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and also to notify the secretariat of the introduction, alteration or removal of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.” (GATT, 1961, page 201). In the same document, it was “underlined the need for governments to use their anti-dumping powers with great care in the recognition of the effects which such powers could have on international trade.”

For the period prior to 1980, Tables 1 and 2 report the figures available on initiations and impositions of AD. However, it should be noted that these figures refer to the cases that were investigated independently of the number of countries involved. Therefore, they are not strictly comparable to the post 1980 data where a petition is defined in terms of the product and targeted country; in this sense, these early data underestimate the degree of AD usage. Following the convention used by the GATT/WTO, the definition of year refers to the period covering July 1st to June 30th of the following year so that, for example, 1969 includes the AD activity undertaken in the period July 1st 1968-June 30th 1969. First of all, it may be surprising to see that no data is reported for Canada for the period 1948-1958. However, “Canada ... does not keep records of either the number of requests for the application of anti-dumping duties or the number of instances in which anti-dumping duties have been applied.” (GATT, 1958, page 53) and New Zealand is in the same situation! But it is probably the 211 AD cases of South Africa that are even more surprising. Indeed, South Africa has been the heaviest user (also in terms of AD duties imposed) for the period although it is never considered among the “traditional users”, a label reserved for Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand, and US.

When looking at the years from 1969 to 1980, it appears that AD has been used consistently by the traditional users. The EEC adopted a common AD law in 1968 but seemed to learn quickly how to use it, considering that since 1972 it filed on average 10 petitions a year. Still, the numbers reported for the EEC are underestimating its total caseload given that until June 1991 the European Community only reported to the GATT its AD actions against “Parties to the [GATT AD] Agreement”, therefore excluding many cases.

Also the numbers referring to the imposition of duties or the conclusion of price undertakings (i.e., agreements where exporters commit to stop dumping) show that many cases ended up with some form of restrictions, although the acceptance rate is much lower than for the more recent period. Interestingly, price undertakings have been quite common also in these early years with the EEC making extensive use of this possibility (just like in the modern days) followed by the US, while Canada, for example,

never recurred to this solution.¹³

For the period from 1980, this paper makes use of a comprehensive dataset that improves upon previous analysis by extending the coverage to some countries not member of the WTO, by correcting mistakes in the GATT/WTO reports, and by filling numerous gaps in the time series with information provided by AD authorities through direct contact or through their publications.¹⁴ In the following, the resulting detailed data are discussed in terms of initiations, affected countries, and outcome of the investigations.

3.1 Cases Initiated

The total caseload of AD investigations initiated in the period July 1980 - June 2001 by initiating country is reported in Table 3. Although the total of 4,597 investigations is not to be taken literally, it should not be very far from the actual number and, if anything, it is an underestimate of it because of missing information.

Looking at these data in conjunction with the previous tables, it appears that most of the 1980s have been characterized by few countries doing all the filings: 11 countries up to 1985, 16 up to 1990 but 45 in the full 1981-2001 period. This simple statistic exemplifies the extent of the widespread use of AD although it also points out that only a subset of countries made use of existing AD laws. Clearly, the “inactive” countries have much smaller trade flows and are, on average, at lower development stages, but still there is an evident possibility that more countries will actively engage in AD as they develop and understand that AD can be a very efficient protectionist tool. The widespread use of AD is also detectable when considering the share of petitions filed by new users (i.e., all the users except Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand, and US) reported at the bottom of Table 3. This share has been substantially increasing over time and it reveals the increasingly important role of these countries in the debate about AD. And among these new users there are some heavy users, as compared to the traditional users. Over the most recent seven years (i.e., 1995-2001), Argentina, India, and South Africa are second only to EEC and US for their total filings and Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea

¹³Also in modern times Canada is not particularly prone to the use of such agreements.

¹⁴See Zanardi (2004) for a detailed description of the dataset.

are filing more than New Zealand. But the group of new users is also composed by small and developing countries (e.g., China, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, Lithuania, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Trinidad Tobago, Ukraine), which suggests that AD is a fairly simple instrument to apply.¹⁵

A graphical representation of the numbers in Table 3 helps understanding other patterns of these filings. Figure 2 shows a business cycle type of fluctuations in filings, which has been proved econometrically by Knetter and Prusa (2003), with AD (as other protectionist measures) increasing during recessions. The sum of the two series also presents an evident upward trend in the total number of investigations. However, the (aggregate) upward trend is due to the filings from new users, which are clearly increasing, while petitions from traditional users present a statically significant downward trend.

3.2 Countries Affected

The list of countries targeted by AD petitions is much longer than the numbers of countries initiating AD cases. Table 4 shows that 113 countries have been named in AD petitions, although this number is partly inflated because of the break-up of former Socialist countries.¹⁶ Asian countries dominate: China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand are in the top ten of the countries most investigated with the remaining places taken by US, European countries and Brazil.

The last columns of Table 4 demonstrate that it is important to look at the evolution over time of such statistics. In fact, the ranking of countries changes substantially when the whole sample is split in three subperiods of seven years each. China goes from receiving 4.1% of total investigations in 1981-1987 to 13.2% in the most recent subsample. Similarly, all the other top Asian countries with the exception of Japan rank much higher in recent years. India and Indonesia are in top places in the period 1995-2001 while confined at the bottom in the 1981-1987 column. For these countries that rise, European countries, Japan, and the United States move downward. This shifting

¹⁵Nonetheless, various documents mention the budget limitations faced by various countries in setting up a well-staffed AD unit.

¹⁶The grand total in Table 4 does not equal the one in Table 3 because in some cases the receiver of an AD petition is unknown.

can be explained by the increasing importance of export activities from Asian countries and the larger number of countries investigating AD cases.¹⁷

A yet different and fruitful way to look at these data is to tabulate them in terms of level of development of the countries. Table 5 reports the results of this exercise in terms of investigating and targeted countries. Also in this case, it is important to split the sample into subperiods. In this way, it is clear that developed countries moved from mostly targeting developed countries to developing countries. A similar change is observable for developing countries as well. Apart from increasing trade volumes from developing countries, this change is consistent with the fact that developing countries initially used AD “in revenge” against developed and traditional users (i.e., 73% of cases) but soon realized its general utility and used it more intensively for countries at their same level of development (i.e., 35%) or in transition (i.e., 32%). Countries in transition make their appearance only in recent years but they also show a tendency to mostly target other countries in transition (i.e., 49%), possibly because of their strong economics connections.

The trend just described can be explained by the increasing export volumes of developing countries and countries in transition but it also suggests that the use of AD is much more generalized than what is usually considered. In other words, the AD debate should not only be framed as a dispute between developed countries as the perpetrators and developing countries as the victims.

When looking in details at the experience of the various countries, it appears that most investigating countries have a large set of targets, as the average of affected countries is 17 and there are ten countries that initiated AD cases against more than 20 countries.¹⁸ Traditional users lead in this ranking with the US having targeted 72 countries over the full sample followed by the EEC, Canada, and Australia with 68, 56, and 50 countries respectively. However, new users feature predominantly in this list with Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Korea filing cases against 40, 53, 38, 38,

¹⁷For completeness, the possibility that there has been a change in the propensity to dump across countries should be considered. This seems unlikely and on a related aspect, Prusa and Skeath (2002) empirically test and reject the hypothesis of an increase in unfair practices as the explanation of the increase in AD activity.

¹⁸Detailed data not reported, but available upon request, to save on space.

and 45 countries respectively. From the perspective of affected countries, South Korea attracts investigations from the most countries (named as a target by 24 countries), followed by China (23), Russia (22), Germany (21), Japan (20), and the US (20).

3.3 Outcomes of cases

The fact that an AD investigation is initiated does not necessarily imply that duties will be imposed. The literature shows that trade effects can be induced by the mere existence of an AD law. However, the available data only allow distinguishing between three possible outcomes of an AD investigation: no duties, AD duties, price undertakings. In the last case, foreign producers commit on the minimum price to charge or on the maximum quantity of exports.

Table 6 ranks investigating countries by the success rate (i.e., percentage of measures imposed over total number of petitions) without distinguishing, at first, between duties and undertakings. Overall, the success rate is 56% with large variations across countries. The EEC dominates this ranking with 74% of the cases resulting in some form of affirmative outcome, and distancing itself from the other traditional users that are much below (e.g., US has the highest success rate among the other traditional users and it is only 59%). However, new users occupy many of the top places of the list: India, South Korea, and Mexico are all on or above a 65% success rate. The detailed breakdown reported in Table 7 reaffirms that some of the new users not only present very high success rates but have also become more important over time in their impositions of final measures. For example, India's share of imposed measures was less than 1% in the years 1988-1994 but it reached 11.5% in 1995-2001. The annual totals of Table 7 also show a sort of business cycle fluctuation in the imposition of definitive measures analogous to the pattern in the initiation of AD cases in Table 3.

The composition of definitive measure is also important. The last column of Table 6 illustrates a large variation in the use of undertakings. The EEC and South Korea regularly make use of these solutions as they account for 41% and 40% respectively of their total measures. Japan's figure at 60% is more complicate since Japan initiated very few cases although it passed its AD law in 1920. When it imposed final measures (five

cases out of ten initiations) it preferred negotiated solutions as “the antidumping system is unfamiliar in Japanese society, a non-litigious society, in which the people prefer to settle conflict ‘out of court’ ” (Yoshimatsu, 2001). However, it seems strange that a nonbelligerent approach is the reason for these different attitudes towards undertakings and it would be worth analyzing the issue in more detail.

Figure 3 illustrates the number of measures in force by groups of countries defined by the stage of development. The graph suggests a learning effect with measures from developing countries increasing more quickly as more users join this group and overall they become more active. It is too early to see the pattern for countries in transition but it would be interesting to see if they follow the example of developing countries that similarly started with very few cases. Instead, developed countries are more stable in their pattern although displaying an increasing trend.

Table 8 proposes a breakdown between countries imposing and receiving final measures in terms of level of development. Similar patterns for what discussed for Table 5 apply here as well. In particular, the aggregate picture from the period 1981-2001 hides important changes in the pattern of measures imposed. The general conclusion to draw from looking at the various subsamples is the increasing importance of developing countries and economies in transition as more recent periods are analyzed. However, if only price undertakings are considered,¹⁹ developed countries mainly use this form of measures with economies in transition, developing countries mostly reach such agreements with developed countries while nothing can be said about economies in transition since they settled only one price undertaking in the whole period. Interestingly, this description is valid across the different periods.

Table 9 reports the definitive measures in place by year and by affected country. Judging from the percentages in the last columns, it seems that there is less variation in ranking of the most affected countries with respect to what can be observed just for the initiations of AD cases. For example, China, Japan, South Korea, and the US are constantly the top four investigated countries independently of the period considered. However, consistent with the statistics reported above, the number of affected countries

¹⁹Data not reported, but available upon request, to save on space.

increases as more recent subperiods are considered. A comparison with the cases initiated indicates once again that many petitions do not lead to any measure as only 89 countries have had final measures imposed even if AD cases were initiated against 113 countries. Similarly, only 38 countries imposed duties and undertakings even if a total of 45 countries filed AD petitions. The discrepancies in these comparisons are in part due to the countries that very recently initiated to use their AD laws, as they may not have reached yet the final stage of the investigations. However, an overall success rate of 56% suggests that many petitions are not well founded but that, at the same time, filers of AD cases seem to find it optimal to allege dumping even when it does not occur. Indeed, there is econometric evidence in this direction as Staiger and Wolak (1994) have found that some firms file petitions with the sole objective of restricting trade during the investigation period.

4 The Intensity in the Use of Antidumping

The figures presented so far are absolute values of the use of AD. However, it may be unfair to compare countries' usage only looking at initiations and impositions of measures since these figures should be related to the amount of imports and exports of the countries. In this sense, cross-country comparisons should be based on relative use. In this section, such indexes are presented following the example of Finger et al. (2002).

Table 10 reports the intensity in the initiations of AD investigations by dividing the number of AD petitions by the real value of imports (in US Dollars)²⁰ and normalizing to 100 the value of the US for the whole 1981-2001 sample.²¹ For each country, the number next to the intensity index is the country's ranking in terms of numbers of initiations. It is evident that the rankings based on initiations and intensity are very different. The US is the country that has initiated most cases over the full sample but it is ranked in the lower portion of the list (28th) in terms of intensity. With the exception of Australia

²⁰Import and export data are from the IMF, with the exception of Taiwan whose data is from the CHELEM database.

²¹A grey background denotes that the value has not been calculated on the whole period because of missing data or because the country did not have an AD during the full sample.

and New Zealand, the top fifteen users of AD are new users with Argentina and South Africa at the top with indices denoting that the intensity of their AD filings is 14 times higher than in the US. This result lends an even stronger meaning to the conclusion, reached above in terms of absolute numbers, on the relevance of new users. And in a way, it shows that the EEC and the US (ranked one after the other) are probably less shameful than usually claimed in their use of AD: their total numbers are high but not in relative terms.

When looking across columns, the filing intensity of the US has decreased over time: relative to its imports, the US is initiating less AD cases nowadays than it did at the beginning of the 1980s. The same holds true for the other traditional users and other countries. Only Australia and New Zealand are the traditional users in the top fifteen also in the most recent subperiod, which could be considered the most reliable period for such comparisons since many countries started using their AD law only recently.

Similarly to Table 10 but with respect to the targeted countries, Table 11 reports the ratios of the number of cases in which a country has been investigated divided by the real value of its exports (in US Dollars) for countries targeted by at least 5 investigations.²² This table illustrates that many small and developing countries are subject to disproportionately many more AD investigations than developed countries. The US are still taken to be the reference point and their intensity is normalized to 100 for the period 1981-2001. Focusing on the most recent period, all but three of the top fifteen most investigated countries are countries in transition, followed by developing countries. And the first developed country in the list (i.e., Spain) is at the 17th position. The bottom panel of Table 5 already pointed out a bias against developing countries and countries in transition but this is even more pronounced when the figures are related to export volumes. With respect to the traditional users, the EEC as a whole (i.e., cases against the European Community as a whole and its member countries) is more heavily targeted than the US. These patterns are true also for the other subperiods, with the exception of 1981-1987. For this period, it is as if a part of the list is removed, some of the same countries are in relevant positions although at the time were not, strictly

²²The previous two footnotes apply to Table 11 as well.

speaking, in transitions (i.e., Hungary, Romania), and some communist countries that do not exist anymore (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) are at the very top of the list.

A yet different way to look at the data is to compute the intensities of initiated investigations with respect to existing measures in force. The idea is that the more duty orders and undertakings are in place in a country and the less it may be left to be investigated. Table 12 reports such statistics for four subperiods (i.e., cases initiated in each subperiod divided by the average number of measures in force in the subperiod) with the ratio for the US in 1981-1985 normalized to 100. As expected, countries present in all subperiods move downwards in the rankings for the most recent periods as new countries appear in the list although the number of cases they initiate puts them in much higher positions in absolute terms.²³ This downward movement is not only due to the new entries; the indices also decrease significantly over time if a country was using AD already in the early 1980s. For example, the US goes from an index of 100 in 1981-1985 to less than a third of it in the years 1996-2001 and New Zealand's ratio (i.e., the top country in the first subperiod) drops from 359 to 65. Among the traditional users, Australia and New Zealand presents higher (and sometimes much higher) ratios than the others and the EEC is always ahead of the US.

4.1 Disaggregate Analysis

The available data would allow a very disaggregated analysis on a country by country basis (both in terms of initiators and recipients of AD petitions). In order to convey what the data can say at such a level of disaggregation, it is best to use some graphs to represent the relative intensities in the initiations of AD cases by focusing on some countries. A natural choice is the set of traditional users and some of the new users.

In Figure 4, the relative intensities in the filings of the traditional users are presented for each potential target country. The countries accused of dumping are aligned on the horizontal axes using the IMF codes, which make it easy to distinguish between industrialized countries (codes 100-200), Latin America countries (codes 201-300), Caribbean countries (301-400), Middle East countries (401-500), Asian countries (501-600), African

²³The numbers next to the intensity measures provide the rankings based on initiations only.

countries (601-800), and countries in transition (900-1000).²⁴ Although in each of the five panels some outliers have been removed, it is possible to detect some clear pattern and commonalities. For one, a common outlier is South Africa, which is the country with the highest intensity for all the traditional users and whose index is several times the value of the highest point in each graph.²⁵ With the exception of Australia and New Zealand, the traditional users exhibit quite high intensities for countries in transition. Asian countries are another favorite target, although less so, in comparative terms, for the US. In each panel, some industrialized countries also stand out from the cloud of points but in this case the traditional users seem to have a less common pattern. Overall, there are some clear regularities and, in fact, correlations between any pair of traditional users are all very close to one. Apart from these patterns, a further look at the five panels also show quite different range of variations for the values of these indices, denoting overall different level of intensities in the use of AD.

Figure 5 proposes the same kind of analysis for a sample of new users, chosen because at the top places in Tables 3 and 10. Overall, there is much less activity from these users (i.e., there are many points with a zero value) and still countries in transition are more heavily targeted than other groups. With the exception of Mexico, South Africa is again an outlier. Looking at the five panels, it appears that the filing activities of these new users have less in common than what comes out from Figure 5. Indeed, pair correlations are much lower for these countries and even negative in some cases. As noted for traditional users, the scales of the vertical axes show quite different general propensities towards filing AD petitions.

5 Conclusions

As we celebrate the 100th birthday of the first AD law that was introduced in Canada in 1904, the data presented in this paper show that the AD has become a standard policy tool in many countries with likely more to follow. Indeed, the literature acknowledges

²⁴The European Union is considered as one country and assigned code 110. Taiwan, whose trade data do not come from the IMF, is assigned code 1001.

²⁵From 68 times for the EEC to 1224 times for New Zealand.

that we are now facing an AD more than a dumping problem, with a clear different emphasis than what we can read in Viner's (1923) seminal contribution on the subject.

The quote at the beginning of the paper shows that dumping is an old phenomenon but if we were to substitute the word dumping with AD the quote would still be applicable one century later. From the 1980s, AD has been spreading worldwide in two dimensions. On the one hand, the number of AD petitions has been growing in the so-called traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand, and US). On the other hand, more and more countries have adopted an AD law and many of them have followed the traditional users' example and started to strongly rely on this policy tool. The various statistics presented in this paper witness such evolution and they show that the new users are learning quite well, as judged by their activity relative to their trade volumes.

When looking at the statistics on the targeted countries, the data show that over time the actions of the new users have been shifted from developed countries to developing countries. In this sense, the usual confrontation between developed and developing countries is partly misleading since much of the action from developing countries is directed to other developing countries. If indeed developing countries started using AD with a "revenge" motive, they soon learnt its general applicability. And for this reason it is likely that more countries will join the group of users and AD will remain a problem over the medium horizon. This dim interpretation may overshadow the fact that AD may work in fostering further trade liberalization by providing a pressure valve to release strong pressures from industrial groups that would otherwise oppose such liberalization. Unfortunately, there is no clear and systematic evidence of this scenario. Instead, we know that the increase in the use of AD in recent years has not been motivated by an increase in dumping behavior (Prusa and Skeath, 2002).

A Appendix

The following categories have been used in the paper:

Developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Developing countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Macao, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Suriname, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Island, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Countries in transition: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, USSR, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia.

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Table 1: AD investigations initiated prior to 1981

Country	1948 1958	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Australia	101	.	.	.	30*	34	18	43	34	40	26	20	.	346
Austria					.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	1	2
Canada	.	9	4	12	9	10	7	7	15	20	19	13	26	151
Denmark		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EEC		1	1	1	11	4	2	0	5	9	23	18	17	92
Finland	.	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
Greece	.	0	6	2	0	2	1	12	0	6	0	1	0	30
Norway	.	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	5
Rhodesia & Nyasaland	4	**												4
Sweden	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
South Africa	211	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	211
United Kingdom	.	13	8	6	9	7	0	6	14	20	0	0	0	83
United States	96	12	27	22	39	27	10	10	27	15	44	44	37***	410
Total	421	36	48	44	69	84	38	79	95	111	112	99	44	1347

Notes: 1980 only refers to the period 1 January 1980 - 30 June 1980.

An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year.

A dot means that no information is available for that year.

* 1 January - 30 June 1972.

** This country broke up in 1963 resulting in Malawi, Rhodesia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

*** 1 July 1979 - 30 June 1980.

Sources: GATT (1948), Lloyd (1977), GATT (various years).

Table 2: AD impositions (duties + undertakings) prior to 1981

Country	1948 1958	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Australia	9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7	7	6	12	.	41
Austria					.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	1	3
Canada	.	.	4	1	5	3	2	4	6	9	13	8	8	63
Denmark		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EEC		0	3	1	3	8	3	0	1	5	0	20	10	54
Finland	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	.	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	6
Norway	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rhodesia & Nyasaland	3	**												3
Sweden	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
South Africa	22	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	22
United Kingdom	.	2	6	3	4	4	0	4	3	18	2	0	0	46
United States	2	5	13	11	22	15	18	0	4	12	11	18	9***	140
Total	38	12	27	16	34	30	23	8	21	52	32	60	19	381

Notes: 1980 only refers to the period 1 January 1980 - 30 June 1980.

An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year.

A dot means that no information is available for that year.

* 1 January - 30 June 1972.

** This country broke up in 1963 resulting in Malawi, Rhodesia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

*** 1 July 1979 - 30 June 1980.

Sources: GATT (1948), Lloyd (1977), GATT (various years).

Table 3: AD investigations initiated, 1981-2001

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%
Developed countries																							
Australia	60	54	71	70	63	54	40	20	19	23	46	76	61	45	6	8	22	35	18	18	20	829	18.0
Austria	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	EEC							9	0.2
Canada	29	64	34	26	35	27	24	20	14	15	12	16	38	22	9	6	8	10	17	11	41	478	10.4
EEEC	33	54	49	42	57	32	30	43	43	34	22	23	33	47	37	16	26	44	41	49	29	784	17.1
Finland	2	0	0	1	0	0	5	5	2	0	1	0	0	0	EEC							16	0.3
New Zealand	.	1	0	0	1	1	6	4	8	0	6	13	4	2	9	9	1	5	4	6	5	85	1.8
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
South Africa	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30	17	20	44	11	39	34	15	20	230	5.0
Spain	0	0	0	1	0	EEC									EEC						1	0.0	
Sweden	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	4	2	1	0	0	EEC						13	0.3	
USA	15	50	40	46	61	63	41	31	25	24	52	62	69	47	30	15	20	28	43	17	77	856	18.6
Developing countries																							
Argentina	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	30	14	7	42	18	8	15	23	44	201	4.4
Barbados	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	.	.	.	0	0.0
Bolivia													.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Brazil						0	4	2	2	0	2	11	9	30	13	1	19	12	13	17	10	143	3.1
Chile						.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	2	4	2	2	1	1	4	17	0.4
Colombia											1	1	5	4	1	2	1	2	6	3	1	27	0.6
Costa Rica															0	1	4	0	1	0	0	6	0.1
Cuba											.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Cyprus	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	.	0	0	0.0
Dominica	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	.	0	0	0.0
Ecuador												.	.	.	.	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.0
Egypt											2	5	13	4	1	25	0.5					25	0.5
El Salvador											0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	0	0.0
Fiji															.	0	0	0	0	.	.	0	0.0
Grenada	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Guatemala															0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.0
Honduras															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Iceland								.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
India					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	1	11	3	24	43	38	27	37	192	4.2
Indonesia															0	0	9	11	0	12	1	33	0.7
Israel												.	.	.	3	4	7	5	3	1	2	25	0.5
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.0
Japan	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	0.2
Malaysia	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	0	2	8	2	1	0	15	0.3
Mexico							3	12	12	11	13	25	24	23	18	3	5	8	12	7	4	180	3.9
Morocco															0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Nicaragua															0	0	0	1	2	0	.	3	0.1
Pakistan			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	.	0	0.0

Table 3: AD investigations initiated, 1981-2001, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%
Panama																0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0.0
Paraguay																0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0.0
Peru												2	2	7	4	4	3	5	5	4	0	36	0.8
Philippines															7	0	2	1	3	4	2	19	0.4
Saint Lucia	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0.0
Senegal															.	0	.	.	.	.	.	0	0.0
Singapore					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.0
South Korea	.	.	.	.	.	3	1	0	0	3	2	0	7	4	3	6	18	5	5	4	5	66	1.4
Taiwan					2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	9	17	3	0	4	9	8	6	0	73	1.6
Thailand														3	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	7	0.2
Trinidad Tobago													.	.	.	0	1	1	5	0	1	8	0.2
Tunisia									12		20	10	6	26	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Turkey																	5	0	7	0	6	94	2.0
Uganda	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	0	.	0	0.0
Uruguay	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0.1
Venezuela												0	5	1	1	5	0	7	10	0	2	31	0.7
Zambia	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Zimbabwe	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	.	0	0.0
Countries in transition																							
Bulgaria															.	.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
China																		3	4	3	12	22	0.5
Croatia																			0	0	0	0	0.0
Czech Rep.																	0	0	2	1	0	3	0.1
Hungary														0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Kyrgyzstan															0	0	0	0	0	0	.	0	0.0
Latvia																				0	0	0	0.0
Lithuania																			0	11	3	14	0.3
Poland*											24				0	0	0	1	3	0	0	28	0.6
Romania												0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Russia**																			.	1	1	2	0.0
Slovak Rep.																	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Slovenia															0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.0
Ukraine**														.	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	0.1
Uzbekistan																	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Total	140	225	195	188	219	185	153	141	129	128	205	254	339	312	190	174	215	299	320	250	336	4597	
% Over Total	3.0	4.9	4.2	4.1	4.8	4.0	3.3	3.1	2.8	2.8	4.5	5.5	7.4	6.8	4.1	3.8	4.7	6.5	7.0	5.4	7.3	100.0	
% New Users	2.1	0.9	0.5	2.1	0.9	4.3	7.8	16.3	15.5	25.0	32.7	25.2	39.5	47.8	52.1	69.0	64.2	59.2	61.6	59.6	48.8	34.0	

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year. A dot means that no information is available for that year.

EEC means that the country joined the EEC in that year; from that year onward its investigations are included in the EEC data.

* Poland initiated investigations in 1992 invoking the customs law, as the AD was implemented only in 1997.

** These numbers should be viewed as minimum cases initiated since they have been obtained from citations in the popular press.

Table 4: Countries affected by AD investigations by year

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%	
Developing countries																											
Australia	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	5	3	2	0	1	2	2	5	1	26	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.7	
Austria	0	1	1	1	4	3	1	3	1	0	2	2	4	1	1	0	2	3	1	2	3	36	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.7	
Belgium	1	8	7	5	0	6	1	2	3	0	5	2	13	3	0	2	1	5	2	1	2	69	1.5	2.4	1.9	0.7	
Canada	3	3	4	6	6	4	5	3	3	1	2	7	7	3	2	2	3	5	1	0	4	74	1.7	2.6	1.7	1.0	
Denmark	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	15	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.3	
EEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	2	5	3	6	28	0.6	0.0	0.7	1.0	
Finland	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	4	2	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	22	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.3	
France	1	15	7	7	3	7	5	2	1	3	5	7	13	8	1	3	1	7	10	6	3	115	2.6	3.8	2.6	1.7	
Germany	9	15	12	12	8	6	10	4	2	7	8	5	17	9	8	7	13	11	11	7	9	190	4.2	6.1	3.4	3.7	
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	9	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	
Ireland	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	13	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	
Italy	2	12	6	11	6	8	3	3	2	1	6	6	8	5	7	3	5	6	4	1	8	113	2.5	4.1	2.1	1.9	
Japan	4	9	22	17	21	14	18	25	14	8	17	13	15	11	9	8	8	15	21	11	12	292	6.5	8.9	6.8	4.7	
Luxembourg	1	6	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.1	
Netherlands	2	5	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	6	6	3	1	7	2	5	4	0	4	59	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	
New Zealand	0	0	4	6	4	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	26	0.6	1.4	0.3	0.3	
Norway	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	14	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.1	
Portugal	0	2	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	15	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	
South Africa	0	0	4	3	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	3	4	7	2	6	2	6	5	3	9	62	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.8	
Spain	3	5	5	16	8	2	4	2	0	1	6	3	4	6	2	5	5	9	4	5	5	100	2.2	3.6	1.5	2.0	
Sweden	1	1	4	5	3	3	2	1	3	0	1	4	1	1	1	0	3	4	0	1	0	39	0.9	1.6	0.7	0.5	
Switzerland	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	12	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.2	
United Kingdom	4	8	9	6	5	9	3	1	1	4	6	8	9	6	2	7	4	8	3	3	12	118	2.6	3.7	2.3	2.2	
United States	16	12	18	11	17	12	17	15	7	14	18	22	33	25	9	17	20	14	16	12	13	338	7.6	8.7	8.9	5.7	
Developing countries																											
Argentina	0	0	1	2	4	2	1	1	1	0	7	4	2	1	3	1	0	2	3	1	3	39	0.9	0.8	1.1	0.7	
Brazil	2	4	11	6	13	9	5	6	4	8	8	9	27	13	5	14	6	9	12	6	11	188	4.2	4.2	5.0	3.5	
Chile	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	3	2	3	1	3	5	25	0.6	0.3	0.3	1.0	
Colombia	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	13	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2	
Egypt	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	2	1	1	2	0	1	14	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.4	
Hong Kong	1	1	0	2	3	1	0	6	6	2	3	4	7	4	5	4	1	4	2	2	1	59	1.3	0.7	2.1	1.1	
India	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	3	7	7	9	9	3	6	9	14	10	11	14	108	2.4	0.3	2.5	3.8	
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	5	4	9	9	4	5	10	11	16	13	92	2.1	0.1	1.5	3.8	
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	7	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.3		
Israel	0	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	21	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.3	
Malaysia	2	1	0	0	1	0	2	5	2	0	1	4	5	9	3	2	4	3	5	7	9	65	1.5	0.5	1.7	1.8	
Mexico	0	0	1	2	3	3	5	0	1	3	3	5	5	2	4	6	2	2	7	3	3	60	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	18	0.4	0.0	0.7	0.4	

Table 4: Countries affected by AD investigations by year, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%	
Philippines	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	1	1	14	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	
Singapore	3	1	0	1	2	2	3	3	1	0	4	5	5	5	1	0	1	3	3	3	2	48	1.1	1.0	1.5	0.7	
South Korea	1	6	13	7	16	12	6	12	13	10	12	20	23	17	14	7	12	25	31	24	24	305	6.8	5.2	7.1	7.7	
Taiwan	1	3	8	3	11	13	9	6	10	9	9	16	10	9	7	4	11	14	15	13	20	201	4.5	4.1	4.6	4.7	
Thailand	0	0	0	5	5	1	1	4	2	3	4	6	9	12	8	4	8	4	13	13	14	116	2.6	1.0	2.7	3.6	
Trinidad Tobago	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	7	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	
Turkey	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	4	0	7	3	2	1	5	3	3	0	4	7	5	3	55	1.2	0.7	1.5	1.4	
Venezuela	0	2	1	0	6	1	1	2	1	1	4	3	2	5	0	0	2	1	3	2	2	39	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.6	
Countries in transition																											
Belarus	0	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	1	3	2	0	0	3	3	4	17	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.7	
Bulgaria																						20	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	
China	3	5	11	12	7	7	4	6	10	11	15	26	32	37	29	34	33	38	22	27	53	422	9.4	4.1	9.1	13.2	
Croatia												0	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	
Czech Republic													4	3	0	1	1	2	3	4	3	21	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.8	
Czechoslovakia	1	8	8	9	4	6	5	1	4	2	2	5	4									59	1.3	3.5	1.2	0.0	
East Germany	2	7	5	6	4	5	3	3	2	1												38	0.8	2.7	0.4	0.0	
Hungary	3	5	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	0	2	1	2	4	1	0	43	1.0	1.7	0.9	0.6	
Kazakhstan												2	2	1	5	1	0	4	1	1	3	20	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.8	
Latvia												0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	3	2	9	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	
Lithuania												0	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	2	1	10	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.4	
Macedonia												0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	
Moldova												1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	
Poland	2	4	1	4	11	4	5	3	4	2	4	0	5	4	1	1	5	5	1	4	5	75	1.7	2.6	1.5	1.2	
Romania	0	8	5	1	5	5	2	4	3	5	6	3	4	2	1	0	2	3	5	1	6	71	1.6	2.2	1.8	1.0	
Russia												2	5	15	7	0	9	12	19	15	8	92	2.1	0.0	1.5	3.9	
Serbia/Monten.													2	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	7	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3	
Slovak Republic													2	2	0	0	1	1	4	0	2	12	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.4	
Ukraine												2	3	9	5	0	4	7	13	9	10	62	1.4	0.0	0.9	2.7	
USSR	2	3	5	3	5	1	5	2	1	2	3	3										35	0.8	2.0	0.7	0.0	
Uzbekistan												1	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.2	
Yugoslavia	2	2	2	2	7	8	5	3	5	3	4	3	1									47	1.1	2.4	1.3	0.0	
Other 45 countries	4	0	2	1	2	5	4	0	2	0	2	9	3	9	13	3	5	5	8	4	5	86	1.9	1.5	1.7	2.4	
Total	80	170	195	188	218	184	147	141	129	128	205	254	339	312	190	174	215	299	320	250	336	4474	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not exist in that year.

Countries affected by less than 5 cases are grouped together.

Table 5: Investigating vs. targeted countries by level of development

Panel A: 1981-2001				
Targeted Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	1339 42%	1125 35%	724 23%	3188 100%
Developing Countries	422 35%	428 35%	363 30%	1213 100%
Countries in Transition	41 56%	8 11%	24 33%	73 100%
TOTAL	1802 40%	1561 35%	1111 25%	4474 100%
Panel B: 1981-1987				
Targeted Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	629 54%	282 24%	256 22%	1167 100%
Developing Countries	11 73%	4 27%	0 0%	15 100%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	640 54.15%	286 24.20%	256 21.66%	1182 100.00%
Panel C: 1988-1994				
Targeted Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	428 39%	431 39%	237 22%	1096 100%
Developing Countries	145 37%	137 35%	106 27%	388 100%
Countries in Transition	24 100%	0 0%	0 0%	24 100%
TOTAL	597 40%	568 38%	343 23%	1508 100%
Panel D: 1995-2001				
Targeted Investigating	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	282 30%	411 44%	232 25%	925 100%
Developing Countries	266 33%	287 35%	257 32%	810 100%
Countries in Transition	17 35%	8 16%	24 49%	49 100%
TOTAL	565 32%	706 40%	513 29%	1784 100%

Table 6: Outcome of AD investigations, 1981-2001

Country	Initiated	Measures		Measures	
		duty	undertak.	% of total	% undert./measures
Thailand	7	6	0	86%	0%
EEC	784	343	235	74%	41%
India	192	138	0	72%	0%
Finland	16	2	9	69%	82%
Egypt	25	17	0	68%	0%
Malaysia	15	10	0	67%	0%
South Korea	66	26	17	65%	40%
Mexico	180	103	14	65%	12%
Venezuela	31	20	0	65%	0%
Philippines	19	12	0	63%	0%
United States	856	483	25	59%	5%
Canada	478	259	20	58%	7%
Colombia	27	15	0	56%	0%
Turkey	94	49	0	52%	0%
Indonesia	33	17	0	52%	0%
South Africa	230	118	0	51%	0%
Japan	10	2	3	50%	60%
Trinidad Tobago	8	3	1	50%	25%
Brazil	143	66	5	50%	7%
New Zealand	85	34	7	48%	17%
Israel	25	12	0	48%	0%
Argentina	201	81	10	45%	11%
Peru	36	15	0	42%	0%
Chile	17	7	0	41%	0%
Australia	829	277	63	41%	19%
China	22	9	0	41%	0%
Taiwan	73	14	6	27%	30%
Poland	28	6	1	25%	14%
Sweden	13	0	3	23%	100%
Costa Rica	6	1	0	17%	0%
Austria	9	0	0	0%	-
Lithuania	14	0	0	0%	-
TOTAL	4572	2145	419	56%	16%

Notes: Countries are included if they initiated at least 5 cases.

Table 7: Definitive measures by imposing country

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%
Developed countries																										
Australia	25	34	49	39	18	25	3	6	12	6	6	35	24	20	3	1	2	7	14	4	7	340	13.2	26.7	15.8	3.3
Canada	15	8	37	13	17	27	10	23	5	6	5	11	15	16	14	6	3	5	11	19	13	279	10.9	17.6	11.8	6.1
EEC	19	31	49	35	31	23	29	16	25	22	25	20	26	19	22	31	15	43	32	28	37	578	22.5	30.0	22.2	18.0
Finland	2	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	EEC							11	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.0
Japan	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.1
New Zealand	.	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	6	1	0	7	9	0	1	3	3	1	0	0	3	41	1.6	0.1	4.2	1.0
South Africa	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	10	3	1	25	14	32	16	12	118	4.6	0.0	2.2	8.9
Spain	0	0	0	0	1	EEC									EEC						1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	EEC						3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	
United States	5	48	8	33	13	25	40	22	29	17	17	16	31	41	55	17	15	17	20	19	20	508	19.8	23.8	25.1	14.1
Developing countries																										
Argentina	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	0	8	21	12	13	12	11	14	91	3.5	0.0	0.0	7.9
Brazil							0	0	4	0	2	2	7	3	1	9	1	8	8	12	14	71	2.8	0.0	2.6	4.6
Chile							.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	0	2	0	2	0	0	7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6
Colombia											0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	4	3	15	0.6	0.0	0.4	1.0
Costa Rica																0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Egypt																0	0	5	0	12	0	17	0.7	0.0	0.0	1.5
Guatemala																0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
India					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	8	6	17	29	32	41	138	5.4	0.0	0.7	11.5
Indonesia															0	0	0	6	8	0	3	17	0.7	0.0	0.0	1.5
Israel												.	.	.	1	0	0	2	5	3	1	12	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Malaysia	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	2	4	0	2	0	10	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.9
Mexico							0	3		5	9	14	7	5	15	23	4	7	9	5	6	112	4.4	0.0	6.3	6.0
Nicaragua															0	0	0	0	1	0	.	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Paraguay															0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Peru												0	0	1	0	2	3	1	1	6	1	15	0.6	0.0	0.1	1.2
Philippines															0	0	3	1	2	1	5	12	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Singapore					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2
South Korea	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	3	0	14	7	5	2	3	43	1.7	0.3	1.0	2.9
Taiwan					0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	6	0	1	1	0	5	1	1	20	0.8	0.1	1.5	0.8
Thailand														0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	6	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5
Trinidad Tobago													.	.	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3
Turkey									.		14	9	3	4	11	0	0	0	0	6	2	49	1.9	0.0	4.4	1.6
Venezuela												0	0	2	2	0	0	1	5	10	0	20	0.8	0.0	0.3	1.6
Countries in transition																										
China																		0	3	0	6	9	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.8
Czech Republic																	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Poland																	0	0	1	0	6	7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6
Ukraine																				0	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Total	66	121	145	120	81	100	90	76	85	59	78	120	134	136	143	128	115	163	208	197	203	2568	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not have an AD law in that year. A dot means that no information is available for that year.

EEC means that the country joined the EEC in that year; from that year onward its investigations are included in the EEC data.

Table 8: Imposing vs. targeted countries by level of development

Panel A: 1981-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	733 40%	589 32%	497 27%	1819 100%
Developing Countries	228 34%	221 33%	223 33%	672 100%
Countries in Transition	7 39%	5 28%	6 33%	18 100%
TOTAL	968 39%	815 32%	726 29%	2509 100%

Panel B: 1981-1987				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	346 52%	140 21%	174 26%	660 100%
Developing Countries	1 33%	2 67%	0 0%	3 100%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	347 52%	142 21%	174 26%	663 100%

Panel C: 1988-1994				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	219 39%	217 38%	128 23%	564 100%
Developing Countries	54 43%	35 28%	36 29%	125 100%
Countries in Transition	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	273 40%	252 37%	164 24%	689 100%

Panel D: 1995-2001				
Targeted Imposing	Developed Countries	Developing Countries	Countries in Transition	TOTAL
Developed Countries	168 28%	232 39%	195 33%	595 100%
Developing Countries	173 32%	184 34%	187 34%	544 100%
Countries in Transition	7 39%	5 28%	6 33%	18 100%
TOTAL	348 30%	421 36%	388 34%	1157 100%

Table 9: Definitive measures by affected country

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%	
Developed countries																											
Australia	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	2	13	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.7	
Austria	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	1	12	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.5	
Belgium	1	1	3	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	2	4	1	1	27	1.1	1.5	1.2	0.8	
Canada	0	8	2	3	4	4	4	3	3	2	0	2	3	3	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	48	1.9	3.8	2.3	0.6	
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	
EEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	6	8	16	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.4	
Finland	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	1	3	2	0	16	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	
France	1	4	10	4	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	4	2	0	3	2	7	6	6	62	2.5	3.5	1.9	2.2	
Germany	3	3	8	6	2	2	1	6	4	2	2	4	4	5	4	4	2	6	7	5	5	85	3.4	3.8	3.9	2.9	
Ireland	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	6	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	
Italy	1	2	3	7	4	2	3	0	3	1	0	4	1	3	3	1	3	3	7	2	2	55	2.2	3.3	1.7	1.8	
Japan	3	18	14	17	10	13	14	12	13	10	11	10	6	9	9	6	5	6	11	13	14	224	8.9	13.4	10.3	5.5	
Netherlands	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	4	0	24	1.0	0.8	1.5	0.8	
New Zealand	0	0	3	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	14	0.6	1.5	0.1	0.3	
South Africa	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	3	2	3	3	5	0	28	1.1	0.8	0.7	1.6	
Spain	2	0	5	4	5	1	0	3	2	0	1	2	1	2	4	0	1	2	5	3	3	46	1.8	2.6	1.6	1.6	
Sweden	1	0	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	27	1.1	2.3	0.9	0.5	
Switzerland	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1		
United Kingdom	1	1	5	3	1	3	0	2	1	1	1	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	43	1.7	2.1	1.9	1.4	
United States	14	7	17	10	9	5	3	5	8	1	7	11	15	13	9	7	9	7	14	9	11	191	7.6	9.8	8.7	5.7	
Developing countries																											
Argentina	0	1	0	2	1	4	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	18	0.7	1.2	0.6	0.5	
Brazil	1	1	8	4	4	5	5	5	1	4	2	7	6	9	6	13	12	4	6	7	4	114	4.5	4.2	4.9	4.5	
Chile	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	1	8	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	6	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.3	
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	3	1	1	2	0	3	1	1	4	0	2	1	0	24	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.8	
Hungary	0	3	2	1	2	2	3	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	3	3	1	28	1.1	2.0	1.0	0.7	
India	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	4	4	4	4	3	2	8	8	11	7	62	2.5	0.9	1.9	3.7	
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	3	2	0	1	3	7	4	6	10	41	1.6	0.0	1.5	2.7	
Israel	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	8	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.2	
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	2	1	1	2	4	3	3	2	2	4	30	1.2	0.0	1.5	1.7	
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	3	1	2	1	4	3	1	1	5	1	1	6	2	35	1.4	0.6	2.0	1.5	
Norway	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	7	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.2	
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	5	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.3	
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	8	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.3	

Table 9: Definitive measures by affected country, continued

Country	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	%	81-87%	88-94%	95-01%	
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	6	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.3	
Singapore	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	3	3	0	0	1	2	6	2	0	0	1	2	2	1	29	1.2	0.9	2.2	0.7	
South Korea	1	1	9	9	4	7	4	2	4	9	4	8	13	11	7	4	2	9	15	19	21	163	6.5	5.3	7.4	6.7	
Taiwan	0	2	2	6	1	5	6	2	7	3	5	7	7	4	3	4	4	9	12	11	11	111	4.4	3.3	5.1	4.7	
Venezuela	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	2	0	4	7	0	1	0	0	1	26	1.0	0.5	1.5	1.1	
Thailand	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	4	2	3	4	3	6	7	3	7	1	7	8	61	2.4	0.5	2.8	3.4	
Turkey	0	1	2	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	3	2	0	0	2	2	2	2	4	2	28	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	
<i>Countries in transition</i>																											
Belarus	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	7	0.3		0.3	0.4	
Bulgaria																						14	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.8	
China	1	1	6	11	6	5	6	3	2	3	17	16	14	20	33	31	22	34	21	14	26	292	11.6	5.4	10.9	15.6	
Croatia												0	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	7	0.3		0.3	0.4	
Czech Republic													1	1	0	3	0	2	2	3	0	12	0.5		0.3	0.9	
Czechoslovakia	0	6	5	4	4	2	2	1	2	1	1	0										28	1.1	3.5	0.7		
East Germany	1	5	5	4	4	3	3	1	1	1												28	1.1	3.8	0.4		
Kazakhstan												0	2	2	0	0	2	0	4	1	1	12	0.5		0.6	0.7	
Latvia												0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	5	0.2		0.4		
Poland	2	4	4	1	2	2	7	0	2	1	1	0	4	1	2	1	2	5	8	2	4	55	2.2	3.3	1.3	2.1	
Romania	2	3	8	2	1	1	4	0	4	4	4	3	1	0	2	1	0	3	2	3	2	50	2.0	3.2	2.3	1.1	
Russia												0	4	5	9	6	5	6	12	11	13	71	2.8		1.3	5.4	
Ukraine												0	3	4	8	2	3	3	8	10	6	47	1.9		1.0	3.5	
USSR	3	3	5	1	2	1	4	3	1	1	0	0										24	1.0	2.9	0.7		
Yugoslavia	0	2	2	1	1	4	3	2	3	4	3	0	0									25	1.0	2.0	1.7		
<i>Other 33 countries</i>	0	3	3	1	0	0	3	4	2	0	1	2	4	0	4	4	1	8	10	5	9	64	2.6	1.5	1.9	3.5	
Total	41	87	144	120	81	100	90	71	89	60	78	120	134	136	143	128	115	165	206	197	203	2508	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Notes: An empty cell means that the country did not exist in that year.

Countries affected by less than 5 cases are grouped together.

Table 10: Intensity of initiations (per value of imports) of AD investigations

Country	1981-2001		Country	1981-1987		Country	1988-1994		Country	1995-2001	
Argentina	1417	6	Australia	2992	1	Poland	4106	12	South Africa	1345	4
South Africa	1406	5	Canada	605	4	Argentina	2009	9	Argentina	1309	5
Australia	1290	2	New Zealand	325	5	South Africa	1710	8	Lithuania	1267	24
Lithuania	1267	26	Mexico	205	11	Australia	1439	2	India	964	3
Peru	699	14	USA	187	2	Peru	1141	15	Trinidad Tobago	698	25
Trinidad Tobago	698	30	EEC	162	3	Turkey	953	6	New Zealand	606	11
New Zealand	630	11	Taiwan	150	7	New Zealand	864	10	Peru	597	16
India	578	7	Finland	104	6	Colombia	591	14	Nicaragua	566	30
Nicaragua	566	34	South Korea	78	8	Brazil	549	7	Egypt	510	14
Egypt	510	19	Sweden	25	9	Mexico	540	5	Australia	419	6
Brazil	381	9	Austria	8	12	Venezuela	230	20	Venezuela	402	17
Venezuela	351	16	Spain	8	13	Canada	229	4	Brazil	331	8
Turkey	344	10	Japan	4	10	EEC	146	3	Costa Rica	277	26
Colombia	337	18				Chile	129	23	Colombia	260	22
Costa Rica	277	32				USA	122	1	Paraguay	231	35
Canada	250	4				Taiwan	122	11	Indonesia	204	12
Paraguay	231	38				Thailand	94	22	Chile	203	21
Mexico	226	8				India	86	16	Uruguay	191	32
Indonesia	204	15				Finland	73	19	Israel	176	15
Chile	197	23				South Korea	48	13	Ukraine	172	31
Uruguay	191	36				Sweden	38	17	Panama	160	34
Poland*	181	17				Austria	36	18	Philippines	128	20
Israel	176	20				Japan	5	21	Canada	111	7
Ukraine**	172	35							Turkey	102	19
Panama	160	37							Mexico	102	9
Philippines	128	22							South Korea	76	10
EEC	109	3							Jamaica	73	40
USA	100	1							Taiwan	72	13
Taiwan	96	12							Guatemala	62	39
Finland	86	24							Ecuador	59	38
South Korea	67	13							USA	53	2
Guatemala	62	42							China	50	18
Ecuador	59	41							Malaysia	45	23
China	50	21							EEC	44	1
Malaysia	45	25							Russia	32	36
Jamaica	34	43							Czech Rep.	29	29
Sweden	33	27							Poland	27	27
Russia**	32	39							Slovenia	23	41
Czech Rep.	29	33							Thailand	14	28
Austria	26	29							Singapore	4	37
Slovenia	23	44							Japan	1	33
Thailand	23	31									
Spain	8	45									
Japan	3	28									
Singapore	2	40									

Notes: A grey background denotes that the value has not been calculated on the whole period because of missing data or because the country did not have an AD during the full sample.

Table 11: Intensities (per value of exports) for countries affected by AD investigations

Country	1981-2001		Country	1981-1987		Country	1988-1994		Country	1995-2001	
Serbia/Monten.	3756	63	Czechoslovakia	1026	12	Kazakhstan	4044	50	Serbia/Monten.	2685	52
Moldova	2378	68	New Zealand	975.7	22	Moldova	2775	65	Latvia	2302	38
Latvia	1965	61	Yugoslavia	883.7	17	Lithuania	2618	61	Moldova	2270	61
Macedonia	1771	67	Poland	836.6	15	Belarus	2390	48	Macedonia	2007	49
Ukraine	1589	22	South Korea	769.2	4	Ukraine	2334	31	Ukraine	1454	12
Kazakhstan	1245	45	Hungary	734.8	20	Slovak Rep.	1940	58	Kazakhstan	1011	28
Lithuania	1126	59	Romania	716.7	18	Croatia	1358	64	Lithuania	863	43
Uzbekistan	1055	65	Brazil	701.3	5	Romania	1327	15	Romania	863	25
Belarus	1017	47	Spain	689.4	11	Czech Rep.	1283	44	Belarus	821	35
Romania	916	18	Belgium + Lux.	687.5	16/33	Brazil	835	5	India	788	8
Czechoslovakia	835	24	China	654.2	6	India	816	10	Egypt	752	42
Yugoslavia	753	29	Taiwan	570	8	China	790.1	1	Bulgaria	648	40
India	681	12	Thailand	537.3	27	Pakistan	716	35	Indonesia	540	7
Brazil	658	7	Portugal	511	36	Russia	674	21	China	529	1
China	608	1	Ireland	467	42	Turkey	630	23	Brazil	505	11
Spain	553	13	Israel	441	32	Yugoslavia	618	25	Uzbekistan	475	64
Poland	544	16	Turkey	436	34	Thailand	616	8	Spain	470	14
South Korea	510	3	Argentina	400.8	30	South Korea	593.1	3	South Africa	465	17
Thailand	503	9	Italy	371.3	7	Poland	592	20	Thailand	446	10
Turkey	480	27	Trinidad Tobago	351	47	Czechoslovakia	586	27	Chile	435	27
Slovak Rep.	468	56	EEC total	288		Argentina	554	29	Turkey	408	20
Egypt	447	50	Colombia	270	46	Greece	522	54	South Korea	405	2
Hungary	425	30	France	266.1	9	Egypt	499	45	Croatia	359	53
Portugal	421	49	United Kingdom	251.6	10	Spain	499	22	Portugal	348	55
Pakistan	394	46	Netherlands	250	23	Hungary	488	33	Poland	345	22
Russia	380	15	Philippines	249	43	Venezuela	486	28	Slovak Rep.	339	41
Taiwan	352	5	Chile	242	45	Trinidad Tobago	439	69	Russia	334	6
Indonesia	351	14	Germany	238	3	Belgium + Lux.	427	14/55	Pakistan	325	44
Trinidad Tobago	350	64	Venezuela	224	29	Colombia	416	43	Greece	312	54
Argentina	346	31	South Africa	215.7	25	Portugal	383	57	Trinidad Tobago	290	71
New Zealand	344	39	Japan	210.5	1	Taiwan	364	6	Taiwan	283	5
Chile	340	40	Austria	206	28	Ireland	361	47	Czech Rep.	236	29
Bulgaria	339	44	Sweden	202	21	Indonesia	324	18	Argentina	221	30
Czech Rep.	324	42	Mexico	187	24	Malaysia	313	17	Netherlands	217	21
South Africa	321	21	Singapore	177.3	26	Israel	273	41	Hungary	211	36
Greece	313	60	Bulgaria	167.5	40	Bulgaria	271	42	Venezuela	187	37
Venezuela	279	33	USA	148.5	2	Netherlands	264	24	Austria	183	34
Netherlands	240	26	India	141.9	41	South Africa	258	30	Malaysia	167	16
Croatia	238	66	Malaysia	140.1	39	Chile	227	49	EEC total	151	
Colombia	235	54	Finland	138.6	38	Philippines	222	52	New Zealand	150	51
Malaysia	201	20	Ecuador	130	56	EEC total	193		Denmark	138	46
Israel	200	43	Canada	124.7	14	Denmark	188	40	Belgium + Lux.	132	32/67
Italy	199	11	Norway	122	35	France	181	9	Italy	131	15
EEC total	194		Greece	120	59	Mexico	179	26	United Kingdom	126	13
Ireland	177	55	Hong Kong	101.2	31	Italy	174	13	Iran	118	48
France	171	10	Egypt	100	57	Singapore	165	19	Finland	118	47
United Kingdom	168	8	Switzerland	79	37	United Kingdom	161	11	Germany	115	9
Austria	165	35	Australia	44	44	Finland	159	39	Colombia	109	57
Germany	142	6	Denmark	36	54	Hong Kong	134	12	France	108	18
Finland	140	41	Iran	30	61	Austria	130	32	Mexico	97	19
Denmark	131	48	Indonesia	15	60	USA	129.9	2	Slovenia	95	70
Mexico	131	23	Saudi Arabia	10	51	Japan	128.1	4	Australia	90	31
Japan	123	4				Germany	112	7	Israel	87	50
Sweden	115	32				Australia	98	37	Sweden	87	39
Philippines	105	58				Sweden	78	36	Japan	79	4
USA	100	2				Canada	77	16	Ireland	62	60
Singapore	95	28				Norway	63	51	USA	61	3
Australia	83	38				Saudi Arabia	50	53	Saudi Arabia	51	45
Hong Kong	77	25				New Zealand	39	56	Singapore	44	33
Canada	65	17				Switzerland	7	81	Hong Kong	42	23
Norway	56	52							Canada	31	26
Iran	55	62							Philippines	30	69
Saudi Arabia	32	53							Switzerland	21	56
Switzerland	28	57							Norway	17	68

Notes: EEC total represents cases brought against the European Community as a whole and its member countries.

Countries are only included if affected by at least 5 cases over the whole sample. A grey background denotes that the value has not been calculated on the whole period because of missing data or because the country did not have an AD during the full sample.

Table 12: Intensity of initiations (per measures in force) of AD investigations

Country	1981-1985		Country	1986-1990		Country	1991-1995		Country	1996-2001	
New Zealand	359	7	Taiwan	486	7	Peru	1347	15	Chile	938	21
Japan	269	6	Mexico	310	5	Argentina	763	9	Costa Rica	816	26
Spain	225	10	Sweden	299	10	India	449	13	Czech Rep.	674	29
EEC	110	2	South Korea	225	11	Sweden	408	23	Nicaragua	337	30
Australia	102	1	Finland	216	8	Thailand	269	24	Paraguay	272	35
USA	100	3	New Zealand	147	6	South Africa	251	6	Ukraine	269	31
Finland	96	5	Brazil	135	12	Taiwan	247	11	Israel	269	17
Canada	59	4	Australia	95	3	South Korea	239	14	Jamaica	264	39
			EEC	62	2	Brazil	225	7	China	247	16
			USA	50	1	Venezuela	210	19	Trinidad Tobago	239	25
			Canada	32	4	Australia	176	2	Egypt	187	14
						Mexico	173	4	Argentina	176	5
						Colombia	168	16	Indonesia	174	11
						Israel	135	22	India	138	3
						Chile	135	21	Poland	120	27
						Turkey	113	8	Taiwan	115	13
						Japan	90	20	Philippines	112	24
						New Zealand	85	10	Peru	111	18
						Canada	55	5	Venezuela	110	15
						EEC	46	3	South Africa	106	4
						USA	44	1	Brazil	99	8
									Australia	95	6
									Malaysia	90	23
									South Korea	85	9
									Colombia	66	20
									New Zealand	65	12
									Guatemala	54	38
									EEC	51	1
									Japan	50	33
									Canada	48	7
									Thailand	47	28
									USA	30	2
									Turkey	28	19
									Mexico	22	10

Notes: A grey background denotes that the value has not been calculated on the whole period because of missing data or because the country did not have an AD during the full sample.

Figure 1: Countries with AD laws and GATT/WTO membership

Notes: Bangladesh, Denmark, Kenya, and Sweden not included because of missing data.

Figure 2: AD investigations initiated

Figure 3: AD measures in force by groups of countries

Figure 4: Filing intensities (per value of imports), 1995-2001

Notes: Outliers excluded from the graphs:

Australia: Colombia, Hungary, South Africa; Canada: Latvia, Slovak Republic, South Africa;

EEC: South Africa; New Zealand: South Africa; US: South Africa.

Figure 5: Filing intensities (per value of imports) , 1995-2001

Notes: Outliers excluded from the graphs:

Argentina: South Africa; Brazil: Kazakhstan, Macedonia, South Africa; India: Macedonia, South Africa.