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**MOBILE MONEY, TRADE CREDIT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE**

By

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Mobile Money, Trade Credit and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence

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Abstract

Using a novel enterprise survey from Kenya (FinAccess Business), we document a strong positive association between the use of mobile money as a method to pay suppliers and access to trade credit. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, imperfect credit markets and the risk of theft to account for this empirical pattern. Mobile money dominates fiat money as a medium of exchange in its capacity to avoid theft, but it comes with higher transaction costs. The interaction between risk of theft and limited access to trade credit generates demand for mobile money as a payment method with suppliers and the use of mobile money in turn raises the value of a credit relationship and hence the willingness to apply for trade credit. Calibrating the stationary equilibrium to match a set of moments that we observe in FinAccess Business and quantifying the importance of the endogenous interactions between mobile money and trade credit on entrepreneurial performance and macroeconomic development, we find that the availability of the mobile money technology increases the macroeconomic output of the entrepreneurial sector by 0.33-0.47%.

Keywords: Money, Trade-Credit, M-Pesa, Allocations.

JEL Classification: D14; G21; O12; O16.

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‡Before the completion of this paper, our dear friend and co-author Ravindra Ramrattan lost his life at the tragic Westgate Mall terrorist attacks in Nairobi, Kenya.

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1 Introduction

“Mobile-Money helps people to save and borrow and empowers them in a big way.” - *Bill Gates* in *2015 Gates Annual Letter*.

Does electronic money help entrepreneurs access trade credit? What is the relationship between the demand for electronic money instruments, transactions, trade credit, and economic performance? We address these questions by focusing on a key financial innovation, which has drawn the attention of many researchers and policy makers over the recent years: The mobile money technology M-Pesa, an SMS-based money transfer and monetary storage tool, initially developed in Kenya.

While an expanding literature has gauged the effect of mobile money and digital payment services on household welfare, we assess the interaction between the use of mobile money, access to supplier credit and firm-level performance in an economy with credit imperfections, information asymmetries and risk of theft.¹ Specifically, we use data from a novel SME survey in Kenya to document a positive relationship between the use of mobile money as payment method by firms and access to supplier credit. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, imperfect credit markets, and the risk of theft to account for this empirical pattern and show that the availability of a mobile money technology such as M-Pesa can significantly contribute to firm and ultimately macroeconomic performance. Calibrating our model to a set of moments from the SME survey, we find that the availability of the mobile money technology increases the macroeconomic output of the entrepreneurial sector by 0.33-0.47%.

After its launch in 2007, M-Pesa² rapidly became the payment method of choice across Kenya, given that its use poses lower risks than informal payment methods, storing money in mobile form implies lower risk than holding cash, and using M-Pesa for payment purposes costs less than bank transfers. As of 2011, 70 percent of adult population in Kenya had an M-Pesa account (Jack and Suri (2014)). Although there was already a substantial demand for money transfer before the introduction of M-Pesa,³, on the one hand, access to online monetary transfer had been largely limited, and other

¹For a review of the recent literature on digital payments, see World Bank, Better than Cash Alliance and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2014).

²M stands for mobile and pesa means money in Swahili.

³High internal labor migration from rural to urban areas has resulted in high demand for sending money from urban areas to families, relatives and friends living in rural areas (Akers and Mbiti (2011); Jack and Suri (2011)).

forms of electronic money transfer instruments, such as Western Union and post office, were way too costly methods to transfer money for the general population (Akers and Mbiti (2011); Jack and Suri (2011); Jack and Suri (2014); Morawczynski and Pickens (2009)). On the other hand, cheaper money transfer methods such as giving money personally, sending money via bus drivers or friends had been common but they were subject to risk of appropriation and theft. Data from the World Bank's Enterprise Survey suggests that every year Kenyan manufacturing firms loose about 2 percent of product values due to theft - which equals to twice the world average - from shipping to remote domestic markets. Similarly, 29 percent of the firms experience losses due to theft and vandalism (compared to the world average of 22 percent). According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 82 percent of firms pay for security services in order to avoid theft in Kenya, compared to the world average of 56 percent. By providing a cheaper and safer money transfer tool, the use of M-Pesa technology expanded rapidly and became the most frequently and widely utilized electronic money instrument for private purposes in the country (Jack and Suri (2011)).

In addition to enhancing money transfer from one household to another, M-Pesa technology serves as an instrument of electronic payment for enterprises as well. However, the penetration of M-Pesa as a commonly accepted method of payment at Kenyan businesses has been far slower compared to the high demand for M-Pesa accounts among households. In a recent survey of 1047 Nairobi SMEs (FinAccess Business Survey 2014), 35 percent of firms report that they accept M-Pesa as a common method of payment from their customers. Similarly, on the supply side, about 32 percent of the firms state that they use M-Pesa as a common method of payment to their suppliers. These statistics show that at most one out of three SMEs in Kenya adopts and uses the M-Pesa technology to run its operations.

In this paper, we concentrate on the relationship of SMEs with their suppliers and study the evolution of the M-Pesa technology as a payment method while making input purchases. Specifically, using the Kenyan FinAccess Survey our regression analysis shows that, controlling for a large number of business and owner characteristics, having a trade credit relationship with suppliers exhibits a strong positive covariance with enterprises' M-Pesa use when settling payments with their suppliers. Figure 1 summarizes this finding, showing that the predicted probability of using mobile money when purchasing goods is significantly higher for businesses with a trade credit relationship with their suppliers. This empirical finding is consistent with causality going into either direction, as we will model in our

theoretical framework.

- Figure 1 About Here -

To account for this empirical pattern, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of entrepreneurial finance. In our model, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to access trade credit and are hit with idiosyncratic productivity and theft shocks. Theft erodes an entrepreneur's fiat money balances; in addition, for borrowers it causes a discontinuation of access to trade credit due to default. We model the M-Pesa technology as a resolution mechanism to theft - as highlighted in the previous literature.⁴ The analytical solution of the model matches the empirical observation that enterprises with access to trade credit, *ceteris paribus*, are more willing to adopt and use the M-Pesa technology. Trade credit allows higher entrepreneurial production, which complements and raises the likelihood of M-Pesa use. There are two channels through which M-Pesa use raises a borrower's production capacity relative to non-borrowers. First, for a borrower the cost of theft is higher at the *input-purchase stage* than for non-borrowers; if the initial endowment is stolen, it is not only the endowment loss that affects the entrepreneur but also the inability to utilize this endowment as collateral and raise the capacity to produce by borrowing. Similarly in the case of theft at the *trade-credit-repayment stage*, theft is not only associated with the loss of the current value of cash but also the loss of future credit market access. The lack of M-Pesa use therefore reduces the future credit market valuation for an entrepreneur, which in turn reduces the amount that the entrepreneur can borrow. Second, given the risk of theft, the contracted interest rate and therefore repayment burden is higher for cash users than for M-Pesa users, which reduces the amount that an entrepreneur can borrow.

We also extend this theoretical set-up and provide entrepreneurs with an endogenous selection into trade-credit relationships. This extension allows us to capture that access to M-Pesa technology stimulates demand for trade-credit and vice versa.

We calibrate the stationary equilibrium of the model to match a set of moments that we observe in the Kenyan FinAccess Business Survey 2014. The parameterized model matches the Kenyan SME data well along the dimensions that we calibrate as well as an important additional statistics that we do not target directly, which is the fraction of M-Pesa users among trade-credit borrowers. Using

⁴To give one example, Sanches and Williamson (2010) formalizes the role of theft in inducing commitment in a search theoretic monetary environment.

the parameterized model, we conduct a counterfactual quantitative exercise, where we shut down the access to M-Pesa technology for entrepreneurs when purchasing inputs from suppliers. Eliminating the use of M-Pesa from SME-supplier relationships causes an expansion in the input-output ratio and a contraction in the credit-output ratio. Most importantly, as a result of these changes, the macroeconomic output of the economy (the aggregate output generated by the SMEs) contracts by 0.33% in the model where access to trade credit is exogenously distributed among SMEs. This result lets us to conclude that the use of M-Pesa when making input purchases from suppliers is quantitatively relevant for alleviating transaction frictions in SME-supplier relationships and in turn for macroeconomic development in Kenya. In the alternative framework, where joining a network and signing up for a trade credit relationship is endogenous, shutting down the M-Pesa technology also lowers the fraction of trade-credit relationships. The decline in trade credit relationships further suppresses the macroeconomic development and causes a total contraction in macro output by 0.47%. This quantitative result underlines the strong interaction between trade credit and M-Pesa. Comparing this output effect with actual growth numbers for the Kenyan economy suggests that the introduction of M-Pesa can explain 14% of per-capita real income growth and 3.4% of the total factor productivity growth between 2006 and 2013 thus pointing to quite a large economic effect of mobile money technology.

The findings of our paper have strong policy implications. First, more secure payment systems that improve on risky cash holdings and allow for more efficient transfers can have economically meaningful implications for firm and macroeconomic development. Second, our results speak to the debate on financial inclusion. While for a long time there has been a focus on credit services for micro- and small entrepreneurs, over the past years the conversation has increasingly broadened to other financial services. Our paper shows the importance of providing efficient payment services as a means to help firms expand their network and production.

Our paper relates to three strands of literature. First, a growing literature analyzes the development implications of mobile phone usage in the context of low-income countries. Earlier studies in the literature explore how mobile technologies can solve information asymmetries regarding market prices in developing countries. Jensen (2007) and Aker (2010) investigate the impact of information flows through increased mobile phone service coverage on market price dispersion in South Indian Fisheries Sector and grain markets in Niger, respectively, and document a reduction in price dispersion in those markets and therefore increase in welfare. Similarly, Megumi Muti and Takashi Yamato (2009) show

that increased information about market prices due to mobile phone network expansion in Uganda between 2005 and 2007 enhanced market participation of banana farmers in remote communities. We contribute to this literature by showing that, in addition to enhancing information flows between economic agents, mobile phone technologies may also help foster economic and financial relationships between enterprises in developing countries.

We also contribute to the rapidly expanding literature gauging the impact of mobile money technology in developing countries on financial transaction patterns and household welfare. Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) document that M-Pesa users sent smaller and frequent remittances - resulting in a sizable increase in remittances to rural areas following the introduction of the M-Pesa technology in Kenya. Directly related to our theoretical model, Vaughn (2007) shows that some individuals store money in M-Pesa under safety considerations, especially when travelling across Kenya. Jack and Suri (2011) document that three out of four Kenyan M-Pesa users indicate that they use M-Pesa to save money. Using ethnographic methods in three communities, Plyler et al. (2010) argue that M-Pesa stimulates small business growth and thereby increases the circulation of money in these communities. Mbiti and Weil (2011) find that the increased use of M-Pesa lowered the use of informal savings mechanisms (for instance ROSCAs), and raised the propensity to save via formal bank accounts.⁵ Finally, Jack and Suri (2014) study the effect of reduced transaction costs on risk sharing, showing that income shocks lower consumption by 7 percent for non-M-Pesa users whereas consumption of M-Pesa-users is unaffected. While this literature has exclusively focused on the household use of M-Pesa, our paper is the first - to our best knowledge - that focuses on business use of M-Pesa and offers an empirical and theoretical analysis of the strategic complementarity of mobile money usage and trade credit use. Building upon a set of theoretical arguments, Jack, Suri and Townsend (2010) suggest that the Kenyan M-Pesa revolution would lead to an expansion in financial connectedness and stimulate economic growth. Our paper formalizes the role of theft and its interaction with M-Pesa technology to explain the impact of M-Pesa on trade-credit connectedness in an economy and the resulting development consequences.

The second line of research we contribute to is the literature on the role of trade credit in economic

⁵Further, Eijkman et al. (2010) explore the functioning of M-PESA stores, which stand ready to exchange cash and mobile-money. Their findings suggest that such stores need to have intensive management of liquidity to serve customers, which is difficult to handle in rural areas. Kikulwe et al. (2013) analyze the impact of M-Pesa using panel data from small farmers in Kenya. They show that M-Pesa users purchase more inputs, sell a larger proportion of their output in markets, and as a result have higher farm-profits.

development in low income countries. Suppliers have an advantage over other lenders in financing credit-constrained firms, which makes trade credit prevalent in financially less developed countries where the majority has limited if any access to bank credit. Unlike credit from financial institutions, trade credit does not rely on formal collateral but on trust and reputation. Fafchamps (1997) shows in the context of Zimbabwe, where network effects and statistical discrimination affect the screening of trade-credit applicants, black entrepreneurs are disadvantaged by the difficulty to distinguish themselves from the mass of financially insecure short-lived African-owned businesses. Using firm-level data from five African countries, Fisman (2001) shows that trade-credit is positively correlated with capacity utilization, while Fisman and Raturi (2004) show that monopoly power is negatively associated with trade-credit provision. Using cross-country analysis, Fisman and Love (2003) show that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing grow faster in countries with weaker financial institutions. Ge and Qiu (2007) compare the use of trade-credit between state owned and non-state-owned companies in China and show that the non-state owned firms use relatively more trade credit when financing their operations. Cull et al. (2009) use a large panel dataset of Chinese firms and find that poorly performing state-owned firms were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with limited access to formal financial markets during China's economic transition. We contribute to this literature showing that the use of mobile money as payment device serves as commitment device vis-a-vis creditors and thus enhances growth of financially constrained enterprises, underlining the importance of efficient payment forms for firm performance.

Finally, our paper also contributes to the macro-finance literature, which investigates the impact of limited financial enforceability on macroeconomic outcomes. Following the seminal studies by Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2002) and Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) we incorporate a limited commitment constraint into a dynamic general equilibrium model, where defaulters get excluded from accessing credit in the future. Different from these papers, in our framework theft raises the likelihood of default and constrains entrepreneurial trade-credit opportunities. Our theoretical contribution shows that M-Pesa lowers the probability of theft and alleviates trade credit constraints, thereby stimulating entrepreneurial performance. We also quantify the aggregate implications of M-Pesa use and limited enforceability on financial markets and macroeconomic performance. In this respect, we also relate to the strand of research focusing on the quantitative implications of financial frictions on macroeconomic development. Closely related to our work, in this literature,

Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) explore the effects of limited contract enforcement on entrepreneurial wealth accumulation, aggregate saving dynamics and development. Antunes et al. (2008), Quintin (2008), and Buera et al. (2013) study the quantitative implications of limited contract enforcement for occupation choice and the efficiency of aggregate capital allocation across a distribution of entrepreneurs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a motivational empirical evidence for the co-variance between M-Pesa and trade credit use. Section 3 develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of entrepreneurial finance. In section 4, we provide an analytical solution to our model and match the empirically observed pattern between M-Pesa use and trade credit. Section 5 calibrates the model economy to match a set of moments that we document using the FinAccess Enterprise Survey data. Section 6 presents a quantitative analysis, where we estimate the aggregate implications of M-Pesa transaction costs for financial markets and macroeconomic development of the Kenyan economy. Section 7 concludes.

2 M-Pesa and Some Motivating Empirical Evidence

2.1 M-Pesa

In Kenya, M-Pesa is the most commonly utilized electronic money service allowing users to send money to any cell phone owner via SMS messages. Cash (fiat money) can be transferred into M-Pesa deposits and vice versa via specialized agents, which are wide-spread all across the country. After being introduced in 2007 by Safaricom, mobile money usage has grown rapidly. Growing 86% and 52% annually, as of December 2014, the number of total M-PESA agent outlets and customers reached 124,000 (around 20 percent of them in Nairobi (FSP interactive maps, 2013)) and 25 million. During 2013, 282.5 million transactions were conducted in total, and the total value of money transferred was 1.9 million Kenyan shillings (22 billion U.S dollars) - equivalent to 40 % of Kenyan GDP in 2013.⁶ Since 2007 Kenyan households have utilized M-Pesa for not only transferring or receiving money but also saving; 85 percent of the households store some money in their M-Pesa account household according to survey evidence from Jack and Suri (2011).

⁶Data used for calculating number of Nairobi M-pesa agents are from November 2013. We calculated U.S dollar equivalent of M-pesa transfers by using 2013 average of official exchange rate.

Exchanging cash for M-Pesa is free. The individual only has to visit the mobile money agent with his or her ID and deposit money. Sending money via SMS involves a variable cost increasing by the amount sent via SMS, and this cost increases if the receiver is not a registered user of M-Pesa. Withdrawing mobile money is also subject to variable costs, which increase in the amount of M-Pesa units transferred.

In addition to facilitating person to person (P2P) transfers, customers can buy goods or pay water, electric, gas and electricity bills to M-Pesa member businesses. There are also some mobile money services via which businesses can send salaries to mobile phones of their workers. P2P service is sometimes also utilized for business related transfers (e.g. purchasing supplies, repaying informal loans) or purchasing goods and services (e.g. paying taxi fees).

2.2 Data

In this study we use the Kenya FinAccess Business Survey 2014 - designed by the Financial Sector Deepening Trust Kenya (FSD-K) together with Tilburg University -, which includes novel business mobile money usage questions. The survey data were collected in 2014 by FSD-K from a representative cross-section of 1,047 mainly small and medium enterprises in Nairobi. The respondents of the questionnaire are owners or executive managers of the firms that were operational in 2014. Table 1 presents detailed variable definitions and descriptive statistics for our sample.

- Table 1 About Here -

Panel A of Table 1 shows that there is quite some sectoral variation in our sample, with 29% and 34% of the businesses operating in manufacturing and service sectors, respectively, while 37% of enterprises operate in trade.

Panel B presents selected business financial characteristics. The key question which we exploit to learn whether a business uses mobile money for business to business transactions asks “whether cash, check, mobile money, or etc. are common method of payments to suppliers”. Statistics show that, after cash and checks, mobile money is the third most common method of payment to pay to suppliers when purchasing inputs; 91% and 50% of the businesses pay for their supplies via cash and check respectively, while mobile money is a common method for 32% of the firms. Most firms in our sample have access to bank accounts; 75 percent of firms use business accounts for their business operations

and 15% of them utilize their personal accounts for businesses. 24% of the firms report that they purchase their inputs from their suppliers on credit.

Panel C presents business size and productivity related indicators. The median firm earns around 5600 U.S dollars per month, averaged over the last 12 months ⁷ and employs 6 workers, ranging from 1 (i.e. self-employed) to 2106 employees.

Finally, Panel D presents other business characteristics. Our sample mostly includes formal businesses; 75% percent of the firms are registered with the Business Registrar at the Attorney General's office. The firms in the sample mostly (75%) have male owners or managers, and 40 % of the owner/managers have at least a university degree.

2.3 Empirical Evidence

Using a formal regression analysis we explore which businesses are more likely to use M-Pesa when buying supplies. Specifically, we regress our M-Pesa use indicator, *purchasing supplies via mobile money*, on selected business characteristics introduced in Table 1. We estimate the model using a probit regression; we control for sectoral fixed effects in the regression but do not report the coefficient estimates to economize on space.

- Table 2 About Here -

Table 2 presents the marginal effect of our estimates at mean levels and robust standard error estimates for each characteristic in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The estimates show that more productive businesses and businesses having younger managers are more likely to use mobile money to pay for their business supplies. Unregistered firms and firms having an accountant are more likely to use mobile money to pay for input purchases. Critically, we find a strong link between *trade credit relationships* and *mobile money use*. The estimate shows that, ceteris paribus, businesses that purchase supplies on credit, are 17 percentage points more likely to use M-Pesa when purchasing inputs. We also test the robustness of this result by first estimating a parsimonious model and then adding control variables gradually. We present these estimates in Table A1 in the Appendix. The results show that the estimates on purchasing supplies via credit are highly stable across different regression specifications.

⁷Profits have a very skewed distribution, as the sample is very heterogeneous including relatively large (1000 employees) and very small (self employed) firms.

We also measure the stability of marginal effects by calculating the ratio between the value in the regression including controls (numerator) - column (5) - and the difference between this effect and the one derived from a regression without covariates (denominator) - column (1). As Bellows and Miguel (2009) suggest, this ratio shows how strong the covariance between the unobserved factors explaining purchasing supplies on credit and using mobile money to pay for supplies needs to be, relative to the covariance between observable factors and entrepreneur's credit use, to explain away the entire effect we find. The ratio is -2, which suggests that to explain the full effect of trade credit-relationship with suppliers on M-Pesa use, the covariance between unobserved factors and existence of trade credit relationships needs to be more than twice as high as the covariance of the included control variables with trade-credit.

It is important to note that these estimates do not imply any causality; rather, the result may imply that having a trade credit relationship leads to mobile money usage between businesses and/or using mobile money facilitates credit relationships between businesses. Both directions of causation have important and interesting research and policy implications. In sections 3 and 4, we will therefore focus on providing a theoretical explanation for both ways of causation, and address why having a trade credit relationship with suppliers and paying suppliers via mobile money complement each other.

3 Model

Let us consider an economic environment with infinitely lived agents, where time is discrete, indexed with t . There are two types of agents in the economy, with the type being permanent: *Suppliers* and *Entrepreneurs*. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous and have access to a production technology - to be delineated below - that converts supplier provided inputs into *consumption* goods. There is a large number of input suppliers in the economy, such that in equilibrium the profits of the suppliers will be driven to zero. The supply of entrepreneurs - in any time period t - is of measure $\mathcal{E}$.

In each period t , there are two subperiods which we call *Day* and *Night*. In the *Day* sub-period entrepreneurs and suppliers meet, suppliers sell inputs to entrepreneurs in return for an immediate payment and/or for a credit repayment to be made in the *Night* sub-period, after the production is finalized. Each entrepreneur can meet many suppliers in the day sub-period, but can contract with at most one supplier. Within any time-period t , agents do not discount between the *Day* sub-period

and the *Night* sub-period. Neither the consumption good nor the production inputs can be stored between t and $t + 1$.⁸

Inputs for entrepreneurial investment are produced through a linear production process using suppliers' labor effort, where $h_{s,t}$ units of labor from supplier s generates $h_{s,t}$ units of production input and $-h_{s,t}$ units of utility loss, where the latter is denominated in terms of consumption. Furthermore, we assume that each supplier has a maximum amount of labor endowment worth of $\bar{h}$ units in every period (unused labor hours cannot be accumulated over-time). Suppliers have linear consumption preferences. By denoting $c_{s,t}$ as the consumption of a supplier s in period t , the preferences of s are given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [c_{s,t} - h_{s,t}], \quad (1)$$

with $\beta \leq 1$.

Every entrepreneur receives e units of consumption good in the *Day* sub-period t , before the entrepreneurial production takes place. The consumption good can be utilized to purchase inputs from a supplier. An entrepreneur i who purchases $h_{i,t}$ units of input in the day sub-period produces

$$y_{i,t}(h_{i,t}) = A_{i,t} f(h_{i,t}) \quad (2)$$

units of consumption good in the night sub-period, where $f'(\cdot) > 0$ and $f''(\cdot) \leq 0$. In this production specification $A_{i,t}$ is the entrepreneur i 's idiosyncratic productivity draw in period t . Productivity draws are *iid* across time and among entrepreneurs and are drawn from a cumulative distribution function $G(A)$. Entrepreneurial endowments and productivity draws are commonly observable as well as verifiable. The output from entrepreneurial output in period t cannot be carried over to period $t + 1$, because the consumption good is non-storable.

Similar to the suppliers, entrepreneurs also have linear preferences with respect to the consumption good. Specifically, denoting $c_{i,t}$ as consumption of an entrepreneur i in period t , the preferences of an entrepreneur i are given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c_{i,t}. \quad (3)$$

⁸The lack of capital accumulation makes the model more easily tractable. Our conjecture is that we underestimate the effect of the mobile money technology on output given the lack of capital accumulation.

3.1 Trade-Credit, Fiat Money and M-Pesa

There are two key frictions in our framework that increase the costs of market transactions between entrepreneurs and suppliers. First, there is information available cost-free about market and credit transactions only for a sub-set of agents. This information exchange can be in the form of a network, from which borrowers can get excluded in the case of default. Being part of the network thus allows access to supplier credit.⁹ As contract enforcement is limited, (endogenous) strategic default of a borrower on credit repayment can be prevented only with the threat of exclusion of defaulters from accessing the credit market for T periods. The higher T , the larger is the cost of default for an entrepreneur.¹⁰ Second, the risk of theft of cash can reduce an entrepreneur's capacity to make purchases in the *Day* sub-period and/or her ability to repay her credit obligation to a particular supplier in the *Night* sub-period. We assume that theft is private information and unverifiable, which implies that defaults due to theft result in the exclusion of a defaulter from the credit market for T periods. M-Pesa technology can insure entrepreneurs against theft of monetary holdings, but it comes with electronic transaction costs. We formalize these assumptions as follows.

An entrepreneur can purchase inputs via immediate consumption good transfer (using entrepreneur's *Day* sub-period endowment e) or partially on trade credit, where in this latter case the credit repayment is to be made after the entrepreneurial production realization in the *Night* sub-period. Trade credit is available only for a sub-set π of entrepreneurs. Specifically, the fraction $\pi < 1$ of all entrepreneurs are part of the network and they can obtain trade credit on their input purchases, with a "trade loan" maturing right after the *Night* sub-period income-flow realization. Credit extension though is constrained and subject to limited commitment. Specifically, an entrepreneur can borrow only if she makes an initial consumption good payment to the supplier worth of her *Day* sub-period consumption good endowment, e . After that, trade credit can be extended to the entrepreneur i in period t ($b_{i,t}$), where the total amount of trade-credit repayment promise cannot exceed the next T periods' credit market valuation ($V_{i,t}$) such that

$$b_{i,t} \leq V_{i,t}. \quad (4)$$

⁹Theoretical papers that investigate the optimal design of payment methods, such as Kocherlakota (1997) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998), refer to this type of an arrangement as a record keeping institute.

¹⁰In our quantitative analysis we utilize T to match the aggregate trade-credit to output ratio.

If a borrower does not repay her credit obligation $b_{i,t}$ in period t , she will be excluded from accessing trade credit between periods $t + 1$ and $t + T$ and as a result suffers an endogenously determined consumption loss worth of $V_{i,t}$. We would like to note that the inequality (4) is a no-strategic-default constraint. This means in equilibrium the entrepreneurs would not strategically default on their trade-credit repayment to make a financial return out of it. However, theft can prevent a debtor from repayment and hence force her to default mechanically, which we will delineate below.

The remaining fraction $1 - \pi$ of the entrepreneurs are not part of the network and lack a commitment device to repay. Hereafter, we will refer to the entrepreneurs who can borrow as “borrower types” and the entrepreneurs who cannot borrow as “credit-constrained types”. We work with two versions of the model. In the basic set-up, we assume that the type of an entrepreneur (π fraction) is exogenously given and fixed over time. In the second version of the model, we endogenize access to the network as an entrepreneurial decision. In the theoretical and quantitative exercises we investigate the implications of both model specifications.

Consumption goods can be transferred from entrepreneurs to input suppliers in two ways: fiat money (cash) or mobile money (M-Pesa). The key differences between both are related to the transaction frictions that each monetary instrument is capable of avoiding. Specifically, cash transfers between an entrepreneur and a supplier, whether it is the *Day* sub-period upfront input purchase payment or the *Night* sub-period credit repayment, is subject to *theft*. Specifically, with probability $1 - \theta$ an entrepreneur loses the entirety of her fiat money holdings before she settles a transaction with a supplier. The aggregate quantity of cash that gets stolen cannot be spent to make purchases in the economy. Theft shocks are *iid* across entrepreneurs and across time and are private information. This implies in an environment with limited commitment that strategic default (faking a theft shock) can be prevented only if non-repayment due to theft is followed up with an exclusion of the defaulter from accessing the credit market. M-Pesa users are not subject to the risk of theft; but, the use of M-Pesa comes with electronic transaction costs. Specifically, adopting the M-Pesa technology implies an f_e units periodic fixed cost for the entrepreneur. Additionally, the transfer of consumption goods to a supplier using the M-Pesa technology requires a variable transaction fee worth of λ units of consumption good for each unit transferred.

3.2 Markets

When an entrepreneur i and a supplier s meet in the *Day* sub-period t , they sign an input-provision contract. The continuation of the contract is conditional on the entrepreneur not having been subject to theft at the beginning of the *Day* sub-period t . Since theft reduces an entrepreneur's initial fiat money balances to zero, a victim of theft discontinues her contract with a supplier. If the entrepreneur does not experience a theft shock before she enters the *Day* sub-market and if she is not part of the network, she pays everything upfront and there is no credit extension. In other words, $b_{i,t} = 0$ for this particular entrepreneur. The contract specifies the amount of inputs to be provided to the credit-constrained entrepreneur i in period t ($h_{i,t}$) and the immediate consumption good transfer to the supplier, denoted with $x_{i,t}$, where

$$x_{i,t} \geq \eta(h_{i,t}) = h_{i,t}. \quad (5)$$

Inequality (5) is a constraint, which needs to hold such that the input supplier has incentives to produce the production inputs. The compensation of the supplier can be paid via cash and/or M-Pesa. If the payment is settled with cash, there are no ex-post transaction costs but the risk of the realization of the theft shock. If the payment is made with M-Pesa, the entrepreneur does not experience the theft shock; however, she will have to pay a fixed M-Pesa cost worth of f_e units of the cash good and $\lambda x_{i,t}$ units of cash as variable M-Pesa cost. Throughout the paper we will assume that all M-Pesa fees are paid ex-post after the realization of the *Night* sub-period cash-flow realization of the entrepreneur.

If the entrepreneur is of a borrower-type, the contract can entail a credit clause as well. Specifically, in return of $h_{i,t}$ units of input, the initial payment to the supplier in the *Day* sub-period equals e plus the repayment amount $b_{i,t}$ in the *Night* sub-period after the realization of the consumption good production:

$$e + b_{i,t}g_{i,t}(\theta) \geq h_{i,t}, \quad (6)$$

where $g_{i,t}(\theta)$ is the perceived probability of the entrepreneur not being subject to theft before repaying her trade credit obligation. For an M-Pesa user, $g_{i,t}(\theta) = 1$ and for a cash user $g_{i,t}(\theta) = \theta$. Correction for perceived theft probability is needed in order to induce the supplier to produce and extend credit, as cash users have a lower likelihood of credit repayment. Of course as we delineated above the

receipt of the trade credit is subject to not being a victim of theft in the *Day* sub-period; if the entrepreneur cannot provide the supplier with e units of cash in the day, she cannot borrow at all. Furthermore, how much the entrepreneur can borrow depends on her future credit market valuation, $V_{i,t}$, as delineated with the limited commitment constraint (4). Similar to the credit-constrained entrepreneur, a borrower-entrepreneur also decides on whether both payments will be made via cash transfers or by M-Pesa by the time the contract is signed. For instance, if M-Pesa is the chosen method of payment both at the initial payment stage and at the credit repayment stage, the entrepreneur incurs the fixed cost of f_e units as well as the variable transaction cost of λe for the *Day* sub-period transaction and the variable cost of $\lambda b_{i,t}$ for the *Night* sub-period transaction.

If the initial payment is planned to be made with cash, with probability θ the payment cannot be made in the day sub-period and the contract is discontinued. If the entrepreneur doesn't experience theft in the day sub-period, the contract is extended with credit - if the borrower is part of the network. If credit repayment is planned to be made with cash and if in the *Night* sub-period the debtor cannot incur the credit repayment because of theft, for the next T periods the entrepreneur will be excluded from the credit market.

3.3 Timing of Events

The timing of events in any time period t is as follows.

Day-subperiod:

1. Entrepreneurs' idiosyncratic productivity shocks, $A_{i,t}$, are realized.
2. Credit types are determined (exogenously or endogenously)
3. Suppliers meet with entrepreneurs.
4. Input contracts are determined. Credit can become part of the contract if the entrepreneur is part of the network.
5. The contract also specifies whether the initial as well as the credit repayment will be settled with cash or M-Pesa.
6. Pre-investment theft shocks are realized.

7. If the entrepreneur experiences theft, the input contract is discontinued and the supplier does not provide the entrepreneur with the production input.
8. If the entrepreneur does not experience the theft shocks, she extends the initial cash payment to the suppliers and inputs are provided by the supplier.

Night-subperiod:

1. Entrepreneurs invest production inputs and generate the night sub-period cash-flow.
2. Post-investment theft shocks are realized.
3. Credit repayment takes place.
4. If a debtor experienced a theft shock and as a result could not honor its debt obligation, she will be excluded from the credit market starting period $t + 1$ for T periods.
5. Periodic M-Pesa costs (including the fixed costs) are paid to the M-Pesa operator.
6. Agents consume.

Entrepreneurs are of two different types - borrower or credit-constrained types -, and are subject to productivity and two types of theft shocks. They have to take a decision on whether to settle transactions in cash (with the risk of theft) or in mobile money (incurring transaction costs).

3.4 Interpretation of the Model

The assumption that having been victim of theft is private information is crucial in our model to generate a non-trivial interaction between M-Pesa use and trade credit. Since credit enforcement is limited, an entrepreneur could lie and say that she was subject to theft and default on her promised repayment obligation. We assume that the only instrument to rule out such strategic default is the suspension from the network - and hence credit - for a defaulter, who claims to have been victim of theft. Such punishment mechanisms are widely used in developing countries (need a reference here). Since membership in the network and access to credit are one-to-one related in our model, theft will imply an exclusion from future credit market transactions. Given this institutional setting, our equilibrium

analysis will show that entrepreneurs who purchase goods on credit will have higher incentives to pay M-Pesa fees and use the M-Pesa technology when settling payments.

To provide some intuition, being excluded from the network - and thus losing access to credit - of a defaulter works as a loss of reputation. Specifically, a credit-constrained entrepreneur who loses her cash because of theft suffers only from the loss of her “cash”. A borrowing entrepreneur - if subject to theft - loses her “cash” as well as her opportunity to benefit from credit market access. The opportunity costs of holding cash are thus higher for borrowers than non-borrowers.

3.5 Optimizing Behavior and Equilibrium

Entrepreneurs maximize life-time value by choosing how much input to invest in entrepreneurial production technology and by choosing the appropriate payment methods. Suppliers maximize utility by providing appropriate labor efforts to produce production inputs.

Definition The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterized by a stream of inputs provided by suppliers, $\{h_{i,t}\}$, transfers made to suppliers, $\{x_{i,t}\}$ and $\{b_{i,t}\}$, and payment methods at which entrepreneurs and suppliers maximize lifetime utility and the input market clears.

4 Solution

We make the following functional form assumption regarding the entrepreneur’s production technology in order to provide a set of closed-form theoretical results.

Assumption 1. $y_{i,t}(h_{i,t}) = A_{i,t}h_{i,t}$.

Denoting $\underline{A}$ as the lowest possible productivity draw, we assume $\underline{A} > \frac{1}{\theta}$, such that for all firms it is worthwhile to shop for inputs and to undertake entrepreneurial production.

4.1 Social Planner’s Allocation

Let us consider a social planner’s problem as a benchmark in order to illustrate the first-best allocation of this economy. Following that we provide the decentralized markets outcome and investigate how the M-Pesa technology alleviates the credit market imperfections and impacts the aggregate performance of the economy.

The social planner takes the probability of theft into consideration. Since the production technology of the entrepreneur is linear and $A_i > \frac{1}{\theta}$ for all entrepreneurs, the social planner would ask each input supplier to provide $\bar{h}$ units of labor (the maximum capacity of labor associated with each supplier) at every entrepreneur-supplier meeting. This implies that the first-best aggregate output of the economy in any period t is expressed as:

$$Y_t = \bar{h} \int_{\underline{A}}^{\bar{A}} A_{i,t} di. \quad (7)$$

4.2 Decentralization with Imperfect Credit Enforcement and Exogenous Access to Credit

Let us first assume that access to trade credit is exogenously distributed among entrepreneurs, such that fraction π of entrepreneurs can apply for trade credit and fraction $1 - \pi$ cannot throughout their lifetime. As we delineated before, defaulting borrowers are excluded from accessing the credit for the next T periods. In equilibrium, suppliers make zero net profits - a condition which closes the economy with the following

$$x_{\ell,t} = h_{\ell,t}, \quad (8)$$

$$e + b_{c,t}g_{i,t}(\theta) = h_{c,t}, \quad (9)$$

where (8) is associated with a creditless supplier-entrepreneur contract and (9) with a credit-based supplier-entrepreneur contract. Note that on the left-hand-side of (9), we take into account the probability of credit non-repayment due to theft. In these equations, the ℓ -subscript stands for creditless (liquidity) trade, whereas the c -subscript stands for trade credit relationships.

Equations (8) and (9) imply that the necessary and sufficient condition for an entrepreneur to shop for inputs and undertake entrepreneurial production - where she utilizes all of her personal endowment to buy supplies - is

$$A_{i,t}\theta > 1. \quad (10)$$

For an entrepreneur who cannot make input purchases on credit, (8) implies:

$$h_{\ell,t} = e. \quad (11)$$

Similarly, if the entrepreneur is part of the network - and hence can purchase on credit - the loan amount is determined by

$$b_{i,t} = \min\{\bar{h}, V_{i,t}\}. \quad (12)$$

This means there are two types of borrowers in the economy: financially unconstrained borrowers for whom $b_{i,t} = \bar{h}$ with $b_{i,t} < V_{i,t}$ and financially constrained borrowers with $b_{i,t} = V_{i,t}$.

For the moment let us assume that all borrowers of trade-credit are financially constrained. We would like to note that financial constraint status is at the intensive margin. At the extensive margin, in the economy there are also SMEs who are completely constrained from accessing trade-credit. Suppose that future credit market valuation equals V for M-Pesa using borrowers, whom we index with p . Since a borrower f who does not use the M-Pesa technology when repaying, gets exposed to the risk of theft and gets excluded from future credit with probability $1 - \theta$, her credit market valuation equals to θV . Furthermore, the M-Pesa user's credit repayment in the non-theft state is $1/\theta$ times higher than that of the cash user. Then, we can express:

$$h_{p,t} = e + V, \quad (13)$$

$$h_{f,t} = e + \theta^2 V, \quad (14)$$

where (13) is the input supplied to an M-Pesa user debtor, whereas (14) is the input supplied to a fiat money user debtor.

Equilibrium M-Pesa Use.

The consumption value function (denoted with $\tilde{U}_{\ell,t}$) of a creditless entrepreneur who uses M-Pesa technology can be expressed as

$$\tilde{U}_{p,t} = A_{\ell,t}e - \lambda e - f_e + U, \quad (15)$$

where U is the (future) continuation value of a creditless entrepreneur and p denotes the use of M-Pesa.

The consumption value if she were to use fiat money to settle transactions would be:

$$\tilde{U}_{f,t} = \theta A_{\ell,t} e + U. \quad (16)$$

where f denotes the use of fiat money. (15) and (16) imply that the entrepreneur would be indifferent between using M-Pesa and fiat money if $A_{\ell} = A^*$, where A^* solves:

$$(1 - \theta)A^* = \frac{f_e}{e} + \lambda. \quad (17)$$

The left hand-side of (17) is the return to M-Pesa usage, whereas the right hand-side of (17) is the cost of M-Pesa use. Equation (17) leads us to obtain our first qualitative result.

Proposition 4.1 *The higher an entrepreneur's productivity the higher is the likelihood of her using M-Pesa when purchasing inputs from a supplier.*

The credit-constrained entrepreneur A^* is indifferent between using fiat money and M-Pesa. Next we would like to address the question, if the A^* -entrepreneur had access to credit networks, whether this would induce her to strictly prefer M-Pesa use over fiat money when settling her transactions with input suppliers. To answer this question, using (13), the consumption value of a debtor from using M-Pesa when purchasing the inputs as well as when repaying the trade-credit can be expressed as follows

$$\tilde{V}_{p,t} = \{A^*e + (A^* - 1)V\} - \{\lambda(e + V) - f_e\} + V + U, \quad (18)$$

where the first component on the RHS is the return to entrepreneurial production with M-Pesa, the second component is the cost of M-Pesa use, the third component is the value of future credit market participation with M-Pesa, and the fourth component is the future value of credit-less trading. Similarly, using (14) together with the condition (10), the value function of a borrower from using fiat money, when settling input purchase and credit payment transactions, is expressed as:

$$\tilde{V}_{f,t} = \{\theta [A^*e + (A^* - 1)\theta^2 V]\} + \{((1 - \theta) + \theta^2)V\} + U, \quad (19)$$

where the first component on the RHS is the return to entrepreneurial production with fiat money, the second component is the value of future credit market participation with fiat money, and the third

component is the future value of liquidity trading. We would like to note that with probability $\theta(1 - \theta)$ the entrepreneur becomes a debtor in period t and at the same time ends up defaulting on the supplier. This means with probability $\theta(1 - \theta)$ a fiat money user with access to credit gets excluded from future credit market transactions - lowering her future credit market valuation by $\theta(1 - \theta)V$ compared to an M-Pesa user with access to credit. Then, the difference between M-Pesa and fiat money values for a debtor is expressed as follows:

$$\tilde{V}_{p,t} - \tilde{V}_{f,t} = (1 - \theta)A^*e + (1 - \theta^3)(A^* - 1)V - \lambda(e + V) - f_e. \quad (20)$$

Using (17) in (20) yields:

$$\tilde{V}_{p,t} - \tilde{V}_{f,t} = (1 - \theta^3)(A^* - 1)V - \lambda V + \theta(1 - \theta)V, \quad (21)$$

Since $(1 - \theta^3) > (1 - \theta^2)$, by re-arranging the RHS of (21) we can show that the sufficient condition for a debtor-type entrepreneur A^* to prefer M-Pesa over fiat money can be expressed as:

$$(1 - \theta^2)(A^* - 1) + \theta(1 - \theta) > \lambda. \quad (22)$$

From (17) we know that $\lambda < (1 - \theta)A^*$ as long as the fixed cost of M-Pesa use $f_e > 0$. For now, let us suppose that $f_e = 0$, then the condition (22) can be replaced with

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \theta^2)(A^* - 1) + \theta(1 - \theta) &> (1 - \theta)A^*, \\ \Rightarrow (1 + \theta)(A^* - 1) + \theta &> A^*, \\ \Rightarrow \theta A^* - 1 - \theta + \theta &> 0, \\ \Rightarrow \theta A^* &> 1. \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

Note that $\theta A^* > 1$ is a necessary and sufficient condition for an entrepreneur to undertake investment in the first place. Hence, the strict inequality (23) holds for all parameter conditions. This means: (23) implies that access to credit generates a strict demand for M-Pesa use for the entrepreneur indexed with A^* , where A^* -entrepreneur was indifferent between using M-Pesa and fiat money if he was completely credit constrained. We summarize this key qualitative result with the following proposition.

Proposition 4.2 *Ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs who purchase goods on trade-credit are more likely to use M-Pesa to settle payments compared to the entrepreneurs with no access to trade-credit.*

The intuition behind this result is related to the increasing value of entrepreneurial production induced by credit, which complements and raises the likelihood of M-Pesa use. There are two sources why the M-Pesa use raises the borrowers' production valuation more than that of non-borrowers. First, for a borrower the cost of theft is higher when purchasing inputs, because if the initial endowment is stolen, the entrepreneur suffers not only the endowment loss, but due to credit market frictions the ability to borrow during that particular period. Similarly, for a debtor at the trade credit repayment stage theft is not only associated with the loss of current value of cash but also the highly important loss of future credit market access. The lack of M-Pesa use therefore contracts the future credit market valuation for an entrepreneur, which in turn reduces the amount that the entrepreneur can borrow. Second, even without theft, interest payment increases with the likelihood of theft, and for a cash user this increases the repayment burden and constrains the amount that an entrepreneur can borrow in the first place.

One last thing to note is that the key result of proposition 4.2 holds as long as the entrepreneur who promises to make the credit repayment with M-Pesa does in fact have the incentives to pay with M-Pesa and not with cash when the credit repayment time comes. We can rule out contractual deviations by assuming that suppliers can punish defaults followed by payment method deviations severely, such as not only cutting access to the credit market but not allowing to pay with M-Pesa for a large enough number of periods. Note that the creditor will have the incentives to impose this punishment because default following a payment deviation increases the cost of extending trade credit for a supplier.

Fixed costs. We assumed $f_e = 0$ so far. Letting $f_e > 0$ leads to a contraction in the right hand-side of (23), since with $f_e > 0$, $\lambda < (1 - \theta)A^*$ holds. This means that the M-Pesa usage of a borrower-type entrepreneur becomes more likely compared to a credit constrained-type if f_e rises. We summarize this result with the following corollary.

Corollary 4.3 *Ceteris paribus, a higher fixed cost of M-Pesa adoption makes a borrower more likely to use M-Pesa compared to a credit constrained entrepreneur.*

The intuition is related to the local increasing returns to scale feature that fixed costs generate:

With fixed costs, the credit constrained entrepreneurs are less likely to engage in M-Pesa transfers when making purchases from input suppliers because their transaction volumes are smaller than the entrepreneurs who can borrow.

Comparing Decentralized Equilibrium with Social Planner's Allocation. As we delineated above, regardless of an entrepreneur's productivity, the social planner allocates $\bar{h}$ units of supplier input to each entrepreneur. In the decentralized equilibrium, access to inputs is determined by an entrepreneur's trade-credit opportunities and the willingness to utilize m-pesa, where the latter correlates with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Therefore, in a decentralized market equilibrium the aggregate output of the economy is lower than socially optimal level of macroeconomic output.

4.3 Endogenizing Access to Trade Credit

While so far we have assumed an exogenous distribution of access to trade credit across entrepreneurs (and thus a uni-directional impact of access to trade credit on the use of M-Pesa corresponding to the regression in Table 2) we now assume that the access to credit is endogenously determined among entrepreneurs, where in each period an entrepreneur needs to incur a non-monetary loss worth of $\kappa_{i,t}$ units of consumption in order to access the trade-credit network. If the entrepreneur does not incur this periodic cost she does not get to borrow trade-credit when purchasing inputs from suppliers.

We assume that at the beginning of each period, before productivity shocks are realized, each entrepreneur draws a non-monetary "joining the trade-network" cost, denoted by $\kappa_{i,t}$. We assume that κ is drawn from a cumulative distribution function $H(\kappa)$ and *iid* among entrepreneurs and across time.

The independence of periodic κ -cost from productivity draws - coupled with the trade-credit M-Pesa complementarity highlighted above - yields that any change in M-Pesa usage costs would lower the demand for signing up for a trade credit relationship among those entrepreneurs who have high levels of κ . We summarize this intuitive result in the following proposition.

Proposition 4.4 *Ceteris paribus, a rise in M-Pesa transaction costs reduces the value of a trade-credit contract, willingness to cover the network access cost κ_i and the aggregate number of trade-credit borrowers.*

Part of our quantitative analysis below will focus on isolating the transmission of the real effects

of M-Pesa usage through the number of trade credit relationships in the economy.

4.4 Stationary Equilibrium

The macro variables of the model, which can exhibit time-variation, are the population fraction of trade-credit borrowers who use *cash* and the population fraction of trade-credit borrowers who use *M-Pesa* when purchasing inputs from suppliers. It is easy to note that if the total number of default-penalty periods (T) is infinitely large, there is no stationary equilibrium, where positive fractions of the population use M-Pesa and Cash when making input purchases on trade-credit. For quantitative purposes, our analysis requires the existence of a stationary equilibrium, where borrowers choose to utilize cash as well as M-Pesa when making input purchases. Therefore, we assume that T is finite. Moreover, given the parameter restrictions that we will impose, $T = 2$ yields an equilibrium trade-credit/output ratio matching the trade-credit/output ratio that we observe in FinAccess Business Kenya. For, $T = 2$, we obtain the following result.

Proposition 4.5 *When $T = 2$, a unique stationary equilibrium exists in which positive fractions of trade-credit borrowers use cash and M-Pesa at purchasing supplier-inputs.*

Proof Let $\mathcal{C}_t$ denote the measure of entrepreneurs with a clean credit history at the beginning of period t , who are eligible to borrow. Suppose the unconditional probability of becoming a borrower is q , which is time-invariant given our distributional assumptions. The probability of being subject to theft is $1 - \theta$. Then the outflow of entrepreneurs from the credit market who will not be able to borrow in period $t + 1$ is $q(1 - \theta)\mathcal{C}_t$. The inflow of entrepreneurs into the credit market in period $t + 1$, who had defaulted in period $t - 2$ is $q(1 - \theta)\mathcal{C}_{t-2}$. From here, we can note that as long as

$$\mathcal{C}_t = \mathcal{C}_{t-2}$$

in some t , the economy will be in a stationary equilibrium in all time periods τ with $\tau \geq t$. Next, we need to establish that for t large enough $\mathcal{C}_t = \mathcal{C}_{t-2}$ holds. Starting with period-1, with a 2-period default penalty we can note that $\mathcal{C}_1 > \mathcal{C}_2 > \mathcal{C}_3$ for periods 1, 2 and 3. While the outflow of entrepreneurs from the credit market who will not be eligible to borrow in period 4 equals to $q(1 - \theta)\mathcal{C}_3$, the inflow of agents in period 4 is $q(1 - \theta)\mathcal{C}_1$. Since $\mathcal{C}_1 > \mathcal{C}_3$, we note that $\mathcal{C}_4 > \mathcal{C}_3$. Formally, defining $z \equiv q(1 - \theta)$

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{C}_2 &= (1 - z)\mathcal{C}_1, \\
\mathcal{C}_3 &= (1 - z)^2\mathcal{C}_1, \\
\mathcal{C}_4 &= (1 - z)^2\mathcal{C}_1 + (1 - z)\mathcal{C}_1 - z(1 - z)^2\mathcal{C}_1,
\end{aligned}$$

using which we can also note that $\mathcal{C}_4 > \mathcal{C}_2$; and $\mathcal{C}_4 > \mathcal{C}_5 > \mathcal{C}_6 > \mathcal{C}_3$. This implies that $|\mathcal{C}_4 - \mathcal{C}_6| < |\mathcal{C}_1 - \mathcal{C}_3|$.

Iterating the process forward yields

$$|\mathcal{C}_t - \mathcal{C}_{t+2}| < |\mathcal{C}_{t-3} - \mathcal{C}_{t-1}|$$

for all t . Hence, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathcal{C}_t = \bar{\mathcal{C}} > 0$. $\square$

5 Benchmark Calibration

In this section, we make functional form assumptions and calibrate the stationary equilibrium of the dynamic general equilibrium model to match the key moments observed in the 2014 FinAccess Business Survey for the Kenyan economy. In section 6 we will use this quantitative framework to gauge the implications of M-Pesa adoption and usage costs for trade credit, entrepreneurial output and macroeconomic development. The target moments that we set using the 2014 FinAccess SME Survey are presented in Table 3.

- Table 3 about here -

As calibration targets, we choose sample moments (means) that are important to assess the quantitative relevance of our theoretical channel in determining the level of macroeconomic development. Namely, in the stationary equilibrium of our model, using five of our model parameters we aim to match the means observed in the FinAccess Business 2014 for the following five variables: average entrepreneurial profit share, average entrepreneurial input-output ratio, average trade credit-output ratio for those entrepreneurs who utilize trade credit, fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy who have a trade credit relationship with their suppliers, and finally the fraction of entrepreneurs in the

economy who utilize the M-Pesa technology when purchasing inputs from suppliers. There is an additional sample moment that we are interested in our analysis: The fraction of M-Pesa use among those entrepreneurs who borrow trade credit. The qualitative mechanism suggests M-Pesa use to be more intense among trade credit borrowers. By not directly targeting this variable with one of our parameters, we put the quantitative relevance of our qualitative mechanism at test.

With respect to the functional forms, we assume that the entrepreneurial technology exhibits the following decreasing returns to scale functional form

$$y_{i,t} = A_{i,t} k_{i,t}^\alpha, \text{ with } 0 < \alpha < 1. \quad (24)$$

We assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, $A_{i,t}$, are drawn from a cumulative distribution function

$$G(A) = A^{1/\gamma_A}, \quad (25)$$

where $\gamma_A > 0$. Note that when γ_A equals one, productivity is uniformly distributed across entrepreneurs. When γ_A is greater than one, productivity distribution is concentrated among entrepreneurs with low levels of productivity.

In addition to the M-Pesa user costs (λ and f_e), the parameter space of the model includes α and γ_A , the probability of being subject to theft (θ), the measure of entrepreneurs in the economy ($\mathcal{E}$), the total number of penalty periods following a default (T) and the discount parameter (β). Finally, we also have the parameter that governs the fraction of entrepreneurs, who apply for trade-credit. As we delineated above we consider two versions of the model: (i) Exogenous distribution of trade credit use, in which case we will parameterize π , the population share of trade-credit users; and, (ii) endogenous distribution of use of trade credit, at which case we will parameterize the distribution of κ_i , the cost of accessing the record keeping institute.

The model parameterization under the assumption of exogenous credit distribution are presented in Table 4. When parameterizing the stationary equilibrium of the model, some parameters are calibrated to match the moments observed for the Kenyan economy in the FinAccess Business Survey, whereas others are assigned with values based on the existing empirical evidence.

- Table 4 about here -

The details of the model parameterization are as follows. We set β as 0.95 - a standard value utilized in the Real Business Cycle Literature. We use a value of 0.95 for θ , which implies that the likelihood of theft is 5%. This is a quite conservative benchmark when it comes to the probability of theft in Kenya and especially Nairobi, as, according to 2011 Afrobarometer survey in Kenya 33% of households in Kenya (37% of households in Nairobi) report that at least once something has been stolen from their house and 5% of households in Kenya (11% of household in Nairobi) state that they feel unsafe when walking in the neighborhood (Afrobarometer Network, 2011). The unit transaction cost associated with M-Pesa use, λ , is set at 1% to match the transaction cost observed in practice when making payments to suppliers.¹¹ The remaining parameters, for which we will assign values are f_e , α , γ_A , $\mathcal{E}$, T and finally π (or κ -distribution). Starting from the last parameter, we set π as 0.25 to match the fraction of the entrepreneurs in the FinAccess Business sample who use trade credit. We choose f_e to match the sample share of entrepreneurs who use the M-Pesa technology when making purchases from the input suppliers, which equals to 0.32. We set γ_A equal to 1 such that the productivity distribution is uniform and choose the lower bound of the productivity distribution as $1/\theta$ and calibrate the upper bound of the productivity distribution and the value of entrepreneurial endowment e to match the aggregate input-output ratio of 0.31. The capital's share in production, α , is calibrated to match the entrepreneurial profit share of 0.45 - observed in the FinAccess Business. The measure of entrepreneurs is chosen such that the benchmark output equals to 100 - net of theft and M-Pesa transaction costs. Finally, the total number of penalty periods T is chosen as 2 to match the credit-output ratio of 0.21 for trade-credit users. To summarize we calibrate π , f_e , the value of e , α and T to match the 5 calibration targets that we listed in table 3.

The parameterized model matches the Kenyan SME data quite well along the dimensions that were targeted (the first 5 statistics in Table 5), as well as the important additional statistics that we did not target using the model parameters, which is the fraction of M-Pesa users among trade-credit borrowers.

- Table 5 about here -

¹¹The costs for using M-Pesa is a step function that decreases by transaction amount. On average, sending money to another M-Pesa user costs 0.2% to 3% of the transaction (this amount is higher for non-registered users) and users may pay between 1.8% and 10% of the amount withdrawn from M-Pesa agents. These costs are calculated by using M-Pesa transaction fees retrieved from <http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/tariffs> on February, 2015.

Specifically and as presented in Table 5, we can match the targeted sample moments (means) of entrepreneur’s profit share, supplier credit-output ratio, fraction of trade credit users perfectly. We only deviate slightly from the targeted fraction of M-Pesa users in the economy. 32% of all entrepreneurs in the FinAccess Business sample utilize M-Pesa when making input purchases from their suppliers; our calibration exercise, where we use the parameter f_e (the fixed cost of M-Pesa adoption) to match the moment of interest, generates a fraction of M-Pesa users equaling to 34%. Similarly, we do not match the average input-output ratio perfectly, where the sample mean equals 0.31, while our model produces an input-output ratio of 0.39.

The key theoretical result from the model indicates that access to trade credit raises the demand to use M-Pesa when making purchases from suppliers. To test the quantitative relevance of our model we leave the fraction of M-Pesa user trade-credit borrowers as a free (un-targeted) variable and investigate the performance of our parameterized model in matching it. The actual fraction of M-Pesa using trade credit borrowers in FinAccess Business sample is about 42%. The parameterized model generates a fraction of M-Pesa users among trade credit borrowers equaling to 45%. This close match supports the quantitative validity of our theoretical mechanism and also indicates that the parameterized model can be utilized to conduct counterfactual policy exercises to understand the interactions between M-Pesa, trade-credit and economic performance.

In Table 6, we parameterize the alternative model, where we allow for endogenous selection into the trade-credit network. In this alternative specification, we incorporate a trade credit choice into the timeline that we presented in section 3. Specifically, at the beginning of each period, before productivity shocks are realized, each entrepreneur draws a “joining the trade-network” cost, denoted by $\kappa_{i,t}$. An entrepreneur becomes eligible to borrow from the trade-credit network if she covers the periodic κ -cost. We assume that κ is distributed uniformly between the interval $[0, \bar{\kappa}]$ and iid among entrepreneurs and across time. We calibrate $\bar{\kappa}$ to match the fraction of trade-credit relationships (0.25) among the sample of SMEs. Trade credit costs are non-monetary, which coupled with the timing of events that we impose¹² implies that the performance of the benchmark calibration replicating the data remains exactly the same in the alternative specification as we show in Table 7.

- Tables 6 and 7 about here -

¹²To be precise, the timing of κ draw leads the draw of A .

6 Counterfactual Analysis

In order to understand the role of M-Pesa technology for entrepreneurial performance and economic development in Kenya, we run a counterfactual quantitative exercises to quantify the importance of the M-Pesa use in alleviating the frictions between entrepreneurs and suppliers in the Kenyan economy.

In the first counterfactual, we utilize the model with exogenous trade credit use and ask the question “how would the economic performance of the Kenyan economy look like if entrepreneurs did not have access to M-Pesa when making purchases from their suppliers? In order to answer this question, we use our parameterized model and hypothetically shut down the access to M-Pesa in supplier relationships.¹³ The quantitative results from this hypothetical exercise are presented in Table 8.

- Table 8 about here -

Eliminating the use of M-Pesa from SME-supplier relationships causes an expansion in the input-output ratio, mostly because entrepreneurial output contracts following the shut-down of access to the M-Pesa technology. Similarly, the credit-output ratio contracts when we eliminate the M-Pesa use because of the increasing likelihood of theft in the economy, which makes the financial constraints tighter for borrowers with access to trade credit.¹⁴ Finally, and most importantly, as a result of these adjustments, the macroeconomic output of the economy (the aggregate output generated by the SMEs) contracts by 0.33%. While this seems like a small change in the level of macroeconomic development, we would like to note that the impact of M-Pesa use on the macroeconomy is determined by the extent of theft. With a larger probability of theft (low θ) the impact of M-Pesa on entrepreneurial as well as macroeconomic performance would be larger. Therefore, this quantitative result lets us to conclude that the use of M-Pesa when making input purchases from suppliers is quantitatively important in alleviating transaction frictions in SME-supplier relationships and in turn for macroeconomic development in the Kenyan economy.

Our theoretical results suggest a strong interaction between access to trade credit and the use of M-Pesa when making input purchases. In this respect, next we turn to the model with “endogenous

¹³In other words we raise the cost of M-Pesa technology so high that entrepreneurs do not end up utilizing this technology when making purchases from their suppliers.

¹⁴We would like to note that the fraction of trade credit borrowers do not change in this exercise, since access to trade credit allocation is set exogenously at 25%.

trade credit allocations” and run a counterfactual exercise in order to isolate the feedbacks through changes in trade credit access on entrepreneurial performance and macroeconomic development. We present the counterfactual quantitative exercise with endogenous trade credit selection in Table 9. When the trade credit relationship is an endogenous choice variable for an entrepreneur, due to the complementarity between M-Pesa and the value of trade-credit relationships, shutting down the M-Pesa technology lowers the fraction of trade-credit borrowers by 1 percentage point. The decline in trade-credit relationships further suppresses the macroeconomic development and causes a total contraction in macro output by 0.47%. This quantitative result allows us to highlight the strong interaction between trade credit and M-Pesa as an important determinant of the economic consequences of mobile money technology.

- Table 9 about here -

Finally, to assess the economic importance of the mechanism we have proposed, we calculate its contribution to economic growth of Kenya since the introduction of M-Pesa in 2007. Kenyan total factor productivity and real per capita income grew 3.4% and 14%, respectively, between 2006 and 2013. The quantitative exercise result from the endogenous model implies that M-Pesa generates 0.5% TFP growth for the Kenyan economy through trade credit channel on an annualized basis.¹⁵ This implies that the mechanism we have proposed can explain 14% of TFP growth and 3.4% of per-capita real income growth over the same period, suggesting quite a large economic impact of mobile money technology.

7 Conclusion

Using a novel SME survey from Kenya (FinAccess Business 2013) we documented a positive co-variance between the use of Mobile-Money (M-Pesa) as a payment method when purchasing inputs from suppliers and the use of trade credit among SMEs. In order to understand what drives this relationship, we

¹⁵The macroeconomic output in our quantitative analysis is the output aggregation over construction, whole-sale, retail trade, hotels, restaurants, manufacturing, real estate, education, transport, communication, and other service sectors which produced 54% of Kenyan economic output between 2007-2013 according to UNSTAT(2014). In our analysis we assume that our sample is representative for the Kenyan economy. We calculate the total factor productivity growth in 2006-2013 by using the methodology in Beck et al (2000). Data for income per capita, capital stock per capita, share of labor compensation and capital depreciation rate for Kenya are from Feenstra et al. (2013) and UNSTAT(2014). The details of the calculation are available upon request.

developed and solved a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs (SMEs). Our model exhibits imperfect credit markets (with limited commitment) and theft, where theft erodes an entrepreneur's fiat money balances and additionally - due to non-repayment (default) - for borrowers it causes a discontinuation of access to trade credit. In this framework, M-Pesa dominates fiat money as a medium of exchange in its capacity to avoid theft but it comes with electronic payment transaction costs.

The key theoretical result from the model shows that access to trade credit generates demand to use M-Pesa as a payment method with suppliers and the use of M-Pesa in turn raises the value of a credit relationship and hence the willingness to apply for trade credit. We calibrate our model to match a set of moments that we observe in the Kenyan FinAccess Survey and quantify the importance of interactions between M-Pesa and trade credit on entrepreneurial performance and macroeconomic development. Eliminating the use of M-Pesa from SME-supplier relationships reduces the macroeconomic output of the economy (the aggregate output generated by the SMEs) by 0.33%. Endogenizing access to trade credit increases the quantitative effect even further, as the lack of a mobile money technology lowers the fraction of trade credit relationships among SMEs. This would further suppress the macroeconomic development and causes a total contraction in macro output by 0.47%.

Our work has important policy implications. The focus of the financial inclusion debate has been for a long time on credit and savings services. Our paper contributes to an expanding literature that shows not only the importance of effective payment services but also the promise that digital payment systems can hold. And while an extensive literature has focused on the lack of access to credit services by enterprises as important growth constraint in developing countries, we show the importance of effective payment services for expanding economic and financial transactions in an economy. Finally, compared to previous work, we also quantify economic significance of mobile money technology.

There are a number ways our current set-up can be extended with. First, so far we studied the implications of M-Pesa on the level of economic development. Incorporating capital accumulation dynamics could help to capture the effects of M-Pesa use on economic growth. Similarly, one can allow for cash accumulation and study the monetary policy interactions of M-Pesa technology. Finally, modelling of an M-Pesa technology provider explicitly would yield the investigation of the optimal design of the Mobile Money institution and its regulation. These extensions we leave to future work.

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Tables and figures

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Panel A: Sectoral breakdown	Definition	Number	Share				
Manufacturing	Equals to 1 if the business is manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise	302	29%				
Service	Equals to 1 if the business is in service sector, 0 otherwise	360	34%				
Trade	Equals to 1 if the business is in trade sector, 0 otherwise	385	37%				
Panel B: Financial charac.		Mean	S.D.	Min.	Median	Max.	
Purchasing supplies via cash	Equals to 1 if the cash is a common method of payment to pay to suppliers, 0 otherwise	0.91	0.28	0	1	1	
Purchasing supplies via check	Equals to 1 if the check is a common method of payment to pay to suppliers, 0 otherwise	0.50	0.50	0	1	1	
Selling goods and services via mobile money	Equals to 1 if the mobile money is common method of payment from your customers,, 0 otherwise						
Purchasing supplies via mobile money	Equals to 1 if the mobile money is common method of payment to your suppliers, 0 otherwise	0.32	0.47	0	0	1	
Purchasing supplies on credit	Equals to 1 if the enterprise receive goods or services on credit, 0 otherwise	0.24	0.42	0	0	1	
Personal bank account	Equals to 1 if the business owner uses personel bank account for the business, 0 otherwise	0.15	0.35	0	0	1	
Business account	Equals to 1 if the enterprise has a business account, 0 otherwise	0.76	0.43	0	1	1	
Panel A: Size and productivity		Mean	S.D.	Min.	Med.	Max.	
Profit	Monthly profits during the last 12 months, in U.S dollars	51712	636859	0	5581	1.98E+07	
Employment	Total number of permanent and temporary employment plus the owner	24	106	1	6	2101	
Productivity	Profits divided by employment, in U.S dollars	3101	11696	0	775	259690	
Panel D: Other charac.		Mean	S.D.	Min.	Med.	Max.	
Registered	Equals to 1 if the enterprise is registered, 0 otherwise	0.66	0.47	0	1	1	
Accountant	Equals to 1 if the enterprise have an accountant, 0 otherwise	0.56	0.50	0	1	1	
Primary education	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager have at most primary level level education, 0 otherwise	0.01	0.11	0	0	1	
Secondary education	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager have secondary level education, 0 otherwise	0.11	0.31	0	0	1	
College education	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager have college level education, 0 otherwise	0.16	0.37	0	0	1	
University education	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager have university level education, 0 otherwise	0.29	0.46	0	0	1	
Graduate education	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager have master or PhD. level education, 0 otherwise	0.11	0.31	0	0	1	
Male	Equals to 1 if the business owner/manager is male, 0 otherwise	0.75	0.43	0	1	1	
Age	Age of the business owner/manager	42	9	20	40	90	

Notes: The table shows the variables definitions and descriptive statistics for the selected variables used in the analysis. Mean, S.D., Min., Med. and Max. shows sample average, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum of the corresponding variable.

Table 2: Probit estimates for paying to suppliers via mobile money and business characteristics

	(1)	(2)
	marg. eff.	s. e.
Productivity	0.02**	(0.01)
Personal business account	0.13	(0.08)
Business Account	0.08	(0.06)
Purchasing supplies on credit	0.17***	(0.04)
Registered	-0.14***	(0.04)
Accountant	0.10***	(0.04)
Secondary education	-0.15	(0.13)
College education	0.07	(0.17)
University education	0.09	(0.17)
Graduate educatio	0.13	(0.18)
Male	0.07*	(0.04)
<i>Age</i>	-0.02*	(0.01)
<i>Age</i> ²	0.00	(0.00)
Observations	1,044	

Notes: This table shows the estimation results for the correlation between using mobile money to pay to suppliers and business characteristics. We estimate $Y_i = \beta_0 + X_i' \beta_1 + \epsilon_i$ for all specifications where i denotes the firm and X_i is the business characteristics, and Y_i equals to 1 if the respondent uses mobile money to pay for supplies (0 otherwise). We estimate the model by using Probit regression and report marginal effects at mean levels and robust standard errors in parentheses. To control for sector level fixed effects, we add sector to the estimations. To control for missing observations due to refusing to answer and not knowing, we add dummy variables for each reason. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Calibration Targets

Variable	Kenyan Economy (Mean)
Entrepreneur's Profit Share	0.45
Input-Output ratio	0.31
Supplier Trade Credit-Output Ratio for Trade Credit Users	0.21
Fraction of Trade-Credit Relation with Suppliers	0.25
Fraction of M-Pesa Users	0.32

Table 4: Model Parameterization for the Kenyan Economy - with Exogenous Credit Allocation

Parameter	Value	Motivation
α	0.55	To match the average share of entrepreneurial profits (in FinAccess Survey)
γ_A	1	Uniform productivity distribution
e	0.29	To match average input-output ratio
β	0.95	The standard value used in the RBC-Growth literature
λ	0.01	M-Pesa Transaction Costs retrieved from Safaricom website on February 2015
f_e	0.065	To Match fraction of M-Pesa user SMEs (in FinAccess)
θ	0.95	As evidenced by Afrabarometer Network (2011)
$\mathcal{E}$	98.46	To match the macroeconomic output of 100 in benchmark calibration
π	0.25	To match the fraction of SMEs with Trade-Credit Relation (in FinAccess)
T	2	To match the average trade credit-output for borrowers (in FinAccess)

Table 5: Benchmark Model vs. Kenyan Economy - with Exogenous Credit Allocation

	Model	Kenyan Economy
Entrepreneur's Profit Share	0.45	0.45
Input-output ratio	0.39	0.31
Supplier credit-output ratio	0.21	0.21
Fraction of Trade-Credit Users	0.25	0.25
Fraction of M-Pesa Users	0.34	0.32
Fraction of M-Pesa Users in with Supplier-Credit	0.45	0.42

Table 6: Model Parameterization for the Kenyan Economy - with Endogenous Credit Allocation

Parameter	Value	Motivation
α	0.55	To match the average share of entrepreneurial profits (in FinAccess Survey)
γ_A	1	Uniform productivity distribution
e	0.29	To match average input-output ratio
β	0.95	The standard value used in the RBC literature
λ	0.01	M-Pesa Transaction Costs retrieved from Safaricom website on February 2015
f_e	0.065	To Match fraction of M-Pesa user SMEs (in FinAccess)
θ	0.95	As evidenced by Afrabarometer Network (2011)
$\mathcal{E}$	98.46	To match the macroeconomic output of 100 in benchmark calibration
$\bar{\kappa}$	1.02	To match the fraction of SMEs with Trade-Credit Relation (in FinAccess)
T	2	To match the average trade credit-output for borrowers (in FinAccess)

Table 7: Benchmark Model vs. Kenyan Economy - with Endogenous Credit Allocation

	Model	Kenyan Economy
Entrepreneur's Profit Share	0.45	0.45
Input-output ratio	0.39	0.31
Supplier credit-output ratio	0.21	0.21
Fraction of Trade-Credit Users	0.25	0.25
Fraction of M-Pesa Users	0.34	0.32
Fraction of M-Pesa Users in with Supplier-Credit	0.45	0.42

Table 8: Counterfactual of Shutting M-Pesa Down with Exogenous Credit Allocation

Macroeconomic Output Loss	0.33%
Entrepreneur's Profit Share	0.45
Input-output ratio	0.40
Supplier credit-output ratio	0.19
Fraction of Trade-Credit Users	0.25
Fraction of M-Pesa Users	0
Fraction of M-Pesa Users in with Supplier-Credit	0

Table 9: Counterfactual of Shutting M-Pesa Down with Endogenous Credit Allocation

Macroeconomic Output Loss	0.47%
Entrepreneur's Profit Share	0.45
Input-output ratio	0.41
Supplier credit-output ratio	0.18
Fraction of Trade-Credit Users	0.24
Fraction of M-Pesa Users	0
Fraction of M-Pesa Users in with Supplier-Credit	0

Figure 1: Share of businesses using mobile money to pay to their suppliers according to credit relationship with suppliers

Notes: The Figure shows the predicted share of businesses considering mobile money as a common method of payment to pay to suppliers according to whether the businesses have credit relationship with input suppliers and the 95% statistical confidence levels for those shares after controlling for other business characteristics. To reach to predicted shares, we estimate the model for which the estimation results are shown in Table 2.

Appendix

Table A1: Stability test

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Purchasing supplies on credit	0.12*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
Productivity		0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Personal account			0.15* (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Business account			0.11* (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Registered			-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Accountant			0.14*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)
Secondary education				-0.15 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.13)
College education				0.06 (0.17)	0.07 (0.17)
University education				0.09 (0.17)	0.09 (0.17)
Graduate education				0.12 (0.18)	0.13 (0.18)
Male				0.06 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Age				-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Age2				0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Observations	1,047	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.12	0.12
Sector FE	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: This table shows the estimation result for the correlation between using mobile money to pay to suppliers and business characteristics. We estimate $Y_i = \beta_0 + X_i' \beta_1 + \epsilon_i$ for all specifications where i denotes the firm and X_i is the business characteristics. We estimate Probit models, report marginal effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we add sector and region dummies to all estimations. To control for missing variables, we add dummy variables for "refusing to answer" or "not knowing" answers when it is relevant. * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$