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CHAPTER NINE

MISSING LINKS? CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND EUROPEAN VALUES

WIM VAN DE DONK, FRANK HENDRIKS & RUUD LUIJKX

If the members of a nation—or a class or a group—do have a conception of common purpose, democracy will enable them to express it and to work for it. If they are trying to give themselves some such guide, democracy will provide them with the freedoms to seek it. But where positive goals are lacking, democracy itself will not supply them. People do ask for a purpose in life, seeking to find something greater than themselves with which to identify – a cause, a movement, a historical or moral reality. In this quest, the central legitimising principle of modernity is at best neutral. (Samuel Beer, in Beer et al., 1973: 4–5)

1 *Introduction*

In this chapter, we will use EVS data to explore the link between values and institutions. More specifically, we will try to relate these data and two theories, both highly influential in contemporary political science and public administration: Putnam's Social Capital Theory and Lijphart's Consensus Democracy Theory. Both authors (among many others, though, see Dekker et al., 2003) explicitly claim a connection between 'effective governance' and particular characteristics of the social and political institutions of a society.

Putnam's Social Capital Theory underscores the importance of informal civic institutions that further and support the development of social capital defined in terms of trust, involvement, solidarity and cooperativeness (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Lijphart's Consensus Democracy Theory emphasizes the importance of formal political institutions that support consensus building through power sharing and dispersal (Lijphart, 1999). Political and social systems that are characterized by high levels of social capital and a 'consensual' political structure seem to be 'linked' with higher levels of social as well as economical performance.

These findings seem to be highly relevant for the current debates about the future institutional shape of the European Union. Both in the context of the discussions about the European Commission's White paper on 'European Governance' as in the discussions that take place in the European Convention, much attention is paid to the institutional design of the European Union. Such a discussion on the future design of the

European institutions is especially important now that the Union will be enlarged with about 10 new member-states. Without a thorough review of Europe's political institutions, it is unlikely that it will ever meet its ambitious economic and social policy goals. But, as we will try to suggest in this chapter, a mere institutional approach might not be appropriate, especially when it tends to overestimate the structural dimensions (the 'hardware') of Europe's future social and political institutions.

In this context, the link between social capital and consensus democracy on the one hand and 'good and effective governance' on the other hand is highly interesting, but it has been studied extensively already, most notably by Putnam and Lijphart themselves. In the next section (section 2), we will shortly summarize their findings on the relation between 'good governance' and consensus democracy and social capital. Much less is known, however, about the kinds of 'backgrounds' these performing political (and social) systems seem to presuppose in terms of the main value orientations that characterize their socio-political environments (their 'software', so to say). In this chapter, we will present the results of a first, tentative exploration into these orientations.

We will try to do so by exploring two possible 'missing links' that reflect the importance of these 'background' dimensions. The first link we look into is the link between consensus democracy as defined by Lijphart and social capital as defined by Putnam (Missing Link I). Do higher levels of consensus democracy go along with higher levels of trust-engendering (informal) social networks and institutions? The second link regards the relation between these two on the one hand and value patterns—following from EVS data—on the other hand (Missing Link II). What do the data of EVS teach us about the cultural backgrounds and value orientations that go along with consensualism and social capital?

We call these 'missing links', because as far as we know these particular links (between a specific institutional pattern and a specific value orientation) have not been specified yet. Influential studies of (political) culture do, however, suggest that such links are worth exploring.

In a more general sense, ideas about a relationship between democracy and political culture were discussed in Almond and Verba's seminal work on 'Civic Culture' (Almond & Verba, 1973). In a comparable way, the relationship between culture (modernization and post-modernization) and democracy gets attention in recent work of Inglehart (1999, 2000). Studies that focus on the interrelation between social capital and consensus democracy on the one hand, and value orientations (and changes therein) on the other hand are, however, scarce¹. Therefore, in this chap-

¹ There are, however, some very interesting suggestions about the relationship between characteristics of national political cultures (that can be characterized by low and

ter, most attention will be devoted to the exploration of Missing Link I (in section 3) and Missing Link II (in section 4).

Note: This chapter focuses on Missing Link I and Missing Link II, combining central notions of Lijphart (1999), Putnam (1993), and EVS (2000).

Figure 9.1 Schematic depiction of the underlying logic

Figure 9.1 presents a graphic abstraction of the complex, multi-causal reality that we address in this chapter. Almond and Verba have very rightfully characterized the phenomena political culture and political structure as variables in a 'complex, multidirectional system of causality'. The lines/arrows in this figure should therefore not be interpreted as simple monocausal relations. We are interested in the interrelation between consensus democracy as defined by Lijphart and social capital as defined by Putnam, and the interrelation of the two with basic cultural orientations. But before we come to that, let us explore (in section 2) shortly what Lijphart and Putnam have to say about the contribution of 'consensualism' and 'social capital' to the economic and social performance of political systems, and—more importantly in this contribution—how they have conceptualized these promising properties of political life and social infrastructure.

In the following sections, we will see whether EVS data will enable us to say something about the interrelations ('links') we have described above. Can we see a relation between: a. the two characteristics (social capital-breeding informal institutions and consensus-orientedness of

high power distances: low or high PDI) and institutional characteristics of political systems in Hofstede (2001: 83, 110-113). There seems to be a high similarity between the countries that Lijphart characterizes as consensus democracies and the countries that are characterized by a high PDI by Hofstede (e.g., France). See more specifically: Lijphart, 1999: 288.

formal political institutions) and b. these institutional characteristics and specific value orientations in countries that fit the same profile?

2 *Patterns of democracy and social capital: Lijphart, Putnam and the European Values Study*

Lijphart and Consensus Democracy – Comparing patterns and performances of democracy in thirty-six democratic systems, Lijphart (1999) concludes that consensus democracies clearly perform better than their counterparts: non-consensual or majoritarian democracies. He successfully challenged the popular assumption that consensus democracies perform better in terms of representation, and that majoritarian democracies function better in terms of performance. Lijphart shows that majoritarian democracies do not outperform the consensus democracies when it comes to keeping public order and managing the national economy. In fact, the consensus democracies even have a slightly better record (Lijphart, 1999: 274). The consensus democracies, furthermore, clearly beat the majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of democracy and democratic representation as well as with regard to what Lijphart calls the ‘kinder and gentler’ qualities of politics and policymaking². Put differently: consensus democracies perform better on the ‘softer’, more ‘feminine’ side of politics and policy-making, while not performing worse (as has always been assumed) on the ‘harder’, more ‘masculine’ side of politics and policymaking (Lijphart, 1999: 294).

In Lijphart’s work, the level of consensualism is measured along two dimensions. The first dimension (L1) is the executives-parties dimension. It measures the extent to which powers and responsibilities are shared in a given democracy. The degree of consensualism on this dimension is determined by five variables. A democracy is more consensual to the extent that it is characterized by:

1. executive power-sharing in broad cabinets/coalitions (versus single-party majority cabinets);
2. executive-legislative balance of power (versus a dominant executive);
3. a multiparty system (versus a two-party system);

²‘Consensus democracies demonstrate these kinder and gentler qualities in the following ways: they are more likely to be welfare states, they have a better record with regard to the protection of the environment, they put fewer people in prison and are less likely to use the death penalty; and the consensus democracies in the developed world are more generous with their economic assistance to the developing nations’ (Lijphart, 1999: 275-276).

4. a system of proportional representation (versus a winner-takes-all electoral system);
5. interest group corporatism (versus interest group pluralism).

The second dimension (L2) is the federal-unitary dimension. It measures the extent to which powers and responsibilities are divided in a given democracy. The degree of consensualism on this dimension is, again, determined by five variables. A democracy is more consensual to the extent that it is characterized by:

1. federal and decentralized government (versus unitary and centralized government);
2. strong bicameralism (versus dominance by a single representative chamber);
3. constitutional rigidity (versus constitutional freedom and flexibility);
4. judicial review by a constitutional court (versus a final say of the legislature in constitutional matters);
5. central bank independence (versus dependent central banks).

Lijphart's variables are mainly formal-political or structural-organizational in character. The institutional structure of politics matters: this, in short, is Lijphart's claim. Consensualism and federalism are keys to a performing political system.

In a similar way, Putnam's work on social capital and associative life, suggests the importance of a particular shape of the more informal institutions of a democratic society.

Putnam and Social Capital – Putnam's study of Italian regions confirms the importance of the institutional structure of politics (in his case: the institutionalization of regional government), but adds an important element too: social capital, which is more on the 'soft' or cultural side of politics and social life (and economics too: see Fine, 2001). Re-introduced by Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990)³, this much debated notion of social capital more or less explicitly describes the importance of families, social bonds, communities, networks and associations, as well as shared habits that enable individuals to act collectively. Successful collective action requires (generalized) mutual trust and 'soft' regulations that exceed the logic of mere instrumental reciprocity (see Putnam, 1993; 2000; Coleman, 1990; Warren, 1999; Fukuyama, 2000; Newton,

³ Fukuyama (2000) recalls how the notion of Social Capital was first used by Lyda Judson Hanifan in 1916 to describe rural school community centers and was also used in Jane Jacob's classic work *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. See also Putnam (2000: 19).

2001; Fine, 2001). 'Though these observers of the contemporary era point to different cultural, political, and institutional factors that have changed the relationships between the citizen, the state, the market and the societal midfield, they all share the notion that a flourishing civil society and a vital democracy presupposes high levels of social trust, cohesion, and social participation. A vibrant democratic civil society is only believed to prosper if based on high levels of social trust accompanied by support for democracy and political involvement of its citizenry.' (Dekker et al., 2003). More specifically, the kind of trust that contributes to social capital is trust that can be generalized to people who are strangers, as compared to trust that is particular, limited to one's family or group (e.g., Warren, 1999, or Putnam, who makes a difference between 'bonding' and 'bridging' forms of social capital).

A society that is characterized by generalized reciprocity is, according to Putnam, more efficient than a distrustful society. 'Frequent interaction among a diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized reciprocity.' (Putnam, 2000: 21). The degree of diversity seems to be especially important for the type of social capital that is produced: 'When economic and political dealing is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced. This is why the diamond trade, with its extreme possibilities for fraud, is concentrated within close-knit ethnic enclaves' (Putnam, 2000: 21). Such a close-knit production of social capital might be favorable for those inside these networks (or 'communities'), but, as Putnam seems to be well aware of, the external effects of these kinds of 'warm and cuddly' social capital are by no means always positive (he mentions sectarianism, ethnocentrism and corruption). 'Of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the most important is the distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive).' (Putnam, 2000: 22). Although Putnam makes clear that bonding and bridging forms of social capital are not 'either-or' categories, but 'more or less' dimensions' along which we can compare different forms of social capital, it is clear that the variables that are used to measure the amount of bridging social capital will differ from those that are used to measure the bonding type.

The concept of (notably bridging) social capital is closely related to the recurrent debate on the importance of a strong 'civil society' for 'making democracies (and economies) work'. Especially Robert Putnam has fuelled this debate in claiming that declining stocks of social capital are related to declining levels of civic organization and association. 'Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria

with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement and collective well-being (...). Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a suffocation miasma of vicious circles. This argument suggests that there may be at least two broad equilibria toward all societies that face problems of collective action (that is all societies) tend to evolve and which, once attained, tend to be self-reinforcing' (Putnam, 1993: 177).

Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993) analyses the impact of the regional governments that were set up in Italy in 1970, in fact a major reform of the formal-political structure. The new regional governments appeared to produce remarkable effects in the whole of Italy. But these effects turned out to be considerably more positive in the North than in the South of the country. According to Putnam, the institutional reforms in the North were combined with more favorable social and cultural circumstances than in the South. This difference could be satisfactorily explained by varying levels of 'social capital': trust, involvement, solidarity and cooperativeness, and expressed in various forms of voluntary association. Over centuries, northern Italian regions have been able to invest more in the stock of social capital than southern Italian regions.

Social capital is crucial in making democracy, and democratic institutions such as regional governments, really work. This goes not only for Italy, Putnam claims, but also for the United States, traditionally known as a 'civil society' but now endangered by the decline of social capital illustrated by the metaphor of *Bowling Alone* (2000). In Putnam's research, the rise and decline of social capital is highly determined by the magnitude of voluntary association. The more voluntary association, the more social capital, the better the chances of 'making democracy work'.

Lijphart, Putnam and EVS – To define Putnam-groups, based on the European Values Study 1999/2000, we follow Knack and Keefer's definition (1997: 1274; see also the chapter of Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik in this volume) for the density of groups. For each country, the average number of groups is computed. Relevant variables in EVS 1999/2000 are those that measure whether people are a member of: religious or church organizations; education, arts, music or cultural activities; youth work, e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs et cetera. This average number of group membership ranges from .12 in Portugal to 1.04 in Sweden.

For our explorative endeavor, we selected those countries from the EVS data for which we had information about the two Lijphart dimensions. Countries that have a high score on Lijphart's first dimension (Executives-parties dimension, L1) can be characterized by an institutional structure that favors the sharing of power, for instance because of high degrees of interest group corporatism, high degrees of proportional re-

presentation and less dominant executives. The institutional structure of these democracies is more 'deliberative' and less 'majoritarian'. Countries that have a high score on his second dimension (Federal-unitary dimension, L2) tend to have a political infrastructure in which decision-making powers are much more concentrated in a unitary and centrally organized political center.

For Lijphart's executives-parties dimension Great Britain has the lowest score (−1.39) and Finland the highest (1.66); for the federal-unitary dimension, Great Britain scores lowest (−1.19) and Germany highest (2.53). In Table 9.1, we present for each country the score on the Putnam-group variable and on both Lijphart dimensions.

Table 9.1 Scores on the Putnam-group variables and on Lijphart's Executives-Parties and Federal-Unitary dimension for eighteen European countries

Country	Putnam Groups	Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension	Lijphart's Federal-Unitary dimension
at* Austria	.42	.26	1.08
be Belgium	.39	1.42	.21
hr Croatia	.23	−.38	−.44
dk Denmark	.35	1.45	−.38
fi Finland	.68	1.66	−.83
fr France	.15	−.93	−.17
de Germany	.23	.23	2.53
gb Great Britain	.21	−1.39	−1.19
gr Greece	.33	−.74	−.75
is Iceland	.93	.66	−1.03
ie Ireland	.37	.12	−.42
it Italy	.24	1.16	−.11
lu Luxembourg	.34	.29	−.89
mt Malta	.22	−.90	−.39
nl Netherlands	.86	1.16	.35
pt Portugal	.12	.36	−.7
es Spain	.16	−.59	.42
se Sweden	1.04	1.04	−.79

*The at refers, as be and so on does, to the way in which the countries are recognized in the graphs that go with this chapter.

In section 3, this dataset will be connected to the dataset that Lijphart has made public together with 'Patterns of Democracy'. In section 4, the aforementioned dataset will be used to see whether, and if so, how far and in which way Putnam's associational groups and Lijphart's consen-

sus democracies correspond to value patterns suggested by the European Values Study (EVS⁴).

3 *Missing Link I: Consensus democracy and voluntary association*

The first link that we want to explore connects the formal and informal institutional characteristics of democratic societies. Can we indeed find a link between Lijphart's consensus democracies and Putnam's voluntary associations and groups? Does consensualism in formal-political terms correlate with 'associationalism' in civic-cultural terms?

Such a link between consensualism and associationalism is suggested—at a theoretical level—by many so-called neo-Tocquevillian inquiries into contemporary democracy. Authors such as Barber (1994) have drawn attention to 'strong' or 'deep' forms of democracy, characterized by a mutual reinforcement of strictly political and more informal and societal repertoires of civic participation. These forms of democracy exclude, *sui generis*, an all too strong concentration and/or centralization of power. Moreover, they favor consensualism rather than majoritarianism. They suggest the importance of a 'political opportunity structure' characterized by shared power, horizontal and vertical subsidiarity, pluralism and (corporatist forms of) deliberation. Moreover, in political systems that are characterized by higher levels of linguistic, ethnic or religious pluralism, many public services tend to be channeled through private, (quasi-)autonomous, non-governmental and non-profit associations. These associations and their umbrella organizations (as intermediary bodies) tend to be highly involved in the public domain. The 'political opportunity structure' of these regimes favors a culture of shared power and responsibilities (and indeed: a larger voluntary nonprofit sector)⁵.

In short: there are good reasons to believe that there is something like a *Wahlverwandtschaft*, an elective affinity, between consensualism and associationalism. One could expect a consensual democratic system (characterized by inter alia a more dispersed allocation of power and proportional representation) to provoke and sustain an 'active society' and a more communitarian societal 'infrastructure'. The correlations in Table 9.2 and the scores in Figure 9.2 suggest that such a link actually exists – at least partially.

⁴ See the introductory chapter of this volume for additional notes on data.

⁵ A larger non-profit sector or voluntary sector is associated with higher levels of social capital, the ability to express a greater variety of value patterns and also with higher levels of innovation and policy learning (thus overcoming some of the negative sides of a dominant state bureaucracy – the bureaucratic constraint). See Douglas (1987).

Table 9.2 Correlations between Scores on the Putnam-group variable and Lijphart's Executives-Parties and Federal-Unitary dimensions for eighteen European countries

	Putnam Groups	Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension
Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension	.56	
Lijphart's Federal-Unitary dimension	-.20	.07

Lijphart's first dimension, the executives-parties dimension, correlates considerably (.56) with associations and groups as defined by Putnam. Figure 9.2 juxtaposes countries such as France and Great Britain (scoring low on associationalism and low on consensualism in terms of power-sharing) to countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Iceland (scoring high on associationalism and high on consensualism according to Lijphart's first dimension). This finding supports the idea that consensual, power-sharing institutions in Northern European countries present a fair breeding-ground for voluntary associations, which are also dependent upon consent in taking up joint responsibilities.

The correlation between Lijphart's second dimension, the federal-unitary dimension, and associations and groups as defined by Putnam is non-significantly negative, that is, virtually non-existent. This is, however, understandable when taking into account the specific items that produce consensualism on Lijphart's second dimension: central bank independence, judicial review, constitutional rigidity, bicameralism, federalization, decentralization. It is not likely that these items correlate with Putnam's associations and groups.

As far as Lijphart's first dimension and the 'Putnam-groups' are concerned, however, the 'correlation' we expected on a theoretical level seems to be mirrored in the data about the 18 EVS countries we were able to use for our first endeavor. The institutional profiles of the formal and the more informal infrastructures seem to be related to each other: Putnam and Lijphart are 'bedfellows'. Although the data-sets we were able to use and the explorative character of this chapter prevent us from being too conclusive, the analysis clearly supports the importance of doing more extensive and systematic theoretical and empirical research into the 'link' between the characteristics of formal and informal institutions of democratic societies.

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.2 Relation between Putnam Groups and Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension

4 *Missing Link II: Consensus democracies, voluntary associations and cultural orientations*

Let us now turn to our second question. Are there reasons to believe that consensualism and associationalism—conceptualized as institutional characteristics of social and political systems—are related to deeper, underlying cultural patterns that reflect particular value orientations? In terms of the explorations in this chapter: do the EVS countries that have high scores on Putnam-groups, and on Lijphart's dimensions of consensualism also have high scores on particular cultural and value orientations?

Both Lijphart and Putnam seem to suggest, though implicitly and, again, at a theoretical level, that such a link might exist. Lijphart (1999: 307), for instance, writes that it is plausible to assume that both consensus democracy and kinder, gentler policies stem from 'an underlying consensual and communitarian culture'. Putnam too, points at such cultural dimensions in his 'Agenda for Social Capitalists' that follows his extensive analysis of all kinds of 'civic disengagement' in the United States. Some of the elements of his agenda explicitly address initiatives and ideas that foster a more communitarian attitude and forms of 'deep

engagement'. Throughout his book, he is more or less explicitly discussing the link between the 'civic values' of American citizens and the institutions that are—at the same time—(re-)producing them. (Putnam, 2000: 402-414). Those who care about the future of civic institutions should, according to Putnam, care about the civic culture and the values that support it.

Data derived from EVS (for the eighteen countries that were also in Lijphart's survey) seem to support the notion of some specific underlying cultural (or value) orientations carrying both associationalism and consensualism. Below these cultural orientations are discussed under the headings of generalized trust, conditional tolerance and political involvement. We have established these cultural patterns by inductively examining correlations with the Putnam-groups as well as the dimensions of consensualism distinguished by Lijphart. The cultural patterns just mentioned appeared to display noteworthy connections with the Putnam-groups and with Lijphart's first dimension of consensualism. Again we stress the explorative character of our contribution: we had to rely on secondary analysis, we only used one data set (EVS) and were not able to construct variables on the basis of a systematic and theoretical exploration of the nature of this second 'missing link'. However, as we will see below, this handicapped strategy still enables us to conclude that there are good reasons to assume that such a link exists, and deserves further research. Moreover Lijphart's second dimension is the odd man out. The federal dimension is not connected to any of the patterns mentioned, it seems to have a logic of its own, and will therefore be discussed separately.

Generalized Trust – Consensual, power-sharing systems, and systems with strong associationalism, are more likely to flourish in high-trust systems than in low-trust systems. Trust, in this case, is measured by the percentage of people in a country that answer that 'most people can be trusted' on a question where they can choose between that answer and the answer: 'you can't be too careful.' In other words, we are talking about the kind of 'generalized trust' we discussed above.

The correlation of generalized trust with the density of Putnam groups is .73 (see left graph in Figure 9.3). Putnam-groups stand better chances of flourishing when generalized trust is available: for making voluntary action worthwhile at least a minimum of generalized trust should be available. The correlation of 'trust' with Lijphart's first dimension is .64 (see right graph in Figure 9.3). Power-sharing institutions seem to be supported, at least to some extent, by a culture that transfers the message that most people can be trusted. A minimum of interpersonal trust should

be available for people to get together to see if some sort of consensus could be reached.

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.3 Relation of Generalized Trust with Putnam Groups and Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension

Qualified Tolerance – Consensualism (in the sense of Lijphart's first dimension) and associationalism (in line with Putnam's conceptualization) are associated with a cultural pattern that values freedom and tolerance, albeit under certain conditions.

Putnam-groups correlate .62 (see left graph in Figure 9.4) and Lijphart's power-sharing dimension (L1) correlates .46 (see right graph in Figure 9.4) with a bundle of 'liberties' that individuals may take without curtailing the choices, or the possibilities, of others. The Y-axis in the graphs in Figure 9.4 ('qualified tolerance') is the first dimension of a principal component analysis of questions where people are asked whether the mentioned 'liberties' are (never) justified; the most typical items are: homosexuality; divorce; abortion; euthanasia; suicide; having casual sex.

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.4 Relation of Qualified Tolerance with Putnam Groups and Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension

These findings are, by the way, similar with Putnam's own findings (see Putnam, 2000: 356 and footnote 10: 496). Putnam writes that 'social capital and tolerance go together'. They go together in a 'liberal communitarian' culture, a culture of building bridges while accepting differences ('Salem without witches'). 'Social Joiners and civic activists are as a rule more tolerant of dissent and unconventional behavior than social isolates are (...)'; '(...) citizens of high-social-capital states are far more tolerant than citizens of low-social-capital states. Far from being incompatible, liberty and fraternity are mutually supportive, and this remains true when we control for other factors like education, income, urbanism, and so on. The most tolerant communities in America are precisely the places with the greatest civic involvement. Conversely, communities whose residents bowl alone are the least tolerant places in America' (Putnam, 2000: 356).

The liberties mentioned reflect an 'open' kind of tolerance towards fellow citizens, granting space that does not entrench on the space of others. Such liberties should, however, be distinguished from the 'liberties' that do entrench on the choices, and the possibilities, of others. These 'liberties' (some would prefer to call them vices) with negative side-effects for others are bundled in a second component ('vices 1': that

reflect some 'egocentric' and 'un-concerning' attitudes towards others): throwing away litter in public places; drunken-driving; joy-riding; speeding; and smoking in public places; and a third component ('vices 2': that reflects, just as much, anti-social attitudes): cheating on tax; paying cash for services to avoid taxes; lying in your own interest; claiming state benefits that you are not entitled to; accepting bribes in the course of duty. Both 'vices 1' and 'vices 2' correlate non-significantly negatively with Putnam-groups as well as Lijphart's first dimension.

Political commitment/involvement – According to Putnam, civic institutions are institutions that are built upon people who are inclined to be involved ('people who join are people who trust'). Throughout his book, he discusses the importance of all kinds and repertoires of involvement in the public (political) domain. Public apathy could be viewed as a threat to democracy: an erosion of civil society, which would rob democracy of its social base (e.g., Dahrendorf in Pharr & Putnam, 2000). In terms of EVS, political involvement is associated with a positive attitude towards all kinds of participation, which can be expressed in a series of more or less 'political' activities: signing a petition; joining in boycotts; attending lawful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes; occupying buildings or factories.

The degrees in which people value the importance of these forms of political involvement correlates .52 with Putnam groups and only .20 with Lijphart's first dimension (see graphs in Figure 9.5).

The odd man out – Lijphart's second dimension, the federal/unitary dimension, is the odd man out. This dimension does not display significant correlations with the (sets of) variables discussed above. Lijphart's second dimension does however display correlations with two other (sets of) variables that are worth mentioning.

First, Lijphart's federal/unitary dimension is clearly associated with aversion to right-wing political extremism⁶ (.69; see left graph in Figure 9.6) as well as left-wing political activism (.62; see right graph in Figure 9.6). This is explainable, taking into account that federalized, power dividing, systems have often been developed in countries where centrifugal tendencies should be feared.

⁶ Such countries often have a history of political violence by political minorities, producing an aversion to political extremism among members of the majority, as well as a need for federalized, power-spreading, institutions to organize a tenable level of unity in pluriformity.

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.5 Relation of Political Commitment with Putnam Groups and Lijphart's Executives-Parties dimension

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.6 Relation of Aversion of Right and Left Wing Political Extremism with Lijphart's Federal-Unitary dimension

Second, Lijphart's federal/unitary dimension is clearly correlated (.73; see left graph in Figure 9.7 with the tendency of people to say 'I belong first of all to my region' (instead of to larger entities like their country or Europe). People living in systems scoring higher on Lijphart's second dimension are less likely to say that they are 'very proud to be a citizen' of their country than people living in states scoring lower on Lijphart's federal/unitary dimension⁷.

Data source: European Values Study 1999/2000

Figure 9.7 Relation of Belonging first of all to my own region and Proud to be a citizen of one's own state with Lijphart's Federal-Unitary dimension

This variation in appreciation (in the sense of belonging to one's region, one's country and the European public domain) is highly relevant to the discussions about the upcoming expansion of the European Union.

But more importantly, the value patterns that express attitudes like trust, tolerance and involvement in the public sphere, seem to be especially important. Our preliminary analysis suggests that those who are designing Europe's future institutions cannot restrict themselves to a mere technical and administrative analysis. Those who care about the social and economical performances of a future European Union must also see to European values, since some values are more than others do,

⁷ There is a negative correlation of .69 between Lijphart's second dimension and the item 'proud to be a citizen of (one's own national state)' – see right graph Figure 9.7. Federalized systems, giving ample room to regional identity and decision making, seem to be a logical answer to cultural patterns that prefer the regional to the national.

supporting the legitimacy and efficacy of its institutions. It is, in this respect, somewhat disappointing to see that an explicit reflection on European Values gets only a marginal role on the European agenda.

5 Discussion and conclusion: The values of European democracy

‘Cultural factors play a crucial role in the long-term survival of democratic institutions. Though the transition to democracy may be initiated by elites (or imposed by foreigners), its long-term survival is linked with relatively high levels of subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. (...) In the long run, democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes or through clever-elite maneuvering. Its survival also depends on what ordinary people think and feel.’ (Inglehart, 1999: 118–119; see also Putnam, 2000: 414).

The European Values Study was designed to empirically explore exactly what Inglehart thinks is important for the future of democratic institutions: that what ordinary people think and feel. In this chapter, we have used some of the data EVS has produced to explore whether we can be somewhat more specific about the complex interrelationship between the values and the institutions of democracy. We did so because we are convinced that the study of European values could successfully be linked to emerging research agenda’s in the field of the performance of European institutions.

We have, more specifically, explored some of the links between EVS and some other bodies of thinking about the nature and future of democracy. Although our analysis is limited, it did show that there are good reasons to believe that those who intend to build an effective and performing European Union cannot restrict themselves to a merely technical design of its institutions and the broadening of the administrative and political infrastructures. Although this is, of course, much more difficult, a ‘deepening’ of the Union, by explicitly putting the European values on the agenda, is at least as necessary in order to ensure that the European institutions perform well. It appears that the current debates on the future of Europe (that especially deal with the importance of strong bureaucracies and competitive markets) have a blind spot for the specific links between the values and the related social institutions that seem to contribute to the performances of democratic and social systems. The ‘missing links’ we have tried to ‘reveal’ in this chapter suggest that it is very worthwhile to engage in further research into the values that support democracy. Changes in European values should be revealed in order to be able to design policies. Of course it will be difficult to establish whether the high levels of generalized trust and ‘qualified tolerance’ we

were able to relate to performing and consensual democracies must be seen as cause or effect. But in both instances, it is worthwhile to investigate and monitor these patterns and values in order to prevent us from neglecting the social qualities and implications of our political institutions. And, furthermore, these investigations and monitors will enhance our capabilities to develop a more elaborated theory about the relationships between values and democracy. During a seminar devoted to the future of political democracy⁸, Hans-Dieter Klingemann has convincingly made the point that we do indeed need more specific theories about the relation between values, political culture and democracy. We are no longer satisfied with theories that look to explain the generic relationships between democracy and a certain set of cultural values, but need to go further in looking for more specific relationships between different value-patterns and different types of democracy. Although there is no reason to think in terms of value-determinism, there is no reason, either, to think of value-relativism. The future of European Democracy is as much as it depends on institutions, depending on the values that support these institutions. It is in this context, that EVS might contribute to an important new research agenda.

Our modest first step towards such an agenda has only tried to make clear that EVS can be helpful in designing some more specific hypotheses about the relation between values, institutions and democracy. There seems to be a kind of elective affinity between the consensual nature of the democratic institutions and the polyarchical nature of the broader social context. Strong democracies seem to go along with substantial levels of civic engagement. Both of them seem to flourish on a fertile soil of specific value patterns: patterns that can be characterized by high levels of (mutual) trust, qualified tolerance and political involvement. A further development of a democratic and effective European Union seems to require, as much as it needs the further development of institutions, a (political) culture that expresses these values. One could infer from these data, that mutual trust, more than treaties, lies at the basis of the further deployment of European democracy. This should inspire European leaders to think of the notion of a further 'expansion' of the European Union beyond the mere territorial and technocratic dimensions that have dominated the recent discussions about Europe's future. A successful strategy of a broadening of the European Union seems to presuppose, more than ever, a 'deepening' of the Union by explicitly discussing the cultures and values that go along with strong democracies: Trust, Tolerance and Involvement.

⁸ Tilburg University, 20 November 2002.

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