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Good tax governance

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Good tax governance

International corporate tax planning and corporate social responsibility - Does one exclude the other?

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATAD - Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
ATAP - Anti-Tax Avoidance Package
BEPS - Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
BJR - Business judgement rule
BSDC - Business and Sustainable Development Commission
CCCTB - Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
CCTB - Common Corporate Tax Base
CG - corporate governance
CSI - Corporate Social Irresponsibility
CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility
ECJ - European Court of Justice
ESG - Environmental, Social and Governance
EU - European Union
G20 - Group of Twenty
GER - Germany
GRI - Global Reporting Initiative
HMRC - Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
IMF - International Monetary Foundation
ISO - International Organization for Standardization
MNC - multinational corporation
MNE - multinational enterprise
NL - the Netherlands
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD MNE Guidelines
PRI - Principles for Responsible Investment
R&D - research and development
RBC - responsible business conduct
SDGs - UN Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs - small- and medium sized enterprises
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US - United States

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

International corporate tax planning has become a heavily debated topic in media, politics, and academia. Various investigations and leaks, such as the UK's Parliament's Public Account Committee (HMRC) hearing about the tax behaviour patterns of Starbucks, Google, and Amazon in the UK,¹ 'Lux Leaks',² 'Panama Papers',³ 'Paradise Papers',⁴ but also the European Commission State Aid investigations,⁵ have concentrated public and political attention on the tax behaviour of multinationals as well as state shortcomings in relation to eliminating the negative effects of tax avoidance on the international arena. Consequently, the necessity for more focused attention on the issue of international corporate tax planning has become inevitable. Extensive attention, a negative public response, and regulatory changes also alert corporate taxpayers themselves, because such negative attention also has its effects on the business.⁶

On the one hand, multinational corporations (MNCs or multinationals) are accused of not paying (enough) tax. The media have published reports on tax planning, generally shining a negative light on the practice and alleging that corporations avoid paying their 'fair share' of taxes.⁷ The reports on so-called aggressive tax planning practices have triggered public outcry from politicians sharing this public sentiment and accusing multinationals of immoral behaviour.⁸ On the other hand, it can be argued that, since multinationals act in accordance with the law (except in the case of tax evasion) and follow their business interests, there is no basis for such morality-based accusations. In general, tax planning stays within the frame of the existing legal rules and it is often a common and acceptable economic behaviour.

Tax planning is legal and, in principle, there is nothing wrong with tax subjects trying to lower their tax burden: from a business economics viewpoint, tax is seen as a cost and costs should be kept low.⁹ Even so, various international organizations, such as the European Union (EU),¹⁰ the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),¹¹ the United Nations (UN),¹² the Group of Twenty (G20),¹³ and the International Monetary Foundation (IMF),¹⁴ have all added international corporate taxation and tax avoidance to their (priority) agendas. In the international political arena, taxation is considered at an equal level as (or even as a higher priority than) economic crises, tense political situations, and problems of developing countries. Such heightened

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¹ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012-13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

² International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies' Secrets Exposed.

³ International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). The Panama Papers.

⁴ International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). An ICIJ Investigation Paradise Papers: Secrets Of The Global Elite.

⁵ European Commission. (2015, October 21). Commission Decides Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are Illegal under EU State Aid Rules. Press release; European Commission. *The Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion*.

Overview webpage; EU state aid rulings (Apple case): European Commission. (2014). State aid case: *Ireland Alleged aid to Apple*; European Commission. (2014). State aid: *Netherlands Alleged aid to Starbucks*; European Commission. (2016). State aid case: *Luxembourg granted to Fiat*.

⁶ See e.g. Engskov, K. (2012, October 16). Starbucks Coffee Company in the UK; Engskov, K. (2012, December 6). An Open Letter from Kris Engskov; The Guardian. (2015, December 15). MEPs Should Support a Fair Tax Payer Label. Open letter to *The Guardian*.

⁷ See e.g. Birrell, I. (2014, January 6). Bill Gates Preaches the Aid Gospel, But Is He Just a Hypocrite? *The Guardian*; The Tax Justice Network comment on this *The Guardian* article: Tax Justice Network (TJN) (2014, January 6). *Bill Gates: Is He Just a Hypocrite?*; Conway, Z. (2015, May 29). BBC Uncovers 'Aggressive' Tax Avoidance Scheme. *BBC News*; Setzler, B. (2014, January 17). The Real Tax Threat to American Businesses. *US News*.

⁸ See e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012-13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited; Wintour, P. (2015, February 6). Ed Miliband: I won't back down on tax avoidance. *The Guardian* (online); European Commission. *The Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion*. Overview webpage.

⁹ See also chapter 3, section 5.

¹⁰ European Commission webpage: *Time to Get the Missing Part Back*.

¹¹ OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

¹² UN Global Compact. *Global Compact for Responsible Corporate Citizenship*.

¹³ See e.g. G20. (2014, November 15-16). *Leaders' Communiqué*. Brisbane, Australia.

¹⁴ International Monetary Fund. (2014, July 29). *Spillover Report 2014*. Washington D. C. : IMF Policy Paper.

political attention suggests that various stakeholders and society at large consider some corporate tax behaviour – even if it is legal – (socially) unacceptable at some point.

Tax planning is not a black and white concept; it can and does occur in many different forms and with various gradations, such as making legitimate use of research and development (R&D) incentives or setting up artificial hybrid entities in low-tax countries. In general, tax planning is a legal way to take the tax effects of various laws and rules into account and to adapt corporate actions accordingly. Every taxpayer engages in tax planning to a certain extent, whether it is intentional or not. Corporate tax planning practices vary from legal and legitimate to legal and socially illegitimate or even illegal. As will be explained in chapter 3, tax planning can be carried out through tax mitigation, which makes legitimate use of tax incentives created by the states. Efforts to mitigate the tax burden, however, can easily turn from legal and legitimate tax planning into legal tax planning that is morally¹⁵ questionable and can be called tax avoidance. Tax avoidance can be strictly legal (according to the letter of the law), but it conflicts with the spirit of the law, in which case such corporate tax practices are called into question.¹⁶ Some multinationals even go a step further and artificially create opportunities to reduce their tax obligation by engaging in aggressive tax planning.¹⁷ Both tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning are terms that seem to have negative moral connotations. Aggressive tax planning is not a legal term, but it suggests that certain corporate behaviour in tax planning matters raises a serious degree of public concern. In this research it is conceptualized as a strictly legal yet unethical form of tax planning which goes against a corporation's moral responsibilities towards society. These four gradations of corporate tax planning will be discussed further in chapter 3.

It goes without saying that it is a state's responsibility to develop a legal system, including tax laws, that facilitates justice and fairness. However, the law is imperfect, because it is always subject to interpretation and lawmakers, when writing the law, cannot predict and thus cannot take into account the future behaviour of people.¹⁸ Consequently, some powerful taxpayers, such as multinationals, are able to circumvent the rules. For instance, they can use legal interpretation to broaden the scope of the wording of the law in an effort to legitimize their tax planning practices. However, where these same practices, although legal, can be argued to conflict with the purpose or the spirit of the law, they may be considered to be socially unacceptable.¹⁹ In chapters 3 and 4 the social element of corporate behavior will be discussed. The core of societal unacceptability of corporate tax practices seems to lie in several factors. For instance, corporations that engage in tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning are seen as eroding their fair share of corporate income taxes in the societies in which they operate. Fair share is for the purposes of this research defined in chapter 3 as corporate income tax that multinationals have to pay according to the combination of the letter and the spirit of the law. However, due to the imperfect laws and often unclear legislative intentions, the spirit of the law is not a clearly defined concept. Moreover, socially responsible corporations are not expected to act as perfect (corporate) citizens but stay away from immoral behaviour instead. Therefore, this research starts from the other end by asking what is unfair, suggesting that paying corporate income tax is a legal and moral obligation of corporations. Another important element of social acceptability of corporate tax practices is transparency; various

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¹⁵ Crane and Matten state that "[M]orality is concerned with the norms, values, and beliefs embedded in social process which define right and wrong for an individual or a community. Ethics is concerned with the study of morality and the application of reason to elucidate specific rules and principles that determine morally acceptable courses of action. Ethical theories are the codifications of these rules and principles." According to them, "[E]thics represents an attempt to systemize and rationalize morality, typically into generalized rules that supposedly offer a solution to situations of moral uncertainty." Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 8-9.

This research uses the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' interchangeably, while largely leaning on this argumentation of Crane and Matten.

¹⁶ See e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Connell, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 385.

¹⁷ Piantavigna, P. (2017). Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: How EU Law and the OECD Are Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in International Tax Law, Despite Linguistic. *World Tax Journal* 9 (1), 37-98. p. 54; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. p. 227.

¹⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 14; See also Chapter 3 on tax planning, section 2.2.

¹⁹ See e.g. Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer; The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London.

stakeholders do not seem to trust multinationals mainly due to vague and not transparent communication on their tax affairs.²⁰

The fact that social acceptability of corporate tax practices depends on various elements suggests that the social legitimacy of tax planning is a matter of degree, which in turn complicates finding common grounds for the (non)acceptance of tax planning. Certain degrees of tax planning, such as tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, are addressed at the national and international level as a growing legal, economic, but also a societal, problem. The reason that corporate tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning can be considered problematic is rooted in the basic functions of taxation, as will be argued in chapter 3 of this research. Most importantly, multinationals that manipulate the legal system for the purpose of avoiding their tax liabilities benefit from public goods and services without contributing to the societal cost of their production and, therewith, act as free-riders.²¹ Corporate free-riding has a number of negative consequences: it compromises the national tax systems, distorts competition, and either leads to a decrease in public goods and services or a price increase of these public goods and services for other taxpayers.²² Corporate tax planning thus becomes unacceptable where core values of society are violated. Tax planning that results in significant reduction of the tax liability in a way that is not intended by the legislator may have a negative impact both on economic development and maintaining a fair society.

As a result, multinationals are even being accused of being immoral while complying with the (letter of the) law.²³ Tax has become a societal debate that inevitably involves moral responsibility. However, it needs to be stressed that, contrary to some interpretations, tax planning, as such, is normal and accepted, but only to a certain degree. It becomes problematic in case the law is abused and stretched to the limits in such a way that certain taxpayers enjoy unjust privileges, such as in the case of tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning. One of the core aims of this research is to help corporations to understand better when and why legal tax planning becomes an issue from a moral perspective. In the corporate context, such moral responsibility can be exercised within the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR is a corporate commitment to go beyond the strict compliance with the law and consider how corporate behaviour affects various important social matters. Usually CSR addresses topics such as the environment, human rights, and labour. For instance, Western multinationals that endorse CSR are expected to abstain from using child labour in less developed Asian countries.²⁴ However, many multinationals that seem to be the forerunners in their positive impact on society are often criticized for their tax planning strategies, such as, for instance, Starbucks, Amazon, and Google.²⁵ This may raise the question whether it is hypocritical for a corporation that claims to have a strong commitment to CSR and, at the same time, possibly as a result of aggressive tax planning strategies, pays (close to) zero corporate income tax in the countries it operates in. Taxes represent an entity's fundamental contribution to society, since, without taxes, there would be no state nor public goods and services.²⁶

Viewing tax as a part of CSR is a growing trend in various related discussions and it is not a new topic.²⁷ In the context of CSR, tax is now considered in a similar way that the environment was 20

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²⁰ See chapters 2.5 and 6.3. See also Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer; The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London.

²¹ Surely, there is no clear direct link between taxes corporations pay and public goods or services they use but this is not the focus of this research. One of the underlying assumptions of this research is that the states have developed tax laws in order to raise the public revenue that will be used for funding public goods and services this states considers necessary. Corporations that operate in certain states make - in one way or another - use of these public goods and services and therefore they should also contribute in to funding them if the law requires so.

²² See e.g. Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.), *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 419.

²³ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. Q. 485, p. 40.

²⁴ Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. (2009). *Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives* (3rd Ed.). Essex: Prentice Hall. p. 46.

²⁵ See also Hasan, I., et al. (2019). Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit Shifting. SSRN Working paper 19.01.2019.

²⁶ See chapter 3, section 2.

²⁷ See e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Connell, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behaviour. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp.

years ago.²⁸ However, tax is still not truly being seen as a part of CSR.²⁹ Therefore, this research investigates whether tax planning should be part of CSR and, if so, how does tax planning fit in the context of CSR. This research focuses foremost on the corporate perspective on the social outcry concerning tax planning. Therefore, it also needs to be investigated whether and how corporate boards are able to combine tax and CSR.

Multinationals are complex entities with multidimensional layers of decision-making processes that need to balance conflicting interests. Taxation poses various challenges for corporate decision making. On the one hand, taxes are considered to be a cost that should be kept low in order to keep some stakeholders, such as shareholders, satisfied. On the other hand, taxes represent a crucial contribution to society and, by avoiding their tax liabilities, corporations fail to take responsibility for the other stakeholders, such as society at large. However, there seems to be a certain understanding that corporate boards face some constraints in corporate law that restrict them considering tax as a part of CSR. Some multinationals seem to lean on this argument to justify their clearly unethical tax planning strategies.³⁰ To understand whether this is the case and how corporate boards balance different interests, corporate decision-making procedures deserve attention. Corporate governance (CG) refers to the way power is distributed within a corporation and to the decision-making process with regard to the use of this power. It is a set of rules and principles for how a (large) company should be regulated and managed.³¹ Among corporate law scholars, there are two prevailing theories that refer to the essence of a corporation. Shareholder theory and stakeholder theory address what corporations should be responsible for and to whom they are accountable. It will be argued in chapter 5 that from the legal perspective there is a conversion between these two theories and in the four jurisdictions this research focuses on (UK, US, GER, NL), corporate boards are not obliged to prioritize shareholder value maximization. On the contrary, according to the law, as developed by the legislator and the courts, their focus should be on but the best long-term corporate interests. Nevertheless, corporate decision-making is next to laws also affected by the corporate culture (in which prioritizing shareholder value maximization may prevail). Based on these CG regimes and cultures, this research will analyze whether multinationals that have committed themselves to ethical business practices, for instance through CSR, can also opt for more responsible tax planning. In this research, such tax planning is conceptualized as good tax governance.

Aggressive tax planning can reward multinationals with higher (short-term) returns but, at the same time, it also presents new growing risks for multinationals. For example, regulatory competition on the state level incentivizes corporations to minimize their tax liabilities, which, at the same time, is being combatted on the international level. This creates legal uncertainty.³² Furthermore, the negative undertone that corporate tax planning has earned in the media and politics, presents a serious threat to the corporate and brand reputation. In addition to such unpredictable threats, corporate tax planning has high transaction costs, since, due to its complexity, it requires various

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183-198). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag; Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168; Sikka, P. (2013). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance—A Reply to Hasseldine and Morris. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 15-28; Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2014). Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 402; University of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-010*; Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed "Assessment" in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875; Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558; Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

²⁸ Houlder, V. (2004, November 22). The Tax Avoidance Story as a Morality Tale. *Financial Times* (online).

²⁹ Schuil, G. et al. (2014). *Good Tax Governance in Transition: Transcending the Tax Debate to CSR*. Report coordinated by the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) with contributions from Oikos and PwC: "of the sixty-nine companies included in the VBDO review, only four (6%) companies specify tax as a CSR issue. Looking at the extensive debate on tax we have witnessed during recent years, this number indicates that this discussion not yet reflects a real change in the mind-set of companies when it comes to tax." (p. 19).

³⁰ For instance, during the UK Public Accounts Committee hearing, Google's Vice President for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe, Matt Brittin claimed that (aggressive) tax planning "is not a matter of personal choice" (UK HMRC 2012, Q. 485, p. Ev 40).

³¹ Du Plessis, J. J. et al. (2015). *Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance* (3rd Ed.). Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p. XXV.

³² Think for example of the recent EU state aid cases where taxpayers such as Starbucks, Fiat, and McDonalds had agreements on a state level that, for different reasons, were reversed at the EU level. With the retroactive effect of such inter-governmental decisions, high monetary sanctions were imposed on corporate taxpayers.

experts to be hired. Thus, in the end, it might be just a Pyrrhic victory for multinationals. Therefore, as I will further argue in this research, good tax governance is not only necessary from an ethical perspective but also from an economic perspective.

1.2. Motivation to conduct this research

International corporate tax planning is a rich research topic that can fascinate any scholar that is in search of the right balance between economic efficiency and social justice. Without taxation there would be no society; at the same time, an unbalanced tax system is also harmful for society. A fair balance in a tax system has always been part of politics and societal debate. In recent years, however, there has been an intriguing change of focus in public debates with regard to tax. It seems that some multinationals that are using loopholes in various national laws to minimize their tax liability, plan their tax strategy to the extent that it can be seen as abusing the system and circumventing the rules.³³ This causes several negative externalities, such as injustice and inequality but also hindering sustainable development,³⁴ as I will explain through this research. Therefore, the tax behaviour of multinational corporations is now the eye of the storm, as they are accused of immoral choices on a regular basis. Having said that, no-one should pay more tax than the law requires. Moreover, states can adopt laws that often incentivize MNCs to behave in this way, as they create tax rules to attract multinationals.³⁵ From the corporate perspective, trying to lower one's tax costs is understandable. However, striving for an absolute minimum by circumventing the laws is not socially responsible, which can for instance result in damaging the reputation of corporations. Consequently, tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning can result in short-term gains but can at the same time negatively affect the best long-term interests of a corporation.

This dilemma highlights many provoking research issues without a one correct answer, and this is very appealing for a legal researcher. Tax laws and corporate laws are complicated and nuanced. Details and technicalities, as well as the international context, add more possibilities for loopholes and errors in laws. This is evident in international tax law, but also in corporate law. Different scandals, such as the 'Lux Leaks', 'Panama Papers', and 'Paradise Papers' have also shown something very important, namely, that there is a gap between what a layperson sees and finds acceptable in tax planning and what some other members of society, such as multinational corporations and wealthy individuals, see and find acceptable. Tax avoidance is an important issue for society, but it exists in a bigger context of complex societal problems. This needs to be acknowledged in order to manage expectations with regard to solving corporate tax planning related problems.

Furthermore, many leaders have publicly criticized tax avoidance schemes that function in a grey area of the law. For instance, former president Barack Obama stated "[M]y attitude is I don't care if it's legal, it's wrong"³⁶ and the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that "[I]t is unconscionable that some companies... are using unethical tax avoidance... to maximise their profits while millions of Africans go without adequate nutrition, health and education."³⁷ Also, the former UK Prime Minister David Cameron condemned tax avoidance stating that it is "morally wrong".³⁸ As a result of such public judgements and discussions, taxation has inevitably become a subject of public interest, which means that a corporation's behaviour will not go unnoticed in this area.

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³³ Some authors even claim that for some companies tax has become a profit centre. See e.g. Schön, W. (2013). Vorstandspflichten und Steuerplanung. In Krieger, G. (Ed.), *Festschrift für Michael Hoffmann-Becking zum 70. Geburtstag* (pp. 1085-1100). München: Beck: "tax department which may be inclined to act as a profit center".

³⁴ "Sustainable development has become a top concern for many businesses as it involves meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." In Europe, sustainability includes both economic and environmental connotations; whereas in the US it is associated more with environment. Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 347.

³⁵ Naturally, corporate lobbyists play an important role in creating certain rules.

³⁶ BBC News. (2014, July 25). Obama Accuses Firms of "Cherry-Picking" Over Tax Rules. *BBC News* (online).

³⁷ Africa Progress Panel (2013). *Equity in Extractives Africa Progress Report 2013*. The Africa Progress Panel: Geneva. p. 7.

³⁸ Morris, N. (2012, June 21). David Cameron Joins the Attacks on Jimmy Carr Over 'Morally Wrong' Scheme to Avoid Tax. *Independent*.

Therefore, corporations cannot ignore that tax includes a moral dimension.³⁹ The way tax avoidance appears in the media and public debates suggests that corporate behaviour does not meet the expectations in relation to distributive justice.⁴⁰ In light of such negative publicity, corporations are often left with empty hands when it comes to solutions.

Aggressive and large-scale tax planning increases inequality. Moreover, tax avoidance potentially has serious consequences for currently well-functioning and sustainable societies and markets,⁴¹ as it undermines sustaining long-term development. What by some stakeholders is seen as free-riding behaviour of certain members of society arguably undermines trust and the well functioning of society.⁴² Taxation is a “part of a bigger development picture,” which has an important role to play with regard to “a collapse of trust in the functioning of tax regimes but also in the economic system in a wider sense.”⁴³ Discussions around taxation reflect different and conflicting opinions and “this needs to be recognized and accepted if the debate is to be moved forward.”⁴⁴ It is important to learn to agree to disagree. Nevertheless, a nuanced dialogue, that this research also aims to contribute to, helps to find possible steps towards various solutions.

The role and responsibilities of corporations in society are in constant movement and need to be adjusted over time. How corporations are viewed in a society also shapes the expectations of society at large. The beliefs and expectations of stakeholders change over time.⁴⁵ Corporations should change over time if they wish to stay competitive and not risk getting a bad reputation.⁴⁶ This is something that can also be witnessed with regard to corporate tax planning. In 2012 PwC concluded that “[W]hat constitutes ‘acceptable’ tax planning may vary geographically but it’s still apparent that attitudes are changing, and that politicians and policy-makers are reacting to these changes.”⁴⁷ As a result of various public hearings, scandals and media attention addressed in this research, stakeholders’ expectations with regard to multinationals’ behaviour concerning their tax planning has changed. Such public hearings “may be politically driven, but it reflects a public sentiment.”⁴⁸ The founder and chief executive of the investment firm BlackRock, Fink, claimed that “[S]ociety is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose”, and corporations should prove their “positive contribution to society”.⁴⁹ This statement was not directly related to taxation, nevertheless, it indicates that multinationals need to be alert in their risk management strategy. For instance, major accounting firms are increasingly advising their corporate clients “to re-examine their tax strategies with a view to mitigating reputational risk and to anticipating greater disclosure requirements on where taxes are paid.”⁵⁰ CSR provides moral guidance on business practices “either by putting limits on what is acceptable behaviour in the short run, or by encouraging companies to pay more attention to long-term performance.”⁵¹ Such long-term performance in the context of tax planning, for instance, would be good tax governance, as I will argue in chapter 6.

Motivated by such serious growing issues in society, this research aims to go back to the very basic questions of taxation and place such questions in the context of ethical business practices.

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³⁹ More empirical research is necessary in order to find out what exactly are the most important factors in relation to the trustworthiness of multinationals’ tax behaviour. This, however, is outside the scope of this research.

⁴⁰ See e.g. Fairless, T. (2015, April 6). Huge Profit Stokes Concerns over Starbucks’s Tax Practices in Europe. *The Wall Street Journal* (online); Rowney, M. (2015, April 20). What’s Wrong with Tax Avoidance? *NewStatesman* (online); see also n1.

⁴¹ See chapter 4, section 5.2.

⁴² See e.g. Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation. (2016). *Rebuilding Trust in Business*. pp. 7-9; Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 9-10, pp. 26-27, p. 29; The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London.

⁴³ KPMG (2018). The Role of Responsible Tax Side Event during the Platform for Collaboration on Tax conference “Taxation and SDGs” New York 14-16 February 2018.

⁴⁴ KPMG (2018). The Role of Responsible Tax Side Event during the Platform for Collaboration on Tax conference “Taxation and SDGs” New York 14-16 February 2018.

⁴⁵ Horrigan, B. (2010). *Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices across Government, Law and Business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 6.

⁴⁶ Eccles, R. G. et al. (2007). Reputation and Its Risks. *Harvard Business Review* February issue 85 (2), 104-114.

⁴⁷ Stamm, R. and Preston, J. (2013). PwC 16th Annual Global CEO Survey Dealing with disruption, Focus on tax: ‘Tax Strategy and Corporate Reputation: A Tax Issue, a Business Issue’.

⁴⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 391.

⁴⁹ Fink, L. (2018). Annual Letter to CEOs: ‘A Sense of Purpose’.

⁵⁰ MSCI ESG Research. (2013, December). The ‘Tax Gap’ in the MSCI World. *ESG Issue Brief*.

⁵¹ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 23.

Companies, especially multinationals, are often seen as greedy monsters blinded by profit. At the same time, many companies are motivated to do more than short-term profit maximization at the cost of society. Here, transparency can be considered as a tool to distinguish good from bad and right from wrong.⁵² There are companies that believe in moral leadership but, with regard to tax planning, it is not very clear what is good or bad or right and wrong. For such businesses, this research will help to give some guidance on reshaping their tax strategies. In addition, this research also provides important discussions and guidelines for other actors involved in tax planning, to improve the legitimacy of the international legal system that affects corporate taxation.

1.3. The aim of this study

This research addresses various issues related to international corporate tax planning from a legal and ethical perspective: a) the conceptualization of tax planning; b) taxation as an element of corporate social responsibility; c) tax planning as a part of corporate decision making, and d) the relationship between corporate regulations, CSR, and taxation.

As a first step, the concept of tax planning and its various possible gradations based on morality and social acceptability are discussed. In light of this, the current debate on (aggressive) tax planning (and avoidance) will be analyzed from the perspective of a multinational. Many academic studies thus far have focused on the issues related to tax planning without clearly identifying and considering the role of the actors, such as states, tax advisors, investors, or other stakeholders, that are (to greater or lesser extent) involved in the tax planning process. This is a problem, because tax planning is an issue that can be approached from different perspectives with conflicting objectives. Nevertheless, for a better understanding of the problem in the bigger picture, it needs to be discussed from different perspectives. This research focuses on the corporate perspective. Thus, the criticism but also the justifications behind tax planning will be approached with the aim of trying to understand the business practices and corporate decision-making process better.

Tax planning can have a negative effect on society and the economy, because it potentially leads to unfairness and market distortions. However, this situation is not only created by the profit-driven behaviour of multinationals but also by diverging tax systems, lack of coordination and regulatory competition between the states. So far, the public debate has mainly focused on accusing multinationals of bad behaviour. This, however, is unbalanced, often leaving out the role of states or media, for instance. Therefore, in this research, the topic of corporate tax planning is approached from a different viewpoint, the perspective of a corporation.

After trying to understand the process of corporate tax planning from the corporate perspective, this research zooms in to companies that endorse their responsibilities towards society. Thus, the focus moves beyond strict compliance with the law. First, the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) will be studied. The main elements of CSR that could help to better understand the social and moral dimension of taxes will be researched. Based on this, the framework on how tax planning should fit into CSR companies' strategies will be developed. Also, the possible challenges that multinationals might face when trying to make their international tax planning strategies more responsible – in chapter 6 conceptualized as good tax governance – will be discussed. Such possible challenges will be studied by briefly comparing different corporate governance regimes in order to understand whether and what kind of limits could they possibly impose on good tax governance, tax planning that is socially responsible. The brief comparison will focus on the 'market-oriented' Anglo-Saxon model (shareholder approach) and the 'network-oriented' Rhineland model (stakeholder approach) of corporate governance.⁵³ These models illustrate two diverging regulatory approaches towards stakeholders and shareholders in company management. The comparative approach is expected to show different potential boundaries and incentives posed by company law

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⁵² See chapter 6, section 3.

⁵³ Habisch, A. (2005). *Corporate Social Responsibility across Europe*. Berlin / New York: Springer. pp. 367-370.

on socially responsible taxpaying. This can be especially useful for multinationals that operate in both systems.

The final aim of this research is to provide some guiding principles that could serve as a foundation for developing a framework for a code of conduct for good tax governance. Good tax governance, as conceptualized in this research, consists of substantive and procedural elements and stands for corporate tax planning practices that are in line with the corporation's CSR agenda; corporations that wish to pursue good tax governance do not pay an unfair share and are transparent about it. The substantive part of good tax governance can be seen as ethical behaviour which is pursued as a goal in itself and the use of transparency as means to that end. Transparency is the procedural element of good tax governance. It means that a multinational communicates its internal tax values and a strategy clearly both internally and externally. As a result, a multinational proves to its stakeholders that its tax governance is in order and under control. Transparency serves as a means to achieve good tax governance under the flagship of CSR. In order to implement good tax governance, multinationals could develop a tax code of conduct.

1.4. Methodological choices

It goes without saying that international corporate tax planning raises countless questions, and, as such, it is not feasible to answer all of them in one research. Moreover, international corporate tax planning is a subject that can be studied in many different fields separately and combined. Here, one can think of, for example, law, economics, politics, or sociology. Furthermore, this is a topic that affects and can be affected by many different actors, such as states, corporations, international organizations, consumers, but also society at large. This suggests that any research problem in this area can be approached from different perspectives. In the light of such complexity, this research takes a closer look at the corporate perspective on international tax planning. This means that multinationals are not considered as wrongdoers; instead, this research aims to help corporations to understand better what is expected from them when it comes to CSR and tax strategy. Furthermore, this research briefly analyses corporate law for explaining that corporate boards have sufficient discretion to opt for good tax governance. Lastly, this research provides some practical suggestions for corporations that wish to opt for good tax governance. This research, however, does not provide elaborate answers concerning which tax structures are socially (ir)responsible. This research concerns the societal perception and the groundwork for good (corporate) tax governance rather than the technical aspects of international tax law.⁵⁴ It is clear that, even though nobody should pay too much tax, paying (close to) no tax is also not acceptable. This also has some serious negative effects for society at large, but also some specific threats for companies. As this research places corporate tax planning in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR), it should be most relevant for companies that claim to be socially responsible and have thereby accepted certain responsibilities beyond pure compliance with (the letter of) the law.

This research has a multidisciplinary (mainly law and applied ethics) nature and is conducted from a bottom-up perspective. This means that the concept of tax planning is approached from a company perspective. It will be investigated whether taxes are part of social responsibility and, if so, how socially responsible companies could implement good tax governance.

Following that, the overview of the underlying methodological choices and limitations of this research are provided. Where appropriate, more detailed methodological aspects will be explained in each separate chapter respectively.

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⁵⁴ As the B-team states (p. 2): "We recognise that public trust in multinationals remains low, and that tax poses an increasing reputational risk for companies." The B Team. (2018). *A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles*. According to the Institute of Business Ethics over recent years, tax avoidance has consistently been the number one concern of the British public when it comes to corporate conduct. See: IBE. (2019). *Attitudes of the British Public to Business Ethics 2019*. Similarly, the Pew Research Center found that 64% of the American public say they are bothered 'to a great extent' by the feeling that some corporations aren't paying a fair amount of taxes. Motel, S. (2015). *5 Facts on How Americans View Taxes*. *Pew Research Center*.

1.4.1. Research questions

Building on the background, aim and motivation of this study, the main research question of this dissertation reads as follows:

How can multinationals opt for socially responsible tax governance while meeting company law requirements?

Supporting sub-questions read as follows (divided according to the pillars of this research):

1. Tax planning: What kind of tax planning is (not) socially responsible?
2. Tax planning and CSR: How does tax planning fit in the context of CSR?
3. Good tax governance and corporate governance: What are possible CG challenges corporations face (internally and externally) when trying to fit their tax planning strategies into their CSR policy?
4. Good tax governance: What is socially responsible tax governance and how can multinationals opt for good tax governance?

1.4.2. Methodology

Taxation is a multidisciplinary field. For example, tax reporting and compliance generally fall under accounting, while questions about tax efficiency concern economics, compliance falls under law, economics and psychology, and discussions about tax competition (state) involve political science.⁵⁵ Therefore, based on the (background of the) research questions presented above and with an ambition to fulfil the aims of this dissertation, several research methodologies will be used.

As said, tax planning is legal and often rational from the business perspective. Moreover, tax planning involves different actors and not just multinationals. Therefore, the accusations that multinationals' behaviour is immoral can sometimes be unjust. Nevertheless, there is a (moral) limit for the societal acceptance of tax planning, which multinationals should consider if they wish to be socially responsible corporations. Accordingly, the underlying statement of this research is that companies that claim to be socially responsible should impose restrictions on themselves, based on certain social norms. Based on an analysis of the theories and practices of CSR it will be argued that multinationals that claim to be CSR companies should have a more transparent tax planning system and they should not avoid paying taxes beyond the limits of moral and societal acceptability (thus, no aggressive tax planning). Since every corporation is different, there are no clear-cut criteria to measure whether corporate tax decisions are socially responsible. Nevertheless, based on studying various indicators developed by different organizations, it is possible to identify some criteria that help corporations to adopt good tax governance. For instance, by developing a tax code of conduct that responds to the stakeholder concerns and being transparent about it are two basic criteria for proving the intention to take responsibility, as will be explained in chapter 6.

Depending on the nature of the corporate governance culture (either shareholder or stakeholder approach), company law and securities regulation may impose some restrictions on multinationals to opt for good tax governance.⁵⁶ Some businesses often protect their aggressive tax planning practices by arguing that they cannot opt for less aggressive tax planning due to their legal obligations towards shareholders (value maximization).⁵⁷ However, whether that is a correct and justified argument is not sufficiently proven yet. Therefore, the aim of this research is to find out whether certain underlying assumptions of CG that are used in public debates, such as, for example, the responsibility of shareholder value maximization, could promote either more aggressive tax

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⁵⁵ Lamb, M. et al. (Eds). (2005). *Taxation: an Interdisciplinary Approach to Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵⁶ See chapter 5.

⁵⁷ See e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. Q. 485, p. Ev 40.

planning or good tax governance. For this purpose, a brief doctrinal analysis of four corporate law regimes (UK, US, GER, NL) will be provided. This research suggests that such corporate reasoning that they cannot opt for less aggressive tax planning due to their legal obligations towards shareholders is not justified from the corporate law perspective. Moreover, by analyzing the concept of CSR and its position with regard to corporate tax practices, it will be explained that good tax governance adds to the long-term shareholder value and corporate reputation and is therefore in the best interests of the company, as developed in company law.

Based on corporate law, corporate board has an exclusive discretion (and obligation) to make decisions concerning corporate strategy and tax planning. In the US, UK and Germany such discretion is rooted in the business judgement rule (BJR) principle⁵⁸ and in the Netherlands this is known as the board supremacy principle.⁵⁹ Surely, one could argue that next to legal discretion, corporate decision-making is affected by the corporate culture. Here one can think of shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented CG models. The stakeholder (Rhineland) model of CG clearly encourages corporate boards to consider a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests and thus leaves room for good tax governance, as will be argued in this research. The shareholder (Anglo-Saxon) model of CG prioritises shareholders' interests but, at the same time, it does not restrict corporate boards from considering a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests, as long as it is in the best interests of the company. Thus, it also leaves room for good tax governance. I will argue that good tax governance is in the best long-term interests of the company because companies benefit from society and state and, by paying their fair share of taxes, corporations are indirectly managing certain fundamental business risks.

The main methodological character of this research is multidisciplinary and exploratory. An exploratory research method is used in situations where "relatively little is known about something, perhaps because of its 'deviant' character or its newness."⁶⁰ Consequently, this exploratory research build theory that can further be tested with empirical studies. When I started with this research in 2014, many people were skeptical about combining tax and CSR. Back then also the academic research in this field was scarce. Therefore, I chose to conduct an exploratory research instead of empirical research for example. I do agree that empirical research studying the questions with regard to tax planning, CSR and CG is very valuable for business practice. Nevertheless, a good empirical research requires a solid theoretical basis and this is what I hope to contribute with this research. Moreover, anno 2020 people (business as well as other actors) are much more open to considering tax as a part of CSR. I think that this helps future studies to go deeper than it was possible in 2014.

The question whether and how multinationals should engage in good tax governance will be studied from various disciplinary perspectives such as law, applied (business) ethics and business management (economic perspective). More specifically, from the legal perspective, this study includes tax law and corporate law. Nevertheless, law cannot be studied in a vacuum. Therefore, this study adds a socio-economic perspective on law in order to investigate the limits of economic rationality and decision-making processes in an international corporation. Furthermore, this research combines company law and tax law from a comparative perspective in relation to applied ethics (CSR). To develop a concept of good tax governance, this research is rather exploratory in order to indicate what CSR corporations (but also other actors) could do in order to engage in good tax governance. Future empirical research hopefully will test the hypotheses that will be developed

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⁵⁸ In the US it originates from the Delaware case law: see e.g. *Gimbel v. Signal Cos.*, 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974); (only in case of takeovers, the board is responsible for seeking highest value for the shareholders; *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)); in the UK it is established in the Companies Act 2006 section 172a; In Germany, this principle is firmly vested in *Aktiengesetz* (German Stock Corporation Act), § 93.1.

⁵⁹ In the Netherlands, this is vested in the Forum-bank case (Forumbank-arrest (HR 21 januari 1955, NJ 1959, 43). This principle is also confirmed in more recent court cases: HR 13.07.2007, NJ 2007/434 (ABN AMRO); HR 09.07.2010, NJ 2010/544 (ASM International), and HR 20.04.2018, RN 2018/52 (Boskalis / Fugro).

⁶⁰ Singleton, R.A. and Straits, B.C. (2005). *Approaches to Social Research* (4th edition). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 68. See also: Van Hoecke, M. (2011). Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline? In Van Hoecke, M. (Ed.). *Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?* Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing. p. 18.

in this research. In order to approach the multidisciplinary nature of this research comprehensively, it is built upon three pillars.

1.4.3. Three pillars of the study

Recent years have witnessed a growing number of studies that combine CSR and tax planning.⁶¹ The last decade has also witnessed an increase in (scholarly) attention on the specific relationship between tax planning and morality⁶² and tax planning in the light of corporate social responsibility.⁶³ However, there is no in-depth study connecting the three subjects of this research – tax planning, corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance – which involve different disciplinary perspectives. There are many unanswered questions and debates without clear fundamental principles and direction. The discussions so far seem mainly to focus on criticizing multinationals for behaving incorrectly based on subjective argumentation and a weak theoretical basis. To my best knowledge, there is a research gap with regard to the link between CSR, tax planning, and CG. The existing research does not provide sufficient theoretical basis, nor does it respond to public concerns, needs and discussions, which means that a further in-depth investigation is necessary. To this end, this research is divided into three main pillars. These pillars represent tax planning, corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance and decision making. The aim of these three main pillars is to understand the complex nature of all of these separate areas and to find common grounds for this research.

a) Pillar I - Tax planning

The first pillar conceptualizes tax planning and reveals the complexity of the issue in the light of the various degrees of tax planning, such as tax mitigation and aggressive tax planning. Moreover, the roles of various actors involved in tax planning processes are explained briefly. At the moment, the topic of international corporate tax planning is discussed from different perspectives, usually without clarifying the role of various actors, such as states, advisors, investors, media, NGOs. Academics, however, seem to handle this issue better than practitioners, politicians, media, NGOs, or the public in general.⁶⁴ This research focuses on multinational corporations, as explained above. Nevertheless, where possible, the role of other actors will also be mentioned.

Tax planning is a concept which is used to describe the interpretation and application of legal rules in order to mitigate one's tax burden. As opposed to tax evasion, tax planning, in its various forms, is legal; it stays within the frames of the law. Nevertheless, the concept of tax planning poses several challenges. For instance, the academic literature on tax planning often uses an unclear concept of 'aggressive' tax planning, which adds to a vagueness of the topic. It has been argued that the line between tax avoidance (legal) and tax evasion (illegal) has become blurry due to the

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⁶¹ See e.g. Preuss, L. (2012). Responsibility in Paradise? The Adoption of CSR Tools by Companies Domiciled in Tax Havens. *Journal of Business Ethics* 110 (1), 1-14; Hoi, C. K. et al. (2013). Is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Associated with Tax Avoidance? Evidence from Irresponsible CSR Activities. *The Accounting Review* 88 (6), 2025-2059; Van Eijdsden, A. (2013). The Relationship between Corporate Responsibility and Tax: Unknown and Unloved. *EC Tax Review* 22 (1), 56-61; Lanis, R. and Richardson, G. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness: A Test of Legitimacy Theory. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 26 (1), 75-100; Davis, A. K. et al. (2016). Do Socially Responsible Firms Pay More Taxes? *The Accounting Review* 91 (1), 47-68; Bird, R. and Davis-Nozemack, K. (2016). Tax Avoidance as a Sustainability Problem. *Journal of Business Ethics (online edition)*, 1-17.

⁶² See e.g. Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250; Happé, R. (2015). Ethics and International Tax Planning. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 49-71). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

⁶³ See e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Connell, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behaviour. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 183-198). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 183-198; Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168; Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14; Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558. See also: Schuil, G. et al. (2014). *Good Tax Governance in Transition: Transcending the Tax Debate to CSR*. VBDO & PwC; Vellenga, I. and Reijngoud, A. (2015). *Tax Transparency Benchmark 2015: A Comparative Study of 64 Dutch Listed Companies*. VBDO; Verstappen, R. et al. (2016). *Tax Transparency Benchmark 2016: A Comparative Study of 68 Dutch Listed Companies*. VBDO.

⁶⁴ For example, prof. Douma has focused more on the role of media and NGOs. Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

activities of OECD and the EU, as well as the complexity of literature and regulations.⁶⁵ There is a tendency to add new terms, such as ‘aggressive tax planning’ or ‘abusive tax avoidance’ in order to cover the blurred area between tax evasion and avoidance. Hence, no uniform definitions exist, and there is a research gap between the letter and the spirit of the law within the context of business taxation. This research does not aim to provide in-depth and uniform definitions but to explain the concepts used by clarifying the definitional nuances for the purposes of this study.

This phase of the study builds a research framework by analyzing the state of art of the different concepts used in academic research as well as media and other non-academic sources for expressing various degrees of tax planning, what it means for different actors and what is meant under the letter and the spirit of the law. The notion of tax planning is analyzed in light of societal acceptability. Societal acceptability is conceptualized based on empirical studies that reflect upon the public perceptions on corporate tax behavior⁶⁶ and on how tax planning is discussed in public debates.⁶⁷ Based on that the continuum for illustrating different degrees of tax planning will be developed. In chapter 3 I will explain that multinationals that are aware of tax effects on their operations actively plan their taxes to avoid double taxation. The first degree of tax planning is tax mitigation, which is legitimate and socially responsible way to plan taxes. In case of tax mitigation, a corporation, encouraged by the relevant legislation, legitimately makes use of tax laws for tax planning purposes, for example by re-arranging its business-operations. The next degree of tax planning is tax avoidance, that occurs when a multinational intentionally re-arranges its business-operations, by complying with the strict letter of the law while ignoring the spirit of the law, with the main purpose to benefit from various tax rules in the different countries it operates in. Aggressive tax planning is a step further from tax avoidance and takes place when multinationals not only rearrange their existing business activities to achieve more beneficial tax treatment but even set up additional entities that lack any economic or commercial justification. In the case of aggressive tax planning, a corporation intentionally makes use of the mismatches between the national laws on the international level.

Data collection is based on existing research, legal sources, policy documents of the OECD and the EU and other materials. With regard to the OECD and EU, this research agrees to large extent with their proposed technical solutions. However, those alone are not enough because socially responsible tax planning will not be achieved with the mind-set that everything that stays within the frames of the legal rules is acceptable. In order to better understand the moral and societal expectations on corporations, CSR needs to be studied further.

b) Pillar II - Corporate social responsibility

The second pillar of this study will analyze the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The focus lies on the theoretical framework of CSR and on the practical implications and rulemaking in relation to companies that claim to endorse CSR. Such companies have accepted the responsibility to go beyond strict compliance with the law. It will therefore be studied how CSR has evolved in theory and practice and what does it require from the companies that commit to do more than required by the law. This research is largely based on legitimacy theory that “builds on the idea that there is an implicit social contract between companies and society. Hence, society grants legitimacy to companies as long as they comply with societal norms and expectations.”⁶⁸

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⁶⁵ See e.g. Van Weeghel, S. and Emmerink, F. (2013). Global Developments and Trends in International Anti-Avoidance. *IBFD Bulletin for International Taxation* 67 (8), 428-435.

⁶⁶ For instance, Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation. (2016). *Rebuilding Trust in Business*. pp 7-9; ACCA. (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London; Hardeck, I. and Hertl, R. (2014). Consumer Reactions to Corporate Tax Strategies: Effects on Corporate Reputation and Purchasing Behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics* 123, 309–326.

⁶⁷ For example, public political hearings, such as UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

⁶⁸ Herzig, C. and Kühn, A.-L. (2017). Corporate Responsibility Reporting. In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 187-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 199.

Corporate social responsibility can be approached from theoretical and practical perspectives. The theoretical perspective considers CSR as an academic discipline, “a coherent body of knowledge, addressing a central theme.”⁶⁹ From a practical perspective, CSR can be seen as a management approach, “a technical, instrumental response to business behaviour”⁷⁰ that focuses on the application of ideas that ideally are backed by academic research and thought. To understand the role of business in contemporary society, both perspectives are important. Having said that, the aim of this research is not to convince corporations to adopt CSR but rather to understand whether companies that already have CSR strategies in place should rethink their tax planning practices accordingly. Moreover, the aim of this research is not to pick a side in the various dilemmas in the CSR debates but rather to find out some common principles that might help to answer the question whether and how tax should belong to the list of corporate social responsibilities.

CSR is not an easy concept to study. It has a long history and many academic researches that include various understandings and views. One of the seminal academic contributions in the CSR field is the CSR Pyramid developed by Carroll. This CSR Pyramid elaborates on CSR as consisting of four layers: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic.⁷¹ Even though Carroll’s CSR Pyramid does not mention tax or the tax behaviour of a company, several criteria that he has set for a ‘good company’ reflects, in my opinion, that the tax behaviour should be counted as one criterion for behaving in a socially responsible manner. According to Carroll, corporations are parties to the ‘social contract’, which enforces the expectation to pursue corporate economic missions within the framework of the law.⁷² Carroll places ethical and philanthropic layers above the economic and legal layers. Ethical responsibilities of a company go beyond the law and profit making and embody those standards, norms or expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders, and the community regard as fair, just or moral. Carroll adds that ethical responsibilities are seen as an obligation to do what is right, just and fair. Ethical considerations go beyond strict compliance with the law. The philanthropic layer of Carroll encompasses those corporate actions that are in response to society’s expectations of a good corporate citizen, for example actively engaging in activities or programmes to promote human welfare or goodwill.⁷³

Carroll’s idea of going beyond the law needs some adjustment, however, for the purposes of this research, because currently it is not very applicable in tax practice. Therefore, in the context of this study I will place Carroll’s theory in the specific context of international corporate tax planning. Furthermore, next to arguing based on the CSR theory of Carroll that tax planning should be part of CSR, this pillar also places tax planning in the continuum between corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility (CSI). The concept of CSI is equally important as CSR, being its inseparable counterpart. The concept of CSI helps to complete the concept of CSR.⁷⁴ As it is often not very clear what is meant with acting over and above legal requirements (CSR), corporate social irresponsibility seems to be a more addressable concern. It is even indispensable to remedy certain shortcomings of the CSR theories.⁷⁵ Thus, instead of ‘what a manager *should* do?’, CSI asks what he should *not* do.⁷⁶ Clarifying what a corporation should not do probably adds to the effectiveness of CSR.⁷⁷ As corporate actions are complicated and there is a nuanced reasoning behind decision making in business, the continuum between CSR and CSI will be introduced. Such a continuum

⁶⁹ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3.

⁷⁰ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3.

⁷¹ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48.

⁷² Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48.

⁷³ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48; See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

⁷⁴ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 19.

⁷⁵ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 5.

⁷⁶ Armstrong, J. S. (1977). Social Irresponsibility in Management. *Journal of Business Research* 5 (3), 185-213. p. 185.

⁷⁷ Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 33.

would help to position the degree of (ir)responsibility of different corporate actors on a case by case basis. In this way, the degrees of tax planning would also fit better in the context of the social responsibilities of corporations.

CSR is a part of corporate strategy and is therefore part of the discretion of the corporate board.⁷⁸ The corporate board is also responsible for the financial performance and tax risk profile of the company.⁷⁹ Therefore, in order to better understand the extent corporate boards can combine CSR and tax planning, CG will be studied further.

c) Pillar III – Corporate decision making: corporate governance & good tax governance

The third pillar of this research aims for a deeper understanding of the main perspective of this study – the corporate perspective – by investigating corporate governance regimes of stock-listed firms. It will be studied what influences corporate decision making when it comes to tax planning matters. This part answers whether there is a difference between two different corporate governance regimes (the ‘market-oriented’ Anglo-Saxon model and the ‘network-oriented’ Rhineland model⁸⁰) and to what extent they are either supporting or hindering the good tax governance of multinationals. The comparison is based on studying two types of corporate governance regimes and rules that may set diverging boundaries in different jurisdictions to include tax in a CSR strategy.⁸¹

In order to understand the regulatory effect on the international level, it will be studied whether and to what extent the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon corporate governance regulatory strategies differ and, moreover, whether and how such differences affect good tax governance. This is an important part of the research, since, if corporate governance regimes would somehow disincentivize good tax governance then either corporate laws or the expectations in regard to corporations’ tax planning behaviour should be changed. Thus, it is a crucial step to evaluate the practical viability of good tax governance.

For example, Schön has argued that “there exists a fundamental distinction between the internal rights and obligations of shareholders and the management under company law and the external obligations of the corporation as such, e.g. in the field of tax law.”⁸² He argued that the relationship between the board of directors and shareholders can have consequences for corporate tax planning behaviour, especially in the US corporate governance regime. Namely, in the business world, there has long been an idea that corporations should generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value.⁸³ The aim of this third pillar of this research is to find out whether corporations’ internal relations are indeed possibly in conflict with good tax governance. The focus is on the boards’ role and responsibilities in tax-related decision-making processes.

d) Good tax governance

To sum up, three relevant frameworks are distinguished in this research: a) tax planning, in order to study the central topic of the international tax debates and alleged problems; b) corporate social

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⁷⁸ See e.g. Martínez-Ferrero, J., Villarón-Peramato, O. and García-Sánchez, I. M. (2017). Can Investors Identify Managerial Discretion in Corporate Social Responsibility Practices? The Moderate Role of Investor Protection. *Australian Accounting Review* 27 (1), 4-16. pp. 5-6.

⁷⁹ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 8.

⁸⁰ See e.g. Reinhardt, F. L. et al. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic Lens. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy* 2 (2), 219-239. p. 11; Wymeersch, E. (2002). Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe? In McCahery J. A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 230-247). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. p. 231; Campbell, K., and Vick, D. (2007). Disclosure Law and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 241-278). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 250-252; Habisch, A. (2005). *Corporate Social Responsibility across Europe*. Berlin / New York: Springer. pp. 367-370.

⁸¹ E.g. Board of Directors obligation to maximize shareholders value.

⁸² Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 33.

⁸³ Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1968). *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World; See also Aviyonah, R. S. (2014). Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 402; University of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-010*.

responsibility in order to explore the existing concept of CSR and possibilities for combining tax and CSR; c) corporate governance, in order to examine whether and to what extent corporate governance regimes could pose restrictions in binding corporate tax and CSR in the form of good tax governance. All pillars are fundamental building blocks for good tax governance. Moreover, every pillar needs its own specific methodological approach.

1.4.4. Limitations

Without a doubt, this study is ambitious. The aim to understand the ‘bigger picture’ by way of multidisciplinary research poses many limitations. The ambition to gain a more general overview of the problem means that many issues will not be as in depth as they at some point might require. Therefore, this research is exploratory to a certain extent, opening several new doors for further research.

The most crucial limitation of this study is a perspective on which this research focuses. As previously noted, international corporate tax planning can be approached from various perspectives. The perspective of this research is that of multinational corporations, more specifically, multinational corporations that endorse CSR. Consequently, the scope of the discussion is usually limited to multinationals. Naturally, international tax planning is a nuanced topic. For instance, there is a role of states and tax regulatory competition (and the role of other actors, as will be briefly explained later).⁸⁴ This research focuses on corporations and thus only on one (but one of the most important) perspective of international corporate tax planning. Moreover, this perspective will be put into a social context.

Further, this research leans on more general literature and current developments⁸⁵ (media, political statements etc. help to understand the societal perspective) in international corporate tax planning and how it fits in the concept of CSR. This research is not an in-depth study of technical aspects of various tax planning structures or existing law. Instead, this research focuses on the societal perceptions of tax planning activities of multinational corporations that claim to be socially responsible. Having a more general corporate law background helps me to take a step back and

⁸⁴ See chapter 3, section 5; chapter 7.

⁸⁵ It has to be noted that international corporate tax system is a fast-developing field. This research involves the developments and discussions until November 2019.

provide a more general and (hopefully) objective evaluation of tax planning. This approach is necessary because international corporate tax planning concerns not only tax experts but also other type of stakeholders, such as politicians, corporate law experts, media, and society at large. Therefore, more a general discussion without focusing on complex tax technicalities should help other actors to understand and take part in the debate on corporate tax practices.

This research will also not simply focus on international corporate tax planning activities, but it will limit itself to these corporations that claim to endorse CSR. This is an important distinction, because this means that these corporations have already accepted certain responsibilities towards the society and can no longer accept that acting purely according to the letter of the law is sufficient. Of course, the discussions and outcomes of this research can also be translated into a broader corporate perspective (perhaps with some additional nuances). For instance, according to the economic approach to CSR, companies are not free to engage CSR (as much as they wish) due to the fierce competition between the companies. According to this approach maximizing profits is more important than serving public interest. For example, Quairel-Lanoizelée has argued that “economists rarely see competition and CSR as compatible.”⁸⁶ The academic debate on competitive advantage of CSR does not provide one commonly agreed conclusion. The mainstream CSR literature, however, suggests that there is a positive connection between CSR and corporate performance.⁸⁷ This research focuses on the corporations that have already decided to engage CSR in their corporate strategy. Therefore, the question whether there is a (positive) link between CSR and corporate performance in the first place will not be discussed in this research. It will be argued that corporations that present themselves as CSR corporations build certain expectations amongst stakeholders and not living up to such expectations can have a negative effect on corporate reputation.⁸⁸

Furthermore, this study focuses only on tax planning activities that stay within the law. Thus, tax evasion and other kinds of corporate fraud will not be discussed in this research. Further, the most important clarification that has to be made is that, unless stated otherwise, all of the discussions in this dissertation concern tax planning, which is legal, as opposed to tax evasion, which is illegal. Nevertheless, this also poses one of the biggest methodological problems, because what in one jurisdiction is considered to be illegal may not have the same status in another jurisdiction. Moreover, the distinction between legal and illegal tax behaviour is usually not black and white. The legal, legitimate, and moral limits of tax planning and related issues will be discussed further in chapter 3 of this research.

Three key terms of this book are tax planning, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility. All of these three mainly raise issues on the international and not so much on the state level. Tax planning, CG and CSR are nationally embedded concepts without clear-cut international harmonization. This suggests that on the international level all these concepts raise issues related to a regulatory vacuum.⁸⁹ Therefore, this research also examines the international approaches and elements around these concepts. Furthermore, the aim of this study is not to go into the legal details and technicalities of the national corporate tax systems nor complicated tax avoidance schemes. This study takes a ‘bird-eye’ approach and investigates the fundamental questions around international business and corporate taxes and their relation to society. Moreover, the focus is on corporate income tax and not on other forms of taxation such as for example value added tax (VAT) or labour tax. Existing research suggests that corporate income tax is more vulnerable to tax avoidance than other forms of taxes imposed on multinationals.⁹⁰ Moreover, also

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⁸⁶ Quairel-Lanoizelée, F. (2011). Are Competition and Corporate Social Responsibility Compatible? The Myth of Sustainable Competitive Advantage. *Society and Business Review* 6 (1), 77-98. p. 80.

⁸⁷ Quairel-Lanoizelée, F. (2011). Are Competition and Corporate Social Responsibility Compatible? The Myth of Sustainable Competitive Advantage. *Society and Business Review* 6 (1), 77-98.

⁸⁸ See e.g. Tetrault-Sirsky, C.-A. and Elena Lvina, E. (2019). From *Doing Good* to *Looking Even Better*: The Dynamics of CSR and Reputation. *Business & Society* 58 (6), 1234-1266.

⁸⁹ See e.g. Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2008). Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 413-431). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 423-425.

⁹⁰ Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40. p. 10.

the public discussions related to corporate tax strategies usually focus on corporate income tax. Therefore, it justifies the focus on corporate income taxes.

Mainly for feasibility reasons, there are more elements of the discussion that are left out of this research. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the starting point in this research is that every corporation should pay (corporate income) taxes if so required by the law. Accordingly, this research will not focus on how tax money is specifically spent by governments (e.g. too much or too little government, corruption etc.) or for instance on a state's decision to levy no corporate income taxes. The central idea is that taxes are important building blocks for society by providing funds for public goods and services and the democratically legitimized lawmaker has an exclusive discretion to decide upon the tax system.

Next to that, as this research aims to approach the topic of tax planning from a company perspective, the discussions concerning the state perspective are limited. Nevertheless, when reading this research, it is important to keep in mind that the behaviour of a taxpayer and issues related to non-compliance may also rise due to a lack of trust in the government or due to different opinions on the role of the government's function when it comes to taxation. However, discussions on compliance issues of corporations caused by the distrust and corruption levels in a public sector calls for other research. Therefore, this study leans on the assumption that, in a democratic system, the state is allowed and legitimately able to decide on the best possible use of tax money and regulation. Nevertheless, the role of different actors in the international tax planning process will be discussed briefly.⁹¹

Tax regulation is important in tax planning discussions as it can either incentivize or disincentivize (harmful) tax planning practices. Nevertheless, it will not be the main focus of this research. The notion of tax regulation raises several discussion points for tax planning – e.g. regulatory competition and corporate lobbying, which can appear in the following forms. Regulatory competition means that states compete with each other by creating a favourable environment for foreign investment through legislative means. The problem with tax competition is that there are no rules for the rule-making process itself. One country's international tax decisions may have spillovers (financial externalities) on other country's macroeconomic stability.⁹² Furthermore, even though the harmonization of international tax laws may ideally decrease the negative effects of tax planning to a minimum, one must realize that there are no perfect laws and laws will always remain a subject for interpretation, which suggests that, when desired, taxpayers will find ways to circumvent the rules.⁹³ That is why the approach in this dissertation is focused more on the (moral) responsibilities of taxpayers (company).

In addition to regulatory competition, corporate lobbying nowadays also often affects the tax-related rulemaking in a state, in addition to the regulatory competition and lack of resources (caused by financial crisis). Academic research has confirmed that, among other things, lobbying also provides for more favourable tax policies for the companies.⁹⁴ The issue of corporate lobbying will be discussed to a limited extent in this research, as the main focus lies on the internal governance of a corporation and its relationship to society.⁹⁵

1.5. Structure of this book

This book is divided into four main parts based on the pillars of this research: Pillar I: Tax planning - identifying societal issue; Pillar II: Corporate social responsibility - providing a context and a possible solution to the identified societal issue; Pillar III: Corporate governance - testing the possible solution within the existing system; and (VI) elaborating on the solution: good tax

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⁹¹ See Chapter 3, section 5; Chapter 7.

⁹² International Monetary Fund. (2014, July 29). *Spillover Report 2014*. Washington D. C.: IMF Policy Paper.

Naturally, in the EU the four basic freedoms of the free market as well as state aid rules should prevent such negative spillover effects.

⁹³ See more in chapter 3.

⁹⁴ See e.g. Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2(1), 3-21; Hill, M. D. et al. (2013). Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying. *Financial Management* 42 (4), 931-957.

⁹⁵ See e.g. chapter 2.

governance. All the chapters of this book are built up in a way that they first discuss principal issues, practical nuances and changes in society. This book is structured into chapters within these four main parts as follows.

Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of a multinational corporation. This is one of the main underlying concepts of this research and needs therefore to be clarified. Various features, issues and aspects of corporations with regard to the main perspective of this research are discussed.

Chapter 3 falls under Pillar I, tax planning. The chapter starts with an insight to the philosophical and moral elements of the concept of tax planning. After showing that the distinction between compliance and non-compliance with the law is complicated, the study further elaborates on the concept of aggressive tax planning. This label seems to be given to behaviour of the multinationals that is not illegal, but which nevertheless also does not have a legal or legitimate basis. Trying to understand the concept of aggressive tax planning inevitably involves the discussions concerning the morality and ethics behind the taxation. Moreover, the complexity of debates about the letter of the law and the spirit of the law will be discussed in the context of international tax planning. This leads to the ongoing discussions on legal positivism, on the one hand, and the principles-based legal system, on the other hand. This phase builds a research framework by illustrating tax planning as a matter of degree. This means that there is no black-and-white answer to what constitutes aggressive tax planning and what could be categorized as acceptable. Also, the current works of the OECD and the EU with regard to fighting aggressive tax planning will be touched upon briefly. The reader should not expect a comprehensive analysis of the positions of the OECD and the EU with regard to corporate tax planning. When the OECD or the EU documents or activities are discussed, it is mainly with the aim to illustrate the regulatory context of fast-changing international tax law.

Chapter 4, Pillar II, puts corporate social responsibility into the spotlight. It will be studied what is CSR and how it has evolved historically. Moreover, what are the common elements in different definitions will be addressed. The aim is to understand the core of the CSR and to give the reader an overview and understanding of what the multinational that accepts CSR does; what are the rights and responsibilities and effects and why would companies do that in the first place (legal obligation to report, trust, social legitimacy, reputation). Approached from the law and tax perspectives, the relevant theories in the field of CSR will be studied. The main focus is on the CSR Pyramid, developed by Archie B. Carroll. Furthermore, it will be explored, how CSR works in practice. To this end, other fields that are important from the CSR perspective will be studied in order to compare this with the tax planning practices of companies and to draw some 'lessons learned' for tax. In order to match various gradations of the tax planning continuum (chapter 3) with CSR, the continuum between corporate social responsibility and corporate social *ir*responsibility (CSI) will be illustrated at this stage of the research. The underlying line of reasoning of this chapter is that companies that claim to be CSR companies have accepted responsibility for going beyond the letter of the law and this should also be translated into their tax matters. The main drivers and challenges for corporations to engage CSR will be explained. In this chapter it will be shown that tax planning within the context of CSR is good tax governance (which will be further fleshed out in chapter 6). Chapter 5 responds to Pillar III and investigates good tax governance and evaluates it from the corporate perspective by focusing on mainly corporate decision making and corporate governance. It will be investigated how and why tax planning fits into the context of CSR and whether CG would hinder that at a certain point. This phase of the research examines whether tax planning could theoretically be involved in CSR strategies, why companies could be incentivized to do this (e.g. reputation protection), and what are the possible effects and challenges for the notion of good tax governance.

Chapter 6 focuses on the elements of good tax governance, both substantive and procedural. The substantive element concerns ethical decision making and paying a fair share of tax, while procedural elements address transparency. The idea of going beyond the law in terms of tax planning will be fleshed out in this chapter.

The last chapter concludes and draws discussion points for further research.

2. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

2.1. Introduction

In the last few decades, international tax planning has become an increasingly important topic in the corporate world. To a large extent it is because the way of doing business has changed. Most importantly, the amount and size of cross-border commercial activities has increased. For instance, the rapid development of the Internet and technology has made the production, marketing, and cross-boarder exchange of goods, services, and capital very easy and fast. On the one hand, this allows multinationals to be innovative in reducing business costs. On the other hand, this also means that companies are operating in highly competitive markets and (in order to survive) they simply have to use different business strategies.⁹⁶

Such a changed situation, however, has put pressure on the old legal, political and also business principles. Politics and law-making has to be more dynamic in order to respond to fast-developing business practices. This appears, for instance, in the form of regulatory changes that will be discussed later in this research.⁹⁷ In addition to regulatory changes, various global developments have accelerated the demand for fair tax balance and the need for transparency. Consequently, companies and their actions are highly visible to stakeholders and society at large. Largely due to media and the fast movement of information, (negative) corporate actions get more attention than ever before. This allows the wider public to debate upon issues related to corporate actions, but also to demand accountability. For instance, Crane et al. claim that large corporations are much more visible and thus more vulnerable to criticism from the public than smaller firms.⁹⁸ Moreover, the way the general public perceives the role of business in a society has changed and the public's attitude towards large companies can evolve over time. For instance, a study from 2003 illustrated how the public's attitude towards large corporations changed between the late 1970s and early 2000s. Approximately 80% of the respondents believed that large companies have a moral duty to society. Nevertheless, according to the same respondents (about 60%), large corporations fell short of the expectations for moral behaviour towards society and the environment.⁹⁹ As a result, corporations are losing public trust,¹⁰⁰ which in turn may have a negative impact on their reputation. I have not been able to find an update of this research but, considering the rather negative public attention on multinational's tax planning practices, I would expect the results to be comparable or even more negative.¹⁰¹

As a result of such various developments, international tax planning also needs to be studied in an international and multidisciplinary context. However, for a well-informed and focused debate, the creature that is called a multinational corporation needs to be better understood. Moreover, understanding the nature of multinationals is necessary too understand what kind of role such business entities play in the societies in which they operate, but also how various stakeholders can affect business practices. This builds a basis for discussing tax planning, CSR, and corporate governance further in this research.

This chapter, therefore, is dedicated to clarifying the concept of a multinational corporation (multinational or MNC) used in this research. First, in section 2 some definitional questions

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⁹⁶ See e.g. Detomasi, D. (2015). The Multinational Corporation as a Political Actor: 'Varieties of Capitalism' Revisited. *Journal of Business Ethics* 128 (3), 685-700. p. 686.

⁹⁷ See e.g. chapter 3, section 5.

⁹⁸ Crane, A. et al. (Eds). (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility, Readings and Cases in a Global Context*. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 8-9.

⁹⁹ Lewis, S. (2003). Reputation and Corporate Responsibility. *Journal of Communication Management* 7 (4), 356-366. See also Porter, M. (interviewed by Morsing, M.). (2003). CSR – a Religion with Too Many Priests? *European Business Forum* 16. pp. 7-8, Wan-Jan, W. S. (2006). Defining Corporate Social Responsibility. *Journal of Public Affairs* 6 (3-4), 176-184.

¹⁰⁰ Lewis, S. (2003). Reputation and Corporate Responsibility. *Journal of Communication Management* 7 (4), 356-366. See also Porter, M. (interviewed by Morsing, M.). (2003). CSR – a Religion with Too Many Priests? *European Business Forum* 16. pp. 7-8, Wan-Jan, W. S. (2006). Defining Corporate Social Responsibility. *Journal of Public Affairs* 6 (3-4), 176-184.

¹⁰¹ See for instance: Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation. (2016). *Rebuilding Trust in Business*. pp 7-9; ACCA. (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London; Hardeck.

concerning concepts of a corporation and, more specifically, the multinational corporation will be discussed. Moreover, terms ‘endorse CSR’ or ‘CSR corporations’ used in this research will be elaborated upon. Further, questions related to corporate power that multinationals possess and responsibility will be explored in section 3. Next, in section 4, corporate accountability and transparency matters will be addressed.¹⁰² Section 5 focuses on how the use of corporate power can affect corporate reputation and how corporations can (re-)build trust among their stakeholders. Further, other corporate risks and risk management will be investigated briefly in section 6; it will be explained how paying taxes helps multinationals to reduce unnecessary corporate risks. As this research focuses on tax planning in the context of business ethics and morality, the question of moral agency will be clarified in section 7. The specific position of multinationals with regard to tax planning will be clarified further in section 8. The final section (9) provides a conclusion.

2.2. Defining multinational corporation

A corporation is in general seen as an entity or collaboration between individuals, set up for organizing a productive activity, usually for gaining economic returns. Farrar defines corporation aptly as “a legal concept which, through the conferment of separate legal personality, provides legal recognition to bodies of persons, associated together, as distinctive holders of rights under a collective name, with distinct legal consequences.”¹⁰³ According to Armour et al., a business corporation has five core structural characteristics: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, centralized management under a board structure, and shared ownership by contributions of equity capital.¹⁰⁴ The most important element this study focuses on is the centralized management under a board structure of listed corporations, especially in the Pillar III,¹⁰⁵ where corporate governance issues will be discussed. Nevertheless, all these core characteristics make a corporation a form of organizing a productive activity attractive but it also generates trade-offs and tensions that will be addressed through this research.¹⁰⁶ In the following sub-sections, it will be clarified how a corporation in general and a multinational corporation more specifically are understood within this research.

2.2.1. What is a corporation?

Despite quite clear generally agreed characteristics, the concept of corporation can raise certain questions. There is no one clear answer as to what a corporation is in the first place. There are various possible views on the legal concept of a company as well as the goal of business. For instance, economists often view the firm as a nexus of contracts, while “business scholars look at the firm as an organisation, a social body with multiple functions including a financial function.”¹⁰⁷ Through the historical transformation of the corporation, three prevailing theories of the corporation can be identified: the aggregate theory, the artificial entity theory, and the real entity theory.¹⁰⁸ According to the aggregate theory, a corporation is defined as an extension of its members or shareholders.¹⁰⁹ The artificial entity theory prescribes the corporation as a creature of the state, as a product of state laws, not as “‘citizens’, but as extensions of the state.”¹¹⁰ It is argued that, in a

¹⁰² See also chapter 6, section 3.

¹⁰³ Farrar, J. (2005). *Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.). *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ See chapter 5.

¹⁰⁶ See especially chapter 5 on Corporate Governance and chapter 4 on CSR.

¹⁰⁷ Sheehy, B. (2015). Defining CSR: Problems and Solutions. *Journal of Business Ethics* 131 (3), 625-648. p. 630.

¹⁰⁸ Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2005). The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility. *Delaware Journal of Corporate Law* 30 (3), 767-818. pp. 770-771.

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Lozano R., et al. (2015). A Review of ‘Theories of the Firm’ and Their Contributions to Corporate Sustainability. Lozano, R. et al. (2015). A Review of ‘Theories of the Firm’ and Their Contributions to Corporate Sustainability. *Journal of Cleaner Production* 106, 430 – 442. p. 433.

¹¹⁰ Lozano R. et al. (2015). A Review of ‘Theories of the Firm’ and Their Contributions to Corporate Sustainability. *Journal of Cleaner Production* 106, 430 – 442. p. 433.

modern society, this theory could apply for state-owned enterprises.¹¹¹ The real entity theory views the corporation as a separate entity controlled by its managers, thus not as the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state.¹¹² As Chaffee points out, each of these three theories “emphasizes a different aspect of the corporation.”¹¹³ According to him, “the artificial entity theory focuses on the role of the government; the real entity theory focuses on the corporation as a distinct entity; and the aggregate theory focuses on the individuals organizing, operating, and owning the business form.”¹¹⁴ Consequently, all of these theories have their limitations.¹¹⁵

There seems, however, to be little consensus on which theory of a corporation prevails. Schön, for instance, has argued that a corporation as such – as a taxpayer – does not exist because it is a nexus of contracts; he has, thus, chosen the aggregate view.¹¹⁶ In the same vein, Avi-Yonah argues that the nexus of contracts theory is the “dominant view amongst contemporary corporate scholars.”¹¹⁷ The idea that a corporation is considered as a nexus of contracts originates from the (law and) economics literature.¹¹⁸ Economists, however, have a conceptually very different understanding of contracts than lawyers do.¹¹⁹ Therefore, it is difficult to adapt the nexus of contracts theory in the legal context. For example, it has received some criticism, because it is “inconsistent with corporation’s legal status” and it “makes it difficult to determine the corporation’s boundaries.”¹²⁰ In the legal literature, a corporation has a separate legal personality.¹²¹ Armour et al. seem to suggest that the nexus of contracts theory is not very accurate anymore as they define the firm as a “nexus *for* contracts” that “serves, fundamentally, as the common counterparty in numerous contracts” with various stakeholders.¹²² A firm, thus, exercises its contractual rights.¹²³ They argue further that corporate law enables “a firm to serve this coordinating role by operating as a single contracting party that is distinct from the various individuals who own or manage the firm.”¹²⁴ According to them, a corporation itself is viewed as the owner of the pool of assets that are distinct from other assets owned by shareholders.¹²⁵ It seems, thus, that without focusing on any theory exclusively, they opt for a more nuanced view by combining elements from various theories. Considering the myriad of opinions, it is safe to conclude that the concept of a corporation is a contested one. Even though the theory of a nexus of contracts could be widely advocated by the economists (or law and economics scholars),¹²⁶ in my opinion it does not reflect on the

¹¹¹ Lozano R. et al. (2015). A Review of ‘Theories of the Firm’ and Their Contributions to Corporate Sustainability. *Journal of Cleaner Production* 106, 430 – 442. p. 433.

¹¹² Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2005). The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility. *Delaware Journal of Corporate Law* 30 (3), 767-818. pp. 770-771. See also: Lozano R. et al. (2015). A Review of ‘Theories of the Firm’ and Their Contributions to Corporate Sustainability. *Journal of Cleaner Production* 106, 430 – 442. p. 433.

¹¹³ Chaffee, E. C. (2017). The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 85, 347-373. p. 362.

¹¹⁴ Chaffee, E. C. (2017). The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 85, 347-373. p. 362.

¹¹⁵ See more in: Chaffee, E. C. (2017). The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 85, 347-373. pp. 362-363.

¹¹⁶ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 32.

¹¹⁷ Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2014). Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 402; University of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-010*. p. 10. Avi-Yonah does not specify whether he means legal or tax scholars but based on his analysis it seems that he focuses on corporate economists and lawyers.

¹¹⁸ See e.g. Cheffins, B. R. (2005). Corporations. In Tushnet, M. and Cane, P. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹¹⁹ Cheffins, B. R. (2005). Corporations. In Tushnet, M. and Cane, P. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 7.

¹²⁰ Stout, L. A. (2017). The Economic Nature of the Corporation. In Parisi, F. (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 2: Private and Commercial Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹²¹ See e.g. Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 8.

¹²² Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹²³ Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹²⁴ Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹²⁵ Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 5-6.

¹²⁶ See e.g. Chaffee, E. C. (2017). The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Cincinnati Law Review* 85, 347-373. pp. 361-362; Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

contemporary nature of corporation that is being discussed within this research. Namely, corporations need to be separate entities apart from their stakeholders.¹²⁷ Naturally, a corporation is not physically comparable to a person made of flesh and bones. Nevertheless, in a society, a corporation enjoys similar rights, such as the right to enjoy public services and goods that are financed with tax money. Therefore, corporations should also bear similar obligations as other citizens. Considering a corporation purely as a nexus of contracts would diminish corporate accountability for some of its actions. Corporations “have their own decision making structures, have choices, and justify them with corporate reasons.”¹²⁸ This means that companies are not only legal entities (artificial persons at law), but also moral ones for they have agency independent of their members as it will be further explained in section 7 of this chapter.¹²⁹ Therefore, it can be argued that corporations could refrain from harming others and they can account for their behaviour by giving moral reasons and assume moral responsibility for their actions affecting others.¹³⁰ Therefore, in this research, the concept of corporation is to a large extent based on the real entity theory. The corporation is seen as a separate entity and as a moral agent that can be held socially accountable for its behaviour. One of the most central elements of the (listed) corporation for this research is the board of directors that has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders and an exclusive discretion when it comes to corporate decision-making.¹³¹

The separate legal and moral personality of a corporation raises questions as to the nature of such a legal personality, how should the accountability be understood and divided, but also what kind of implications this has on the decision-making process.¹³² How corporations are perceived and how corporate actions are regulated is very dependent on the culture. For instance, CSR leaves more room for corporations in the US, because it is less regulated there than in Europe (whereas in Asia and Africa, for instance, it is more related to religious and cultural traditions).¹³³ In Europe CSR is understood rather “the choice of constraints”, whereas in the US it is rather “the choice within constraints”. Moreover, there is a difference between Central-Europe and post-communist countries. In addition, CSR, as a form of business ethics, is also affected by the religious values and history of societies. Nevertheless, it is argued that, due to globalization, there is a convergence of approaches and, therefore, also in Europe there is “a rapid and comprehensive move towards deregulation of business activities, which increasingly puts businesses in contexts similar to the American version of capitalism.”¹³⁴ This also indicates that CSR can often be coloured by the various cultural backgrounds of countries, which might be challenging for multinationals that operate within such different cultures. “Different cultures emphasize different aspects of CSR” and this means that one multinational may face different expectations in different countries.¹³⁵

Cultural differences are related to different perceptions of the importance and meaning of CSR and to different beliefs about business, organizations and ethics. This impacts how corporations are perceived within societies and to what extent organizations are exposed to institutional pressure and that it has an influence on ethical decision making and moral commitment. Culture is related to societal values and moral judgements. Consequently, it “influences what is perceived as right or

¹²⁷ See also Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation Is Failing Us And How To Restore Trust In It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 173.

¹²⁸ Brown, M. T. (2005). *Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 123. See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

¹²⁹ See e.g. Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250.

¹³⁰ Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

¹³¹ See Chapter 5.

¹³² Farrar, J. (2005). *Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

¹³³ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 53.

¹³⁴ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 22-30.

¹³⁵ Arthaud-Day, M. L. (2005). Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility: A Tri-Dimensional approach to International CSR Research. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 15 (1), 1-22. p. 3, p. 9.

wrong, acceptable or unacceptable, and ethical or unethical” in a certain society.¹³⁶ Therefore, culture determines the likelihood of a business to succeed with its CSR strategies.¹³⁷ Also, corporate law is attached to the cultural background of legal regimes. For instance, Anglo-Saxon roots place shareholders in a more central position when defining a corporation, while the (Continental-)European model recognizes a corporation rather as a social institution that represents the interests of wider group of stakeholders than just shareholders.¹³⁸ Such issues will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5 of this research. For dealing within such a cultural mixture, multinationals should decide upon their corporate values and if possible adopt codes of conduct (a form of self-regulation) in which they make their values and commitments clear, as will be argued in chapter 6 of this research.

In summary, on a very fundamental level, the concept of corporation might pose some challenges. Nowadays, conceptualizing a corporation is even more complex due to the international dimension. There is, namely, “no legally precise and universally accepted definition of the multinational enterprise.”¹³⁹ Without a doubt, however, a multinational corporation differs from a national corporation and also from small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because it operates in several jurisdictions and is involved in large-scale business practices. Therefore, it comprises different legal frameworks, (cultural) characteristics related to its operation, decision-making, accountability, but also its effects on the societies in which it operates, as will be discussed next.

2.2.2. Multinational corporation

Arguably, the term ‘multinational corporation’¹⁴⁰ was first used in the 1960s in the US context.¹⁴¹ One of the first research projects studying the phenomenon of a multinational corporation was carried out in Harvard in the 1970s.¹⁴² Note that, despite the definitional attention in the 1960s, the idea of a multinational corporation as such existed in practice already earlier. For instance, in the context of tax, the arm’s length principle, which with regard to transfer pricing means that the price charged by one related party (such as enterprises within one multinational corporation) to another for a given product must be the same as if the parties were not related, was introduced already in the 1920s. Nevertheless, back then, “related parties were relatively autonomous and only a relatively small amount of international trade of tangible goods occurred”.¹⁴³

The OECD, whose approach is important because of its role with regard to international tax regulation, defines a multinational corporation¹⁴⁴ as “[C]ompany or group of companies with business establishments in two or more countries.”¹⁴⁵ Arguably, there are several possibilities for

¹³⁶ Gössling T, (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Performance: Theories and Evidence about Organizational Responsibility*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 65.

¹³⁷ See further Gössling T, (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Performance: Theories and Evidence about Organizational Responsibility*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 62-63.

¹³⁸ See e.g. Farrar, J. (2005). *Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 21.

¹³⁹ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Next to the term multinational ‘corporation’, ‘enterprise’ is also often used. Arguably, these terms are not always interchangeable, as the term ‘multinational enterprise’ is considered to have a wider scope than the term ‘multinational corporation’. Naturally, both involve cross-boarder business practices. However, an enterprise is any corporation that “owns (in whole or in part), controls and manages income creating assets in more than one country.” Therefore, the term ‘enterprise’ includes both direct and portfolio investments. This distinction is important, because direct investment usually also gives the enterprise managerial control next to the financial stake in the foreign company, whereas portfolio investment does not. It is notable that economists usually use the term ‘multinational enterprise’, which might be an important element to keep in mind in conducting interdisciplinary research. (Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 5.) For the purposes of this research, no specific distinction is made between those terms; that is because managerial control is an important element with regard to the corporate governance analysis in chapter 5, but this does not suggest that the findings of this research could not be relevant for portfolio investors. Therefore, the terms ‘enterprise’ or ‘corporation’ are used interchangeably within this research.

¹⁴¹ Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹⁴² Vernon, R. (1971). *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York / London: Basic Books, Inc.

¹⁴³ De Wilde, M. F. (2015). *‘Sharing the Pie’: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market*. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. p. 347. See also Li, J. (2002). Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation. *Canadian Tax Journal* 50 (3), 823-883.

¹⁴⁴ The OECD in general uses the term ‘enterprise’ instead of ‘corporation’ in its regulatory materials. However, as it is not further clarified, it is unclear whether this choice of terminology has been intentional or whether it has some specific implementation.

¹⁴⁵ OECD Glossary of Tax Terms.

sub-categorizing a multinational corporation (such as for instance multi-domestic companies or global companies).¹⁴⁶ For the purposes of this research, multinationals that can be described as transnational companies are the most relevant. Such multinationals are “networks and tend to have little specific national identification or base, although they do have a legal base in a particular country.”¹⁴⁷ To my mind, this part of the definition can be more nuanced in certain cases; for instance, Volvo, Philips, or Apple often present themselves as Swedish, Dutch and American corporations respectively. Therefore, I believe that a distinction between technical and cultural ‘belonging’ can be made in this respect. In addition, according to the definition, transnational corporations are said to be “run by international management and are willing to move their capital and operations to any favourable location.”¹⁴⁸ The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines transnational corporations as “incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates” whereas a parent company is “an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake.”¹⁴⁹ Transnational companies, thus, operate in a range of countries but they might not always have a strong connection with a certain home country. This UN definition broadened the previously used definition of multinational corporation now also governing corporations that are “jointly owned and controlled by entities from several countries”, such as Unilever or Shell.¹⁵⁰ Transnational corporation and multinational corporation were terms used to refer to different business entities for some time in the UN, but nowadays the distinction does not seem to be made anymore.¹⁵¹ Therefore, a transnational corporation, as defined by UNCTAD, refers to the same business entities as used in this research.

What some scholars define as a transnational company is referred to within this research as a multinational company, because this is the term that is usually used in the international tax planning debates, even though in essence the main discussions concern transnational corporations. The term multinational (company) used in this research is in corporate law usually referred to as a large international operating stock company. Nevertheless, such a level of technical detail is not necessary to fulfil the aim of this research, which focuses on the more general level of decision making, actions and the public perception of multinational corporations. Thus, as this research does not focus on the specific structure of transnational corporations in comparison to other possible organizational forms, referring to multinational corporations in general should suffice. A multinational is, thus, in this research, a company that consists of different establishments operating under different national and international laws and regulations. Such a multinational consists of a parent company and at least one or more foreign subsidiaries, typically with a high degree of strategic interaction among the units. When the discretion of the corporate board is discussed, the board of the parent company is meant.

Furthermore, multinational organizations could be approached from an economic or legal perspective. From an economic activity perspective, multinationals can be seen as one entity while, from the legal perspective, a multinational consists of separate legal entities.¹⁵² Such a distinction is important because “national law for the most part governs the separate legal entities, not the single economic enterprise.”¹⁵³ The arm’s length principle is an example of how the legal and economic dimensions of a multinational corporation differ and add up to complex nuances. From

¹⁴⁶ Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. (2009). *Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives* (3rd Ed.). Essex: Prentice Hall. pp. 472-473. (They are referring to Harzing, A.-W. (2000). An Empirical Test and Extension of the Bartlett and Ghoshal Typology of Multinational Companies. *Journal of International Business Studies* 31 (1), 101-120).

¹⁴⁷ Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. (2009). *Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives* (3rd Ed.). Essex: Prentice Hall. p. 473. They are referring to Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996). *Globalisation in Question*. Oxford: Polity Press. p. 11.

¹⁴⁸ Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. (2009). *Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives* (3rd Ed.). Essex: Prentice Hall. p. 473. They are referring to Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996). *Globalisation in Question*. Oxford: Polity Press. p. 11.

¹⁴⁹ UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Transnational Corporations.

¹⁵⁰ Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 6.

¹⁵¹ Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 6.

¹⁵² See e.g. Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. pp. 3-4.

¹⁵³ See e.g. Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 4.

an economic point of view, a multinational could be seen as one entity that does business, while from a legal perspective it is important to distinguish between the entities in order to allocate tax obligations. In this sense, this research focuses mainly on the economic perspective¹⁵⁴ on multinationals that engage in foreign direct investment, which also includes certain managerial control.¹⁵⁵ It, therefore, restricts this study to “incorporated business entities and corporate groups based on parent/subsidiary relations.”¹⁵⁶ Thus, a more limited definitional framework is used. Nevertheless, it does not imply any specific limitations to reading this research. This choice is simply important because this research focuses on multinational corporations as one entity that can use their internal control and relations for tax planning purposes.¹⁵⁷ For instance, in the case of highly sophisticated tax planning schemes, passive subsidiaries that are often referred to as ‘letterbox companies’¹⁵⁸ are also part of an MNC.

Ruggie argues that an “economic organization, acting through one legal ‘self’ (often called the corporate ‘parent’), has the authority to create and structure the other legal ‘selves’ (which of course are integral parts of the single economic organization) in such a way as to optimize the entire group’s interests throughout its transnational sphere of operation, as well as to limit its liabilities.”¹⁵⁹ The parent company usually “sets the strategic objectives for the entire enterprise,” such as deciding “where and how to allocate its assets, which is based not only on such factors as market size, labor costs, or promising natural resource deposits, but also on selecting or constructing favorable regulatory environments through the global market for legal norms.”¹⁶⁰ This is important for the multinational’s internal governance structures.

According to Eijsbouts, multinational corporations have their “own internal governance structures that have to be in line with the various external legal regimes and national and international codes governing the group operations worldwide on the one hand and their complex internal structures on the other hand.”¹⁶¹ Such a mixture of systems inevitably includes the possibility of conflicts between these frameworks to which corporate decision-making organs need to respond. As a result, a multinationals’ internal and external systems differ from those of a corporation operating in one country, as most national laws focus on corporate entities operating within one country (even if these entities are a part of a multinational). In the context of human rights, Ruggie has argued that national corporate and securities laws are out-dated in the context of multinational business practices, since multinationals have possibilities for structuring their business activities “in up to two hundred states and territories around the world” by setting up legally “separate and independent entity even where the parent company is the sole shareholder.”¹⁶² In light of human rights, according to Ruggie, this raises a fundamental question with regard to the multinational’s social responsibilities and accountability.¹⁶³ This, however, applies in any kind of context, not only human rights.

¹⁵⁴ Therefore, nuances related to transfer pricing rules and the arm’s length principle will also not be further discussed in this research.

¹⁵⁵ Direct investment gives the investor (a multinational in this case) not only a financial stake in the venture but also managerial control (this differs from portfolio investment). Foreign direct investment is a direct investment outside an investor’s home country. Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹⁵⁷ See also: Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 299 ff.

¹⁵⁸ See e.g. Teichmann, C. (2012). The Downside of Being a Letterbox Company. *European Company Law* 9 (3), 180-184; Werlauff, E. (2010). Pro Forma Registration of Companies: Why a Brass Plate in the Host Country Is Enough in Some Respects, but Not in Others. *European Company Law* 7 (1), 25-30.

¹⁵⁹ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 12.

¹⁶⁰ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 12.

¹⁶¹ Eijsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 52.

¹⁶² Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 132.

¹⁶³ “How do we get a multinational corporation to assume the responsibility to respect human rights for the entire corporate group, not atomize it down to its various constituent units?” Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 188. The presumption of atomization drives the analysis of Radu Mares, “Responsibility to Respect: Why do core company should act when affiliates infringe human rights” in Mares, R. (Ed.). (2011). *The UN Guiding principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation*. The Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library (Vol. 39). Leiden / Boston: Martinus Nijhoff (Brill).

Also, in the context of taxes, a multinational as such is not one coherent entity that pays or does not pay tax. Different national tax laws are applicable to separate entities in a multinational group. Therefore, different entities in one corporate group have different rules to comply with and thus also different tax burdens. However, in practice, this detail is an important part of international (aggressive) tax planning. Namely, because different entities and their activities are subject to different rules, they can be set up for tax reasons, for instance in the case of aggressive tax planning.¹⁶⁴ The exact way in which parent company control is exercised in a group of companies in taxation matters is, however, not the focus of this research. Within the scope of this research, the relationship among the group of entities is not necessary at this stage. Moreover, as this research does not focus on national laws but on the international element of the issue instead, a multinational is considered as one (economic) entity. Also when it comes to CSR, the location of the subsidiaries can be important for the degree CSR or concrete actions involved but for the purpose of this research it is important that the decision to engage in CSR in the first place comes from the parent company. This indicates what the stakeholders can expect from the multinational and its products or services in a broader perspective.

The special character of multinationals – one entity combining different and often conflicting national laws – allows them to operate on a global level in somewhat a regulatory vacuum. This means that multinationals' actions cannot be controlled on the nation-state level of regulation due to the transnational nature of the activities and transactions. In such transnational situations, global regulatory governance is usually weak.¹⁶⁵ This is also the case with regard to international aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance. Note, however, that multinationals also have to plan their taxes in order to avoid double taxation. Thus, tax planning by multinationals is not always necessarily an unacceptable practice.¹⁶⁶

The imperfections of national laws, weakness of global governance, and corporate power (see section 3 of this chapter) are in general the main drivers behind the idea of CSR.¹⁶⁷ Without these drivers, the concept of CSR would probably have a different role in business and society.¹⁶⁸ This is also the reason why this research focuses foremost on the multinational companies that on their official webpage or annual report (or in any other official publicly available source) state that they voluntarily accept either social or moral responsibilities towards the societies in which they operate. Such corporations are referred to as 'CSR corporations' within this research. CSR corporations can be SMEs as well as (large) multinationals. This research focuses mainly on the latter.

It goes without saying that multinationals are complex entities and usually there are various considerations next to tax planning that affect strategic corporate decisions. However, in case of what in this research is classified as aggressive tax planning (see chapter 3), some entities in a multinational group are only set up for tax planning purposes (even though it might be difficult to prove that). Therefore, in this research, multinationals as such are viewed as one entity in a sense that they have the possibility to set up these separate entities in different jurisdictions for tax planning purposes. The question is whether and to what extent CSR corporations should do that, as will be discussed in the following chapters.

2.2.3. Concluding remarks

In conclusion, for this research the most relevant characteristics of a multinational corporation are mobility, many subsidiaries, and the mobility of capital. Mobility provides that a multinational can set up new business units in different jurisdictions. This allows a multinational to have subsidiaries, which, from a tax planning perspective, means that a multinational is, for instance, able to move

¹⁶⁴ See also chapter 3, section 3.

¹⁶⁵ See e.g. Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2008). Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 413-431). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 423-425.

¹⁶⁶ See also chapter 3.

¹⁶⁷ See chapter 4 on CSR.

¹⁶⁸ See also chapter 4 on CSR.

its costs to high-tax jurisdictions and profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Being able to do this means that a multinational has a mobile capital. These three elements also provide multinationals with a specific position of power, as will be discussed in the following section.

2.3. Corporate power

Multinational corporations can enjoy a special powerful position that most individuals and SMEs do not have. This position includes that large corporations can have a significant impact on the societies in which they operate: for instance, corporate banks in the USA that, according to Barkan, engaged in “unsustainable and predatory” lending causing the financial bubble in 2008 or oil companies that failed to meet basic maintenance and environmental oversight that caused the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.¹⁶⁹ Next to such extreme examples, large corporations can use their powerful position in various ways, also in relation to tax planning for instance.

As indicated previously, the way of doing business has changed. Globalization has caused an expansion of cross-border commercial activities.¹⁷⁰ Consequently, multinationals have a lot of recourses and opportunities to contend with in competitive global markets. The fact that a multinational is one economic organization means that it is in a position to combine “the most favourable regulations of different countries within a single contract.”¹⁷¹ This has had the result, as also Hirst and Thomson write, that multinational corporations “could no longer be controlled or even constrained by the policies of particular nation states.” Instead, such corporations “could escape all but the commonly agreed and enforced international regulatory standards.”¹⁷² In other words, such companies are bigger and faster than governments.¹⁷³ Already in the 1970s, Vernon was worried about the excessive power of multinationals, wondering whether this is “undermining the capacity of nations to work for the welfare of their people.”¹⁷⁴ The power of multinationals to operate beyond states leads to a regulatory vacuum, which means that national regulations cannot tackle international problems and international rulemaking is not sufficiently developed yet.¹⁷⁵ Such a regulatory vacuum of international standards has created a possibility for multinational corporations to use mismatching national (tax) laws to extremes.¹⁷⁶ Already in the 1970s the multinational’s freedom to allocate their profits among jurisdictions was seen as one of the tax issues arising from the growth of corporate power, while nowadays it could be categorized as tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning.¹⁷⁷

Such a situation in which corporations can achieve their goals by circumventing the rules if necessary can be considered as a part of corporate power. Corporate power can be economic (in general, a lot of money to spend) or political. In political science, power is typically defined as “the ability of A to get B to do something that B otherwise would not do.”¹⁷⁸ Strange calls this ‘direct’

¹⁶⁹ Barkan, J. (2013). *Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 1-18.

¹⁷⁰ ‘Globalization’ is a widely used concept, but it is seldom concretely defined. Giddens, for instance, defines globalization as “the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events many miles away and vice versa.” (Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 1.) Richter (2001. p. 1) writes that, despite the definitional vagueness, globalization clearly includes the following aspects: “the internationalization of economy and finance; the expansion of technologies, particularly communication and information technologies; and the contraction of space for democratic decision-making and social well-fare as the role and significance of the nation-state changes.” She adds that the key concern of globalization is “how to influence those practices of transnational corporations (TCNs) that conflict with social well-being.” For more discussion on the concept of globalization, see also: Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-22.

¹⁷¹ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 12.

¹⁷² Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996). *Globalisation in Question*. Oxford: Polity Press. p. 11.

¹⁷³ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 184.

¹⁷⁴ Vernon, R. (1971). *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York / London: Basic Books, Inc. p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ See e.g. Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2008). Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 413-431). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 423-425.

¹⁷⁶ See e.g. Grapper, J. (2019, November 4). Do Global Businesses have too Much Power? *Financial Times* (online). See more on the concept of tax planning in chapter 3, section 3. Of course, with regard to tax planning, corporations do not always act against the will of the government, as states sometimes also provoke tax planning by engaging in tax competition; see chapter 3, section 4.

¹⁷⁷ Vernon, R. (1971). *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York / London: Basic Books, Inc. pp. 274-277.

¹⁷⁸ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 5.

form of power the relational power.¹⁷⁹ Such structural power is rooted in understanding “where the power is derived from.”¹⁸⁰ According to Strange, such a structural power is derived from four sources: “control over security, control over production, control over credit, and control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas.”¹⁸¹ In the case of multinational corporations, all these sources of power are present, which, as Strange also claims, indicates the power of (private) markets. Such power of markets (and, therefore, multinational corporations) also affects how political systems work.

More specifically, in relation to political corporate power, Ruggie identifies three dimensions: instrumental power, structural power, and discursive power.¹⁸² Instrumental power concerns business lobbying, which means that corporations indirectly affect the law-making in a favourable direction for them (for instance, internet companies try to convince politicians to have a less strict regulation of privacy matters).¹⁸³ Structural power in terms of Ruggie’s definition concerns “locational choice sets, the ability to transfer risks to suppliers, and generally the ways in which business gets things onto or keeps them off the policy agenda.”¹⁸⁴ Discursive power refers to “the ability by business and business associations to frame and define public interest issues in their favor.”¹⁸⁵ In the context of this research, the first two dimensions of Ruggie’s definition – instrumental and structural power – are the most relevant.

I believe that, in the context of tax planning, we can talk about multidimensional corporate power that goes even further than the division of political corporate power proposed by Ruggie and is in line with the reasoning of Strange. It can even be argued that, in the case of tax planning, a multinationals’s power has grown and can even overrule the state power. In the context of international tax planning, the multinationals’ corporate power appears, for instance, in the form of knowledge and possibilities to (ab)use the mismatching of national tax laws to extremes (Ruggie’s structural power)¹⁸⁶ or by lobbying for favourable rules (instrumental power).¹⁸⁷ Thus, multinationals are mobile and they have strong negotiation powers. Next to the possibilities to move business activities around the globe and to lobby for favourable laws, corporations can also use their power in the law enforcement phase. This means that multinationals can negotiate, within the limits of national and international tax law, specific tax rulings with tax authorities.¹⁸⁸ This could be seen as a combination of instrumental and structural power. Accordingly, in my opinion, multidimensional corporate power in the context of tax planning consists of three main categories: lobbying power, knowledge and mobility. These categories are also in line with the sources of structural power as defined by Strange.

First, some authors conclude that multinationals can affect law-making by lobbying for more favourable rules.¹⁸⁹ Multinationals have enough power to affect the law-making process by

¹⁷⁹ Strange, S. (1994). *States and Markets* (2nd Ed.). London / New York: Continuum. p. 24.

¹⁸⁰ Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 200.

¹⁸¹ Strange, S. (1994). *States and Markets* (2nd Ed.). London / New York: Continuum. p. 26.

¹⁸² Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333, p. 5.

¹⁸³ See more on corporate lobbying in Ruggie, J.G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance*.

¹⁸⁴ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 5.

¹⁸⁶ Even Ruggie places corporate power in the context of tax planning by arguing that “multinationals’ structural power is greatly augmented by the existence of tax havens.” Even though he does not exactly define ‘tax havens’ as it is defined for instance by the OECD, he adds that, as long as tax and tariff rates are not harmonized, “this remains a source of structural power for multinationals.” See Ruggie, J. G. (2017). Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy. *Regulation & Governance* 12 (3), 317-333. p. 8. It must also be noted that lobbying, as such, may add more knowledge to democratic process and this in turn enhances the quality of better-informed decisions.

¹⁸⁷ For more information about the lobbyist activities in the EU, see e.g. Corporate Europe Observatory webpage. *Exposing the Power of Corporate Lobbying in the EU*.

¹⁸⁸ See e.g. LuxLeaks; EU state aid cases: Apple, Starbucks, Fiat; see also European Commission. (2015, October 21). Commission Decides Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are Illegal under EU State Aid Rules. Press release

¹⁸⁹ See e.g. about the lobbyist activities in the EU: Corporate Europe Observatory webpage. *Exposing the Power of Corporate Lobbying in the EU*; Christians, A. (2017). Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 151-173). Antwerpen: Intersentia.

engaging in corporate lobbying.¹⁹⁰ “Companies lobby because lobbying pays.”¹⁹¹ In relation to corporate tax planning, multinationals often practise corporate lobbying, which according to Christians “results in tax policy as favourable as possible to those who have recourses to shape it.”¹⁹² There is evidence that lobbying activities result in significant tax benefits for companies.¹⁹³ A clear example of such lobbying is when Unilever and Shell allegedly lobbied in the Netherlands for abolishing dividend taxation.¹⁹⁴ Such a political influence is a clear form of corporate power. Christians argues that, because of the successful corporate lobbying in relation to tax regulation, society is losing trust in the system.¹⁹⁵ Concentration of power causes societal mistrust.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, excessive corporate lobbying power can be described as a negative use of corporate power. For instance, a good example of trying to affect the law-making process is demonstrated by the case of Starbucks that, shortly after tax avoidance scandals in the UK, went on to lobby in the US for having the privilege to benefit from the stateless income strategies of multinational companies.¹⁹⁷

The second dimension of corporate power is that multinationals can use their knowledge and strong negotiation position in the law enforcement phase when they have to deal with the tax authorities.¹⁹⁸ Some multinationals even go as far as to use their powerful negotiation position when dealing with some developing countries, as Crane and Matten explain that multinationals sometimes “pitch developing countries against each other by allocating foreign direct investment to countries that can offer them the most favourable conditions in terms of low tax rates, low levels of environmental regulation, and restricted workers' rights.” Such multinationals are “accused of exploiting workers in developing countries, destroying the environment, and, by abusing their economic power, engaging developing countries in a so-called ‘race to the bottom’.”¹⁹⁹ This dimension of corporate power can, nevertheless, also occur in more developed countries. For example, the so-called LuxLeaks scandal that revealed how many multinationals (nearly 340), such as Pepsi, IKEA, and Deutsche Bank had “secured secret deals from Luxembourg that allowed many of them to slash their global tax bills.”²⁰⁰ Reality is probably more nuanced than media presents, but in my opinion this example shows that multinationals have the possibility to interact with the lawmaker in a way that SMEs usually do not. The economic power that multinationals possess makes them “influential actors in the decision-making process” and therefore they often succeed in achieving “tax privileges at the expense of other taxpayer.”²⁰¹ In addition, sometimes the economic situation in a state can simply be so weak that there is no other possibility than to accept any offer a multinational makes. That either indicates that states have a weak negotiation position with respect to the multinational enterprises or that a politician’s personal interests lead to certain agreements. Some tax gaps in the

¹⁹⁰ Blowfield and Murray seem to suggest that lobbying for lower corporate taxes can appear to be in line with an executive’s fiduciary duties. Whether this statement has legal grounds, however, needs further research. Nevertheless, they do acknowledge that depriving government of revenues can lead to cuts in public services. See: Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 93. See also Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. pp. 201-202.

¹⁹¹ Christians, A. (2017). Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 151-173). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 155.

¹⁹² Christians, A. (2017). Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 151-173). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 152.

¹⁹³ Christians, A. (2017). Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 151-173). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 155.

¹⁹⁴ See e.g. White, J. (2018, August 24). How Shell Manages its Dutch Dividend Withholding Tax. *International Tax Review*. Note that, due to harsh political opposition, this regulation was not successfully established.

¹⁹⁵ Christians, A. (2017). Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 151-173). Antwerpen: Intersentia.

¹⁹⁶ Bradshaw, T. and Vogel, D. (1981). *Corporations and Their Critics: Issues and Answers to the Problems of Corporate Social Responsibility*. New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 223.

¹⁹⁷ See Kleinbard, E. D. (2013). Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income Planning. *Tax Notes*, 1515-1535; Politi, J. and Jopson, B. (2013, April 24). Starbucks Seeks Fresh U.S. Tax Breaks. *The Financial Times*.

¹⁹⁸ See more on knowledge transfer as a corporate power in Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 8.

¹⁹⁹ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 18.

²⁰⁰ International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). *Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets Exposed*. Note that some of these structures are investigated by the European Commission as possible state aid cases. See also chapter 3, section 5.

²⁰¹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 15.

laws are not caused by a special reason however; sometimes it is just the sheer complexity, lack of knowledge or overwhelming bureaucracy that pave the way for weak legislation. Nevertheless, when negotiating favourable deals (usually with the help of various corporate advisers²⁰²), multinationals have a strong position, since they are very mobile, which means that, if they do not get the deal from one state, they can always turn to another state.

This leads to the third dimension of corporate power: possibilities for moving (parts of their operations) to other jurisdictions that would allow them to plan their taxes as they wish. In my opinion, this dimension falls under the structural power as defined by Strange. Multinationals are mobile or they can restructure their business operations in a self-serving way, for instance by setting up a 'letterbox company' in certain states to avoid some applicable rules (think for instance of transfer pricing). Setting up various business entities in different countries for taking advantage of various tax treaty rules is called (tax) treaty shopping.²⁰³ Next to competition distortion, such 'cherry picking' creates a situation that is perceived as unfair.

In summary, due to their specific transnational character, multinationals have various opportunities in their decision-making processes and these choices have a major effect on society. A company that has a financial possibility to establish and be successful in different markets usually has corporate power that in turn can have important consequences on the societies in which it operates. Especially in case of tax planning, multinationals possess powers that may even overrule the state power. Such corporate power is three-dimensional: first, multinationals can lobby for favourable rules and thereby shape the legal and political system in which they operate; second, multinationals have knowledge to assure that they lobby in a certain – for them favourable – direction (this is also linked to an economic power of corporation, which allows them to hire the best advisors); third, due to a high degree of mobility, in a very short period of time, multinationals can operate globally or adjust their structures, which gives them a strong negotiation position in relation to states. All these dimensions are related and mutually non-exclusive.

Multinationals have, thus, various opportunities in their decision-making processes and these choices have an effect on society.²⁰⁴ Empirical evidence suggests that society is also aware of the strong position of corporations. For instance, "one recent poll revealed that a large majority of the US population believe that lobbyists (71%), major companies (67%), and banks and financial institutions (67%) have too much power."²⁰⁵ For instance, corporate power provides a multinational corporation with mobility for using the national laws on a global level, which often is a crucial element of tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning. Naturally, this does not mean that all corporations make use of such possibilities. Moreover, companies are economic entities after all and will not actively search for the ways that would require them to pay more tax than they already pay. However, free-riding and making profits at a considerable cost to society's welfare could potentially result in losing social legitimacy. Therefore, multinationals have a role to play in taking into account the effects of their tax planning practices, especially CSR companies, as I will argue later in this research.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, without society there would be no corporations.²⁰⁷ Therefore, corporations need to be accountable to the societies in which they operate; corporate power also presumes corporate accountability.

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²⁰² See also chapter 3, section 3.

²⁰³ See e.g. Ault, H. J. (2013). Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles. *Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper* 2013 – 03.

²⁰⁴ See also chapter 3, section 2.1; chapter 2.

²⁰⁵ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 9. They are referring to Saad, L. (2012, April 11). Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds: Independents Agree with GOP that Federal Government Has Too Much Power. *News Gallup* (online).

²⁰⁶ Chapter 4.

²⁰⁷ For example, an American business magnate and investor Warren Buffett has agreed that, for his success, a well-functioning society has been crucial: "I personally think that society is responsible for a very significant percentage of what I've earned. If you stick me down in the middle of Bangladesh or Peru or someplace, you'll find out how much this talent is going to produce in the wrong kind of soil. I will be struggling thirty years later. I work in a market system that happens to reward what I do very well – disproportionately well." As quoted in Chang, H.-J. (2010). *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Allen Lane, p. 30.

2.4. Corporate accountability and transparency

In order to discuss to whom and why corporations should be accountable, it is important to understand what accountability means in the first place. The business dictionary defines corporate accountability as the obligation “to account for its activities, accept responsibility for them, and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.”²⁰⁸ In addition to accepting responsibility, accountability involves transparency, the continuous, systematic, and public communication of information and reasons designed to justify an organization’s decisions, actions, and outputs to various stakeholders; it is “a form of ethical communication directed toward those parties who are affected by corporate activities and effects.”²⁰⁹ Such transparency helps stakeholders to keep corporations accountable.

Based on the literature on political accountability, Valor defines corporate accountability as “corporate control; that is, the establishment of clear means for sanctioning failure.”²¹⁰ The neoclassical – narrow – vision of corporate accountability suggests that companies should only be accountable to shareholders.²¹¹ From a CSR perspective, accountability should be understood broadly, “as social corporate control” because “corporations are accountable for the creation of organizational wealth for its multiple constituents.”²¹² Accountability as a tool for control suggests “the establishment of clear means for sanctioning failure.”²¹³ Depending on who should be able to control a company suggests the tension between a corporation’s responsibility towards shareholders and a larger group of stakeholders. Such tension will be discussed further in this research in chapter 5 on corporate governance. Nevertheless, as this research focuses on the societal element of tax planning and CSR, accountability is approached in rather wide sense – towards society.

Society, namely, “grants legitimacy and power to business.”²¹⁴ In case businesses do not use their corporate power responsibly, they lose such social legitimacy.²¹⁵ Derived from this, Wood writes that a corporation is “a social institution that must avoid abusing its power.”²¹⁶ It can be agreed that corporations should avoid abusing their power if they do not want to risk losing their power and social legitimacy. Corporate accountability stands for controlling or taming excessive corporate power. Companies need “social acceptance” or “social legitimacy” to operate.²¹⁷ Of course, shareholders are important stakeholders of a corporation but, for long-term business practices, other stakeholders are also crucial.²¹⁸ Swift argues, from a CSR perspective, that “organisations should account for their actions through the *provision of information* to stakeholders and society.”²¹⁹ She claims that “essentially accountability is about the provision of information between two parties where the one who is accountable, explains or justifies actions to the one to whom the account is

²⁰⁸ See: Business Dictionary online. Retrieved from: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/accountability.html> (accessed 03.03.2019).

²⁰⁹ Pava, M. L. (2008). Corporate Accountability. In Kolb, R. W. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia*. p. 451.

²¹⁰ Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. p. 196.

²¹¹ See chapter 5.

²¹² Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. pp. 196-197.

²¹³ Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. p. 196.

²¹⁴ Davis, K. (1973). The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities. *Academy Management Journal* 16 (2), 312-322. p. 314.

²¹⁵ Davis, K. (1973). The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities. *Academy Management Journal* 16 (2), 312-322. p. 314.

²¹⁶ Wood, D. J. (1991a). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718. p. 695.

²¹⁷ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 52. On corporate social performance, see also Sethi, S. P. (1975). Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance: An Analytic Framework. *California Management Review* 17 (3), 58-64; Ackerman, R. W. (1973). How Companies Respond to Social Demands. *Harvard University Review* 51 (4), 88-98; Ackerman, R. W. and Bauer, R. (1976). *Corporate Social Responsiveness*. Reston: Reston Publishing; Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718.

²¹⁸ See also chapter 5, section 4.

²¹⁹ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. p. 16.

owed.”²²⁰ In other words, “in order to enhance corporate accountability, corporate social performance should be made more visible to those with a stake in the corporation.”²²¹ Therefore, in order to keep multinationals accountable towards the societies in which they operate, transparency is necessary. That is especially important in situations of a regulatory vacuum because in such cases laws fall short in keeping corporations accountable.

It goes without saying that “transparency” is a broad and complicated concept.²²² Transparency not only counts for corporate impact, but also for “how an organization has managed those impacts and the associated stakeholder relationships.” In other words, ideally, transparency should serve the stakeholders’ “(moral) right to know what is going on when it affects them.”²²³ Corporate accountability does not only require simple transparency but an “accessible, reasonable, and meaningful” openness.²²⁴

In the international law context, transparency is “universally perceived as a positive value.”²²⁵ Moreover, Bianchi argues that “in contrast, the opposites of transparency, such as secrecy and confidentiality, have taken on a negative connotation” and “although they remain paradigmatic narratives in some areas, overall they are largely considered as manifestations of power and, often, of its abuse.”²²⁶ Transparency leads to “a moral obligation to improve performance.” Thus, “it is accepted that full transparency is central to ethical behaviour,” nevertheless, it is unclear how far reaching corporate transparency should go. For instance, “[T]here is uncertainty about the significance of current reporting practices and doubt about what transparency should actually mean in practical situations.”²²⁷ Moreover, how corporate transparency is interpreted (for instance, by media²²⁸) can pose certain business risks that need to be strategically managed. Especially in the context of corporate tax practices, an absolute transparency can pose various risks because the media and other stakeholders, such as NGOs, can interpret the disclosed information one-sidedly.²²⁹ From the corporate perspective, an absolute transparency is, thus, not always positive. Therefore, I will argue in chapter 6 that in the specific context of corporate tax practices transparency does not only mean disclosing certain information but it also means an open and clear communication. On other words, good tax governance needs a transparent dialogue.²³⁰

For the purposes of this research, transparency will be considered as a principle of being open about one’s tax planning practices, which is a reflection of an ethical value.²³¹ Transparency is often considered to be a key principle in the fight against a certain type of tax planning.²³² The European Commission, for instance, states that “transparency is a crucial element in securing fairer taxation”, adding that the Commission has “given high priority to improving tax transparency in the Single Market”.²³³ One of the reasons that various international regulatory approaches aim to create more

²²⁰ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. p. 17. She is referring to Gray, R. et al. (1997). Struggling With the Praxis of Social Accounting. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 10 (3), 325-364.

²²¹ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 77.

²²² See e.g. Schnackenberg, A. K. and Tomlinson, E. C. (2016). Organizational Transparency: A New Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder Relationships. *Journal of Management* 42 (7), 1784-1810.

²²³ Henriques, A. (2007). *Corporate Truth: The Limits of Transparency*. Sterling: Earthscan. p. 25.

²²⁴ Pava, M. L. (2008). Corporate Accountability. In Kolb, R. W. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia*. p. 451.

²²⁵ Bianchi, A. (2013). On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law. In Bianchi, A. and Peters, A. (Eds.). *Transparency in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 2.

²²⁶ Bianchi, A. (2013). On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law. In Bianchi, A. and Peters, A. (Eds.). *Transparency in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 2.

²²⁷ Henriques, A. (2007). *Corporate Truth: The Limits of Transparency*. Sterling: Earthscan. pp. 2-3.

²²⁸ See also chapter 6.

²²⁹ Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

²³⁰ See also Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p.43; Hillenbrand, C., Money, K. G., Brooks, C. and Tovstiga, N. (2019). Corporate Tax: What Do Stakeholders Expect? *Journal of Business Ethics* 158, 403-426.

²³¹ See also chapter 6.

²³² See also Peters, C. (2017). Improving Democratic International Tax Governance: On the Power of Citizens, Transparency and Independent Watchdogs. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 203-234). Antwerpen: Intersentia. pp. 218-231. Also, corporate practice seems to (start to) accept that the demand for tax transparency has grown, see BDO. (2017, 19 May). The Pros and Cons of Tax Transparency. *BDO Scope*.

²³³ European Commission. (2015, June 17). *Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action*. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.

transparency in tax planning discussions is to minimize the information gap between corporations and other interested parties, such as tax authorities, states or society at large. Multinationals, namely, often possess more information with regard to possible tax planning structures as well as the reasoning behind those structures. Without such knowledge, it is difficult for lawmakers, as well as investors, (other) stakeholders or society, to assess which structures are acceptable and which need a response, such as changing the laws and how. In economics, such an information gap is referred to as an information asymmetry, which describes situations in which one party to a transaction or agreement has less information than the other.²³⁴ The corporate power allows corporations to create an information asymmetry in their favour. Therefore, transparency is an important door to corporate accountability. Transparency with regard to taxation is not a new phenomenon. However, in light of concentrated attention on corporate tax practices, the understanding of tax transparency is changing. The taxpayer is only not expected to be transparent towards the tax administration but also towards the wider public.²³⁵ Transparency is not only a goal in itself but also a means towards a certain outcome, such as accountability. Transparency with regard to taxation will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6 on good tax governance.

It is understandable that companies, as they are economic entities, will not actively search for possibilities to pay more tax. Moreover, full transparency as a part of social accountability with regard to its payments and tax choices is usually even opposed by companies that have nothing to hide.²³⁶ There can be many downsides to this, such as a threat to the taxpayers' privacy, weakening its competitive position, or risking a misinterpretation of information by a misinformed receiver. Such risks, however, do not justify that some multinationals are using their corporate power at the considerable cost of society's welfare, undermining social values and leading to an increase of inequality. Moreover, such negative effects on society potentially also influence the markets, which in turn can be harmful for corporations themselves in the long run. Therefore, multinationals have their role to play in taking into account the effects of their tax planning practices. Moreover, considering the growing public interest in corporate tax practices, multinationals cannot ignore the need for accountability and transparency because otherwise they risk reputation damage.

2.5. Corporate reputation and trust

Abusing corporate power or diminishing responsibilities towards society in other ways may be a risky business. One of the most relevant corporate risks in the context of this research is the reputational risk, since one of the biggest corporate risks with regard to tax planning is considered to be the risk of getting a bad reputation.²³⁷ Eccles et al. argue that "in an economy where 70% to 80% of market value comes from hard-to-assess intangible assets such as brand equity, intellectual capital, and goodwill, organizations are especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations."²³⁸ Reputation can be considered as "one of organization's greatest intangible assets with tangible value."²³⁹ Even though the value of reputation is difficult to quantify, a good reputation can bring with it a competitive advantage.²⁴⁰

But what exactly is corporate reputation? Corporate reputation can be defined as "assessments of an organization by a social system,"²⁴¹ that is, by its stakeholders. As a corporation has various

²³⁴ See e.g. Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. *The American Economic Review* 92 (3), 460-501. pp. 469-470.

²³⁵ Hey, J. (2018). Tax Transparency (preparatory materials). EATLP Annual Conference 2018, Zurich.

²³⁶ See e.g. BDO. (2017, 19 May). The Pros and Cons of Tax Transparency. *BDO Scope*. p. 5, p. 23; Peters, C. (2017). Improving Democratic International Tax Governance: On the Power of Citizens, Transparency and Independent Watchdogs. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 203-234). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 227.

²³⁷ See e.g. PwC. (2013). *Tax Strategy and Corporate Reputation—a Business Issue*; Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50.

²³⁸ Eccles, R. G. et al. (2007). Reputation and Its Risks. *Harvard Business Review* February issue 85 (2), 104-114.

²³⁹ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 37.

²⁴⁰ Wickert, C. and Cornelissen, J. (2017). CSR and Reputation: Too Much of a Good Thing? In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 187-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 332.

²⁴¹ Deephouse, D. L. and Carter, S. M. (2005). An Examination of Differences Between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation. *Journal of Management Studies* 42 (2), 329-360. p. 329.

stakeholders, its reputation can be different among those different stakeholders.²⁴² Reputation is the result of judgments in moral terms for it is “the aggregate of many personal judgments about the company’s credibility, reliability, responsibility, and trustworthiness.”²⁴³ In other words, corporate reputation entails a “value judgement,”²⁴⁴ as stakeholders take values into account when evaluating a corporation’s behaviour. Taking these values seriously reflects a corporation’s commitment to stakeholders with whom they interact directly or who may be affected by their corporate actions indirectly.²⁴⁵ Corporate reputation informs stakeholders about “what products to buy, what companies to work for, or what stocks to invest in.”²⁴⁶ In other words, corporate reputation helps stakeholders to decide whether to engage with this corporation or not.²⁴⁷ Thus, corporate reputation can be characterized as “a level of familiarity with the organization, beliefs about what to expect from the organization in the future, and impressions about the organization’s overall appeal.”²⁴⁸ Stakeholders usually build their judgement “the perceptions of past behaviour and a reflection of future expectations.”²⁴⁹ As a result, corporate reputation is a key to a social license to operate from the local communities;²⁵⁰ it builds and increases corporate social legitimacy.²⁵¹ Consequently, this reflects the trust stakeholders have in a corporation. Trust is essentially a contested concept.²⁵² It can mean something else to everybody.²⁵³ Therefore, the literature on trust can often be “piecemeal, under-researched, and fragmented across a variety of disciplines.”²⁵⁴ According to Castaldo et al.²⁵⁵ who have studied the meaning of trust, the most influential definitions of trust in the market relationships are those of Moorman et al.²⁵⁶ and Morgan and Hunt.²⁵⁷ According to Moorman et al., trust is a “willingness to rely” on the other party in whom one has “confidence.”²⁵⁸ Morgan and Hunt identify trust as “confidence in the trustee’s reliability.” They add that “confidence on the part of the trusting party results from the firm belief that the trustworthy party is reliable and has high integrity, which are associated with such qualities as consistent, competent, honest, fair, responsible, helpful, and benevolent.”²⁵⁹ It is a relationship between parties in which both (or all) give away something that makes them to a certain degree

²⁴² Deutsch, Y. and Ross, T. W. (2003). You Are Known by the Directors You Keep: Reputable Directors as a Signalling Mechanism for Young Firms. *Management Science* 49 (8), 1003-1017. p. 1004.

This is also the reason why corporate reputation scholars usually talk about reputation in plural. See for an overview e.g. Barnett, M. L. et al. (2006). Corporate Reputation: The Definitional Landscape. *Corporate Reputation Review* 9 (1), 26-38.

²⁴³ Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation. Realizing Value from the Corporate Image*. Boston (MA): Harvard Business School Press. p. 72.

²⁴⁴ Gray, E. R. and Balmer, J. M. T. (1998). Managing Corporate Image and Corporate Reputation. *Long Range Planning* 31 (5), 695-702. p. 679.

²⁴⁵ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

²⁴⁶ Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation. Realizing Value from the Corporate Image*. Boston (MA): Harvard Business School Press. p. 5.

²⁴⁷ Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation. Realizing Value from the Corporate Image*. Boston (MA): Harvard Business School Press. p. 5.

²⁴⁸ Lange, D. et al. (2011). Organizational Reputation: A Review. *Journal of Management* 37 (1), 153-184. p. 178.

²⁴⁹ Ivey, P. (2010). Reputation. In Visser, W. et al. (Ed.), *The A to Z of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 337-339). Chichester: Wiley p. 337.

²⁵⁰ Lewis, S. (2003). Reputation and Corporate Responsibility. *Journal of Communication Management* 7 (4), 356-366. See also Melé, D.

(2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 49. See also chapter 4, section 3.

²⁵¹ Searcy, C. and Buslovich, R. (2014). Corporate Perspectives on the Development and Use of Sustainability Reports. *Journal of Business Ethics* 121 (2), 149-169; Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338. See also: Pava, M. L. (2008). Corporate Accountability. In Kolb, R. W. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia*. p. 451; Kurucz, E. C. et al. (2008). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 83-112). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-91.

²⁵² Garver, E. (1978). Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments. *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 11 (3), 156-172.

²⁵³ See e.g. McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. *Academy of Management Journal* 38 (1), 24-59. p. 709; Castaldo, S. et al. (2010). The Meaning(s) of Trust. A Content Analysis on the Diverse Conceptualizations of Trust in Scholarly Research on Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 96 (4), 657-668. p. 658.

²⁵⁴ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. p. 18.

²⁵⁵ Castaldo, S. et al. (2010). The Meaning(s) of Trust. A Content Analysis on the Diverse Conceptualizations of Trust in Scholarly Research on Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 96 (4), 657-668. p. 662.

²⁵⁶ Moorman, C. et al. (1992). Relationships between Providers and Users of Market Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between Organizations. *Journal of Marketing Research* 29 (3), 314-328.

²⁵⁷ Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S. D. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. *Journal of Marketing* 58 (3), 20-38.

²⁵⁸ Castaldo, S. et al. (2010). The Meaning(s) of Trust. A Content Analysis on the Diverse Conceptualizations of Trust in Scholarly Research on Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 96 (4), 657-668. p. 662.

²⁵⁹ Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S. D. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. *Journal of Marketing* 58 (3), 20-38. p. 23. See also Castaldo, S. et al. (2010). The Meaning(s) of Trust. A Content Analysis on the Diverse Conceptualizations of Trust in Scholarly Research on Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 96 (4), 657-668, p. 662.

vulnerable.²⁶⁰ Tapscott and Ticoll explain that trust is based on “presence of shared norms and values, reciprocity, validation, and transference.” Transparency “changes each of these, accelerating the speed at which trust can be strengthened or weakened, consolidated or destroyed.”²⁶¹ Trust is the basis of every relationship – both business and personal.²⁶² Therefore, trust is an important asset when addressing ethical issues in business and building a reputation of a good corporation. According to Castaldo et al., trust “provides the cultural basis and the ‘glue’ that promote ethical behavior, and discourages deviation from ethical norms.”²⁶³ Therefore, corporations that are trusted are believed to make moral decisions, and the other way around – corporations that make moral decisions are trusted. Thus, trustworthy behaviour in a society can add up to a corporation’s reputation.²⁶⁴

Empirical research suggests that businesses face a general trust deficit,²⁶⁵ which requires reaction from a corporate entity. CSR can be a means to rebuild trust. For instance, CSR is considered as a “core element of reputation” that is an important tool for establishing trust among stakeholders.²⁶⁶ This proves the relevance of the concept of CSR for this research. However, CSR and trust have a circular relationship. On the one hand, CSR helps corporations to build trust and consequently reputation. On the other hand, trust is a precondition for successful CSR. Perrini et al. suggest that “trust is a key mediator capable of measuring and explaining the success (or failure) of the CSR policies adopted by the company.”²⁶⁷ Corporations, thus, first need to create trust in its CSR strategy. For building trust in this process, transparency is an important tool for it “forces trustworthy behavior” and allows stakeholders to control corporate behaviour.²⁶⁸ Also, with regard to corporate tax planning practices, a decrease of trust and bad reputation can be witnessed. Here also transparency and CSR provide a possible tool for the improvement of corporate reputation and an increase in trust.

With regard to tax, reputational risk concerns “the impact on the company that may arise from its tax decisions and actions if persons outside the company were to become aware of it.”²⁶⁹ For instance, aggressive tax planning is considered to have a negative impact on corporate reputation.²⁷⁰ Negative media attention can lead to reputation damage amongst consumers. However, scarce empirical research shows that such negative effect might only be short-term.²⁷¹ Responsible tax behaviour, on the other hand seems to enhance corporate reputation amongst the consumers,

²⁶⁰ Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A. (2001). Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 149 (6), 1735-1810. p. 1746.

²⁶¹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 78.

²⁶² Perrini, F. et al. (2010). The Relationship between Corporate Responsibility and Brand Loyalty in Retailing: The Mediating Role of Trust’. In Smith, N.C. et al. (Eds.), *Global Challenges in Responsible Business* (pp. 191-214). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 195.

²⁶³ Castaldo, S. et al. (2010). The Meaning(s) of Trust. A Content Analysis on the Diverse Conceptualizations of Trust in Scholarly Research on Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics* 96 (4), 657-668. p. 657.

²⁶⁴ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. See also e.g. Jøsang, A. et al. (2007). A Survey of Trust and Reputation Systems for Online Service Provision. *Decision Support Systems* 43 (2), 618-644. pp. 620-622; Eisenegger, M. (2009). Trust and Reputation in the Age of Globalisation. In Klewes, J. and Wreschniok, R. (Eds.), *Reputation Capital*. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 11-12.

²⁶⁵ “Only 18 % of the general population trusts business leaders to tell the truth and just 19% trust them to make ethical decisions” Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 12. Referring to 2013 Edelman Trust Barometer. (2013, January 19). Retrieved from: <https://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/trust-2013/> (accessed 03.03.2019).

“For 17 years the Edelman Trust Barometer has surveyed tens of thousands of people across dozens of countries about their level of trust in business, media, government, and NGOs.” See: Harrington, M. (2017, January 16). Survey: People’s Trust Has Declined in Business, Media, Government, and NGO. *Harvard Business Review* (online). See also: Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation. (2016). *Rebuilding Trust in Business*. pp 7-9; ACCA. (2017, March). *G20 Public Trust in Tax*. ACCA: London; Hardeck.

²⁶⁶ Wickert, C. and Cornelissen, J. (2017). CSR and Reputation: Too Much of a Good Thing? In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 187-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 329.

²⁶⁷ Perrini, F. et al. (2010). The Relationship between Corporate Responsibility and Brand Loyalty in Retailing: The Mediating Role of Trust’. In Smith, N. C. et al. (Eds.), *Global Challenges in Responsible Business* (pp. 191-214). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 192.

²⁶⁸ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 78. See also chapter 2, section 4.

²⁶⁹ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 15.

²⁷⁰ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 15.

²⁷¹ Brooks, C., Godfrey, C., Hillenbrand, C. and Money, K. (2016). Do Investors Care About Corporate Taxes? *Journal of Corporate Finance* 38, 218-248.

empirical research suggests.²⁷² Having said that, Hardeck and Hertl argue that “consumers are not willing to pay a price premium for products sold by responsible tax-planning companies, but rather punish aggressive tax-planning companies through a slightly lower willingness to pay.”²⁷³ Consumer protests against Starbucks provide a good example of how corporate tax planning can affect its reputation.²⁷⁴ In 2012, Starbucks was accused of aggressive tax planning in the UK.²⁷⁵ The coffee giant seemed to be well aware that its aggressive tax planning practice was the cause of diminished trust in the multinational in the UK. Its tax planning strategy that was made public was met with extensive negative publicity, ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns of NGOs, and a customer strike.²⁷⁶ Stakeholders’ behaviour showed that Starbucks’s reputation was vulnerable since the multinational decided to respond to such public accusations of unethical behaviour.²⁷⁷ Starbucks tried to restore public trust by showing a change in its tax practice.²⁷⁸ Kris Engskov, director of the Starbucks UK, stated that, while Starbucks has always paid taxes “to the letter of the law”, to retain public trust more is necessary. In his letter (16 October 2012) Engskov also noted that Starbucks is “doing business to the highest ethical standards” both in sourcing coffee as well as in paying taxes.²⁷⁹ Later (6 December 2012) he added that “the most important asset” Starbucks has built “in the UK is trust – trust with our employees, customers and the wider society in which we operate.”²⁸⁰ He admitted that “it is vital to listen closely to our customers – and that acting responsibly makes good business sense.”²⁸¹ Whether this commitment was just a PR strategy or truth, is still up for discussion. Nevertheless, such a public commitment to restore public trust in their tax matters proves that tax planning does include a trust relationship. Starbucks made itself vulnerable by accepting that there have been morally weak decisions in order to show the willingness to change and gain consumers’ trust.²⁸² Surely, this is only one example and more empirical evidence is necessary to test the hypothesis this research proposes.

To some, Starbucks might be considered as an anecdotal example in the corporate tax planning discussions because it is widely used. However, in my opinion, this is exactly the reason why Starbucks-case is a good example in the context of this research. It is one of the landmark cases that after the UK HMRC public hearing accelerated public discussions around corporate tax practices in general. Moreover, Starbucks has also been part of the European Commission state aid investigations. Since the name of this multinational appears in various public debates, it is appealing example to different readers of this book. In addition to the Starbucks case, there are various examples of how Apple’s and GE’s reputations were affected by a New York Times article about their tax practices²⁸³ or how also Amazon and Google reputations were harmed after the UK

²⁷² Hardeck, I. and Hertl, R. (2014). Consumer Reactions to Corporate Tax Strategies: Effects on Corporate Reputation and Purchasing Behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics* 123, 309–326.

²⁷³ Hardeck, I. and Hertl, R. (2014). Consumer Reactions to Corporate Tax Strategies: Effects on Corporate Reputation and Purchasing Behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics* 123, 309–326.

²⁷⁴ See also Christians, A. (2013). How Starbucks Lost its Social License—and Paid £20 million to Get it Back. *Tax Notes International* 71 (7), 637–640.

²⁷⁵ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011–12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012–13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

²⁷⁶ See e.g. BBC News. (2012, December 8). UK Uncut Protests Over Starbucks 'Tax Avoidance'. *BBC News* (online).

²⁷⁷ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2016). Good Tax Governance and Transparency: A Matter of Reputation or Ethical Motivation? *Derivatives and Financial Instruments* 18 (1), 3–24.

²⁷⁸ Engskov, K. (2012, October 16). Starbucks Coffee Company in the UK. See also Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38–60.

²⁷⁹ Engskov, K. (2012, October 16). Starbucks Coffee Company in the UK. See also Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38–60.

²⁸⁰ Engskov, K. (2012, December 6). An Open Letter from Kris Engskov. See also Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38–60.

²⁸¹ Engskov, K. (2012, December 6). An Open Letter from Kris Engskov. See also Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38–60.

²⁸² See also Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310–338.

²⁸³ Marzilli, T. (2012, May 8). Apple’s Reputation Tougher than GE’s Based on Recent Tax Avoidance Scandal. *YouGov Brandindex*. See also Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2016). Good Tax Governance and Transparency: A Matter of Reputation or Ethical Motivation? *Derivatives and Financial Instruments* 18 (1), 3–24.

Parliamentary Investigative Committee (HMRC) Public Hearings in 2011.²⁸⁴ Furthermore, MSCI ESG Research concluded that certain tax strategies of multinationals (such as using tax havens) could cause reputational risks for they “could be viewed as a potential trigger for scrutiny by the media or the public, which is not necessarily informed by a detailed understanding of the intricacies of international tax laws and treaties.”²⁸⁵ Academic empirical research does not yet provide concrete evidence as to what extent and what kind of relationship exists between tax planning and reputation. Nevertheless, a growing number of empirical research on corporate reputation in relation to tax avoidance shows that to a certain extent there is a negative correlation between corporate tax planning practices and its reputation.²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, there is also research that indicates that there is mixed evidence,²⁸⁷ which suggests that further in-depth research in this field is necessary. It is, however, clear that aggressive tax planning strategies can increase the risk on corporate reputation and conflicts with CSR, as will be argued later in this research. Any kind of risk can increase corporate costs. Therefore, risk management is a central element of business practices.

2.6. Risk management

In addition to the risk of a bad reputation, corporate tax practices can potentially increase various other risks that might not be that evident at first sight, such as competitive pressure, increase of regulation to comply with, data leakage, political changes in countries in which they operate.²⁸⁸ The list is endless. Managing risks, which also includes lowering unnecessary risks, is a normal part of business strategy.²⁸⁹ Corporate risk can be defined as “the uncertainty associated with both a potential gain or loss.”²⁹⁰ Depending on the nature and structure of a company and its operations, it faces different risks. Risk management concerns the prioritization of such various risks; is it the processes through which organizations understand, evaluate and take action on their risks. Doing so helps to increase the probability of a corporation’s success and reduces the likelihood of failure.²⁹¹ Effective risk management comforts shareholders and other stakeholders and proves that a corporation has a good corporate governance and management that understands its business. Effective risk management adds, thus, to corporate accountability. Such risk management, however, mainly addresses the risks that can be directly addressed by the company, such as the risk of a bad reputation. However, corporations also face risks that cannot be directly managed by themselves. Here, one could think of a safe and stable legal and political system or healthy and educated people who could possibly be a workforce for a company.

²⁸⁴ YouGov Brandindex. (2012, November 21). Google is Spared the Public’s Anger Over UK Tax Spat. *YouGov Brandindex*. See also HMRC hearings, e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

²⁸⁵ MSCI ESG Research. (2013, December). The ‘Tax Gap’ in the MSCI World. *ESG Issue Brief*. p. 4. Also, Erle confirms the relationship between tax planning and reputational risks: Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 210.

²⁸⁶ See e.g. Desai, M. A. and Dharmapala, D. (2009). Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 91 (3), 537-546; Dhaliwal, D. S. and Erickson, M. (1998). *Wealth Effects of Tax-Related Court Rulings*. The Journal of the American Taxation 20 (1), 21-49; Seida, J. A. and Wempe, W. F. (2004). Investors’ and Managers’ Reactions to Corporate Inversions Transactions. *Working Paper, University of Notre Dame*; Brown, T. J. and Dacin. P. A. (1997). The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses. *Journal of Marketing* 61 (January), 68-84; Hanlon, M. and Slemrod, J. (2009). What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News about Tax Shelter Involvement. *Journal of Public Economics*; Graham, J. R. et al. (2014). *Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field*. Accounting Review 89 (3), 991-1023; Kim, J. B et al. (2011). Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risks: Firm-Level Analysis. *Journal of Financial Economics* 100 (3), 639-662. p. 639. See also Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2016). Good Tax Governance and Transparency: A Matter of Reputation or Ethical Motivation? *Derivatives and Financial Instruments* 18 (1), 3-24.

²⁸⁷ See e.g. Gallemore, J. et al. (2014). The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance. *Contemporary Accounting Research* 31 (4), 1103-1133; Austin, C. R. and Wilson, R. J. (2017). An Examination of Reputational Costs and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Firms with Valuable Consumer Brands. *Journal of the American Taxation Association* 39 (1), 67-93.

²⁸⁸ On tax planning and corporate risk profile, see also Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 48-49.

²⁸⁹ Corporate boards should usually identify corporate risks and risk management strategy.

²⁹⁰ Solomon, J. F. et al. (2000). A Conceptual Framework for Corporate Risk Disclosure Emerging from the Agenda for Corporate Governance Reform. *The British Accounting Review* 32 (4), 447-478. p. 449.

²⁹¹ Kaplan, R. S. and Mikes, A. (2012). Managing Risks: A New Framework. Harvard Business Review June issue.

For instance, an inefficient legal system may have serious consequences for businesses. The protection of intellectual property is a good example in this case, for this is a concern for many corporations nowadays. Various patent laws ensure that the corporations' "competitive advantages" are protected "by granting to the firm a monopoly for the exploitation of that advantage for a specific period of time." If corporations' patents are protected, it can safely invest in innovation and enjoy returns on such investment. Muchlinsky argues that the state-guaranteed protection of patent rights complements "the firm's protection of its innovation through the market power it enjoys as a result of its integrated international network and from the difficulty of recreating advanced industrial technology."²⁹² By granting such protection, the legal system complements corporate internal risk management. The legal system is one example of a public good or service that corporations can benefit from.²⁹³ Other similar public goods that help companies to reduce unnecessary risks are for example infrastructure, the military, education, and the health care system, which all help to provide a safe and stable environment, healthy and educated prospective workforce. Moreover, companies also have similar rights and responsibilities towards the state as natural persons do. For example, business organizations have similar possibilities to apply for a court ruling as natural persons, and they also benefit from the state's military protection in case of war situation. All these public goods and services are (normally) funded by taxes.

The availability of public goods, provided by the state, ensures stability and reduces unnecessary (other than business-making) risks for companies. Holmes and Sunstein have, for example, argued that "property is worth little if you, and potential purchasers, do not believe in the future."²⁹⁴ They argue that "confidence in long-term stability is partly a product of law enforcement."²⁹⁵ Accordingly, a sustainable business climate depends on taxes. Consequently, "in the absence of government machinery capable of detecting and remedying misrepresentation and false dealing, free exchange would be an even more risky business than it is."²⁹⁶ For instance, corporate law enables that entrepreneurs have the flexibility to set up business entities to lower the costs of doing business, but it also helps to provide investors with the trust they need in preventing agency costs.²⁹⁷ Such trust is created by a legal system that provides a safety net when necessary.

Consequently, taxes are (to a certain extent) a means for companies to reduce some risks that are of a more general nature but at the same time are also crucial for supporting long-term business. The existence of public goods and services, but also other functions of taxes, as will be discussed in chapter 3 of this research,²⁹⁸ are the basis for an equal and stable society, which is integral to a successful business. Hence, companies benefit from society and state and, by paying their fair share of taxes, corporations are indirectly managing certain fundamental risks. In other words, paying taxes can be seen as an indirect way of mitigating business-related risks. Thus, next to mitigating reputational risks, paying a fair share of taxes is an investment into a sustainable political and legal system, infrastructure, or healthy and educated employees. Such an investment is important because a lower quality of public goods and services can, for example, result in poor infrastructure, which may cause higher logistic or transport reparation costs, or less healthy or less educated employees, or using public services operated by less qualified employees, and so on. In other words, business would be seriously hampered if the state would not be able to carry out the functions of taxation.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, the state also actively supports business success by fostering innovation (for example

²⁹² Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 34.

²⁹³ See more on public goods and services in chapter 3, section 2.

²⁹⁴ Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. R. (2000). *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes*. New York / London: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 70.

²⁹⁵ Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. R. (2000). *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes*. New York / London: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 70.

²⁹⁶ Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. R. (2000). *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes*. New York / London: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 73.

²⁹⁷ Kraakman, R. et al. (2009). *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (2^{edn}). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 2.

²⁹⁸ Chapter 3, section 2.

²⁹⁹ See chapter 3, section 2.

by funding R&D),³⁰⁰ encouraging investment, promoting economic growth, boosting worker productivity and stimulating the efficient use of scarce resources. Therefore, corporations also need to invest in innovation by paying their fair share of taxes. In other words, by paying taxes, companies are indirectly investing in their own welfare.³⁰¹

While for the argument related to business-case for paying a fair share of tax is important, it is not the central focus of this research. Corporate decision making motivated by business-case in principle only falls under the economic layer of Carroll's Pyramid, as will be explained in chapter 4 of this research. This research, however, focuses mainly on the ethical layer of the CSR Pyramid.³⁰² Corporations that avoid paying taxes are free-riding on the societies in which they operate.³⁰³ Such corporate behaviour has negative externalities on its stakeholders and society at large, because it compromises the national tax systems, distorts competition, and either leads to a decrease in public goods and services or a price increase of these public goods and services for other taxpayers. In light of such negative effects of corporate tax avoidance, the increased attention on corporate tax practices should be no surprise. The resulting societal and legislative changes, therefore, inevitably need to be included in the corporate risk profile. Society at large expects multinationals to be (morally) accountable and "to take responsibility for avoiding, reducing, or, at best, compensating for negative externalities as well as contributing to social welfare, while also being accountable for these impacts and explaining them in a transparent manner."³⁰⁴ This is also true for international corporate tax planning practices. Consequently, tax ethics is part of modern corporate risk management.³⁰⁵ In order to argue for accountability and corporate responsibility in moral terms, the question of corporate moral agency needs to be clarified.

2.7. Moral agency

As explained above, multinationals have an important role to play in the societies in which they operate, since they form a part of these societies. This research argues further that taxes are an important contribution to a society and that taxes also have a moral dimension next to legal and economic dimensions.³⁰⁶ Accepting such a moral dimension, however, means that a multinational could be seen as an entity that can bear independent moral responsibilities. Is a corporation a moral agent? Stainer, for instance, wrote that "corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned, they therefore do as they like."³⁰⁷ But is this really the case?

One of the basic assumptions of this research is that society is cooperation between its members. Without such cooperation there would be no society.³⁰⁸ Such cooperation therefore also presumes a specific kind of relationship between individuals; those engaged in this system of social cooperation should be able to rely on each other to do their part.³⁰⁹ In other words, being part of society entails moral rights and obligations. It concerns therefore how one should live in relation to other individuals.³¹⁰ Law and morality regulate these kinds of relationships between members of a

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³⁰⁰ This goes even for countries which seemingly do not feature very much government intervention. Chang, H.-J. (2010). *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Penguin, p. 206: "Between the 1950s and 1980s [...] the share of government funding in total R&D in the supposedly free-market US accounting for, depending on the year, between 47 per cent and 65 per cent, as against around 20 per cent in Japan and Korea."

³⁰¹ See also Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue. Of course, the question always remains if and how the governments are spending the tax money, but this again is a question for another research.

³⁰² See chapter 4.

³⁰³ See chapter 3, section 2.

³⁰⁴ Herzig, C. and Kühn, A.-L. (2017). Corporate Responsibility Reporting. In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 187-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 187.

³⁰⁵ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 399.

³⁰⁶ See chapter 3 and chapter 6.

³⁰⁷ Stainer, L. (2004). Ethical Dimensions of Management Decision-making. *Strategic Change* 13 (6), 333-342. p. 334, cited in Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

³⁰⁸ Compare this to the social contract theory of Rawls: Rawls, J. (2001). *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. Edited by Kelly, E. Cambridge (MA) / London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 61.

³⁰⁹ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

³¹⁰ Bloomfield, P. (2007). Introduction. In Bloomfield, P. (Ed.), *Morality and Self-Interest* (pp. 3-9). New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-4.

society.³¹¹ Next to the question of how one ought to live as an individual, morality also addresses how individuals interact with other individuals.³¹² In the words of Paine, “moral thinking is about how we ought to live – as a society, as individuals, and as individuals in relation to one another.”³¹³ According to Paine, thinking of dilemmas from the moral point of view calls for a reflection upon one’s choices and upon the effect of those choices on others.³¹⁴ It is not just about what is normal to do, but what is proper, (morally) right to do. Paine adds that such moral choices can be done “directly by considering the affected parties; or indirectly through the various behavioral norms and ideals, both social and personal, which govern our behavior in relation to others.”³¹⁵ Moreover, such other individuals are both, “others with whom we interact personally, as well as those more distant who may be affected by what we do.”³¹⁶

Thus, the central problem of morality in the context of this research is focused on the question how one should live in a society in relation to other individuals. Society consists of individuals and organizations, also including businesses. Companies contribute to society, for example in the form of products, services, employment, and taxation. Like individuals, businesses interact with other (corporate) persons; they affect others and are affected by the actions of others. Companies benefit from society at large, from all kinds of public goods funded by taxes, as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, in line with Paine’s reasoning, corporations should also reflect upon their choices and the effect of those choices from a moral perspective.

Society involves morality but moral norms and values are usually not written down. Here, the law has an important role to play, since the law forms part of the morality of any complex society. The law provides rules that regulate interactions within a society. The law, however, is imperfect, because it is always subject to interpretation and lawmakers, when writing the law, cannot predict and, thus, cannot take into account the future behaviour of people.³¹⁷ Therefore, the law leaves sufficient room for choices and the subjects of law, members of a society, have a possibility within the legal rules to make (im)moral choices when interpreting the law.³¹⁸ Making a moral choice, however, “requires not that individuals deny their personal needs and aspirations and consider only the interests of others, but rather that individuals see their personal interests and objectives in relation to those of others.”³¹⁹ It is therefore clear that individuals are moral agents that can make (im)moral choices and consider their personal interests in relation to those of others.

Within the framework of this research, corporations are also seen as moral agents that can make choices. Naturally, corporations are entities that are different from natural persons. Nevertheless, companies “have their own decision making structures, have choices, and justify them with corporate reasons”³²⁰ which suggests that they make independent choices that can involve morality. Moreover, a company “has a reputation that is distinct from the shareholders.”³²¹ This adds to an argument that a corporation is an independent moral agent and not for instance a contractual creation of shareholders.³²² In other words, corporations can make decisions that cannot be traced back to individual persons with personal interests behind the decision. Such decisions are corporate decisions; they belong to the corporation as a legal and moral person that has “whatever privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons.”³²³ Companies,

³¹¹ On the relationship between law and morality, see also chapter 3, section 2; chapter 4, section 5; chapter 6.

³¹² See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

³¹³ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³¹⁴ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³¹⁵ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³¹⁶ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³¹⁷ See chapter 3.

³¹⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 14. See also chapter 6.

³¹⁹ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³²⁰ Brown, M. T. (2005). *Corporate Integrity: Rethinking Organizational Ethics and Leadership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 123.

³²¹ Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is Failing us and How to Restore Trust in it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 111.

³²² See also Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 7.

³²³ French, P. A. (1979). The Corporation as a Moral Person. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (3), 207-215. p. 207.

as such, can therefore refrain from harming others and they can account for their behaviour by giving moral reasons and assume moral responsibility for their actions affecting others. They are not only legal persons, but also moral ones, since they have agency independent of their members.³²⁴ That corporations are part of society and have moral agency are two basic premises of the social responsibility concept.³²⁵

Within corporate thinking, it is not common to consider corporations as moral agents but rather as a means to generate profit. Therefore, Perrini et al. argue that “the moralization of the corporations represents a radical departure from the mechanistic conception that has dominated corporate thinking.” Accordingly, “the attribution of moral personality to companies necessitates fundamental changes in internal structure and management.” Such a fundamental change would be, for instance, that corporate management should take a lead on moral leadership: “[M]anagement has to bring a dual perspective to their decisions, which must pass the test of both ethical and economic rationality [...] corporate performance has moral as well as financial implications and that the pursuit of excellence requires attention to both.”³²⁶ It will be argued in this research that taxation is a moral phenomenon that creates moral responsibilities for taxpayers. Especially corporations that accept moral responsibilities towards society (e.g. in a form of CSR) should test their tax planning strategies, not only according to economic but also moral rationality. Thus, the question of morality and moral agency is about how multinationals behave in relation to the societies in which they operate. In case multinationals pay (almost) no taxes in the societies in which they operate, they are not contributing to this society, which can be considered unfair towards these societies. For instance, by interpreting the law in their own favour in the case of tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning,³²⁷ multinationals make decisions to benefit their own (short-term financial) interests at the cost of the welfare of other members of this society. This proves that corporations can make a moral choice between using their position (corporate power³²⁸) to pursue their own economic ambitions exclusively while others are (possibly) harmed. This also leads to thinking that such corporate practices, although legal, may arguably conflict with the purpose or the spirit of the law, they may be considered as socially irresponsible.³²⁹ Multinationals need to realize that a purely legal behaviour is not always moral and *vice versa*. As moral agents, they are also accountable for moral choices. Considering the complex decision-making structures within multinationals, re-thinking such choices can, nevertheless, be challenging.

2.8. Multinationals and tax planning

Multinationals have a very different relationship with the state and other taxpayers in comparison to most individual taxpayers. For instance, multinationals are in a position to make use of various international tax planning possibilities; this makes them key actors in the current tax planning discussions. The fact is that, even if states (would be able to) produce perfect rules that do not facilitate international tax avoidance,³³⁰ possibilities for international tax avoidance could still exist, since it stays within the limits of (the letter of) the law. Law is always subject to interpretation and hence leaves sufficient leeway for multinationals. Interpreting laws is not an exact science and may lead to different meanings dependent on the context in which the laws are interpreted. Ensuring a fair interpretation of tax laws can, therefore, be considered as a shared responsibility between

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³²⁴ See also French, P. A. (1979). The Corporation as a Moral Person. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (3), 207-215; Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 47-48; Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

³²⁵ Wartick, S. L. and Cochran, P. L. (1985). The Evolution of the Corporate Social Performance Model. *Academy of Management Review* 10 (4), 758-769. See also chapter 4.

³²⁶ Perrini, F. et al. (2006). *Developing Corporate Social Responsibility: A European Perspective*. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 95.

³²⁷ See more in chapter 3.

³²⁸ See chapter 2, section 3.

³²⁹ See chapter 4, section 3.3.

³³⁰ Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40.

states and corporations.³³¹ Corporations are in a position to interpret laws in a way that promotes their self-interest, which to a certain extent is also acceptable as it is a part of the tax risk management.³³² Making a moral choice, as explained above, does not require denying one's own personal needs and aspirations. This, however, leads to a difficult dilemma in the international tax planning arena: multinationals may act according to the letter of the law but they fail to meet the spirit of the law, that is, the intention of the lawmaker.³³³ Here, Paine's theory is relevant: making a moral choice presumes viewing personal interests and objectives in relation to those of others.³³⁴ While states have the responsibility to create more clarity, legal certainty and a fair distribution of the tax burden, multinationals are responsible for not abusing the flaws in the regulations, especially CSR corporations.³³⁵ Multinationals are responsible for determining their own limits.³³⁶ Their growing role and power also increases their responsibility. Moon et al. argue that "corporations are acquiring an increasing conspicuous and, in some respects, contentious profile."³³⁷ The authors propose various reasons for this: "corporations have acquired a greater share of economic participation following widespread privatizations; they have created new consumer markets; their cross-border activities appear to have increased; and they have assumed greater roles in the delivery of public goods." With such a greater role in the world economy, corporations have also gained greater corporate power, as argued previously (section 3).

Tax planning as such is a part of a multinational's decision making.³³⁸ However, doing business is more complicated than just taking care of taxes or accounting. Managing a multinational corporation inevitably requires a complicated balancing of conflicting interests. For example, corporate decision making is affected by the conflicting interests of various stakeholders, such as customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders, society in general, and also other state institutions other than tax authorities.³³⁹ Sikka sees it as a balancing of "a variety of competing capitals." He claims that "[S]hareholders provide finance capital, employees provide human capital and the state on behalf of society provides social capital in the shape of education, healthcare, transport, security, legal system, subsidies and support for corporations, and public goods."³⁴⁰ It goes without saying that each 'capital provider' expects a return on its investment. Sikka explains that such a return on investment is in the form of dividends for shareholders, in the form of salaries (or other compensations) for employees, and in the form of taxes for the state.³⁴¹ Moreover, a multinational can have stakeholders with different interests, either long-term or short-term.³⁴² This might affect how aggressive a corporate strategy to increase the after-tax profit will be. Multinationals namely need to keep their shareholders satisfied, because otherwise they simply leave and remove their investment.³⁴³ Consequently, different expectations of different shareholders can affect corporate tax strategies.

Usually, such multidimensional decision-making processes involve many people with different levels of knowledge.³⁴⁴ Corporate decision making needs to take different interests, rules,

³³¹ See also chapter 6; chapter 7, section 4.

³³² Dourado, A. P. (2015). Aggressive Tax Planning in EU Law and in the Light of BEPS: The EC Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and BEPS Actions 2 and 6. *Intertax* 43 (1), 42-57. p. 44. See also discussions in section 3, *Shades of Tax Planning*, of this chapter.

³³³ See more in chapter 3, section 2.3; chapter 6.

³³⁴ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

³³⁵ See chapter 4; chapter 5, section 4.

³³⁶ Essers, P. (2017). International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.). *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 235-265). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 245.

³³⁷ Moon, J. et al. (2008). Corporate Power and Responsibility: A Citizenship Perspective. In Conill, J. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Citizenship, Contractarianism and Ethical Theory: On Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics*. Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. pp. 13-14.

³³⁸ Owens, J. P. (2008). Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 9-12). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag; Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 31-36; Russo, R. and Van Trigt, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Taxes. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 23-48). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

³³⁹ This is based on the behavioral theory of the firm, the theory of coalition of participants (Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.). See more on balancing between various conflicting interests in chapter 4 and chapter 5.

³⁴⁰ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 155.

³⁴¹ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 155.

³⁴² See also chapter 4, section 4.

³⁴³ See also chapter 5.

³⁴⁴ West, A. (2017). Multinational Tax Avoidance: Virtue Ethics and the Role of Accountants. *Journal of Business Ethics* 153 (4), 1143-1156.

situations, and plans into account.³⁴⁵ Nowadays, corporate boards are expected to explain and defend the consequences and societal impact of tax planning strategies and to take decisions regarding these strategies.³⁴⁶ Such a complex process inevitably also involves various corporate advisors, since corporate boards simply do not have all the necessary technical knowledge. For instance, tax avoidance is a legal concept and it originates with tax laws, which are often complicated. Therefore, tax advisors play an essential role in interpreting tax laws and “determine its application and to identify tax-related behaviour that is to be classified as tax evasion or tax avoidance.”³⁴⁷ Moreover, tax advisors need to calculate the economic effects and risks of various tax policies. Hence, different experts, such as tax advisors but also public relations professionals, banks, etc.³⁴⁸, contribute their knowledge to this decision-making process.

For example, some argue that, in the Netherlands, the client is still seen as a king in a sense that tax advisors should help their client to find the most optimal tax planning structure.³⁴⁹ Consequently, advisory firms are often considered as facilitators of tax avoidance.³⁵⁰ In addition, generally the exact knowledge of aggressive tax planning structures is confidential and kept between the multinational and its advisers.³⁵¹ Such a role also triggers a lot of criticism.³⁵² Tax advisors are sometimes described as architects of aggressive tax planning.³⁵³ Hasseldine and Morris, however, claim that tax consultants “operate as intermediaries between corporate taxpayers and tax agencies”, therefore they “do not just act as ‘exploiters’ of the tax system but have an active ‘enforcer’ role to play in tax systems.”³⁵⁴ The truth is probably somewhere in the middle; there are many tax consultants who see their role as advisors differently. Nowadays, next to the obligation to “reduce the tax liability of their clients as much as possible through lawful, strategic planning” tax advisors are expected to consider that ‘lawfulness’ of their advised strategies “is subject to multi-layered, constantly evolving standards of legality, influenced by considerations of morality, ethics, and government objectives.”³⁵⁵ Such a statement suggests that, even though the legal dimension of Carroll’s CSR Pyramid is praised, the ethical dimension is also subject to increased attention.³⁵⁶ In other words, the role of corporate tax advisors is evolving.³⁵⁷

Consequently, legal and accountancy knowledge might not be enough for understanding the broader effects of corporate tax practices and for (not) considering tax as a part of CSR. It makes sense for most multinationals that claim to have a CSR policy to have a person responsible for developing and maintaining corporate CSR policy and public reputation. However, there seems to be little consensus on the question who bears such responsibility. As top managers are the ones who decide upon the values of a company, they are seen as drivers for CSR.³⁵⁸ On a more practical level, developing and maintaining CSR strategy seems to be a result of a co-operation of different departments such as the legal, public relations (communication), sales and marketing departments,

³⁴⁵ See chapter 5.

³⁴⁶ See also KPMG. (2004). Tax in the Boardroom: A Discussion Paper; Whalen, D. T. (2017, August 3). Social Responsibility and Strategy Meet in the Boardroom. *Forbes* (online).

³⁴⁷ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14. p. 3.

³⁴⁸ See also Brock, G. and Russell, H. (2015). Abusive Tax Avoidance and Institutional Corruption: The Responsibilities of Tax Professionals. *Edmond J. Safra Working Paper* 56.

³⁴⁹ Herreveld, H. R. (2017). Rechten & Plichten van de Belastingadviseur. *TFO* 2017/152.6. p. 7.

³⁵⁰ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168; West, A. (2017). Multinational Tax Avoidance: Virtue Ethics and the Role of Accountants. *Journal of Business Ethics* 153 (4), 1143-1156; UK PAC HMRC. (2015). Tax Avoidance: The Role of Large Accountancy Firms (follow-up). *Thirty-eighth Report of Session 2014-15*.

³⁵¹ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. p. 25.

³⁵² Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 157.

³⁵³ Herreveld, H. R. (2017). Rechten & Plichten van de Belastingadviseur. *TFO* 2017/152.6. p. 9.

³⁵⁴ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14. p. 9. They are referring to: Klepper, S. et al. (2001). Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers. *Journal of Law and Economics* 34 (1), 205-229; and National Audit Office (NAO). (2010). *HM Revenue and Customs: Engaging With Tax Agents*. London: The Stationery Office.

³⁵⁵ Pfeifer, M. G. and Jin Yoon, S. (2016). The Ethical Limits of Tax Planning. *Trusts & Trustees* 22 (1), 159-165. p. 165.

³⁵⁶ See chapter 4, section 3.1. for Carroll’s Pyramid.

³⁵⁷ See more on the changing societal expectations on corporations in chapter 4.

³⁵⁸ Swanson, D. L. (2008). Top Managers as Drivers for Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 227-248). New York: Oxford University Press.

but also the board of directors.³⁵⁹ In the context of this research these experts are recognized as CSR advisors; however, more (empirical) research on how CSR policy making works in corporate practice is necessary. Naturally, the initiative for good tax governance does not necessarily have to come from the CSR-advisors; tax directors or management can also change the course in this respect.

Additionally, next to the profession-based categorization, the advisors can be divided into internal and external advisors. Internal advisors are the in-house advisors that are working in the company and affect the decision-making process internally. External advisors offer their services to multinationals independently. Here, two principal issues arise. First, internal and external advisors have different objectives, and this creates different interests and biases. Second, their mind-set and culture are different.³⁶⁰ This can create a gap between the various expectations of corporate behaviour. In sum, all corporate advisors can have a different perspective on tax planning. Moreover, here – as with any other actor group – also the personal background, knowledge, and beliefs of individuals play a role. This setting illustrates that decision-making processes in multinational corporations are highly complex.

Corporate boards should understand various elements and make a balanced decision. Specialist tax advisors provide information (specific to their background and role) and corporate managers are in a position to make a decision, based on that information, which is “a matter of commercial judgment falling outside the scope of the duty of care of a person retained specifically to advise on tax.”³⁶¹ Here, managers have to follow their fiduciary duty to make a decision that is in the best interest of the corporation. As will be explained later in chapter 5 on corporate governance, managers can choose whether they opt for tax avoidance or not. It is clear, however, that, in order to focus on long-term interests, CSR is a helpful tool for corporate decision making.³⁶²

2.9. Conclusion

The central perspective of this research is that of a multinational corporation. Before delving into the nuanced questions related to tax planning and CSR, the concept of a multinational was clarified in this chapter. This chapter explained the specifics of the concept of a multinational that is used in this research.

First, the definition of a multinational corporation was analyzed. For the purposes of this research, a corporation is considered as a separate entity controlled by its managers and not, for example, as the sum of its owners nor as an extension of the state. Therefore, a corporation, as discussed within this research, is a distinct legal person with rights independent from the rights of the individual stakeholders. Moreover, as a part of society and as an institution that can make (moral) choices, a corporation is considered to have moral agency.

A multinational corporation differs from a national corporation and also from small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), because it operates in several jurisdictions. Multinationals are networks that, in general, have little specific national identification, despite the fact that they do have a home country. It was further explained that, for the purposes of this research, a multinational as such is considered as one entity, even though it consists of a group of corporate entities. A multinational has the possibility to set up these separate entities in different jurisdictions for tax planning purposes and this is what is most relevant for the purposes of this research. In order to better understand the decision-making process of such a multinational in relation to tax planning, corporate governance is studied in chapter 5 of this research.

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³⁵⁹ Bonner, J. and Friedman, A. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility: Who's Responsible? Finding an Organizational Home for an Increasingly Critical Function. *working paper*, New York University; Byrum, K. (2015). The Role of the Public Relations Professional in Corporate Social Responsibility Communication. *CSRWire*.

³⁶⁰ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 157.

³⁶¹ Farrer & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 4.

³⁶² Mitchell, L. E. (2007). The Board as a Path toward Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 279-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 283.

The special characteristics and possibilities that multinationals possess allow them also to enjoy a specific kind of corporate power that is distinct from most individuals and SMEs. Moreover, transnational corporations operate in a sphere where national regulations are weak. For instance, some multinationals have started using mismatching national tax laws to extremes by using their corporate power. Therefore, it was explained that, in the case of tax planning, multinationals often have a power that can even overrule the state power. With regard to tax planning, multinationals possess multidimensional corporate power, which consists of corporate lobbying power, extensive knowledge and a strong negotiation position, and global mobility. Consequently, the corporate power of multinationals puts them in positions where they have a possibility to make (im)moral choices.

The special character of multinationals allows them to operate on a global level where there is often a regulatory vacuum. To keep multinationals accountable towards the societies in which they operate, the need for transparency arises. Transparency is necessary to make corporations accountable for their actions and to reflect on their own decisions and direct them towards moral choices. In case multinationals abuse their corporate power or do not meet their responsibilities toward society in other ways, they may face several corporate risks. One of the most relevant in the context of this research is the risk to their reputation. Reputation reflects stakeholder trust in a corporation and its actions. Trust is a foundation of every relationship – both business and personal relationships.

Naturally, companies are set up to make profit and, from a company perspective, taxes are usually seen rather as costs. In order to make profit, companies should keep their costs low. Therefore, multinational corporations, as any other taxpayers, plan their taxes.³⁶³ However, multinationals have to manage different risks and reduce the unnecessary costs. It was argued in this chapter that taxes are (to a certain extent) a means for companies to manage some important risks related to the creation of a well-functioning society. In order to reduce such risks, multinationals should invest in public goods and services by paying their fair share of tax.

Every member of a society should pay his or her share of tax. This research argues that taxes are an important contribution to a society and that, next to legal and economic dimensions, taxes also have a moral dimension. Morality addresses not only the question as to how one ought to live as an individual, but also how individuals interact with other individuals. Thus, being part of a society entails moral rights and obligations. Society consists of individuals and organizations, including businesses. Like individuals, businesses interact with other members of society and thus affect others and benefit from their actions. Companies benefit from society through all kinds of public goods funded by taxes. Therefore, corporations are expected to contribute to society, because they are moral agents that can make (im)moral choices when it comes to tax planning. The question of morality and fairness is, namely, about how multinationals behave in relation to the societies in which they operate. Thus, in case multinationals pay (almost) no taxes in the societies in which they operate, they are not contributing to this society and this can be considered irresponsible towards these societies. The corporate decision making with regard to tax planning is, nevertheless, a complex process that relies on the input of various advisors and stakeholders.

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³⁶³ See chapter 3.

3. THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY OF TAX PLANNING UNDER QUESTION

3.1. Introduction

In recent years, scandals such as the so-called ‘Panama Papers’³⁶⁴ and ‘Lux Leaks’,³⁶⁵ but also the European Commission State Aid investigations³⁶⁶ as well as international political responses and regulatory changes,³⁶⁷ have accelerated discussions around corporate tax planning. International corporate tax planning has become a heavily debated topic in media, politics, and academia, both, in the national and international spheres. On the one hand, multinational corporations are accused of not paying (enough) tax.³⁶⁸ On the other hand, international tax planning stays strictly within the limits of the law as an acceptable and reasonable business practice.³⁶⁹

A range of multinationals such as Starbucks, Google, Apple, and Amazon, have been questioned about their tax planning strategies in different states in which they operate.³⁷⁰ For instance, during the last few years, Starbucks has appeared in the media headlines as one of the biggest tax avoiders in Europe.³⁷¹ This American multinational is accused of paying very low corporate income tax rates in Europe while having various business entities in different countries without solid economic substance (stateless income).³⁷² Starbucks is a widely used example in various academic papers; however, it is not the only multinational company whose tax practices have been criticized. Also, for example, Google has been questioned about its tax planning strategies all over the world – in the UK, US, and Australia.³⁷³ According to its various representatives, however, Google believes that it pays a lot of taxes according to the law and, if the lawmaker wishes them to pay more, the laws should be changed accordingly.³⁷⁴ Such cases provide substance for many heated discussions among tax professionals as well as non-professionals.

As a result, there is a range of contradicting opinions and several vague and sometimes even misleading ideas and terminology. For instance, concepts such as tax evasion and tax avoidance

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³⁶⁴ International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). The Panama Papers.

³⁶⁵ International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. (ICIJ). Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies' Secrets Exposed.

³⁶⁶ See European Commission. *State Aid: Tax Rulings*. Overview webpage.

³⁶⁷ See e.g. OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing; European Commission. (2016). Anti Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP).

³⁶⁸ See e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited; Birrell, I. (2014, January 6). Bill Gates Preaches the Aid Gospel, but is He Just a Hypocrite? *The Guardian*; The Tax Justice Network comment on this *The Guardian* article: Tax Justice Network (TJN) (2014, January 6). *Bill Gates: Is He Just a Hypocrite?*; Conway, Z. (2015, May 29). BBC Uncovers 'Aggressive' Tax Avoidance Scheme. *BBC News*; Setzler, B. (2014, January 17). The Real Tax Threat to American Businesses. *US News*.

³⁶⁹ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. Ev 2-3, Ev 6, Ev 24, footnote 2; Bill Gates' response in, see e.g. Birrell, I. (2014, January 6). Bill Gates Preaches the Aid Gospel, but is he Just a Hypocrite? *The Guardian*; Tim Cook's response in Oliver, C et al. (2016, April 4). Apple's Tax Affairs Spark a Transatlantic Face-off. *Financial Times* (online); see also Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558.

³⁷⁰ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited; U.S.: Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2012, September 20). Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code - Part 1 (Microsoft & Hewlett-Packard); Parliament of Australia. List of Public Hearings Related to Tax Avoidance and Aggressive Tax Planning (2015-2016). See also European Commission. (2017, October 4). State aid: Commission Finds Luxembourg Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Amazon Worth Around €250 Million.

³⁷¹ See e.g. Fairless, T. (2015, April 6). Huge Profit Stokes Concerns over Starbucks's Tax Practices in Europe. *The Wall Street Journal* (online).

³⁷² See e.g. Kleinbard, E. D. (2013). Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks's Stateless Income Planning. *Tax Notes*, 1515-1535.

³⁷³ See e.g. Wade, M. (2015, April 9). Tax Avoidance Hearing: Google, Microsoft and Apple Tell Senate Committee They Fully Comply with Australian Laws. *The Sydney Morning Herald*; Aston, H. et al. (2015, April 11). Senate Tax Inquiry: Google, Apple, Microsoft Policies Highlight Golden Days of Tax Laxness. *The Sydney Morning Herald*; UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. pp. 9-10 (pts. 10-11); Bowers, S. (2016, January 29). Google's Tax Deal with the UK: Key Questions Answered. *The Guardian* (online); Callahan, D. (2010, October 21). Google's Tax Avoidance: So Much for "Don't Be Evil". *The Huffington Post* (online).

³⁷⁴ Wade, M. (2015, April 9). Tax Avoidance Hearing: Google, Microsoft and Apple Tell Senate Committee They Fully Comply with Australian Laws. *The Sydney Morning Herald*.

are often mixed up with each other.³⁷⁵ Moreover, additional concepts such as aggressive tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning are added.³⁷⁶ In addition, vague and subjective terms such as fair share, fair play, and spirit of the law are used, often without a clear definition.³⁷⁷ Consequently, tax debates are moving beyond the legal discussion towards morality. “We are not accusing you of being illegal, we are accusing you of being immoral”³⁷⁸ is the famous statement of that aptly summarises the public rage around this issue.³⁷⁹ Indeed, on some points, the morality of corporate legal tax planning can be questioned; nevertheless, I do not agree that all kinds of tax planning are immoral *per se*. Based on (business) ethics, it can be argued that certain kinds of tax planning are socially irresponsible, as I will explain later in chapter 4.

In light of such described international discussions and developments, the aim of this chapter is on clarifying the different aspects of the tax planning debate in order to understand the tension points between socially responsible and irresponsible international corporate tax planning practices. Corporate tax planning is, namely, not only a matter of strict compliance with the law, but it also has political, economic, and moral dimensions. Therefore, discussions around tax planning are complex and contain ethical nuances that should not be crowded out. For the purposes of this research, the moral element of tax planning is examined and the societal acceptability, which is a tool to assess corporate (ir-)responsibility, of tax planning is discussed.

This part of the research offers a theoretical framework for understanding the different concepts of minimizing tax while staying within the (letter of the) law, such as tax planning, tax mitigation, tax avoidance, and aggressive tax planning. Clarifying such concepts used in debates helps to better understand the core subject and focus of debates on a more basic level. For example, from a public finance perspective, the distinction between the terms tax avoidance (legal) and tax evasion (illegal) is not very crucial, because both result in less taxes paid to the state. From a legal perspective, the distinction is, nevertheless, important, because illegal action may lead to criminal punishment. Such a distinction is not easy to achieve. Moreover, addressing legal activities that have morally unacceptable results is more complicated than fighting illegal activities (which is also not easy by any means). This has also caused a growing number of new concepts and terms that should cover the grey area between illegal and legal but morally unacceptable practices.

This chapter will, nevertheless, not provide one clear answer to what is the right or wrong position in the issues mentioned. It is also not the aim of this research to provide technical definitions or guidelines or ‘check-the-box’ lists for multinationals to identify in which category their tax planning practices fall. On the contrary, it will be proposed that tax planning is a matter of degree and that a common factor behind various different terms is that at a certain level international tax planning becomes socially irresponsible. Therefore, the acceptability of tax planning can vary in some situations. To illustrate the gradations of the moral responsibility of legal tax planning, a continuum is developed (section 4).

This chapter is structured as follows. First, the role of taxation in society is discussed and the functions as well as the moral element of taxes and the concept of highly debated ‘fair share’ will be explained (section 2). Further, in section 3 the various concepts of tax planning used within this research will be defined for the purpose of this research. In section 4, a tax planning legitimacy continuum is developed in order to illustrate the scale on which the societal acceptability of tax planning could be seen. Further, as this research focuses on international corporate tax planning practices, section 5 will provide a brief overview of developments and positions within the OECD

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³⁷⁵ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14.

³⁷⁶ See e.g. De Colle, S. and Bennett, A. M. (2014). State-induced, Strategic, or Toxic? An Ethical Analysis of Tax Avoidance Practices. *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 33 (1), 53-82; Payne, D. M. and Raiborn, C. A. (2015). Aggressive Tax Avoidance: A Conundrum for Stakeholders, Governments, and Morality. *Journal of Business Ethics* online, 1-19.

³⁷⁷ See e.g. Fisher, J. M. (2014). Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social Responsibility. *Boston University Law Review* 94 (1), 337-365; Lanis, R. and Richardson, G. (2015). Is Corporate Social Responsibility Performance Associated with Tax Avoidance? *Journal of Business Ethics* 127 (2), 439-457.

³⁷⁸ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012-13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. Q. 485, p. 40.

³⁷⁹ See also chapter 1, section 6.

and the EU towards the issue of aggressive tax planning. Last, section 6 provides a short summary and conclusion for this chapter.

3.2. The role of taxes in society

When discussing the nuances of the tax planning debate, it is necessary to take a step back to address some basic elements of taxation. Clarifying the principles and initial ideas behind taxation helps to better understand why taxation is necessary and where the obligation to pay taxes originates. Such a theoretical basis is fundamental for the further discussions in this research. From an economic perspective, it can be debatable whether corporate taxes are justified in the first place.³⁸⁰ However, the necessity of corporate taxation from an economic tax-technical perspective is outside the scope of this research. Without aiming to provide an in-depth study on the philosophy of tax law, the following sub-sections use some insights from philosophical theories as a helpful tool to try to better understand the different parties and the arguments in the debates about international corporate tax planning. The reasons behind an obligation to pay taxes will be examined closely. It goes without saying that it is not possible to discuss all the basic elements of taxation in depth here. This section focuses therefore more specifically on the role of taxes in a society that is beneficial for companies. The concept of fair share and morality will also be discussed later in this research with regard to the concept of good tax governance.³⁸¹ The discussions in the following sub-sections in this chapter focus on clarifying the current discussions related to international corporate (aggressive) tax planning with regard to morality and societal expectations.

3.2.1. Functions of taxes

Taxes have three main functions. First, taxes provide funds for governments to operate and to offer essential public goods. A well-functioning government with sufficient funds is essential for modern state and society to exist. The functioning of a state depends on the quality of the public goods and services provided. Public goods that are necessary are for example the military to protect the country, education, health care, a legal system, and infrastructure. The second objective of taxation is to redistribute wealth between citizens, with the aim to achieve a measure of economic equality, welfare, and satisfaction in society through the redistribution of wealth (distributive justice).³⁸² Distributive justice can be seen as a principle that provides “moral guidance for the political processes” and affects “the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies”.³⁸³ Distributive justice is based on the principle that society is responsible for taking care of the less well off. The state should “guarantee that property is distributed through society so that everyone is supplied with a certain level of material means.”³⁸⁴ Consequently, the tax system is a tool for the state to ensure distributive justice. Thirdly, taxation serves as means for the tax legislature to steer citizens’ behaviour to achieve different policy goals.³⁸⁵ This is an extra value-adding function for a (modern) state. In this way, taxation, for example, provides incentives to regulate the market by fostering innovation and starting up new business enterprises, or disincentives through, for instance, excise taxes regulating the consumption of alcohol or environmentally polluting activities.³⁸⁶ Generally

³⁸⁰ See e.g. Bird, R. M. (1996). *Why Tax Corporations? Working paper no. 96-2 prepared for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation*, Ottawa; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2004). *Corporations, Society, and the State: a Defense of the Corporate Tax*. *University of Michigan Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 40; Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-006*; Bärsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 22-24.

³⁸¹ See chapter 6, section 2.

³⁸² Murphy, L. B. and Nagel, T. (2002). *The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 40-42. Even the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone is “entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions” but the state may, if necessary, for instance, impose taxes on the possessions in the public interest. See Council of Europe. *European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)*. p. 33 (Protocol, Art. 1).

³⁸³ Lamont, J. and Favor, C. (2017) Distributive Justice. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Spring Edition. Zalta, E. N. (Ed.).

³⁸⁴ Fleischacker, S. (2004). *A Short History of Distributive Justice*. Cambridge (MA) / London: Harvard University Press. p. 4.

³⁸⁵ Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2006). The Three Goals of Taxation. *Tax Law Review* 60 (1), 1-28. p. 3; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. pp. 229-230.

³⁸⁶ See e.g. Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28.

said, this is a means for governments to regulate the specific behaviour of citizens.³⁸⁷ Based on these three functions, it can be concluded that “taxes are what we pay for a civilized society...”.³⁸⁸ To have a well-functioning society, it has to be organized, which in turn presupposes (agreed) rules to coordinate behaviour. In a modern society, such rules are developed by the state. The state thus has a responsibility to determine the share every member should contribute to the cooperative society.³⁸⁹ Hilling and Ostas aptly argue that “the redistribution of income and wealth involves more than creating tax equality between poor and rich taxpayers.” They provide evidence that “the private concentration of wealth eventually threatens the democratic foundation of a modern society, because it confers social and political power to persons who are not elected by the people.”³⁹⁰ Consequently, the effect that taxation has on equality severely affects people’s purchasing power or health (e.g. via access to health care).³⁹¹ Therefore, states have a responsibility to set up an effective and fair tax system.

While deciding upon the fair share every taxpayer has to contribute, the state also interferes with private ownership of the taxpayers. Private ownership provides that something is owned by a private individual (or organization), as opposed to something public that can be owned (and used) by a larger group of individuals. Money or the work done in order to receive money can be qualified as private ownership. Therefore, some authors see taxes as violating private ownership. The libertarian philosopher Nozick, for example, argued that the initial obligation to pay taxes violates private ownership to an extent that it can be compared to slavery.³⁹² This view underscores a classical liberal-legalist perspective that accepts corporate tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning that complies with the strict letter of the law only.³⁹³ On the other hand, as liberals Holmes and Sunstein rightly argue, without taxes there would be no private ownership in the first place, because, by means of tax money, states provide protection for private ownership without which it would have no value.³⁹⁴ Without discussing the extent a state should interfere with private ownership it is clear that the public goods and services the state offers in return are important for every member of the society, and also for corporations. In addition, “[T]he quality and quantity of public goods supplied by the government depends heavily on the amount of taxes the economic agents are willing to pay.”³⁹⁵

Some believe that the provision of public goods and services should not necessarily be a function of a state. For example, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedman strongly supported the free market and minimal tax, stating that all the benefits that governments seem to provide can be achieved by market regulation.³⁹⁶ His standpoint was that if governments do not build roads, but people see that they do need them, they will do it themselves. Another Nobel Prize-winning economist, Coase, showed for instance that lighthouses, “thought to be the public good *par excellence*” were operated privately in the UK for a long time.³⁹⁷ Hence, the logic is that, if public goods can be organized without governments interfering with private property, paying taxes is unnecessary. Free market regulation would basically be based on competition without government

³⁸⁷ See e.g. Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2006). The Three Goals of Taxation. *Tax Law Review* 60 (1), 1-28. pp. 3-4; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2012). Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles. *International Tax Law Review* 3, 9-42. pp. 13-16.

³⁸⁸ *Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Inland Revenue*, 275 US 87 (1972) O.W. Holmes (dissenting). p. 100.

³⁸⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 15.

³⁹⁰ Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 33-35.

³⁹¹ See more on how taxation influences equality in society and people’s purchasing power in: Wijtvet, L. (2018). The Tax Tectonics: Well-being and Wealth Inequality in Relation to a Shift in the Tax Mix from Direct to Indirect Taxes. *Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research*.

³⁹² Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. 169. See also Vogel, K. (1988). The Justification for Taxation: A Forgotten Question. *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 33 (1), 19-59. pp. 22-23.

³⁹³ Note that, in this research, the term ‘letter of the law’ does not only refer to a literal interpretation of the law but is rather used as a reference to tax planning practices that exploit the technicalities or differences between tax systems by making use of different tax planning techniques like mismatch arrangements or loss-making financial assets artificially allocated to high-tax jurisdictions.

³⁹⁴ Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. R. (2000). *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes*. New York / London: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 59, p. 66.

³⁹⁵ Schön, W. (2005). Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared. *Common Market Law Review* 42 (2), 331-365. p. 335.

³⁹⁶ Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. D. (1980). *Free to Choose: A Personal Statement*. Orlando: Harcourt. e.g. p. 11, pp. 25-37.

³⁹⁷ Mackaay, E. (2000). History of Law and Economics. In Bouckaert, B. and De Geest, G. (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics* (vol. 1) (pp. 65-117). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 65-117.

interference. Nevertheless, Coase did not suggest “any reason to suppose that letting the market deal with externalities will produce a good outcome.”³⁹⁸ Moreover, the question is whether such free market regulation would work for all kinds of public goods, especially considering market failures.

The idea of market self-regulation may seem to work from a pure economic perspective, but there is also a downside to it. Namely, not everybody’s needs, interests, morality, common sense, values, and principles are the same nor are they static. This means that in a free-market, without particular norms (that would also stand for the interests of the less well off), parties could be acting based on their own interest or understanding of justice and morality. This, however, could lead, for example, to price discrimination for using the public goods or services. Such self-interested behaviour is not desirable in a modern society, because it may be harmful for the quality and availability of the benefits a society should provide. In a *laissez-faire* economy, goods or services would only be provided for those who are able to pay the market price. It could work with some goods and services, such as Coase’s example of lighthouses, but it is questionable whether lighthouses are comparable to education, health care, the legal system, or even infrastructure.

A real-life example of the privatization of public goods should provide an answer. In late 1970s, St. Louis (a city in the USA) had financial difficulties and problems maintaining its streets, a public good *par excellence*.³⁹⁹ Instead of raising taxes, the streets were privatized, which resulted in well-maintained streets. However, the owners also often refused to open the streets for public use. As a result, commuting in the city became almost impossible. This situation was especially problematic for Washington University, because many of its students could no longer walk to school, as the streets around the campus were privatized. The university was forced to negotiate with the owners of the streets around the campus to create a special corridor that students could use.⁴⁰⁰ This example proves that not all public goods or services should be traded in free market conditions, regulated by the actors and their behaviours in this market.⁴⁰¹ The reason that some commodities are considered public goods (or services) is that they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.⁴⁰² Unlike in the case of private goods, people cannot be prevented from using a public good. Moreover, if one person enjoys a public good, the other person’s enjoyment of that good is not excluded.⁴⁰³ Nevertheless, public goods may create a free-rider problem.⁴⁰⁴ For example, in the case of national defence, if one person in a state is defended against foreign attack, others are as well. Therefore it would not be possible to charge a fee for this service because many people would not pay if they know that they are defended even without paying.⁴⁰⁵ Such a free-rider issue is solved by state-provided public goods funded by taxes that are collected from everyone (equally).⁴⁰⁶ Taxation is thus the price paid for the availability and the use of public goods and services but also an investment in a well-functioning society.

Like citizens, corporations that benefit from public goods and services in a state without paying taxes can be considered free-riders. Corporations “need healthy societies in order to become and stay healthy themselves.”⁴⁰⁷ This is achieved next to the (good quality of) public goods and services, also via effective distributive justice in a state. Next to moral considerations (taking care of the less well), distributive justice is also a prerequisite for a well-functioning society (in the form of educated workforce or purchasing power of consumers). To fulfil such tasks that are essential

³⁹⁸ Cassidy, J. (2013, September 3). Ronald Coase and the Misuse of Economics. *The New Yorker*.

³⁹⁹ Heath, J. (2002). *Efficient Society Why Canada is as Close to Utopia as it Gets*. Toronto: Viking. p. 58.

⁴⁰⁰ Heath, J. (2002). *Efficient Society Why Canada is as Close to Utopia as it Gets*. Toronto: Viking. p. 58.

⁴⁰¹ Ver Eecke, W. (2008). *Ethical Dimensions of the Economy: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and Merit Goods*. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 6-10, pp. 69-78.

⁴⁰² Nordhaus, W. D. (2006). Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods. In Szenberg, M. et al. (Eds.), *Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 88-98). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 88-98.

⁴⁰³ Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). *Economics of the Public Sector*. New York: Norton. p. 226.

⁴⁰⁴ Hardin, R. (2013). The Free Rider Problem. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Spring Edition. Zalta, E. N. (Ed.).

⁴⁰⁵ Cowen, T. (2008). Public Goods. *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty*.

⁴⁰⁶ Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). *Economics of the Public Sector*. New York: Norton. p. 228.

⁴⁰⁷ Eijssbouts, J. (2011). International Market Regulation, Corporate Governance, CSR and Multinationals. In Muller, S. et al. (Eds.). *The Law of the Future and the Future of Law* (pp. 295-303). Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, p. 297, referring to: Porter, M. E. and Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and Society: The Link between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility. *Harvard Business Review* December issue (online).

for a well-functioning society, states act as intermediary to decide upon the fair share and collection of taxes.⁴⁰⁸ The fair share every taxpayer has to pay is determined in the tax laws. As taxation interferes with private ownership, it needs to be justified and regulated by laws.⁴⁰⁹ The aim of the laws should be “getting companies to pay a fair share of tax in the jurisdiction in which it produces income.”⁴¹⁰ Nevertheless, as Freedman argues, it is inevitable that some taxpayers will “operate closer to the boundaries than others.”⁴¹¹ Freedman further argues, rightly, that “governments have the responsibility to create the right conditions and culture for a generally tax-compliant system which would benefit the entire legitimate business community in keeping costs down and spreading tax burdens fairly.”⁴¹²

3.2.2. Coping with the imperfections of the law

Law is a means “to organize life between the members of a given society at a given time” and it “is a tool that allows society to function.”⁴¹³ It is known for its written rules that form a legal system, which is “a formal public system containing norms regulating (corporate) citizens’ behaviour; it governs behaviour affecting other persons.”⁴¹⁴ In developing a legal system, economic and political considerations, but also certain principles, moral values that guide the behaviour of members of society play an important role. A legal system regulates relationships between members of society and consequently ensures a degree of mutual trust. Next to the legal system, morality is also a public system that guides individuals’ behaviour. However, “it addresses not only the question as to how one ought to live as an individual, but also how individuals should interact with other individuals.” As a set of unwritten rules, morality can be defined as an informal public system that consists of “moral rules, principles, values, ideas and virtues, which, however, may entail conflicting and competing demands.”⁴¹⁵ Even though the legal system should codify public morality, it will never be able to do so exhaustively.⁴¹⁶

Taxpayers’ rights and obligations are laid down in a system of legal rules. Paying taxes as a moral obligation to contribute to the cooperative society⁴¹⁷ is in this way transformed into an elaborate legal system. The legal system is thus seen as “an institutionalization or codification” of ethics into specific principles, rules, and procedures.⁴¹⁸ However, legal rules in a complex society inevitably leave room for different interpretations and choices with regard to the use of the system of tax rules. This can in turn lead to different outcomes, also to outcomes that might be negative for society as a whole,⁴¹⁹ suggesting that, in case legal rules fall short, morality should help to fill in the gaps. Such existing choices lead to a moral dilemma concerning making the right choices in relation to others.

⁴⁰⁸ See e.g. De Wilde, M. F. (2015). *‘Sharing the Pie’: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market*. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. p. 22; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28; Stevens, S. (2014). The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their Fair Share. *Intertax* 42 (11), 702-708.

⁴⁰⁹ Vogel, K. (1988). The Justification for Taxation: A Forgotten Question. *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 33 (1), 19-59; Matsos, G. (2017, May 29). No Taxation without Representation. *Kluwer International Tax Blog*; Schwartz, R. D. and Orleans, S. (1967). On Legal Sanctions. *The University of Chicago Law Review* 34 (2), 274-300.

⁴¹⁰ Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. p. 55.

⁴¹¹ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 368.

⁴¹² Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 387.

⁴¹³ Barak, A. (2011). On Society, Law and Judging. In De Visser, M. and Witteveen, W. (Eds.). *The Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, Views from Europe* (pp. 15-50). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. p. 15.

⁴¹⁴ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 13.

⁴¹⁵ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 14.

⁴¹⁶ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48. p. 41; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 14.

⁴¹⁷ Concept developed by John Rawls: Rawls, J. (1972). *Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 4.

⁴¹⁸ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

⁴¹⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. p. 235.

With respect to tax planning, moral questions have to be addressed, because the legal system is inevitably imperfect. Multinationals' tax practices have proven that legal rules can be used and complied with in different ways, with different moral and societal impacts. This is possible, because tax laws are often complex and unclear. This results in gaps in the law and between different legal systems. These imperfections in the legal rules make circumvention or even manipulation of the rules possible. Interpreting and using the law, therefore, inevitably implies making value judgments.⁴²⁰ Thus, although both morality and the law should guide the behaviour of the members of a society, they are not interchangeable. The law and morality are interconnected, but the law does not exhaust morality. With regard to tax law, "moral responsibility begins where actions are not completely determined by the tax law"⁴²¹ for "[E]ven the best designed and drafted tax laws are not capable of anticipating every new product, service or business model and every taxpayer transaction and structure, particularly those of an aggressive nature or those that are otherwise undertaken for tax avoidance purposes."⁴²² The law, thus, leaves room for interpretation and actions with various outcomes. Morality is a compass for choosing the right actions.

Morality requires the members of society to make certain value judgements and behave (morally) responsibly when making a choice.⁴²³ To my mind, fairness and making right choices is linked to justice. Sandel has argued that justice is in any case "inescapably judgmental".⁴²⁴ According to him "questions of justice are bound up with competing notions of honor and virtue, pride and recognition." Consequently, "[J]ustice is not only about the right way to distribute things" but also "about the right way to value things."⁴²⁵ Thus, morality is individual, but it is bound to society. Holmes and Sunstein have argued that morality is something that comes from inside us and is often also dependent on social norms.⁴²⁶ That means that morality is something that guides (corporate) persons as individuals (intrinsic motivation) and as individuals in relation to others (social norms).⁴²⁷ For example, people may act in a good and legal way without it being required by the law. The same is true for multinationals that, for instance, do not make use of child labour in their factories in developing countries, even though child labour is legal in some of these countries.⁴²⁸ Also companies can thus accept moral obligations towards (internal and external) stakeholders, stretching these obligations beyond the legal obligations.⁴²⁹ Concerning their tax planning practices, multinationals may also opt for a less aggressive stance than minimization within the boundaries of the (letter of the) law.⁴³⁰

Corporate tax planning usually involves a cross-border dimension. Multinationals operate within different legal systems, which leaves them even more room for moral choices. Multinationals are in a position to plan their taxes on the international level and erode their duty to pay a fair share in the societies in which they operate.⁴³¹ Accordingly, multinationals may meet the legal requirements on state level while at the same time eroding their moral responsibilities by taking advantage of a lacking international tax law system. Thus, the problem is that, with regard to aggressive tax planning, multinationals can interpret the law in a self-serving way, choosing to comply only with

⁴²⁰ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. pp. 239–240.

⁴²¹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12–28. p. 14.

⁴²² OECD & IMF. (2017 March). *Tax Certainty: IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers*. p. 20.

⁴²³ See also: Benn, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. p. 13. Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. pp. 30–32.

⁴²⁴ Sandel, M. J. (2010). *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* London: Penguin Books. p. 261.

⁴²⁵ Sandel, M. J. (2010). *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* London: Penguin Books. p. 261.

⁴²⁶ Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. R. (2000). *The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes*. New York / London: W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 162–171.

⁴²⁷ The distinction between moral and social norms is an interesting discussion that falls outside the scope of this research. The underlying starting point in this research is that moral norms and morality are based on personal reasoning in making difference between good and bad, right and wrong. Social norms, on the other hand, are the informal (and usually unwritten) rules that govern behavior in groups and societies. Both moral and social norms influence each other. For an overview of moral and social norms see e.g. Brennan, G. et al. (2013). *Moral and Social Norms*. In Brennan, G. et al. (Eds.). *Explaining Norms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴²⁸ Fisher, C. and Lovell, A. (2009). *Business Ethics and Values: Individual, Corporate and International Perspectives* (3rd Ed.). Essex: Prentice Hall. p. 46.

⁴²⁹ Corporations have moral agency. See chapter 2, section 7.

⁴³⁰ Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70–88. p. 73.

⁴³¹ See more on fair share in chapter 3, section 2.3; chapter 6, section 2.1.

the letter of the law and crowd out moral responsibility. At the same time, however, “the letter of the law is often a poor instrument for guiding taxpayer behaviour” because “it is often unclear how the letter of the law should be interpreted.”⁴³² Moreover, the interpretation of the law is a task of law enforcers, such as judges⁴³³ or tax administrators. This raises a question whether it is justified to expect a taxpayer, a subject of the law, to interpret the law in a certain way. The short answer would be negative. However, corporate boards usually have to calculate legal interpretation into their decision making (with the help of tax advisers), because they need to consider whether their tax planning strategies can be challenged in the court and, if so, how would the judge interpret the law. Usually tax advisors present their advice with a scale of probability whether the alternative tax planning strategies could end up before the judge and whether it could be successful or not.⁴³⁴ Thus, the taxpayer interprets law and takes it into account in its decision making.

Typically, in order to set up an international aggressive tax planning structure, the effects of different laws in different countries need to be combined.⁴³⁵ Thus, international tax planning structures may profit from the interaction between several tax systems.⁴³⁶ Therefore, tax planning is often not simply a matter of interpreting one specific law but combining various laws. In such a situation, multinationals can, but do not necessarily have to, extort the imperfections of the law while justifying one’s position based on pure legality (without underlying morality) of the action (legal-positivist view). In other words, in the case of interpreting laws that are relevant for tax planning (tax laws as well as corporate laws), there is sufficient room for multinationals to opt for an beneficial interpretation of the law, which can lead to acting outside the purpose of various national laws. Nevertheless, in my mind, this does not suggest that all multinationals make use of such a possibility. Such freedom of choice simply indicates that there is room for morality and, thus, for moral responsibility. Gribnau claims that “the tax rules should grosso modo reflect public morality, but there is no identity between the two.”⁴³⁷ Law, being a subject for interpretation, provides choices, which is an essential prerequisite for morality. Therefore, in search for limits and a better understanding of what is acceptable and what is not, or even better, what is defensible and what is not, discussions of morality are inevitable.

It goes without saying that tax laws should ensure that taxpayers are “able to predict with a sufficient degree of certainty the tax consequences of their actions according to the rules created through the legislative process.”⁴³⁸ However, perfection is impossible and laws will always leave room for (aggressive) tax planning.⁴³⁹ National laws often fall short in an international context because of the mismatches between national legal systems. “The power of a government has traditionally been confined to a certain territory” and “as soon as company leaves its home territory and moves part of its production chain to” another country “the legal framework becomes very different.” As a result, “managers can no longer simply rely on the legal framework when deciding

⁴³² Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 235.

⁴³³ For example, in the Netherlands’ legal system there is a concept of *fraus legis* which leaves judges interpretation room when deciding whether tax planning contradicts the purpose of the law, even though all other legal tools agree that it is in accordance with the letter of the law. See more on *fraus legis* in De Wilde, M. F. and Wisman, C. (2016). EATLP 2016: Tax Avoidance Revisited: The Netherlands. *EATLP National Reports*: “Fraus legis addresses legal arrangements typically lacking real practical meaning, which have predominantly been set-up to avoid tax in contradict the intent of the tax legislation. The doctrine allows courts to eliminate legal facts or to substitute these for constructed ones to discover a tax outcome in line with the purpose of the law.” In many other jurisdictions general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR) leave similar room. See also Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 48-51.

⁴³⁴ See e.g. Bruijsten, C. (2016). *Onzekerheid in Fiscale Rechtsvinding*. Doctoral Dissertation. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 355-364. For further research, it would be interesting to try to define the vague concept of aggressive tax planning based on the advice tax advisors give to their clients (e.g. level of probability of surviving tax audit). Brock and Russell argue that “the soundness or legitimacy of these legal opinions is highly dubious.” Brock, G. and Russell, H. (2015). Abusive Tax Avoidance and Institutional Corruption: The Responsibilities of Tax Professionals. *Edmond J. Safra Working Paper* 56. p. 38.

⁴³⁵ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. p. 51.

⁴³⁶ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. p. 51.

⁴³⁷ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 14.

⁴³⁸ Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. p. 38.

⁴³⁹ See e.g. Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. p. 39; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250.

on the right or wrong of certain business practices.” This is the situation in which morality plays a crucial role; “business ethics begins where the law ends”, which means that “globalization increases the demand for business ethics because globalized economic activities are beyond the control of national (territorial) governments.”⁴⁴⁰ This confirms the space for moral responsibility.

Next to inner moral norms (what is the right thing to do?), in a society there are also wider social norms. Wenzel has argued that, while tax ethics refer to the “respondents’ own personal beliefs about the normative appropriateness of tax compliance or noncompliance, social norms refer to their perceptions of what most other people believe is appropriate.”⁴⁴¹ This also ensures that the core reason for people’s actions may differ from the socially acceptable norms. However, such social norms may be strong enough to affect inner morality. In the context of tax planning, there is nothing wrong with companies planning their taxes, as long as they do not override other welfare and rights of others. In other words, multinationals’ decisions need to follow the legal systems as well as moral norms and social expectations. Since law does not exhaustively codify morality and since there are no universal international guidelines (in tax law nor corporate law) for responsible tax behaviour, CSR, as a form of ethical business practices, can be considered to be a helpful tool, as it will be explained in chapter 4 of this research.⁴⁴² Tax planning that evidently does not meet the moral and societal norms calls for public outrage.⁴⁴³ It suggests that such tax planning evaporates a business’ moral responsibility towards society or societies.

3.2.3. ‘Fair share’ and the spirit of the law⁴⁴⁴

Corporations have, in general, a legal obligation to pay corporate income tax. Some argue that this obligation should be considered apart from morality.⁴⁴⁵ According to Erle, “the business process need to ensure that taxes are not overpaid but that legal obligations are fulfilled.”⁴⁴⁶ This seems to be a legal-positivist approach, according to which strictly following the written rules – tax laws – is sufficient to fulfil obligations towards the state and society.⁴⁴⁷ However, the question that is often raised concerns whether corporations are paying their fair share if they fulfil only their written legal obligations while engaging in aggressive tax planning.⁴⁴⁸ There is much discussion about the concept of fair share, the definition of which is not commonly agreed.

For instance, in the Netherlands, the concept of fair share has resulted in a heated debate.⁴⁴⁹ An academic debate between Happé and (Leo) Stevens provides an apt illustration of this discussion. Happé argues that every member of society should pay its fair share, since they are members of a

⁴⁴⁰ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 21.

⁴⁴¹ Wenzel, M. (2005). Motivation or Rationalisation? Causal Relations between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance. *Journal of Economic Psychology* 26 (4), 491-508. p. 493.

⁴⁴² See chapter 4.

⁴⁴³ See e.g. Robinson, D. (2010, October 27). Protesters Target Vodafone over Taxes. *Financial Times (online)*; BBC News. (2012, December 8). UK Uncut Protests Over Starbucks 'Tax Avoidance'. *BBC News (online)*; Watson, J. (2013, April 11). Time to Wake Up - Corporate Abuse of Tax Havens. *International Bar Association*; Irvine, J. (2013, March 1). Public Outrage at Tax Avoidance. *Economia* (ICAEW); Rawlinson, K. (2014, June 15). UK Uncut Protesters Blockade Vodafone Stores Across Country. *The Guardian*.

⁴⁴⁴ Note that the concept of fair share and morality will also be discussed in chapter 6.2.1. of this research, specifically with regard to the concept of good tax governance. The discussion in this sub-section focuses on clarifying the current discussions and the state of the art related to international corporate (aggressive) tax planning with regard to morality and societal expectations.

⁴⁴⁵ See e.g. Friese, A. et al. (2008). Taxation and Corporate Governance – The State of the Art. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 357-425). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 401.

⁴⁴⁶ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 211; Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Honoré, T. (1993). The Dependence of Morality on Law. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 13 (1), 1-17.

⁴⁴⁷ See a discussion on the legal positivist and principles-based approach e.g. in Braithwaite, J. (2002). Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty. *Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy*.

⁴⁴⁸ See e.g. Landry, S. et al. (2013). Tax Aggressiveness, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Ownership Structure. *Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy* 14 (3), 611-645; Oxfam International. (2016). Would You Pay 20 Euros for a Beer? International public campaign on tax avoidance, *YouTube*.

⁴⁴⁹ See e.g. Happé, R. H. (2015). Fiscale Ethiek Voor Multinationals. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/938; Happé, R. H. (2015). De Kleren van de Keizer. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/1208; Bender, T. (2017). Tussen Ethiek en Wet: Een Derde Weg. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 146 (7176), 110-119; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2014). Ethische Aspecten van Tax Planning. *Ars Aequi Maart*, 173-183; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2014). Fiscale Ethiek in de Boardroom. *Vakblad Tax Assurance* 2 (1), 42-49; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250.

cooperative society and make use of public goods, and that members of the society have an obligation to act according to the legal and moral rules established in the societies in which they operate (*nakomingsplicht*). He emphasises that a good corporate citizen is self-restraining (*terughoudendheid*) and moderate (*maatgevoel*).⁴⁵⁰ Happé's stand-points have been criticized by Stevens who argues that a system that is overly complex and flawed inevitably calls for cynical reactions from the taxpayers. According to him, tax rules are no longer a harmonized basis of a society. Stevens thereby places the responsibility to frame the obligation to pay a fair share on the legislature (which is in line with Freedman in the UK).⁴⁵¹ Stevens' main criticism of Happé's argumentation lies in the vagueness and subjectivity of the moral norms that, according to Stevens, cannot fill the gaps in the laws.⁴⁵² Happé answered Stevens' criticism, arguing that Stevens' criticism is out-dated and does not accept the changing nature of international tax law. Happé agrees that both multinationals as well as the lawmaker are not perfect nor is it expected from them to be perfect. Nevertheless, he believes that 'gaming the rules' is unacceptable from a moral perspective.⁴⁵³ I agree that, from a moral perspective, circumventing or manipulating the laws to minimize one's tax burden to the absolute minimum is unacceptable because it implies free-riding behaviour. At the same time, states also need to be clear on the expectations on taxpayers in order to provide legal certainty. In my opinion, both states and multinationals bear the shared (moral) responsibility for a better (tax) system.

The (un)acceptability of the inclusion of the moral perspective in the tax debate is also discussed at the international academic level. For instance, Österman pleads for "the benefit of '*the rule of law*' basis for taxes", because taxpaying is never voluntary and should be regulated.⁴⁵⁴ Besides, Österman seems to claim that accepting the moral dimension of taxation would pass the legislative power over to a society based on ethics. I do agree with Österman that taxes need a strong rule of law. However, as will be shown further, the rule of law is not always perfect. Naturally, this does not mean that the states should lay back and expect society to fix the issue based on ethics. Good tax governance, based on morality, as explained in this research, does not replace the law but accepts a moral responsibility beyond the law, especially in cases where the rule of law falls short. A sustainable tax system is a shared responsibility of various actors, such as states and MNEs but also for instance media that should educate the public and publish an objective picture of the societal problems. States, however, bear the primary responsibility for creating fair legal system and legal certainty.

Freedman, who equates the moral perspective and discussions around fair share with CSR, argues that "companies will engage in CSR only to the extent that it makes business sense for them to do so." Thus, she seems to believe that corporations embrace CSR for reasons of reputation only. Therefore, Freedman is skeptical about corporate moral responsibility and argues that only government regulation could "force companies to make unprofitable decisions, even if they are socially beneficial in a wider sense."⁴⁵⁵ Freedman's skepticism in relation to a corporation's motivation to engage in CSR only when a sufficient business case exists is understandable and also widely discussed in the CSR literature.⁴⁵⁶ However, in my opinion, here Freedman seems to skip a few nuances with regard to CSR. First, not all companies engage in CSR for profit maximization reasons, just as not all companies engage in tax planning for strict profit maximization reasons. Second, Freedman's conceptualization of CSR seems to be too generalized. She considers CSR in relation to tax as "a question of the relationship with governments rather than problems of natural

⁴⁵⁰ Happé, R. H. (2015). Fiscale Ethiek Voor Multinationals. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/938.

⁴⁵¹ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Conneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁵² Stevens, L. G. M. (2015). Fiscale ethiek voor iedereen. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/1060.

⁴⁵³ Happé, R. H. (2015). De kleren van de Keizer. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/1208.

⁴⁵⁴ Österman, R. P. (2018). Perspectives on Corporate Taxation from a Sustainable Business Perspective. In Arvidsson, S. (Ed.) *Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business: Reporting, Taxation, Ethics and Governance* (pp. 371-397). Lund: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 372.

⁴⁵⁵ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Conneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 382.

⁴⁵⁶ See e.g. Carroll, A. B. and Shabana, K. M. (2010). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts. *International Journal of Management Reviews* 12 (1), 85-105; see also chapter 4 on CSR.

or human resources where a norm can be established without government involvement.”⁴⁵⁷ Freedman seems, thus, to argue that CSR is only something that corporations do when governments fall short. I do not disagree with Freedman’s standpoint that it is the task of governments to define the essence of the tax obligation. At the same time, CSR is not suggested as a moral remedy for government’s inactivity. As I will argue further in this research, CSR is a voluntary tool for corporations to meet their moral responsibilities in addition to the legal ones. This is not a responsibility towards the government but a responsibility towards society.

The fair share of tax that multinationals have to pay is a topic that has much to do with the difference between but also interconnectedness of the written law and moral norms. The debates often point out that multinationals can avoid paying their fair share by not following the spirit of the law and focusing only on compliance with the strict letter of the law.⁴⁵⁸ This suggests that the definition of the concept of fair share depends on the vaguely defined concept of the spirit of the law. Corporations that fail to comply with the spirit of the law do not pay a fair share. Even though the concept of the spirit of the law lacks a coherent definition, it seems that, in general, not following the spirit of the law could be understood as consciously avoiding the tax consequences of the law that were meant by the lawmaker.⁴⁵⁹ Thus, simply fulfilling legal obligations based on a strict interpretation of the written legal rules – strict compliance with the letter of the law only – does not seem to suffice. Due to the imperfect laws, the spirit of the law is not a clearly defined concept. Moreover, socially responsible corporations are not expected to act as perfect (corporate) citizens. Therefore, as I will argue below, it is better to start from the other end by asking what is unfair, suggesting that paying corporate income tax is a legal and moral obligation of corporations. In my opinion, the irresponsible element of tax planning is not just the literal interpretation of the law, but rather an interpretation of the law that leads to tax planning techniques which intentionally exploit the technicalities or differences between tax systems by making use of different tax planning techniques.⁴⁶⁰

Hasseldine and Morris, however, are critical about distinguishing between the letter and the spirit of the law. Making a difference between the letter and the spirit of the tax law “appears to ignore the purpose of the tax code, which among other purposes, is to identify in a reasonably clear manner events that are to be taxed or events that lead to a tax benefit or credit”, they write. Thus, Hasseldine and Morris choose the legal-positivist view, suggesting that “there is nothing beyond the tax code.”⁴⁶¹ For their argumentation, they rely on Lord Hoffman who claims that the only way in which the lawmaker “can express an intention to impose a tax is by statute, which means that such a tax is imposed. If that is what [the lawmaker] means, the courts should be trusted to give effect to its intention.”⁴⁶² In my opinion, if courts can give effect to the lawmakers’ intention, then this means that the laws are always open to interpretation. Furthermore, if courts can interpret laws, other actors such as companies can also do that. The tension between the spirit and the letter of the law leads, thus, to a question whether governments should take care of clearer laws that reflect the spirit of the law⁴⁶³ or whether the companies should interpret laws less egoistically.⁴⁶⁴ I do agree that

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⁴⁵⁷ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 383.

⁴⁵⁸ Happé, R. (2015). Ethics and International Tax Planning. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 49-71). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. Russo & Van Trigit.

⁴⁵⁹ See e.g. OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 60. See also Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁶⁰ As will be explained later, also states have a primary for ensuring that the differences between tax systems do not enable taxpayers to pay an unfair share.

⁴⁶¹ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14. p. 11.

⁴⁶² Hoffman, L. (2005). Tax Avoidance. *British Tax Review* 2, 197-206. As cited in Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14. p. 12.

⁴⁶³ See e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Stevens, L. G. M. (2015). Fiscale ethiek voor iedereen. *Weekblad fiscaal recht* 2015/1060; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28.

⁴⁶⁴ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. section XI. 2; Happé, R. (2007). Multinationals, Enforcement Covenants and Fair Share. *Intertax* 35 (10), 537-547; Stevens, S. (2014). The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their

laws should determine how and how much taxes should be paid and that there should be one ‘meaning’ for every taxpayer. However, in my opinion, this does not mean that, as long as the law does not literally forbid certain behaviour, it should not be criticized, as some legal positivists tend to believe. Legal behaviour does not always equal to legitimate behaviour.

Russo and Van Trigt claim that “fair share in the context of taxes means to pay taxes in a jurisdiction corresponding to the economic benefits that are enjoyed in that jurisdiction.”⁴⁶⁵ They also add that “ideally, fair share and the letter of the legislation should amount to the same thing.”⁴⁶⁶ In the same vein, Gribnau argues that ideally “tax legislation serves (formal) legal equality and legal certainty, for the legislature determines the amount of tax to be paid and lays this down in tax laws.” Accordingly, the main task of the lawmaker within the framework of tax law is “the distribution of the tax burden over members of society.”⁴⁶⁷ Thus, there seems to be an agreement on the fact that the legislature is responsible for decreasing the mismatch between the letter and the spirit of the law, which is necessary to establish a fair and effective tax system. Consequently, the fair share every taxpayer should pay is ideally determined in the tax laws.⁴⁶⁸ In other words, it is the government’s responsibility to produce laws with comprehensible spirit, meaning, or purpose and to make sure that the laws ensure the fair distribution of tax burden among the taxpayers. However, as explained, the law is almost always subject to interpretation.⁴⁶⁹ This means that taxpayers (especially multinationals⁴⁷⁰) have the possibility to focus only on the letter of the law and to interpret it in their own favour, ignoring the spirit of the law. It is clear from the public outrage that this is unacceptable and some would say also unfair.

Legal rules should ideally give a concrete form to morality. As explained in the previous section, the legal obligation to pay tax derives from the written legal rules, which are inevitably “imperfect, ambiguous, lagging behind societal, economic and technical developments and taxpayers’ undesirable use of legislation.”⁴⁷¹ According to Peters, there are taxpayers that have the possibility to engage in international tax planning, such as multinationals, “confronted with two (mutually reinforcing) incentives.” They can either “comply with international tax law because they are forced to do so, or they can comply with international tax law because they feel that there are good (normative) reasons to pay their ‘fair share’.” This implies, in the words of Peters, thus, that “international tax law is either regarded to be a ‘fact’ that can be objectively understood (and manipulated), or as a social ‘norm’ that deserves recognition.”⁴⁷² To this also personal moral norm or living up to a moral responsibility, can be added.

For the purposes of this research, the fair share of tax every taxpayer should pay is understood as a tax burden that derives from the combination of the letter and the spirit of the law. This view is, in general, consistent with the positions of Happé,⁴⁷³ Gribnau,⁴⁷⁴ and (Stan) Stevens.⁴⁷⁵ Thus, this research considers paying tax not only a legal but also a moral obligation. However, as the concept

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Fair Share. *Intertax* 42 (11), 702-708; Russo, R. and Van Trigt, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Taxes. In Russo, R. (Ed.). *Tax Assurance* (pp. 23-48). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 31; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250; Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.

⁴⁶⁵ Russo, R. and Van Trigt, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Taxes. In Russo, R. (Ed.). *Tax Assurance* (pp. 23-48). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 31. Compare also to Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 362.

⁴⁶⁶ Russo, R. and Van Trigt, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Taxes. In Russo, R. (Ed.). *Tax Assurance* (pp. 23-48). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 31.

⁴⁶⁷ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 13.

⁴⁶⁸ See also Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 361.

⁴⁶⁹ See chapter 3, section 2.2.

⁴⁷⁰ See chapter 2, section 3.

⁴⁷¹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28. p. 15.

⁴⁷² Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. pp. 306-307. His argumentation is inspired by the work of J. Habermas.

⁴⁷³ Happé, R. H. (2015). Fiscale Ethiek Voor Multinationals. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/938; Happé, R. H. (2015). De Kleren van de Keizer. *Weekblad Fiscaal Recht* 2015/1208; Happé, R. (2015). Ethics and International Tax Planning. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 49-71). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

⁴⁷⁴ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28.

⁴⁷⁵ Stevens, S. (2014). The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their Fair Share. *Intertax* 42 (11), 702-708.

of the spirit of the law is vague, it raises a question whether the fair share is an objective reality that has a sound basis in the legal system or subjective perception of certain actors. Therefore, I believe that it is easier to find common grounds when starting from the other end – what is unfair? Consequently, the concept of ‘fair share’ in this research then refers not to corporate tax planning practices that do not comply with the ‘spirit of the law’ but to corporate tax practices that go beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law. Such corporate tax practices are, in my opinion, in general evidently not unfair. This starting point is in line with the argumentation with regard to corporate social *ir*responsibility, as will be explained later in this research.⁴⁷⁶ Going beyond pure compliance with the law has procedural⁴⁷⁷ and substantial dimensions, as I will explain in chapter 6 of this research, and it involves both the law and underlying morality and social norms.

The substantial dimension is not separate from the procedural one. However, the substantial dimension could be more linked to distributive justice and fair competition. In the context of distributive justice, it can be argued that multinationals that engage in aggressive tax planning are not contributing their fair share of tax to society and its public goods and services. This is because, if multinationals pay almost no tax (especially, as a result of aggressive tax planning techniques), other members of the society have to pay more or they suffer from more expensive or less public goods.⁴⁷⁸ As a result, current tax planning practices of several multinationals do result in accusations of paying an unfair share and societal outrage.⁴⁷⁹ Failing to pay a fair share of tax in this respect can, for instance, even be linked to an increased wealth gap and inequality in society.⁴⁸⁰ For example, in 2013, the MSCI research identified 213 multinationals that (likely, based on aggressive tax planning strategies) pay much less tax than their peers: calling it a ‘tax gap’. The research argued that, if these 213 companies would have paid taxes comparable to their peers, they would have paid “an estimated USD 70 billion per year in aggregate” more.⁴⁸¹ This, in turn, “could have reduced aggregate profit after taxes across these companies by approximately 20%.” MSCI adds that, even though the economic conditions in the major European markets and the US have improved, “the continuation of fiscal imbalances coupled with distrust of the corporate sector will likely continue to shine a spotlight on companies’ inscrutable tax strategies.”⁴⁸² To improve the general public image, transparency is key, as will be argued in chapter 6.

Both fair play and fair share have moral elements. First, society is a cooperative venture⁴⁸³ and all the members are expected to contribute fairly to upholding the system; second, the right to benefit from the society creates a (moral) obligation to contribute to this society. In case of international corporate tax planning, a multinational, in essence, has a choice with regard to how it interprets the law (whether it deviates from the spirit of the law or not). As a result, in moral terms, the board of a multinational can choose to what extent it contributes in the societies in which it operates. Operating in a cross-border situation increases the possibility and extent of the choices.⁴⁸⁴ Such an international context complicates the national legislators’ opportunities (for instance, due to information asymmetry or tax competition between the states) to reduce the gap between the letter and the spirit of the law. Therefore, this issue needs international cooperation (of states), which will be discussed later in this chapter. There can be many theoretical discussions on the relationship between the letter and the spirit of the law in the context of the national legal system. The international context adds a different dimension to this dilemma, however.

⁴⁷⁶ See chapter 4, section 3.3.

⁴⁷⁷ Compare with ‘fair play’ in the words of Rawls as discussed in Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). Voluntary Compliance beyond the Letter of the Law: Reciprocity and Fair Play. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 173-201). Intersentia, Antwerpen. e.g. pp. 37-43.

⁴⁷⁸ See e.g. Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.), *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 419.

⁴⁷⁹ See e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

⁴⁸⁰ See e.g. Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). *The Price of Inequality. How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future*. New York / London: W.W. Norton & Company.

⁴⁸¹ MSCI ESG Research. (2013, December). The ‘Tax Gap’ in the MSCI World. *ESG Issue Brief*. p. 4.

⁴⁸² MSCI ESG Research. (2013, December). The ‘Tax Gap’ in the MSCI World. *ESG Issue Brief*. p. 4.

⁴⁸³ Rawls, J. (1972). *Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 4.

⁴⁸⁴ See chapter 2.

3.2.4. Concluding remarks

With tax laws, states decide on the legal obligation to pay tax – what is the fair share every taxpayer has to contribute. Therefore, every member of a society should pay taxes according to the law. The legal rules are, however, inevitably not perfect. This imperfection can lead to unexpected and undesired results, for instance, in the context of international corporate tax planning. Aggressive tax planning practices of some multinationals have resulted in discussions in the field of morality, suggesting that corporations should pay their fair share of tax. The fair share of tax every taxpayer should pay is often understood as a tax burden that derives from the combination of the letter and the spirit of the law. In order to minimize the possible misunderstandings by using vague idealistic terms, this research starts from the other end: what is unfair instead of what is fair? Therefore, the concept of ‘fair share’ in this research refers to corporate tax practices that go beyond the pure compliance with the letter of the law, which has procedural and substantial dimensions. The procedural dimension concerns investing in public goods and services without free-riding while the substantial dimension is related to distributive justice and fair competition. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive and both include a moral layer.

It goes without saying that the obligation to pay tax comes from the law. However, the law is ambiguous or not internationally harmonized. For instance, in order to avoid double taxation, taxpayers usually plan their taxes by being aware of the effects of various laws on their tax burden. From an economic point of view, tax is often considered a cost and therefore tax planning plays an important role for corporate entities.⁴⁸⁵ Therefore, multinationals need to make choices that take account of their economic needs but at the same time that are not harmful to society at large. It cannot be claimed that any kind of tax planning is immoral. However, a purely legal behaviour is not always ethical and vice versa. Thus, the question is usually not whether to engage tax planning but rather to what extent. Therefore, the degrees of tax planning will be given further attention in the following section.

3.3. Degrees of tax planning

Taxation builds the financial backbone of a society. Tax laws determine the legal obligation to pay tax and the fair share every taxpayer has to contribute. In order not to pay more than the law requires, taxpayers usually plan their taxes by being aware of the effects of various laws on their tax burden. From an economic point of view, tax is a cost and therefore tax planning plays an important role for corporate entities. Also, the MSCI research mentioned above illustrates well the effect of tax planning: it has a potential to increase after-tax business profits by approximately 20%.⁴⁸⁶

Tax planning can be carried out in various ways, which are described in different terms. In legal literature, two main categories used are tax avoidance and tax evasion. In general, tax avoidance is not breaking (the letter of) the law. Tax evasion, on the other hand, is an illegal act, which consists of illegal arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored.⁴⁸⁷ Tax avoidance is thus legal, while tax evasion is illegal. Tax evasion violates both the letter and the spirit of the law. This research focuses on tax planning activities that remain within the boundaries of the law, because illegal activities would need a different theoretical approach. Thus, tax evasion will not be given further attention.

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⁴⁸⁵ However, it is arguable whether tax should be considered as a cost or for instance as a distribution, similar to dividends. See also Henriques, A. (2007). *Corporate Truth: The Limits of Transparency*. Sterling: Earthscan. p. 114.

⁴⁸⁶ MSCI ESG Research. (2013, December). The ‘Tax Gap’ in the MSCI World. *ESG Issue Brief*. p. 4.

It has to be noted, however, that such estimates should be considered with a certain level of precaution, because it is very difficult, if not possible, to calculate such effects exactly.

⁴⁸⁷ OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#A> (accessed 03.03.2019); Merks, P. (2006). Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning. *Intertax* 34 (5), 272-281; Freedman, J. (2004). Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle. *British Tax Review* 4, 332-357. pp. 347-350.

Tax planning activities that remain within the boundaries of the law can be divided into a number of sub-categories. In this research, which focuses on the corporate decision-making process, the categorizing of tax-planning activities is based on a corporate intention to minimize tax costs. While intention, as such, is often difficult to prove within the legal context, this research aims to point out some general activities that indicate whether corporate tax planning activities simply take tax into account or, for instance, use it for profit maximization purposes. This research differentiates between tax mitigation, tax avoidance, and aggressive tax planning. These concepts are also the most used in the international literature and rule making. Having said that, there is remarkably little consensus in the definition of these terms. For the purposes of this research, these terms thus need some further clarification. The aim of the following sub-sections is not to provide in-depth and uniform definitions but merely to explain the concepts used throughout this research. The aim is to illustrate the existence of corporate behaviour that might be legal but not always legitimate, which is an important distinction in order to understand the further discussions on ‘going beyond the law’ later in this research.⁴⁸⁸

3.3.1. Tax planning and mitigation

Tax planning is a legal way to take into account the tax effects of various laws and rules. This is something that every taxpayer does to a certain extent whether this is intentional or not. Tax planning means that a taxpayer tries to be in control of his/her finances by being aware of the impacts of taxation and by adjusting behaviour accordingly (e.g. by using tax reliefs and incentives), for instance to avoid double-taxation.⁴⁸⁹ For the purposes of this research, tax planning is seen as a general term expressing steps that a taxpayer can take as a response to tax legislation within the boundaries of the law. If a taxpayer simply considers tax as a cost and pays its legal dues without actively seeking possibilities to lower such costs at all, this taxpayer is not engaging in tax planning. Furthermore, tax planning is not always tax avoidance or aggressive, which will be discussed in the following sub-sections. Sometimes tax planning is for example necessary to avoid double-taxation. Nevertheless, any form of tax mitigation or avoidance inevitably includes at least some degree of tax planning.

The first step of tax planning is when a taxpayer adopts “a course of action that is clearly (and, ordinarily, expressly) encouraged by the relevant legislation.”⁴⁹⁰ This is called tax mitigation.⁴⁹¹ Such tax planning is considered “valid under relevant legislation (including relevant specific anti-avoidance rules), and not vulnerable to a GAAR, either statutory or judge-made.”⁴⁹² Tax mitigation constitutes legitimate tax planning that uses “tax reliefs for the purpose in which they were intended,”⁴⁹³ such as the legitimate use of tax reliefs and incentives. Tax mitigation, thus, complies with the letter and the spirit of the law. De Colle and Bennet call it a ‘state-induced avoidance’ because this kind of tax planning makes use of schemes that are “explicitly introduced by the government to achieve socially desirable ends.”⁴⁹⁴ Within tax mitigation, the steps taken by the taxpayers that result in reducing the tax burden have a “commercial purpose apart from tax advantage.”⁴⁹⁵ Tax mitigation occurs, for example, when companies that reduce their negative impact on the environment and they therefore benefit from tax incentives that are introduced for

⁴⁸⁸ See chapter 4, section 3.2; chapter 6.

⁴⁸⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 226.

⁴⁹⁰ Prebble, Z. M. and Prebble, J. (2010). The Morality of Tax Avoidance. *Creighton Law Review* 43 (3), 693–745. p. 706.

⁴⁹¹ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12–28. p. 22.

⁴⁹² Prebble, Z. M. and Prebble, J. (2010). The Morality of Tax Avoidance. *Creighton Law Review* 43 (3), 693–745. p. 706.

⁴⁹³ UK PAC HMRC. (2012, October 18). Measuring Tax Gaps 2012; Tax Gap Estimates for 2010–11. An Official Statistics Release. p. 8.

⁴⁹⁴ De Colle, S. and Bennett, A. M. (2014). State-induced, Strategic, or Toxic? An Ethical Analysis of Tax Avoidance Practices. *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 33 (1), 53–82. p. 68.

⁴⁹⁵ Templeman, S. (2001). Tax and the Taxpayer. *Law Quarterly Review* 117, 575–588, p. 579 (as referred to in De Colle, S. and Bennett, A. M. (2014). State-induced, Strategic, or Toxic? An Ethical Analysis of Tax Avoidance Practices. *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 33 (1), 53–82).

companies that reduce their negative impact on the environment. In this way, tax mitigation can be identified most clearly at the national level.

In the international context, multinationals mitigating their taxes pay according to the applicable tax legislation in the countries in which they operate. In a cross-boarder situation, tax mitigation takes advantage of national tax legislation by setting up corporate operations without re-arranging its global business operations with the (sole) purpose of tax minimization. At a certain point, making use of such tax planning possibilities, however, can no longer be qualified as tax mitigation (especially when intentionally abusing such rights). Tax mitigation can, namely, easily progress from legal and legitimate tax planning into legal tax planning the legitimacy of which is under question – tax avoidance.

3.3.2. Tax avoidance

According to the OECD, tax avoidance is difficult to define, but it means that a taxpayer arranges his affairs with the intention to reduce his tax liability beyond the tax incentives intended by the lawmaker and, even though the arrangement could be strictly legal, it is usually considered to be in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow.⁴⁹⁶ This definition is roughly in line with the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) test on unacceptable tax avoidance that includes objective (result of the transaction and the purpose of the law) and subjective (intent) elements.⁴⁹⁷ Tax avoidance is understood as a legal way to adapt one's actions intentionally in order to reduce the possible tax effects of various rules. Tax avoidance intentionally seeks out legal gaps for tax planning purposes. Therefore, in this research, tax avoidance is a form of tax planning that takes a step further from tax mitigation.

In general, international tax avoidance is understood as a tax reducing activity that is practiced by operating in compliance with different laws in various countries. The ECJ, for instance, has confirmed that, from a legal perspective, in the EU, a corporation can profit from the Freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty Freedoms), such as free movement of persons and goods.⁴⁹⁸ In its earlier cases, such as *Centros*⁴⁹⁹ or *Avoir Fiscal*,⁵⁰⁰ the ECJ accepted that the Treaty Freedoms also guarantee, to a certain extent, the free movement of taxpayers, thereby increasing the risk of tax avoidance in the EU.⁵⁰¹ Under these Treaty Freedoms, corporations could choose to incorporate in a Member State that has a more beneficial tax system.⁵⁰² The ECJ has repeatedly confirmed this by stating that "taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax liability."⁵⁰³ Moreover, EU law does not require a taxpayer to choose an alternative business transaction that involves paying higher tax.⁵⁰⁴ Based on the principle of legal certainty⁵⁰⁵ the ECJ case law prescribed until recently that, only in case of clear abuse, a taxpayers rights based on Treaty Freedoms can be withdrawn. However, the ECJ's view on tax avoidance

⁴⁹⁶ OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#A> (accessed 03.03.2019).

⁴⁹⁷ Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 340.

⁴⁹⁸ For an overview of EU tax (case) law see: Weber, D. (2013). Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ - part 1. *European Taxation* 53 (6), 251-264; Weber, D. (2013). Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ - part 2. *European Taxation*, 53(7), 313-32.

⁴⁹⁹ ECJ. (1999, March 9). Case C-212/97. *Centros*.

⁵⁰⁰ ECJ. (1983). Case C-270/83, *Commission v. French Republic*.

⁵⁰¹ Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 340.

⁵⁰² The direct tax rates are not harmonized in the EU and the Member States have the power to levy direct taxes.

⁵⁰³ ECJ. (2006, February 21). Case C-255/02. *Halifax*. para. 73. (note that this case concerns VAT).

⁵⁰⁴ In the area of VAT, see ECJ. (2006, February 21). Case C-255/02 *Halifax*; with regard to the Capital Tax Directive (69/335), see ECJ. (2007, June 7). Case C-178/05, *Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic*; for direct taxation, see ECJ. (2006, September 12). ECJ. (2006, September 12). Case C-196/04. *Cadbury Schweppes*.

⁵⁰⁵ Weber, D. (2013). Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ - part 1. *European Taxation* 53 (6), 251-264.

seems to be developing in the last years.⁵⁰⁶ In more recent cases,⁵⁰⁷ the ECJ prohibits unacceptable tax avoidance more actively if objective (result of the transaction and the purpose of the law) and subjective (intent) elements of the Court's test are present.⁵⁰⁸ In the so-called Danish beneficial ownership cases, the ECJ even made clear that a Member State should apply the general EU anti-abuse doctrine when it has not implemented specific anti-avoidance legislation in its national legislation.⁵⁰⁹

Based on the development of the EU case law, Brokelind and Wattel suggest that the ECJ has moved from a case-by-case assessment of the presence of actual abuse to general presumptions of abuse, providing the Member States more room to fight aggressive tax planning.⁵¹⁰ In other words, there are some signs that illustrate a change of direction in the ECJ case law. The ECJ is clearly trying to find a new proper balance between respecting the Treaty Freedoms on the one hand and prohibiting the use of the EU law to obtain an unaccepted tax advantage on the other hand.⁵¹¹ Nevertheless, this does not mean that the taxpayers are not allowed to opt for "the most tax-efficient route if there are several possibilities to attain a (mostly) non-tax aim."⁵¹² Currently there is a lot of discussion about the interpretation of the already mentioned Danish beneficial ownership cases which seem to add a new chapter to this discussion.⁵¹³ For the purposes of this research it suffices to conclude that the developments in the ECJ's case law illustrate that the boundaries between strictly legal and moral behaviour are shifting. As Freedman states, tax avoidance is "reprehensible where the legal analysis deviates from the economic substance and this is the case regardless of the wording of the legislation in question."⁵¹⁴ In other words, the law is interpreted for the purpose of corporate profit maximization, even if it means ignoring corporate moral and social responsibilities. In contrast to tax mitigation, the social legitimacy of tax avoidance is not clear anymore, because tax avoidance constitutes paying less tax than could be expected when interpreting the law in a way as was intended by the legislator.⁵¹⁵

Naturally, there are various possibilities for avoiding corporate income tax.⁵¹⁶ For illustration purposes, several countries have introduced tax incentives for research and development (R&D), such as a lower rate of corporation income tax on profits that are earned from using patented inventions or other innovations that include intellectual property (depending on the specific country legislation); this is often referred to as patent box or innovation box.⁵¹⁷ The aim of such incentives is usually to encourage companies to invest more in innovation in a country that uses such a

⁵⁰⁶ See e.g. Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 347-349; Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 344-346.

⁵⁰⁷ Such as ECJ. (2017). Case C-39/16, *Argenta Spaarbank NV v Belgische Staat*.

⁵⁰⁸ Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 340.

⁵⁰⁹ The ECJ's judgment in the "Danish Beneficial Ownership Cases": On 26 February 2019 the ECJ rendered two landmark decisions on the interpretation of the beneficial owner concept in cases where the Interest and Royalties Directive (joined cases N Luxembourg, X Denmark, C Denmark and Z Denmark) and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (joined cases T Denmark and Y Denmark) apply. The four joined cases N Luxembourg 1 (C-115/16), X Denmark (C-118/16) and C Denmark 1 (C-119/16) and Z Denmark case (C-299/16) all involve back-to-back financing transactions, under which a Danish resident subsidiary was financed by its non-resident parent company via a series of loans granted to intermediary holding companies resident in another EU Member State. The two joined cases T Denmark (C-116/16) and Y Denmark (C-117/16) both concern dividend distributions made by a Danish resident company to an intermediate holding company resident in the EU.

⁵¹⁰ Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 347-349.

⁵¹¹ Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 344-346.

⁵¹² Brokelind, C. and Wattel, P. J. (2018). Free Movement and Tax Base Integrity. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 339-360). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 346.

⁵¹³ It is, nevertheless, out of the scope of this research to go into this discussion.

⁵¹⁴ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 362.

⁵¹⁵ See more on legitimacy in chapter 3, section 4.

⁵¹⁶ See e.g. OECD (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting*. OECD Publishing, Paris; Ault, H. J. (2013). Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles. *Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper* 2013 – 03.

⁵¹⁷ See e.g. Gravelle, J. G. (2016, June 13). A Patent/Innovation Box as a Tax Incentive for Domestic Research and Development. *Technical Report R44522, Congressional Research Service*.

regime.⁵¹⁸ For example, in the UK, companies that meet the following criteria can benefit from such a regime: first, a company has to be liable to Corporation Tax and earn “a profit from exploiting patented inventions”; second, a company has to “own or exclusively license-in the patents and must have undertaken qualifying development on them”; third, in case a “company is a member of a group, it may qualify if another company in the group has undertaken the qualifying development.”⁵¹⁹ In addition, it is stated that if a company is a member of a group of companies, such as multinationals as described in this research,⁵²⁰ “it must also actively own the patented invention by taking a significant role in managing its whole portfolio of eligible patents.”⁵²¹

Corporations that have their R&D activities in the UK, according to the regulation, make a legitimate use of the UK patent box regime; this is tax mitigation. However, intangible assets such as intellectual property can be used for shifting income from high tax countries to low tax countries.⁵²² For instance, in line with the Treaty Freedoms, “none of the IP Box regimes require that the innovative activity underlying the intellectual property be carried out domestically.”⁵²³ This means that corporations can carry out the innovative activity in a country that offers the most favourable conditions for that activity, such as a well-educated workforce for the specific innovation development. Following on from this, the intellectual property can be licensed in other (usually high tax) country where it becomes tax deductible. In this case, the initial aim underlying the innovation box regime – encouraging intellectual activity in this certain country – is not met. Within the context of this research, this can be called tax avoidance when such shifting takes place within a multinational that already had subsidiaries in both countries and it simply makes use of such a tax planning possibility.⁵²⁴ In other words, a multinational that has real business activities in the UK and other countries, in the context of this example, can be considered as avoiding taxes if its R&D activities actually take place in some other country but it ostensibly re-arranges its business operations in order to benefit from the UK R&D tax rules. By doing this, the multinational is ignoring the purpose of this regulation that encourages companies to invest more in innovation in the UK. The multinationals’ arrangements might be legal but, in reality, they ignore the spirit (intent) of the law for tax minimization purposes. The OECD BEPS package that will be discussed briefly below, however, aimed at eliminating such a situation and since the BEPS actions are applied in the laws, such situation might not be possible in practice at the time of publishing this research.

The phenomenon of tax avoidance faces contradicting opinions. For instance, Hasseldine and Morris argue that tax avoiders (in contrast to tax evaders) exercise “choice between alternative courses of action, but the tax avoider (not the tax evader) fulfils all obligations and satisfies all ‘democratically agreed taxes’ imposed by society.”⁵²⁵ While this might be true from a purely legal perspective, the fact that a corporation has alternative choices that add a moral perspective to tax avoidance, as explained previously. Such a moral perspective, however, brings into question whether a multinational fulfils all its obligations imposed, for instance, by society, such as paying its fair share of tax. This dilemma proves that, with regard to tax planning, multinationals have

⁵¹⁸ Note that there is a variation between the design and tax rates various European countries offer under such innovation box regime: “from 0% in Malta to 15.5% in France”. Evers, L. et al. (2015). Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations. *International Tax Public Finance* 22 (3), 502–530. p. 504.

⁵¹⁹ UK PAC HMRC. (2007, January 1). *Guidance on Corporation Tax: the Patent Box*.

⁵²⁰ See chapter 2.

⁵²¹ A “company doesn’t have to make all the decisions regarding the portfolio, but it must undertake a significant amount of the management”. UK PAC HMRC. (2007, January 1). *Guidance on Corporation Tax: the Patent Box*.

⁵²² Note that the OECD BEPS Action Plan has made such shifting of income much more difficult (if not impossible).

⁵²³ Evers, L. et al. (2015). Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations. *International Tax Public Finance* 22 (3), 502–530. p. 507. Note that the OECD BEPS project (action 5) has set stricter requirements in these kind of cases.

⁵²⁴ Naturally, innovation box regimes are also states’ way of participating in tax competition between the states in order to attract foreign direct investment. For example, the OECD BEPS considers such a preferential tax regime design as a ‘key pressure area’ in tax policy. See: Evers, L. et al. (2015). Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations. *International Tax Public Finance* 22 (3), 502–530. p. 522; see also a critical reflection on the UK patent box regime in Mckenna, T. (2013, February 13). The Government’s “Patent Box” is the Tax Avoidance Package Companies Have Been Begging For. *The New Statesman* (online); OECD (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting*. OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 17. Tax competition between the states is the question of a state’s actions legitimacy in tax planning that is not the focus of this research.

⁵²⁵ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1–14. p. 7.

room within their legal behaviour to go beyond strict compliance, as will be discussed later in this research.⁵²⁶

Multinationals have possibilities (and always will have in my opinion) to organize their international business activities in a way that they choose and consequently which national legal rules apply to their transactions. In this way, multinationals can skilfully manipulate the amount of corporate income tax they have to pay at a world-wide level. In general, the problem of tax avoidance lies not only in what a multinational formally owes in the end, but how it reaches this result, for instance, how aggressively it takes advantage of the legal gaps (by using their corporate power). McBarnet calls it creative compliance with the law.⁵²⁷ This kind of tax planning stays within the boundaries of the letter of the law (of different jurisdictions), nonetheless it is questionable whether the tax burden of these multinationals should be higher in some jurisdictions in which they operate.⁵²⁸ The reality today is that, in case of multinationals, the corporate income tax is levied less than once or the amount paid does not seem (responsible) enough for the wider public. Thus, formally such practices might be legal; however, the effect is similar to tax evasion. This can also be one of the reasons why scholars and politicians have introduced a new concept into the discussions – aggressive tax planning – that will be discussed in the next sub-section.

3.3.3. Aggressive tax planning

Aggressive tax planning is a step further from tax avoidance on the tax planning continuum.⁵²⁹ It is a form of tax planning in which a taxpayer intentionally searches and uses, or even artificially creates, possibilities to lower the possible tax effects of various rules as far as possible. In contrast to tax avoidance that arguably ignores the spirit of the law, it can be said that aggressive tax planning intentionally misinterprets and abuses the spirit of the law for tax minimization (and profit maximization) purposes. It is tax planning that goes as far as exploiting the technicalities or differences between tax systems by making use of “a bewildering variety of techniques (e.g. multiple deductions of the same loss, double-dip leases, mismatch arrangements, loss-making financial assets artificially allocated to high-tax jurisdictions).”⁵³⁰ Thus, in the case of aggressive tax planning, the taxpayers’ decisions and actions are adjusted in a way that the effect of possible tax regulation is avoided.

Sometimes, aggressive tax planning goes as far as creating so-called stateless income.⁵³¹ Kleinbard defines stateless income as “the movement of taxable income within a multinational group from high-tax to low-tax source countries *without* shifting the location of externally-supplied capital or activities involving third parties,”⁵³² which results in corporate income that is in principle not taxed in any state. Often the adjustment of decisions and planning actions are, thus, ostensible and legally correct when using a pure linguistic interpretation of the law. Aggressive tax planning clearly includes the intention to minimize tax in a way that abuses the (imperfection of the) legal system for it lacks “a proper business motive” and it consists of “transactions which do not reflect the economic reality.”⁵³³ Therefore, in my opinion, it inevitably includes a moral judgement (whether it is subject to GAARs or not), which has been the grounds for public outrage.

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⁵²⁶ See chapter 6.

⁵²⁷ McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 48.

⁵²⁸ See e.g. Happé, R. (2007). Multinationals, Enforcement Covenants and Fair Share. *Intertax* 35 (10), 537-547; Happé, R. (2015). Ethics and International Tax Planning. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 49-71). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 49-71; Lanis, R. and Richardson, G. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness: A Test of Legitimacy Theory. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 26 (1), 75-100; Stevens, S. (2014). The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their Fair Share. *Intertax* 42 (11), 702-708.

⁵²⁹ In this research, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning both refer to socially unacceptable corporate tax planning.

⁵³⁰ Piantavigna, P. (2017). Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: How EU Law and the OECD Are Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in International Tax Law, Despite Linguistic. *World Tax Journal* 9 (1), 37-98. p. 52.

⁵³¹ Note that the OECD BEPS Action Plan has made creating stateless income much more difficult (if not impossible).

⁵³² Kleinbard, E. D. (2011). Stateless Income. *Florida Tax Review* 11 (9), 699-774. p. 703.

⁵³³ Cachia, F. (2017). Aggressive Tax Planning: An Analysis from an EU Perspective. *EC Tax Review* 26 (5), 257-273. p. 259.

Some sources claim that the term aggressive tax planning should in general fit into the grey area between illegal tax evasion and legal but unacceptable tax avoidance.⁵³⁴ Nevertheless, the concrete meaning of the concept of aggressive tax planning is still open to debate. For example, the OECD's website has a special section on aggressive tax planning.⁵³⁵ However, in the OECD glossary of tax terms it has not been defined nor explained. The concept should originate from the OECD's Study Into the Role of Tax Intermediaries.⁵³⁶ In this Study, aggressive tax planning was defined as corporate tax practices with "unintended and unexpected tax revenue consequences", which is often not sufficiently disclosed.⁵³⁷ Thus, the conflict with the spirit of the law was indicated and the element of the lack of transparency was added. This concept of aggressive tax planning replaced the term used previously by the OECD "unacceptable tax minimization arrangements."⁵³⁸ Within its BEPS Action Plan, the OECD has naturally created more content to include in this term, for instance, by identifying areas that need stricter regulation.⁵³⁹ Several scholars are sceptical, however, concerning how the OECD has tried to add content to the concept of aggressive tax planning over the time.⁵⁴⁰ The OECD approach is considered vague and difficult to apply in practice, especially because it also proposes that companies should comply with both the letter and the spirit of the law,⁵⁴¹ without further explaining this concept of the spirit of the law that in itself has resulted in many discussions.⁵⁴² Moreover, from a practical perspective, it is not clear whether the OECD considers aggressive tax planning as a synonym for tax avoidance.

Next to the OECD, the EU uses the concept of aggressive tax planning.⁵⁴³ The Commission defines aggressive tax planning as tax planning that "consists in taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability."⁵⁴⁴ In other words, the Commission also indicates that aggressive tax planning includes a strict intention to abuse the system.⁵⁴⁵ According to the Commission, the consequences of aggressive tax planning include double deductions (e.g. the same loss is deducted both in the state of source and residence) and double non-taxation (e.g. income which is not taxed in the source state is exempt in the state of residence).⁵⁴⁶ The European Commission is convinced that aggressive tax planning "includes the use of artificial operations or structures and the exploitation of mismatches between tax systems with the effect of undermining Member States' tax rules and exacerbating the loss of tax revenues."⁵⁴⁷ The EU approach focuses mainly on the artificial nature of the arrangements and on the presence of economic substance.⁵⁴⁸

⁵³⁴ See e.g. OECD. (2008). *Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries*. Paris: OECD Publishing; Alm, J. (2014). Does an Uncertain Tax System Encourage "Aggressive Tax Planning"? *Economic Analysis and Policy* 44 (1), 30-38.

⁵³⁵ OECD. *Aggressive Tax Planning*.

⁵³⁶ Baker, P. (2015). The BEPS Project: Disclosure of Aggressive Tax Planning Schemes. *Intertax* 43(1), 85-90. p. 86; OECD. (2008). *Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries*. Paris: OECD Publishing; Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of 'Aggressive Tax Planning' Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206-226. p. 212.

⁵³⁷ OECD. (2008). *Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁵³⁸ OECD. (2008). *Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 10.

⁵³⁹ OECD (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁵⁴⁰ See e.g. Baker, P. (2015). The BEPS Project: Disclosure of Aggressive Tax Planning Schemes. *Intertax* 43(1), 85-90.; Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of 'Aggressive Tax Planning' Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206-226.

⁵⁴¹ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Section XI.

⁵⁴² See also chapter 3, section 2.2.3.

⁵⁴³ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

⁵⁴⁴ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

⁵⁴⁵ For instance, in the Netherlands, the abuse of tax law, which is not illegal, is regulated with the doctrine of *fraus legis*. For more information on *fraus legis* see: De Wilde, M. F. and Wisman, C. (2016). EATLP 2016: Tax Avoidance Revisited: The Netherlands. *EATLP National Reports*.

⁵⁴⁶ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

⁵⁴⁷ European Commission. (2012, June 27). Communication from the Commission to the Council on Concrete Ways to Reinforce the Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion Including in Relation to Third Countries. p. 3.

⁵⁴⁸ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final. para. 4.2, p. 4.

Even though the European Commission provides more technical details in comparison to the OECD approach, it also relies on the interplay between the letter and the spirit of the law.⁵⁴⁹ The concept of the spirit of the law is, as already argued, a vague concept that is difficult to track down in practice. Essers criticizes the European Commissions' Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning: "it is very unclear and leaves too much leeway for subjective interpretation by tax inspectors and judges."⁵⁵⁰ In other words, the European Commission's approach is also relatively vague and does not provide sufficient clarification for a concrete application in business practice. Meldgaard et al. have identified several aggressive tax planning structures based on the economic literature.⁵⁵¹ They acknowledge that "[T]he existing body of literature does not necessarily provide granular details concerning the nature and composition of known" aggressive tax planning structures as defined by the European Commission.⁵⁵² However, for the aim of their study to analyze causes, drivers, inhibitors, or effects with respect to profit shifting and anti-avoidance rules, they identify "three major, empirically proven channels for profit shifting" that are: debt shifting, the role of intellectual property and intangible assets, and strategic transfer pricing.⁵⁵³ These three channels have a strong correlation with corporate tax planning and the resulting tax rate. Nevertheless, the exact knowledge of how aggressive tax planning structures are set up is usually "based on tacit knowledge", confidential, and the nature is known only to the multinationals and their advisers.⁵⁵⁴

For instance, based on publicly available information, Starbucks' tax planning practices, that have received much attention, could be categorized as aggressive. In 2012, Starbucks' tax planning schemes were questioned during the HMRC hearing in the UK.⁵⁵⁵ The main focus of these investigations were on "three intragroup charges through which Starbucks UK paid substantial amounts to other group companies: (1) royalties and license fees paid to a Dutch affiliate, (2) markups on coffee purchased via another Dutch affiliate and a Swiss affiliate, and (3) interest paid on a loan from the U.S. parent company."⁵⁵⁶ These transactions, that were ostensibly set up for tax planning purposes, ensured that on paper Starbucks would generate losses in the UK and erode the UK tax base.⁵⁵⁷ As a result of such actions, on comparable sales revenues for example in the UK for 2010–2011, a competitor of Starbucks, Costa, "paid an effective tax rate of 30.5 % while Starbucks' rate was 0 %."⁵⁵⁸ Naturally, the tax planning structures that Starbucks used are very nuanced and complex. Studying these structures in detail is a subject for another research. Nevertheless, the existing literature based on the available data and public attention, mixed with secrecy from the multinationals' side, allows one to suggest that Starbucks' tax planning has been aggressive, because it has artificially set up business entities in different countries with the main aim to create stateless income and thereby pay no corporate income tax in the countries in which it has real business operations. Artificially setting up business entities to benefit from favourable tax treatment can, for the purposes of this research, be considered as bending the spirit of the law. In addition, evidence suggests that Starbucks has been using its corporate power in other ways to

⁵⁴⁹ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final. para. 4.5, p. 5.

⁵⁵⁰ Essers, P. (2017). International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.). *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 235-265). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 256.

⁵⁵¹ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. pp. 21-22.

⁵⁵² European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

⁵⁵³ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. pp. 21-22.

⁵⁵⁴ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. p. 25.

⁵⁵⁵ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

⁵⁵⁶ Kleinbard, E. D. (2013). Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks's Stateless Income Planning. *Tax Notes*, 1515-1535. p. 1520.

⁵⁵⁷ Kleinbard, E. D. (2013). Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks's Stateless Income Planning. *Tax Notes*, 1515-1535.

⁵⁵⁸ Dowling, G. R. (2014). The Curious Case of Corporate Tax Avoidance: Is it Socially Irresponsible? *Journal of Business Ethics* 124 (1), 173-184. p. 176.

achieve beneficial tax treatment,⁵⁵⁹ which additionally confirms that Starbucks' behaviour can be categorized as aggressive tax planning in the context of this research.

3.3.4. Concluding remarks

This section provided a brief theoretical framework concerning the corporate tax planning terminology used within this research. The aim of this section was not to provide in-depth and uniform definitions but to explain how the concepts are used throughout this research.

Multinationals that are aware of tax effects on their operations actively plan their taxes to avoid double taxation. A legitimate and socially responsible way to plan taxes is tax mitigation, where a corporation legitimately makes use of tax laws for tax planning purposes, for instance, such as a UK company applying the UK R&D tax rules, as was explained earlier. A multinational that intentionally re-arranges its business-operations, by complying with the strict letter of the law while ignoring the spirit of the law, with the main purpose to benefit from various tax rules in the different countries it operates in can be considered as avoiding tax. For instance, if a multinational has business activities in the UK and other countries, with its R&D activities actually taking place in some other country, re-arranges its business operations in order to benefit from the UK R&D tax rules, it thereby engages in tax avoidance. In case the company actually transfers its R&D activities to the UK, it is considered tax mitigation. Multinationals that not only rearrange their existing business activities to achieve more beneficial tax treatment but even set up additional entities that lack any economic or commercial justification can be considered as aggressive tax planners. In the case of aggressive tax planning, a corporation intentionally makes use of the mismatches between the national laws on the international level.

Aggressive tax planning is a term that is often used in debates on international tax planning but which is seldom clearly defined or conceptualized in the legal debates. The definitional gap causes confusion and misunderstandings in theory and legal uncertainty in practice. Based on the analysis of the OECD and EU approaches, Calderón Carrero and Quintas Seara claim that the concept of aggressive tax planning should not be established in practice as a “new ‘legal concept’ for preventing abusive tax practices” but considered as a “tax policy ‘guiding principle’ aimed at shaping the domestic and international tax systems.”⁵⁶⁰ As a result, the concept of aggressive tax planning is used to bring “a substantial change in the international taxation system” and repair “its faults and loopholes”, which should “curtail and constrict the limits of legitimate tax planning.”⁵⁶¹ This, however, confirms that, notwithstanding the definitional vagueness, legal corporate tax planning is not always self-evidently legitimate.

3.4. Tax planning social legitimacy continuum

In practice, distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate tax planning is complicated, as it is not a black and white issue and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, to illustrate the core of contemporary public discussions, a social legitimacy continuum of tax planning could be a starting point, guiding the debate on international corporate tax planning. For instance, there have been several academic debates around tax planning and its acceptance, morality or (social) legitimacy.⁵⁶² However, such debates do not seem to achieve a common ground, because they focus

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⁵⁵⁹ See e.g. Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38–60; European Commission. (2014). State Aid SA.38374 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) – Netherlands Alleged aid to Starbucks, Brussels, 11.06.2014 C(2014) 3626 final.

⁵⁶⁰ Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of ‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206–226. p. 210.

⁵⁶¹ Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of ‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206–226. pp. 210–211.

⁵⁶² See e.g. Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1–14, in discussion with Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3–4), 153–168; Sikka, P. (2013). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance—A Reply to Hasseldine and Morris. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 15–28.

on the different points in the tax planning (social) legitimacy continuum. Therefore, it could be that all arguments of the debate are equally right or wrong. This suggests that, in further research, this subject matter needs to be better clarified.⁵⁶³ This research focuses further on what aggressive tax planning is not; what is good tax governance that responds to (aiming at) going beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law and is, therefore, in general not unfair.⁵⁶⁴ Before some concrete suggestions for good tax governance can be made (chapter 6), however, the issues concerning the social legitimacy – the social acceptance – of tax planning should be discussed.

Organizational legitimacy can be defined as the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”⁵⁶⁵ Legitimacy, thus, reflects the acceptability or acceptance of certain actors by stakeholders,⁵⁶⁶ which is a necessary precondition for a social licence to operate⁵⁶⁷ and for trust.⁵⁶⁸ The central element of legitimacy is “meeting and adhering to the expectations of a social system’s norms, values, rules, and meanings.”⁵⁶⁹ Holland et al. argue that organizational legitimacy can be divided into components, such as pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy.⁵⁷⁰ For the purposes of this research, moral legitimacy is the most interesting, as it “takes a wider or sociotropic perspective of an organisation’s effects on the evaluator’s social group or society as a whole.”⁵⁷¹ In other words, moral legitimacy concerns the effects of corporate actions from a wider perspective than, for instance, legal rules only. Based on recent attention on corporate tax practices, it can be said that, in this regard, corporations do not always meet or adhere to the expectations of social or moral norms or values.⁵⁷² In this respect, aggressive tax planning can be considered socially illegitimate, as it seems to be in conflict with “some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”, especially from the perspective of a wider group of corporate stakeholders. Such corporate practices can harm obtaining the corporate social licence to operate. In addition, empirical research shows that the corporate managers themselves “appear to perceive tax avoidance as an emerging threat to legitimacy.”⁵⁷³ This proves that legal tax planning has (social) legitimacy gradations that might be harmful for companies and also that social acceptability plays a role in corporate tax planning practices.

Nevertheless, it might not be that simple for a corporation to understand whether its tax planning could be socially legitimate or not. Many corporate decisions have tax consequences and tax planning is necessary in order to stay in control of financial affairs. However, in corporate practice, some tax planning strategies may pose difficult moral challenges for corporate boards. For instance, within a multinational, different transactions and financial needs of subsidiaries (or other entities within a multinational) can be financed by means of various financial instruments, such as debt or equity instruments. In addition to these traditional forms of financing, there are also various hybrid forms of financing. There is no commonly agreed upon definition for hybrid financial instruments,

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⁵⁶³ Moreover, different arguments in the debate can be justified or declined depending on from whose perspective they are presented. Tax planning namely is a multidimensional issue that involves various actors. This, however, has not received much focus in the debates up to now and deserves further research.

⁵⁶⁴ See chapter 6.

⁵⁶⁵ Schuman, M. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. *Academy Management Review* 20 (3), 571- 610. p. 547.

⁵⁶⁶ See also: Deephouse, D. L. and Carter, S. M. (2005). An Examination of Differences between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation. *Journal of Management Studies* 42 (2), 329-360.

⁵⁶⁷ Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338. p. 313.

⁵⁶⁸ On trust, see chapter 2, section 5.

⁵⁶⁹ Deephouse, D. L. and Carter, S. M. (2005). An Examination of Differences between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation. *Journal of Management Studies* 42 (2), 329-360. p. 331.

⁵⁷⁰ Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338. p. 313.

⁵⁷¹ Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338. p. 316.

⁵⁷² The distinction between moral and social norms is an interesting discussion that falls outside the scope of this research. The underlying starting point in this research is that moral norms and morality are personal reasoning on making a difference between good and bad, right and wrong. Social norms, on the other hand, are the informal (and usually unwritten) rules that govern behavior in groups and societies. Both moral and social norms influence each other. For an overview on moral and social norms, see e.g. Brennan, G. et al. (2013). *Moral and Social Norms*. In Brennan, G. et al. (Eds.). *Explaining Norms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵⁷³ Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338. p. 337.

but, in general, “hybrid financial instruments are bundled rights and obligations which have legally combined value determining characteristics underlying more than one basic form of financial instruments”, such as debt or equity.⁵⁷⁴ The OECD defines a ‘hybrid mismatch arrangement’ as “a profit shifting arrangement that utilises a hybrid element in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes in respect of a payment that is made under that arrangement.”⁵⁷⁵ The OECD fights against aggressive tax planning by regulating the effects of hybrid mismatches, among other things.⁵⁷⁶ Also the EU ATAD aims at closing many of the existing loopholes where hybrid mismatches are used.⁵⁷⁷

However, from an economic point of view, “debt and equity are functionally equivalent and differ only (but widely) in degree of a risk-return continuum, but not in kind.”⁵⁷⁸ In other words, some forms of financing would trigger certain tax benefits under some national laws, such as interest deduction in the Netherlands and no taxation of the same income in some other countries. Consequently, corporations can have tax reasons for using various hybrid financial instruments.⁵⁷⁹ In the context of this research, the use of hybrid financial instruments by multinationals could be considered as tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning if corporations deliberately structure such arrangements with the (almost) sole purpose to minimize tax. However, if corporations use hybrid financial instruments for valid business purposes, for instance when the loan is given without the repayment obligation of the debtor, then it indeed fulfils the purpose of the specific tax rules and can legitimately benefit from the exemptions. In such a case, the use of a profit participating loan could be considered as tax mitigation.

The OECD also admits that, due to a “wide variety of financial instruments and the different ways jurisdictions tax them, it has proven impossible, in practice, [...] to comprehensively identify and accurately define all those situations where cross-border conflicts in the characterisation of a payment under a financing instrument may lead to a mismatch in tax treatment.”⁵⁸⁰ Nevertheless, as Bärtsch illustrates, various non-tax reasons, related to “the different rights and obligations attached to financial instruments” also exist.⁵⁸¹ In other words, such hybrid financial instruments are “simply a function of two countries having, typically unilaterally, decided not to tax a particular cross-border dealing or give some other favourable tax effect (such as a deduction).” Such a situation could be used for aggressive tax planning purposes, but this is not necessarily always the case. The problem with hybrid mismatch arrangements can lie in “the manner in which tax advisers and multinationals have in recent years aggressively sought out and exploited such arrangements.”⁵⁸² In other words, this refers to how it has been used for aggressive tax planning. As shown in the previous section, legal tax planning can have various degrees and, sometimes, even though it is legal, it is not always necessarily legitimate or socially acceptable. Consequently, such corporate tax planning might still cause some criticism or even public outrage, as happened with Starbucks in the UK in 2012.⁵⁸³ Such public outrage may impose some serious costs for

⁵⁷⁴ Bärtsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 10.

Bärtsch also explains different types of hybrid financial instruments.

⁵⁷⁵ OECD. (2014). *BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws)*, Public Discussion Draft of 19 March 2014. Paris: OECD Publishing. para. 17.

⁵⁷⁶ See OECD BEPS Action Plan, Action 2.

⁵⁷⁷ See e.g. Fibbe, G. K. and Stevens, A. J. A. (2017). Hybrid Mismatches Under ATAD I and II. *EC Tax Review* 26 (3), 153-166.

⁵⁷⁸ Bärtsch Bärtsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 15.

⁵⁷⁹ For instance, in some cases, the mismatches in national tax treatments of corporate financing instruments can lead to double non-taxation or stateless income, which are desired outcomes from the aggressive tax planning perspective.

⁵⁸⁰ OECD. (2014). *BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws)*, Public Discussion Draft of 19 March 2014. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 49.

⁵⁸¹ Bärtsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 12.

⁵⁸² Harris, P. (2014). Neutralizing Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements. *The United Nations Papers on Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries*. p. 3.

⁵⁸³ See e.g. UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited; Campbell, P. (2012, October 17). Starbucks Facing Boycott over Tax: Protest Groups Threaten to Try and Close Branches over Revelations it hasn't Paid for Three Years. *Daily Mail* (online).

multinationals, such as losing the social licence to operate or losing trust.⁵⁸⁴ Moreover, tax planning that does not comply with moral and social expectations is in conflict with certain corporate responsibilities, such as responsibilities towards society (CSR).⁵⁸⁵ Thus, there is a grey, uncertain area between legal tax planning and illegal tax planning (tax evasion). However, it is not an easy task to decide upon where the acceptable lines of legal tax planning lie, as the example of hybrid financial instruments show.

As a first step, the law determines the acceptability of tax planning. Therefore, states have an important role to play, since states often even use taxes as means to regulate taxpayers' behaviour. Tax policies and laws in every state are different and a regulation that imposes tax liability varies per state.⁵⁸⁶ Mismatching national laws creates a regulatory vacuum at the international level.⁵⁸⁷ Often states facilitate (and sometimes even initiate via tax incentives) tax planning. For instance, states offer tax incentives as a regulatory instrument to steer taxpayer's behaviour. States use tax incentives "to stimulate or discourage taxpayers to act in a way that actually means paying less (or not more) tax."⁵⁸⁸ Moreover, in the international setting, states use tax legislation in an instrumental way in order to attract foreign investment, which can lead to tax competition between the states.⁵⁸⁹ On the one hand, attracting more businesses can bring new jobs, innovation and investment for a state and its society. On the other hand, making such benefits available for certain companies increases inequality and may cause other taxpayers to pay more. Thus, this distorts fair competition and distributive justice. Therefore, it needs to be decreased. This, however, calls for international cooperation between the states.⁵⁹⁰ For instance, in the case of hybrid mismatches, there is often nothing specifically wrong with a law on a state level. The problems may arise from the fact that there is a mismatch between how different states classify a certain tax planning arrangement. In such cases, both states are equally responsible.⁵⁹¹ However, despite the important role of state, corporations also bear responsibility with regard to making use of the imperfections of the legal systems. Corporations that make use of tax incentives and plan their activities according to this act in a legitimate way, in general. They act in a way that states wish them to act. This is categorized as tax mitigation, as explained earlier (section 3.3.1.). Nevertheless, some multinationals either ignore or bend the initial purpose of various laws or take advantage of the imperfections of the system. Such behavior can be considered socially illegitimate.

The social legitimacy of tax planning that was categorized as tax avoidance (section 3.3.2.) is disputable, as such tax planning behaviour brings the intentions of taxpayers into question. Next to (ab-)using tax incentives in a way illustrated in section 3.3.2., some multinationals go even further in trying to minimize their tax burden by engaging aggressive tax planning (section 3.3.3). In such cases, legal tax planning ends up with the taxpayer profiting from the societal common goods

⁵⁸⁴ See also chapter 2.

⁵⁸⁵ See chapter 4, section 5.

⁵⁸⁶ Hasseldine, J. and Morris, G. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance: A Comment and Reflection. *Accounting Forum* 37 (1), 1-14. p. 4.

⁵⁸⁷ See also chapter 3, section 2.2.

⁵⁸⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. p. 229.

⁵⁸⁹ Tax competition between states means that the nation states compete with each other in attracting and preserving economic activity within their territories by creating favourable tax regimes for multinationals. States that try to beat each other in order to attract foreign investment (Schön, W. (2003). *Tax Competition in Europe*. Amsterdam: IBFD; Schön, W. (2005). Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared. *Common Market Law Review* 42 (2), 331-365; Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series). Such competition can lead to harmful tax competition and a so-called 'race to the bottom' (Mendoza, E. G. and Tesar, L. L. (2005). Why Hasn't Tax Competition Triggered a Race to the Bottom? Some Quantitative Lessons from The EU. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52 (1), 163-204. pp. 165-166.) or 'fiscal degradation' (Gribnau, J. L. M. (2008). *Soft Law and Taxation: EU and International Aspects*. *Legisprudence* II (2), 67-117. p. 76). Often, such competition between the states takes place at each other's expense, which means that the gain of one state is a loss of the other due to the spill-over effects (De Wilde, M. F. (2015). *'Sharing the Pie': Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market*. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. p. 6, p. 223).

⁵⁹⁰ Or for a unitary international approach, which however faces many political obstacles. See: International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). Research reports; Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40. pp. 7-9; Picciotto, S. (2016). Towards Unitary Taxation: Combined Reporting and Formulary Apportionment. In Pogge, T. and Mehta, K. (Eds.), *Global Tax Fairness* (pp. 221-237). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 232-235. See also chapter 3, section 4.

⁵⁹¹ Meldgaard, H. et al. (2015, December 23). Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report. *European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper N. 61 – 2015*. p. 59.

without contributing to this society and, thus, evaporating its moral responsibility.⁵⁹² Thereby, the acceptability of tax planning moves beyond the law towards morality and social norms. Hilling and Ostas write that “aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance can be described as excessive utilization of tax benefits intended by the government to generate social good.” Such “excessive utilization of tax benefits challenges”, according to them, “the social norms that underpin the tax system.”⁵⁹³ Consequently, next to the legal dimension, tax planning can be categorized as either socially legitimate or illegitimate tax planning.

More specifically, tax planning can vary from legitimate tax planning responding to tax incentives to illegitimate tax planning abusing tax laws and free-riding on the societies in which corporations operate. Based on such a distinction, tax planning can be illustrated in a continuum: on the one end there is tax planning that legitimately accepts tax incentives following its business strategy and, on the other end, there is tax planning that searches for the limits of the letter of the law for its own gain without considering the negative externalities of its actions and the intent of the lawmaker, resulting in paying an unfair share of taxes. Since tax evasion is illegal and thus clearly morally unacceptable, this side has a concrete starting point. Tax planning in the context of good tax governance, on the other hand, can always be improved and is therefore illustrated as indefinite line. Between these two ends are various degrees, which should be analyzed case-by-case basis. In chapter 6 I will provide certain elements of good tax governance for companies that wish to move more towards the green side of this continuum.

Good tax governance is at one end of the tax planning continuum,⁵⁹⁴ which means that a corporation engages in legal and legitimate tax planning. A multinational that mitigates its tax burden is compliant with the (letter and the spirit of the) law and accepts the social expectations on corporate tax planning practices.⁵⁹⁵ Tax planning that is (close to) illegal is on the other end: bad tax governance that exploits the benefits of a society and state without fulfilling its (moral) obligations towards them.⁵⁹⁶ It is clear that companies that claim to endorse CSR should stay away from behaviour that could possibly fall within such a definition, as it will be argued later in this research.⁵⁹⁷

For comparison, the European Commission has also represented tax planning in a continuum in its report on aggressive tax planning indicators.⁵⁹⁸ The Commission notes, however, that “[W]hile it is theoretically possible to draw a line between acceptable tax planning and aggressive tax planning, the boundaries will in reality be somewhat blurred.”⁵⁹⁹ The continuum of the European Commission⁶⁰⁰ “ranges from activities, which are clearly in the spirit of the law e.g. claiming tax credits or using loss carry forwards etc., to behaviour which is clearly illegal, i.e. tax evasion.”⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹² See chapter 3, section 2. See also chapter 4, section 5; chapter 6.

⁵⁹³ Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. p. 54.

⁵⁹⁴ See more on good tax governance in chapter 6.

⁵⁹⁵ What exactly such social expectations are, however, needs further research.

⁵⁹⁶ See chapter 6.

⁵⁹⁷ Chapter 4; chapter 6.

⁵⁹⁸ European Commission. (2017). *Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators. Final Report. Working Paper No 71 – 2017*.

⁵⁹⁹ European Commission. (2017). *Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators. Final Report. Working Paper No 71 – 2017*. p. 23.

⁶⁰⁰ Note that the continuum of the European Commission starts with tax planning and ends with tax evasion, illustrating tax evasion as indefinite arrow. To my mind, tax evasion is illegal and thus clearly morally unacceptable and therefore I illustrate it as a clear starting point. Companies that wish to engage good tax governance should definitely not engage in tax evasion but their tax planning practices can always be improved. Therefore, the tax planning arrow should be in my opinion indefinite.

⁶⁰¹ European Commission. (2017). *Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators. Final Report. Working Paper No 71 – 2017*. p. 23.

Source: European Commission. (2017). Aggressive Tax Planning Indicators. Final Report. Working Paper No 71 – 2017. p. 23.

Calderón Carrero and Quintas Seara argue that the tax paradigm shift is “heading towards a new international and domestic tax framework that provides a lower tolerance threshold regarding tax planning, in the sense that red line demarcating what is considered acceptable and unacceptable is shifting.”⁶⁰² For the purposes of this research, such a tax paradigm shift can be illustrated based on some important recent changes in international tax law.

3.5. Changing international tax law

“The state exists for its individuals”⁶⁰³ and, in a democratic state, individuals choose their representatives that (keeping in mind basic human rights) decide upon the discourse of that state.⁶⁰⁴ However, “the methods of determining national priorities vary from one society to another.”⁶⁰⁵ This applies especially in the context of tax legislation, since taxation undertakes several important functions that are important from a national sovereignty and (socio-)economic development perspective.⁶⁰⁶ Nevertheless, it is a regulators’ responsibility to “provide citizens with political mechanisms to control firms, because these political means would complement and overcome the flaws of the economic mechanisms consumers can resort to.”⁶⁰⁷ The state, thus, has a role to play to keep corporations accountable in case they start using their economic power in a way that is not acceptable for the society. On a state level, several responsibilities but also obstacles appear concerning developing tax policies that would facilitate more responsible tax planning. States have to ensure the efficient functioning of the state and provide public goods and services. By serving this public function, states must develop or preserve the living standard of citizens and ensure the underlying accepted principles of society, as was explained in section 3.2 of this chapter.⁶⁰⁸ The legal system contains rights and obligations, which is also true for taxation. The legislature determines the share taxpayers have to contribute to society and translates this into tax laws. The obligation to contribute to society is crystallized in a large number of very complex legal rules that contain taxpayers’ obligations and rights. Such complexity and the level of the technical details of tax legislation, however, may undermine legal certainty, equality, consistency, and transparency.

⁶⁰² Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of ‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206–226. p. 225.

⁶⁰³ Barak, A. (2011). On Society, Law and Judging. In De Visser, M. and Witteveen, W. (Eds.). *The Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, Views from Europe* (pp. 15-50). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. p. 16.

⁶⁰⁴ Barak, A. (2011). On Society, Law and Judging. In De Visser, M. and Witteveen, W. (Eds.). *The Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, Views from Europe* (pp. 15-50). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. pp. 15-16.

⁶⁰⁵ Barak, A. (2011). On Society, Law and Judging. In De Visser, M. and Witteveen, W. (Eds.). *The Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, Views from Europe* (pp. 15-50). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. p. 15.

⁶⁰⁶ See also chapter 3, section 2.1.

⁶⁰⁷ Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. p. 201.

⁶⁰⁸ On the other hand, to meeting these responsibilities, states need financial resources that they receive from tax payments and foreign investment. In case states focus only on such financial opportunities, a threat for unequal treatment of different taxpayers arises. There can be several reasons why states treat certain taxpayers favourably, such as corporate lobbying power. See chapter 2, section 3.

This also creates problems for the enforcement of such tax rules, especially in the global context.⁶⁰⁹ According to Peters states are “expecting the taxpayer to take an objectivating attitude⁶¹⁰ to international tax law”, by which he means the coercive power of public authorities to force taxpayers “to comply with the provisions of international tax law even if they do not agree with the normative content of these provisions.”⁶¹¹ It is, however, “impossible for a single taxpayer to match these normative expectations with the factual reality of the tax law market and the patchwork of distortions.”⁶¹² Moreover, the complexity of the tax legislation “gives rise to unintentional non-compliance and intentional overcompliance both of which appeared to favour the tax authority in terms of revenue collection.”⁶¹³ As a result, a complex tax system may catalyze “an unfair burden on taxpayers who are not knowledgeable about the tax system” and this undermines the integrity of the system.⁶¹⁴ On the other hand, such complexity also causes loopholes that can be abused by taxpayers with short-term self-interested intentions. Thus, the international tax law system can give taxpayers a confusing message.⁶¹⁵ In this case, states bear the responsibility to reform their national tax system and cooperate on the international level, which also takes place, for instance, on the OECD and the EU levels.

Corporate tax planning has not only received much attention in the media, but it has also triggered international rule making. Corporate tax planning is not a new phenomenon, “yet globalization and the evolution of the international tax regime have created the conditions for MNEs to maximize their inherent advantages in tax planning.”⁶¹⁶ Consequently, various debates around aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance have brought the social legitimacy of international corporate tax practices under question. The OECD was addressing this problem in its BEPS Action Plan and is now developing it further in the follow-up steps, and⁶¹⁷ the EU is also taking the BEPS actions a step further.

According to the OECD, “enterprises should comply with both the letter and spirit of the tax laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate.”⁶¹⁸ Such an expectation on multinationals means that multinationals should try to understand and follow the intention of the legislature. To determine the intention of the legislature, a multinational is expected to interpret “tax rules consistent with that intention in light of the statutory language and relevant, contemporaneous legislative history.”⁶¹⁹ Multinationals should thereby not pay more tax than legally required but corporate transactions are expected to be consistent with “the underlying economic consequences

⁶⁰⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 531; see also: McKerchar, M. (2003). The Impact of Complexity upon Personal Taxpayers: A Study of Australian Personal Taxpayers. Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation.

⁶¹⁰ Peters, who studied the legitimacy issues with regard to the legal framework for international tax law, concludes that “[T]axpayers in the international society of states and individuals should be able to take two different attitudes toward international tax law: an objectivating and a performative attitude.” While objectivating attitude “is and will continue to be the responsibility of states”, performative attitude requires a more active participation of taxpayer for according to this “taxpayers should be able to abide to the norms of international tax law, because they are of the opinion that there is a ‘moral’ obligation to do so.” This performative attitude is in line with this research to the extent that more active participation by the taxpayer is expected. Corporations that wish to maintain or improve their trustworthiness and reputation in the eyes of the lawmaker seem to have a clear incentive for such performative attitude. Nevertheless, this research does not touch upon the concrete relationship between (international) law-making organizations and taxpayers, but the relationship of the taxpayer with society in a broader sense. Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 272.

⁶¹¹ Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 272.

⁶¹² Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 306.

⁶¹³ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 531. See also: McKerchar, M. (2003). The Impact of Complexity upon Personal Taxpayers: A Study of Australian Personal Taxpayers. Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation.

⁶¹⁴ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 531. See also: McKerchar, M. (2003). The Impact of Complexity upon Personal Taxpayers: A Study of Australian Personal Taxpayers. Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation.

⁶¹⁵ Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 306. Note that this dissertation was written before the OECD BEPS Action Plan was implemented. The current international tax laws system aims at eliminating such mixed messages.

⁶¹⁶ Brauner, Y. (2014). What the BEPS? *Florida Tax Review* 16 (2), 55–115. p. 57.

⁶¹⁷ For a brief overview of other OECD policies, see e.g. Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12–28. pp. 21–22.

⁶¹⁸ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. XI.2.

⁶¹⁹ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. XI.2.

of the transaction unless there exists specific legislation designed to give that result.”⁶²⁰ Thus, according to the OECD, the structure of transactions and the underlying economic outcomes should be tied to each other in order for a company to act according to both the letter and the spirit of the law. In my opinion, this expectation of the OECD on multinational corporations is in line with this research – corporations that wish to improve their tax planning practices in a moral sense should not opt for a strict legal-positivist approach, leaving all moral considerations aside. Nevertheless, in the way it is framed, it is too vague and does not provide any clarity for corporations. Furthermore, it is unclear whether and to what extent these principles of the OECD MNE Guidelines⁶²¹ were considered when working out the BEPS Action Plan.

The OECD has given its standpoint with regard to corporate tax avoidance a more practical form in its BEPS Action Plan and its follow-up steps for curbing harmful tax practices by corporations and harmful tax competition between the states.⁶²² The Action Plan focused on various phases of tax planning for eliminating possibilities for tax avoidance and increasing transparency and cooperation between (the OECD member) states.⁶²³ With its BEPS Action Plan, the OECD was also trying to respond to the recent changes and developments in business practices, such as e-commerce. The BEPS was initiated at the G20 summit in Mexico in June 2012, where the OECD was invited to take steps to prevent base erosion and profit shifting.⁶²⁴ In November 2015, the G20 endorsed the finalized OECD BEPS Action Plan.⁶²⁵ Currently the OECD members are working on implementing the BEPS Action Plan.⁶²⁶

Implementing BEPS Action plan, however, is not a very simple task because of the various political preferences of various states.⁶²⁷ For instance, Durst believes that states are “unlikely to implement more than symbolic and minimally incremental BEPS reforms.”⁶²⁸ In addition, because of its unilateral implementation, the BEPS proposal leads to different national measures and leaves room for disparities,⁶²⁹ which in turn “leave opportunities for multinationals to continue to avoid large volumes of taxes through profit shifting.”⁶³⁰ Therefore it can be said that while BEPS Action Plan has been an important and positive step, it is not a final solution to the problem. Consequently, next to states, other actors, such as multinationals, also need to accept their responsibility. Some of the political difficulties that occur on the OECD level can, however, be overcome on the EU level. According to Essers “it seems that the OECD soft law rules of BEPS will be substituted and complimented by EU hard law.”⁶³¹

In light of the economic and financial crisis (2008) the European Commission started to dedicate more targeted attention to international tax cooperation and common standards of business taxation. As a result, in April 2009, the European Commission published a communication Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters.⁶³² This Communication identified and positioned the EU concerns and

⁶²⁰ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. XI.2.

⁶²¹ Note that OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is a broader set of guiding principles and standards of responsible business conduct for multinational corporations, while OECD BEPS Action Plan is an OECD/G20 project to set up an international framework to combat tax avoidance by multinationals.

⁶²² Currently, the OECD is working on resolving the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy.

⁶²³ OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁶²⁴ G20. (2012, June 19). *Leaders Declaration*. Los Cabos, Mexico.

⁶²⁵ G20. (2015, November 15-16). *Leaders Communiqué*. Antalya, Turkey; OECD. (2015). *OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Explanatory Statement*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁶²⁶ See OECD. (2019, May 31). *International Community Agrees on a Road Map for Resolving the Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation of the Economy*.

⁶²⁷ See e.g. Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40. p. 6; Christians, A. and Van Apeldoorn, L. (2018). The OECD Inclusive Framework. *Bulletin for International Taxation* 72 (4/5); Christians, A. and Van Apeldoorn, L. (2018). Taxing Income Where Value is Created. *Florida Tax Review* 22 (1). p. 32, footnote 94; Essers, P. (2017). International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.). *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 235-265). Antwerpen: Intersentia.

⁶²⁸ Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40. p. 3.

⁶²⁹ Dourado, A. P. (2016). The EU Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Moving Ahead of BEPS? *Intertax* 11 (6 & 7), 440-446. p. 440.

⁶³⁰ Durst, M. C. (2015). Limitations of the BEPS Reforms: Looking Beyond Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains. *International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper* 40. p. 13.

⁶³¹ Essers, P. (2017). International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.). *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 235-265). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 260.

⁶³² European Commission. (2009, April 28). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters.

contribution to the G20 and following OECD work on tax avoidance. Keywords such as transparency, exchange of information, and fair tax competition were already in the centre of the discussion.⁶³³ The structure of the EU allows it to take more concrete steps than G20/OECD and install viable enforcement mechanisms to fight aggressive tax planning.⁶³⁴ However, providing a comprehensive overview and timeline of all the steps taken by various institutions within the EU is outside the scope of this research. For the purposes of this research it suffices to briefly illustrate that the issue of tax good governance, as the Commission framed it, has been given a certain political priority.⁶³⁵

In December 2012, the European Commission introduced “An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion”⁶³⁶ and the “Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning”.⁶³⁷ With its Action Plan the Commission set up a Platform for Tax Good Governance, which held its opening meeting in June 2013.⁶³⁸ This Platform consists of various stakeholders such as business practice representatives, tax professionals, and civil society organizations. In June 2015, the Commission adopted an Action Plan to tackle tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning in the EU.⁶³⁹ One of the central points of this Action Plan was to re-launch the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) that was a comprehensive set of rules for calculating multinationals’ taxable profits in the EU, which faced many political obstacles. In October 2016, the European Commission launched two draft directives on the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB)⁶⁴⁰ and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).⁶⁴¹ These proposals, however, received much criticism (CCCTB more than CCTB), varying from contradicting the basic EU law principles to problems of achieving political compromise.⁶⁴²

Furthermore, in January 2016, the European Commission launched the Anti Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP) that is “part of the Commission’s ambitious agenda for fairer, simpler and more effective corporate taxation in the EU.”⁶⁴³ Next to important and informative research, within the ATAP, the European Commission is facilitating seven concrete measures towards a fairer corporate taxation: a Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD); a Recommendation on Tax Treaties that should enhance the vision of the OECD BEPS on tax treaty abuse and on permanent establishments; a Revised Administrative Cooperation Directive that follows the OECD BEPS example on country-by-country reporting; a general policy Communication on the ATAP and proposed way forward; a general policy Communication on an EU external strategy for effective taxation; a Staff Working Document; and a Study on Aggressive Tax Planning.⁶⁴⁴

The European Commission has “strongly reaffirmed the OECD’s work on BEPS.”⁶⁴⁵ With the Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive (ATAD), adopted in 2016 and revised in 2017, the European Commission has become a front-runner with regard to implementing the OECD’s BEPS measures within the EU.⁶⁴⁶ By implementing some additional measures, such as an exit tax duty and a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), the EU has taken a step further than OECD BEPS.⁶⁴⁷ The ATAD is

⁶³³ European Commission. (2011). A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility. *Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*.

⁶³⁴ For a comprehensive overview of the EU tax law, see Terra, B. J. M. and Wattel, P. J. (2012). *European Tax Law*. Deventer: Kluwer.

⁶³⁵ The concept of ‘good tax governance’ or ‘tax good governance’ is used rather vaguely and not defined or used in the exact same way as this research will propose in chapter 6.

⁶³⁶ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion.

⁶³⁷ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, C(2012) 8806 final.

⁶³⁸ European Commission. *Information page on Platform for Tax Good Governance*.

⁶³⁹ European Commission. (2015, June). Action Plan on Corporate Taxation.

⁶⁴⁰ European Commission. (2016, October 26). Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

⁶⁴¹ European Commission. (2016, October 26). Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).

⁶⁴² See e.g. Gutmann, D. and De La Bltire, E. R. (2017). CC(C)TB and International Taxation. *EC Tax Review* 5, 233-245.

⁶⁴³ European Commission. (2016). Anti Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP).

⁶⁴⁴ European Commission. (2016). Anti Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP).

⁶⁴⁵ Smit, D. (2018). The Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 245-175). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 245.

⁶⁴⁶ Smit, D. (2018). The Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 245-175). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 245.

⁶⁴⁷ Smit, D. (2018). The Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 245-175). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 247.

an important step towards eliminating unaccepted corporate tax avoidance practices; however, as Smit argues, “the ATAD is only focusing on symptoms instead of the causes of BEPS.” The ATAD namely focuses on “legal reality” instead of the “economic reality in which the multinationals operate” and the latter is essentially “the cause of BEPS.”⁶⁴⁸ Research suggests that, even though ATAD has been an important accomplishment, it is still imperfect, leaving possibilities for aggressive tax planning.⁶⁴⁹ This suggests, thus, that even international regulatory frameworks that have been developed by various states working together can be imperfect. Furthermore, the European Commission has been developing the BEPS transparency agenda further with the proposals for the amendment of Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, commonly referred to as DAC 6.⁶⁵⁰ The scope of this DAC 6 is very broad, requiring the taxpayers and intermediaries report to the tax authorities about cross-border arrangements that meet the criteria of the Directive. The first notifications should be reported in August 2020. The broad scope of the Directive, however, indicates that the tax authorities will probably receive so much information that it is questionable whether they are able to use this for addressing aggressive tax planning structures.⁶⁵¹ It goes without saying that the efforts on the EU level, such as ATAD as well as DAC 6, are crucial steps but, as also argued earlier, legal rulemaking alone cannot wholly eliminate the problem of aggressive tax planning. Therefore, multinationals also have a responsibility in this matter, as argued through this research.⁶⁵²

Since the harmonization of tax legislation or even any other (direct) tax regulation in the EU is politically very complicated, the European Commission has also addressed certain cases of tax avoidance or even aggressive tax planning with the state aid regulation. At this point, the Competition division of the European Commission decided to step into the aggressive tax planning debate. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), state aid is “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain good.”⁶⁵³ State aid is “in so far as it affects trade between Member States” incompatible with the internal market.⁶⁵⁴ In some cases, state aid may, however, be considered to be compatible with the internal market. In the past years, there has been much discussion around whether tax rulings favouring a specific company can be considered illegal state aid.⁶⁵⁵ Fighting aggressive tax planning by means of state aid regulation has, nevertheless, resulted in many debates and much criticism.⁶⁵⁶ The connection between the European Commissions’ state aid investigations and aggressive tax planning is, however, outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, they prove that certain corporate tax planning practices are highly relevant in several areas in the EU and that the imperfection of the existing legal measures calls for a more creative approach.

To conclude, inter-governmental organizations, such as the OECD and EU, have an important role to play in the tax planning debate, as it is an international issue. Tax planning becomes problematic when multinationals abuse the imperfections of national rules at the global level. Therefore, the role of international regulatory mechanisms is crucial in mitigating this issue. The concrete actions taken on the EU and OECD level prove that the international tax law and the acceptance of the limits of corporate tax planning are constantly changing. Both the EU and the OECD are contributing to improving global regulation for a fairer tax system. Calderón Carrero and Quintas

⁶⁴⁸ Smit, D. (2018). The Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive. In Wattel, P. J. et al. (Eds.). (2018). *European Tax Law. Volume I – General Topics and Direct Taxation* (pp. 245-175). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 275.

⁶⁴⁹ See e.g. Fibbe, G. K. and Stevens, A. J. A. (2017). Hybrid Mismatches Under ATAD I and II. *EC Tax Review* 26 (3), 153-166; Ginerva, G. (2017). The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan: Necessity and Adequacy of the Measures at the EU Level. *Intertax* 45 (2), 120-137.

⁶⁵⁰ The Council of the European Union. (2018, May 25). Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation in Relation to Reportable Cross-Border Arrangements. OJ L 139/1.

⁶⁵¹ See also: Stevens, S. (2018, September 14). *Meer transparantie in de vennootschapsbelasting?* Tilburg University. p. 33.

⁶⁵² See chapter 6.

⁶⁵³ The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390, Art. 107.

⁶⁵⁴ The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390, Art. 107.

⁶⁵⁵ See European Commission. *State Aid: Tax Rulings*. Overview webpage.

⁶⁵⁶ See e.g. De Broe, L. (2015). The State Aid Review against Aggressive Tax Planning: ‘Always Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth’. *EC Tax Review* 24 (6), 290-293.

Seara argue that the OECD and the European Commission initiatives “are pushing the boundaries and redefining narrowly the concept of legitimate tax planning.”⁶⁵⁷ Both the OECD and the EU are actively fighting against certain types of tax planning, which they themselves often define as aggressive.⁶⁵⁸ In general, it seems that both rule-makers address the technical aspects of corporate tax planning (laws) and not the mind-set that leads corporate decision making, which will be discussed further in the following chapters of this research.

Based on the briefly illustrated positions of the OECD and the EU, it can be concluded that, despite the very important accomplishments, international tax law system is not perfect and multinationals have sufficient possibilities for ‘going beyond the law’.⁶⁵⁹ At the same time, the growing attention on the international regulatory level shows that tax planning is a dynamic issue and that the limits of acceptance of various corporate practices change over time. Moreover, the fact that tax avoidance has explicitly received growing attention after the financial crisis suggests that there is a strong link between taxation, tax avoidance, and society. Therefore, it proves the necessity to consider corporate tax practices in relation to CSR, as will be argued in the next chapters of this research.

3.6. Conclusion

In recent years, international corporate tax practices have become a heavily debated topic. Based on various discussions, the aim of this chapter was to clarify the different aspects of the tax planning debate and the changing nature of international tax law, and to understand the relationship between legal and legitimate and legal but socially illegitimate international corporate tax planning practices. Tax planning contains more than just law, politics, or economics, and therefore tax debates are moving beyond the legal discussion towards morality. Therefore, tax planning can be seen as a matter of degree, which at a certain level becomes socially unacceptable. This part of the research provided an explanation for the different concepts of minimizing tax while staying within the (letter of the) law, such as tax planning, tax mitigation, tax avoidance, and aggressive tax planning, as used in this research.

First, based on the current debates as presented in the media and academic studies, the role of taxation in a society, as well as the moral element of taxes, and the concept of fair share were discussed. Most importantly, taxes provide funds for governments to offer essential public goods and to redistribute wealth among citizens. The obligation to pay taxes comes from the law. Taxpayers’ rights and obligations are laid down in a system of legal rules that organize life in a society. Next to the legal system, morality also guides individuals’ behaviour. The role of the legal system is to codify public morality; however, it will never be able to do so exhaustively. It was illustrated that even strong and important international steps of the OECD and EU are far from perfect. Therefore, legal rules in a complex society inevitably leave room for different choices with regard to the use of the system of tax rules. This suggests that, in case legal rules fall short, morality should fill the gap.

Morality requires the members of society to make certain value judgements and behave justly or fairly when making choices. Corporations enjoy the right to choose the most favourable way of doing business. Tax planning that evidently does not meet moral and societal norms and results in corporations not paying their fair share towards society or societies, however, calls for public outrage. Having said that, it is not entirely clear what exactly this fair share of tax that corporations should contribute is. In my opinion, corporations that fulfil only their written legal obligations while (intentionally) ignoring the spirit of the law in their tax planning practices evidently do not contribute their fair share. The fair share of tax that multinationals have to pay is the topic that has much to do with the difference but also the interconnectedness of the written law and moral norms. As laws are imperfect, the letter of the law can be interpreted in a way that it violates the spirit of

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⁶⁵⁷ Calderón Carrero, J. M. and Quintas Seara, A. (2016). The Concept of ‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning. *Intertax* 44 (3), 206–226. p. 217.

⁶⁵⁸ See more on the OECD and the EU regulatory frameworks in section 6, *International Tax Law and Changing Mind-set*, of this chapter.

⁶⁵⁹ See chapter 4, section 3.2.

the law. Due to various justified standpoints, it is difficult to agree on what is fair and what exactly complies with the spirit of the law; it is easier to start with what is evidently unfair. Therefore, the concept of 'fair share' in this research refers to corporate tax practises that go beyond strict compliance with the letter of the law.

In general, it is a task of the lawmaker to strive for the best legal system that does not leave much room for wishful interpretation. However, a perfect system is impossible. In the case of international corporate tax planning, multinationals have choices concerning how they interpret the law (whether it deviates from the spirit of the law or not) and, as a result, to what extent they contribute to the societies in which they operate. In addition, the international context of corporate tax planning complicates the national legislators' opportunities to reduce the gap between the letter and the spirit of the law because of the different interests or possibilities of states. This suggests that multinationals that present themselves as socially responsible corporations also have a moral responsibility to pay their fair share and to (morally) account for their choices. For the context of this research, the concept of fair share reflects whether multinationals contribute a part to public goods and services without free-riding. How multinationals that wish to engage in responsible tax governance can interpret 'fair share' will be discussed in chapter 6 of this research.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that multinationals are not expected to fully step away from their right to plan taxes. This research focuses only on tax planning activities that remain within the boundaries of the law. Thus, only tax planning, tax mitigation, tax avoidance, and aggressive tax planning were discussed. Tax planning is a legal way to take the tax effects of various laws and rules into account and to adapt ones' actions accordingly. Every taxpayer plans taxes to a certain extent, whether this is intentional or not. The forms of corporate tax planning practices vary from legal and legitimate to legal and illegitimate (or even illegal). Tax planning is a complex topic with many nuances, varying from legitimate tax planning responding to tax incentives to illegitimate tax planning abusing tax laws and paying an unfair share. As an illustration, a tax planning social legitimacy continuum was developed in this chapter. This continuum helps later in this research to understand the space between corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility.⁶⁶⁰

The first level of tax planning is tax mitigation, legitimate tax planning that makes legitimate use of tax incentives created by the states and differences in tax systems. Tax mitigation can, however, easily turn from legal and legitimate tax planning into legal tax planning the legitimacy, which is under question and is considered tax avoidance. Some multinationals even take a step further and create artificial possibilities to lower the possible tax effects of various rules by engaging in aggressive tax planning. Both tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning include moral judgement; ignoring such moral element with regard to tax practices is in my opinion one of the cornerstones of the public outrage. Aggressive tax planning is not a legal term, but it suggests that corporate behaviour in tax planning matters causes public distrust. It is another strictly legal yet illegitimate form of tax planning in case of which corporations eliminate their moral responsibilities towards society.

Tax planning should, at a minimum, comply with the law. However, nowadays, more is expected from multinationals, especially from the multinationals that present themselves as good corporate citizens. Also, the current works of the OECD and the EU with regard to fighting aggressive tax planning were briefly discussed in this chapter to illustrate the regulatory context of dynamic and fast-changing international tax law. Despite the fact that concepts such as fair share or the spirit of the law are often used in tax planning debates or that complex international regulations do not offer much guidance or content for business practices, corporations are expected to react. International corporate tax practice is in desperate need of being subject to ongoing moral reflection, because the existing tax systems do not seem to prevent aggressive tax planning successfully. Next to legal tax planning, legitimacy is also expected.⁶⁶¹ Thus, companies decide how they interpret the laws. This

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⁶⁶⁰ See chapter 4, section 3.3.

⁶⁶¹ See also Pfeifer, M. G. and Jin Yoon, S. (2016). The Ethical Limits Of Tax Planning. *Trusts & Trustees* 22 (1), 159-165. p. 165.

also means that, in theory, corporations have the freedom to interpret tax laws even in a way that their tax planning strategies could be categorized as aggressive tax planning.

Requiring multinationals to take responsibility does not suggest that corporations have to act as ideal or even altruistic corporate citizens. This research focuses foremost on the multinationals that have voluntarily claimed that they take corporate social responsibilities (CSR) seriously. They have, thus, accepted moral responsibility towards society. This research does not go as far as to claim that tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning is immoral (also not saying that it is moral) but it goes without saying that society has a right to call for moral accountability. However, some multinationals engaging in aggressive tax planning practices do not seem to respect that and this is what makes tax avoidance problematic. Engaging in morally questionable tax practices implies that corporations erode their moral obligations to the society in the countries in which they operate.⁶⁶² Naturally, multinationals are economic entities, whose business interests are to reduce costs and increase profits. It is important to have a balanced view and understand that tax planning, as well as tax legislation, require balancing conflicting interests. This chapter (Pillar I) built a research framework by illustrating tax planning as a question of degrees of moral acceptability. This means that there is no black or white answer to what constitutes as aggressive tax planning and what could be categorized as acceptable. Multinationals that have accepted responsibility towards society should also, thus, include such responsibility in their tax matters. As one of the possible solutions in this case, multinationals could consider tax planning as part of CSR. As the concept of CSR suggests, there is a relationship between business and society. Therefore, it might prove to be useful to test whether and how CSR could help to balance the legal obligations and societal expectations in this complex issue of tax planning.

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⁶⁶² See also Chang, H.-J. (2011). *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Penguin books. p. 81.

4. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO TAX

4.1. Introduction

Corporate social responsibility and sustainability⁶⁶³ are terms that nowadays belong to the everyday business world. Many multinationals claim to have integrated social responsibility strategies in their activities. However, it is not always entirely self-evident what exactly is meant under such corporate responsibilities and whether companies are actually engaging in CSR or whether they just use it to build a better reputation. Some multinationals that claim to endorse CSR (and are even used as positive examples in business ethics books or reports⁶⁶⁴) use complex aggressive tax planning schemes to minimize their tax burden. For instance, Starbucks – an example that I have used through this study – states on its webpage that it is a socially responsible company: “We have always believed Starbucks can – and should — have a positive impact on the communities we serve.”⁶⁶⁵ Starbucks’ business practices allegedly respect human rights, environment, contribute to society, and aim to constantly develop in terms of CSR.⁶⁶⁶ Moreover, Starbucks is also claimed to be one of the most ethical companies in the world.⁶⁶⁷ Nevertheless, at the same time, Starbucks has been heavily criticized about its tax planning practices.⁶⁶⁸

Multinationals that claim to be socially responsible but at the same time avoid paying taxes raise questions related to the moral responsibilities of corporations. It is not yet commonly accepted whether corporate tax planning practices should form a part of a corporations’ responsibilities towards society or not.⁶⁶⁹ However, there is growing interest in this matter.⁶⁷⁰ As shown in the previous chapter of this research, taxes are important contributions towards society, which is grounds to consider paying taxes is a part of corporate social responsibilities. However, it is not entirely clear what kinds of responsibilities corporations have towards society and how to ensure that they meet those responsibilities. In general, in order to hold corporations accountable for their actions, three solutions are suggested: market competition, legal sanctions, and CSR.⁶⁷¹ Market competition should address economic issues, and legal sanctions protect parties from abuse and remove restrictions on factors that are necessary for perfect competition. CSR highlights moral concerns of the society in situations where other solutions fall short.⁶⁷² Having said that, CSR is a

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⁶⁶³ Sustainable development is according to the Brundtland Commission “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (United Nations. (1987). *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*. Retrieved from:

<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf> (accessed 14.11.2019). In the context of this research *sustainability* refers to long-term socially responsible behavior. In the context of good tax governance (chapter 6) it means, thus, that good tax governance is exercised in long-term perspective.

⁶⁶⁴ See e.g. IKEA in Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 184; Starbucks in Morsing, M. (2017). CSR Communication: What Is It? Why Is It Important? In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 281-306). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CSR Communication: What Is It? Why Is It Important? In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 281-306). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 288; Apple in Greenpeace (2017, October 17). Guide to Greener Electronics 2017.

⁶⁶⁵ Starbucks website: <http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility> (accessed 03.03.2019).

⁶⁶⁶ Starbucks website: <http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility> (accessed 03.03.2019).

⁶⁶⁷ See Ethisphere: The World’s Most Ethical Companies 2018.

⁶⁶⁸ Guardian, the (2012, October 17). Starbucks Tax Avoidance: HMRC to Face Parliamentary Committees. *The Guardian* (online).

⁶⁶⁹ See e.g. discussion in chapter 4, section 5. See also: Schuil, G. et al. (2014). *Good Tax Governance in Transition: Transcending the Tax Debate to CSR*. Report coordinated by the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) with contributions from Oikos and PwC: “of the sixty-nine companies included in the VBDO review, only four (6%) companies specify tax as a CSR issue. Looking at the extensive debate on tax we have witnessed during recent years, this number indicates that this discussion not yet reflects a real change in the mind-set of companies when it comes to tax.” (p. 19). However, four years later this was 71%, according to the Tax Transparency Benchmark 2018 (p. 35).

⁶⁷⁰ For example, CSR scholars also start to use tax avoidance as a negative example with regard to corporate social responsibilities. See e.g. Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 52. Earlier CSR books, in general, have not really focused on tax planning in this context.

⁶⁷¹ See more Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

⁶⁷² See e.g. Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Scherer, A. G. and Palazzo, G. (2008). Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 413-431). New York: Oxford University Press; Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 20-22.

essentially contested concept.⁶⁷³ Thus, it can mean something different to everybody and can therefore have various definitions depending on the context.⁶⁷⁴ Mandatory public disclosure rules enable a basis for information that is necessary for various stakeholders to hold corporations accountable based on these three named solutions.

In order to understand the extent of corporate moral responsibilities beyond profit maximization, a discussion of the theoretical framework of CSR is necessary. Having said that, there is quite a range of branches of CSR and it is not the aim of this research to provide a comprehensive literature review in this area. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the expectations on corporations beyond the strict legal obligations. Whether corporate tax practices should be considered under CSR is a question that has received much attention in the last years.⁶⁷⁵ For instance, there is increasing (scholarly) attention on the specific relationship between tax planning and morality⁶⁷⁶ and tax planning in the light of CSR.⁶⁷⁷ However, since both taxation and CSR are complicated and nuanced fields in academic research as well as for business practice, existing works trying to combine those two usually do not pay sufficient attention to the complexity and the nuances of terms used in both fields. For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, the existing literature in general does not provide a coherent definition of tax avoidance nor aggressive tax planning, which is confusing. Also, the definitions and theoretical framework of CSR used in the context of taxation fall short; tax professionals often use the concept of CSR too simplistically. Non-tax experts make the same mistake the other way around. In order not to replicate such flaws in this research, this chapter will dive deeper into the theory and practice of CSR before analyzing whether, why, and how tax planning and CSR fit together. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to explore the expectations (moral and legal) on multinationals with regard to CSR and whether and how multinationals (are able to) respond to these expectations. It will be explored what CSR means, how it has evolved, and how it is enforced in practice.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, the underlying reasons for CSR development from practice will be explored briefly (section 4.2). Next, section 4.3 analyzes the extent of CSR more closely. It will be explained that CSR entails going beyond mere compliance with the law. As also explained in the previous chapter,⁶⁷⁸ it is difficult to agree upon what an ideal good corporate citizen should do; it is, therefore, reasonable to start from the other end. Therefore, in section 4.3 of this chapter the counterpart of CSR – corporate social *ir*responsibility – will also be introduced. Further, in section 4.4, the challenges and limitations of CSR are discussed. It will be explained, for example, that corporations have to manage the conflicting interests of various stakeholders with regard to

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⁶⁷³ See more about the notion of ‘essentially contested concept’: Garver, E. (1978). Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments. *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 11 (3), 156-172. See more about CSR as an essentially contested concept e.g.: Crane, A. et al. (2008). The Corporate Social Responsibility Agenda. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 3-15). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

⁶⁷⁴ For an overview of the term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, see Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bann, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 56-63; Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct. *Business & Society* 38 (3), 268-295; Williams, C. A. and Aguilera, R. V. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 452-473). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Dahlsrud, A. (2008). How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: an Analysis of 37 Definitions. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 15 (1), 1-13; Votaw, D. (1972). Genius Became Rare: A Comment on the Doctrine of Social Responsibility Pt 1. *California Management Review* 15(2), 25-31. p. 25.

⁶⁷⁵ See e.g. Schuil, G., et al. (2014). *Good Tax Governance in Transition: Transcending the Tax Debate to CSR*. Report coordinated by the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) with contributions from Oikos and PwC.

⁶⁷⁶ See e.g. Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250; Happé, R. (2015). Ethics and International Tax Planning. In Russo, R. (Ed.), *Tax Assurance* (pp. 49-71). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

⁶⁷⁷ See e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behaviour. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 183-198). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag; Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2014). Just Say No: Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility. *University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 402*; University of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-010; Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed “Assessment” in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875; Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558; Ylönen, M. and Laine, M. (2015). For Logistical Reasons Only? A Case Study of Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 33, 5-23; Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

⁶⁷⁸ Chapter 3, section 3.

CSR. As a result of many conflicting interests, corporations can have various reasons to engage in CSR. In section 4.5, CSR will be connected to tax planning. The last section draws conclusions for this chapter.

4.2. CSR as a response to amoral business

By definition, CSR restricts corporations in their actions from focusing only on raising profits and market share at any cost (for example, at the cost of the welfare of a wider group of stakeholders). CSR, which draws from business ethics for its philosophy,⁶⁷⁹ means that, in general, companies take (moral) responsibility for the effect of their actions on society. It is a business strategy that shows the areas in which the company (aims to) step beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law.⁶⁸⁰ CSR and ethical business practices are on the agendas of many corporations but they are also relevant for law and policy framing institutions. For example, since the introduction of EU Directive 2006/46/EU in 2006,⁶⁸¹ all listed companies in the EU are obliged to publish their CSR statement. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether these published strategies also contribute to the meaning of a socially responsible company or whether they are simply formalities that can be met by ‘ticking the box’.⁶⁸²

CSR is a contested concept, it can be understood as legal responsibility or liability, as a responsible behaviour towards the society in an ethical sense, as “‘responsible for’ in a causal mode,” for instance, in form of charitable contribution, as being socially conscious, as “a mere synonym for legitimacy in the context of belonging or being proper or valid”, or as a fiduciary duty that sets higher standards on businessmen and so forth.⁶⁸³ To some, CSR might be an out-dated concept.⁶⁸⁴ Nowadays, many alternative theoretical concepts, such as corporate citizenship⁶⁸⁵ or sustainability, are used.⁶⁸⁶ In theory, there is probably sufficient justification to use such different concepts. In this research, the concept of CSR is nevertheless used as a general term referring to corporate ethical responsibilities, because the concept of CSR is the most used and best-understood term for the wider public. Moreover, for this research, it is not necessary to fill in the details of definitional theories of various terms, because the main focus of this research is on the principal fact that, on moral and societal grounds, the expectations on corporate behaviour go beyond strict compliance with the letter of the law. Thus, the concept of CSR used in this research focuses on the role of multinationals and their relationship with society.

The idea of modern CSR was born after the Great Depression and the Second World War as a rejection of “the devastating consequences of imbalance of corporate power such as environmental degradation, unhealthy and even deadly consumer products, inhumane working conditions, and so on.”⁶⁸⁷ Certain corporate actions undermined moral values that led to a debate on the

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⁶⁷⁹ Goel, M. and Ramanathanb, P. E. (2014). Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility – Is there a Dividing Line? *Procedia Economics and Finance* 11, 49-59. p. 50.

⁶⁸⁰ See e.g. McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48-50.

⁶⁸¹ European Parliament. (2006). Directive 2006/46/EC: Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 83/349/EEC on Consolidated Accounts, 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and other Financial Institutions and 91/674/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings.

⁶⁸² See e.g. Goel, M. and Ramanathanb, P. E. (2014). Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility – Is there a Dividing Line? *Procedia Economics and Finance* 11, 49-59. pp. 53-55.

⁶⁸³ Votaw, D. (1972). Genius Became Rare: A Comment on the Doctrine of Social Responsibility Pt 1. *California Management Review* 15(2), 25-31. p. 25.

⁶⁸⁴ See e.g. Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 12.

⁶⁸⁵ “The term corporate citizenship is often used to express the extent to which business strategically meet the economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities placed on them by various stakeholders.” Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 37. Referring to: Maignan, I. et al. (1999). Corporate Citizenship: Cultural Antecedents and Business Benefits. *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science* 27 (4), 455-469. p. 457.)

Moon et al., for instance, describe corporate lobbying as a process of citizenship. See Moon, J. et al. (2008). Corporate Power and Responsibility: A Citizenship Perspective. In Conill, J. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Citizenship, Contractarianism and Ethical Theory: On Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics*. Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. pp. 16-20.

⁶⁸⁶ See e.g. Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-13.

⁶⁸⁷ Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 21, they are referring to Logsdon, J. M. and Wood, D. J. (2002). Business Citizenship from Domestic to Global Level of Analysis. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 12 (2), 155-

responsibilities that could reasonably be expected from business entities.⁶⁸⁸ Consequently, CSR was mainly related to human rights and environment.⁶⁸⁹ For instance, the discussions concerning the responsibilities of corporations in relation to human rights became prominent in the 1990s when big oil, gas, and mining companies expanded into less developed areas, and the production of consumer goods in less developed areas took place under poor working conditions.⁶⁹⁰ One of the seminal cases that concentrated attention on corporate responsibilities with regard to human rights was the Union Carbide case in 1984 when the Bhopal chemical gas leak killed thousands of people in India. It was one of the world's first industrial disasters.⁶⁹¹ At this point, corporate action, or rather a lack of care, resulted in a violation of the most important human right, the right to life. As a result of this disaster, the "concept of multinational enterprise liability" was developed.⁶⁹² In general, human rights can be considered "relevant to the economic, social and environmental aspects of corporate activity."⁶⁹³ For example, the economic aspect is related to fair wages for employees, the social aspect is related to non-discrimination, and environmental aspects are related to pollution (e.g. people's right to clean drinking water).⁶⁹⁴ Human rights are "those fundamental moral rights of the person that are necessary for a life with human dignity" and are therefore a "means to a greater social end."⁶⁹⁵ The universal nature of human rights suggests that the protection of human rights is not solely a task of states⁶⁹⁶ but also corporations.⁶⁹⁷ The corporate responsibility not to violate human rights is based on various international reports,⁶⁹⁸ such as the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework (also called as the Ruggie Report by the name of its author). This Framework, as the name suggests, rests on three pillars. First, the state has a duty to protect people against human rights abuses through appropriate policies, regulation, and judicial processes. Second, corporations have the responsibility to respect human rights; they must act responsibly in order not to infringe the rights of others and, if such harm occurs, it must be addressed. Third, the Framework requires that victims of human rights abuses have better access to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies.⁶⁹⁹ According to Ruggie's Framework, both states and corporations have an important role with regard to ensuring the protection of human rights. Thus, there is a shared responsibility between the states and multinationals: while states have the primary responsibility to ensure the effective (legal) system, the corporations must respect the system and its underlying principles. The reason that multinationals became the central focus of business and human rights concerns was the corporate scope and power that "expanded beyond the reach of effective public governance systems, thereby

187; Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 25.

⁶⁸⁸ Lee, M.-D. P. (2008). A Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead.

International Journal of Management Reviews 10 (1), 53-73. p. 57, referring to Bowen, H. (1953). *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman*. New York: Harper and Row; See also Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 25.

⁶⁸⁹ Arthaud-Day, M. L. (2005). Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility: A Tri-Dimensional approach to International CSR Research. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 15 (1), 1-22. pp. 11-12.

⁶⁹⁰ Ruggie, J. G. (2010, September). *The UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights*. A brief explanation of the Framework by Special Representative Ruggie.

⁶⁹¹ See e.g. BBC News. (2010, June 7). Bhopal Trial: Eight Convicted Over India Gas Disaster. *BBC News (online)*; Business & Human Rights Centre: Business & Human Rights - A Brief Introduction.

⁶⁹² Eijssbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 53.

⁶⁹³ Australian Human Rights Commission (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility & Human Rights*.

⁶⁹⁴ Australian Human Rights Commission (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility & Human Rights*.

⁶⁹⁵ Forsythe, D. P. (2012). *Human Rights in International Relations* (3rd Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 3.

⁶⁹⁶ See e.g. Horrigan, B. (2010). *Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices across Government, Law and Business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 303.

⁶⁹⁷ According to the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "every individual and every organ of society" has to promote and respect human rights. See UN. (1948). *The Universal Declaration of Human Right*. Such responsibility nowadays excludes, thus, "no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace." *Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.*, 244 F.Supp.2d 289. p. 318, as quoted: Business & Human Rights Centre: Business & Human Rights - A Brief Introduction.

⁶⁹⁸ Such as Global Sullivan Principles; Caux Round Table Principles for Business; OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁶⁹⁹ See Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; See also Ruggie, J. G. (2010, September). *The UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights*. A brief explanation of the Framework by Special Representative Ruggie.

creating permissive environments for wrongful acts by companies.”⁷⁰⁰ Furthermore, for accountability reasons, Ruggie was convinced that corporations should “know and show” that they are meeting this responsibility. In other words, companies should “become aware of, prevent, and address their adverse human rights impacts.” Such “due diligence” is “a statement of commitment to respecting rights and supporting policies” that consists of the assessment of “human rights impacts”, integrates “respect for human rights across relevant internal functions and processes” and tracks and communicates performance.⁷⁰¹ Similar expectations of transparency by corporations as well as shared responsibility of various actors will also be discussed with regard to taxation in chapter 6 of this research.⁷⁰²

Next to human rights, CSR is often also linked to the effect of corporate actions on the environment – most importantly because of rapid climate change. A radical change in business practices that harms the environment was needed. Corporations can have two types of effects on the environment – extraction and pollution – both of which concern using up natural resources; pollution can destroy air and water and extraction exhausts minerals.⁷⁰³ Environmental regulations respond to such corporate actions, especially in developed countries, but many corporations “in dirty sectors” respond to this by moving to “poor countries with low environmental regulation.”⁷⁰⁴ In other words, corporations search for possibilities to reduce their production costs (as a result of environmental regulations), even if it would be at the cost of environmental harm (but then in another state). Corporate effects on the environment are, however, general and affect everybody, regardless of the location of the corporate actions. Therefore, migration to other countries to reduce the costs at the cost of the effects on the environment is considered morally irresponsible.⁷⁰⁵ Corporations that avoid environmental regulation, but at the same time present themselves as socially responsible, are sometimes accused of ‘greenwashing’, which means the manipulation of the image of the company by the media and advertising industry. Companies engaged in greenwashing are publicly claiming that they undertake good ‘green’ practices but they hide the additional negative effects.⁷⁰⁶ Such a situation where corporations behave apparently (legally) correctly while still having negative effects on society can be compared to aggressive tax planning.⁷⁰⁷

To summarize, various examples from practice show that the concept of CSR has developed as a response to corporate activities that reduce corporate moral responsibilities towards society. Multinationals are in a position to harm the (quality of) human life regardless of regulations. In order to restrict corporations to focus on financial returns at any costs, CSR is aimed at keeping corporations accountable in a moral sense, since they have moral responsibilities towards society. The bottom line of such responsibility is that not everything that is (legally) possible should be done. Therefore, CSR expects corporations to go beyond pure compliance with the law.

4.3. CSR as moral responsibilities to take distance from irresponsible behaviour

Corporations have first and foremost economic and legal responsibilities. CSR begins where the law ends, and where the company goes beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law.⁷⁰⁸ CSR concerns responsibilities that corporations have with regard to certain moral values and legal shortcomings; it concerns “making positive contribution to society above and beyond that which

⁷⁰⁰ Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. xxiii.

⁷⁰¹ Ruggie, J. G. (2010, September). *The UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights*. A brief explanation of the Framework by Special Representative Ruggie; Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 90ff.

⁷⁰² See e.g. chapter 6, section 3.

⁷⁰³ Chamberlain, N. W. (1973). *The Limits of Corporate Responsibility*. New York: Basic Books New York. p. 32.

⁷⁰⁴ Dam, L. and Scholtens, B. (2008). Environmental Regulation and MNEs Location: Does CSR Matter? *Ecological Economics* 67 (1), 55-65. p. 56. See also Chamberlain, N. W. (1973). *The Limits of Corporate Responsibility*. New York: Basic Books New York. pp. 40-46.

⁷⁰⁵ Especially in light of the Paris Climate Agreement corporations cannot escape their crucial role in protecting the environment.

⁷⁰⁶ See Benn, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 115-119.

⁷⁰⁷ See chapter 3, section 3.3.

⁷⁰⁸ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48; McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

constitutes their legal obligations.”⁷⁰⁹ According to Bowen, social responsibility “refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society.”⁷¹⁰ Most of the CSR definitions include the idea that businesses “have obligations toward society beyond their economic obligations toward shareholders”⁷¹¹ and that “actions and decisions by a company do not only concern its own interests but also those of society as a whole, or in economic terms: companies should internalise negative external effects.”⁷¹² The underlying reasoning behind CSR is that corporations should “serve society not only by creating wealth, but also by contributing to social needs and satisfying social expectations towards business” because “society gives license to business to operate.”⁷¹³

Consequently, CSR is often also conceptualized as the Triple Bottom Line: People, Planet, Profit.⁷¹⁴ The aim of this approach is to protect the long-term sustainability “of systems according to environmental, economic, and social considerations.”⁷¹⁵ The key issue of the triple bottom line “in the social perspective on sustainability is that of *social justice*.”⁷¹⁶ Social justice refers to a fair relationship between society and its members. This can be linked to distributive justice that is upheld by taxation, as discussed in the previous chapter of this research.⁷¹⁷ The corporate responsibility for society and social justice suggests a relationship between businesses and society, and moral behaviour. CSR means that companies take responsibility for the effects of their actions on society. In case businesses do not use their corporate power responsibly,⁷¹⁸ they lose their social license to operate.⁷¹⁹

Having said that, it is not very self-evident how corporations should (accept and) carry out their social responsibilities.⁷²⁰ Despite the conceptual vagueness, there are some theoretical frameworks that help to understand the essence of CSR for the purposes of this research. In the following subsections, the CSR Pyramid developed by Archie B. Carroll will be introduced and, based on that, the expectation of going beyond the law will be explained. Also, socially irresponsible corporate behaviour will be addressed.

4.3.1. Theoretical framework of CSR

To understand the substance of corporate responsibilities and the expectations that corporations face, Carroll’s CSR Pyramid, developed in 1991, is a helpful tool. Carroll is often considered to be one of the most important academics among the CSR scholars. According to him, CSR consists of four layers: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities. Based on that, Carroll

⁷⁰⁹ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-13.

⁷¹⁰ Bowen, H. (1953). *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman*. New York: Harper and Row. p. 6.

⁷¹¹ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 19.

⁷¹² Schreck, P. (2009). *The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 10.

⁷¹³ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 49. See also chapter 2, sections 3-5.

⁷¹⁴ See e.g. Eijsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University.

⁷¹⁵ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 33; see also Eijsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University; see also Valente, M. (2017). Corporate Responsibility Strategies for Sustainability. In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 86-109). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 87.

⁷¹⁶ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 35.

⁷¹⁷ See chapter 3, section 2.1.

⁷¹⁸ See chapter 2, section 3-5.

⁷¹⁹ Davis, K. (1973). The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities. *Academy Management Journal* 16 (2), 312-322. p. 314; Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 52. On corporate social performance, see also Sethi, S. P. (1975). Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance: An Analytic Framework. *California management Review* 17 (3), 58-64; Ackerman, R. W. (1973). How Companies Respond to Social Demands. *Harvard University Review* 51 (4), 88-98; Ackerman, R. W. and Bauer, R. (1976). *Corporate Social Responsiveness*. Reston: Reston Publishing; Wood, D. J. (1991b). Toward Improving Corporate Social Performance. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 66-73. See also chapter 2, section 3.

⁷²⁰ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-14.

developed a corporate social responsibility pyramid that describes these four building blocks of CSR:⁷²¹

As explained earlier in this research, two basic premises of CSR are that corporations are part of a social contract and have moral agency.⁷²² This is also Carroll's starting point,⁷²³ which enforces the expectation to pursue corporate economic missions within the framework of the law. Carroll places the ethical and philanthropic layers above the economic and legal layers. Ethical responsibilities of a company go beyond the law and profit making and embody those standards, norms, or expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders, and the community regard as fair, just, or moral. Carroll adds that ethical responsibilities are seen as the obligation to do what is right, just and fair. Ethical responsibilities in the context of Carroll's work respond to "the kinds of behaviors and ethical norms that society expects business to follow."⁷²⁴ This relates back to the moral element of taxation that was discussed in the previous chapter of this research.⁷²⁵ Interestingly, recently the CSR scholars have also started to use corporate tax planning practices as an illustration of corporate ethical responsibilities where corporations are expected to "do what is right, just, and fair even when they are not compelled to do so by the legal framework."⁷²⁶ The philanthropic layer of Carroll's pyramid encompasses those corporate actions that are in response to society's expectations of a good corporate citizen, for example by actively engaging in activities or programs to promote human welfare or goodwill.⁷²⁷ The philanthropic responsibilities are merely desired and not required from a CSR corporation.⁷²⁸ Some authors consider philanthropy as a marketing investment.⁷²⁹

⁷²¹ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48.

⁷²² Wartick, S. L. and Cochran, P. L. (1985). The Evolution of the Corporate Social Performance Model. *Academy of Management Review* 10 (4), 758-769. See also chapter 2, section 7.

⁷²³ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48. p. 40. This is a Hobbesian view. See e.g.: Rayman-Bacchus, L. and Crowther, D. (Eds.). (2004). *Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility*. Abington: Taylor and Francis. pp. 3-5. See also chapter 2, section 7.

⁷²⁴ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54-55. See also Carroll, A. B. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. *The Academy of Management Review* 4 (4), 497-505. p. 500; Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct. *Business & Society* 38 (3), 268-295. p. 283.

⁷²⁵ See chapter 3, section 2; chapter 6, section 2.2.

⁷²⁶ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 52.

⁷²⁷ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48. pp. 40-43.

⁷²⁸ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 52.

⁷²⁹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 72.

Carroll later added that nowadays many people consider that, in his theory, “the economic component is what the business firm *does for itself* and the legal, ethical, and discretionary (or philanthropic) components are what business *does for others*.”⁷³⁰ Nevertheless, “while this distinction is attractive”, he believes that “economic viability is something business does for society as well, in perpetuating the business system, though we seldom look at it in this way.”⁷³¹ This, Carroll claims, was the initial reason why economic responsibility was included in his CSR theory. It can be agreed with the view that economic viability is something that businesses do in society as well because, by increasing its economic value, a corporation can also improve their services or goods that they produce for society. Furthermore, accepting economic responsibility as a part of CSR also fits well with corporate tax planning: it also usually has economic reasoning behind it and, as explained in the previous chapter, of this research, tax planning is an acceptable business practice.⁷³²

It has to be noted that the CSR Pyramid of Carroll was later elaborated upon by Carroll and Schwartz.⁷³³ The core elements remain the same but, based on further research, Carroll and Schwartz illustrated the layers as a Venn diagram. Even though Carroll’s CSR Pyramid is still actual and relevant, the Venn diagram responded to critics who objected to the pyramid framework as it suggests a hierarchy of CSR layers, which has been found out not too be the case, and because it does not capture the overlapping nature of CSR domains.⁷³⁴ Moreover, in the form of Venn diagram, the separate philanthropy domain was left out due to the overlap with other (mainly economic and ethical) domains.⁷³⁵ As a result, Carroll’s CSR theory (1991) was adjusted to the Three-Domain Model of CSR.⁷³⁶

Both the Pyramid and Venn Diagram are important theoretical frameworks for CSR. However, for the general picture, which is the purpose of this research, the Pyramid theory is the most suitable. Carroll’s CSR Pyramid could be translated into the corporate relationship with different stakeholders and society. The economic layer involves the profit maximizing relationship with

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Moreover, in some cases, in the context of tax planning, the motives behind corporate philanthropy can be questionable because of its beneficial tax treatments it could be categorized as a part of tax avoidance. This, nevertheless, is a topic for another research.

⁷³⁰ Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-34.

⁷³¹ Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-34.

⁷³² See chapter 3, section 3.1.

⁷³³ Schwartz, M. S. and Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13 (4), 503-530.

⁷³⁴ Schwartz, M. S. and Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13 (4), 503-530. p. 505.

⁷³⁵ Schwartz, M. S. and Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13 (4), 503-530. p. 505.

⁷³⁶ Schwartz, M. S. and Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13 (4), 503-530. p. 509.

shareholders. Naturally, a company can have many shareholders with different interests; for instance, some shareholders are interested in long-term value maximization, while others are interested in short-term value.⁷³⁷ How these interests should be balanced depends on the management board and the business strategy. The legal layer of the CSR Pyramid represents the corporate relationship with the state and tax authorities by complying with the laws. Ethical and philanthropic layers concern a moral relationship with society at large. Of course, stakeholders can also have different expectations, since shareholders can also be considered stakeholders.

Engaging in CSR, in my opinion, can be driven by intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.⁷³⁸ Intrinsic motives are a characteristic of an integrity-based approach, where corporations are driven by morality next to economic performance (profits) and compliance with the law. Such intrinsic motivation rests on self-regulation “in accordance with a set of guiding principles.”⁷³⁹ Intrinsic motivation is directly connected to morality, to an internal drive to do what is right, just and fair. Corporations are expected to engage in a social and ethical manner of doing business, “being responsible is doing the right thing.”⁷⁴⁰ This reflects the intrinsic motivation of CSR that has been related to terms such as ‘values of our society’, ‘social expectation’, ‘performance expectation’.⁷⁴¹ The main focus of this approach is on whether companies behave respectfully in relation to all people (for instance, by respecting human rights).⁷⁴² In the early writings, CSR was considered in the context of “the problems that arise when the corporate enterprise casts its shadow on the social scene, and of the ethical principles that ought to govern the relationships between the corporation and society.”⁷⁴³ In my opinion, in the Venn Diagram, for instance, intrinsic motivation is illustrated in the centre where it considers different interests and results in balanced business decisions and implies, therefore, corporate self-reflection and evaluation of its actions vis-à-vis society.

The extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, indicates that a corporation behaves in a certain way because of some (external) reward, coercion or a desire to avoid penalties or a bad reputation. In terms of extrinsic motivation, CSR serves the corporate business strategy.⁷⁴⁴ This would be the instrumental use of CSR, which focuses on “the application of CSR as a means of wealth creation or maximizing shareholder value through seeking competitive advantage.”⁷⁴⁵ Some would call it the business case for CSR. In the case of external motivation, the societal acceptance of a company’s ethical behaviour is exclusively measured by the lack of public resistance.⁷⁴⁶ Here, “status” or “good reputation” is a matter of public relations and is thus not guided by an intrinsic

⁷³⁷ See more on different shareholders in chapter 5, section 3.

⁷³⁸ Du, S. et al. (2007). Reaping Relational Rewards from Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Competitive Positioning. *International Journal of Research in Marketing* 24 (3), 224-241. p. 226; Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88. Compare the view of CSR as a moral obligation towards society and stakeholders in contrast to the view of CSR as a pure marketing tool. See e.g. Salazar, J. and Husted, B. W. (2008). Principals and Agents: Further Thoughts on the Friedmanite Critique of Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 137-155). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-150; Garriga, E. and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics* 53 (1-2), 51-71; Bann, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 14-17, 56-62, 112-113, 115-118. See also Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2016). Good Tax Governance and Transparency: A Matter of Reputation or Ethical Motivation? *Derivatives and Financial Instruments* 18 (1), 3-24.

⁷³⁹ Paine, L. S. (1994). Managing Organizational Integrity. *Harvard Business Review* 7 (2), 106-117. p. 111.

⁷⁴⁰ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 50.

⁷⁴¹ See e.g. Bowen, H. (1953). *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman*. New York: Harper and Row; Frederick, W. C. (1960). The Growing Concern Over Business Responsibility. *California Management Review* 2 (4), 54-61. p. 60; Sethi, S. P. (1975). Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance: An Analytic Framework. *California Management Review* 17 (3), 58-64. p. 62. Carroll, A. B. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. *The Academy of Management Review* 4 (4), 497-505.

⁷⁴² Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54-55.

⁷⁴³ Eells, R. et al. (1961). *Conceptual Foundations of Business: An Outline of Major Ideas Sustaining Business Enterprise in the Western World*. R.D. Irwin: Homewood. pp. 457-458.

⁷⁴⁴ See also: Rasche, A. et al. (2017). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 29.

⁷⁴⁵ Bann, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. p. 57. See more on using CSR as a marketing tool: pp. 112-113; pp. 115-118.

⁷⁴⁶ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

drive to be open and transparent.⁷⁴⁷ CSR actions can be attributed to both intrinsic and extrinsic motives at the same time.⁷⁴⁸ However, if an extrinsic motivation to endorse CSR prevails, the firm's responsible behaviour is not driven by an internal wish to do what is right, just and fair. Absent an intrinsic motivation, a CSR approach is seen as an instrument to purely enhance the firm's reputation (which, in turn, will often be an instrument to achieve something else, for example an increase in market value),⁷⁴⁹ and not as a by-product of responsible behaviour.⁷⁵⁰ In such cases, CSR is a marketing tool to gain social acceptance.⁷⁵¹ From a business-perspective such strategic approach to CSR is understandable as it is a part of corporate strategy. However, such behaviour can also be compared to corporate hypocrisy and paying lip-service to CSR in the form of "window dressing" or "green washing". Extrinsic motivation is often driven by preserving or enhancing the corporation's reputation to increase shareholders value or receive public praise.⁷⁵² When the extrinsic motivation prevails, the firm's responsible behaviour is not driven by an internal wish to do what is right, just and fair. Consequently, the company operates within the economic or economic/legal layers, leaving out the ethical motivation and in such cases, it can be questionable whether corporate boards are willing to truly improve their business practices for the purposes of moral responsibility.

Also the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance seem to implicitly accept the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of CSR, stating that "even in areas where stakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make additional commitments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate reputation and corporate performance often requires the recognition of broader interests."⁷⁵³ It further adds that "[H]igh ethical standards are in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments."⁷⁵⁴ Absent an intrinsic motivation, a social responsibility approach is seen as a mere instrument to enhance the firm's reputation (which in turn will often be an instrument to achieve some other economic goal, for example an increase in market value⁷⁵⁵), and not as a by-product of responsible behaviour.⁷⁵⁶ Responsible behaviour means that corporations consider the effects of their actions on society and, where necessary (for instance in case the law leaves much room for interpretation), do not act merely in compliance with legal rules but they go a step further. If the corporations are driven by an extrinsic motivation only, they do not reach above the legal layer of Carroll's Pyramid, as their motivation serves economic goals within the (letter of the) law. This suggests that CSR is not about corporate reputation but about changing the mind-set instead.

⁷⁴⁷ Ulrich, P. (2008). *Integrative Economic Ethics: Foundations of a Civilized Market Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 400.

⁷⁴⁸ Du, S. et al. (2007). Reaping Relational Rewards from Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Competitive Positioning. *International Journal of Research in Marketing* 24 (3), 224-241. p. 226.

⁷⁴⁹ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Connell, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 384.

⁷⁵⁰ Benn, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 57-58. This may also be labelled as "passive tax responsibility" versus "passive tax responsibility". See e.g. Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed "Assessment" in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875; Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.

⁷⁵¹ Busch, T. and Shepherd, T. (2014). Doing Well By Doing Good? Normative Tensions Underlying Twitter's Corporate Social Responsibility Ethos. *Convergence* 20 (3), 293-315; See also: Arnold, D. G. et al. (2013). *Ethical Theory and Business* (9th edition). Boston: Pearson. p. 51; Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct. *Business & Society* 38 (3), 268-295, p. 143; Ulrich, P. (2008). *Integrative Economic Ethics: Foundations of a Civilized Market Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 400, p. 427.

⁷⁵² Interestingly, Australian empirical research suggests that "shareholders do not send clear messages concerning the level of tax aggressiveness they believe to be acceptable, and do not demonstrate an interest in 'their' company's income tax strategy ex ante"; Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 32.

⁷⁵³ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 34 (section IV).

⁷⁵⁴ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 47.

⁷⁵⁵ See Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Connell, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 384: "the market provides some incentives for corporate responsibility, mostly around reputation, and it also provides a discipline, with constraints on corporate responsibility."

⁷⁵⁶ See Benn, S. and Bolton, D. (2011). *Key Concepts in Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 57-58. This may also be labelled as 'passive tax responsibility' versus 'passive tax responsibility'; see Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed "Assessment" in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875. pp. 851-852.

For instance, 25 years after developing the Triple Bottom Line, Elkington argues that simply implementing sustainability policies is not enough; it is the mind-set that needs to be changed: “*none* of these sustainability frameworks will be enough, as long as they lack the suitable pace and scale — the necessary radical intent — needed to stop us all overshooting our planetary boundaries.”⁷⁵⁷

4.3.2. Going beyond the law

Perfect laws are a utopia, as laws always remain a subject of interpretation.⁷⁵⁸ Therefore, in the case of international tax planning, complying with the letter of the law only can lead to very low or zero effective corporate income tax rates. Such a conflict between the letter and the spirit of the law⁷⁵⁹ can also be seen as a legal vacuum⁷⁶⁰ or accountability vacuum⁷⁶¹ or a grey area of the law.⁷⁶² CSR can be seen as a tool that should fill this unclear space, as it expects corporations to act in accordance with certain moral values.⁷⁶³ Consequently, CSR entails corporate responsibilities towards society beyond the strictly legal requirements. Going beyond indicates taking a step further and providing something in addition to what is mandated by the written law. In the context of this research, this step further means acting ethically, according to (unwritten) moral and social norms underlying the written laws. This is in contrast to legal positivist behaviour that interprets laws at the cost of moral and social norms underlying these written laws.⁷⁶⁴

As also shown in chapter 3.2.3, the spirit or intent of (tax) laws is a hotly debated issue and there is no consensus on its concrete meaning. It is not the aim of this research to prove the legal-positivist perspective wrong. A strong rule of law is a basis not only for taxes⁷⁶⁵ but for a stable society in general. The rule of law should provide legal certainty. Nevertheless, the rule of law is not always perfect and thereby not able to regulate all kinds of (corporate) behavior. That applies especially in the context of powerful multinationals.⁷⁶⁶ In order to keep their social legitimacy to operate, multinationals are accountable not only based on the rule of law but they also bear moral responsibility towards society.⁷⁶⁷ It goes without saying that the perspective of corporate moral responsibility does not replace the law, nor does it give the lawmaker an excuse to lay back and expect society to organize itself based on ethics. In my opinion, CSR is not a tool for states to put pressure on corporations to be compliant with the laws, as, for example, Österman⁷⁶⁸ or Freedman⁷⁶⁹ seem to suggest. If states wish to change corporate behavior, they have to react by (improving) legislation. CSR is a voluntary tool for corporations to meet their moral responsibilities in addition to their legal ones. Consequently, the debates around distinguishing the letter and the spirit of the law nor the legal-positivist thinking should be considered as hindering factors for the purposes of this research.

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⁷⁵⁷ Elkington, J. (2018, June 25). 25 Years ago I Coined the Phrase “Triple Bottom Line.” Here’s Why it’s Time to Rethink it. *Harvard Business Review*.

⁷⁵⁸ See also chapter 3, section 2.2.

⁷⁵⁹ See also chapter 3, section 2.

⁷⁶⁰ Kinley, D. and Tadaki, J. (2004). From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law. *Virginia Journal of International Law* 44 (4), 931-1023. p. 933.

⁷⁶¹ Stephens, B. (2002). The Amoralism of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights. *Berkeley Journal International Law* 20 (1), 45-90. p. 56.

⁷⁶² Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁷⁶³ Davarnejad, L. (2010). The Impact of Non-State Actors on the International Law Regime of Corporate Social Responsibility: Blessing or Curse? In Ryngaert, C. and Noortmann, M. (Eds.), *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers* (pp. 41-65). Farnham: Ashgate. pp. 41-65.

⁷⁶⁴ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250;

Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28.

⁷⁶⁵ Österman, R. P. (2018). Perspectives on Corporate Taxation from a Sustainable Business Perspective. In Arvidsson, S. (Ed.) *Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business: Reporting, Taxation, Ethics and Governance* (pp. 371-397). Lund: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 372.

⁷⁶⁶ See chapter 2, section 3.

⁷⁶⁷ See chapter 2, section 4 and section 7.

⁷⁶⁸ Österman, R. P. (2018). Perspectives on Corporate Taxation from a Sustainable Business Perspective. In Arvidsson, S. (Ed.) *Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business: Reporting, Taxation, Ethics and Governance* (pp. 371-397). Lund: Palgrave Macmillan, S. (Ed.) *Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business: Reporting, Taxation, Ethics and Governance* (pp. 371-397). Lund: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 372.

⁷⁶⁹ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 382.

Going beyond strict compliance with the law using CSR is a response to the legal vacuum. With regard to corporate tax planning, by simply fulfilling legal obligations based on a strict interpretation of the written legal rules – strict compliance with the letter of the law only – does not seem to comply with the corporate moral responsibilities towards society, as shown previously.⁷⁷⁰ In line with Carroll's Pyramid, this means that corporations should fulfil their legal obligations and also their moral obligations. Going beyond the law with regard to CSR does not expect a multinational to take over the role of the lawmaker and try to guess the possible intentions behind the law-making process; it rather expects ethical decision making when facing (moral) choices that, for instance, exist due to the imperfections in the legal system.⁷⁷¹

To understand CSR, Blowfield and Murray suggest three possible general views. The first is a values-based view that is driven by intrinsic motivation to do good, as explained in the previous section. According to this view, "companies, like people, have values that guide their interactions with other society members."⁷⁷² This perspective is "concerned with the values of business as a whole and how a company integrates values, such as honesty, trust, integrity, respect, and fairness, into its policies, practices, and decision making."⁷⁷³ This values-based view is given a more concrete form in the second view that Blowfield and Murray distinguish. This second perspective sees corporate responsibility as a relationship and interaction between business and society. The primary concern of this second view is to regulate and motivate corporations to contribute more to public goods and services by showing that corporations have a broader purpose than simply generating profit. Blowfield and Murray place the Carroll Pyramid framework within this relationship between business and society as an illustration to how business can apply the values-based view and manage its responsibilities towards society.⁷⁷⁴ The third view focuses on "the specific areas in which business is now expected to take action",⁷⁷⁵ such as environment, animal rights, or corruption.⁷⁷⁶ The underlying idea of all of these views that Blowfield and Murray distinguish seems to be the thought that business should contribute to the common public good and be concerned with the underlying norms and values of society.⁷⁷⁷ Therefore, for this research, it is not necessary to go into further detail on these views. This research considers CSR as a combination of these three views, which all implicitly expect corporations to go beyond the (letter of the) law by upholding societal and moral values.

In chapter 6, some practical suggestions will be made with regard to what multinationals could do in order to go beyond the law in the context of tax planning. For now, in order to better understand the moral responsibilities that CSR corporations accept beyond the (letter of the) law, it is useful to know what can be considered as irresponsible. Nobody is an ideal citizen and, therefore, also no corporation should be expected to act as an ideal corporate citizen. Having said that, socially responsible corporations should distance themselves from irresponsible behaviour.

4.3.3. Corporate social irresponsibility

While it is difficult if not impossible to decide upon the ceiling of CSR, it is possible to talk about what CSR is not: corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). The concept of corporate social irresponsibility is equally important as CSR – being its inseparable counterpart. Neglecting the importance of the CSI concept accounts for an incomplete conceptualization of CSR.⁷⁷⁸ As shown above, CSR businesses voluntarily accept the obligation to go beyond compliance with legal requirements. However, some practitioners might be sceptical about CSR, as it is not very clear

⁷⁷⁰ Chapter 3.

⁷⁷¹ Ethical decision making, see chapter 6; morality see chapter 2, section 7 and chapter 3, section 3.

⁷⁷² Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 16-18.

⁷⁷³ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 18.

⁷⁷⁴ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 20- 21.

⁷⁷⁵ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 16-17.

⁷⁷⁶ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 24-36.

⁷⁷⁷ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

⁷⁷⁸ Tench, R. et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 19.

what is meant with acting over and above legal requirements. It does not always provide clear-cut criteria and effective guidance. For instance, it is questionable whether it entails that CSR companies should behave like ideal (corporate) citizens or whether corporations should behave better, according to higher moral standards, than the average citizen. Ideals are the subject of much debate and the same is true for the means (strategy) to realize ideals: consensus is often hard to reach. Thus, the aspirational idea of accepting ethical obligations beyond compliance with the law is discretionary and can be quite abstract. Lacking clarity, defending and prescribing behaviour beyond compliance with the law to inspire corporate action will probably not be very convincing and effective for business practice. Furthermore, for instance with regard to tax planning, corporations enjoy the right to choose the most favourable way of doing business.

In order to add to the effectiveness of CSR and to help managers in their decision-making process, CSI can be a helpful tool, as it seems to be a concern that is easier to address. It is even indispensable to remedy certain shortcomings of the CSR theories. As Tench et al. argue, “without the concept of CSI, CSR is eventually empty.”⁷⁷⁹ Armstrong has approached CSI as follows: “‘Social responsibility’” is difficult to define. What *should* a manager do? It is easier to look at the problem in terms of what he should *not* do - i.e., at “social irresponsibility.” A socially irresponsible act is a decision to accept an alternative that is *thought by the decision maker to be inferior to another alternative when the effects upon all parties are considered*. Generally this involves a gain by one party at the expense of the total system.”⁷⁸⁰ Thus, he argues that it might be easier to find out what companies should not do instead of dictating what they should do.

The extent of CSR can, thus, be clarified by asking the key question: “what is not CSR?”⁷⁸¹ In order to clarify what a corporation should not do, Armstrong argues that corporate managers act irresponsibly if they choose for an alternative decision that has (more) negative effects for other parties. Legal-but-irresponsible business is an example of the exploitation of negative externalities that negatively impact other businesses and society at large. Such behaviour can be viewed “as anticompetitive between firms which also leads to counter-productive outcomes for social welfare.”⁷⁸² Moreover, such behaviour may be judged as unethical by using the negative golden rule that “exhorts people NOT to do unto others what you would NOT wish done unto you.”⁷⁸³ In the same vein, while it is difficult to agree on what a fair share of tax is, it is probably easier to agree that paying almost no corporate tax as a result of aggressive tax planning is evidently not a fair share.

Clarifying what a corporation should not do probably adds to the effectiveness of CSR; clarity about what not to do may be more effective as guidance to convince businesses to take action than a prescriptive approach. Defining undesirable behaviour will be more successful because “acts which involve negative consequences are much more salient than acts resulting in positive rewards.”⁷⁸⁴ Of course, CSR and CSI are logically inseparable, they exist in practice and by “eliminating or reducing CSI, CSR will significantly increase and become more effective.”⁷⁸⁵ Tench et al. illustrate the CSR and CSI relationship with the following continuum:⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁷⁹ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 5.

⁷⁸⁰ Armstrong, J. S. (1977). Social Irresponsibility in Management. *Journal of Business Research* 5 (3), 185-213. p. 185.

⁷⁸¹ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 8.

⁷⁸² Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 30.

⁷⁸³ Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 33.

⁷⁸⁴ Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 33.

⁷⁸⁵ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 5.

⁷⁸⁶ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 9.

This continuum shows that CSI has a finite endpoint, whereas CSR is illustrated as infinitely scalable. That is because CSI can have a concrete definition (e.g. based on negative effects on society, as shown above) while CSR is an aspirational ideal that leaves room for various corporate activities. First, it is clear that illegal activities are socially irresponsible. Therefore, this is also a starting point of the continuum. Further, this continuum illustrates that not all kinds of legal behaviour are necessarily socially responsible. Tench et al. add that CSI is “always subject to societal norms, traditions, cultures, expectations, conditions and contingent factors.”⁷⁸⁷ The same is true for CSR, because, in practice, the definition of the concept of CSR can vary from region to region, e.g. between the Europe and US.⁷⁸⁸ Therefore, it can be difficult to interpret “legal but severely unsustainable and/or unethical and totally unacceptable is contextually dependent and can be clearly defined by collective agreements in a society.”⁷⁸⁹ Such a collective agreement in a society can, according to Tench et al., be reached for instance through regulation or tight monitoring by pressure groups. I believe that such an agreement is also a subject for a broader public debate. A continuous debate is crucial, because the boundaries in this continuum are “arbitrary, dynamic and shifting,” especially with regard to minor unsustainable and/or unethical issues. In order to contribute to such a debate, I consider CSR as an ideal to strive for and keeping away from CSI that can be seen as a practical starting point for responsible corporations. How this fits with corporate tax planning will be further explained in chapter 6 of this research.

4.3.4. Concluding remarks

This section explained that corporations face various responsibilities, such as economic and legal responsibilities. In addition, corporations also have ethical responsibilities that go beyond the legal and economic ones. This section explained Carroll’s CSR theory that is also used as a theoretical framework for CSR in this research. The most important element of this theory in the context of this research is that socially responsible corporations accept their responsibilities beyond the pure compliance with the letter of the law; in other words, their ethical responsibilities. This does not imply that ethical responsibilities should replace legal ones but rather they exist in addition to legal ones. This starting point is also illustrated with the CSI/CSR continuum, which shows that not all kinds of legal behaviour are automatically morally responsible. CSR is a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Corporations operate in a dynamic regulatory world where things might quickly change. Moreover, “regulations may fail to address social and environmental concerns and so a minimal step beyond compliance may meet technical definitional requirements but hardly make a firm socially responsible from a broader perspective.”⁷⁹⁰ CSR is namely “the responsibility of corporations to meet the legitimate expectations of society for the firm to conduct its businesses

⁷⁸⁷ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 9.

⁷⁸⁸ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 13. See also chapter 2, section 2.1.

⁷⁸⁹ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 9.

⁷⁹⁰ Sheehy, B. (2015). Defining CSR: Problems and Solutions. *Journal of Business Ethics* 131 (3), 625-648. pp. 630-631.

in ways that produce economic, social and ecological benefits to relevant stakeholders and society at large.”⁷⁹¹ For instance, initially, social expectations were rooted in various religious cultures but nowadays the sources of social expectations on business behaviour have changed. Nowadays, media and activist groups play an increasingly important role in shaping public expectations of corporate behaviour.⁷⁹² Therefore, corporations need to understand the expectations that society has of their behaviour. To this end, it might be helpful to start by understanding the other end – what it is not (CSI).

The evolution of the business and society relationship has a long history. Through the evolution of CSR theories,⁷⁹³ two differing views concerning the core of the business and society relationship can be identified. One view follows that the only responsibility of a company is to operate within the framework of the law with minimal ethical constraints,⁷⁹⁴ while the other stresses that corporations should behave ethically above law taking account of certain moral responsibilities towards the society in which they operate.⁷⁹⁵ These views are also at the centre of this research. For the purposes of this research, it is necessary to understand whose interests business practice is expected to balance, especially with regard to tax planning.

4.4. Challenges of CSR

Engaging in CSR is a morally responsible strategy for corporations. Nevertheless, it is not self-evident why and to what extent corporations embed CSR in their everyday business activities. In other words, what kind of latitude does CSR leave for corporations? To understand how far corporations could go beyond compliance, it is necessary to analyze more specifically to whom corporations are responsible and what drives CSR. Corporations namely have various stakeholders that have different and often conflicting interests. This can weaken the focus of corporate accountability. All theories supporting the social responsibilities of business are based, to a lesser or greater extent, on the idea that businesses should account for their behaviour to a larger group of stakeholders than only shareholders.⁷⁹⁶ Every corporation has a stakeholder web, which is “a network of stakeholders that scrutinizes and attempts to influence a corporation’s behaviour.”⁷⁹⁷ Such webs “actively investigate, evaluate, and seek to change the behaviours of institutions (such as corporations) to achieve better alignment with the values and interests of their participants.”⁷⁹⁸ Corporations need to balance such conflicting interests, priorities and values. This balancing act, however, is done differently in various corporations, which means that it influences how CSR is applied in corporate practice.⁷⁹⁹ The following sub-sections focus on the nuances various corporate stakeholders and their conflicting interests add to CSR and also what drives corporations to embed CSR in their business practices.

⁷⁹¹ Eijbsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 31.

⁷⁹² Moon, J. et al. (2017). Historical Perspectives in Corporate Social Responsibility. In Rasche, A., Morsing, M., and Moon, J. (Eds). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 31-62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 42.

⁷⁹³ See e.g. Wood, D. J. (1991a). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718; Frederick, W. C. (1994). From CSR1 to CSR2: The Maturing of Business-and-Society Thought. *Business & Society* 33 (2), 150-164.

⁷⁹⁴ See e.g. Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*; Levitt, T. (1958). The Dangers of Social Responsibility. *Harvard Business Review* 36 (5), 41-50.

⁷⁹⁵ See e.g. Carroll, A. B. (1979). A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance. *The Academy of Management Review* 4 (4), 497-505; Epstein, E. M. (1987). The Corporate Social Policy Process: Beyond Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Corporate Social Responsiveness. *California Management Review* 29 (3), 99-114.

⁷⁹⁶ See e.g. Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. Boston: Pitman; Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of a Corporation: Concepts Evidence, and Implications. *Academy Management Review* 20 (1), 65-91; Melé Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 64

⁷⁹⁷ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 53.

⁷⁹⁸ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. pp. 53-54.

⁷⁹⁹ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 16.

4.4.1. CSR: a matter of balancing conflicting interests

There is no agreement concerning the extent of corporate moral responsibilities. In general, there are two conflicting perspectives with regard to the question to whom corporations are responsible: the stakeholder and shareholder perspective. A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”⁸⁰⁰ In other words, stakeholders are individuals (or a group of individuals) who have “a commitment to a corporation that stems from the fact that they work for it, supply it, purchase from it, live near it, or are affected in some way by its activities.”⁸⁰¹ Also, shareholders are corporate stakeholders. However, considering the specific relationship shareholders have with the corporation, they are considered a separate group. In corporate law, as well as in CSR theories, shareholders’ interests are often in conflict with those of other stakeholders.⁸⁰²

Stakeholder theory scholars describe a corporation by placing a wider group of stakeholders in the middle of it: “[T]he firm is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm activities. The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services.”⁸⁰³ The basic idea is that value creation is the result of interaction among groups, such as customers, suppliers, employees, financiers (stockholders, bondholders, banks), communities, and managers, which have a stake in the activities that make up business.⁸⁰⁴ In these relationships, the principles of reciprocity and responsibility are at play;⁸⁰⁵ for instance, “the local community grants the firm the right to build facilities and, in turn, it benefits from the tax base and economic and social contributions of the firm.”⁸⁰⁶ The stakeholder approach is criticized for its vague but high expectations on corporations that could be prioritized at the expense of profit maximization.⁸⁰⁷

As opposed to stakeholder theory, the view that corporations should be run to increase corporate profits and shareholders’ value originates from the writings of Friedman.⁸⁰⁸ This neo-classical economic (or neo-liberal)⁸⁰⁹ perspective is often presented as the absolute opposite to the idea of possible social responsibilities of businesses. It is also referred to as shareholder value theory or shareholder wealth maximization. Arguably, the supreme goal according to this theory is “increasing the economic value of the company for its shareholders” in the short term.⁸¹⁰ Based on that, all other social activities that corporate boards could think about would only be acceptable if they are obliged by law or if they add to the maximization of shareholder value.⁸¹¹ Garriga and

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⁸⁰⁰ Freeman, R. E. et al. (2010). *Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 207, quoting Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. Boston: Pitman; compare to: Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-27.

⁸⁰¹ Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is failing us and How to Restore Trust in it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 32.

⁸⁰² The specific position of shareholders will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

⁸⁰³ Clarkson, M. B. E. (1995). A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance. *Academy Management Review* 20 (1), 92-117. p. 105.

⁸⁰⁴ Freeman, R. E. et al. (2010). *Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 24.

⁸⁰⁵ Jallai, A.-G. and Gribnau, J. L. M. (2018). Aggressive Tax Planning and Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Managerial Discretion in the Light of Corporate Governance. In Mulligan, E. and Oats, L. (Eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Tax Research*, Volume 3 (pp. 51-86). Birmingham: Fiscal Publications.

⁸⁰⁶ Freeman, R. E. et al. (2010). *Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 25; See also Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 64.

⁸⁰⁷ See e.g. Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2002). Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? In McCahery J.A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 56-82). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. p. 60.

⁸⁰⁸ See e.g. Friedman, M. (1970, September, 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*.

⁸⁰⁹ Weyzig, F. (2009). Political and Economic Arguments for Corporate Social Responsibility: Analysis and a Proposition Regarding the CSR Agenda. *Journal of Business Ethics* 86(4), 417-428.

⁸¹⁰ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 55; See also Jackson, G. (2010). Understanding Corporate Governance in the United States: An Historical and Theoretical Reassessment. *Hans Böckler Foundation Arbeitspapier* 223. p. 16.

⁸¹¹ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 133.

Melé argue that nowadays “it is quite readily accepted that shareholder value maximization is not incompatible with satisfying certain interests of people with a stake in the firm (stakeholders).”⁸¹² Shareholders form a special group of stakeholders (individuals, group, or organization) that hold shares of a company. Shares are “units of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset that provide for an equal distribution in any profits, if any are declared, in the form of dividends.”⁸¹³ Shareholders are often also considered as the owners of a company⁸¹⁴ who either benefit or suffer from the increase or decrease of the share price. This is also the reason why shareholders are considered a specific group of stakeholders – they take direct risks when investing in a company. The idea of shareholder value maximization in general focuses on the predominance of property relations, which means that shareholders, as the owners of their investment (capital), should be protected against unreasonable spending. Managers are agents whose function is to maximize shareholders’ value.⁸¹⁵ Such a view is generally backed by a high level of distrust in relation to managers because of their self-serving motivation.⁸¹⁶ Friedman’s theory considers shareholder value maximization as “the supreme reference for corporate decision-making.”⁸¹⁷ Shareholder value theory supporters claim that “the only one responsibility of business towards the society is the maximization of profits to the shareholders, within the legal framework and the ethical custom of the country.”⁸¹⁸ However, in contrast to this widely-spread understanding, such a view is not in conflict with CSR in its entirety, it is merely supporting a more limited approach to corporate social responsibilities.⁸¹⁹ In Friedman’s view, companies are not allowed to “engage in deception or fraud, even if by doing so they are maximizing profits while abiding by the law.”⁸²⁰ Whereas, deception in this context includes “the ethical obligation to act honestly, with sufficient transparency in one’s actions such that they can be effectively evaluated by others.”⁸²¹ The neo-classical view on corporate social responsibilities, thus, grants CSR an instrumental role by considering “CSR as a mere means to the end of profits.”⁸²² Thus, “the economic aspect of the interactions between business and society is considered” and “any supposed social activity is accepted if, and only if, it is consistent with wealth creation.” That means that practicing CSR is allowed if it makes “good business sense.”⁸²³ Such an approach is called a business case for CSR, according to which engaging in CSR should enhance (long-term) revenues, reduce (e.g. energy) costs, manage risk and uncertainty (e.g. in relation to reputation), and maintain social license to operate.⁸²⁴ Such instrumental morality can also be seen as external motivation for CSR, according

⁸¹² Garriga, E. and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics* 53 (1-2), 51-71. p. 54.

⁸¹³ Investopedia definition of ‘shares’. Retrieved from: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shares.asp> (accessed 03.03.2019).

⁸¹⁴ This is an economic and not legal perspective. From the legal perspective, shareholders rights are usually limited because they do not have control in the company. This will be further discussed in chapter 5.

⁸¹⁵ Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 60; Logsdon, J. M. and Yuthas, K. (1997). Corporate Social Performance, Stakeholder Orientation, and Organizational Moral Development. *Journal of Business Ethics* 16(12/13), 1213- 1226; See e.g. Sternberg 2000; Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A., Matten, D., McWilliams, A., Moon, J. and Siegel, D. S. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 58.

⁸¹⁶ Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 60.

⁸¹⁷ Garriga, E. and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics* 53 (1-2), 51-71. p. 54.

⁸¹⁸ Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*.

⁸¹⁹ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 56.

⁸²⁰ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 55.

⁸²¹ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 55.

⁸²² Garriga, E. and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics* 53 (1-2), 51-71. p. 52.

⁸²³ Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 59. To understand this theory, it is important to keep in mind that it is a very economic approach. The main advocates of this shareholder value theory, such as for instance Friedman (1962) and Levitt (1958), are economists. They have argued that the responsibility of a corporation is to maximize shareholder value and social problems should be a concern of politicians and civil society. See Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. D. (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, see also Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*; Levitt, T. (1958). The Dangers of Social Responsibility. *Harvard Business Review* 36 (5), 41-50; Lee, M.-D. P. (2008). A Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead. *International Journal of Management Reviews* 10 (1), 53-73. p. 56.

⁸²⁴ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 49.

to which businesses turn CSR into economic opportunities and benefit.⁸²⁵ This perspective is, however, criticized as a “value-free” ideology that defends self-serving individualism and is not morally defensible.⁸²⁶ Stakeholder theory, in comparison with the shareholder theory, is considered to be more ethical, just and “more respectful of human dignity and rights.”⁸²⁷

In my opinion, these two theories represent different starting points in the CSR Pyramid. Socially responsible corporations should balance such different layers. Moreover, Friedman also argued in 1970 that the only one responsibility of business towards society is the maximization of profits for the shareholders, but he added that it should be done “while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”⁸²⁸ This broad view on the basic rules of society is often not taken into account when Friedman is quoted. Nevertheless, this point suggests that Friedman is not against any social responsibilities of a company; he supports a thin theory of CSR.⁸²⁹ In his opinion, it is justified that managers of a corporation that is a major employer in a small community devote resources to providing amenities to that community or to improving its government, because it is in the long-term interest of that corporation.⁸³⁰ However, for him, it is a matter of generating goodwill rather than social responsibility.⁸³¹ He refers to this as acting from self-interest. Such self-interest may include a commitment to certain social and ethical values – for example in response to public pressure, representing external motivation for CSR. According to Schwartz, Friedman’s position could be summarized as a responsibility “to make as much money as possible” (e.g. maximize profits) while complying with the “rules of the game” or “basic rules of the society” in which the firm is operating.⁸³² Such rules of society include obeying the “law,” conforming to “ethical custom” (e.g. business norms where you do business), and acting “without deception or fraud.”⁸³³ In other words, even Friedman did not consider corporations separate from society but as a part of societies. Moreover, his view seems also to confirm that corporations benefit from society, which is also one of the hypotheses of this research.

I believe that corporations, as members of the societies in which they operate, are responsible to a wider group of stakeholders. This is mostly because the shares of publicly-held corporations are transferable, which ensures the “liquidity of shareholders’ interests and makes it easier for shareholders to construct and maintain diversified investment portfolios.”⁸³⁴ In other words, nowadays shareholders are highly mobile; they have the possibility to reduce their investment at any time.⁸³⁵ Shareholders can “simply by holding a portfolio of stocks, to ‘diversify away’ much

⁸²⁵ See chapter 4, section 5.

See e.g. Samuelson, P. A. (1971). Love That Corporation. *Mountain Bell Magazine* (Spring Ed.); Drucker, P. F. (1954). *The Practice of Management*. New York: Harper & Row; Drucker, P. F. (1984). The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility. *California Management Review* 26 (2), 53-63. p. 62.

⁸²⁶ Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 59; Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. p. 201; See also Rasche, A. (2018, March 9). The Ethical Blindness of Corporate Sustainability. *The Business of Society*.

⁸²⁷ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 66.

⁸²⁸ Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*. pp. 32-33.

⁸²⁹ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 56.

⁸³⁰ Parkinson, J. (2006). Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Business Behaviour. In MacLeod, S. (Ed.), *Global Governance and the Quest for Justice - Volume II Corporate Governance* (pp. 27-46). Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing. p. 9.

⁸³¹ Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*. pp. 122-126.

⁸³² Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 52.

⁸³³ Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 52.

There are, nevertheless, some unclear elements in Friedman’s theory for the purposes of this contribution. For one thing, Friedman has not clearly defined what he means by “ethical custom”. Schwartz believes that “presumably this consists of what would be considered acceptable behaviour by the corporate community in the place in which the firm is doing business.” [Schwartz. (2011). p. 55] However, it could well be the wider society rather than the corporate community for Friedman considers “ethical custom” as part of the basic rules of society. Moreover, as also shown above, according to Friedman, companies should not engage in deception or fraud, even if by doing so they are maximizing profits while abiding by the law. Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. *New York Times Magazine*. pp. 32-33; Schwartz, M. S. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility: An Ethical Approach*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. p. 55.

See further also: Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 32. Dobson, J. (1999). Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral? *Financial Analysts Journal* 55 (5), 69-75. p. 72.

⁸³⁴ Armour, J. et al. (2017). What is Corporate Law? In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 10.

⁸³⁵ See e.g. Chang, H.-J. (2011). *23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Penguin books. pp. 17-21.

of the risk that a corporation might itself find threatening.”⁸³⁶ Affected by globalization, the role of shareholders has changed over time. In former days, shareholders might have been considered as the owners of a corporation of which they owned the shares (the agency theory).⁸³⁷ Nowadays, however, it is more complicated and therefore shareholders should be considered as the owners of the shares rather than the corporation.⁸³⁸ This is especially true in the case of multinationals: “shareholders no longer personally identify with the corporation they own.”⁸³⁹ Therefore, “most owners today only consider their ownership in the corporation as an investment.”⁸⁴⁰ Moreover, from the legal perspective, shareholders are not in control in stock-listed companies.⁸⁴¹ In addition, even shareholders can have different interests in practice. There are those that invest their money long-term and those who have opposite expectations. Shareholders who wish to maximize short-term returns are free to invest in firms that do not engage in CSR and are more risk-seeking.⁸⁴² The shareholder value theory is believed to support short-term profit making rather than long-term corporate value maximization. This is believed to be a rather negative way of running a business.⁸⁴³ Mitchell has argued that the legal structure of most large modern public corporations is very responsive to the stock market that “has become a place to look only for short-term behaviour.”⁸⁴⁴ According to Mitchell, under such short-term market pressure the corporate board has two choices: either “bend to the pressure” and focus corporate operations and benefit from on the short-term returns or “resist that pressure” and attract long-term, sustainable investors.⁸⁴⁵ Shareholders can decide upon their own ethical agendas by moving money to (less) ethical companies; they have their own responsibilities.⁸⁴⁶ Shareholders have different interests and motivations to invest in certain companies. For some companies, attracting investors is the most important driver behind certain decisions. CSR actions, however, (also) have various other drivers that can change over time.

4.4.2. CSR as a voluntary response to various societal expectations

CSR plays an important role in building “competitive advantage by enhancing the reputation and legitimacy of the organization.”⁸⁴⁷ Therefore, CSR is often also seen as a tool to (re-)build trust and

⁸³⁶ Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of “Shareholder Wealth Maximization”. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9(3), 39-52. p. 43.

⁸³⁷ See Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. pp. 116-117.

⁸³⁸ “While many laypersons believe shareholders own corporations, this statement is incorrect as a matter of law. As legal persons, corporations (like natural persons) either own themselves or have no owners.” See Blair, M. M. (1995). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute; Robe, J.-P. (2011). The Legal Structure of the Firm. *Accounting, Economics and Law* 1 (1), 1-86; Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’. In Vasudev, P.M. & Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. See also Stout, L. A. (2016). Corporate Entities: Their Ownership, Control, and Purpose. *Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics*, Forthcoming, Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-38. pp. 22-23.

⁸³⁹ Molz, R. (1995). The Theory of Pluralism in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Test. *Journal of Business Ethics* 14 (10), 789-804. p. 791.

⁸⁴⁰ Molz, R. (1995). The Theory of Pluralism in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Test. *Journal of Business Ethics* 14 (10), 789-804, p. 791; see also Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is Failing us and How to Restore Trust in it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 34.

⁸⁴¹ See chapter 5.

⁸⁴² See also Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2005). The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility. *Delaware Journal of Corporate Law* 30 (3), 767-818. p. 815.

⁸⁴³ See e.g. Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61.

⁸⁴⁴ Mitchell, L. E. (2007). The Board as a Path toward Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 279-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 281.

⁸⁴⁵ Mitchell, L. E. (2007). The Board as a Path toward Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 279-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 281-282.

⁸⁴⁶ See also chapter 2, section 4.

⁸⁴⁷ Kurucz, E. C. et al. (2008). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 83-112). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-91.

thereby also a corporations' competitive position.⁸⁴⁸ Perrini et al. argue that among consumers⁸⁴⁹ a socially-oriented company is associated with a higher level of trust in that company and its products.⁸⁵⁰ CSR is a corporate tool to show their moral responsibility. A crucial precondition for CSR in this sense is that corporations have the discretion to decide upon whether they engage in CSR and how they embed this into their business strategies. In other words, CSR is a corporate voluntary responsibility. Such a perspective fits well with the idea of intrinsic motivation for CSR. Nevertheless, considering that corporations also have extrinsic motivations, such as regulatory initiatives, shareholder pressure or fear of reputation damage, it is questionable whether CSR is and can be truly voluntary.

Arguably, one of the core characteristics of CSR is that it should be voluntary and that it constitutes corporate self-regulation rather than being mandated by regulations, laws, or industry codes.⁸⁵¹ Moreover, socially responsible corporate behaviour is expected to internalize or manage externalities, be oriented on multiple stakeholders, align social and economic responsibilities, and consider thereby social practices and values.⁸⁵² In other words, CSR expects companies themselves to think about the effect of their actions on society at large. Businesses are important to society; they are moral agencies which are free to make choices and choose their own identity (within the limits of the law).⁸⁵³ CSR is often "considered to be an integral part of a broadening notion of corporate governance."⁸⁵⁴ CSR "as a particular subdivision" of corporate governance is "a container of a regulatory mix consisting of hard law, soft law, self-regulation (collective and individual) and uncoded societal norms (the social expectations, to be judged by the courts of public opinion)."⁸⁵⁵ In light of the previous argumentation that CSR developed as a response to regulatory vacuum,⁸⁵⁶ CSR can be defined as "international private business regulation."⁸⁵⁷ CSR has, thus, a voluntary and self-regulatory nature.⁸⁵⁸ However, corporations are obliged to disclose in their annual reports whether and to what extent they engage CSR.

However, CSR is also a dynamic concept. Initially, CSR was simply corporate philanthropy, most probably in the sense of intrinsic motivation. Nowadays, there are different opinions as to what kind of regulation CSR is. That is mainly because the expectations and standards in relation to the social responsibilities of business are increasingly regulated. In general, corporations should be able to decide themselves whether and to what extent they go beyond the law. Nevertheless, the increasing regulatory attention, but also other external drivers of CSR (such as media attention or private international standards), raise questions with regard to whether CSR really is voluntary or not. For instance, some scholars argue that CSR is indeed "responsibility in management of organizations, taking social issues, environmental issues and the economic development of region and society into account" but it is not voluntary because "there are societal institutional pressures that demand such responsibility."⁸⁵⁹ In addition to regulation, corporations thus also face informal

⁸⁴⁸ See e.g. Jallai, A.-G. (2016). Restoring Stakeholders' Trust in Multinationals' Tax Planning Practices with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Trust and Taxation* (pp. 173-201). Antwerp: Intersentia; Lewis, S. (2003). Reputation and Corporate Responsibility. *Journal of Communication Management* 7 (4), 356-366. See also Porter, M. (interviewed by Morsing, M.). (2003). CSR – a Religion with too Many Priests? *European Business Forum* 16; Wan-Jan, W. S. (2006). Defining Corporate Social Responsibility. *Journal of Public Affairs* 6 (3-4), 176-184. p. 180.

⁸⁴⁹ Naturally, the author is aware that this is just one example of a company's various stakeholder groups.

⁸⁵⁰ Perrini, F. et al. (2010). The Relationship Between Corporate Responsibility and Brand Loyalty in Retailing: The Mediating Role of Trust'. In Smith, N.C. et al. (Eds.), *Global Challenges in Responsible Business* (pp. 191-214). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 192.

⁸⁵¹ See e.g. Porter, T. and Miles, P. (2013). CSR Longevity: Evidence from Long-Term Practices in Large Corporations. *Corporate Reputation Review* 16 (4), 313-340. p. 315.

⁸⁵² See Crane, A. et al. (Eds.). (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility, Readings and Cases in a Global Context*. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 3-20; See also Eijssbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 13.

⁸⁵³ See chapter 2.

⁸⁵⁴ Eijssbouts, J. (2011b). International Market Regulation, Corporate Governance, CSR and Multinationals. In Muller, S. et al. (Eds.). *The Law of the Future and the Future of Law* (pp. 295-303). Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic Publisher. p. 297.

⁸⁵⁵ Eijssbouts, J. (2011b). International Market Regulation, Corporate Governance, CSR and Multinationals. In Muller, S. et al. (Eds.). *The Law of the Future and the Future of Law* (pp. 295-303). Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic Publisher. p. 300.

⁸⁵⁶ See chapter 4, section 3.2.; see also chapter 2.

⁸⁵⁷ Sheehy, B. (2015). Defining CSR: Problems and Solutions. *Journal of Business Ethics* 131 (3), 625-648. pp. 640-643.

⁸⁵⁸ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 13.

⁸⁵⁹ Gössling T. (2011). *Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Performance: Theories and Evidence about Organizational Responsibility*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 1.

pressure with regard to CSR. Such informal pressure can come either from the outside of the corporation (e.g. NGOs) or from the inside (e.g. employees).

To clarify, to my mind CSR can have both voluntary and involuntary nature. From the legal perspective, CSR is voluntary. Such voluntary corporate-self regulation can be initiated by internal and external drivers, as argued in section 4.3.2. of this chapter. At the same time, there are various expectations on corporations with regard to whether and how they engage CSR. These expectations come in form of regulations, standards, or other informal pressure, which create an involuntary driver for corporations to engage in CSR.⁸⁶⁰ CSR, in any case, is not a strict hard-law obligation. Laws do not exactly determine what CSR contains; neither should laws do that because CSR should fill the shortcomings of legal governance. Thus, CSR is a form of voluntary corporate self-regulation. On the other hand, informally, CSR is not entirely voluntary in a sense that corporations are expected to be accountable for their actions. Such expectations derive from public pressure as well as certain standards on CSR that aim at ensuring a level playing field.

To sum, in the context of this research, two conclusions can be offered. On the one hand, from the regulatory perspective corporations have discretion on deciding whether and how they concretely engage in CSR. On the other hand, there are certain expectations on corporations that engage in CSR. The informal pressure to meet such expectations indicate that corporate discretion to voluntarily engage in CSR is limited. Furthermore, such expectations are in constant flux, since they respond to the dynamics of business practices. Consequently, corporations cannot ignore their social responsibilities, because the changing nature of the role of corporations in society implies that they have more responsibilities (that e.g. are outside the reach of governments only, e.g. because of globalization).⁸⁶¹ Corporations have a social role, which provides a basis for the conceptualization of corporate citizenship, which implies that corporations take over certain tasks where governments fall short.⁸⁶² For this research, CSR is used as a general umbrella term that also includes corporate citizenship. Therefore, the concept of corporate citizenship is not discussed in detail. Nevertheless, the concept of corporate citizenship illustrates well that corporations also have a political role next to the economic role in a society.⁸⁶³ This role might not always be purely voluntary but as a consequence of the pressure exercised by different activist groups.⁸⁶⁴ Hence, corporations are pressured to take responsibility, but they can decide themselves how far such responsibility goes.⁸⁶⁵

The voluntary nature of CSR (in other words, the freedom of the corporate board to engage in CSR at its own discretion) fuels the criticism of CSR from the shareholder theory perspective. It is namely believed that if Friedman's doctrine that the only responsibility of business is to maximize its profits and shareholders' value, then voluntary CSR would breach "the fiduciary duties of management vis-à-vis their shareholders."⁸⁶⁶ This argument will be analyzed in more detail in chapter 5 of this research.

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⁸⁶⁰ See also Steurer, R. (2009). The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe. *Policy Sciences* 43 (1), 49-72. p. 53.

⁸⁶¹ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68. See also chapter II on multinational corporations.

⁸⁶² Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

⁸⁶³ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 73.

⁸⁶⁴ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 73.

⁸⁶⁵ Steurer, R. (2009). The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe. *Policy Sciences* 43 (1), 49-72. p. 54.

⁸⁶⁶ Eijssbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 27.

4.4.3. Concluding remarks

In the previous sub-sections, it was explained, what is expected from corporations in the context of CSR, in theory and in practice. As shown, the expectations are not always clear or self-evident. On the one hand, in the context of stakeholder theory, corporations are expected to behave morally and limit their choices provided by corporate power. On the other hand, the shareholder value view considers corporations as economic actors that should increase the financial returns for their investors. Moreover, corporate boards do not only need to balance between the different interests of shareholders and stakeholders, in general, but also conflicting interests within these groups.⁸⁶⁷ Thus, a corporation can have many stakeholders with “competing and inconsistent constituent interests”.⁸⁶⁸ That leaves corporations with difficult choices. Roselle argues that the conflicting interests of different corporate stakeholders “present perhaps the most difficult management issue for companies that seek to be socially responsible.”⁸⁶⁹ Stakeholder theory, nevertheless, does not require managers to exclude shareholders’ interests; it just considers a wider group of stakeholders than shareholders only.

Consequently, corporations are at first faced with a challenge concerning to whom corporations should be responsible. Further, should that be clear, corporations face a challenge defining the nature of CSR. As argued earlier in this chapter, CSR corporations are expected to go beyond strict compliance with the law. Here, however, the question with regard to the voluntary nature of CSR arises. Namely, considering the increasing societal pressure and standard setting, one might think that CSR is involuntary. It was explained that for this research, it suffices to conclude that corporations have discretion when deciding whether and how they concretely engage in CSR. At the same time, there are certain expectations of corporations that engage in CSR. In addition, as business practices changes over time, societal expectations of CSR corporations also change. This suggests a dynamic nature of CSR, which also clarifies why taxation is increasingly discussed in the context of CSR.

4.5. CSR and taxes

It is evident that corporations have specific responsibilities that reach beyond the pure obligation to follow the laws. The extent of such responsibilities is, nevertheless, debatable. Having said that, corporations that present themselves as socially responsible have accepted to respect moral responsibilities towards society by going beyond pure compliance with the law. The question underlying this research is whether tax should be considered as one such corporate responsibility as, for instance, human rights or environment are; whether and how these examples of responsibility with regard to human rights and environment can be comparable, or serve as an example, to taxation. The following sub-sections will analyze these issues.

4.5.1. Paying taxes as a domain for CSR

From a moral perspective, it would seem difficult to disagree that corporations have responsibilities with regard to human rights. The (quality of) human life has a higher priority than corporate actions or profit. Some critics, however, argue that the effects of corporate tax planning violate certain

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⁸⁶⁷ For instance, there are shareholders with long-term expectations in a company performance and shareholders with short-term financial interests; see e.g. Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 23: An oil industry CEO: “On the one hand, you’ve got Wall Street squeezing you harder and harder for shorter and shorter term performance. On the other hand, you have a broader constituent base that wants more than financial results...Most CEOs will tell you, ‘This is damn hard work’.” Long and short termism will also be discussed in chapter 5.

⁸⁶⁸ Jensen, M. C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. In Beer, M. and Nohria N. (Eds.), *Breaking the Code of Change* (pp. 35-78). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. pp. 44-45; see also Weyzig, F. (2009). Political and Economic Arguments for Corporate Social Responsibility: Analysis and a Proposition Regarding the CSR Agenda. *Journal of Business Ethics* 86 (4), 417-428. pp. 418-419.

⁸⁶⁹ Roselle, J. (2011). The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value. In Mullerat, R. (Ed.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 129-156). Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 148.

human rights as well.⁸⁷⁰ To my mind, aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance do not violate human rights directly but can have a negative effect on human rights.⁸⁷¹ The corporate tax practices that can affect human rights rely mainly on moral reasoning.⁸⁷² Human rights that can be negatively affected due to corporate tax avoidance are mainly socio-economic in nature. Such socio-economic human rights are for example the right to education or other elementary public goods and services that should be provided by means of tax money.⁸⁷³ Such deprivation occurs especially (but not only) with regard to poor (developing) countries when they are involved in tax planning schemes.⁸⁷⁴ Approaching corporate tax planning from the perspective of human rights links back to the function of taxes (discussed in chapter 3). By not contributing a fair share to society, a taxpayer violates the principle of distributive justice and limits the state's possibility to provide essential public goods and services.⁸⁷⁵ This, in turn, has a negative effect on protecting or ensuring basic human rights. In other words, "tax abuses deprive governments of the resources required to provide the programmes that give effect to economic, social and cultural rights, and to create and strengthen the institutions that uphold civil and political rights."⁸⁷⁶ By providing tools for states to ensure individuals' socio-economic rights, taxation can be considered a key tool for "tackling inequality and for generating the resources necessary for poverty reduction and the realization of human rights, and can also be used to foster stronger governance, accountability and participation in public affairs."⁸⁷⁷ Consequently, aggressive tax planning might not harm human rights directly, but it has a potential to have a more wide-ranging effect on human rights. Therefore, in my opinion, paying a fair share of taxes is as important a corporate moral responsibility as not violating human rights directly. Furthermore, aggressive corporate tax planning practices are comparable to both human rights and environment in a sense that they can make use of corporate power with regard to mobility. Namely, also in case of aggressive tax planning, corporations often move their activities to states that apply less socially responsible standards (offshoring), or they act according to the letter of the law and avoid the spirit of the law. Such behaviour might be strictly legal, but it fails to meet the general purpose of the law, which is either paying a fair share of tax or ensuring that corporate practices are not harmful for the environment. In such situations corporate power can make use of a legal vacuum for profit making purposes. Such (ab-)use of corporate power can be related back to the moral roots. Namely, corporations that, driven by profit maximization, seriously diminish living standards of other members of society and thereby harm society, erode their moral responsibilities towards the societies in which they operate.⁸⁷⁸ Thus, in both cases, multinationals can use their corporate power⁸⁷⁹ to avoid (or even evade) regulation that would impose higher costs on a company in a situation where the underlying morality can be questioned. Moreover, such situation affects negatively the level playing field vis-à-vis other taxpayers. CSR should overcome the excessive use of corporate power, represented, for

⁸⁷⁰ See e.g. Destrooper, T. (2016, April 10). *Belastingontduiking is een schending van mensenrechten*. *Mondiaal Nieuws* (online); Boerrild, T. (2015, December 16). It's Time for Companies to Bring Tax Into Their Human Rights Due Diligence. *Business & Human Rights Recourse Centre*; Kohonen, M. (2017, November 16). Paradise Papers: Corporate Duty to Respect Human Rights in the Spotlight. *Lawyers for Better Business (L4BB) Blog*.

⁸⁷¹ International Bar Association. (2013, October). Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights. *A report of the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights*. p. 95.

⁸⁷² International Bar Association. (2013, October). Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights. *A report of the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights*. p. 94.

⁸⁷³ International Bar Association. (2013, October). Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights. *A report of the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights*. pp. 99-102; See also Destrooper, T. (2016, April 10). *Belastingontduiking is een schending van mensenrechten*. *Mondiaal Nieuws* (online). For an overview of the universal human rights, see the UN. (1948). *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

⁸⁷⁴ Pogge, T. and Mehta, K. (2016). Introduction: The Moral Significance of Tax-Motivated Illicit Financial Outflows. In Pogge, T. and Mehta, K. (Eds), *Global Tax Fairness* (pp. 1-13). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 2-5.

⁸⁷⁵ See also chapter 4, section 5.2.

⁸⁷⁶ International Bar Association. (2013, October). Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights. *A report of the International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights*. p. 2.

Economic, social and cultural rights are social-economic human rights, such as a right to education, housing, adequate standard of living, health, and science and culture. See more in: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2008). *Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, Fact Sheet No. 33.

⁸⁷⁷ UN. (2014). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona*.

⁸⁷⁸ See chapter 3.

⁸⁷⁹ See chapter 2, section 3.

example, by “the businessman’s decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s direct economic or technical interest ... which need to be commensurate with the company’s social power.”⁸⁸⁰ The society has “certain expectations for appropriate business behavior and outcomes.”⁸⁸¹ A corporation is considered “a social institution that must avoid abusing its power.”⁸⁸² Here I would add that corporations must not avoid using power in any sense. In my opinion, moral responsibility entails that corporations avoid abusing their power at the cost of society.

Paying a fair share of taxes is a responsibility of every member of a society, including corporations. However, from the economic perspective, tax is a cost and therefore some powerful corporations engage in tax planning, which in many cases is acceptable but may turn into abuse of corporate power.⁸⁸³ Various possibilities to engage in international tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning introduced in chapter 3 prove that there is a regulatory vacuum on an issue that has severe consequences for society. In similar situations in other fields, such as environmental damage or human rights abuses, the idea of CSR became important. Thus, the appearance of such similar pattern suggests that tax should be part of CSR. Corporations that avoid paying their fair share of taxes are not socially responsible.⁸⁸⁴ Instead, they are, for instance, undermining the socio-economic rights of other members of society. In other words, being socially responsible in other spheres, such as human rights or environmental protection, does not make up for a minimal contribution to society’s common good.⁸⁸⁵ Distributive justice and public goods are indispensable for a sustainable society and for ensuring human rights, as explained previously.⁸⁸⁶

Aggressive tax planning as a form of creative compliance⁸⁸⁷ cannot be tackled by changes to the law alone “because creative compliance is the product not just of limits of the law but of a mind-set which seeks to exploit those limits, and, crucially, which sees this exploitation as perfectly legitimate.”⁸⁸⁸ General tax systems are based on the expectation that everybody contributes his/her fair share of tax to a well-functioning society. Laws reflect the moral values of society.⁸⁸⁹ However, in some cases, written laws fall short of achieving the moral outcome desired of citizens’ behaviour. There are also social norms that “exist over and above compliance with laws and regulations.”⁸⁹⁰ Paying taxes is a contribution to society that is written in the law; moral norms require that such laws are not circumvented by taking advantage of ones’ powerful position.

Next to the fact that, in its very essence, tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning does not fit in the same picture with CSR, there are also other reasons for corporations to consider its tax strategy in relation to the notion of CSR. Already in 2008, Hartnett argued that “boards in the U.K. are beginning to realize that taxation disputes cost serious management time and serious money, and they involve serious reputational risk.”⁸⁹¹ This is not only the case in the UK but also in other countries. Today, after various scandals and information leaks, the reputation risk seems to be even more relevant. Hartnett argued that, by combining tax and CSR, “business can convince tax administrators that a more trusting tax environment is possible, and high levels of suspicion occurring in tax administrations can be reduced.”⁸⁹² This position of Hartnett pinpoints two

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⁸⁸⁰ Davis, K. (1960). Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities? *California Management Review* 2 (3), 70-76.

⁸⁸¹ Wood, D. J. (1991a). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718. p. 695.

⁸⁸² Wood, D. J. (1991a). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718. p. 695.

⁸⁸³ See chapter 3, section 3.

⁸⁸⁴ See also chapter 6, section 2.2.

⁸⁸⁵ See also Bowers, S. (2018). Apple Claims to be a Good Corporate Citizen, but is it Really? *International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*.

⁸⁸⁶ See more on sustainability and its relation to tax governance in chapter 4, section 5.2.

⁸⁸⁷ As argued in chapter 3.

⁸⁸⁸ McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 48.

⁸⁸⁹ See chapter 3, section 2.

⁸⁹⁰ Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 91.

⁸⁹¹ Hartnett, D. (2008). The Link between Taxation and Corporate Governance. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 3-8). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 5.

⁸⁹² Hartnett, D. (2008). The Link between Taxation and Corporate Governance. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 3-8). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 4.

important factors of tax avoidance that are relevant from the corporate perspective: reputation and trust.⁸⁹³

In order to rebuild trust and reputation, corporations can adopt a tax policy as a part of their CSR strategy. As shown previously, the initial idea of CSR arose from the fact that corporations had gained a lot of power, which started to cross some lines that demanded a reaction of society. This gave rise to thoughts on how to keep these powerful corporations morally responsible and accountable for their actions. This is now happening with regard to tax planning. Taxes are an important fundament for society, which implies that CSR companies also have to include such voluntary moral responsibility in their tax planning.⁸⁹⁴ Corporations that present themselves as socially responsible should not do away with only applying ethical standards in business operations that are the most convenient to them.

It goes without saying that there are people who do not believe in CSR as a possible solution for certain fundamental issues in society. For instance, Freedman has argued, “but ultimately, although something can be achieved by CSR, it is limited by the profit system that underlies capitalism.”⁸⁹⁵ Freedman seems to be pessimistic about corporate moral responsibilities. She is correct in that most multinationals are profit driven. Having said that, in addition to public outrage, important investors are also increasingly requiring corporations to live up to their moral responsibilities.⁸⁹⁶ Therefore, I refuse to trash corporate moral responsibilities simply by accepting the capitalist roots of business practices. The neo-liberal roots of business making should not be a counter argument to the request for a co-operative and mutually respectful society. CSR is a contested concept, as is explained in this chapter. Therefore, I may have a different understanding of CSR than Freedman does. In the context of this research, combining CSR and tax does not mean “giving part of its profit back to society”⁸⁹⁷ but it means that certain members of society should not be earning unfair profits by minimizing their tax burden at the expense of society. Corporate tax planning that is in line with a corporation’s CSR agenda is conceptualized as good tax governance in the context of this research.⁸⁹⁸ Later in this research,⁸⁹⁹ it will be explained in more detail what are the elements of such good tax governance. At the very basic level, good tax governance refers to CSR and at the other extreme bad tax governance refers to the area of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI).⁹⁰⁰ Another critic of the idea of integrating taxation with CSR, Panayi, does not agree that corporations that engage in aggressive tax planning are socially irresponsible.⁹⁰¹ According to her, CSR is a vague concept that is used as a solution to the inadequate existing principles of international tax law.⁹⁰² Panayi also claims that “it is a slippery slope for a country to expect to raise or increase corporate tax revenues from CSR.”⁹⁰³ As a consequence of socially responsible tax planning, various states’ tax revenues would probably increase, but that should not be the main point. The point is that companies who have already taken the responsibility to engage in CSR should not claim that they are responsible while they erode their tax obligations in this society. Without diving into the relationship between tax and CSR in depth, Panayi argues that CSR is about ‘feeling’ which is incorrect. CSR is about being responsible towards a cooperative society that CSR companies

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⁸⁹³ As discussed in chapter 2, section 5.

⁸⁹⁴ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

⁸⁹⁵ Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O’Cinneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 384.

⁸⁹⁶ See e.g. Fink, L. (2018). Annual Letter to CEOs: ‘A Sense of Purpose’. See also chapter 6.

⁸⁹⁷ Eijssbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 11. Referring to Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 7.

⁸⁹⁸ Some sources call a similar idea an “active tax responsibility” (as a contrast to “passive tax responsibility”). See: Beloe, S. et al. (2006). Taxing Issues: Responsible Business and Tax. *SustainAbility Report*; Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed “Assessment” in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875. pp. 851-852.

⁸⁹⁹ Chapter 6.

⁹⁰⁰ See more chapter 4, section 3.3.

⁹⁰¹ Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558; on corporate social irresponsibility, see also section 3.3.3. of this chapter.

⁹⁰² Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558. p. 544.

⁹⁰³ Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558. p. 555.

claim to be. Being a part of society also includes, next to the right to enjoy the fruits of this society, obligations to contribute to that society. Companies that do not fulfil their obligations enjoy their rights at the cost of other members of this society.⁹⁰⁴ Naturally, it is a nuanced and complex issue, as Panayi correctly points out. Having said that, even a critical scholar such as Panayi concluded that in the context of tax CSR is the direction for the future. Therefore, she argues that “CSR initiatives should at most be seen as complementary soft law by the international tax community, not an all-pervasive solution to the tax problems faced in today’s globalized world.”⁹⁰⁵ This is a conclusion that is difficult to disagree with. However, claiming that CSR is an unjustified concept in this context is in my opinion misleading.

4.5.2. Regulation and tax governance

While the starting point of this research is that CSR rests upon the relationship between business and society, it does not suggest that the state has no role in this relationship. Both on the national and international level, rulemaking is crucial for steering CSR. Roselle argues that governments should recognize their responsibility “to create an enabling environment for private investment through rules that enhance transparency and reward CSR.” “[V]oluntary, flexible and non-coercive partnerships” between corporations and their various stakeholder groups are, according to Roselle, a suitable means for encouraging corporations to meet CSR goals.⁹⁰⁶ Also “global governance and the links between commerce, investment and sustainable development are the fundamental questions in the debate about the CSR.”⁹⁰⁷ International public and private guidelines, such as OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE Guidelines), The European Union definition on CSR, and Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) should help corporations to understand what society expects from multinationals with regard to good tax governance.

The UN has developed several guidelines for sustainable corporate practices.⁹⁰⁸ For this research, PRI, which are supported by the UN,⁹⁰⁹ are the most concrete. The PRI focuses on “the investment implications of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors” and it provides guidelines for how investors could incorporate these “factors into their investment and ownership decisions.”⁹¹⁰ The aim of PRI is to encourage long-term investment decisions that are responsible towards “the financial markets and economies in which they operate and ultimately of the environment and society as a whole.”⁹¹¹ Institutional investors can voluntarily commit themselves to PRI, which then in turn holds them accountable for six principles of responsible investment.⁹¹² It is noteworthy that

⁹⁰⁴ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

⁹⁰⁵ Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2015). Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible? *Intertax* 43 (10), 544-558. p. 558.

⁹⁰⁶ Roselle, J. (2011). The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value. In Mullerat, R. (Ed.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 129-156). Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 156.

⁹⁰⁷ Eberhard-Harribey, L. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility as a New Paradigm in the European Policy: How CSR Comes to Legitimate the European Regulation Process. In Lenssen, G. et al. (Eds), *Corporate Responsibility and Competitiveness* 6 (4) (pp. 358-368). Bradford: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. p. 364.

⁹⁰⁸ E.g. Global Compact “of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global market” aims at bringing “business together with UN agencies, labor, civil society and governments to advance ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption.” Corporations can voluntarily become a part of the UN Global Compact “by incorporating the Global Compact principles into strategies, policies and procedures, and establishing a culture of integrity.” By doing that, “companies are not only upholding their basic responsibilities to people and planet, but also setting the stage for long-term success.” UN Global Compact offers, thus, voluntary sustainability standards that businesses can follow. The Ten Principles on the UN Global Compact concern human rights, labour conditions, environment, and anti-corruption. The UN Global Compact has more than 8,000 participating companies from more than 170 countries. Therefore, it is considered to be “the world’s largest voluntary corporate citizenship initiative.” Rasche claims that the Global Compact “is *not* designed as a certification instrument or a tool to regulate and sanction its participants, but instead to foster a dialogue among a diverse set of actors in a non-bureaucratic way.” Important keywords constantly recurring within the UN Global Compact are “transparency”, “values”, “principles”, and “dialogue”. It seems, therefore, to be a perfect trust-based relationship that aims to educate businesses on the CSR field and helps if necessary. See UN. (1999, February 1). *Secretary-General Address to the World Economic Forum in Davos*; CSR Wire information page on United Nations Global Compact; UN Global Compact. Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact; Rasche, A. (2009). ‘A Necessary Supplement’ - What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not. *Business and Society Review* 48 (4), 511-537.

⁹⁰⁹ UN PRI. Information Page on Principles of Responsible investment (PRI).

⁹¹⁰ UN PRI. Information Page on Principles of Responsible investment (PRI).

⁹¹¹ UN PRI. Information Page on Principles of Responsible investment (PRI).

⁹¹² UN PRI. *The Six Principles of Responsible investment* (PRI).

PRI also has separate engagement guidance on corporate tax responsibility,⁹¹³ which should incentivize multinationals that wish to attract investors that have committed themselves to PRI to re-think their corporate tax practices.

Also UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the world-wide supported sustainability agreements, (indirectly) rely on good tax governance.⁹¹⁴ Most of the countries in the world (UN members) and also many corporations have agreed to contribute to SDGs that are aimed at achieving a better future; well-functioning and sustainable societies and markets. Taxation is crucial for achieving SDGs. In recent years, SDGs have received much attention in the context of state as well as corporate responsibilities. SDGs are 17 goals, adopted in 2015 by UN member states, to combat poverty, inequality and climate change. SDGs “call for action by all countries, poor, rich and middle-income to promote prosperity while protecting the planet” and “recognize that ending poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that build economic growth.”⁹¹⁵ It is to a large extent governments’ responsibility to establish regulatory frameworks in order to achieve SDGs by 2030. The SDGs are aimed at achieving well-functioning and sustainable societies and markets. In recent years, SDGs have received much attention in the context of state as well as corporate responsibilities.⁹¹⁶ Thus, such SDGs provide more concrete content for CSR.

Most SDGs, such as ending poverty, developing infrastructure or reducing inequality are (based on) essential public goods that are financed by collecting taxes.⁹¹⁷ Therefore, “taxation has a key role to play in financing the SDGs.”⁹¹⁸ Achieving SDGs depends largely on whether and how governments succeed in improving and enforcing their tax systems.⁹¹⁹ At the same time, as a group of leading companies maintain, “fairer, more transparent tax systems, should be supported and upheld by business.”⁹²⁰ As explained previously, perfect laws do not exist and to a certain degree multinationals will always have a choice whether to comply with the (moral) norms or circumvent the system.⁹²¹ This usually happens at the expense of public revenue and shifts the tax burden to less expert taxpayers. Tax avoidance has, therefore, to my mind an important influence on achieving SDGs. Taxation is “instrumental to state-building”;⁹²² by not contributing his or her fair share to society, a taxpayer limits the state’s possibility to provide essential public goods and services. In other words, “tax abuses deprive governments of the resources required to provide the programmes that give effect to economic, social and cultural rights, and to create and strengthen the institutions that uphold civil and political rights.”⁹²³

Consequently corporate tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning can be categorized as unsustainable because, if corporations “are not willing to fund the political institutional environment (such as schools, hospitals, the police, and the justice system), they erode one of the key institutional bases of their corporate success.”⁹²⁴ In 2017 the Business and Sustainable Development Commission (BSDC) launched a report that explains the necessity of corporate engagement with regard to sustainable development.⁹²⁵ According to this report, businesses need to regain public trust and, in order to do that, they need to demonstrate that they pay taxes where

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⁹¹³ UN. (2017, February 6). *New Recommendations Help Investors Engage on Tax*.

⁹¹⁴ See also chapter 6.

⁹¹⁵ UN. *The Sustainable Development Agenda*.

⁹¹⁶ See more: UN. The Sustainable Development Goals webpage: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs> (accessed 27.07.2019).

⁹¹⁷ UN. (2014). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona*. p. 1.

⁹¹⁸ Platform for Collaboration on Tax. (2018, February 16). Platform Partners’ Statement at the Closing of the Conference. p. 1.

⁹¹⁹ Lustig, N. (2015). A Missing Target in the SDGs: Tax Systems Should Not Reduce the Income of the Poor. *International Growth Centre*.

⁹²⁰ The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles. p. 1.

⁹²¹ Chapter 2; chapter 3.

⁹²² Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2017). The Europeanization of Good Tax Governance. In Albors-Llorens, A. et al. (Eds.), *Yearbook of European Law* (pp. 1-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 22.

⁹²³ IBA International Bar Association. (2013, October). Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights. *A report of the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute Task Force on Illicit Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights*. p. 2.

⁹²⁴ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-34.

⁹²⁵ “The Business and Sustainable Development Commission was launched in Davos in January 2016. It brings together leaders from business, finance, civil society, labour, and international organisations, with the twin aims of mapping the economic prize that could be available to business if the UN Sustainable Development Goals are achieved, and describing how business can contribute to delivering these goals.” See Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). *Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission*.

revenue is earned and are socially aware and responsible in other fields, such as environmental and labour standards: “to build an economy that is more just.”⁹²⁶ Achieving SDGs, however, also includes an extrinsic motivation for corporations by offering new possibilities for companies. For instance, it argued to open up “US\$12 trillion of market opportunities in the four economic systems”⁹²⁷ and create 380 million new jobs.⁹²⁸ However, in order to “capture these opportunities in full, businesses need to pursue social and environmental sustainability as avidly as they pursue market share and shareholder value.” In case businesses fail to do that, “the costs and uncertainty of unsustainable development could swell until there is no viable world in which to do business.”⁹²⁹ Moreover, a responsible mind-set and focus helps to build corporate reputation among different stakeholders.⁹³⁰ These are clear examples of external motivations to engage good tax governance. Further, the OECD MNE Guidelines are “the world’s most comprehensive multilateral agreement on business ethics and the only international corporate responsibility instrument.”⁹³¹ The MNE Guidelines “provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards.”⁹³² In recent years, the OECD has decided to abandon the concept of CSR and use the term responsible business conduct (RBC) instead.⁹³³ RBC “means that businesses should make a positive contribution to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable development and that businesses have a responsibility to avoid and address the adverse impacts of their operations.”⁹³⁴ The OECD MNE Guidelines, that is international soft-law regulation of CSR, “are far-reaching recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries.” These Guidelines provide semi-voluntary “principles and standards for responsible business conduct in areas such as employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation.”⁹³⁵ Moreover, according to the Guidelines, multinationals are expected to “refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework” related to taxation, among others.⁹³⁶ With regard to corporate tax planning, the Guidelines state that multinationals should “contribute to the public finances of host countries” while being transparent and complying with “both the letter and spirit of tax laws,” a fair share, thus.⁹³⁷ Also the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance argue in the same line that “aggressive tax avoidance” does not fit in an “overall framework for ethical conduct [that] goes beyond compliance with the law, which should always be a fundamental requirement.”⁹³⁸

According to the European Commission, CSR “refers to companies voluntarily going beyond what the law requires to achieve social and environmental objectives during the course of their daily business activities.”⁹³⁹ The effectiveness of CSR initiatives is in the EU “closely associated with

⁹²⁶ Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. pp. 7-8.

⁹²⁷ Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. p 12.

⁹²⁸ Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. p 18.

⁹²⁹ Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. p 12.

⁹³⁰ See e.g. Business and Sustainable Development Commission (2017, January). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. p 12.

⁹³¹ Nieuwenkamp, R. (2016, January 22). 2016: CSR is Dead! What’s next? *OECD Insights*.

⁹³² OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 3.

⁹³³ In January 2016, the OECD had an information page on CSR explicitly (OECD. *Corporate Responsibility: Frequently asked questions*), according to which there is “mutual dependence of business and society” whereas corporate responsibility “refers to the actions taken by businesses to nurture and enhance this symbiotic relationship.” The core element of CSR goes according to the OECD “beyond the core function of conducting business.” Therefore, “businesses are expected to obey the various laws which are applicable to them” and also “respond to societal expectations that are not written down as formal law.”

⁹³⁴ Nieuwenkamp, R. (2016, January 22). 2016: CSR is Dead! What’s next? *OECD Insights*.

⁹³⁵ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁹³⁶ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Article II. General Policies. pt. 5, p. 19.

⁹³⁷ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Chapter. XI, pt. 1. P. 60.

⁹³⁸ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 47.

⁹³⁹ European Commission. *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)*.

the effectiveness of broader systems of private and public governance.”⁹⁴⁰ CSR should, thus, fill in for the insufficiencies of public governance systems. According to the European Commission, CSR “refers to companies taking responsibility for their impact on society” and it “is important for the sustainability, competitiveness, and innovation of EU enterprises and the EU economy.”⁹⁴¹ The Commission tries to build a business case for CSR by arguing that CSR helps corporations since it “benefits for risk management, cost savings, access to capital, customer relationships, and human resource management.”⁹⁴² Moreover, according to EU law, large companies are required to “disclose certain information on the way they operate and manage social and environmental challenges.”⁹⁴³ Thus, clearly EU law leaves corporations room to decide upon the specific content on how corporations integrate responsible conduct (as long as it stays within the law, of course), but this requirement puts corporations under pressure to be transparent about their actions and possibly act according to public pressure.

Also, international private organizations develop different sustainability guidelines and reporting standards for corporations to follow. To name a few: International Organization for Standardization (ISO),⁹⁴⁴ Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),⁹⁴⁵ Accountability,⁹⁴⁶ MSCI,⁹⁴⁷ and Dow Jones Sustainability Indices.⁹⁴⁸ For instance, MSCI, “the world’s most widely used sustainable investment benchmarks”, is considering “penalising companies that use aggressive tax avoidance policies.”⁹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, there seems to be no concrete plans yet. MSCI is one of the world’s largest providers of corporate sustainability information to the global investment community.⁹⁵⁰ In general, MSCI provides investors with research-based information on CSR;⁹⁵¹ corporations whose investors rely on such MSCI information are pressured to keep up with the standards MSCI endorses.

4.5.3. Concluding remarks

Different fields of CSR have different drivers and reasons for applying certain responsibilities beyond the law on corporations. However, all of them can be linked to the moral dimension of aggressive tax planning;⁹⁵² they involve moral behaviour towards other members of society. Moreover, in all cases where CSR is applicable, traces of excessive corporate power in relation to

⁹⁴⁰ Carroll, A. B. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 41.

⁹⁴¹ European Commission. *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)*.

⁹⁴² European Commission. *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)*; see also Eberhard-Harribey, L. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility as a New Paradigm in the European Policy: How CSR Comes to Legitimate the European Regulation Process. In Lenssen, G. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Responsibility and Competitiveness* 6 (4) (pp. 358-368). Bradford: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. pp. 361-362.

This EU approach to CSR leans on guidelines and principles developed by other international organizations. See European Commission. *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)*.

⁹⁴³ European Commission. *Information page on Non-Financial Reporting*; European Parliament. (2006). Directive 2006/46/EC: Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 83/349/EEC on Consolidated Accounts, 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and other Financial Institutions and 91/674/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings.

⁹⁴⁴ International Organization for Standardization (ISO) webpage: “ISO is an independent, non-governmental international organization with a membership of 162 national standards bodies. Through its members, it brings together experts to share knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-based, market relevant International Standards that support innovation and provide solutions to global challenges.”

⁹⁴⁵ The Global Reporting Initiative webpage: “GRI helps businesses and governments worldwide understand and communicate their impact on critical sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, governance and social well-being. This enables real action to create social, environmental and economic benefits for everyone. The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards are developed with true multi-stakeholder contributions and rooted in the public interest.”

⁹⁴⁶ The AccountAbility webpage: “AccountAbility is a global consulting and standards firm that works with business, governments and multi-lateral organizations to advance responsible business practices and improve long term performance. We measure our success in terms of our impact on the performance of our clients, our people and our firm.”

⁹⁴⁷ The MSCI webpage: “We are an independent provider of research-driven insights and tools for institutional investors. We have deep expertise in the areas of risk and performance measurement that is based on more than 40 years of academic research, real-world experience and collaboration with our clients.”

⁹⁴⁸ Sustainability Indices webpage: “We have developed some of the most sophisticated ESG index solutions available to the asset management industry through our unique and unparalleled methodology for gathering, analyzing, quantifying, and distributing ESG data.”

⁹⁴⁹ Ram, A. (2016, November 13). MSCI Takes Aim at Corporate Tax Avoidance. *Financial Times* (online).

⁹⁵⁰ Skroupa, C. P. (2017, April 24). ESG Reporting Reshapes Global Markets. *Forbes* (online).

⁹⁵¹ MSCI. Information page on CSR.

⁹⁵² See chapter 3, section 3.

a legal vacuum on the international level or lacking state power can be found.⁹⁵³ The violation of human rights or environmental damages can have more severe and more direct effects on fellow citizens compared to tax avoidance. Nevertheless, taxation is an important building block for protecting and ensuring (the quality of) human rights and life. Aggressive tax planning might not harm human rights directly, but it has the potential to have a more wide-ranging effect on human rights.

To conclude, good tax governance contributes (as will be conceptualized in chapter 6) to CSR's other fields such as human rights and environment. In addition, taxation can be considered as an independent category of CSR, since, in the case of aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance, corporations can use their corporate power to ignore the laws and harm the societies in which they operate. Thus, discussing corporate tax practices under the heading of CSR is certainly justified. In this research, combining CSR and tax represents the idea that certain members of society should not be earning unfair profits at the expense of society. CSR should help to fill the insufficiencies of public governance systems with regard to problems related to corporate moral responsibility towards society.⁹⁵⁴

4.6. Conclusion

Corporate responsibility is a term that nowadays belongs to a normal business practice. Having said that, it is not always entirely self-evident what exactly is meant under such corporate responsibilities and whether companies are actually engaging in CSR driven by an internal desire to do good or just use it to build a better reputation (external motivation). Even more puzzling is the question as to what kind of responsibilities corporations have. For example, this research suggests that from the moral perspective there is a conflict if multinationals claim to be responsible corporate leaders but at the same time avoid paying their fair share of tax. In order to analyze this conflict further, this chapter focused on the concept of CSR.

In this chapter, it was explained how various examples from practice show that the concept of CSR has developed as a response to corporate activities that reduce corporate moral responsibilities towards society. CSR is aimed at controlling powerful corporations by keeping them accountable in a moral sense. CSR corporations have explicitly accepted the bottom line of CSR, which expects corporations to go beyond pure compliance with the law. From the legal perspective this might not be enforceable but not meeting such expectations can have negative consequences for corporations (such as reputation damage and losing trust), which can be seen as external driver.

It goes without saying that next to ethical responsibilities, corporations have basic responsibilities, such as economic and legal responsibilities. Ethical responsibilities go beyond the legal and economic ones. In this chapter Carroll's CSR theory was explained. The basic element of Carroll's CSR theory – that socially responsible corporations accept their responsibilities beyond the pure compliance with the letter of the law – forms a theoretical framework for understanding CSR in this research. It is important to note that going beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law does not imply that ethical responsibilities should replace legal ones, but rather they exist in addition to legal ones. This starting point was also illustrated with the CSI/CSR continuum, which shows that not all kinds of legal behaviour is automatically morally responsible.

Corporations have a social role. Not only from a societal but also a regulatory perspective; there are clear expectations on corporations, yet, sometimes corporations can do something that cannot be restricted by the law but that is still not acceptable by society: legal but illegitimate. Therefore, it is not purely voluntary, because there is a lot of social pressure for corporate accountability. However, even though corporations are not purely free to decide whether they engage in CSR or not, they are left with discretion to decide about the content and extent of such responsibilities. This can be seen as a space between corporate social responsibility and corporate social irresponsibility

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⁹⁵³ See more on corporate power in chapter 2, section 3.

⁹⁵⁴ See also chapter 3.

(CSI). Clarifying what a corporation should not do adds to the effectiveness of CSR; clarity about what not to do may be more effective as guidance to convince businesses to take action than a prescriptive approach. Corporations are expected to take responsibility and accept accountability for their actions. Thus, society expects companies to stay away from CSI and engage in CSR. In order to meet such requirements of society with regard corporate accountability and transparency, corporations need to report their strategies. Accountability is way to legitimate the exercise of corporate power. Accountability to society at large requires transparency to enable stakeholders to evaluate tax practices of a multinational company. Therefore, in summary, CSR is a tool to fight excessive corporate power and to endorse corporate moral responsibility where the legal system(s) falls short.

This chapter also discussed two differing views concerning the core of the business and society relationship: the stakeholder view and shareholder view. According to the shareholder value maximization view, the only responsibility of a company is to operate within the framework of the law with minimal ethical constraints. The stakeholder perspective, on the other hand, implies that corporations should behave ethically above the law, accounting for certain moral responsibilities towards the society in which they operate. Both views imply different expectations on corporations with regard to CSR. Corporate boards do not only need to balance between the different interests of shareholders and stakeholders in general, but they must also take into account conflicting interests within these groups. This leaves corporations with difficult choices. In addition, corporations face a challenge defining the nature of CSR. Societal expectations of CSR corporations change together with the developments in business practices. Such a dynamic nature of CSR also clarifies why taxation is increasingly discussed in the context of CSR.

In order to better understand how tax fits within the concept of CSR, other fields of CSR were briefly analyzed in this chapter. Different fields of CSR have different drivers and reasons for expecting certain responsibilities beyond the law from corporations. However, it was concluded in this chapter that all of them involve moral behaviour towards other members of society and concern excessive corporate power in relation to a legal vacuum on the international level. The violation of human rights or environmental damages can have more severe and more direct effects on fellow citizens compared to tax avoidance. Nevertheless, taxation is an important building block for protecting and ensuring (the quality of) human rights and life. Aggressive tax planning might not harm human rights directly, but it has the potential to have a more wide-ranging effect on human rights. Therefore, paying a fair share of taxes can be seen as important in corporate responsibility as not violating human rights directly. It was therefore suggested that taxation can be considered as an independent category of CSR, as, in case of aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance, corporations can use their corporate power to ignore the laws and harm the societies in which they operate.

Combining CSR and tax promotes the idea that certain members of society should not be earning unfair profits at the expense of society. CSR should help to fill in for the insufficiencies of public governance systems with regard to problems related to corporate moral responsibility towards society. This does not mean that corporations should forget their economic responsibilities, which is also in line with the argumentation of Paine that moral behaviour does not require denying one's own personal needs and aspirations.⁹⁵⁵ A corporate management board should act in the best interests of the company.⁹⁵⁶ The best interest of the company is without a doubt long-term financial stability, which is dependent on corporate reputations among its shareholders as well as stakeholders. It has been suggested that in order to act in "the economic interest of stockholders", corporate managers should often act "in the moral interests of certain stakeholders."⁹⁵⁷ In other words, "the market is not antithetical to ethics."⁹⁵⁸ The question is whether these best interests are in conflict with the shareholder value maximization. Different cultural and legal systems do burden

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⁹⁵⁵ See chapter 2, section 8.

⁹⁵⁶ See chapter 5.

⁹⁵⁷ Dobson, J. (1999). Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral? *Financial Analysts Journal* 55 (5), 69-75. p. 72.

⁹⁵⁸ Dobson, J. (1999). Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral? *Financial Analysts Journal* 55 (5), 69-75. p. 73.

corporations with various responsibilities such as “fiduciary duties, duties of care, good faith, adequate management, gross or simple mismanagement.”⁹⁵⁹ Such obligations might sometimes conflict with corporate moral responsibilities, especially in tax matters. In order to analyze such corporate obligations and their relationship to taxation and CSR, the next chapter will look into different corporate governance theories and practices.

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⁹⁵⁹ Eijsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. p. 39.

5. GOOD TAX GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONFLICTING INTERESTS?

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that tax fits well within CSR. Only paying taxes according to the letter of the law does not seem to suffice anymore, and stakeholders and society at large seem often to expect corporations to take into account moral considerations in addition to purely legal and economic ones in their tax strategy.⁹⁶⁰ Consequently, corporations are confronted with conflicting and evolving expectations with regard to their tax planning behaviour. They have to evolve with the changes in order to survive in a competitive market. Naturally, more empirical research is necessary in order to find out what exactly are the most important factors in relation to the trustworthiness of multinationals' tax behaviour. This detailed analysis is outside the scope of this research. However, considering the political as well as the general public's response to the latest tax avoidance news, it seems that currently certain corporate tax behaviour does not meet the societal expectations in relation to fairness and distributive justice.⁹⁶¹ Consequently, corporations face complex choices in their every-day business practices concerning taxation. Two of the most extreme positions in corporate culture are whether to choose exclusively aiming at paying as little tax as possible to maximize the shareholder value or whether also to consider a moral approach that satisfies a larger group of stakeholders. Here, we see the shareholder approach opposed to the stakeholder approach. For the purposes of this research, it is interesting to focus on these two extreme positions.

The previous chapter briefly introduced the concept of good tax governance and explained various reasons why paying a fair share of tax is a part of corporate social responsibilities. Having said that, there are also arguments against this (in addition to Panayi and Freedman's arguments discussed in the previous chapter⁹⁶²). Corporations namely face several legal obligations not (directly) related to tax. Different cultural and legal systems burden corporations with various responsibilities such as "fiduciary duties, duties of care, good faith, adequate management, gross or simple mismanagement."⁹⁶³ Such obligations might sometimes be considered to be in conflict with corporate moral responsibilities towards society. Especially in tax matters, such conflict can be challenging for tax can be considered both a corporate cost and moral responsibility at the same time.⁹⁶⁴

Some business and tax experts have claimed that various corporate legal obligations, such as the responsibility to promote the interests of shareholders, have an important effect on corporate tax decisions.⁹⁶⁵ It is the responsibility of corporate managers to ensure that corporate legal obligations are met. The responsibility to operate in the best interests of the shareholders sometimes even seems to override the interests of other stakeholders, which is in the centre of CSR. Schön, for example, has argued that the corporate management "is not in the position to deviate from the goal to maximize the after-tax profit of the firm without consent from the shareholders in their entirety."⁹⁶⁶ According to him, any tax decision that "substantially changes the risk profile of the corporation"

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⁹⁶⁰ See chapter 3; chapter 4.

⁹⁶¹ See e.g. Fairless, T. (2015, April 6). Huge Profit Stokes Concerns over Starbucks's Tax Practices in Europe. *The Wall Street Journal* (online); Rowney, M. (2015, April 20). What's Wrong with Tax Avoidance? *NewStatesman* (online).

⁹⁶² See chapter 4, section 5.1.

⁹⁶³ Eijssbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University, p. 39.

⁹⁶⁴ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. In addition, during the UK Public Accounts Committee hearing, Google's European president Matt Brittin claimed that (aggressive) tax planning "is not a matter of personal choice" (UK HMRC 2012, Q. 485, p. Ev 40).

⁹⁶⁵ See e.g. Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag; See also: Amin, M. The Case Against Morality in Tax. *Common Vision Blog post*.

⁹⁶⁶ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, p. 47.

It must be mentioned that this line of reasoning was developed more than ten years ago. Much has changed during this time. To the best knowledge of the author of this research, prof. Schön has not recently developed this argumentation further (in English).

is outside the scope of managerial decision making if it is not directly stated otherwise in the corporate statutes.⁹⁶⁷ It has to be noted that Schön made this statement in 2008 and a lot has changed in the last decade. Nevertheless, his position that choosing the tax minimizing strategy is a task of corporate management is still used in public debates. Sikka, for example, is concerned about the “considerable autonomy” that corporate management enjoys “to appropriate economic surpluses for shareholders.”⁹⁶⁸ This seems to suggest that managers have a choice, but they use it consciously for shareholder value maximization. Corporate management has to follow the applicable laws but, in the words of Sikka, “their discretion to pay democratically agreed taxes and maximise social welfare, is severely constrained by ideologies that preclude corporations from voluntarily embracing policies which subordinate shareholder interests to the advancement of collective social welfare.”⁹⁶⁹ Opting for good tax governance is, thus, also a question of the discretion of corporate management. Based on these two illustrated views, corporate boards⁹⁷⁰ face a certain pressure to opt for (aggressive) tax planning to increase shareholder value. If this is the case, exercising socially responsible tax governance would be greatly hindered. Whether such a position holds true (especially in light of current debates) is not that certain, however.⁹⁷¹ From the corporate law perspective corporate boards enjoy the discretion to set corporate tax strategy and business strategy, under which falls also CSR, as will be discussed further in this chapter. For instance, the Business Roundtable Guiding Principles for CG state: “the board approves corporate strategies that are intended to build sustainable long-term value”.⁹⁷² Corporate management has, thus, to operate in the best interests of the company and, in my opinion, good tax governance serves this responsibility, as will be argued in this chapter.

Other than shareholder value maximization, in order to argue for moral responsibility with regard to corporate tax planning practices, it is necessary to understand what affects corporate strategy and decisions with regard to CSR as well as tax. Roselle writes that good corporate governance (CG) is “a key ingredient” for the successful implementation of CSR, because “without it the company will lack the vision, leadership and accountability to develop sustainable profit in a manner that will appropriately consider the needs of all of the company’s constituencies.”⁹⁷³ Increasingly, CG should not only “ensure that the company has tools required to comply with applicable laws and regulations” but also “to articulate in a consistent manner how it views its responsibilities and commitments to the people and communities that it seeks to serve.”⁹⁷⁴ To understand whether multinationals face certain constraints in corporate law that restrict them from considering tax as a part of CSR, this chapter analyzes good tax governance from the perspective of CG principles. It will be studied whether good tax governance can be considered to be in conflict with corporate responsibilities towards shareholders under the CG rules.

This chapter is, however, subject to some methodological limitations. For instance, the term ‘shareholders’ is addressed as a general group of stakeholders that holds or owns a share of a corporation. The specific characteristics and interests of any particular group of shareholders, such as activist institutional shareholders and hedge funds, are not analyzed in detail. Furthermore, to illustrate the contradictory views on corporate responsibilities, two theoretical models of corporate governance are compared briefly: shareholder orientation (Anglo-Saxon model) and stakeholder orientation (Rhineland model). I will provide a brief overview of four jurisdictions that are

⁹⁶⁷ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 48.

⁹⁶⁸ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 155.

⁹⁶⁹ Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 155; he refers to Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. D. (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁹⁷⁰ In this research, corporate management and corporate board are used interchangeably. When corporate decision making is talked about, it refers to the actions of corporate boards.

⁹⁷¹ See also: Sikka, P. (2010). Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Accounting Forum* 34 (3-4), 153-168. p. 155.

⁹⁷² The Business Roundtable. (2016). *Principles of Corporate Governance*.

⁹⁷³ Roselle, J. (2011). The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value. In Mullerat, R. (Ed.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 129-156). Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 133.

⁹⁷⁴ Roselle, J. (2011). The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value. In Mullerat, R. (Ed.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 129-156). Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 133.

considered to reflect these two theoretical models of CG: the US and UK as examples of the Anglo-Saxon model and the Netherlands and Germany as examples of the Rhineland model. Where appropriate, specific examples of certain jurisdictions are provided. Focusing more on the theoretical models of CG instead of comparing the jurisdictions in depth makes it possible to provide a fundamental picture of the expectations of corporate management. At the same time, such an approach limits drawing concrete country-specific conclusions, which leaves room for further research.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, section 2 explains the background of the importance of CG with regard to the corporate tax planning debate that is central for this research. The concept of corporate governance and one of the underlying tools of CG – fiduciary duty – are explained. Furthermore, the underlying corporate law rules of the UK, US, Germany and the Netherlands are described. Section 3 illustrates the possible conflicting interests of various corporate stakeholders and their relevance from the CG perspective. The 4th section connects CG with good tax governance. It is shown that, regardless of various corporate law cultures and regimes, the primary duty of corporate managers is to act in the best long-term interests of the company and that aggressive tax planning or avoiding structures cannot be justified as being in the interest of CSR corporations. CSR is a part of corporate strategy and from the corporate law perspective it is the exclusive power of the board of the publicly listed corporations to decide upon corporate strategy and tax strategy. The last section concludes.

5.2. Corporate governance and arguments against good tax governance

Even though, in theory, tax planning should fit within the concept of CSR, it can be questionable whether and why corporate managers as well as tax advisors should be convinced to imply this in their daily business practices. The fact is that, in order to improve or incentivize the corporate mind-set in relation to tax morale and tie it to the notion of CSR, it is necessary to understand how corporations work. The decision-making processes in a multinational are complex and require compromises to be made between conflicting interests. From this perspective, multinationals can have various internal and external motivations to engage in good tax governance, as explained in the previous chapter. From the corporate law perspective corporate boards enjoy exclusive discretion to decide upon the corporate strategies (board supremacy principle). However, there are also arguments against engaging in good tax governance, which deserve some attention in order to develop a thorough understanding of this concept.

As explained in the previous chapter of this research, multinationals can have intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to switch to good tax governance.⁹⁷⁵ In other words, ethical behaviour can be seen as a goal in itself, such as being a ‘good corporate citizen’ or as ethical behaviour as a means to some other end, such as improving reputation or preventing political risk.⁹⁷⁶ Intrinsic motivation is an integrity-based approach, where morality drives the company. Naturally, economic performance (profits) and compliance with the law are relevant factors, as Carroll’s CSR Pyramid also suggests,⁹⁷⁷ but going beyond the law towards ethical behaviour is driven by a corporate internal drive to do what is right, just and fair. Integrity is based on the concept of self-governance. This motivation considers the effects of corporate actions on others, stakeholders and society at large. Good tax governance is a mix of both motivations but can eventually result in higher costs on corporations in the short term and thereby lower returns for shareholders.

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⁹⁷⁵ See chapter 4.

⁹⁷⁶ In 1985, Moon and Richardson wrote that motivation for CSR is to offset the threat of regulation. See Moon, J. and Vogel, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility, Government, and Civil Society. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 303-323). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 308. This can also be seen to be the case today in relation to tax. This is especially so when we focus on the multinationals that claim to be CSR. If corporations could prove that they do not abuse the imperfections of laws, the legislator does not have to (rush with) make(ing) imperfect laws. Despite the grey areas in international tax planning, there are possibilities for companies to show their good intentions and trustworthiness. One such intention is, thus, reflected in implementing social responsibility policies with regard to taxation.

⁹⁷⁷ See chapter 4, section 3.1.

Tax-as-a-cost argument needs more attention, however, for the purposes of this research, because it can play a crucial role with regard to CG. Namely, as illustrated in the introduction of this chapter, some believe that aggressive tax planning is an obligation of corporate management under the shareholder value maximization CG culture.⁹⁷⁸ This is an important position to analyze because, if this holds true, integrating good tax governance could be seriously hindered. In addition, CG is regulated (to a large extent) by (corporate and securities) laws while good tax governance as an element of CSR would (to a large extent) be a subject of voluntary corporate self-regulation. In other words, CG is based on hard law, while CSR is a form of soft law. Consequently, in the case of conflict, legal obligations should be fulfilled first. As a result, corporations face various practical questions such as whether and how would good tax governance fit with other legal obligations. Corporate and securities laws, which concern incorporation and listing requirements, director's duties, reporting requirements, and related policies shape "what companies do and how they do it."⁹⁷⁹ Therefore, to analyze corporate managers' general legal obligations, the following subsections briefly introduce the theoretical background of CG and the deriving managerial legal obligations.

5.2.1. Understanding corporate governance in the context of this research⁹⁸⁰

'Governance', as such, is a broad concept that applies to the purpose, management and functions of nations, governments, communities, and organizations, such as corporations. The governance of corporations, corporate governance (CG), refers to the way power is distributed within a corporation and to the decision-making process with regard to the use of this power. It sets rules and principles for how a (large) company should be regulated and managed.⁹⁸¹ CG originates with the birth of corporations. Already in 1776, Adam Smith pointed to the need for the supervision of managers because of the (legal) separation of ownership in capital from the control over that capital - i.e. the management of a business.⁹⁸²

The concept of corporate governance can have varying definitions. Many theoretical definitions of CG reflect the concern for the supposedly self-serving motivation of managers related to the separation of ownership and control. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny define CG as "the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment."⁹⁸³ However, there is a need for control by those who have to realize this return on investment. La Porta et al. define CG as "a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders."⁹⁸⁴ Frieze et al. aptly summarize the common general elements as "the sum of all mechanisms of control and supervision that are aimed at ensuring the successful operation of a business in a corporate form and in this respect to remedy the effects of the separation of ownership and management."⁹⁸⁵

Sir Adrian Cadbury, whose work on developing CG in practice is recognized around the world,⁹⁸⁶ wrote in his foreword to the World Bank's Corporate Governance Framework for Implementation that CG concerns "holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals." According to him, it is the aim of CG to "align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society" while encouraging "the efficient use of

⁹⁷⁸ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 47.

⁹⁷⁹ Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 87.

⁹⁸⁰ Corporate governance is a broad concept and this research focuses only on certain basic elements of this concept.

⁹⁸¹ Du Plessis J. J. et al. (2015). *Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance* (3rd Ed.). Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p. XXV.

⁹⁸² "[T]he directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own .... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company." Smith, A. (1776). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations of 1776*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. p. 741.

⁹⁸³ Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. *Journal of Finance* 52(2), 737-783.

⁹⁸⁴ La Porta R. et al. (2000). Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. *Journal of Financial Economics* 58 (1), 3-27. p. 4.

⁹⁸⁵ Frieze, A. et al. (2008). Taxation and Corporate Governance - The State of the Art. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 357-425). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 364.

⁹⁸⁶ Adeney, M. (2015, September 6). Sir Adrian Cadbury Obituary. *The Guardian* (online).

resources” and assuring the “accountability for the stewardship of those resources.”⁹⁸⁷ Thus, a CG system should provide incentives for the corporate board⁹⁸⁸ to “pursue objectives that are in the interest of both the company and its stakeholders.”⁹⁸⁹ This leaves room for considering CSR under the obligations that derive from CG. In other words, CG “provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.”⁹⁹⁰ According to Owens, an effective CG system is necessary for “a degree of confidence” which is a precondition for “the proper functioning of a market economy.”⁹⁹¹ Thus, CG can be seen as a “part of the larger economic context” which is also affected by tax rules, but also “business ethics and corporate awareness of the environmental and societal interests of the communities in which a company operates.”⁹⁹² Such a view on CG is, nevertheless, not commonly agreed upon. In general, there is an underlying assumption in most of the CG literature that corporate managers “operate with self-serving motivation.”⁹⁹³ Nevertheless, it does not imply that it is commonly agreed whose interests CG should take into account or prioritize. Corporations are managed and directed by a board of directors; CG determines corporate accountability, to whom a corporate board is accountable and for what.

To a large extent, it is argued that the corporate board “acts as a surrogate for the shareholders of the corporation and its primary role is to oversee management’s performance in terms of increasing profits and meeting social responsibilities.”⁹⁹⁴ That is why CG rules usually focus on the conflicting relationship between the corporate board and shareholders. For instance, according to the UK Cadbury Commission, CG is “the system by which companies are directed and controlled.”⁹⁹⁵ The direction of the companies should be controlled to protect investors. The Anglo-Saxon CG system is built on agency theory, according to which “the shareholders not only own the company but also its assets, which are entrusted to the managers based on their so-called fiduciary duty.”⁹⁹⁶ Based on this theory, corporations should be run serving the shareholders’ interests. Even though the modern

⁹⁸⁷ A. Cadbury, foreword in Iskander, M. R. and Chamlou, N. (2000). *Corporate Governance, a Framework for Implementation*. Washington: The World Bank. p. vi.

⁹⁸⁸ Various national legal systems recognize different board structures, such as a one-tier system or two-tier system. This research does not advocate any particular board structure and the term ‘board’ is used to embrace the different national models of board structures. Similar to the OECD/G20 Principles of Corporate Governance, this research combines in the term ‘management board’ both supervisory board as well as key executives, which in a two-tier system are considered as two separate corporate boards. See OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 10.

One-tier board is common in Anglo-Saxon system of CG whereas a two-tier board has been more used in Rhineland CG system. However, due to global business practices there is convergence towards a one-tier system for it is arguably more efficient. See AMS Advocaten. See also Frieze, A. et al. (2008). Taxation and Corporate Governance – The State of the Art. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 357-425). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 361.

⁹⁸⁹ Van Daelen, M. M. A. (2012). *Risk Management and Corporate Governance: Match between the Legal Framework and Practice*. Doctoral dissertation. Brugge: Die Keure. p. 243; see also Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 132.

⁹⁹⁰ Owens, J. P. (2008). *Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension*. In. Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 9-12). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 9.

⁹⁹¹ Owens, J. P. (2008). *Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension*. In. Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 9-12). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 9.

⁹⁹² Owens, J. P. (2008). *Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension*. In. Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 9-12). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 9.

⁹⁹³ Buchholtz, A. K. et al. (2008). Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 327-345). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 329.

Nowadays the managers’ self-serving motivation is conceptualized as agency theory, according to which one person (agent) has to make decisions on behalf of (or that affects the) another person (principal). Corporate governance rules should offer a safety net in case there occur conflicts between agents and principals. Agents are usually corporate managers and principals are stakeholders, while shareholders are often considered the most important group of stakeholders.

⁹⁹⁴ “Corporate governance is essential to corporate accountability and without which no corporation can exist. State laws demand that corporations are to be managed and directed by a board of directors. This board acts as a surrogate for the shareholders of the corporation and its primary role is to oversee management’s performance in terms of increasing profits and meeting social responsibilities. As such, corporate governance is fundamental component to corporate accountability as defined above because it provides a strong institutional forum for communication between managers and shareholder’s representatives.” Sage Publications. (2012). *SAGE Brief Guide to Corporate Social Responsibility*. Los Angeles / London: SAGE. p. 49. See also Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

⁹⁹⁵ Cadbury, A. (1992, December 1). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and Gee and Co. Ltd. para. 2.5.

⁹⁹⁶ Eijbsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. Pp. 48-49.

corporate law recognizes that a corporation is “a legal institution in its own right, owning its assets and being responsible for its liabilities”⁹⁹⁷ it still puts shareholders in the centre of corporate actions. Nevertheless, not all CG rules or guidelines require focusing on shareholders interests only. According to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, CG is about good governance and the supervision of listed companies; it regulates relationships between directors, auditors and shareholders.⁹⁹⁸ Thus, CG concerns mechanisms to supervise the behaviour of different actors. According to its preamble, the Dutch point of departure is that the corporation is “a long-term alliance between the various parties involved in the company.” The Dutch Code refers to different actors: the stakeholders, “the groups and individuals who, directly or indirectly, influence – or are influenced by – the attainment of the company’s objects: i.e. employees, shareholders and other lenders, suppliers, customers, the public sector and civil society.”⁹⁹⁹ The Dutch Code puts the responsibility on the corporate board “for weighing up these interests, generally with a view to ensuring the continuity of the enterprise, while the company endeavours to create long-term shareholder value.”¹⁰⁰⁰ Furthermore, according to the OECD CG reflects “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.” It additionally, sets a framework for achieving the objectives of the company and for monitoring corporate performance.¹⁰⁰¹ The OECD also notes that the aim of CG is to “build an environment of trust, transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investment, financial stability and business integrity, thereby supporting stronger growth and more inclusive societies.”¹⁰⁰² Such a perspective clearly goes further than focusing on shareholder interests only. But what is the main tool of CG to achieve such purposes?

5.2.2. Fiduciary duties of corporate managers

Thus, CG should set certain rules and principles for company management in order to decrease possible negative externalities that might arise from the self-interested behaviour of managers. In the other words, CG should prevent that managers, who do not run the business with their own capital, abuse their power at the expense of the capital owners’ – the shareholders’ – interests, or at the expense of stakeholders’ interests more in general. The most complex tension in the CG debate that has not been solved yet is how to balance “the profit-making objective of corporations and company officers against broader social responsibilities owed to the wider community.”¹⁰⁰³ With regard to tax planning, this balancing act is complicated. On the one hand, tax is a cost and the economic shareholder value perspective requires that costs are kept low. Thus, it can be questioned whether it is a reason for corporations to continue with aggressive tax planning in order to keep costs low and shareholders’ return high. On the other hand, taxes are an investment in a society and, due to their moral element, corporations should abstain from tax planning practices that aim at paying the absolute minimum without taking into account ethical considerations. Moreover, aggressive tax planning also brings certain costs and risks, which, in the long-term, might harm shareholder value as well.¹⁰⁰⁴ How should corporate boards deal with such a dilemma? According to the OECD, corporate boards “should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.”¹⁰⁰⁵ In certain

⁹⁹⁷ Eijsbouts, J. (2011a, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. pp. 48-49.

⁹⁹⁸ “Corporate governance gaat over goed bestuur van beursgenoteerde bedrijven en het toezicht daarop. Het regelt verhoudingen tussen bestuurders, commissarissen en aandeelhouders. De overheid heeft wetten opgesteld voor goed en eerlijk bestuur van bedrijven. Ook is er een gedragscode: de Corporate Governance Code.” Dutch Corporate Governance Code.

⁹⁹⁹ “Corporate governance gaat over goed bestuur van beursgenoteerde bedrijven en het toezicht daarop. Het regelt verhoudingen tussen bestuurders, commissarissen en aandeelhouders. De overheid heeft wetten opgesteld voor goed en eerlijk bestuur van bedrijven. Ook is er een gedragscode: de Corporate Governance Code.” Dutch Corporate Governance Code.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Dutch Corporate Governance Code. Preamble point 7.

¹⁰⁰¹ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 9.

¹⁰⁰² OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 7.

¹⁰⁰³ Du Plessis J. J. et al. (2015). *Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance* (3rd Ed.). Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p. XXV.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See also chapter 2, section 5 and section 6.

¹⁰⁰⁵ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 45-46.

jurisdictions, it is a legal requirement for corporate boards to “act in the interest of the company, taking into account the interests of shareholders, employees, and the public good.”¹⁰⁰⁶ Naturally, the central concern of CG is that the corporate board would not become self-interested. Therefore, the members of the corporate boards have fiduciary duty, which, according to the OECD, consists of two key elements: “the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.” The first duty “requires board members to act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care”,¹⁰⁰⁷ while the second “underpins effective implementation” of CG rules.¹⁰⁰⁸

According to Stout the fiduciary duty of loyalty precludes corporate boards from “using their corporate positions to line their own pockets.” Nevertheless, she believes that managers remain free “to pursue other, nonshareholder-related goals under the comforting mantle of the business judgement rule.”¹⁰⁰⁹ According to the business judgement rule (BJR), the managers are obliged to act in the best interests of the company. Advancing the successful operation of the corporation demands pursuing the interests of the corporation. The board’s discretion to make decisions that involve alternative choices can be derived from the BJR. Stout adds that “contrary to the shareholder primacy thesis, shareholders cannot recover against directors or officers for breach of fiduciary duty simply because those directors and officers favour stakeholders’ interests over the shareholders’ own.”¹⁰¹⁰ In contrast to various other corporate law scholars, Stout argued convincingly that “corporate law treats directors not as agents of shareholders but as fiduciaries who owe legal duties not only to shareholders, but also to the corporate entity itself.”¹⁰¹¹ I agree with this view.

Schön, on the other hand, has argued that the duty of care requires that corporate boards “take all decisions which are expected to bring about a positive net return on investment.” Consequently, “any tax-driven measure shall be taken if the expected amount of tax reduction fairly surpasses the ensuing costs,” such as “the narrow range of advisory and compliance costs for the tax measure itself and the broad range of costs incurred by the tax-driven operation as such.” Thus, corporate managers should choose, based on a cost-benefit analysis, whether to engage in various tax planning structures in order to fulfil their duty of care.¹⁰¹² In the same vein, Schön has argued later that in Germany managers have discretion with regard to the choice of tax planning structures, which is protected by the BJR. Only in quite extreme situations will there be a violation of their duty of care.¹⁰¹³ Schön has also argued (in 2005) that aggressive tax planning might at some point “tend to employ corporate constructions which are not justified from a corporate governance standpoint”, as it may result in “a dramatic loss of transparency for the shareholders, who are no longer in the position to estimate the true profitability of their capital.” Such managerial behaviour is, thus, according to Schön, harmful from a shareholder value perspective.¹⁰¹⁴ This, however, seems to highlight management’s decision-making power in tax-planning choices, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁰⁰⁶ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 45-46.

¹⁰⁰⁷ “In some jurisdictions there is a standard of reference which is the behaviour that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. In nearly all jurisdictions, the duty of care does not extend to errors of business judgement so long as board members are not grossly negligent and a decision is made with due diligence, etc. The principle calls for board members to act on a fully informed basis. Good practice takes this to mean that they should be satisfied that key corporate information and compliance systems are fundamentally sound and underpin the key monitoring role of the board advocated by the Principles. In many jurisdictions this meaning is already considered an element of the duty of care, while in others it is required by securities regulation, accounting standards, etc.” OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 45-46.

¹⁰⁰⁸ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 45-46.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’. In Vasudev, P.M. and Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 29.

¹⁰¹⁰ Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’. In Vasudev, P.M. and Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 29.

¹⁰¹¹ Stout, L. A. (2016). Corporate Entities: Their Ownership, Control, and Purpose. *Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-38*.

¹⁰¹² Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 46-47.

¹⁰¹³ Schön, W. (2013). Vorstandspflichten und Steuerplanung. In Krieger, G. et al. (Eds.), *Festschrift für Michael Hoffmann-Becking zum 70. Geburtstag*. Munich: Beck. pp. 1091-1092; see also Jallai, A.-G. and Gribnau, J. L. M. (2018). Aggressive Tax Planning and Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Managerial Discretion in the Light of Corporate Governance. In Mulligan, E. and Oats, L. (Eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Tax Research*, Volume 3 (pp. 51-86). Birmingham: Fiscal Publications.

¹⁰¹⁴ Schön, W. (2005). Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared. *Common Market Law Review* 42 (2), 331-365. pp. 348-349.

It goes without saying that Schön is right in that managers must not act in conflict with their legal duties. However, Stout's broader interpretation of manager's duties illustrates well how legal requirements leave room for various interpretations. While managers' fiduciary duty might be considered a requirement for acting in the best interests of the shareholders, a fiduciary relationship is much broader than understood in corporate law. For instance, Ghahramani points out that a "fiduciary relationship need not be created by contract; it may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed."¹⁰¹⁵ Fiduciary responsibilities are initially not based on "threatening liability but by expressing and reinforcing social norms of careful and loyal behavior."¹⁰¹⁶ Fiduciary duties in general are, however, not considered as special duties for "they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings."¹⁰¹⁷ In contrast, the basic functions of taxation suggest that paying taxes is an obligation that has a moral footing.¹⁰¹⁸ According to this line of reasoning, the fiduciary duties of corporate managers do not hinder good tax governance for good tax governance does not expect managers to act in their own interests but in the (long-term) interests of the company, which eventually should also be in the interests of the shareholders.

In practice, "the duties that fiduciaries owe the beneficiaries are of 'good faith, trust, confidence, and candor'."¹⁰¹⁹ Consequently, fiduciaries "are entrusted with discretion over beneficiary interests."¹⁰²⁰ Monks and Minow argue that the fiduciary duty is "the highest standard of procedural and substantive performance ever developed under our legal system". This duty imposes "responsibilities based not just on contracts but on honor, integrity, trust, and ethics."¹⁰²¹ Fiduciary duty in corporate law should prevent managers' self-interested behavior for "fiduciary law is inherently altruistic, as it imposes an unquestionable duty to place the interests of another before one's own."¹⁰²²

5.2.3. Board discretion as rooted in corporate law

In order to better understand the role of corporate boards with regard to the decision-making in two theoretical models of corporate governance – shareholder orientation (Anglo-Saxon model) and stakeholder orientation (Rhineland model), it is necessary to know what corporate law says. For this purpose, I will now provide a brief overview of the underlying rules concerning the board's decision-making discretion in UK and US corporate law as the representatives of the Anglo-Saxon model of CG, and Germany and the Netherlands corporate laws as examples of the Rhineland model.

In the US the exclusive discretion (and obligation) of the board to make decisions concerning corporate strategy is established mostly in (Delaware) case law.¹⁰²³ The role of the corporate board

¹⁰¹⁵ Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 21.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 21.

¹⁰¹⁷ Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R. (1993). Contract and Fiduciary Duty. *The Journal of Law and Economics* 36 (1), 425-446. As cited in Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 20.

¹⁰¹⁸ See chapter 3.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 23.

¹⁰²⁰ Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 23.

¹⁰²¹ Monks, R. A. G. and Minow, N. (2011). *Corporate Governance* (5th Ed.). West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. p. 102.

¹⁰²² Ghahramani, S. (2018). Business Ethics, Contractarianism, and (Optional?) Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. *Business Law Review* 39 (1), 20-24. p. 23.

¹⁰²³ See e.g. *Gimbel v. Signal Cos.*, 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974); *Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Mar. 1, 1984). Only in case of takeovers, the board is responsible for seeking highest value for the shareholders; *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See also Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Transatlantic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. pp. 30-34.

See also: Van der Elst, C., de Jong, A. and Raaijmakers, T. (2007). Een overzicht van juridische en economische dimensies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen. *Onderzoeksrapport ten behoeve van de SER Commissie Evenwicht in Ondernemingsbestuur*. pp. 104-120; American Law Institute (ALI). *Principles of Corporate Governance*.

as “the ultimate manager of the corporation” is protected and promoted by the business judgement rule, which was also discussed in the previous sub-section.¹⁰²⁴ The BJR is not “a substantive rule of law” but a presumption that the board acts in the best long-term interests of the company and thereby thus also in the best interests of the shareholders.¹⁰²⁵

In the UK, the board supremacy principle is vested in the Companies Act 2006 (section 172a).¹⁰²⁶ According to the Companies Act 2006 (172), the corporate board has a duty to promote the success of the company “for the benefit of its members as a whole” and in doing so corporate boards have to, amongst other responsibilities, for instance, consider “the likely consequences of any decision in the long term” and maintain “a reputation for high standards of business conduct”. Moore argues that under the UK company law “shareholders have no subjective power over the corporation or its management”.¹⁰²⁷

In Germany, the rights and obligations of the board of the stock-listed corporations are vested in *Aktiengesetz*, the German Stock Corporation Act.¹⁰²⁸ *Aktiengesetz* confirms the board supremacy principle.¹⁰²⁹ According to § 93 of the *Aktiengesetz*, the management board has the duty of care to act in the best interests of the company,¹⁰³⁰ which implies the existence of the business judgement rule in German corporate law.¹⁰³¹

In the Netherlands the exclusive right of the board to make decisions regarding business and tax strategy is known as the board supremacy principle.¹⁰³² This principle is vested various Supreme court cases, such as in the Forum-bank case, ABN AMRO, ASM International, and Boskalis / Fugro.¹⁰³³ According to this principle, the corporate board has the exclusive discretion for core decision-making in the company. These decisions, however, need to be disclosed and explained to the shareholders on a yearly basis in the annual reports.¹⁰³⁴ From the investor protection standpoint, in all of the aforementioned jurisdictions, corporate boards have to be transparent about their decision-making and disclose relevant information in their annual reports.¹⁰³⁵ For instance, the amendments in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2009) strengthen the financial disclosure to the market in order to restore the confidence of the investors in the board decision-making.¹⁰³⁶ Based on these legal rules, it is evident that corporate managers have in all jurisdictions clear discretion to decide upon corporate strategy, which includes business (CSR) strategy as well as tax

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¹⁰²⁴ Cahn, A. and Donald, D. C. (2010). *Comparative Company Law: Texts and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 392.

¹⁰²⁵ Cahn, A. and Donald, D. C. (2010). *Comparative Company Law: Texts and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 392.

¹⁰²⁶ See also: Moore, M. T. (2017). Understanding the Modern Company through the Lens of Quasi-Public Power. In Choudhury, B. and Petrin, M. (Eds.), *Understanding the Company: Corporate Governance and Theory* (pp. 91-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 103-106.

¹⁰²⁷ Moore, M. T. (2017). Understanding the Modern Company through the Lens of Quasi-Public Power. In Choudhury, B. and Petrin, M. (Eds.), *Understanding the Company: Corporate Governance and Theory* (pp. 91-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 104.

¹⁰²⁸ Cahn, A. and Donald, D. C. (2010). *Comparative Company Law: Texts and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-17.

¹⁰²⁹ *Aktiengesetz* § 76.1 and § 93.1. See also: Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. pp. 30-34, p. 116; Schön, W. (2013). Vorstandspflichten und Steuerplanung. In Krieger, G. et al. (Eds.), *Festschrift für Michael Hoffmann-Becking zum 70. Geburtstag*. Munich: Beck. pp. 1091-1092.

¹⁰³⁰ *Aktiengesetz* § 93 (1). See: Schulz, M. and Wasmeier, O. (2012). *The Law of Business Organizations: A Concise Overview of German Corporate Law*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer – Verlag. p. 188.

¹⁰³¹ See also: Van der Elst, C., de Jong, A. and Raaijmakers, T. (2007). Een overzicht van juridische en economische dimensies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen. *Onderzoeksrapport ten behoeve van de SER Commissie Evenwicht in Ondernemingsbestuur*. pp. 77-78.

¹⁰³² Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. p. 31.

¹⁰³³ Forumbank-arrest (HR 21 januari 1955, NJ 1959, 43); HR 13.07.2007, NJ 2007/434 (ABN AMRO); HR 09.07.2010, NJ 2010/544 (ASM International), and HR 20.04.2018, RN 2018/52 (Boskalis / Fugro). See also Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. p. 116.

¹⁰³⁴ Van der Elst, C., de Jong, A. and Raaijmakers, T. (2007). Een overzicht van juridische en economische dimensies van de kwetsbaarheid van Nederlandse beursvennootschappen. *Onderzoeksrapport ten behoeve van de SER Commissie Evenwicht in Ondernemingsbestuur*. pp. 76-77.

¹⁰³⁵ See e.g. Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. pp. 40 ff.

¹⁰³⁶ Van der Schee, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. p. 119.

strategy.¹⁰³⁷ Next to legal rules, corporate decision-making is also affected by the corporate cultures that are underlying the shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented CG models. The stakeholder (Rhineland) model of CG clearly encourages corporate boards to consider a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests and thus leaves room for good tax governance, as is argued in this research. The shareholder (Anglo-Saxon) model of CG prioritises shareholders' interests but, at the same time, as shown based on the corporate laws in the UK and the US, it does not restrict corporate boards from considering a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests, as long as it is in the best interests of the company. Thus, it also leaves room for good tax governance.

The board supremacy principle leaves, to my mind, in all jurisdictions corporate boards of the CSR corporations sufficient elbow-room for endorsing good tax governance. So far, there is no court case where shareholders have claimed that corporate boards were acting in bad faith, unprofessionally or uninformed when trying to improve the moral acceptability of the corporate tax practices. Based on the case law of various jurisdictions, it seems unlikely that any court would allow such hypothetical claim. On the contrary, corporations that claim to engage in good tax governance but at the same time undertake aggressive tax planning actions, can, in my opinion risk the claims of shareholders based on building wrong expectations.

5.2.4. Concluding remarks

Fiduciary duty is foremost one of the essential tools of CG for preventing managers from the self-interested behaviour (avoid agency costs). On the other hand, the BJR requires managers to act in the best interests of the company and thereby leaves the freedom to managers to "pursue other, nonshareholder-related goals."¹⁰³⁸ Even the shareholder primacy principle does not provide the shareholders with the possibility to "recover against directors or officers for breach of fiduciary duty simply because those directors and officers favour stakeholders' interests over the shareholders' own."¹⁰³⁹ For instance, the US corporate law, which follows the shareholder primacy model, allows corporate boards "leeway to commit corporate resources to projects that benefit the public" as long as such decisions have "some plausible connection to future profitability."¹⁰⁴⁰

In principle CG, thus, expects corporate managers to act in the interests of somebody else instead of their own interests. Various theories of CG indicate different starting points – supervision mechanisms protecting first and foremost shareholder interests, on the one hand, or also explicitly taking stakeholder interests into account on the other hand. CG theories are largely based on theories of companies and on the question to whom a corporation should be responsible and accountable, shareholders or stakeholders. Naturally, there is much discussion concerning the purpose of a corporation. Among economists, there has long been an understanding that corporations should generally be run so as to maximize its owners' – shareholder – value.¹⁰⁴¹ There is, nevertheless, also a group of people who believe that the purpose of the company is to "provide *ethically and profitably* the goods and services people need and want."¹⁰⁴² Both positions are hotly debated, as will be shown next. In my opinion, corporate decision making should be in line with legal requirements, but it is not necessarily restricted to such requirements in a sense that corporations have a leeway to go beyond strict compliance with the law. I believe that Stout's position reflects the complex business environment and decision making better than a strict

¹⁰³⁷ Compare, for instance, to the argumentation of Matt Brittin during the UK Public Accounts Committee hearing, Google's Vice President for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe: he claimed that (aggressive) tax planning "is not a matter of personal choice" (UK HMRC 2012, Q. 485, p. Ev 40).

¹⁰³⁸ Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on 'Shareholder Primacy'. In Vasudev, P.M. and Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 29.

¹⁰³⁹ Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on 'Shareholder Primacy'. In Vasudev, P.M. and Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 29.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Stavins, R. N. et al. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic Lens. *HKS Working Paper No RWP08-023; FEEM Working Paper No 842008*. p. 17.

¹⁰⁴¹ Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1968). *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World; Friedman, F. (2002). *Capitalism and Freedom, Fortieth Anniversary Edition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 133.

¹⁰⁴² Charkham, J. (2005). *Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten Years on* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 2, p. 21.

corporate hard-law approach. Corporate boards have discretion to combine legal requirements with economic results and a myriad of conflicting interests. From the legal perspective corporate boards are not obliged to prioritize shareholder value maximization in any jurisdiction but the best long-term corporate interests, as developed by the legislator and the courts, instead. Nevertheless, corporate decision-making is next to laws also affected by the corporate culture. Based on these CG regimes and cultures, this research will analyze whether multinationals that have committed themselves to ethical business practices, for instance through CSR, can also opt for more responsible tax planning. This, however, raises a question in whose interests should corporate managers act?

5.3. Corporate governance and conflicting interests

In business practice corporate governance has a wide spectrum of nuances and forms. For the purposes of this research, I will focus on two GC theories that represent quite opposite approaches to illustrate the conflicting interests that corporate managers might face. These CG regimes respond to two prevailing theories among corporate law scholars when addressing the essence of corporation.¹⁰⁴³ These theories, which reflect upon to whom corporations should be responsible and accountable, are shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. The first theory reflects “the importance of the primacy of the shareholder interest and the enhancement of the shareholder value.” The stakeholder theory, on the other hand, presumes that “corporations exist to serve a number of different interests and not just shareholders.”¹⁰⁴⁴ Both theories are also the foundation of CSR-related debates, as discussed in the previous chapter of this research.¹⁰⁴⁵ These two theories also represent two theoretical models of corporate governance: the ‘market-oriented’ Anglo-Saxon model (based on shareholder theory) and the ‘network-oriented’ Rhineland model (based on stakeholder theory) of corporate governance.¹⁰⁴⁶ These models illustrate two diverging regulatory and business culture approaches towards shareholders and stakeholders in company management.¹⁰⁴⁷

According to Ferrell et al. stakeholder and shareholder perspectives are two ends of a continuum, of which the shareholder model is a more restrictive precursor to the stakeholder orientation.¹⁰⁴⁸ It is the responsibility of the boards of directors of the publicly held corporations to ensure “their firms’ success or failure, as well as the ethics of their actions.”¹⁰⁴⁹ This suggests that boards need to balance various interests in order to ensure the success of a company. The Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK and US, are considered shareholder oriented. However, as showed in the previous section the directors of a company have no specific fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value only.¹⁰⁵⁰ The US system is “based much more on hard law and a regulatory state,” whereas the UK approach “relies more on soft law and self-regulatory mechanisms, such as Codes.”¹⁰⁵¹ Jackson has argued that the US hard-law approach (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX) to

¹⁰⁴³ For a comprehensive overview of the development of theories of the corporation and its responsibilities, see e.g. Avi-Yonah, R. S. (2005). The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility. *Delaware Journal of Corporate Law* 30 (3), 767-818.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Farrar, J. (2005). *Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5.

¹⁰⁴⁵ See chapter 4, section 4.1.

¹⁰⁴⁶ See e.g. Wymeersch, E. (2002). Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe? In McCahery J. A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 230-247). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. p. 231; Campbell, K., and Vick, D. (2007). Disclosure Law and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 241-278). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 250-252; Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 76; McCahery, J. A. et al. (2002). *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 231.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Habisch, A. (2005). *Corporate Social Responsibility Across Europe*. Berlin / New York: Springer. pp. 367-370.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 45.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 45.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Only in case of takeovers is the board under the US jurisdiction responsible for seeking highest value for the shareholders; the so-called Revlon principle: *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See also: Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of “Shareholder Wealth Maximization”. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9 (3), 39-52. p. 41.

¹⁰⁵¹ Jackson, G. (2010). Understanding Corporate Governance in the United States: An Historical and Theoretical Reassessment. *Hans Böckler Foundation Arbeitspapier* 223. p. 9.

agency theory has not improved the excessive managerial incentives for risk taking.¹⁰⁵² Arguably, SOX, which has been a regulatory response to various corporate scandals, such as Enron, has not increased shareholder rights and responsibilities, but it has been “more about diffusing private power into a more public system of checks and balances.”¹⁰⁵³ Such checks and balances are necessary to increase the public accountability of a corporation.

In the Rhineland model countries in continental Europe, such as Germany and the Netherlands, managers also have a fiduciary duty but with no judicial obligation to exclusively maximize shareholder value.¹⁰⁵⁴ In German corporate law, for instance, the concept of the plurality of interests exists: “corporations are expected to abide by commonly accepted legal and ethical norms, and directors are required to take account of the interests of the parties in addition to those of shareholders” – stakeholders, thus.¹⁰⁵⁵ The most common groups of stakeholders whose interests should be considered in European companies are employees and creditors.¹⁰⁵⁶ Inherent to the Anglo-Saxon shareholder model is that the focus lies more on “issues of individual liberty and economic freedom,” while in Europe the central point of interest is focusing more on “class difference and community solidarity.”¹⁰⁵⁷ The shareholder model, thus, prioritizes less “the interests of the community in the governance of the corporation.”¹⁰⁵⁸

The OECD, that has to adjust its principles on CG for different jurisdictions and cultures, recognizes that CG concerns “relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.”¹⁰⁵⁹ It points out that various stakeholders play an important role “in contributing to the long-term success and performance of the company.”¹⁰⁶⁰ The OECD thus seems to propose a pluralist approach to CG. On the one hand, it expects that the board members’ remuneration is aligned with “the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders.”¹⁰⁶¹ At the same time, it also suggests that the corporate board “should apply high ethical standards” and “take into account the interests of stakeholders.”¹⁰⁶² The OECD principles of CG illustrate that, in the global setting, both contradicting systems need to be respected. However, it is unclear which system prevails according to the OECD.

Indeed, as a result of globalizing business practices, there is a degree of convergence of CG standards.¹⁰⁶³ As a consequence of such convergence, the differences between these two conflicting

¹⁰⁵² Jackson, G. (2010). Understanding Corporate Governance in the United States: An Historical and Theoretical Reassessment. *Hans Böckler Foundation Arbeitspapier* 223. p. 10.

¹⁰⁵³ Jackson, G. (2010). Understanding Corporate Governance in the United States: An Historical and Theoretical Reassessment. *Hans Böckler Foundation Arbeitspapier* 223. p. 40.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See also Reinhardt, F. L. et al. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic Lens. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy* 2 (2), 219-239. p. 11; Neri-Castracane, G. (2015). Corporate Governance from a Comparative Perspective: Does the Business Judgment Rule Help Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? *Frontiers of Law in China* 10 (1), 8-23. p. 13.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is failing us and How to Restore Trust in it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 40.

In the same vein: Muchlinsky, P. T. (2007). *Multinational Enterprises & the Law* (2nd Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 341-342: “the classical Anglo-American model of the single board corporation may not give adequate voice to the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. By contrast, the German dual board model has been supplemented by a mandatory allocation of seats on the supervisory board for workers representatives under the co-determination laws (*Mitbestimmung*).” The participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process is one of the premises (besides transparency and accountability), which are common to both corporate governance and CSR (Lambooy, T. (2010). *Corporate Social Responsibility*. Deventer: Kluwer. pp. 49-104).

¹⁰⁵⁶ Lambooy, T. (2010). *Corporate Social Responsibility*. Deventer: Kluwer. p. 56.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Donaldson, T. (2008). The Transatlantic Paradox: How Outdated Concepts Confuse the American/European Debate about Corporate Governance. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 543-551). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 546.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Donaldson, T. (2008). The Transatlantic Paradox: How Outdated Concepts Confuse the American/European Debate about Corporate Governance. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 543-551). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 545-546.

For a contrasting example, Sweden has a corporate governance system that lies in between these two ‘extremes’: directors have the possibility to “interpret the company’s interests as extending beyond those of the shareholders” but they are not obliged to do so: Mayer, C. P. (2013). *Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is failing us and How to Restore Trust in it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 41.

¹⁰⁵⁹ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 9.

¹⁰⁶⁰ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 10.

¹⁰⁶¹ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 48.

¹⁰⁶² OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 46-47.

¹⁰⁶³ A. Cadbury, foreword in Iskander, M. R. and Chamlou, N. (2000). *Corporate Governance, a Framework for Implementation*. Washington: The World Bank.

views with regard to shareholders and stakeholders have arguably become smaller.¹⁰⁶⁴ It is, however, not entirely clear what this convergence exactly entails. In 2002, shortly after the Enron scandal, leading US CG scholars Hansmann and Kraakman argued that there is an international convergence towards the ‘standard’ model of CG – the shareholder model – since it is the best and strongest, according to the authors.¹⁰⁶⁵ On the other hand, there are scholars who criticize theories of convergence, because CG is very much attached to national systems and therefore there is no possibility for one general international system.¹⁰⁶⁶ For instance, Van der Schree claims that “in spite of globalisation of economies and financial markets, corporate governance systems and ownership structures are still very different”.¹⁰⁶⁷

Whether there is convergence or not, tax matters provide nuances, which make it still a difficult debate. It is namely inevitable that different stakeholders (including shareholders) have likely different perspectives on tax avoidance.¹⁰⁶⁸ This is because tax, in itself, results in debates where it is not entirely clear what is the goal that companies should aim for. For a further discussion in the context of tax planning, both stakeholder and shareholder-oriented systems still offer various insights to consider; this is especially the case with regard to tax planning in the context of CSR. For instance some corporate directors seem to argue that they do not have a choice with regard to tax planning, implying that a responsible tax planning strategy is not an option.¹⁰⁶⁹ Therefore, the question of managerial discretion will be addressed further by presenting the two theories in a traditional, rather black-and-white way, although without leaving out nuances evidencing some convergence. The aim of the following sub-sections is to review some of the more recent debates on CG that support either the shareholder or stakeholder perspective and to put these debates in the context of tax planning and good tax governance.

5.3.1. Corporate responsibilities towards shareholders

Taken to extremes, the shareholder value perspective would claim that it is “inappropriate for companies to take on the presumed costs associated with being ‘good’”.¹⁰⁷⁰ This seems to reflect Schön’s argumentation referred to previously. Tapscott and Ticoll explain that, according to this understanding, firms “contribute to society by creating useful products and services, creating jobs, paying taxes, and generating wealth for shareholders”, which would then eliminate “the need for ethical considerations outside the requirements of law.”¹⁰⁷¹ Such a perspective suggests that economic (costs), legal, and ethical layers of business practices are considered separately. However, Carroll’s CSR Pyramid, illustrated in chapter 4, expects CSR corporations to combine these layers for moral decision making.

Moreover, focusing on shareholder value maximization solely would be a complicated task. Under the OECD Principles of CG, shareholders enjoy various basic rights, such as transferring shares, obtaining relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely and regular manner,

¹⁰⁶⁴ Stout, L. A. (2012). New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’. In Vasudev, P.M. and Watson, S. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis* (pp. 25-41). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 26.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2002). Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? In McCahery J. A. et al. (Eds.). *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 56-82). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 56-58, 76.

The statement of Business Roundtable (April 2019), however, seems to suggest that there is a convergence more towards the stakeholder model. See the Business Roundtable. (2019, April 19). *Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation*. Retrieved from: <https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures-1.pdf> (accessed 09.11.2019).

¹⁰⁶⁶ Farrar, J. (2005). *Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-13; see also Mallin, C. A. (2016). *Corporate Governance* (5th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 278.

¹⁰⁶⁷ See also Van der Schree, P. A. (2011). *Regulation of Issuers and Investor Protection in the US and EU: A Translatic Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law*. Hoofddorp: Eleven International Publishing. p. 120.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Austin, C. R. and Wilson, R. J. (2017). An Examination of Reputational Costs and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Firms with Valuable Consumer Brands. *Journal of the American Taxation Association* 39 (1), 67-93. p. 68.

¹⁰⁶⁹ For instance, during the UK Public Accounts Committee hearing, Google’s Vice President for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe, Matt Brittin claimed that (aggressive) tax planning “is not a matter of personal choice” (UK HMRC 2012, Q. 485, p. Ev 40).

¹⁰⁷⁰ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 67.

¹⁰⁷¹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 67.

voting in general shareholder meetings, electing and removing board members, and more.¹⁰⁷² Modigliani and Miller write that shareholders expect returns on their investment. Nevertheless, not all shareholders have the same expectations. In other words, shareholders' interests may also conflict. In such cases, Modigliani and Miller argue that, if any shareholder "disagrees with management and the market over the valuation of the project, he is free to sell out and reinvest elsewhere, but will still benefit from the capital appreciation resulting from management's decision."¹⁰⁷³ In the same vein, Hu argues that corporate decision making cannot consider the best interests of individual shareholders, but "individual shareholders can engage in hedging on their own if they so desire."¹⁰⁷⁴

Shareholders expect, according to Molz, that "the corporation should generate a steady stream of increasing quarterly profits and higher stock prices."¹⁰⁷⁵ If such an expectation is met, "the investors are satisfied and unlikely to question the decision making in the firm." Based on such a focus on the short-term returns, corporate boards might lose sight of "broader social issues in the decision making process."¹⁰⁷⁶ A problem with shareholders is that they are "not accountable as owners for the company's activities, nor do they have the responsibilities that officers and directors do to protect the company's interests."¹⁰⁷⁷ Consequently, as Bouwer and Paine rightly argue, praising shareholders' interests only "results in a narrowness of vision that prevents corporate leaders from seeing, let alone acting on, many risks and opportunities."¹⁰⁷⁸ Furthermore, the high mobility of shareholders allows them to step out any time they wish; other stakeholders often cannot do that so easily. Therefore, focusing only on the (short-term) shareholder value is not in the interests of the company nor the economy at large.¹⁰⁷⁹ Consequently, shareholders' short-term interests might be bad for company's long-term interests.¹⁰⁸⁰ In general, shareholders and managers are like-minded: shareholders look for (fast) returns while managers seek investments. In addition, it cannot be ignored that, due to the high mobility of shareholders, managers might often be under pressure to satisfy shareholders' needs in order not to lose the future investment. Consequently, managers might get carried away by short-term decisions. This can, however, create negative externalities for the rest of the stakeholders or society at large. Nonetheless, to my mind, a fear that shareholders might leave is not equal to a legal obligation to maximize shareholder value at any cost. Excessive executive compensation might push some corporate board members towards more amoral decisions for "the incentives for executives are very biased toward high-powered short-term gains",¹⁰⁸¹ but this discussion is out of the scope of this research.

Pursuing shareholders' interests in the Anglo-Saxon CG regimes, especially in the US system, is to a large extent based on hard-law regulations. Having said that, the US case law refrains from making it so explicit.¹⁰⁸² For instance, the courts of Delaware, the state in which most of the big US

¹⁰⁷² OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 20.

¹⁰⁷³ Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. *The American Economic Review* 48 (3), 261-297. p. 264.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization". *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9(3), 39-52. p. 44. Hedging means investing to reduce the risk of adverse price movements in an asset; Investopedia definition on 'hedge'. Retrieved from: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp?ad=dirN&qo=relatedSearchNarrow&qsrc=6&o=40186> (accessed 03.03.2019). See also chapter 2, section 7.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Molz, R. (1995). The Theory of Pluralism in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Test. *Journal of Business Ethics* 14 (10), 789-804. p. 791.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Molz, R. (1995). The Theory of Pluralism in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Test. *Journal of Business Ethics* 14 (10), 789-804. p. 791.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹⁰⁷⁹ See also Chang, H.-J. (2011). *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism*. London: Penguin books. p. 19.

¹⁰⁸⁰ See e.g. Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61; See e.g. Owens, J. P. (2008). Good Corporate Governance: The Tax Dimension. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 9-12). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 11-12. See also: Wolf, M. (2018, December 11). We must rethink the purpose of the corporation. *FT* (online).

¹⁰⁸¹ Jackson, G. (2010). Understanding Corporate Governance in the United States: An Historical and Theoretical Reassessment. *Hans Böckler Foundation Arbeitspapier* 223. p. 37, p. 32; see also Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 165-166.

¹⁰⁸² Hu Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization". *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9(3), 39-52. p. 41. See also Parkinson, J. (1993). *Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, as paraphrased in McBarnet 2007. p. 23.

corporations are incorporated, confirm the centrality of the company's interests instead of shareholders' interests. Delaware case law demands that managers must refrain from pursuing their self-interests and act in "the best interests of the company" as also shown in section 5.2.3.¹⁰⁸³ This is because "managers and directors are fiduciaries rather than agents – and not just for shareholders but also for the corporation." The difference is that agents must "carry out the wishes of a principal, whereas a fiduciary's obligation is to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a beneficiary."¹⁰⁸⁴ Additionally, dual class shares in the US give management boards much discretion, which means that shareholders have even less of a say than previously thought. In this sense, the role of CG rules is to oblige managers to opt for the long-term best interests of company.¹⁰⁸⁵ That managers should act in the best interests of the company is affirmed in the Anglo-Saxon model of CG in the form of the BJR principle, explained previously. The BJR in the US or the Companies Act in the UK grant managers a safe harbour for making choices that might not always be in the short-term interests of shareholders but are in the long-term interests of the company. The OECD justifies this by stating that "a balance must be struck between allowing investors to seek remedies for infringement of ownership rights and avoiding excessive litigation."¹⁰⁸⁶

In addition to various debatable elements of the shareholder value maximization perspective, tax planning provides some additional nuances with regard to CG. For instance, it is unclear whether serving the shareholders' interests calls for maximizing "reported earnings or earnings per se" or in terms of maximizing earnings per "after-tax cash flow".¹⁰⁸⁷ Schön argued that shareholder value maximization does not focus on the pre-tax profit but on the value of dividends, "which have been subject to corporate income tax, the interest of the shareholders goes for the after-tax profit rather than for the pre-tax profit." Therefore, he concluded that tax minimization is a corporate managers' duty of care. He argued that corporate boards "are legally bound to engage in tax strategies."¹⁰⁸⁸ The question however remains what kind of strategies to employ, because, as argued in chapter 3 of this research,¹⁰⁸⁹ tax planning has various gradations. It is a normal business practice to mitigate tax risks, however, it can not be agreed with Schön if he intends that corporate managers are legally bound to engage tax avoidance or even aggressive tax planning.

Interestingly, Australian empirical research suggests that "shareholders do not send clear messages concerning the level of tax aggressiveness they believe to be acceptable, and do not demonstrate an interest in 'their' company's income tax strategy ex ante".¹⁰⁹⁰ The corporate finance literature, however, suggests that, if shareholders could choose, they prefer higher cash flows instead of higher reported earnings.¹⁰⁹¹ This indicates in my opinion what shareholders would possibly prefer and not what corporate boards are legally obliged to do. Indeed, shareholders can pressure corporate boards in this direction, but it is still not a legal obligation. With regard to tax planning, Schön, however, argued that the corporate board "is not in the position to deviate from the goal to maximize the after-tax profit of the firm without consent from the shareholders in their entirety."¹⁰⁹² Such a position, nevertheless, still leaves room for good tax governance, as it allows shareholders to opt for socially responsible tax planning which is part of the corporate strategy, as explained previously.

¹⁰⁸³ See also e.g. Neri-Castracane, G. (2015). Corporate Governance from a Comparative Perspective: Does the Business Judgment Rule Help Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? *Frontiers of Law in China* 10 (1), 8-23. p. 10, referring to *Aroson vs Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); *Kaplan vs Centex Corp.*, 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. 1971); *Robinson vs Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp.*, 126 A. 46 (Del. 1924).

¹⁰⁸⁴ Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹⁰⁸⁵ See Jackson, R. J. (2018, February 15). Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case against Corporate Royalty. Speech.

¹⁰⁸⁶ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 20.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization". *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9 (3), 39-52. p. 41.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 46.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Chapter 3, section 3.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 32.

¹⁰⁹¹ Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization". *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9 (3), 39-52. p. 41.

¹⁰⁹² Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 47.

Furthermore, nowadays, assuming that socially responsible behaviour is “incompatible with owner rights to generate as much profit as possible” is considered wrong, since shareholders’ wealth would likely decrease “when firms act in socially irresponsible, let alone illicit, manners.”¹⁰⁹³ As a result, “it is quite readily accepted that shareholder value maximization is not incompatible with satisfying certain interests of people with a stake in the firm (stakeholders).”¹⁰⁹⁴ Therefore, the neo-classical theory has been developed to a so-called “enlightened value maximization” theory. This theory, developed by Jensen, does not accept the stakeholder approach (that corporate decision making should consider the interests of all the stakeholders in a firm). Instead, it focuses on creating long-run profit maximization for shareholders, while creating social value as a by-product.¹⁰⁹⁵ Even though corporate boards do legally stay accountable to shareholders,¹⁰⁹⁶ CSR takes a step further from enlightened value maximization theory and requires that the interests of the wider group of stakeholders are also considered.¹⁰⁹⁷ In order to act in the best long-term interests of the company, managers (especially of multinational corporations) cannot ignore other stakeholder interests in addition to those of shareholders.

5.3.2. Corporate governance and responsibilities towards other stakeholders

Many authors have argued that corporations should be responsible to a larger group of stakeholders than just shareholders.¹⁰⁹⁸ For instance, CSR, per definition, requires managers to take into account the interests of members of society and/or company’s stakeholders in a slightly more limited sense. Thus, the interests to be served by managers include those of the shareholders (who are internal stakeholders) as well as the (other) stakeholders. This stakeholder theory takes stakeholders rather than shareholders as its point of departure.¹⁰⁹⁹ The stakeholder theory is not meant to be an antipode to shareholder theory but “instead a larger view about corporations that encompasses shareholder theory.”¹¹⁰⁰ Freeman et al. argue that the introduction of stakeholder theory entails an “invitation to a conversation that forces managers and the public to examine together two questions ‘what is the purpose of a corporation?’ and ‘to whom are managers responsible?’” These two questions arguably “have both ethics and business thoroughly embedded in them.”¹¹⁰¹ This is clearly a non-positivist view, as it does not focus on the letter of the law only.¹¹⁰²

Two ethical principles covering the corporation and its stakeholders’ relationship concern corporate rights and corporate effects.¹¹⁰³ The principle of corporate rights establishes that “the corporation and its managers may not violate the legitimate rights of others to determine their future.” The principle of corporate effects states that “the corporation and its managers are responsible for the

¹⁰⁹³ Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 65.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Garriga, E. and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory. *Journal of Business Ethics* 53 (1-2), 51-71. p. 54.

¹⁰⁹⁵ See more on enlightened shareholder value maximization in Jensen, M. C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. In Beer, M. and Nohria N. (Eds.), *Breaking the Code of Change* (pp. 35-78). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. pp. 35-78 See also Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 57. See also Keinert, C. (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy*. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. p. 65.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Also, as Schön argued in 2008: Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Friese, A. et al. (2008). Taxation and Corporate Governance – The State of the Art. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 357-425). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 363; referring to: Smerdon, A. (2004). *Practical Guide to Corporate Governance* (2nd Ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 250.

¹⁰⁹⁸ See e.g. Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*. Boston: Pitman; Friedman, A. L. and Miles, S. (2006). *Stakeholders: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of a Corporation: Concepts Evidence, and Implications. *Academy Management Review* 20 (1), 65-91; Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 64.

¹⁰⁹⁹ See chapter 4.

¹¹⁰⁰ Freeman, R. E. et al. (2010). *Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 206.

¹¹⁰¹ Freeman, R. E. et al. (2010). *Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 206; see also Cerioni, L. (2014). International Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Crucial Issues and a Proposed “Assessment” in the European Union Context. *European Business Law Review* 25 (6), 845-875. p. 848.

¹¹⁰² See chapter 3, section 2.

¹¹⁰³ Evan, W. M. and Freeman, R. E. (1988). A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism. In Beauchamp, T. and Bowie, N. (Eds.), *Ethical Theory and Business* (pp. 75-93). Harlow: Prentice Hall. pp. 75-93.

effects of their actions on others” and focuses, thereby, on the responsibility for consequences of corporate actions.¹¹⁰⁴ Also, the OECD Principles of CG, for instance, include both these ethical principles by recognizing that the corporate boards should act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Nevertheless, it is also expected that corporate boards “take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities.” Additionally, the boards should consider relevant “environmental and social standards”.¹¹⁰⁵ In other words, corporations should also consider stakeholder interests and the corporate effects on society.

Initially the stakeholder theory was introduced as “a managerial theory” for better strategic management. According to Hansmann and Kraakman, “at the core of this view was the belief that professional corporate managers could serve as disinterested technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business corporations to perform in ways that would serve the general public interest.”¹¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, corporations focusing on the larger group of stakeholders’ interests do not provide a cost-efficient business case, while shareholder orientation does, it is said.¹¹⁰⁷ This point of view reveals one of the most important criticisms that shareholder theory supporters have with regard to stakeholder theory – it is considered to be economically inefficient. However, since there is also evidence that shows that stakeholder orientation has a business case,¹¹⁰⁸ it is difficult to completely reject the stakeholder-orientation based on the business case argumentation. For instance, Clacher and Hagendorff concluded that, even though there is no strong evidence, CSR calls for a positive market reaction which suggests that CSR adds to the corporate value.¹¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, stakeholder theory has also been considered “a normative theory which requires management to have a moral duty to protect corporation as a whole and, connected with this aim, the legitimate interests of all stakeholders.”¹¹¹⁰ Whether protecting the corporate interests as a whole is always economically inefficient is open to debate. In addition, the stakeholder approach offers considerable business case indications, because a corporation’s competitive advantage is increasingly “stemmed more and more from the intangible values embodied in human and social capital.”¹¹¹¹

Some CSR scholars claim that CSR is directly financially beneficial for companies and, thus, also in the best economic interests of the company.¹¹¹² Carroll and Shabana have argued that, usually, “the business case for CSR is being made by documenting and illustrating that CSR has a positive economic impact on a firm’s financial performance.”¹¹¹³ However, CSR can only have a positive impact on corporate financial performance in case there is “a convergence between the firm’s economic objectives and the social objectives of society.”¹¹¹⁴ A successful firm requires more than “self-interest and concern for profits”: “trust, a sense of loyalty, and good relationships with all stakeholders and, as a consequence, an enduring cooperation among those who are involved in or

¹¹⁰⁴ Evan, W. M. and Freeman, R. E. (1988). A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism. In Beauchamp, T. and Bowie, N. (Eds.), *Ethical Theory and Business* (pp. 75-93). Harlow: Prentice Hall. pp. 75-93. See also Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 64.

¹¹⁰⁵ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 45.

¹¹⁰⁶ Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2002). Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? In McCahery J. A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 56-82). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. p. 60.

¹¹⁰⁷ Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2002). Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? In McCahery J. A. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity* (pp. 56-82). Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. p. 60.

¹¹⁰⁸ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 41.

¹¹⁰⁹ Clacher, I. and Hagendorff, J. (2012). Do Announcements about Corporate Social Responsibility Create or Destroy Shareholder Wealth? Evidence from the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics* 106 (3), 253-266.

¹¹¹⁰ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 63.

¹¹¹¹ Plender, J. (1997). *A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution*. London: Nicholas Brealey. p. 2. As cited in Clarke, T. (2004). The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age. In Clarke, T. (Ed.), *Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance* (pp. 189 -201). New York: Routledge. p. 200.

¹¹¹² Carroll, A. B. and Shabana, K. M. (2010). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts. *International Journal of Management Reviews* 12 (1), 85-105. p. 102.

¹¹¹³ Carroll, A. B. and Shabana, K. M. (2010). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts. *International Journal of Management Reviews* 12 (1), 85-105. p. 102.

¹¹¹⁴ Carroll, A. B. and Shabana, K. M. (2010). The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts. *International Journal of Management Reviews* 12 (1), 85-105. p. 102.

are independent with the firm.”¹¹¹⁵ Social responsibility “doesn’t just deliver benefits. Increasingly it is a requirement for success.”¹¹¹⁶ Mitchell has aptly argued that “management that understands that running a successful and sustainable business requires it to behave in a manner that does not risk undermining its own legitimacy, is management that will run a corporation that, as a matter of course, will address most of the problems with which CSR is concerned.”¹¹¹⁷

The stakeholder theory can be criticized on the grounds that stakeholders’ interests are many¹¹¹⁸ and sometimes they may conflict.¹¹¹⁹ Different companies have different stakeholders. Moreover, one company can have different stakeholders in different situations.¹¹²⁰ Also, shareholders are stakeholders. Because of different groups of stakeholders and the different nature of the relations the corporation has with these groups and different interests, the corporation is “situated at the centre of series of independent two-way relationships.”¹¹²¹ Moreover, as stakeholders often have stakeholders themselves, there exists a network of stakeholders.¹¹²² Accordingly, stakeholder management is not necessarily directed against shareholders; it just considers a wider group of stakeholders than shareholders only. This leaves corporate managers with difficult dilemmas.

Jensen, for instance, claims that any theory should provide the actors (managers in this case) with guidance on how to deal with multiple “competing and inconsistent constituent interests.”¹¹²³

Jensen argues that stakeholder theory presented by other scholars does not explain how to deal with trade-offs that managers have to deal with. Therefore, he proposes a more advanced – enlightened – stakeholder theory. Enlightened stakeholder theory requires managers to operate in a way that maximizes the total long-term market value of the firm.¹¹²⁴ Thus, the trade-offs the managers face need to consider the long-term market value of the firm as an ultimate goal. This gives managers latitude to assess which competing interests need to be prioritized in order to serve the long-term goals and value of the firm.

5.3.3. Concluding remarks

This section focused on two different CG theories in order to understand the conflicting interests the corporate managers have to balance in different CG cultures. In general, the Rhineland model of CG encourages corporate boards to consider a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests, while the Anglo-Saxon model of GG prioritizes shareholders interests. It was shown in these sub-sections that the Anglo-Saxon model of CG does not restrict corporate boards from considering a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests, as long as it is in the best interests of the company. As also shown in section 5.2.3 both stakeholder as well as shareholder jurisdictions ultimately focus on the best interests of the company. Balancing conflicting interests can, however, have a different focus. Therefore, in both corporate governance systems that explicitly attach weight to one of the two

¹¹¹⁵ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61. See also Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The Connecting Link between Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics. *Academy Management Review* 20 (2), 373-403; Kay, J. (1993). *The Foundations of Corporate Success*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kotter, J. P. and Heskett, J. (1992). *Corporate Culture and Performance*. New York: Free Press.

¹¹¹⁶ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 72.

¹¹¹⁷ Mitchell, L. E. (2007). The Board as a Path toward Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 279-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 281.

¹¹¹⁸ See Weyzig, F. (2009). Political and Economic Arguments for Corporate Social Responsibility: Analysis and a Proposition Regarding the CSR Agenda. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 86(4), 417-428. pp. 418-419.

¹¹¹⁹ See chapter 4, section 4.1.

¹¹²⁰ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 59.

¹¹²¹ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61.

¹¹²² Rowley, T. J. (1997). Moving Beyond Dyadic Ties: a Network Theory of Stakeholder Influences. *Academy of Management Review* 22(4), 62-71.

¹¹²³ Jensen, M. C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. In Beer, M. and Nohria N. (Eds.), *Breaking the Code of Change* (pp. 35-78). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. pp. 44-45.

¹¹²⁴ Jensen, M. C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. In Beer, M. and Nohria N. (Eds.), *Breaking the Code of Change* (pp. 35-78). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 51; Jensen, M. C. (2010). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 22(1), 32-42.

theories, managers do have sufficient latitude for decision making.¹¹²⁵ In CG systems that lean on stakeholder theory, managerial discretion to implement CSR theories might be broader. This, however, does not suggest that shareholder systems prohibit engaging in CSR entirely. Ferrell et al. argue that “a shareholder orientation should drive a firm’s decision toward serving the best interests of investors.”¹¹²⁶ Nevertheless, they go on to say that, next to “a responsibility for economic success and viability to satisfy stockholders”, corporations should also consider other stakeholders and balance various interests.¹¹²⁷

Starbucks, a multinational that operates within various CG systems, provides a good example of challenges that conflicting interests can pose with regard to corporate tax planning. Starbucks claims on its webpage that it pursues stakeholder inclusiveness, while its tax strategies as well as annual reports show a focus on its shareholder orientation. For instance, the 2012 HMRC hearings in the UK¹¹²⁸ illustrate how aggressive tax planning practices have affected the corporation’s stock price and relationship with shareholders and other stakeholders. Starbucks was accused of immoral tax behaviour.¹¹²⁹ At the same time, “a Reuter’s article compared the amount of Starbucks’ U.K. sales to the amount of U.K. income taxes paid by the company” finding that “while Starbucks reported no profit for tax purposes in the U.K., the company was concurrently telling analysts and investors that U.K. operations were profitable and should serve as an example for the U.S.”¹¹³⁰ In addition, from the HMRC minutes (and evidence), it seems that multinationals can either keep business success and no profit in light of taxes apart or they can be considered successful if they do not make profit in jurisdictions where tax rates are high.¹¹³¹ Moreover, shortly after the HMRC hearing, the multinational made a statement in the UK saying that it changed its tax strategies in order to win back the trust of stakeholders such as customers. Such corporate (conflicting) behaviour proves that some multinationals present a different picture to shareholders and stakeholders (especially customers). At the same time, it also proves the challenges multinationals face when balancing conflicting expectations. Therefore, good corporate governance needs to include balanced tax governance.

5.4. Corporate governance and good tax governance

CSR is a part of corporate strategy and is therefore a part of the discretion of the corporate board.¹¹³² The corporate board is also responsible for the financial performance and tax risk profile of the company.¹¹³³

Naturally, the distinction between shareholder and stakeholder approaches in practice is not as clear-cut as presented previously. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, it suffices to conclude that the main difference between the two approaches lies in prioritizing conflicting interests: shareholder theory starts with the economic interests of the company, while stakeholder theory sets society above or on the equal level with pure economic interests. It is not the aim of this research to argue in favour of one or criticize the other model. On the contrary, the aim is to find a

¹¹²⁵ Compare to Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 36

¹¹²⁶ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 44.

¹¹²⁷ Ferrell, O. C. et al. (2017). *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases* (11th Ed.). Boston: Engage Learning. p. 45.

¹¹²⁸ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

¹¹²⁹ See the statement of Margaret Hodge in UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

¹¹³⁰ Austin, C. R. and Wilson, R. J. (2017). An Examination of Reputational Costs and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Firms with Valuable Consumer Brands. *Journal of the American Taxation Association* 39 (1), 67-93. p. 67.

¹¹³¹ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited. p. Ev. 21.

¹¹³² See e.g. Martínez-Ferrero, J., Villarón-Peramato, O. and García-Sánchez, I. M. (2017). Can Investors Identify Managerial Discretion in Corporate Social Responsibility Practices? The Moderate Role of Investor Protection. *Australian Accounting Review* 27 (1), 4-16. pp. 5-6.

¹¹³³ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 8.

connecting factor which appears to be in the long-term best interests of the company, as also legal rules seem to suggest. Without a doubt, financial performance is crucial for the best long-term interests of the company. In addition, “financial success is important because the more a company earns the more taxes it is able to pay.”¹¹³⁴ Taxes are important for corporate decision making for “[T]hey have strong implications for the year end results as well as the profitability and the ability to pay dividends.”¹¹³⁵ Consequently, taxes can affect the share price.¹¹³⁶ Therefore, corporate boards should balance between “being profitable and not taking tax risks that could have negative impacts on the business performance and the financial statements.”¹¹³⁷ In other words, corporate boards are “responsible for tax risk management” and they can be held accountable for doing so by the shareholders as well as stakeholders of the company.¹¹³⁸ Tax planning does not concern only direct financial returns but also has an effect on corporate reputation, which in turn may influence the interests of a company in the long run, as discussed earlier in this research.¹¹³⁹

Especially multinationals that aspire to being socially responsible should seriously address their tax planning practices. Next to acting in the best interests of the company (and thus shareholders), they also need to be aware of the societal effects of tax planning. The attention corporate tax planning has received in recent years (for instance in public hearings where corporate managers need to explain their tax-planning strategies) have shown that corporate boards have to understand the content of their company’s tax strategies better. This has also resulted in a changing relationship between corporate management and tax directors. Tax is an important topic in the boardrooms nowadays.¹¹⁴⁰

To develop good tax governance, it is important to know how far managers can go in their tax planning decisions and in taking into account the non-shareholders’ interests, as CSR encourages.¹¹⁴¹ Therefore, good tax governance will be further put into the context of CG in order to understand how good tax governance in principle would promote the best long-term interests of the company. The best interests of the company can diverge from the best interests of the shareholders as explained previously.¹¹⁴² Taxation is not only a cost for a corporation but also an investment and moral obligation.¹¹⁴³ Therefore, good tax governance would also consider the wider interests of stakeholders. In the following sub-sections, it will be analyzed whether corporate boards have sufficient latitude to consider good tax governance, how it can be understood in practice, and what is the relationship between tax planning and the best interests of the company.

5.4.1. Corporate boards’ latitude to engage in CSR

As shown in the previous sections, shareholders enjoy a specific position and resulting rights in a corporation according to corporate governance rules. Various legal rules prevent managers from acting against the interest of shareholders. Moreover, as equity financing is important for corporations, managers have serious financial and competition-related motivations to try to satisfy shareholders. Nevertheless, CSR corporations build a certain profile, which creates expectations of such corporations. Not living up to this profile, corporate reputations among different stakeholders, such as consumers, shareholders, media, or government, might be damaged. Moreover, also

¹¹³⁴ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 205-206.

¹¹³⁵ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 205-206.

¹¹³⁶ “In February 2006 Google announced reduced earnings due to a higher than expected tax charge. Market value fell by 20 billion dollars.” Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 205-206.

¹¹³⁷ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. pp. 205-206.

¹¹³⁸ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 220.

¹¹³⁹ See chapter 2.

¹¹⁴⁰ See e.g. KPMG. (2004). Tax in the Boardroom: A Discussion Paper.

¹¹⁴¹ See more on good tax governance in chapter 6.

¹¹⁴² See also: Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹¹⁴³ See chapter 2, section 6; chapter 4, section 5; chapter 5, section 2.

‘shareholder interest’ is not one commonly agreed-upon concept; shareholders interests are many.¹¹⁴⁴ For instance, there is a growing group of investors that are focused on CSR, as will be discussed below. Consequently, in order to live up to many expectations on corporations, which are crucial for ensuring the best long-term success of a corporation, corporate managers have sufficient leeway with regard the corporate decision making.

It is true that, for some, acting in the best interests of the company equals creating shareholder value through maximizing profits “by excluding extraneous factors like social responsibility.”¹¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the research on socially responsible investment (SRI) suggests that socially responsible and transparent firms are lower-risk investments.¹¹⁴⁶ The question is thus whether and to what extent are shareholders willing to take the risk of aggressive tax planning. Based on legal-positivist thinking, Schön argued that it is naïve to think that “‘honest shareholders do not want their company to engage in more or less strategic tax planning.” He argued that “[A]s long as shareholders have not declared formally their will in one way or the other that the company shall abstain from certain tax measures, thus ‘putting tax paying first’, management has no justification to do so.”¹¹⁴⁷ In addition to the doubtfulness of such an argument, nowadays socially responsible investments are on the rise.¹¹⁴⁸ The European Parliament, for instance, stresses that SRI “is part of the implementation process of CSR in investment decisions; notes that although there is currently no universal definition of SRI, it usually combines investors’ financial objectives with their concerns regarding social, environmental and ethical (SEE) and corporate governance issues”¹¹⁴⁹ Some investor groups can be hesitant about this “difficult trade-off between return on investment and social responsibility.”¹¹⁵⁰ It is, however, inevitable that both short-term and responsible shareholders need to make compromises in their ideal solutions in order to make the general picture work. Therefore, tax adds another spectrum to corporations’ attractiveness for investors. Also, the EU has been considering sustainable investment as a fiduciary duty of investors.¹¹⁵¹ Good evidence of the importance of SRI is also BlackRock’s (“one of the most influential investors in the world”¹¹⁵²) letter, entitled “A sense of purpose”, to many publicly held companies in which they invest, stating that “[T]o prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”¹¹⁵³ Fink, a CEO of BlackRock, did not ask corporations to stop aggressive tax planning nor did he deny the corporate responsibility to be accountable to shareholders. He stated that responsible companies will ultimately “provide subpar returns to the investors who depend on it”. This suggests that the investor is careful when talking about long-term shareholder value.¹¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, BlackRock’s statement showed that institutional investors who are often thought to be short-term self-interested capitalists also put sustainability and corporate responsibility high on the agenda.¹¹⁵⁵ Also the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) that convenes a large group of corporate members appraises responsible tax planning practices.¹¹⁵⁶ In CSR theory, it is clear that, in addition to “self-interest and concern for profits”, a successful firm requires more “trust, a sense of loyalty, and good

¹¹⁴⁴ See also: Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹¹⁴⁵ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 235.

¹¹⁴⁶ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. pp. 236-241.

¹¹⁴⁷ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 48.

¹¹⁴⁸ See e.g. VBDO, Nordea, PRI, BlackRock.

¹¹⁴⁹ European Parliament (2016, January 22). Resolution of 6 February 2013 on Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth (2012/2098(INI)). Pt. 20.

¹¹⁵⁰ Verstappen, R. et al. (2017). VBDO Investor Guide: Integration of Tax in Responsible Investment: Practical Steps to Design and Implement a Responsible Tax Strategy for Investors. *VBDO & PwC*. p. 6.

¹¹⁵¹ Rust, S. (2017, November 13). EU Considering Sustainable Investing as Fiduciary Duty for Investors. *European Pensions and Institutional Investment News* (online).

¹¹⁵² Sorkin, A. S. (2018, January 15). BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our Support. *The New York Times* (online).

¹¹⁵³ Fink, L. (2018). Annual Letter to CEOs: ‘A Sense of Purpose’.

¹¹⁵⁴ Alexander, R. (2018, February 26). Benefit Corporation: Accountability Matters. *Corporate Governance*.

¹¹⁵⁵ See also Turak, N. (2018, January 25). ‘We don’t talk about inclusion’ and that’s a problem, says BlackRock’s Larry Fink. *CNBC news* (online).

¹¹⁵⁶ See e.g. UN. (2017, February 6). *New Recommendations Help Investors Engage on Tax*.

relationships with all stakeholders and, as a consequence, an enduring cooperation among those who are involved in or are independent with the firm.”¹¹⁵⁷ Therefore, investors bear a shared responsibility with regard to good tax governance.

The growing importance of SRI has, however, not only provided “an economic incentive for companies to adopt socially responsible practices” but also a “means to measure comparative investment returns between those companies that meet criteria for social investment funds and those that do not.”¹¹⁵⁸ For instance, RobecoSAM, which is also a part of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index,¹¹⁵⁹ claims that, as a result of the recent financial crisis that “exposed significant risks associated with short-termism,” there is a growing demand among investors for “long-term oriented strategies that integrate economic, environmental and social criteria within their portfolios.”¹¹⁶⁰ Therefore, sustainability considerations have become an important part of investors’ decision-making.¹¹⁶¹ RobecoSAM that conducts a Corporate Sustainability Assessment for investors puts much attention on “media and stakeholder commentaries and other publicly available information from consumer organizations, NGOs, governments or international organizations to identify companies’ involvement and response to environmental, economic and social crisis situations that may have a damaging effect on their reputation and core business.”¹¹⁶² Having said this, the causality between CSR and profit maximization is not yet proven.¹¹⁶³ A sustainable mind-set seems to have a positive effect on corporate financial performance,¹¹⁶⁴ but it is not clear whether it is due to the fact that a corporation is indeed sustainable or due to the fact that running a sustainable business requires planning strategic long-term vision.¹¹⁶⁵ Further (empirical) research is necessary to understand the causality between sustainability, corporate social (CSR), and financial performances.

Good CG in general “requires business ethics at several levels: individual decision making, corporate culture and an overall understanding of a collective business purpose that balances different interests and values.”¹¹⁶⁶ Balancing various conflicting interests presents an opportunity for corporate managers to apply good corporate governance. Conflicts “need to be managed through a combination of negotiations and bargaining, disclosures and approvals, and reliance on basic underlying rules of trustworthiness and fair dealing.”¹¹⁶⁷ As argued previously, different CG models entail specific principles that the corporate board has to follow. These different principles still leave a possibility of choices within these rules. Usually, if corporate management would face conflicting interests, the decision should be based on evaluating which alternative is in the best interests of the company and maximizes “the long-term market value of the firm.”¹¹⁶⁸ This is the prevalent corporate law rule in every jurisdiction discussed in section 5.2.3.

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¹¹⁵⁷ Melé, D. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Theories. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61. See also Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The Connecting Link between Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics. *Academy Management Review* 20(2), 373-403; Kay, J. (1993). *The Foundations of Corporate Success*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kotter, J. P. and Heskett, J. (1992). *Corporate Culture and Performance*. New York: Free Press.

¹¹⁵⁸ Roselle, J. (2011). The Triple Bottom Line: Building Shareholder Value. In Mullerat, R. (Ed.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 129-156). Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 136.

¹¹⁵⁹ Sustainability Indices webpage.

¹¹⁶⁰ RobecoSAM. (2015). Measuring Intangibles ROBECOSAM’s Corporate Sustainability Assessment Methodology. p. 16.

¹¹⁶¹ Dixon, C. and Sharma, A. (2018, January 24). Weil Discusses 2018 10-K and Proxy Season: Spotlight on Corporate Sustainability. *Columbia Law School’s Blue Sky Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets*; see also: Schroder, A. (2017, March 9). Responsible Investing Growing in Importance; see also “Socially responsible investments (SRIs) constitute one of the most rapidly growing segments of the investing community, representing over \$2.34 trillion or over 10% of all investments” Tschopp, D. J. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparison between the United States and the European Union. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 12 (1), 55-59. p. 57.

¹¹⁶² RobecoSAM. (2015). Measuring Intangibles ROBECOSAM’s Corporate Sustainability Assessment Methodology. p. 10.

¹¹⁶³ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 49.

¹¹⁶⁴ Eccles, R. G. et al. (2007). Reputation and Its Risks. *Harvard Business Review* February issue 85 (2), 104-114.

¹¹⁶⁵ Van Son, H. (2014). How duurzaam is de duurzame ondernemer in het mkb? Een explorative studie. PhD dissertation, Tilburg University. p. 44.

¹¹⁶⁶ Orts, E. (2002, August 23). Law is Never Enough to Guarantee Fair Practice. *Financial Times* (online).

¹¹⁶⁷ Orts, E. (2002, August 23). Law is Never Enough to Guarantee Fair Practice. *Financial Times* (online).

¹¹⁶⁸ “And ‘firm value,’ by the way, means not just the value of the equity, but the sum of the values of *all* financial claims on the firm—debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as well as equity” Jensen, M. C. (2000). Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate

Some authors argue that a duty to act in the interests of the enterprise can be seen as “a duty to protect the business for the benefit of those groups, in addition to shareholders, whose interests are likely to be affected by its success.”¹¹⁶⁹ Corporate laws in general “do not compel spending on social causes, they do not prohibit either.”¹¹⁷⁰ For instance, even in the US, where “fiduciary duties to shareholders are formally perhaps the strongest, in practice directors enjoy wide latitude to further the interests of non-shareholder constituencies so long as the decision is framed in terms of promoting long-term shareholder value.”¹¹⁷¹ Moreover, even under the shareholder (long-term) value maximization obligation, the directors can (under the BJR) make socially responsible decisions “insofar as these decisions have a supposed business purpose.”¹¹⁷² From the perspective of the shareholder value approach, extrinsic motivation to engage in good tax governance should, thus, be sufficient.¹¹⁷³ However, as the business-case of good tax governance still needs to be proven empirically, it is necessary to know whether corporations could also engage in good tax governance based on intrinsic motivation.

The OECD Principles of CG, for instance, refer to ethical concerns as one of the relevant factors that (should) affect corporations’ decision-making processes.¹¹⁷⁴ The OECD acknowledges that, in principle, CG should ensure “the flow of external capital to companies both in the form of equity and credit.” Nevertheless, it also points out that CG should also include other stakeholders for “[T]he competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employees, creditors, customers and suppliers, and other stakeholders.”¹¹⁷⁵ Considering the interests of stakeholders is thus, according to the OECD, in the long-term interest of corporations. Furthermore, in its MNE Guidelines,¹¹⁷⁶ the OECD points out that good CG reassures “shareholders and other stakeholders that their rights are protected and make it possible for corporations to decrease the cost of capital and to facilitate their access to the capital market.”¹¹⁷⁷ Moreover, corporate boards should, according to the OECD, “adopt tax risk management strategies to ensure that the financial, regulatory and reputational risks associated with taxation are fully identified and evaluated.”¹¹⁷⁸ Considering that aggressive tax planning “may involve substantial indirect costs, including reputation losses, political trouble, more expensive debt, and a higher risk of stock price crash,”¹¹⁷⁹ it does not seem that corporate boards engaging in such practices act in the best interests of the company. Even Schön, who argued for corporate managers’ legal responsibility to create shareholders’ value, agrees that “the management acts contrary to its duty of care when they set up structures where the tax advantages are regularly outweighed by the compliance costs and any negative impact on the real operations of the company.”¹¹⁸⁰

Objective Function. In Beer, M. and Nohria N. (Eds.), *Breaking the Code of Change* (pp. 35-78). Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 32.

¹¹⁶⁹ Parkinson, J. (2006). Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Business Behaviour. In MacLeod, S. (Ed.), *Global Governance and the Quest for Justice - Volume II Corporate Governance* (pp. 27-46). Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing. p. 54. [as referred to in: Horrigan, B. (2010). *Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices Across Government, Law and Business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. p. 22.]

¹¹⁷⁰ Enriques, L. et al. (2017). The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies. In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 79-108). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 98.

¹¹⁷¹ Enriques, L. et al. (2017). The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies. In Kraakman, R. H. et al. (Eds.), *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (3rd Ed.) (pp. 79-108). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-99.

¹¹⁷² Neri-Castracane, G. (2015). Corporate Governance from a Comparative Perspective: Does the Business Judgment Rule Help Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? *Frontiers of Law in China* 10 (1), 8-23. p. 15, *idem* Sheehy, B. and Feaver, D. (2014). Anglo-American Directors’ Legal Duties and CSR: Prohibited, Permitted or Prescribed? *Dalhousie Law Journal* 37 (1), 345-396. pp. 387-388.

¹¹⁷³ See more on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in Chapter 4.

¹¹⁷⁴ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁷⁵ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 34. Compare this to the behavioral theory of the firm and the nexus of contracts theory. See e.g. Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

¹¹⁷⁶ See more on OECD MNE Guidelines in CSR chapter, section 6.3

¹¹⁷⁷ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 10.

¹¹⁷⁸ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 60-61. See also Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407.

¹¹⁷⁹ Bayar, O. et al. (2018). Corporate Governance, Tax Avoidance, and Finance Constraints. *The CLS Blue Sky Blog*.

¹¹⁸⁰ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62).

Corporate boards can, thus, use their discretion based on corporate law, as shown in 5.2.3., to engage in CSR and give their own interpretation to what they consider as going beyond pure compliance with legal rules. This indicates that boards are quite flexible when acting in the best interests of the company in relation to CSR. For instance, a group of chief executive officers (CEOs) of America's leading companies – Business Roundtable – published recently a statement to commit to all the stakeholders and societies in which they operate, in addition to generating long-term shareholder value.¹¹⁸¹ This illustrates that corporate managers are aware of the importance of various stakeholders and that they consider it as added value to the best interests of the company. Moreover, multinationals that already have a CSR strategy in place have an incentive to manoeuvre. For corporate practice, however, it is not very clear what is meant by acting beyond pure compliance with legal rules, because it does not provide clear-cut criteria and effective guidance.¹¹⁸² In other words, the aspirational idea of accepting ethical obligations beyond compliance with the law is quite ambiguous. Lacking clarity, defending and prescribing behaviour beyond compliance to justify corporate action will probably not be very convincing and effective for business practice. Therefore, the concept of so-called corporate social irresponsibility (CSI), as introduced in the previous chapter of this research, might be a helpful tool for corporations.¹¹⁸³

5.4.2. Tax planning and the best interests of a company

From the responses that the representatives of some large multinationals provided to the UK Public Accounts hearing committee, it seems that multinationals keep business success and profit generation separate in relation to taxes; tax seems rather to be a possibility to increase profit for these businesses.¹¹⁸⁴ This indicates the shareholder value maximization mind-set, which is keeping tax low in order to keep shareholder return high. In my opinion, this cannot be considered in the best long-term interests of the company, as explained previously. For example, Vodafone is allegedly taking a new direction with regard to its tax planning practices. It is namely claiming to commit itself to tax principles that are in line with the multinationals' wider spectrum of social responsibilities and, at the same time, in line with the shareholder value protection.¹¹⁸⁵ Even though it is unclear whether Vodafone is (willing to be) transparent about its tax planning structures, such a statement already suggests that such balancing is also accepted in corporate practices and not seen as 'mission impossible'. Here has to be noted, however, that transparency is not the same as changing firm's material behavior.¹¹⁸⁶ The core question here is: what really is in the best interests of the company when it comes to tax planning?

It is not easy to decide what is in the best long-term interests of the company. Multinational operations affect and are affected by a myriad of factors in various areas. In addition to a typical cost-benefit analysis, which can already almost be seen as a synonym of business administration in the capitalist era, corporations cannot ignore changing societal expectations in relation to their behaviour.¹¹⁸⁷ Recent years have witnessed increased attention on corporate tax practices; a growing number of corporate stakeholders (such as governments, NGOs, media, but also certain groups of investors, as shown above) have a certain negative perception of multinationals' tax practices. The European Parliament also considers CG to be "a key element" of CSR.¹¹⁸⁸ In addition, the European Parliament further states that "a business's tax policy should be considered part and parcel of CSR and that socially responsible behaviour consequently leaves no room for

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Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, p. 56.

¹¹⁸¹ Business Roundtable. (2019, April 19). *Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation*.

¹¹⁸² See more on 'going beyond the law' in chapter 4, section 3.2.

¹¹⁸³ See on CSI in chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹¹⁸⁴ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). *Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12*. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012-13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited, p. Ev. 21.

¹¹⁸⁵ Vodafone. (2017). *Taxation and our Total Economic Contribution to Public Finances 2016-17*, p. 12.

¹¹⁸⁶ See the difference between substantive and procedural good tax governance in chapter 6.

¹¹⁸⁷ See more on societal expectations in chapter 4.

¹¹⁸⁸ European Parliament (2016, January 22). *Resolution of 6 February 2013 on Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth (2012/2098(INI))*. Pt. 6.

strategies aimed at evading tax or exploiting tax havens”.¹¹⁸⁹ It is a corporate law duty of corporate managers to consider whether aggressive tax planning practices are in the best long-term interests of the company.

Considering the complexities of tax legislation and societal changes with regard to multinationals’ tax practices,¹¹⁹⁰ corporations face various tax-related risks. For instance, Gribnau et al. argue that such changes, complexities and debates “entail risk[s] with regard to reputation (the general public demanding transparency with regard to the taxes companies pay), legislative risk (complex legislation and different interpretations of a country’s tax legislation) and tax supervision risk related to the tax administration’s compliance strategy.”¹¹⁹¹ Such risks constitute an external motivation for corporations to have a “robust risk management” that is related to “the valuation of tax positions – often related to uncertainty about interpretation of tax legislation – and the ensuing risks.”¹¹⁹² Tax is important for investors, because the amount of tax a corporation has to pay “is material to its profitability.”¹¹⁹³ Aggressive tax planning practices might be a signal for investors of “underlying legal, operational, reputational, financial and/or governance risks.” Moreover, aggressive tax planning practices inform investors about the risk tolerance or aversion of the management, which is important for the investors from a CG perspective. High risk tolerance can potentially lead to “a variety of damaging outcomes for the business.”¹¹⁹⁴ Good tax governance and transparency are thus tools to ensure investors’ confidence. Investors, namely, are also aware of the fact that taxation is a precondition for “a solid foundation for competition, growth and other factors that enable long-term business sustainability at investee companies.”¹¹⁹⁵ Corporate management that acts in the best interests of the corporation addresses such risks.

For instance, in the corporate risk paragraph of its annual report, Starbucks (2017) admits that its international nature of business operations inevitably includes additional risks, such as “interpretation and application of laws and regulations, including tax” regulations among others.¹¹⁹⁶ The report further adds: “Failure to comply with applicable laws and changing legal and regulatory requirements could harm our business and financial results.”¹¹⁹⁷ After the public attention Starbucks received in the UK after its tax planning was addressed by the UK PAC, there is no doubt that tax presents a risk for this multinational.¹¹⁹⁸ Considering the negative attention the multinational received with regard to its tax practices all over the world, it is questionable whether corporate management addressed such risks properly.

It goes without saying that “taxes are the result of firm’s strategy and decisions”, which falls under the board discretion.¹¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, as argued in chapter 3, various (corporate) laws and tax rules can drive corporate decision making, as corporations can choose between different alternatives that can have different tax consequences (such as hybrid financial instruments).¹²⁰⁰ Tax should follow business. However, in the case of aggressive tax planning, for instance, a firm’s strategy and decisions are the result of various tax regulations. As explained in chapter 3, various legal tax schemes enable corporate (and wealthy) taxpayers to avoid taxes.¹²⁰¹ Of course, taxpayers may structure their affairs to achieve a favourable tax treatment within the limits set by law. Some

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¹¹⁸⁹ European Parliament (2016, January 22). Resolution of 6 February 2013 on Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth (2012/2098(INI)). Pt. 7.

¹¹⁹⁰ See chapter 3.

¹¹⁹¹ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 400.

¹¹⁹² Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 400.

¹¹⁹³ Ravishankar, V. (2018). Evaluating and Engaging on Corporate Tax Transparency: An Investor Guide. *UN Principles of Responsible Investment*. p. 5.

¹¹⁹⁴ Ravishankar, V. (2018). Evaluating and Engaging on Corporate Tax Transparency: An Investor Guide. *UN Principles of Responsible Investment*. p. 5.

¹¹⁹⁵ Ravishankar, V. (2018). Evaluating and Engaging on Corporate Tax Transparency: An Investor Guide. *UN Principles of Responsible Investment*. p. 5. See also chapter 3, section 2.1.

¹¹⁹⁶ Starbucks. (2018). Fiscal 2017 Annual Report. p. 15.

¹¹⁹⁷ Starbucks. (2018). Fiscal 2017 Annual Report. p. 17.

¹¹⁹⁸ See Campbell, K. and Helleloid, D. (2016). Educational Case Starbucks: Social Responsibility and Tax Avoidance. *Journal of Accounting Education* 37, 38-60.

¹¹⁹⁹ Huseynov, F. and Klamm, B. K. (2012). Tax Avoidance, Tax Management and Corporate Social Responsibility. *Journal of Corporate Finance* 18 (4), 804-827. p. 809.

¹²⁰⁰ See chapter 3, section 3.

¹²⁰¹ Chapter 3, section 3.

(corporate) taxpayers, however, command the kind of resources that enable them to do this in a very sophisticated and successful manner, thus by paying hardly any (income) taxes at all they shift the tax burden to less expert taxpayers. Clark and Grantham see aggressive tax planning as a familiar example of irresponsible corporate behaviour because it exploits negative externalities. In their view, firm costs are thus transferred “to unwilling or unwitting recipients, benefiting the firm at the expense of the total system.” According to Clark and Grantham, aggressive tax planning conflicts with the use of tax breaks “in the spirit of their intentions, directing investment to areas of policy priorities, that activity aligns with society’s larger interests.”¹²⁰² Companies that do not pay their fair share by engaging in creative tax compliance and exploiting loopholes generate a negative externality, “a decrease in the amount of funds available to government programs that hurts society.”¹²⁰³ Additionally, Clark and Grantham see this behaviour as anticompetitive “for those businesses that pay their taxes appropriately, competition with less scrupulous firms is made more difficult since they are essentially shirking their financial responsibilities and gaining an unfair advantage, leaving an increased tax burden to others.”¹²⁰⁴ The tax burden is not only shifted to other businesses but also to other taxpayers. Clearly these negative externalities allow for the conclusion that such corporate taxpayers are acting irresponsibly, rather than simply not acting in a socially responsible way, namely not living up to the ideal of paying a fair share.

The fact is that, despite the objection from the multinationals’ side, changing societal expectations with regard to corporate tax planning seem to have an effect. For instance, Starbucks received much public criticism in the UK because of its tax planning practices,¹²⁰⁵ which also had an effect on the multinationals’ reputation in the UK.¹²⁰⁶ This forced the multinational to react and change its behaviour¹²⁰⁷ (even though this cannot be traced back in the annual reports of Starbucks¹²⁰⁸). Another example of a changing corporate position with regard to taxation is Greene King plc, a British leading pub retailer and brewer. In its 2013 annual report, the company stated the following: “The group’s tax policy, which has been approved by the board, is aligned with business strategy. It seeks to protect shareholder value by structuring operations in a tax efficient manner, while complying with all relevant tax laws and legislation and fulfilling our obligations as a responsible UK tax payer.”¹²⁰⁹ In comparison, the annual report of 2017 stated that the Greene King tax policy “which has been approved by the board, aligns with this strategy and ensures that the group fulfils its obligations as a responsible UK taxpayer.”¹²¹⁰ These are clear examples of corporations that, to a certain extent, have responded to societal changes with regard to corporate tax planning practices. Also, VBDO’s yearly Tax Transparency Benchmark illustrates well the progress that corporate taxation goes through.¹²¹¹

Corporations that wish to change can do that. For instance, in 2013, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) asked a prestigious law firm Farrer & Co for its opinion with regard to corporate fiduciary duties and tax planning. The TJN concluded that managers have the obligation “to promote the success of the company, but this should not be misunderstood as requiring blinkered attention solely to maximising distributable profits.”¹²¹² Farrer & Co noted that, according to UK corporate law, “[I]t is not possible to construe a director’s statutory duty to promote the success of the company as

¹²⁰² Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 31.

¹²⁰³ Clark T. S. and Grantham K. N. (2012). What CSR is Not: Corporate Social Irresponsibility. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Challenging Concept* (pp. 23-41). Bingley: Emerald. p. 31; See also chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹²⁰⁴ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 31. See also chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹²⁰⁵ UK: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs (PAC HMRC). (2012). Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12. Nineteenth Report of Session 2012- 13 Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited; Bergin, T. (2012, 17 October). UK Committees to Examine Starbucks Tax Strategies. *Reuters* (online).

¹²⁰⁶ YouGov Brandindex. (2012, November 21). Google is spared the Public’s Anger Over UK Tax Spat. *YouGov Brandindex*.

¹²⁰⁷ Engskov, K. (2012, October 16). Starbucks Coffee Company in the UK; Engskov, K. (2012, December 6). An Open Letter from Kris Engskov.

¹²⁰⁸ See e.g. Starbucks. (2018). Fiscal 2017 Annual Report.

¹²⁰⁹ Greene King plc. Annual Report 2013. p. 25.

¹²¹⁰ Greene King plc. Annual Report 2017. p. 31.

¹²¹¹ See e.g. Urbach, X. et al. (2018). Tax Transparency Benchmark 2018: A comparative study of 76 Dutch listed companies. *VBDO*.

¹²¹² Tax Justice Network (2013, September 9). *Formal Legal Opinion: Company Directors Have no Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Tax*.

constituting a positive duty to avoid tax.”¹²¹³ As a matter of fact, the law firm argued that “the legislation expressly protects directors from criticism in circumstances where they take decisions based on the kind of factors which would militate against tax avoidance (e.g. change-of-law risk, reputation, brand impact, relationship with HMRC and community impact).”¹²¹⁴ A director’s fiduciary duty under UK corporate law suggests, according to Farrar & Co, that corporate decisions are “taken in good faith in pursuit of the success of the company upon proper deliberation and with regard to the relevant factors”.¹²¹⁵ As long as such a general duty is in principle met, courts would not question that.

Having said that, corporate managers can also have various reasons for believing that tax avoidance is in the long-term interest of the company, such as “the adverse risk profile of tax-structured transactions in the long term” or “the desirability of investment” in other important spheres for company stakeholders.¹²¹⁶ Thus, if the managers have a solid reason “in good faith and upon proper deliberation” to believe that corporate tax structuring is in the best long-term interest of the company, the managers “would be immune from judicial criticism” (from the corporate law perspective) as well.¹²¹⁷ As a result, corporate fiduciary duty, especially as developed under the Anglo-Saxon CG model, does not strictly require nor prohibit corporate tax avoidance. Farrar & Co’s opinion explains that “codified corporate governance practice and performance-related executive reward structures” are the reasons why some corporate managers “may tend towards the result that the board is motivated to act to the measurable financial benefit of shareholders.”¹²¹⁸ This is, according to the law firm, an “erroneous assumption” rather than misunderstanding the fiduciary duty.

In terms of tax planning, it is in the best interests of the company to stay away from irresponsible behaviour. Businesses are driven by taking risks and aggressive tax planning might bring considerable short-term gains. Aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance may “result in both higher cash flows and higher after-tax earnings”¹²¹⁹ but, at the same time, it brings certain risks with it, such as reputation damage.¹²²⁰ It is argued that stock price is determined by “whatever society values”¹²²¹ and, as shown through this research, society seems not to value aggressive tax planning. Thus, tax planning creates a situation in which risks are confronted with rewards and corporations have to make choices. As explained in chapter 3, one of possibilities for tax planning, but also for aggressive tax planning, is the use of hybrid financial instruments. Bärsch writes that “there is an enormous diversity of types of financial instruments available” and therefore “the corporation has to make a decision about the precise type of financial instruments needed.”¹²²² This confirms the corporate managers discretion to decide upon the level of tax planning as well. For instance, with regard to hybrid mismatch arrangements, corporate managers might have sufficient reasons to opt for the most tax-efficient alternative.¹²²³ It is up to corporate managers to decide whether they engage in moral considerations in their decision making or not. Thus, corporate tax avoidance is by no legal means an obligation but rather a choice for corporate managers. Consequently, corporate managers have latitude in their decision making. However, corporations that operate under the flagship of CSR already impose such an expectation on their managers.

From a moral perspective, aggressive tax planning conflicts with CSR and (even though not being illegal) meets the conditions of CSI, which is not in the best interests of the company, as it might, for instance, harm corporate reputation and trustworthiness. It is evident that businesses face many

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¹²¹³ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 1.

¹²¹⁴ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 1.

¹²¹⁵ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 3. See also the Companies Act 2006, section 172.

¹²¹⁶ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 3.

¹²¹⁷ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 3.

¹²¹⁸ Farrar & Co (2013, June 7). *Fiduciary Duties and Tax Avoidance. Opinion*. p. 4.

¹²¹⁹ Austin, C. R. and Wilson, R. J. (2017). An Examination of Reputational Costs and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Firms with Valuable Consumer Brands. *Journal of the American Taxation Association* 39 (1), 67-93. p. 67.

¹²²⁰ See chapter 2, section 6.

¹²²¹ Dobson, J. (1999). Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral? *Financial Analysts Journal* 55 (5), 69-75. p. 71.

¹²²² Bärsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 9.

¹²²³ See more on hybrid mismatch instruments in chapter 3, section 3.

changing regulations, such as the new rules as a result of the BEPS project,¹²²⁴ as well as changing societal expectations.¹²²⁵ The expectations of stakeholders are becoming increasingly important for “companies are more and more relying on their reputation of behaving in a socially responsible way as a factor contributing to their success.”¹²²⁶ Also the OECD suggests that aggressive tax planning does not “contribute to the long term interests of the company and its shareholders, and can cause legal and reputational risks.”¹²²⁷ This hypothesis, however, needs to be further tested by empirical research. Furthermore, as shown above, SRI proves that the preferences of investors might also change over time and they are already changing as shown above. Therefore, good tax governance can be attractive to investors, for instance because of reduced compliance costs and a lower risk of future liabilities (such as those related to reputation damage). Taking moral perspective into account may thus have economic impact. Therefore, corporations should balance tax risk management with good tax governance. High ethical standards are evidently “in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments.”¹²²⁸

In 2008 Erle argued that an effective tax governance system minimizes the effective tax rate and adds sustainable value to the company. This is, according to Erle, in the best long-term interests of a company because “only a company that remains competitive and successful in the market can pay taxes and contribute to society.”¹²²⁹ From a purely profit-maximization standpoint, Erle has a point. However, it is also clear that corporations have to innovate and adapt to changes in order to remain competitive in a changing world. Corporations also need to adapt their CG “practices so that they can meet new demands and grasp new opportunities.”¹²³⁰ Corporate boards should take the wider societal interest seriously for it is “their fiduciary obligation to close such reputation-reality gaps ... as great as their obligation to improve real performance.” Both things arguably “drive value creation for shareholders”¹²³¹ and are in the best interests of the company. Having said that, it is not always self-evident what kind of decision making is in the best interest of the company. This is often up to corporate boards to identify. Nevertheless, aggressive tax planning does not seem to fit with the idea of the best long-term corporate interests.

Bärsch explains that, both in theory and practice, “corporate finance deals mainly with maximizing the corporation’s value by minimizing its cost of capital and maximizing its access to external capital.”¹²³² Bärsch explains that, in theory, “interest payments for debt financing reduce the corporation’s tax burden providing hereby a valuable asset, namely the tax shield”¹²³³ and therefore corporations that wish to plan their taxes as aggressively as possible, could use this instrument. However, in practice, corporations often seem to use more balanced financing.¹²³⁴ This proves that corporate managers have the advantage of asymmetric information and have a certain decision-making discretion. The next chapter of this research analyzes what corporate managers should consider to apply good tax governance in practice.

¹²²⁴ See chapter 3, section 5.

¹²²⁵ See OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing. See also OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 46-47.

¹²²⁶ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 220.

¹²²⁷ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 46-47.

¹²²⁸ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. pp. 46-47.

¹²²⁹ Erle, B. (2008). Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility. In Schön, W. (Ed.). *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 205-220). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 220.

¹²³⁰ OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 11.

¹²³¹ Eccles, R. G. et al. (2007). Reputation and Its Risks. *Harvard Business Review* February issue 85 (2), 104-114.

¹²³² Bärsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 17.

¹²³³ Thin capitalization rules already set certain limits to debt financing. Bärsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 17.

¹²³⁴ Bärsch, S.-E. (2012). *Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an International and Cross-border Context Issues and Options for Reform*. Doctoral Dissertation Universität Mannheim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

5.4.3. Concluding remarks

In this section, I argued that good tax governance can have some negative short-term economic consequences on multinationals, since abandoning aggressive tax planning structures would result in a higher tax burden. Nevertheless, multinationals that profile themselves as socially responsible admit that they do not operate according to economic or purely legal layers only.¹²³⁵ Existing CG systems do leave room for corporate managers to opt for good tax governance, as long as it is in the best interests of the company.

The BJR, in principle, allows managers to consider stakeholder interests even in shareholder value maximization-minded CG systems. Moreover, managers' latitude is underpinned by the fact that the managers are obliged to consider the best interests of the company. Therefore, to a certain extent, managers are free to decide how aggressive or responsible the company should be in relation to the societies in which they operate. Naturally, management could have less (informal) room to manoeuvre if the majority shareholders are short-term value seeking. Nevertheless, there are certain things that managers still can consider. There is no doubt that corporate managers have an important responsibility in their decision-making process. Managers have to balance the effect of corporate actions and the various expectations multinationals should meet in order to act in the best interests of the company. It goes without saying that it is not an easy task to have a concrete guidance for corporate managers with regard to behaving in the best interests of the company. Similar to CSR, it is easier to agree upon what is not responsible and not in the best long-term interests of the company. Aggressive tax planning clearly constitutes socially irresponsible corporate behaviour and thus is also not in the best interests of a company. Therefore, corporate boards should make use of their discretion to engage in good tax governance. CG rules set certain limits for managers when exercising such a balancing act. However, most importantly, managers have discretion to act in the best long-term interests of the company, also with regard to corporate tax governance.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the third pillar of this study: corporate governance. It aimed at understanding whether multinationals face certain constraints in corporate law that restrict them from considering tax as a part of CSR. Thus, good tax governance was analyzed from the perspective of CG principles. Various corporate law elements behind corporate decision making were placed in the context of tax planning. In order to understand the regulatory effect on the international level, it was studied whether and to what extent the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon CG approaches differ, but also what are their connecting factors. Moreover, whether and how such differences and similarities affect good tax governance.

Choosing the right tax strategy is a legal task of corporate management and also opting for good tax governance is, thus, a question of the discretion of corporate management. Based on two illustrated views on CG theories, corporate boards may face certain pressure to opt for (aggressive) tax planning to increase shareholder value. Tax considerations inevitably form an important part of corporate decision making.¹²³⁶ Corporate decision making needs to consider factors such as trust and reputation, which can be severely harmed when engaging in aggressive tax planning, but also tax as a cost element, which should be kept low. From various regulatory developments as well as from the intense public attention, it can be concluded that just paying its due taxes according to the letter of the law (thus, engaging in tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning) does not seem to be sufficient. Nevertheless, satisfying shareholders with higher returns as a result of aggressive tax planning might force corporations to slip away from the idea of good tax governance.

Some business and tax experts have claimed that the various corporate responsibilities to operate in the best interests of the shareholders sometimes even seems to override the interests of other

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¹²³⁵ See chapter 4, section 3.1.

¹²³⁶ See also Desai, M. A. and Dharmapala, D. (2006). Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives. *Journal of Financial Economics* 79 (1), 145-179.

stakeholders. In the other words, this suggests that corporate boards are forced to engage in aggressive tax planning. In order to prove this position wrong, this chapter analyzed various theoretical and regulatory frameworks considering the corporate responsibilities towards shareholders and larger groups of stakeholders. Corporations that are convinced of their motivation and wish to embed good tax governance in their business strategies often face various practical questions such as whether and how would they fit with other legal obligations.

CG should set certain rules and principles for company management in order to decrease possible negative externalities that might arise from the self-interested behaviour of managers. From the corporate law perspective, it is often suggested that corporate boards that act as agents for shareholders, the owners of the company, should increase the value for shareholders. Thus, any kind of corporate actions are expected increase shareholder value. On the other hand, nowadays shareholders cannot be directly identified as the owners of the company anymore but as the owners of the shares of the company, as they are very mobile. This suggests that, for the long-term sustainability of a corporation, the boards should act in the best interests of the company instead of the shareholders.

It goes without saying that the distinction between the shareholder and stakeholder approaches is not an exact science in practice. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, it suffices to conclude that the main conflict between the two theoretical approaches lies in prioritizing conflicting interests: shareholder theory prioritizes the economic interests of the company, while stakeholder theory sets society above or on the equal level with pure economic interests. The connecting factor between both approaches is that corporate boards should foremost be acting in the long-term best interests of the company. Without a doubt, optimal financial performance is crucial for the best long-term interests of the company. Furthermore, a financially healthy corporation can add more value to society than a corporation that performs poorly with regard to its economic responsibilities.¹²³⁷ Therefore, corporate boards should balance between being profitable and being socially responsible. Having said that, the aspirational idea of aiming for ethical obligations beyond compliance with the law is quite ambiguous. Therefore, in this chapter, it was proposed that the concept of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) might be a helpful tool for corporations. It namely provides some guidance for corporations with regard to what is not in the best interests of the company.

The most complex tension in the CG debate concerns the question of how to balance the profit-making objective of corporations with the corporate responsibilities to the wider group of stakeholders and society at large. Especially with regard to tax planning, this balancing act is complicated, as was illustrated in this chapter. From the profit-making objective of corporations, tax is a cost and should be managed accordingly. On the other hand, taxes are an investment in a society and therefore indirect investments in the well-being of the company.¹²³⁸ Moreover, it is argued that, also from a moral perspective, corporations should abstain from tax planning practices that aim at the absolute minimum without ethical considerations. By definition, CSR requires managers to take into account the interests of a company's stakeholders in a broader sense. Thus, in order to act in the best interests of the CSR company (for instance, by not risking reputation damage), the interests to be served by managers include those of the shareholders (who are internal stakeholders) as well as the (other) stakeholders. This is advocated by the stakeholder theory, taking stakeholders rather than shareholders as its point of departure. Aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance, namely, do not fit with the concept of CSR and corporations that present themselves as CSR corporations should take this into account. Corporations that integrate CSR into their business activities should not violate the legitimate rights of others and they are responsible for the effects of their actions on others. Aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance violate both of these elements. As a result, the line of reasoning of Schön, which was introduced in the beginning of this chapter, is questionable, since, as shown above, managers do have exclusive legal discretion. If such

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¹²³⁷ See Carroll's CSR Pyramid in chapter 4, section 3.1.

¹²³⁸ See also chapter 2, section 6.

discretion is combined with pressure from various stakeholders (including certain shareholders, such as SRI) it is in the best interests of the company to avoid (continuing) to engage in aggressive tax planning strategies. Corporate boards that act in the best interests of the company, thus, take into account the interests of various stakeholders and balance those interests with the interests of the company and shareholders. This is the latitude that corporate managers have in their decision making. Therefore, to a certain extent, corporate boards are free to decide how aggressive or responsible the company should be in relation to the societies in which they operate. Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) should help managers to better understand the freedom that corporate boards have in exercising their discretion and what to do with that freedom. CSI refers to decisions that responsible companies should not make. Aggressive tax planning has been suggested as an example of irresponsible corporate behaviour, because it exploits negative externalities. It seems to be quite clear that corporate boards that operate within the framework of CSI are not acting in the best interests of the company. Businesses are used to taking risks and aggressive tax planning might bring considerable short-term gains. However, at the same time, aggressive tax planning (or, indeed, tax avoidance) brings certain risks, such as reputation damage. Such reputation damage might also occur in a certain group of shareholders (SRI).

There are many issues related to CG that this research does not solve. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, it was proven that various CG approaches in principle do not strictly restrict corporations from opting for good tax governance. Naturally, corporate decision making cannot satisfy all of the conflicting interests of various stakeholders and shareholders. Corporate boards should balance various interests and create value fairly. Needless to say, this does not suggest that corporate managerial power should be increased. CSR that expects corporations to consider larger groups of stakeholders affects corporate decision making from an external perspective, while CG rules affect decision making from an internal perspective. A successful company should balance both. Corporate boards simply need to act in the best interests of the company and not only in their own interests or those of the shareholders or nonshareholder stakeholders. For instance, the Business Roundtable's recent statement to commit to all the stakeholders and societies in which they operate, in addition to generating long-term shareholder value, proves that also managers in the Anglo-Saxon system are aware of broader corporate responsibilities.¹²³⁹ The next chapter will propose some ideas for corporate boards to engage in good tax governance.

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¹²³⁹ Business Roundtable. (2019, April 19). *Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation*.

6. GOOD TAX GOVERNANCE

6.1. Introduction

CSR is increasingly gaining attention with regard to corporate tax planning. Taxation is a crucial building block for society and therefore corporations are called to account for contributing their part to society.¹²⁴⁰ In the words of the European Commission, “[B]y paying taxes businesses can have an important positive impact on the rest of society.”¹²⁴¹ Moreover, by not paying taxes, businesses can have a negative impact on society.¹²⁴² Consequently, paying taxes, next to a legal obligation, is also a moral obligation of corporations, as argued earlier in this research.¹²⁴³ Therefore, multinationals presenting themselves as corporations that operate according to socially responsible values should also apply these values in their tax planning practices. In other words, socially responsible corporations should engage in good tax governance. Appropriate tax governance helps multinationals to “comply with tax laws, as well as have processes in place to adhere to the principles and commitments in their own tax strategy.”¹²⁴⁴ Good tax governance can be seen as a tool that helps corporations to be consistent with regard to their tax planning strategies internally and also communicate them properly externally.

As explained earlier,¹²⁴⁵ governance is a broad concept that applies to the purpose, management and functions of nations, governments, communities, and organizations, such as corporations. Corporate governance establishes rules and principles for the way power is distributed within a corporation and for the decision-making process with regard to the use of this power. Derived from this, tax governance can be seen as rules and principles for managing corporate tax practices and good tax governance refers to the ethical dimension of tax governance.¹²⁴⁶ From the business practice perspective, however, the words such as *good*, *ethical*, or *moral* are often vague and do not provide sufficient guidelines nor a normative framework for sound business practices. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, such terms need to be fleshed out in order to provide a more concrete picture of good tax governance.

The previous chapters showed that a certain kind of tax planning does not fit with the profile that many multinationals try to present of themselves: a socially responsible company that contributes to society and sustainable development. In light of recent developments, all corporations should reflect upon their tax planning practices and choose their position in this matter; if necessary, they might need to reconsider some of their practices. This might have certain short-term economic consequences, but it is not in conflict with the best long-term interests of the company.¹²⁴⁷ Despite the understanding that corporations should be run to maximize profit and exclusively increase shareholders’ value that still might prevail in the business world, multinationals have sufficient freedom to consider tax planning under the umbrella of CSR. Even Friedman, whose statements are often interpreted as supporting the absolute opposite to businesses having social responsibilities, leaves room for corporations to engage in practices that take the interests of stakeholders into account, and not solely those of shareholders, in order to advance the long-term interests of the

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¹²⁴⁰ See chapter 3, section 2.

¹²⁴¹ European Commission. (2012, December 6). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion. Brussels, 6.12.2012 COM(2012) 722 final. p. 6.

¹²⁴² See chapter 4, section 5.

¹²⁴³ See chapter 3.

¹²⁴⁴ Ravishankar, V. (2018). Evaluating and Engaging on Corporate Tax Transparency: An Investor Guide. *UN Principles of Responsible Investment*. p. 13.

¹²⁴⁵ Chapter 5, section 2.1

¹²⁴⁶ See also chapter 4, section 5.

¹²⁴⁷ See chapter 5. See also Lanis, R. and Richardson, G. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness: A Test of Legitimacy Theory. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 26 (1), 75-100; Jallai, A.-G. and Gribnau, J. L. M. (2018). Aggressive Tax Planning and Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Managerial Discretion in the Light of Corporate Governance. In Mulligan, E. and Oats, L. (Eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Tax Research*, vol. 3 (pp. 51-86). Birmingham: Fiscal Publications.

firm.¹²⁴⁸ Therefore, corporations have no valid (legal) excuse for supporting aggressive tax planning.¹²⁴⁹

Companies that have already taken on the responsibility to engage in CSR should not claim that they behave responsibly while minimizing their tax obligations to the bare minimum.¹²⁵⁰ Lavermicocca and Buchan argue in the same vein that corporations that commit to acting responsibly not only in economic or financial terms, but also in social terms, are expected to “place a higher level of importance on tax compliance and tax contributions to government.”¹²⁵¹ According to Pfeifer and JinYoon taxpayers can comply with tax rules with the help of professional tax advisers (who help corporations to interpret and comply with the rules), but also by “making full disclosure of all facts material and relevant to the tax plan, and making sure that the tax avoidance plan as actually implemented is in conformity with the transaction as planned.”¹²⁵² In my opinion, CSR companies should extend such transparency and also disclose their tax values in a moral sense because by doing so they show their stakeholders willingness to improve and engage in dialogue. Therefore, when it comes to tax planning, the notion of “going beyond the compliance”¹²⁵³ consists of two layers, one substantive and the other procedural. The substantive element of good tax governance requires ethical decision making and developing tax values. The procedural element means being open about the tax values and strategies of the corporation.¹²⁵⁴ Good – socially responsible – and sustainable tax¹²⁵⁵ governance entails both.

With regard to the substantive layer, based on Carroll’s CSR Pyramid, socially responsible companies need to take into account ethical considerations in addition to legal and economic ones when defining and implementing a business strategy and making tax-related decisions. The procedural layer involves the principle of transparency and thereby goes beyond compliance with legal reporting obligations. Accountability concerns the process and outcome.¹²⁵⁶ Corporate accountability in tax matters concerns, thus, the substantive and procedural elements. For living up to the standards socially responsible, sustainable companies set themselves, they should pay their fair share of tax (or at least not unfair), and they should be open and willing to discuss their tax planning strategy and practice. Good tax governance goes beyond a mere cost-benefit analysis aimed at achieving high returns for shareholders; it takes a broader perspective on the effects a corporation’s tax planning practices can have.

ActionAid suggests that companies endorsing good tax governance should “create a company tax policy setting out the principles they apply and the practices they rule out; disseminate this policy to internal and external stakeholders; ensure board level oversight of internal tax policymaking; disclose a range of qualitative and quantitative information on their tax practices and their impacts; work with peers and stakeholders to formulate a mutually agreed code of conduct.”¹²⁵⁷ In other words, good tax governance requires multinationals to develop a corporate tax strategy that is in accordance with the overall corporate values, such as codes of conduct. This strategy should be communicated to internal and external stakeholders (transparency). Furthermore, such a strategy should be monitored, evaluated and, where necessary, adjusted over time.

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¹²⁴⁸ See chapter 5.

¹²⁴⁹ Compare to Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

¹²⁵⁰ It should not be misunderstood that only CSR corporations bear moral responsibilities. All companies have moral responsibilities, but CSR companies especially should take a step further.

¹²⁵¹ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 12.

¹²⁵² Pfeifer, M. G. and Jin Yoon, S. (2016). The Ethical Limits of Tax Planning. *Trusts & Trustees* 22 (1), 159-165. p. 165.

¹²⁵³ See more on going beyond compliance in chapter 4, section 3.2.

¹²⁵⁴ See also Nouy, D. (2018, March 22). *Good Governance for Good Decisions*. Speech by Danièle Nouy, 2nd Banking Supervision Conference: “Governance Expectations for Banks in a Changing Financial Environment”, Frankfurt.

¹²⁵⁵ See also Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2018). Sustainable Tax Governance and Transparency. In Arvidsson, S. (Ed.). *Challenges in Managing Sustainable Business: Reporting, Taxation, Ethics and Governance* (pp. 337-369). Lund: Springer Nature / Palgrave Macmillan. See also footnote 643.

¹²⁵⁶ Buchholtz, A. K. et al. (2008). Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 327-345). New York: Oxford University Press. p. 335.

¹²⁵⁷ Action Aid (2011). Tax Responsibility: The Business Case for Making Tax a Corporate Responsibility Issue. *ActionAid UK*.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a better understanding and practical guidance on good tax governance for multinationals. The main focus lies on the substantive (ethical decision-making) and procedural (transparency) elements of good tax governance. This chapter is structured as follows. First, in section 2, the substantive element of good tax governance is analyzed. It will be explained that fairness with regard to taxation depends to a great extent on ethical decision making; a suitable tool guiding corporate decision making is a code of conduct. Section 3 dives into the procedural element of good tax governance: transparency. Expectations of multinationals with regard to various forms of transparency in relation to tax planning will be discussed. A long-term good tax governance serves sustainable development. Therefore, sustainable tax governance, which is not only in the hands of multinationals, will also be studied (section 4). The last section concludes this chapter.

6.2. A substantive element of good tax governance

Next to economic and regulatory considerations, corporations have to deal with moral choices when planning taxes. Society has “certain expectations for appropriate business behavior and outcomes.”¹²⁵⁸ Such expectations can be categorized under social norms, which, according to Ruggie, “exist over and above compliance with laws and regulations.”¹²⁵⁹ In other words, corporations that wish to increase their income, market share or alike should be aware of the effect of their behaviour on society. Corporations minimizing their tax liability irresponsibly risk losing their social legitimacy to operate, at least as long as they use their corporate power for tax avoidance when creating their various tax structures.¹²⁶⁰ Such corporations do not meet the societal expectations for appropriate business behaviour and outcomes. This is especially risky for corporations that claim to endorse CSR. Corporate commitment to CSR should be consistently applied to all of the company’s dealings and activities. All corporations face ethical choices in every-day business practices but companies that present themselves as socially responsible corporations have made a commitment also to take into account ethical considerations, in addition to legal and economic ones, when defining and implementing a business strategy and making decisions. Consequently, such corporations (but not limited to them) should apply good tax governance.

CSR theories help to understand the core of good tax governance as proposed in this research. As explained, according to the CSR Pyramid developed by Carroll,¹²⁶¹ corporations are part of the ‘social contract’ and are therefore expected to pursue their economic missions within the framework of the law and moral norms.¹²⁶² Ethical responsibilities of a company go beyond pure compliance with the law and profit making and embody those standards, norms, or expectations that reflect a concern for what its stakeholders regard as fair, just, or moral. CSR corporations are expected to act in line with ethical responsibilities by doing what is right, just, and fair.¹²⁶³ In terms of the key element of Carroll’s CSR theory, both layers of good tax governance – substantive and procedural – expect corporations to go beyond strict compliance with the (letter of the) law.¹²⁶⁴

Even though the exact meaning of ‘fair share’ is open to debate,¹²⁶⁵ in my view, the link between corporate tax planning and moral behaviour can be made. In chapter 3 I conceptualized fair share as corporate income tax that multinationals have to pay according to (the combination of) the letter and the spirit of the law. But since the spirit of the law is not a clearly defined concept, this research

¹²⁵⁸ Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate Social Performance Revisited. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (4), 691-718. p. 695.

¹²⁵⁹ Ruggie, J. G. (2013). *Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 91.

¹²⁶⁰ Jallai, A.-G. (2016). Restoring Stakeholders’ Trust in Multinationals’ Tax Planning Practices with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Trust and Taxation* (pp. 173-201). Antwerp: Intersentia; see also chapter 2, section 3; chapter 3.

¹²⁶¹ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48. pp. 40-43. See also chapter 4, section 3.1.

¹²⁶² Rayman-Bacchus, L. and Crowther, D. (Eds.). (2004). *Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility*. Abington: Taylor and Francis. pp. 3-5.

¹²⁶³ Carroll, A. B. (1991). The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. *Business Horizons* 34 (4), 39-48. pp. 40-43. See also chapter 4, section 3.1.

¹²⁶⁴ See chapter 4, section 3.2.

¹²⁶⁵ See chapter 3, section 2.3.

suggests to start from the other end by asking what is unfair. Moreover, socially responsible corporations are not expected to act as perfect (corporate) citizens but stay away from immoral behaviour instead. As explained in earlier chapters, morality is about how (corporate) persons live together as a society and “as individuals in relation to one another.”¹²⁶⁶ Tax constitutes a link between a (functioning) society and individuals but also individuals among each other within a society. This, of course, complicates corporate stakeholder networks.¹²⁶⁷ Ethics provides a tool for corporations to balance conflicting interests. For instance, it helps corporations to balance short-term shareholder value creation and long-term sustainable development. In terms of good tax governance, such conflicting interests do not always have to exclude the other. In this research, the main question involves the long-term best interests of the company and its relation to society. For good tax governance, corporations should reflect upon their actions; it is an active instead of reactive attitude. In terms of substantive and procedural parts of good tax governance,¹²⁶⁸ multinationals should not strive to pay as little tax as possible (of course, also not as much tax as possible is not expected).¹²⁶⁹ In the following sub-sections, the substantive element of good tax governance will be dealt with. How multinationals could understand the idea of fair share and how they could include this in their ethical decision making will be explained. One such possibility would be a code of conduct as proposed in the third sub-part of this section.

6.2.1. Understanding the essence of fair share in the context of good tax governance

Arguably, responsible corporations should pay their fair share of tax. This, however, is not a very successful term in a sense that it does not give concrete context or practical guidance to what is a fair, just, or moral thing to do. ‘Fairness’ with regard to taxation is often described as subjective, vague, or a blurred concept.¹²⁷⁰ For instance, even the courts (e.g. ECJ) do not seem to address the concept of fairness consistently.¹²⁷¹ Due to its vagueness and broad scope, the use of the principle of fairness might conflict with the requirement of legal certainty if not given concrete content.¹²⁷² Therefore, fairness from a taxpayer’s perspective deserves a brief explanation. Fairness in taxation seems to be based on the “relations between the taxpayers and expectations they have on each other”; it concerns not only the tax system itself, “but the use some taxpayers make of the tax system resulting in other tax payers having to pay more.”¹²⁷³ Ensuring that everybody contributes their share for the financing of the public goods and services and distributive justice – the fairness of the system – is a responsibility of the state. However, as described earlier in this research,¹²⁷⁴ states are not always able to create a perfect system to facilitate international tax fairness; this is so especially when corporations are in a position to take advantage of various legal systems. Therefore, fairness with regard to taxation is also the responsibility of the corporations. In the words of Hemels, “fairness primarily places an obligation on tax payers towards each other and subsequently on governments to safeguard this reciprocity between citizens.”¹²⁷⁵ Thus, fairness expects multinationals to exercise some kind of self-restraint.¹²⁷⁶ Multinationals that

¹²⁶⁶ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. p. 478.

¹²⁶⁷ See more on corporate stakeholders in chapter 4.

¹²⁶⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88.

¹²⁶⁹ See also chapter 3.

¹²⁷⁰ See e.g. Lamberts, P. B. W. L. (2017). Fair Taxation: Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder. *Intertax* 45 (1), 49-53. pp. 49-53; Burgers, I. J. J. and Mosquera Valderrama, I. J. (2017). Fairness: A Dire International Tax Standard with No Meaning? *Intertax* 45 (12), 767-783.

¹²⁷¹ Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. pp. 428-436.

¹²⁷² See also Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 436.

¹²⁷³ Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 414.

¹²⁷⁴ See chapter 3, section 3.

¹²⁷⁵ Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 424.

¹²⁷⁶ See also Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.

wish to adhere to good tax governance should act fairly towards other taxpayers and pay their fair share of taxes.

As explained earlier, paying a fair share arguably means paying “taxes in a jurisdiction corresponding to the economic benefits that are enjoyed in that jurisdiction.”¹²⁷⁷ This is not a commonly accepted definition and therefore it is unclear what exactly the concept of a fair share means. As explained earlier in this research, multinationals are in a position to interpret the laws and, thus, to choose between what is possible within the letter of the law and what should be done in terms of moral behaviour as described by Paine.¹²⁷⁸ Good tax governance requires that multinationals refrain from corporate decision making that aims at tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning, which can be conceptualized as an unfair share since it entails free-riding on the societies in which they operate. Aggressive tax planning by powerful multinationals undermines reciprocity and shared responsibility among citizens.¹²⁷⁹ Therefore, it is considered the opposite to paying a fair share; it is socially irresponsible corporate behaviour.¹²⁸⁰ Corporations that “accept CSR as a guideline for their actions should take into account ethical considerations when using and applying legal rules.”¹²⁸¹ This requires honest decision making from corporations. Multinationals can choose between deliberately a minimalist interpretation of the letter of the law in the short-term self-interest of a company and in the interest of society and long-term sustainable development (and also various gradations between those two extreme positions).¹²⁸² To be clear, it is not expected that corporations opt for philanthropy, they should rather go for collective self-interest (since the existence of public goods and services is in the collective self-interest). Free-riding on other taxpayers is not in line with fairness.¹²⁸³

The fact is that, despite its vagueness, public and political attention is focused largely on the concept of fairness with regard to taxation. In tax debates, fairness is given an important position because of the peoples’ perception of fairness.¹²⁸⁴ The free-riding behaviour of other taxpayers is not perceived as fair and this can be seen as the starting point for the debates about fair share. In order to adjust or change its tax planning behaviour (whether intrinsically or extrinsically motivated¹²⁸⁵), multinationals that wish to engage in good tax governance need to accept that taxation has a moral dimension. Acting fairly does not concern the question whether corporations are breaking the rules (acting illegally) but it is about not taking advantage of loopholes, mismatches, or ambiguities in the system.¹²⁸⁶ Hemels argues that the general anti-abuse rules limit corporate self-serving short-term aggressive behaviour and “could therefore be regarded as a reflection of the principle of fairness.”¹²⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in my opinion, this is not enough.

As explained throughout this research, no system is perfect and, consequently, multinationals can always find ways to work around the rules if they wish. Multinationals often have a choice between different legal rules, which, as Gribnau argues, “can be manipulated in unethical ways.”¹²⁸⁸

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¹²⁷⁷ Russo, R. and Van Trigt, J. (2015). Corporate Governance and Taxes. In Russo, R. (Ed.). *Tax Assurance* (pp. 23-48). Deventer: Wolters Kluwer. p. 31; see chapter 3, section 2.3.

¹²⁷⁸ Paine, L. S. (1996). Moral Thinking in Management: An Essential Capability. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6 (4), 477-492. See also chapter 3.

¹²⁷⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). Voluntary Compliance beyond the Letter of the Law: Reciprocity and Fair Play. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 173-201). Intersentia, Antwerpen; Gribnau, J. L. M. (2017). The Integrity of the Tax System after BEPS: A Shared Responsibility. *Erasmus Law Review* 1, 12-28.

¹²⁸⁰ See chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹²⁸¹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. p 241.

¹²⁸² See also section 4 of this chapter.

¹²⁸³ Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 419.

¹²⁸⁴ Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer

¹²⁸⁵ See chapter 4.

¹²⁸⁶ Rawls, J. (1958). Justice as Fairness. *The Philosophical Review* 67 (2). 164-194. p. 180; See also Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.), *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 426.

¹²⁸⁷ Hemels, S. J. C. (2014). Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU Tax Law? In Brokelind, D. (Ed.). *Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law* (pp. 413-437). Amsterdam: IBFD. p. 426.

¹²⁸⁸ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225-250. p. 240.

Moreover, he adds, “interpreting and using the law inevitably imply making value judgements.”¹²⁸⁹ Consequently, it can be said that, in tax planning, multinationals have a choice between interpreting the letter of the law according to their own self-serving welfare or according to the intention of the legislator. Therefore, the corporate mind-set on the decision-making level needs to change and this is the starting point of good tax governance.

Good tax governance mainly concerns the corporate tax structures and practices of tax planning or creative compliance with the law, more than the amount of tax paid. The effective corporate tax rate is usually an outcome of these corporate practices, which means that the effective tax rate of responsible companies is probably higher than that of aggressive tax planners. This, however, could be seen as a trade-off for good tax governance. Indeed, lower tax rates are sometimes a result of the legitimate use of tax incentives, as discussed earlier,¹²⁹⁰ and this is not in conflict with good tax governance. As explained in the previous chapter of this research, social responsibility is often in line with long-term financial responsibility.¹²⁹¹ Good tax governance is a business strategy that does not accept artificial structures, which are set up for base erosion or profit shifting. In the words of the OECD, corporations should “comply with both the letter and spirit of the tax laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate” and, for that purpose, corporations should take “reasonable steps to determine the intention of the legislature and interprets those tax rules consistent with that intention in light of the statutory language and relevant, contemporaneous legislative history.”¹²⁹² In other words, corporations that engage in good tax governance are expected to go beyond strict compliance with the letter of the law. This requires ethical decision making and staying away from CSI.¹²⁹³

6.2.2. Ethical decision making

Corporate ethical decision making is crucial in situations where “values are in conflict”.¹²⁹⁴ Corporate decision making requires an ethical reflection in case the decision, which provides corporate managers with “alternative courses of action”, is “likely to have significant effects on others” or “the decision is perceived as ethically relevant by one or more parties”.¹²⁹⁵ One of these ‘grey areas’ of business that requires moral reflection that is not covered by the law¹²⁹⁶ is also corporate tax planning. Moral decision making in the context of tax planning entails going beyond minimalist compliance, beyond the strict letter of the tax law. This kind of ethical conduct beyond compliance fits well within a CSR framework.¹²⁹⁷ Therefore, companies that seek to prove moral leadership can implement CSR policies and companies that already claim to show moral leadership by having a CSR strategy in place must meet the expectations of good tax governance since taxes are their contribution to society.

In my opinion, in international tax planning practices, the economic layer of Carroll’s pyramid is not up for discussion. All forms of tax planning discussed in chapter 3 stay initially within the economic layer of Carroll’s Pyramid.¹²⁹⁸ Any form of tax planning (even tax evasion) that initially aims at lowering costs can be interpreted within the economic layer of Carroll’s Pyramid. Taxpayers have the right (liberty) to structure their affairs in a tax-efficient way within the limits set by law.

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¹²⁸⁹ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Planning: Not by Rules Alone. *Social & Legal Studies* 24 (2), 225–250. p. 240.

¹²⁹⁰ See chapter 3.

¹²⁹¹ See chapter 5.

¹²⁹² OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 60.

¹²⁹³ See chapter 4.

¹²⁹⁴ Treviño, L. K. and Nelson, K. A. (2014). *Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk about How to Do it Right* (6th Ed.). Hoboken: John Wiley. p. 39. As cited in Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 6.

¹²⁹⁵ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136–137.

¹²⁹⁶ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 6.

¹²⁹⁷ See chapter 4, section 3.2.

¹²⁹⁸ It is, nevertheless, questionable whether short-termism is in the best long-term economic interest of the company. This discussion, however, is outside the scope of this research.

The legal layer of Carroll's theory poses, however, some questions with regard to tax planning. Namely, Carroll's idea of going beyond the law, in its original form, does not directly concern tax practice. There are certain rules and – often with the help of tax advisors – multinationals comply with these rules. Thus, any form of tax that stays within the law would in principle comply the legal layer of CSR Pyramid. Having said that, in my view, the legal layer does not distinguish between the letter and the spirit of the law, which in terms of taxation is very important, because what is legal may not always be morally acceptable, as explained earlier.¹²⁹⁹ Consequently, the line between Carroll's legal and ethical layers is also unclear with regard to taxation. From the legal-positivist perspective, the law could be seen apart from ethics, as the Pyramid seems to suggest.¹³⁰⁰ This research, however, argues that ethics is part of the law, but sometimes legal rules fall short in codifying ethics.¹³⁰¹ Such shortcomings of the law could, in this sense, be categorized within the ethical layer of the CSR Pyramid. Thus, the ethical layer, which stands for going beyond mere compliance, could practically mark the notions of the spirit of the law and fair share, which was discussed previously.

Good tax governance and aggressive tax planning can thus be translated respectively into corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI).¹³⁰² CSI indicates what companies should not do instead of what they should do. Therefore, it fits within the idea that tax planning is a matter of degree that, at a certain level, becomes unacceptable by society, which means that corporations should keep away from it.¹³⁰³ The concept of CSI can be a helpful tool for multinationals to develop good tax governance. Clearly, within the framework of the CSI and CSR continuum developed by Tench et al., CSR companies should aim to operate on the part of the continuum which as far as possible from CSI.¹³⁰⁴ This continuum illustrates aptly how legal corporate behaviour (compliance with the letter of the law) can be developed towards a socially responsible corporate behaviour (such as good tax governance) with the help of ethical corporate codes.

Gribnau et al. argue that corporate codes of conduct “are important instruments to enhance moral corporate behaviour.”¹³⁰⁵ Moreover, tax codes of conduct could present an opportunity for corporations to “meet stakeholder needs with regard to tax in the current highly politicized and mediatized environment.”¹³⁰⁶ Consequently, as good tax governance is not a commonly agreed-upon concept, developing a code of ethical tax conduct provides an opportunity for CSR corporations to prove their intrinsic motivation. It is important, however, that such an ethical “commitment to principled thinking should be consistent and not opportunistic.”¹³⁰⁷ Thus, it should be a result of morally responsible business practices, which, according to Carroll “aspires to succeed, but only within the confines of sound ethical precepts – that is, standards predicated upon such ideals as fairness, justice, and due process.”¹³⁰⁸ Based on these kinds of standards, according to Carroll, management pursues “its objectives while simultaneously requiring and desiring profitability, legality, and morality.”¹³⁰⁹ Moral management can thus be seen as “a matter of balancing competing interests, principles, values and ideals.”¹³¹⁰ Corporations can no longer separate tax and other corporate values.¹³¹¹

¹²⁹⁹ Chapter 3, section 3.

¹³⁰⁰ See also chapter 4, section 3; chapter 3, section 2.

¹³⁰¹ See chapter 3, section 2.3.

¹³⁰² See more on CSI in chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹³⁰³ See chapter 3, section 4; chapter 5, section 4.

¹³⁰⁴ Tench, R et al. (2012). The Challenging Concept of Corporate Social Irresponsibility: An Introduction. In Tench, R. et al. (Eds.), *Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability*, vol. 4 (pp. 3-20). Bingley: Emerald. p. 9. See also chapter 4, section 3.3.

¹³⁰⁵ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 407.

¹³⁰⁶ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 391.

¹³⁰⁷ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 398.

¹³⁰⁸ Carroll, A. B. (1987). In Search of the Moral Manager. *Business Horizons* 30 (2), 7-15.

¹³⁰⁹ Carroll, A. B. (1987). In Search of the Moral Manager. *Business Horizons* 30 (2), 7-15. p. 10.

¹³¹⁰ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 398.

¹³¹¹ See also e.g. Bowers, S. (2018). Apple Claims to be a Good Corporate Citizen, but is it Really? *International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*.

Corporate values are in general guided by personal values.¹³¹² Personal value is the “enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state.”¹³¹³ Personal values influence behaviour and persist over time, and are “concerned with individual and/or collective well-being.”¹³¹⁴ Crane and Matten state that “most of us are not as ethical as we think we are”.¹³¹⁵ Moreover, most people make different ethical decisions in different situations.¹³¹⁶ Therefore, good tax governance is not only based on intrinsic motivation but a mixture of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Ethical decisions are often also guided by the actions of superiors and peers.¹³¹⁷ This suggests a shared responsibility of various actors for developing the principles behind good tax governance. Moreover, a dialogue (with both internal as well as external stakeholders) is necessary to understand the true meaning of good tax governance.

Corporate boards that are interested in some concrete criteria for improving their tax governance could, for instance, consult the Responsible Tax Principles (the Principles) developed by the B Team, a global nonprofit initiative of a group of global leaders from business, civil society and government.¹³¹⁸ These principles are divided into three groups: approach to tax management, relationships with others and reporting to stakeholders.¹³¹⁹ Approach to tax management reflects according to these Principles corporate decision-making with regard to tax strategy. It states that the board should a) consider tax as a part of CSR, b) comply with the tax legislation of the countries in which they operate and pay the right amount of tax at the right time, in the countries where the value is created, and c) use only “business structures that are driven by commercial considerations” and thus “do not seek abusive tax results”. These criteria state, in my opinion, that good tax governance requires that both the real activities and legal structures of a corporation are aligned and are not set up for aggressive tax planning purposes. Further, relationships with others, as proposed in the Principles, reflect what in this research is conceptualized as the (responsible) use of corporate power. Under relationships with others, the Principles state that responsible corporations a) “develop cooperative relationships with tax authorities, based on mutual respect, transparency and trust”, b) they make use of tax incentives in a way that is “transparent and consistent with statutory or regulatory frameworks” (tax mitigation, as argued in chapter 3), and c) “engage constructively in national and international dialogue with governments, business groups and civil society to support the development of effective tax systems, legislation and administration.”¹³²⁰ Under reporting to stakeholders, the Principles mean transparency, providing “regular information to our stakeholders, including investors, policy makers, employees, civil society and the general public, about our approach to tax and taxes paid.”¹³²¹ This is the procedural part of good tax governance in the context of this research, as will be discussed in section 6.3. The management of a CSR company could, for instance, use codes of conducts for developing good tax governance and for initiating a dialogue with its stakeholders.¹³²²

¹³¹² See chapter 4, section 3.

¹³¹³ Rokeach, M. (1973). *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: Free Press. p. 5. As cited in Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 149.

¹³¹⁴ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 149.

¹³¹⁵ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 150. Referring to Banaji, M. R. et al. (2003). How (un)ethical Are You? *Harvard Business Review* 81 (12), 56-65.

¹³¹⁶ Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 156. Referring to Treviño, L. K. and Nelson, K. A. (2014). *Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk About How to Do it Right* (6th Ed.). Hoboken: John Wiley. p. 252.

¹³¹⁷ Treviño, L. K. and Nelson, K. A. (2014). *Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk about How to Do it Right* (6th Ed.). Hoboken: John Wiley. p. 82. As cited in Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 146.

¹³¹⁸ See: <https://bteam.org> (accessed 10.03.2020); The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles.

¹³¹⁹ The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles.

¹³²⁰ The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles.

¹³²¹ The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles.

¹³²² Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 149-150.

6.2.3. Code of conduct: a corporate tool for ethical tax risk management

A code of conduct can be conceptualized as a set of corporate self-regulatory¹³²³ “rules that guides and orients behaviour within an organisation or sector in order to promote social, environmental, and/or ethical behaviour.”¹³²⁴ It is a tool for internal and external communication of CSR commitments,¹³²⁵ to clarify a corporation’s understanding of moral behaviour. In other words, such codes set ethical behavioural standards for corporate decisions and operations. Such codes, thus, are a tool for combining intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of good tax governance; on the one hand, they give a practical form to corporate moral values and, on the other hand, they send the external stakeholders a message that a corporation accounts for its moral behaviour. Codes of conduct help “to achieve moral consistency throughout the company” if they are “implemented strongly and embedded in the organizational culture.”¹³²⁶ Moreover, a code of conduct can be “a truly helpful resource that employees use for ethical decision-making.”¹³²⁷ Since stakeholders’ expectations, as well as the regulatory environment, business strategy, or ethical norms may change over time, corporations should adjust the code if necessary. Bouwer and Paine aptly argue that corporate long-term interests can only prosper “if they’re able to learn, adapt, and regularly transform themselves.”¹³²⁸ Therefore, Harris’s suggestion to “periodically review the code – every three years is common – and update it to remain aligned with changes in the business or in the regulatory environment” is useful.¹³²⁹ Additionally, corporate employees on different levels should be trained on a continuous basis “about their responsibilities functioning as ethical role models, recognizing and preventing retaliation, and responding to” arising concerns.¹³³⁰ Managing corporate strategy and values, as well as reputation and trust among stakeholders, suggests that tax governance is a responsibility of the corporate board. It is part of corporate risk management.¹³³¹ According to Mitchell, “running a successful and sustainable business” requires that corporate managers do “not risk undermining its own legitimacy” by ignoring CSR concerns.¹³³² Thus, it is the role of the board “to set general guidelines for the company’s global tax philosophy and the framework for the governance of tax issues and processes.”¹³³³ To develop a code of conduct for good tax governance, management should have certain tax values that are respected in their decision-making process. Good tax governance, as a self-regulatory approach, should be attractive for multinationals, because it is fairly flexible, and corporations can give their own content to it. Moreover, companies have a choice in deciding how far reaching their social responsibility strategy is. In other words, multinationals aspiring to engage in good tax governance should have certain ethical tax values in place. For example, PwC suggests that sustainable tax is a concept that is based on four key elements: a) conscious choices, that are made based on b) corporate values (which are developed in dialogue with various stakeholders), and that are c)

¹³²³ Self-regulation stands for regulation that is “exclusively set by business” for business. Such a set of rules and norms are considered to work “as a direct counterpart to governmental regulation”. Examples of such self-regulatory standards are “collective agreements or commitments by industry”, which are “intended to avoid, forestall or soften potential laws”, or corporate codes of conduct. Crane, A. and Matten, D. (2016). *Business Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization* (4th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 520.

¹³²⁴ Leipziger, D. (2010). Codes of Conduct. In Visser, W. et al. (Eds.), *The A to Z of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 71-74). Chichester: Wiley; Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 398. Referring to: Buchholtz, A. K. and Carroll, A. B. (2008). *Business & Society: Ethics & Stakeholder Management* (7th Ed.). Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning. p. 401.

¹³²⁵ Bondy, K. et al. (2008). Codes of Conducts as a Tool for Sustainable Governance in MNCs, in *Corporate Social Responsibility*. In Crane, A. et al. (Eds.) *Readings and Cases in a Global Context* (pp. 432– 448). London: Routledge. As referred to in Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 398.

¹³²⁶ Gribnau, J. L. M. et al. (2018). Codes of Conduct as a Means to Manage Ethical Tax Governance. *Intertax* 46 (5), 390-407. p. 398. Referring to: Buchholtz, A. K. and Carroll, A. B. (2008). *Business & Society: Ethics & Stakeholder Management* (7th Ed.). Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning. p. 331.

¹³²⁷ Harris, A. R. (2017). Creating a Code of Ethics and Conduct. *National Defense Magazine*.

¹³²⁸ Bower, J. L. and Paine, L. S. (2017). The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, May-June issue.

¹³²⁹ Harris, A. R. (2017). Creating a Code of Ethics and Conduct. *National Defense Magazine*.

¹³³⁰ Harris, A. R. (2017). Creating a Code of Ethics and Conduct. *National Defense Magazine*.

¹³³¹ See also chapter 2.

¹³³² Mitchell, L. E. (2007). The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 279-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 281.

¹³³³ Bronzewska, K. and Van der Enden, E. (2014). Tax Control Framework – A Conceptual Approach: The Six Nuances of Good Tax Governance. *Bulletin for International Taxation* 68 (11), 635-640. p. 636.

implemented through the corporation (e.g. in a form of Tax Control Framework), and that is d) digitalized (in order “to gather, analyse and prepare data and to steer tax operation”).¹³³⁴ In my opinion, developing certain tax values is at the core of good tax governance, as it leads corporate boards as well as the employees in their decision-making processes.

Therefore, corporate management should “set general guidelines for the company’s global tax philosophy and the framework for the governance of tax issues and processes.”¹³³⁵ Such a tax philosophy should be integrated in “the overall business mission and vision”. Multinationals that aspire to be regarded as responsible corporations are expected to have (often required) “an internal validation system” (Tax Control Framework) next to moral values. A Tax Control Framework (TCF) is a guiding corporate tax strategy that is aimed at explaining corporate tax strategy: “what the tax risks are and how these are managed.”¹³³⁶ The OECD defines TCF as “the part of the system of internal control that assures the accuracy and completeness of the tax returns and disclosures made by an enterprise.” The OECD appraises the importance of TCF from the perspective of co-operative compliance.¹³³⁷ In its MNE Guidelines, the OECD states that corporations’ “commitments to co-operation, transparency and tax compliance should be reflected in risk management systems, structures and policies.” According to the OECD, corporate boards should “proactively develop appropriate tax policy principles, as well as establish internal tax control systems so that the actions of management are consistent with the views of the board with regard to tax risk.” Developing a TCF allows “the enterprise to not only act as a good corporate citizen but also to effectively manage tax risk, which can serve to avoid major financial, regulatory and reputation risk for an enterprise.”¹³³⁸ In my opinion, a corporate tax code and TCF can be seen as complementary to each other, as TCF is a corporate tool to show that it is in control of its good tax governance.

Corporations that wish to develop tax values and the risk management framework for that (such as, TCF) can use various sources to begin with. In recent years, many organizations, such as VBDO,¹³³⁹ PRI,¹³⁴⁰ Fair Tax Mark,¹³⁴¹ or B Corp,¹³⁴² have published various principles for responsible tax planning.¹³⁴³ For instance, VBDO guiding principles are an appropriate illustration for companies that wish to develop a code of conduct for good tax governance. These principles are: (1) define and communicate a clear strategy regarding tax governance; (2) align taxation with the business and tax is not to be regarded as a profit centre in itself; 3) respect the spirit of the law, i.e. tax compliant behaviour is the norm; (4) have insight into the management of tax risks; (5) monitor and test tax controls and adhere to tax policies and strategy; and (6) be able to provide tax assurance.¹³⁴⁴ In a nutshell, all such principles concern sustainable decision making, transparency, compliance with the laws, and cooperation with the tax authorities.

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¹³³⁴ PwC. (2017). *Sustainable Tax for Institutional Investors & Asset Managers*.

¹³³⁵ Bronzewska, K. and Van der Enden, E. (2014). Tax Control Framework – A Conceptual Approach: The Six Nuances of Good Tax Governance. *Bulletin for International Taxation* 68 (11), 635-640. p. 636.

¹³³⁶ Bronzewska, K. and Van der Enden, E. (2014). Tax Control Framework – A Conceptual Approach: The Six Nuances of Good Tax Governance. *Bulletin for International Taxation* 68 (11), 635-640. pp. 635-636.

¹³³⁷ OECD. (2016). *Co-operative Tax Compliance: Building Better Tax Control Frameworks*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 7.

¹³³⁸ OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 61.

¹³³⁹ See Verstappen, R. et al. (2017). VBDO Investor Guide: Integration of Tax in Responsible Investment: Practical Steps to Design and Implement a Responsible Tax Strategy for Investors. *VBDO & PwC*. p. 13; Urbach, X. et al. (2018). *Tax Transparency Benchmark 2018: A comparative study of 76 Dutch listed companies*. VBDO.

¹³⁴⁰ UN PRI. Information Page on Principles of Responsible investment (PRI).

¹³⁴¹ Fair Tax Mark.

¹³⁴² The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles. See also: Alexander, R. (2018, February 26). Benefit Corporation: Accountability Matters. *Corporate Governance*.

¹³⁴³ In practice, corporations use key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure whether and how business objectives are achieved. Also, with regard to taxation, KPIs are important for business practice as they make it possible to measure a corporation’s tax performance against its overall business objectives and goals. It is, nevertheless, outside the scope of this research to propose possible examples for good tax governance KPIs. See more on KPMG. (2016). *Key Performance Indicators Driving Indirect Tax Value: Getting Down to Business with Indirect Tax*.

¹³⁴⁴ Schuil, G. et al. (2014). *Good Tax Governance in Transition: Transcending the Tax Debate to CSR*. Report coordinated by the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO) with contributions from Oikos and PwC.

There are several multinationals that already have developed good tax governance, such as Unilever or DSM, or some members of the B Team.¹³⁴⁵ Developing such responsible practices does not immediately mean that those are perfect, however, they are definitely a good start. I am convinced that such corporate practices will be rather common business practice in the future, rather than exceptional examples. It is suggested that usually the first to implement good tax governance are financial institutions “including institutional investors” for “they are and have been subject to increased scrutiny by regulators and the general public.”¹³⁴⁶ Consequently, it is only a matter of time that multinationals should also implement more responsible tax practices, as they are likely to face pressure from such investors. Thus, they could gain a competitive advantage if they develop good tax governance ahead of time. PwC suggests that “from a fiduciary perspective, developing a robust tax governance model is valuable to demonstrate that you are in control of your tax position and that potential tax risks around investments are being monitored.”¹³⁴⁷ This also sends a positive message to economic value-seeking shareholders.¹³⁴⁸

There is also evidence that multinationals that have been at the centre of various aggressive tax planning scandals are changing their tax strategies.¹³⁴⁹ For instance, some sources claim that the social media giant Facebook is changing its legal structure in order to ensure that “ad revenues would be booked in the local markets rather than at its international headquarters in Ireland.”¹³⁵⁰ Also Google has allegedly become more transparent in New Zealand after public pressure.¹³⁵¹ Furthermore, Starbucks allegedly changed its corporate structure in Europe in order to pay more tax in the UK after 2012.¹³⁵² In addition, ten large UK multinationals that are accredited to the Fair Tax Mark in December 2015 made a statement supporting that “progressive business practice is recognised and other companies are challenged to be as transparent as possible.” The statement praised tax transparency and paying a fair share and, thus, good tax governance in the context of this research. Moreover, it claimed that tax is a CSR issue to which corporations need to respond.¹³⁵³ These are clear examples of the positive reactions of business to changing societal expectations with regard to corporate tax planning.

6.2.4. Concluding remarks

A substantive element of good tax governance relies on paying a fair share of tax. Despite its vagueness, fairness has inevitably become an important concept with regard to taxation. The free-riding behaviour of some taxpayers is perceived as unfair. In order to adjust or change their tax planning behaviour, multinationals that wish to engage in good tax governance need to accept that taxation has a moral dimension. Acting fairly suggests that corporations are not taking advantage of loopholes or ambiguities in the system. This requires ethical decision making, which is crucial when corporations face situations where certain values conflict. In such a situation, various conflicting interests need to be balanced.

Naturally, as was also discussed in the previous chapters,¹³⁵⁴ various stakeholders can have conflicting expectations of corporate decision making. In order to prevent reputation damage among certain groups of stakeholders, corporations should manage expectations.¹³⁵⁵ In order to

¹³⁴⁵ See e.g. Urbach, X. et al. (2018). Tax Transparency Benchmark 2018: A comparative study of 76 Dutch listed companies. *VBDO*; The B Team. (2018). A New Bar for Responsible Tax: The B Team Responsible Tax Principles.

¹³⁴⁶ PwC. (2017). *Sustainable Tax for Institutional Investors & Asset Managers*.

¹³⁴⁷ PwC. (2017). *Sustainable Tax for Institutional Investors & Asset Managers*.

¹³⁴⁸ Food for thought: “Even Lehman Brothers had a page on sustainability in its 2007 annual report, hailing its role as an environmentally conscious ‘global corporate citizen’.” Edgecliffe-Johnson, A. (2019, January 4). Beyond the Bottom Line: Should Business Put Purpose Before Profit? *Financial Times* (online).

¹³⁴⁹ See some examples also in chapter 5, section 4.

¹³⁵⁰ Kuchler, H. (2017, 12 December). Facebook to Stop Booking Ad Sales through Irish HQ. *Financial Times* (online).

¹³⁵¹ Smyth, J. (2018, February 22). Google Shift Strikes Blow for New Zealand in Global Tax Clampdown. *Financial Times* (online).

¹³⁵² Note, however, that they do not admit any wrongdoing with regard to practices that were at the centre of criticism.

¹³⁵³ The Guardian. (2015, December 15). MEPs Should Support a Fair Tax Payer Label. Open letter to *The Guardian* (online).

¹³⁵⁴ Chapter 5; chapter 4, section 4.

¹³⁵⁵ For instance, multinationals should deal with the shareholder expectations, which “may well differ among industries and companies, as well as among the types of risks involved.” In case of conflicting expectations, the corporate board can “change what they were planning to do so as to better adhere to existing shareholder expectations” or “they could try to change shareholder expectations; or they could

manage expectations, corporations can engage in a dialogue with various stakeholders in order to learn what such expectations are with regard to good tax governance. From a corporate perspective, “CSR is clearly about a particular set of business practices and strategies that deal with social issues.”¹³⁵⁶ However, “for many people it is also something more than that – namely a philosophy or set of values that underpin these practices.”¹³⁵⁷ This dimension of values and morality, however, also causes much controversy and many debates within the discipline of CSR.¹³⁵⁸ For many corporations this can be burdensome for “there are significant pressures on firms to meet public expectations and standards of legitimacy as far as its CSR engagement is concerned.”¹³⁵⁹ Morality is inevitably a rather vague concept that raises many questions. Dialogues may help to develop a common understanding on fairness with regard to taxation.¹³⁶⁰ Such dialogues, as they enter the more general public platform, inevitably involve a moral element. Having said that, not everybody will agree with this. For instance, Essers, argues that judging taxpayers on ethical grounds “is not appropriate.”¹³⁶¹ Nevertheless, Essers agrees that companies should, for instance, consider tax as a part of CSR. However, it is difficult to agree with the position that judging the aggressive tax planning practices of multinationals on ethical grounds is inappropriate *per se*. Of course, states should respond with effective policies (though a perfect regulatory system is not possible) but, as argued, corporations face many choices in every-day business practices and deciding between such choices is often a value-based judgement. Therefore, in my opinion, involving an ethical dimension in dialogues about aggressive tax planning is not inappropriate. However, in order to understand the problem, a debate is necessary, and morality is part of this debate.¹³⁶² The B Team’s Responsible Tax Principles that provide a good example of clear criteria for good tax governance reflect the discussions through this research. CSR corporations that wish to improve their tax practices are invited to use these Principles as an example of good practices. Nevertheless, corporations need to adjust these criteria for their own company-specific environment. In order to better understand what the stakeholders exactly expect from corporations, initiating a dialogue is necessary. For a well-informed debate, corporations should be transparent. Transparency is a procedural element of good tax governance.

6.3. Transparency: a procedural element of good tax governance

There is increasing public interest in corporate tax practices. Therefore, developing only certain tax values for internal use is not sufficient from the public perspective. In order to understand and accept the corporate behaviour, stakeholders need to know and understand this. Increased public interest in corporate tax practices has also increased the demand for corporate accountability.¹³⁶³ Accountability can be considered as “social corporate control”, because “corporations are accountable for the creation of organizational wealth for its multiple constituents.”¹³⁶⁴ Such social corporate control expects corporations to account for their “activities, accept responsibility for

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even perhaps attempt to change their shareholder ‘clientele’.” Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of “Shareholder Wealth Maximization”. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9 (3), 39-52. p. 50.

¹³⁵⁶ Eijssbouts, J. (2011, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. pp. 30-31, quoting Crane, A. et al. (Eds.). (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility, Readings and Cases in a Global Context*. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 8.

¹³⁵⁷ Eijssbouts, J. (2011, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. pp. 30-31, quoting Crane, A. et al. (Eds.). (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility, Readings and Cases in a Global Context*. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 8.

¹³⁵⁸ Eijssbouts, J. (2011, October 20). *Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate*. Inaugural Lecture, Maastricht University. pp. 30-31, quoting Crane, A. et al. (Eds.). (2008). *Corporate Social Responsibility, Readings and Cases in a Global Context*. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 8.

¹³⁵⁹ Wickert, C. and Cornelissen, J. (2017). CSR and Reputation: Too Much of a Good Thing? In Rasche, A. et al. (Eds.). *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 187-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 336.

¹³⁶⁰ Peters, C. (2014). *On the Legitimacy of International Tax Law*. Amsterdam: IBFD Doctoral Series. p. 307.

¹³⁶¹ Essers, P. (2017). International Tax Justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.). *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 235-265). Antwerpen: Intersentia. p. 248.

¹³⁶² See more on the relationship between the law and morality in chapter 3, section 2.

¹³⁶³ See more on accountability in chapter 2, section 4.

¹³⁶⁴ Valor, C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate Accountability. *Business and Society Review* 110 (2), 191-212. pp. 196-197.

them, and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.”¹³⁶⁵ Accountability can, thus, be achieved through transparency, “through the *provision of information* to stakeholders and society.”¹³⁶⁶ With respect to transparency, “the one who is accountable, explains or justifies actions to the one to whom the account is owed.”¹³⁶⁷ In other words, transparency is a primary requirement to keep multinationals accountable towards the societies in which they operate.¹³⁶⁸ Without information, it is hardly possible to acquire the knowledge required to hold those who wield power over others accountable. Accountability enables people to check the exercise of power.¹³⁶⁹ This explains why the demand for transparency in tax affairs has become urgent.¹³⁷⁰

The Internet era facilitates unprecedented access to information, which allows stakeholders to demand accountability. Stakeholders want information in order to assess corporations’ conduct and values, whether they are in line with a stakeholders’ own values. This is also important for corporate reputation.¹³⁷¹ In this sense, only publishing financial information is not enough. For instance, in addition to commercial objectives, the OECD encourages companies to “disclose policies and performance relating to business ethics, the environment and, where material to the company, social issues, human rights and other public policy commitments.”¹³⁷² Also, good tax governance could be considered a matter related to business ethics that is material to all of the OECD’s listed commitments. In this context, codes of conduct can serve the extrinsic motivation behind good tax governance.

Transparency, as a procedural element of good tax governance, can also be driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.¹³⁷³ An extrinsic motivation for transparency originates from mandatory and semi-voluntary requirements, such as (private or public) regulation or investors’ requirements. An intrinsic motivation of transparency serves the willingness to be in dialogue with stakeholders and illustrate an entity’s values. Also, here, good tax governance is based on both motivations. The division between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations is not black and white but the starting point can indeed be distinguished. In general, mandatory transparency requirements expect multinationals to publish information that can be considered material, which is the information about the company that “is likely to change the perceived value of a security when it is disclosed to the public.”¹³⁷⁴ The materiality of information depends on the decision context for “information may have little or no bearing on one type of decision, but be extremely important for another.” Lo explains that, in case “materiality is determined by reference to the potential to affect decisions, then it is the potential change in expectations that determines whether an item is relevant.”¹³⁷⁵ Moreover, information that is material in one context might become immaterial in another context.¹³⁷⁶ Despite the challenge to distinguish between material and immaterial information, “this does not mean that an ‘immaterial’ item has zero effect on users—the effect is simply expected to be smaller than the threshold for materiality, so there are still costs and benefits to disclosing such immaterial information.” Therefore, as “materiality in concept is continuous and a matter of

¹³⁶⁵ Business Dictionary (online). Search term: “accountability”. Retrieved from:

<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/accountability.html> (accessed 03.03.2019).

¹³⁶⁶ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. p. 16.

¹³⁶⁷ Swift, T. (2001). Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to Stakeholders. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 10 (1), 16-26. p. 17.

¹³⁶⁸ See also chapter 2, section 4.

¹³⁶⁹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. pp. 13, 225; Bianchi, A. (2013). On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law. In Bianchi, A. and Peters, A. (Eds.). *Transparency in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 2.

¹³⁷⁰ See more on corporate power in relation to tax planning in chapter 2, section 3.

¹³⁷¹ See chapter 2, section 5.

¹³⁷² OECD. (2015). *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 34.

¹³⁷³ See also chapter 4, section 3.1.

¹³⁷⁴ Business Dictionary (online). Search term: “material information”. Retrieved from:

<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/material-information.html> (accessed 03.03.2019).

The U.S. Supreme Court interprets material information as the information which would likely be “viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.” Grewal, J., Hauptmann, C. and Serafeim, G. (2017). Material Sustainability Information and Stock Price Informativeness. *Harvard Business School Working Paper*. p. 10. See also: OECD. (2011). *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 27.

¹³⁷⁵ Lo, K. (2010). Materiality and Voluntary Disclosures. *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 49 (1), 133–135. pp. 133-134.

¹³⁷⁶ Corporate Reporting Dialogue. (2016, March). *Statement of Common Principles of Materiality of the Corporate Reporting Dialogue*. p. 3.

degree,”¹³⁷⁷ it is a responsibility of the corporate decision-making organ to determine which information is material “from the perspective of stakeholders.”¹³⁷⁸ Corporate decision making “should reflect management’s best interpretation of stakeholder expectations as of the reporting date.”¹³⁷⁹ Deciding upon the materiality of the information to be disclosed is, however, a challenging task for “there is no international consensus on standards of business conduct.”¹³⁸⁰ Moreover, different stakeholders value different kinds of information and they need to be able to “separate signal from noise.”¹³⁸¹ For the purposes of good tax governance, multinationals should thus communicate their tax values and strategies even though it is not required by the law. This illustrates, in my opinion, how mandatory (extrinsic) transparency requirements can in practice evolve into voluntary (intrinsic) transparency. Naturally, in terms of voluntary transparency, corporations have discretion to decide upon the content and extent of the information published. A reasonable and responsible business practice does not publish all of the available corporate information, however, as this would harm a corporations’ competitive position.¹³⁸² Voluntary transparency in terms of good tax governance communicates corporate tax values and actions this corporation takes to live up to the values it has set for itself. In the following sub-sections, mandatory and voluntary dimensions of transparency are discussed. It will be first discussed what kind of externally motivated transparency requirements corporations need to fulfil (mandatory transparency requirements), and then it will be analyzed how corporations can go beyond compliance and external motivation (voluntary transparency).

6.3.1. Extrinsic drivers of tax transparency

Transparency with regard to corporate tax planning is a legal requirement in the first place. Various international transparency requirements and tax disclosure rules represent an extrinsic driver of procedural good tax governance. As argued in this research, multinationals are in a position to use their corporate power with regard to tax planning at a considerable cost to society’s welfare.¹³⁸³ Usually legal but (socially) illegitimate tax planning structures benefit from information asymmetry and a lack of transparency.¹³⁸⁴ Corporations that wish to prove that their tax planning practices are (socially) legitimate should be transparent about it. For instance, Henriques argues that corporations should be transparent about their role with regard to shaping the law through lobbying and consultations, which were identified as one dimension of corporate power.¹³⁸⁵ In the fight against certain types of tax planning, transparency is often considered a key element.¹³⁸⁶ It is not the aim of this research to analyze whether and in which form the regulatory tax transparency initiatives would eliminate tax avoidance efficiently. The following examples merely illustrate various mandatory tax transparency initiatives at the international level. These examples prove that transparency is a crucial topic with regard to corporate tax planning.

The urgency of transparency was clearly visible already in the 2013 OECD report to the G20: “Leaders, civil society and everyday taxpayers are renewing demands for greater transparency and (...) changes to the international tax rules to restore fairness and integrity of their tax systems and

¹³⁷⁷ Lo, K. (2010). Materiality and Voluntary Disclosures. *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 49 (1), 133–135. pp. 133-134.

¹³⁷⁸ Corporate Reporting Dialogue. (2016, March). *Statement of Common Principles of Materiality of the Corporate Reporting Dialogue*. p. 4.

¹³⁷⁹ Corporate Reporting Dialogue. (2016, March). *Statement of Common Principles of Materiality of the Corporate Reporting Dialogue*. p. 4.

¹³⁸⁰ Donaldson, T. (1996). Values in Tension: Ethics away from Home. *Harvard Business Review* 74 (5), 48-64. p. 52.

¹³⁸¹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 22.

¹³⁸² For a discussion regarding the threats of transparency in tax matters, see Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer; Stevens, S. (2018, September 14). *Meer transparantie in de vennootschapsbelasting?* Tilburg University. See also Oats, L. and Tuck, P. (2019). Corporate Tax Avoidance: Is Tax Transparency the Solution?. *Accounting and Business Research* 49 (5), 565–583, who point at the risk of dysfunctional consequences, for instance additional costs in providing and processing additional information and the prospect of increased disputes as new information generates new misinterpretations.

¹³⁸³ See chapter 2, section 3.

¹³⁸⁴ See chapter 3, section 3.

¹³⁸⁵ See chapter 2.

¹³⁸⁶ Peters, C. (2017). Improving Democratic International Tax Governance: On the Power of Citizens, Transparency and Independent Watchdogs. In Peeters, B. et al. (Eds.), *Rebuilding Trust in Taxation* (pp. 203-234). Antwerpen: Intersentia. pp. 218-231.

the global financial systems more generally.”¹³⁸⁷ The European Commission considers transparency “a crucial element in securing fairer taxation.”¹³⁸⁸ According to the Commission, transparency is one of the “three principles of good tax governance.”¹³⁸⁹ One of the main reasons why various international regulatory approaches aim to create more transparency in tax planning discussions is to minimize the information gap between corporations and tax authorities. In economics, such an information gap is referred to as information asymmetry, which describes situations in which one party to a transaction or agreement has less information than the other.¹³⁹⁰ Multinationals possess corporate power that gives them a favourable position in relation to information asymmetry.¹³⁹¹ Various disclosure rules help to evaluate the information corporations provide. This is important, since “without comparability and consistency standards the current reports are more ‘greenwash’ or environmental spin than a factual representation of the company’s actual position.”¹³⁹²

Both the OECD BEPS Action Plan¹³⁹³ and the EU Action Plan¹³⁹⁴ aim at increasing transparency with their country-by-country reporting initiatives that aim at the exchange of data between tax authorities with regard to income and the wealth of taxpayers.¹³⁹⁵ This exchange can be done upon request but much data is exchanged automatically between the tax authorities in an increasing number of countries.¹³⁹⁶ By way of transnational tax information exchange networks, tax administrators can cooperate actively with administrators from other countries and achieve the capacity to enforce national tax laws in respect of multinational and mobile capital and labour.¹³⁹⁷ The exchange of tax relevant information is an important means for tax authorities to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance.¹³⁹⁸ According to Hey, this reflects a “recent international push for transparency” and the tax legislators’ interest in “understanding complex economic structures and upcoming business models”, which in turn can lead to “new policy considerations and new legislative actions.”¹³⁹⁹ Some argue that increased disclosure requirements are considered to reduce corporate tax aggressiveness.¹⁴⁰⁰ However, in my opinion, as long as the concept of tax

¹³⁸⁷ OECD. (2013). OECD Secretary-General Report to the G20 Finance Ministers. Paris: OECD Publishing. p. 2.

¹³⁸⁸ European Commission. (2015, June 17). *Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action*. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels: COM(2015) 302 final.

¹³⁸⁹ European Commission. (2015, June 17). *Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action*. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels: COM(2015) 302 final.

¹³⁹⁰ Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. *The American Economic Review* 92 (3), 460-501. pp. 469-470; Hood, C. (2006). Transparency in a Historical Perspective. In Hood, C. and Heald, D. (Eds.), *Transparency: Key to Better Governance?* (pp. 3-23). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 18.

¹³⁹¹ See chapter 2, section 3.

¹³⁹² Tschoopp, D. J. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparison between the United States and the European Union. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 12 (1), 55-59. p. 56-57. See also Holland, K. et al. (2016). Tax Avoidance: A Threat to Corporate Legitimacy? An Examination of Companies’ Financial and CSR Reports. *British Tax Review* 3, 310-338.

¹³⁹³ OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing; OECD. (2014, January 30). *Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting*. Paris: OECD Publishing. See more on the OECD BEPS and the EU ATAP in chapter 3, section 5.

¹³⁹⁴ European Commission. (2015, June). Action Plan on Corporate Taxation; European Council. (2018, May 25). Directive (EU) 2018/822 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation in Relation to Reportable Cross-Border Arrangements. Official Journal of the European Union L 139/1, 05.06.2018. pp. 1-13. See also Hilling, A. and Ostas, D. T. (2017). *Corporate Taxation and Social Responsibility*. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer. pp. 46-54. European Commission. *Overview: Public Country-by-Country Reporting*; European Commission. (2015, March 15). *Combating Corporate Tax Avoidance: Commission Presents Tax Transparency Package*. Press release. Brussels.

¹³⁹⁵ The EU ATAP is an implementation of the OECD BEPS.

¹³⁹⁶ Enhancing transparency and cooperation is laid down in the obligation of country-by-country reporting (CbC reporting). See e.g. OECD. (2013). *Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Action 13. See also Panayi, C. H. J. I. (2017). The Europeanization of Good Tax Governance. In Albors-Llorens, A. et al. (Eds.), *Yearbook of European Law* (pp. 1-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 16. For criticism on CbC reporting see e.g. Cockfield, A. J. and MacArthur, C. D. (2015). Country-by-Country Reporting and Commercial Confidentiality. *Canadian Tax Journal/Revue Fiscale Canadienne* 63 (3), 627-660. p. 642; Financial Transparency Coalition (2015, September 17). *OECD Country-by-Country Reporting: Only for the Strong?*

¹³⁹⁷ Stewart explores the important question of the legitimacy of these transnational networks, which will be crucial for their sustainability and effectiveness in the long term. Stewart, M. (2013). Global Tax Information Exchange Networks: Legitimacy in a Global Administrative State. In Brauner, Y. and Stewart, M. (Eds.), *Tax, Law and Development* (pp. 316-344). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

¹³⁹⁸ Grinberg, I. (2016). Building Institutions for a Globalized World. Automatic Information Exchange. In Pogge, T. and Mehta, K. (Eds.), *Global Tax Fairness* (pp. 14-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹³⁹⁹ Hey, J. (2018). Tax Transparency (preparatory materials). EATLP Annual Conference 2018, Zurich.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Lavermicocca, C. and Buchan, J. (2015). Role of Reputational Risk in Tax Decision Making by Large Companies. *eJournal of Tax Research* 13 (1), 5-50. p. 18.

aggressiveness in itself remains unclear,¹⁴⁰¹ the concrete aim of such requirements remains questionable.

Moreover, mandatory disclosure rules do not always provide necessary information to all interested parties. As a result, in addition to mandatory rules, various corporate stakeholders request publicly available information about corporate tax strategies and values in a form that is understandable to a non-tax expert. This is where corporate voluntary transparency plays a role. Such public calls for transparency, while not unimportant, form another layer of extrinsic motivation for tax transparency. For instance, many NGOs pressure corporations into disclosing their tax strategies in the hope of establishing more corporate accountability.¹⁴⁰² Also, shareholders increasingly request more information on corporate tax strategies. Blowfield and Murray claim that “the degree of transparency depends on legal and stock market requirements.”¹⁴⁰³ Such legal and market requirements force corporations to be more transparent and can, therefore, be categorized as extrinsically motivated transparency. Such external calls for transparency are important, as they put more pressure on the corporate moral obligation to pay a fair share. Consequently, corporations can no longer ignore their tax practices and any dubious strategy can have an effect on the corporate reputation, for example, which puts more pressure on companies to behave responsibly. Such external pressure-driven transparency appears, for instance, in the form of private reporting initiatives, such as Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting.

ESG reporting is one of the most widely used corporate responsibility reporting standards. ESG metrics help investors to calculate long-term returns, as they indicate healthy corporate performance. ESG reporting is especially important in the context of socially responsible investments (SRI).¹⁴⁰⁴ A myriad of institutions provide guidance for corporations and information for investors with regard to ESG reporting and performance. Many investors pay increasing attention to corporate sustainability in combination with transparency.¹⁴⁰⁵ For example, FTSE Russell ESG Ratings also include tax transparency as part of the (ES)Governance.¹⁴⁰⁶ Sustainability considerations have become an important part of investors’ decision-making processes.¹⁴⁰⁷ This also proves that both standardization organizations as well as investors are important actors with regard to the corporate tax planning debate, as they can (financially) motivate corporations towards more sustainable tax governance. For instance, the VBDO Investor Guide to responsible investment states that “[I]nvestors play a crucial role in responsible business conduct.”¹⁴⁰⁸ A responsible investment criterion provides companies with a strong catalyst for change.

The Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI), for example, encourage companies to “disclose information related to policy, governance and performance” through “multiple channels”, such as a separate corporate tax policy statement or “the annual report or sustainability report and/or the company website.”¹⁴⁰⁹ Such a comprehensive disclosure should illustrate how corporate boards see taxation and “how this approach is aligned with its business and sustainability strategy.”¹⁴¹⁰ Additionally, it should convince investors that a corporation is in control of its tax-related risks.¹⁴¹¹ In other words, the PRI expects corporations to have and disclose their TCF that was discussed previously.¹⁴¹¹ Such an approach suggests that, for (a certain group of) investors, transparency in

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¹⁴⁰¹ See also chapter 3.

¹⁴⁰² See e.g. Tax Justice Network; Oxfam Novib.

¹⁴⁰³ Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. (2008). *Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 35-36.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Skroupa, C. P. (2017, April 24). ESG Reporting Reshapes Global Markets. *Forbes* (online); see also chapter 4, section 5.2.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See e.g. RobecoSAM in chapter 5. See also: Bird, R. and Davis-Nozemack, K. (2016). Tax Avoidance as a Sustainability Problem. *Journal of Business Ethics* (online edition), 1-17.

¹⁴⁰⁶ FTSE Russell. ESG Ratings.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Dixon, C. and Sharma, A. (2018, January 24). Weil Discusses 2018 10-K and Proxy Season: Spotlight on Corporate Sustainability. *Columbia Law School's Blue Sky Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets*.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Verstappen, R. et al. (2017). VBDO Investor Guide: Integration of Tax in Responsible Investment: Practical Steps to Design and Implement a Responsible Tax Strategy for Investors. VBDO & PwC. p. 6.

¹⁴⁰⁹ UN PRI. *Investors' Recommendations on Corporate Income Tax Disclosure*.

¹⁴¹⁰ UN PRI. *Investors' Recommendations on Corporate Income Tax Disclosure*. See also chapter 5.

¹⁴¹¹ Chapter 6, section 2.3.

tax matters is also very important, which puts pressure on corporations to meet such expectations.¹⁴¹²

In addition to the UN, several other institutions focus on tax transparency. For instance, in the Netherlands, the VBDO, a responsible investors' organization,¹⁴¹³ has developed the Tax Transparency Benchmark¹⁴¹⁴ that provides extra recognition for corporations that have adopted good tax governance and consequently transparency measures. Such a transparency initiative provides an additional dimension of external motivation for good tax governance. Namely, such positive recognition not only adds to a good corporate reputation, but it also creates a competitive environment among corporations to prove their positive impact, creating a race to the top. Another example of a companies' own transparency initiative and peer-pressure on other corporations is the initiative of ten large UK multinationals that are accredited to the Fair Tax Mark. These multinationals made a statement in 2015 supporting that "progressive business practice is recognised and other companies are challenged to be as transparent as possible."¹⁴¹⁵ The statement claimed that "enhanced transparency is vital, whether from country-by-country reporting or from public statements on tax policies and governance." Furthermore, it encouraged the businesses to "demonstrate that they are open and transparent about their tax affairs, and pay the right amount of corporation tax at the right time and in the right place." It further recognized tax as the corporate responsibility issue to which corporations must respond. All such statements and publications put extra pressure on multinationals to be more transparent about their tax planning and values.¹⁴¹⁶

Also, in recent years, the media and NGOs have been crucial drivers of a wide debate on corporate taxation.¹⁴¹⁷ Various information leaks have proven that "corporate tax issues remain out of the public eye until the media discovers them"; only after media attention, such tax issues have "become part of social concern."¹⁴¹⁸ Such attention adds to the extrinsic motivation of transparency, as it can affect corporate reputation. Empirical research "suggests that public pressure can increase both corporate compliance with and government enforcement of existing laws."¹⁴¹⁹ Public opinion is mostly formed by the media and NGOs.¹⁴²⁰ It can be agreed with Lee that "news media exerts an effect by translating complex and obscure tax issues into simple and provocative messages which then easily penetrate into the public's mind through repetitive broadcasting."¹⁴²¹ While such media and NGO attention on corporate tax practices has been a crucial catalyst for good tax governance, it also has had an adverse effect.¹⁴²² For instance, the UK PAC claims that SMEs' tax evasion is increasing because of too much 'media noise' (inconsistent and not nuanced media news); SMEs think that if multinationals successfully avoid paying their fair share of tax then they should also not pay.¹⁴²³ Lee argues that "external influence of the overheated media coverage of a firm's tax affairs may not be able to shift the level of tax disclosure in an upward direction."¹⁴²⁴ In other

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¹⁴¹² Additionally, many shareholders are concerned about "[C]orporate lobbying to influence laws and regulations affect all aspects of the economy". McRitchie, J. (2018, March 14). Lobbying Disclosure Sought @ 50 Companies. CorpGov.net blog. This is also important from the corporate tax planning perspective (see chapter 3). As a matter of fact, corporate lobbying disclosure would be an important dimension of transparency for keeping both corporations as well as politicians accountable for the sustainable system. This discussion is, nevertheless, outside the scope of this research.

¹⁴¹³ Webpage: <http://www.vbdo.nl>

¹⁴¹⁴ See e.g. Urbach, X. et al. (2018). Tax Transparency Benchmark 2018: A Comparative Study of 76 Dutch Listed Companies. VBDO; Vellenga, I. and Reijngoud, A. (2015). Tax Transparency Benchmark 2015: A Comparative Study of 64 Dutch Listed Companies. VBDO; Verstappen, R. et al. (2016). Tax Transparency Benchmark 2016: A Comparative Study of 68 Dutch Listed Companies. VBDO.

¹⁴¹⁵ The Guardian. (2015, December 15). MEPs Should Support a Fair Tax Payer Label. Open letter to The Guardian.

¹⁴¹⁶ See also e.g. Integrated Reporting (IR): International Integrated Reporting (IR) Council information webpage; Global Reporting Initiative (2016). Forging a Path to Integrated Reporting: Insights from the GRI Corporate Leadership Group on Integrated Reporting. Amsterdam: GRI. p. 3.

¹⁴¹⁷ See e.g. Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

¹⁴¹⁸ Lee, S. (2015). News Media Coverage of Corporate Tax Avoidance and Corporate Tax Reporting. *WU International Taxation Research Paper Series* 2015-16. p. 2.

¹⁴¹⁹ Dyreng, S. D. et al. (2016). Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior. *Journal of Accounting Research* 54 (1), 147-186. p. 153.

¹⁴²⁰ Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

¹⁴²¹ Lee, S. (2015). News Media Coverage of Corporate Tax Avoidance and Corporate Tax Reporting. *WU International Taxation Research Paper Series* 2015-16. p. 23.

¹⁴²² Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

¹⁴²³ UK HMRC (2017, September). Understanding evasion by Small and Mid-Sized Businesses. *HM Revenue and Customs Research Report* 433.

¹⁴²⁴ Lee, S. (2015). News Media Coverage of Corporate Tax Avoidance and Corporate Tax Reporting. *WU International Taxation Research Paper Series* 2015-16. p. 23.

words, transparency has its limitations and the media should pursue their role responsibly. It is clear that both the media's as well as NGOs' viability depends on publicity; their financial returns depend on the number of readers, followers or attention in any other form they get. Consequently, media and NGOs serve mixed interests: to educate the public while staying popular. Therefore, the media and NGOs also bear responsibility for a balanced and objective discussion in order to achieve sustainable tax governance.

All these examples of extrinsic motivation behind tax transparency prove their relevance for various stakeholders. Goo and Klinger explain that "there is no perfectly efficient market as there are often information asymmetries between the parties to the transaction."¹⁴²⁵ Extrinsically motivated procedural good tax governance, thus, complies with mandatory reporting requirements and also provides the required information to stakeholders. Such transparency, by definition, "will not benefit the party who possesses the information but will increase the overall efficiency of the transaction."¹⁴²⁶ Also, good tax governance has the potential to increase the overall efficiency of transactions in the market economy, as it increases the level playing field and, in my opinion, potentially also consumer purchase power. Additionally, when done properly and with the right intentions, good tax governance also has the potential to benefit the party who possesses the information, multinationals in this case. Information related to corporate tax planning strategies have gained a certain importance when assessing corporate risks, in light of various scandals and public interest.¹⁴²⁷ Such transparency is important, as it "would empower investors to decide whether they want to put their money into a company which has opted for a certain tax risk profile."¹⁴²⁸ In order to eliminate the information asymmetry and related risks to various stakeholders, transparency is, thus, important. Corporations that wish to take transparency to a higher level in the context of good tax governance should engage in dialogue with their stakeholders, as will be discussed next.

6.3.2. Intrinsic tax transparency

"Transparency" is a broad and complicated concept.¹⁴²⁹ In this research, transparency is considered a principle of being open about one's tax planning practices. It concerns "the accessibility of information to stakeholders of institutions, regarding matters that affect their interests."¹⁴³⁰ When a corporation is convinced that its tax planning practices are legal, legitimate (responsible), and in accordance with its CSR engagements, it should be able to report this openly to the public. If a corporation is hesitant to be in dialogue with its stakeholders about its tax values, it could be seen as a first red flag. Companies are economic entities and will not actively search for the possibilities to pay more tax. Full transparency, about its business operations, payments, and tax choices, is usually even rejected by companies that have nothing to hide and this is totally understandable. There can be many downsides to this, such as a threat to taxpayers' privacy, weakening its competitive position or risking a misinterpretation of information by misinformed receivers.¹⁴³¹ Nevertheless, a truly transparent "company cannot be silent about its relationship to the law."¹⁴³² Transparency and accountability are not only important with regard to shaping the law but also with regard to complying with the law. Therefore, multinationals that wish to engage in good tax

¹⁴²⁵ Goo, S. H. and Klinger, D. (2014). The Limits of Directors' Duties in Fostering Corporate Social Responsibility and the Idea of a Multi-Stakeholder Board. In Paolini, A. (Ed.), *Research Handbook on Directors' Duties* (pp. 185-210). Cheltenham / Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar. pp. 192- 193.

¹⁴²⁶ Goo, S. H. and Klinger, D. (2014). The Limits of Directors' Duties in Fostering Corporate Social Responsibility and the Idea of a Multi-Stakeholder Board. In Paolini, A. (Ed.), *Research Handbook on Directors' Duties* (pp. 185-210). Cheltenham / Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar. pp. 192- 193.

¹⁴²⁷ See also chapter 2.

¹⁴²⁸ Schön, W. (2008). Tax and Corporate Governance: A Legal Approach. In Schön, W. (Ed.), *Tax and Corporate Governance* (pp. 31-62). Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 49.

¹⁴²⁹ Schnackenberg, A. K. and Tomlinson, E. C. (2016). Organizational Transparency: A New Perspective on Managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder Relationships. *Journal of Management* 42 (7), 1784-1810. See also chapter 2.

¹⁴³⁰ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 22.

¹⁴³¹ Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

¹⁴³² Henriques, A. (2007). *Corporate Truth: The Limits of Transparency*. Sterling: Earthscan. p. 23.

governance should be transparent about (the effects of) their tax planning practices. Moreover, failing to do so increases the risk of a bad reputation (extrinsic motivation).¹⁴³³ Therefore, such corporations need to communicate their tax strategy in a balanced and integer way.

It is unclear which tax practices exactly are considered socially illegitimate or unacceptable and it is a government's responsibility to provide more guidance in this matter.¹⁴³⁴ However, transparency from the corporations' side opens the door for an informed discussion in order to establish what legitimate or acceptable tax planning practices are. Transparency and openness are preconditions for a focused discussion, as it is necessary to get the facts right and take different perspectives on board. This, in turn, helps corporations to understand the expectations and needs of its stakeholders and to protect (or, where necessary, to re-establish) or advance their reputation and stakeholders' trust.¹⁴³⁵ Furthermore, transparency and the inclusion of tax in CSR reporting would help to minimize the information asymmetry gap that, in current debates, seems to confuse the understanding of the problem. Reporting and openness are significant procedural elements of CSR.¹⁴³⁶ Transparency should nevertheless not be seen as an end in itself here; it is always a means to some other value, for example accountability. Transparency and openness are first steps towards moral tax behaviour. Moreover, transparency is a precondition for accountability and open debate is crucial in creating a better tax compliance environment. Debate promotes a better understanding of factors business take into account in their tax decisions and the moral acceptability of tax planning practices. An informed debate is indispensable for developing standards of substantive good tax governance. Such an informed debate does not request full transparency from corporations but true information (that is not misleading or aiming at showing a corporation in a better light) about corporate tax values and practices in an understandable language for broader discussion. Nowadays, corporations and their actions are visible to the public and "validation of trust is a click away, as is the power to transfer or destroy trust."¹⁴³⁷ Various technological developments already enhance the availability of information and transparency. Nevertheless, as also described in a previous sub-section, the downside of such transparency is that such information can be misleading or misinterpreted. This can be called uncontrolled transparency, which can do more harm than good (for instance, reputation damage caused by misinterpreted information).¹⁴³⁸ This should be one of the many incentives for corporations to be voluntarily and clearly transparent about their tax values. Transparency is considered an inherent part of tax responsible companies that "will help rebuilding trust and addressing the growing expectations from the public and from the policy makers in terms of transparency and aggressive tax planning by some companies."¹⁴³⁹ Trust, as explained earlier in this research,¹⁴⁴⁰ "is the expectation that others will be honest, accountable, considerate, and open."¹⁴⁴¹ Corporations increasingly depend on stakeholders' trust since people have "unprecedented access to information", which means that corporate actions are more visible. Consequently, various stakeholders require "evidence that firms are trustworthy and behaving according to their values."¹⁴⁴² Responsible and open corporations should "understand that transparency is a corporate value that must be connected to principles of honesty, accountability,

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¹⁴³³ Gribnau, J. L. M. and Jallai, A.-G. (2017). Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral Responsibility and Transparency. *Nordic Tax Journal* 1, 70-88. pp. 77-79.

¹⁴³⁴ See also chapter 3.

¹⁴³⁵ Hu, H. T. C. (1996). Behind the Corporate Hedge: Information and the Limits of "Shareholder Wealth Maximization". *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 9 (3), 39-52. p. 50. See also chapter 2.

¹⁴³⁶ See e.g. McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 32-37; GRI Sustainability Reporting.

¹⁴³⁷ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 82.

¹⁴³⁸ See e.g. UK HMRC (2017, September). Understanding Evasion by Small and Mid-Sized Businesses. *HM Revenue and Customs Research Report 433*.

¹⁴³⁹ CSR Europe: Tax Project: From Tax Transparency to Responsible Tax Behaviour. *The European Business Network for Corporate Social Responsibility*.

¹⁴⁴⁰ See chapter 2, section 5.

¹⁴⁴¹ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 19.

¹⁴⁴² Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 19.

and consideration to sustain trust.” Moreover, such transparent corporations are expected to embrace and value their networks, “reciprocal engagements with customers, employees, partners, shareholders, and the public”, and balance the competing interests of stakeholders.¹⁴⁴³ Therefore, intrinsically motivated and honest transparency is a part of good tax governance that helps to (re-)build trust among stakeholders.

Stakeholders’ trust “is a central notion in both corporate governance and CSR.”¹⁴⁴⁴ It is natural that corporations are hesitant about being transparent due to tension between transparency and sensitive corporate (competitive) information. This also true in the case of intrinsic motivation. When acting in the best interests of a corporation, managers are in a position to make choices with regard to what kind of information they publish and how they publish it. Transparency, while being a good value in general, has its limits, and therefore poorly executed transparency increases instead of decreases corporate risk. O’Neill, for instance, argues that, while transparency might “destroy secrecy”, it “may not limit the deception and deliberate misinformation that undermine[s] relations of trust.” In order to restore trust, O’Neill aptly argues that “*deception and lies* rather than *secrecy*” should be reduced.¹⁴⁴⁵ In my opinion, multinationals could reduce deception and lies with moral decision-making, honest and knowledgeable disclosure, and dialogue with stakeholders. This is also the reason that transparency, in this research, is considered a principle of being open about one’s tax planning practices and not a tool to, for example, achieve a better reputation.

According to Cadbury, disclosure is “[T]he foundation of any structure of corporate governance”; it is “the basis of public confidence in the corporate system, and funds will flow to the centers of economic activity that inspire trust.”¹⁴⁴⁶ Scarce empirical evidence, however, suggests that CSR can also bring some risks with regard to corporate reputation.¹⁴⁴⁷ For instance, promoting CSR attracts extra attention to corporate activities, which can improve the corporate reputation if done well, but it may also damage it if it is executed poorly. Corporations that present themselves as socially responsible companies are often viewed critically. Therefore, corporations have to be careful with their expectations of management and clear with their communication and CSR integration.¹⁴⁴⁸ In order to avoid the negative side-effects of transparency, multinationals should (be willing to) explain their tax planning in the context of their CSR policy by fleshing out whether and how their tax strategies fit with their role and responsibilities in the societies in which they operate. This is a clear example of how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are combined. At the same time, such possible negative side-effects of transparency suggest that also the public debate has its limitations. To my mind this indicates that good tax governance is a matter of shared responsibility of various actors – also other participants of the debate need to accept their responsibility for improving corporate tax practices instead of promoting their own ideas or position (such as media or NGOs could do).¹⁴⁴⁹

O’Neill, who is critical about the question of (mis-)trust in a society, argues that “[G]ood governance is possible only if institutions are allowed some margin for self-governance of a form appropriate to their particular tasks, within a framework of financial and other reporting.”¹⁴⁵⁰ This also fits aptly with the essence of intrinsically motivated transparency with regard to good tax governance: multinationals are truly accountable if they provide “substantive and knowledgeable independent judgement” of their tax values beyond the “standardised or relentlessly detailed”

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¹⁴⁴³ Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2004). *The Naked Corporation. How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize Business*. New York: Penguin. p. 73.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Eijssbouts, J. (2011). Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism Regulatory Options to Reinforce the Licence to Operate. Inaugural Speech, Maastricht University. p. 44.

¹⁴⁴⁵ O’Neill, O. (2002). *A Question of Trust. The BBC Reith Lectures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 70.

¹⁴⁴⁶ A. Cadbury, foreword in Iskander, M. R. and Chamliou, N. (2000). *Corporate Governance, a Framework for Implementation*. Washington: The World Bank. p. vi.

¹⁴⁴⁷ See e.g. Graafland, J. (2018). Does Corporate Social Responsibility Put Reputation at Risk by Inviting Activist Targeting? An Empirical Test among European SMEs. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 25 (1), 1–13.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Graafland, J. (2018). Does Corporate Social Responsibility Put Reputation at Risk by Inviting Activist Targeting? An Empirical Test among European SMEs. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 25 (1), 1–13.

¹⁴⁴⁹ See also chapter 7.

¹⁴⁵⁰ O’Neill, O. (2002). *A Question of Trust. The BBC Reith Lectures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 58.

reporting requirements.¹⁴⁵¹ A corporation is, to a large extent, free to define its “own ethical aspirations” and “communicate the criteria by which it wants to be held and judged.” Corporate codes are tools, in this context, that “provide both outsiders and insiders specific and clear statements to use in evaluating the credibility of corporate management.”¹⁴⁵²

From the practical perspective, in order to reach various stakeholders, such communication should be available in a simple language that does not require a specific tax background. This is inevitably a challenging task for corporations, because tax laws are very complex. Nevertheless, in my opinion, corporations and stakeholders that know their values should be in position to explain their practices. Moreover, it should be available in the different languages of relevant stakeholders, and easily accessible on the corporate webpage. In principle, CSR reporting should “provide investors with the information they desire to make decisions.”¹⁴⁵³ However, it should also provide other stakeholders with relevant information to allow them to give an informed opinion about the corporation and its values and act accordingly. For instance, Novo Nordisk, a global healthcare company, has published a tax statement in which the company briefly explains its tax values and commits to behaving responsibly with regard to tax planning.¹⁴⁵⁴ It is a short document in simple language. Nevertheless, it is a corporate commitment that allows stakeholders to evaluate the company’s position with regard to the international tax planning debate. Moreover, this written and public statement requires the company to live up to its words in order to avoid becoming a hypocrite and suffering reputation damage.¹⁴⁵⁵

6.3.3. Concluding remarks

To (re-)establish trust, multinationals, in addition to the substantial elements of good tax governance, should also be transparent about it. Transparency stands for the procedural element of good tax governance. In terms of good tax governance, transparency has various functions. Transparency can have countless dimensions and conceptualizations, which makes it a complex topic with no clear-cut division. For the purposes of understanding good tax governance, transparency can be approached from the perspective of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations,¹⁴⁵⁶ as there are different drivers of transparency, as was described in previous sub-sections.

Most importantly, transparency can be seen as a dialogue with stakeholders, which helps a corporation to explain its (tax) strategy and practices and understand what stakeholders require from corporations as well as to manage stakeholders’ expectations. This is an intrinsic driver of transparency that enforces corporate accountability and ensures that corporations live up to the substantive element of its good tax governance. Corporations that embrace good tax governance should be honestly transparent about it. This means that a corporation does not intentionally publish confusing technical data but only data that is necessary to understand its practices. Moreover, where necessary, corporations should explain their position with regard to tax planning. In terms of going beyond the law, this means that sometimes multinationals might need to take a step further than the existing legal disclosure requirements and reporting obligations. Transparency is a door to corporate accountability as well as to a dialogue between a corporation and its stakeholders and helps corporations to understand what is the ‘fair share’ according to their stakeholders. Both accountability and dialogue with stakeholders are signs of socially responsible corporations. Moreover, both help to find a compromise and a common understanding of what kinds of tax practices are acceptable (legitimate) and what not.

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¹⁴⁵¹ Sage Publications. (2012). *SAGE Brief Guide to Corporate Social Responsibility*. Los Angeles / London: SAGE. p. 50.

¹⁴⁵² Sage Publications. (2012). *SAGE Brief Guide to Corporate Social Responsibility*. Los Angeles / London: SAGE. p. 50.

¹⁴⁵³ Tschopp, D. J. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparison between the United States and the European Union. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 12 (1), 55-59. p. 56.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Novo Nordisk. (2016). *Novo Nordisk Tax Approach*.

¹⁴⁵⁵ See for example also Vodafone’s tax statement: Vodafone. (2017). Taxation and our Total Economic Contribution to Public Finances 2016-17.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations were also discussed in chapter 4.

The extrinsic motivation for transparency originates from various mandatory and semi-voluntary requirements, such as regulations or investors' requirements. Mandatory transparency should provide a common ground for corporate disclosure. In order to achieve consistency and comparability, regulated reporting standards or guidelines, such as the OECD and EU initiatives or investors' benchmarks, are important, since, without them, voluntary transparency could represent merely "biased marketing campaigns."¹⁴⁵⁷ These tax transparency initiatives are complementary to intrinsically motivated transparency. Both drivers of transparency are important parts of procedural good tax governance. This combination entails ethical decision making, balancing conflicting interests and not prioritizing one over another because of some kind of reward. This form of transparency allows stakeholders to understand corporate tax values and practices, which is necessary for trust.

Transparency can be given various (mutually non-exclusive) forms, such as publishing a code of conduct; explaining good tax governance in the corporate annual reports; communicating corporate tax values openly via various channels, or by (public) country-by-country reporting.¹⁴⁵⁸ Even though good tax governance requires honest disclosure from corporations, also externally motivated and mandatory transparency requests are very important for setting certain benchmarks and expectations of corporate behaviour. The positive aspect of voluntary intrinsic transparency is that corporations can create and clearly communicate their own perspective of their (good) tax governance. In this way, they would have an advantage in public debates concerning their tax practices.

There are also limits to transparency. First, full transparency harms the market if corporations should publicly disclose all of their operational information. At the same time, if only parts of the information are disclosed, it might present a false picture of corporate behaviour, which is also negative. Transparency refers, first of all, to public access to information, which is relevant for informed decision making for stakeholders.¹⁴⁵⁹ But, access to public data, as such, does not guarantee the same or agreed understanding of the content of such information. It should not be taken for granted that people will use the information they obtained to make rational judgments and decisions. Thus, disclosed information can be interpreted selectively.¹⁴⁶⁰ Therefore, as was explained in this section, both extrinsic and intrinsic elements of transparency are important. Extrinsically driven transparency sets minimum standards for disclosure rules. Corporations that wish to go beyond the law and rules, add an intrinsic layer and step into well-informed dialogue with their stakeholders in order to explore the societal acceptability lines of corporate tax behaviour.

6.4. Conclusion

Multinationals, whose responsibility with regard to good tax governance has been discussed throughout this research, should develop and live up to certain tax values that are also sufficient from the public perspective in terms of morality and fairness. This is a substantive part of good tax governance. To this end, multinationals could adopt a code of conduct concerning their tax values.¹⁴⁶¹ In order to understand and accept corporate behaviour, stakeholders need to know about corporate tax planning strategies and values. Therefore, a company that meets the substantive elements of good tax governance should also be transparent about it. Transparency should provide the parties in the debate with a more balanced view and pave the way for regulatory and political changes but also for the changes in the corporate mind-set. Moreover, transparency increases corporate accountability. Transparency on all fronts is one of the most important elements of a more

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¹⁴⁵⁷ Tschopp, D. J. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparison between the United States and the European Union. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 12 (1), 55-59. pp. 56-57.

¹⁴⁵⁸ See for instance, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, *Tax Contribution Report 2018*. p. 4. Retrieved from: https://reports.shell.com/tax-contribution-report/2018/servicepages/downloads/files/shell_tax_contribution_report_2018.pdf (accessed 17.03.2020).

Data on the contribution that large businesses make to the societies in which they operate are a precondition for an informed stakeholder dialogue. See, for instance EBTF/PwC. (2019). *Total Tax Contribution: A Study of the Largest Companies in the EU and EFTA*.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Fung, A. et al. (2008). *Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 24-25.

¹⁴⁶⁰ PwC. (2013). *Tax Strategy and Corporate Reputation—a Business Issue*. p. 8.

¹⁴⁶¹ See also chapter 6, section 2.3.

effective fight against international tax avoidance.¹⁴⁶² Transparency serves as a means to achieve good tax governance under the flagship of CSR.

In this chapter, the substantive and procedural elements of good tax governance were explained. A substantive approach focuses on the amount of tax that a company pays and asks whether this is more than is demanded by mere compliance with the letter of the law.¹⁴⁶³ In this sense, good tax governance adheres to the principle that tax follows business. In the other words, multinationals would pay taxes based on where the economic activities take place. In this way, a multinational exercising good tax governance competes fairly with other enterprises. For instance, the Responsible Tax Principles developed by the B Team are a good example of practical criteria for good tax governance. These principles provide some practical guidelines with regard to approach to tax management, relationships with others and reporting to stakeholders. However, corporations that wish to lean on these Principles should, in my opinion, adjust these principles to fit with their own business operations.

In order to implement good tax governance, multinationals could develop a tax code of conduct. Good tax governance stands for corporate tax planning practices that are in line with the corporation's CSR agenda; corporations that wish to pursue good tax governance pay a fair share and are transparent about it. The substantive part of good tax governance can be seen as ethical behaviour which is pursued as a goal in itself and the use of transparency as means to that end. Without information, no evaluation of the way power is exercised is possible.

The procedural element of good tax governance calls for transparency. It means that a multinational has developed internal tax values and a strategy that confirms the substantive element and communicates these values and strategy clearly both internally and externally. As a result, a multinational proves to its stakeholders that its tax governance is in order and under control. A procedural approach provides information on a company's tax strategy (a substantive part of good tax governance), for instance on how much corporate income tax it pays in all the countries it operates in. Transparency includes extrinsic and intrinsic drivers. An extrinsic motivation of transparency is to respond to various disclosure rules, such as mandatory transparency rules. Nevertheless, for true good tax governance, this alone is not enough. Intrinsic motivation aims at engaging in dialogue with the stakeholders by going beyond compliance with (legal) disclosure requirements and reporting obligations.¹⁴⁶⁴ Although transparency is not a panacea, it still is a precondition for accountability to the stakeholders. Decision-making procedures, strategies, principles, and their results should be transparent.

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¹⁴⁶² Nouwen, M. F. (2017). The European Code of Conduct Group Becomes Increasingly Important in the Fight against Tax Avoidance: More Openness and Transparency is Necessary. *Intertax* 45 (2), 138-149.

¹⁴⁶³ See chapter 3.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Gutmann, D. (2010). L'évasion fiscale des sociétés. *Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé* 62 (2), 533-551. pp. 546-547.

7. CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

International corporate tax planning and corporate social responsibility are topics that might not seem to have common ground at first sight. The aim of this research was to prove the contrary. This research addressed international corporate tax planning from various perspectives, such as regulation, ethics, business, and society.

International corporate tax planning is in the eye of a storm: the societal and political expectations in relation to corporate tax planning are changing. Not all forms of legal tax planning are considered (socially) legitimate anymore. Corporate tax planning is a complex issue: on the one hand, it is common corporate practice to keep costs low. On the other hand, corporations have to contribute to society and common goods by paying (corporate income) taxes as any other member of society. It goes without saying that it is the state's responsibility to ensure a fair tax system, however, the issue with the corporate tax practices now is that powerful multinationals are in position to potentially (ab)use the system by profiting from society without contributing to it. Having said that, it should be clear not all kinds of corporate tax practices are (socially) illegitimate *per se*.

Tax planning can be carried out in various forms, which are described with different terms. The legal literature differentiates mainly between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is in general not breaking (the letter of) the law while tax evasion clearly is. This research focused on tax planning activities that remain within the boundaries of the law, because illegal activities would need a different theoretical approach. Tax planning activities that remain within the law can be divided into a number of sub-categories based on a degree of social legitimacy, as this research pointed out. Focusing on the corporate decision-making process, categorizing tax planning activities was based on a corporate intention to minimize tax costs. The intention, as such, is often difficult to prove, especially in a legal context. This research pointed out some general indicators behind corporate tax planning activities that, for instance, are aimed at avoiding double taxation or that are used for profit maximization purposes. As a result, my categorization of legal tax planning activities differentiates between tax mitigation, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning. These concepts are also the most used in the international literature and rule making but there is no true consensus when defining these terms.

Even though all of the different kinds of behaviour described by these concepts are legal, not all of these practices are socially legitimate, because, in the case of tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, multinationals fail to contribute their fair share to society. According to the categorization in chapter 3, I defined the underlying terms for the purposes of this research as follows. Multinationals that are aware of the tax effects on their operations and avoid double taxation actively plan their taxes. A legitimate and socially responsible way to plan taxes is tax mitigation, where a corporation legitimately makes use of tax laws for tax planning purposes, for instance by making use of tax incentives in a transparent and consistent way. A step further from tax mitigation is tax avoidance, in which the taxpayer arranges his/her affairs within existing corporate structures with an intention to reduce his/her tax liability and, even though the arrangement could be strictly legal, it is usually considered to conflict with the intent of the law it purports to follow. Tax avoidance intentionally seeks gaps, mismatches, and other weaknesses in the (international) legal system for tax planning purposes, for instance by structuring transactions within the corporate group with a main intention to minimize corporate income tax. Multinationals that not only rearrange their existing business activities to achieve more beneficial tax treatment but take a step further by, for instance, setting up additional artificial entities that lack any economic or commercial justification can be considered aggressive tax planners. In the case of aggressive tax planning, a corporation intentionally makes use of the mismatches between the national laws at the international level, for instance by setting up ostensible business entities (usually in tax havens).

As a result of legal tax planning that is not always socially acceptable, discussions of morality have entered the picture. Taxes provide funds for governments to offer essential public goods and to

redistribute wealth among citizens. Taxation plays an important role in society; it supports societal cooperation and provides resources to finance essential public goods and services. Distributive justice and public goods are indispensable for a sustainable society. In other words, taxes enable the government to provide a (legal) framework for the functioning of society and the economy. Enforcing contracts for instance supports trust in markets without which corporations could not operate. Taxes also contribute to the well-being of corporations in other ways, as the state fosters innovation, encourages investment for sustainable growth, boosts worker productivity, and stimulates the efficient use of scarce resources. This is done with subsidies paid for by taxes but also by tax (dis)incentives, such as regulations regarding investments in R&D. Based on that, it can be said that taxation is an essential precondition for the sustainable development of society and markets.

Thus, taxes build a basis for a society. The obligation to pay taxes originates from the law, but in a society morality also guides individuals' behaviour. The legal system should codify public morality; however, it will never be able to do so exhaustively. Therefore, legal rules in a complex society inevitably leave room for different interpretations and choices with regard to the use of the system of tax rules. This suggests that, in case legal rules fall short, morality should fill the gap. Moreover, what is acceptable changes over time and is bound to cultural beliefs. This research linked morality to CSR, which can be seen as a tool for multinationals to balance conflicting interests in a moral way.

Some might believe that various other legal obligations, such as corporate governance rules, restrict corporations from opting for a moral business practices if it decreases shareholder value (in the short term). However, based on the analysis of corporate governance in this research, I am convinced that, as long as managers act in the best interests of the corporation, they do not breach their fiduciary duty when engaging in good tax governance. Furthermore, companies that have already taken on the responsibility to engage in CSR should not claim that they behave responsibly while minimizing their tax obligations. This research argued that socially responsible corporations should engage in good tax governance, which consists of substantive (paying fair share; developing tax codes of conduct) and procedural (transparency) elements.

This concluding chapter provides a brief summary of this research (section 2). Following that, in section 3, the most important findings and answers to the research questions will be summarized. Section 4 sheds some light on the practical implications of good tax governance and the last section makes suggestions for further research.

7.2. Summary

This research was divided into three main pillars. These pillars represent tax planning, corporate social responsibility, and corporate governance and decision making. The aim of these three main pillars was to understand the complex nature of all of these separate areas and to find common grounds for developing a concept of good tax governance.

This research was structured as follows. First, in chapter 2 the concept of a multinational corporation was discussed. Since this research focused on the current debate on (aggressive) tax planning (and avoidance) from the perspective of a multinational, it was necessary to clarify what is understood under the concept of multinational. Next, in chapter 3 another crucial element of this research – tax planning – was analyzed. The concept of tax planning and its various possible degrees based on morality and social acceptability were discussed. Following, chapter 4 focused the third important concept underlying this research: corporate social responsibility. Chapter 5 aimed at bringing together the legal and social responsibilities of corporate boards from corporate law and culture perspectives. Therefore, the underlying principles of corporate governance were analyzed. All of these steps were necessary in order to understand what socially responsible corporations should and could do with regard to socially responsible, good tax governance (chapter 6). The following subsections will provide a brief summary of these chapters.

7.2.1. Multinational corporations and moral responsibility

International tax planning has become an increasingly important topic in the last few decades in the corporate world. To a large extent it is because the way of doing business has changed. Most importantly, the amount and size of cross-border commercial activities has increased. Multinationals have countless possibilities to reduce business costs but, at the same time, they also operate in highly competitive markets. Such possibilities combined with the necessity to constantly improve and grow also means that some corporations have started seeing tax, or more specifically flaws in the tax systems, as an opportunity to reduce costs and increase wealth. As a response to that, various global developments have accelerated the demand for a fair tax balance and the need for transparency. Consequently, corporate actions are visible to the wider public. A large amount of publicly available information allows the wider public to debate upon issues related to corporate actions but also to demand accountability. Increasing negative attention on multinationals has resulted in a decrease of public trust in corporations, which in turn has a negative impact on corporate reputation.

Tax planning at some point has a negative effect on the society and economy, because it leads to unfairness and distortions of fair play. The current public debate with regard to corporate tax planning focuses mostly on the profit-driven behaviour of multinationals, often forgetting that flaws in the tax system are also created by diverging tax systems, a lack of coordination and regulatory competition between the states. Only accusing multinationals of misbehaviour in this context is unbalanced, in my opinion. Therefore, in this research, the topic of corporate tax planning was approached from the perspective of a corporation, more specifically a multinational corporation, rather than for instance the state or (international) regulation.

Chapter 2 of this research explained the core characteristics of a multinational corporation, as used in this research. In this chapter, I defined a corporation as a separate entity controlled by its managers and not, for example, as the sum of its owners nor as an extension of the state. Therefore, a corporation, as discussed within this research, is a distinct legal person with rights independent from the rights of the individual stakeholders. Moreover, as a part of society and as an institution that can make (moral) choices, a corporation was considered to have moral agency. A multinational is in this research, a large stock-listed company that consists of different establishments operating under different national and international laws and regulations. Such a multinational consists of a parent company located in the home country and at least one or more foreign subsidiaries, typically with a high degree of strategic interaction among the units.

Morality addresses not only the question of how one ought to live as an individual, but also how individuals interact with other individuals. Being part of a society entails moral rights and obligations. A society consists of individuals and organizations, which also includes businesses. Like individuals, businesses interact with other members of society and thus affect others and benefit from their actions. Companies benefit from society at large, from many kinds of public goods funded by taxes. Therefore, corporations are expected to contribute to society, because they are moral agents that can make (im)moral choices with regard to tax planning. The question of morality and fairness is, namely, about how multinationals behave, what kind decisions corporate board take, in relation to the societies in which they operate. Multinationals that voluntarily accept either social or moral responsibilities towards the societies in which they operate were conceptualized in this research as CSR corporations.

Also, the specific position of multinationals with regard to tax planning was discussed in this chapter. A multinational corporation, namely, differs from a national corporation and also from small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), because it operates in several jurisdictions. Multinationals are corporations that consist of various subsidiaries and that, as compared to SMEs, in general, have less specific national identification, despite the fact that – in a legal sense – they do have a home country. It was further explained that, for the purposes of this research, a multinational, as such, is considered as one entity, even though it consists of a group of corporate entities. A multinational has the possibility to set up these separate entities in different jurisdictions

for tax planning purposes, which has been one of the crucial characteristics in the context of this research.

The special characteristics and possibilities multinationals possess also allow them to enjoy a specific kind of corporate power that is distinct from most individuals and SMEs. The special character of multinationals allows them to operate on a global level where, with regard to certain (tax and corporate) rules, there often exists a situation that is close to a regulatory vacuum. For instance, some multinationals have started using mismatching national tax laws to extremes by using their corporate power. Therefore, in the case of tax planning, multinationals can enjoy power that even overrules state power. With regard to tax planning multinationals possess multidimensional corporate power, which consists of corporate lobbying power, extensive knowledge and a strong negotiation position, and global mobility. Consequently, the corporate power of multinationals puts them in positions in which they have the possibility to make (im)moral choices.

To keep multinationals accountable towards the societies in which they operate, the need for transparency arises. Transparency is necessary to enable stakeholders and society to keep corporations accountable for their actions and to reflect on their own decisions and direct them towards moral choices. If multinationals abuse their corporate power or do not meet their responsibilities towards society in other ways, they may face several corporate risks. One of the most relevant in the context of this research was the risk to their reputation. Reputation reflects stakeholder trust in corporation and its actions. Trust is the foundation of every relationship – both business and personal. In order to understand what kind of corporate tax behaviour is socially illegitimate, chapter 3 further focused on the concept of tax planning.

7.2.2. The social legitimacy of tax planning under question

In recent years, several multinationals, such as Starbucks, Google, Apple, and Amazon, have been questioned about their tax planning strategies in the different states in which they operate. It led to many heated discussions among tax professionals as well as non-professionals. Chapter 3 of this research focused on the concept of tax planning and showed how complicated the issue is concerning the various degrees of tax planning, such as tax mitigation, international corporate tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning. This chapter discussed the role of taxation in society. Thereby, the functions as well as the moral element of taxes and the concept of the much debated ‘fair share’ were explained. Various concepts of tax planning used within this research were explained for the purpose of this research and a tax planning legitimacy continuum was developed in order to illustrate the scale on which the societal acceptability of tax planning could be evaluated. It was argued that, at some point, the morality of corporate legal tax planning can be questioned; nevertheless, not all kinds of tax planning is immoral *per se*. The aim of this chapter was to clarify the different aspects of the tax planning debate in order to understand the tension between socially responsible and irresponsible international corporate tax planning practices. Corporate tax planning is, namely, not only a matter of strict compliance with the law, but it also has political, economic, and moral dimensions. Therefore, discussions around tax planning are complex and contain ethical nuances that should not be ignored.

Most importantly, taxes provide funds for governments to offer essential public goods and to redistribute wealth among citizens. The obligation to pay taxes is a natural obligation which the legislature lays down in the law, in order to enhance certainty and legal equality and make it enforceable. Taxpayers’ rights and obligations are laid down in a system of legal rules that support and organize life in a society. Next to the legal system, morality also guides individuals’ behaviour. The legal system should codify public morality; however, it will never be able to do so exhaustively. Therefore, legal rules in a complex society inevitably leave room for different choices with regard to the use of the system of tax rules. This suggests that if written legal rules evidently fall short in codifying ethics, morality should fill the gap. Morality requires the members of society to make certain value judgements and behave justly or fairly when making choices. Tax

planning that evidently does not meet the moral and societal norms results in public outrage, which suggests that such tax planning eliminates paying a fair share towards society or societies. Having said that, it is not entirely clear what exactly this fair share of tax is that corporations should contribute.

In general, it is a task of the lawmaker to strive for the best legal system that does not leave much room for wishful interpretation. However, a perfect system is impossible. In the case of international corporate tax planning, multinationals have choices concerning how they interpret the law (whether it deviates from the spirit of the law or not) and, as a result, to what extent they contribute in the societies in which they operate. In addition, the international context of corporate tax planning complicates the national legislators' opportunities to reduce the gap between the letter and the spirit of the law because of different interests or possibilities of states. In other words, tax competition between the states creates tax planning opportunities, and at the same time corporate tax planning leads to the tax competition between the states. This suggests that multinationals also have a moral responsibility to pay their fair share, to (morally) account for their choices. For the context of this research, the concept of fair share can be summarized as reflecting whether multinationals contribute a part to public goods and services without free-riding.

Every taxpayer plans taxes, to a certain extent, whether this is intentional or not. Taxpayers have the right to structure their affairs to achieve a favorable tax treatment within the limits set by law. Tax planning is a legal way to take into account the tax effects of various laws and rules and adapt ones' actions accordingly. Tax planning is a concept which is used to describe the interpretation and application of legal rules in order to mitigate one's tax burden or avoid double taxation. Contrary to tax evasion, tax planning is legal in its various forms; it stays within the framework of the law. Tax planning is, nevertheless, a complex topic with many nuances, varying from legitimate tax planning responding to tax incentives to illegitimate tax planning abusing tax laws and paying an unfair share. Chapter 3 of this research focused on such issues and built a research framework by analyzing the state of the art of different concepts used to express various degrees of tax planning. Tax planning can be seen as a matter of degree, which, at a certain level, becomes socially unacceptable.

The first degree of tax planning is tax mitigation: a form of tax planning that makes a legitimate use of tax incentives created by the states and differences in the tax systems. Tax mitigation, for instance, complies with the tax legislation of the countries in which corporations operate and pay the right amount of tax at the right time by making use of tax incentives without allowing such incentives to become the main driver for structuring transactions. Tax mitigation can, however, easily change from legal and legitimate tax planning to legal tax planning, the social legitimacy of which is questionable and results in tax avoidance. In case of tax avoidance corporations intentionally structure their transactions within the existing business operations with a main aim to minimize corporate income tax.

Some multinationals even take a step further and create artificial possibilities, such as new artificial entities in tax havens, to reduce the possible tax effects of various rules by engaging in aggressive tax planning. Both tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning include a moral judgement, which has given grounds for public outrage. Aggressive tax planning is not a legal term, but it suggests that there is a corporate behaviour in tax planning matters that raises public concern. It is another strictly legal yet socially illegitimate form of tax planning in which corporations intentionally eliminate their moral responsibilities towards society.

Tax planning should, at a minimum, comply with the law. This implies that the state bears the primary responsibility for good regulation, but that is not an exclusive responsibility. Nowadays, more is expected from multinationals, especially from the multinationals that present themselves as good corporate citizens. Also, the current works of the OECD and the EU with regard to fighting aggressive tax planning were discussed briefly in this chapter to illustrate the regulatory context of the fast-changing international tax law. Despite the fact that concepts such as a fair share or the spirit of the law, that are often used in tax planning debates or complex international regulations, do not offer much guidance or content for business practice, corporations are expected to react to

the societal disapproval of their behaviour. International corporate tax practice is in desperate need of moral reflection, because the existing international tax system does not seem to be able prevent aggressive tax planning (yet). Next to legality, nowadays legitimacy is also expected with regard to tax planning. Thus, it is up to companies how they interpret the laws. In theory, corporations have the freedom to interpret tax laws even in a way that their tax planning strategies could be categorized as aggressive tax planning.

Requiring multinationals to take responsibility does not suggest that corporations have to act as ideal or even altruistic corporate citizens. In other words, this research did not propose that multinationals are expected to fully abstain from their right to plan taxes; it is acceptable – often even required for the interests of the company – to plan and mitigate taxes as long as the corporation can explain and defend it. At the same time, the multinationals that have voluntarily claimed that they take corporate social responsibilities (CSR) seriously, have accepted moral responsibility towards society. The society has a right to call for moral accountability and CSR companies have accepted to provide it; in my opinion, this should also apply to corporate tax practices. Some multinationals engaging in aggressive tax planning practices do not seem to respect this and that is what makes tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning problematic. Consequently, corporations should balance between profit making and moral responsibilities. With regard to tax planning, there is no black and white answer as to what kind of behaviour is acceptable and what not.

Chapter 3 concluded that, despite the very important accomplishments on the international regulatory level (such as OECD BEPS and EU ATAD), there is still a governance vacuum at the global level. The international system is imperfect, which leaves multinationals possibilities for ‘going beyond the law’. Moreover, the fact that tax avoidance has explicitly received growing attention (especially after the financial crisis) suggests a strong link between taxation, tax avoidance, and society. Therefore, this shows the necessity to consider corporate tax practices in relation to CSR, which was the focus-point of chapter 4 of this research.

7.2.3. Corporate social responsibility and its application to tax

The fourth chapter of this research zoomed in on companies that explicitly endorse moral responsibilities towards society. Thus, the focus moved further to corporate behaviour beyond compliance with the letter of the law, towards the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR nowadays belongs to every-day business practices. Many companies claim to have integrated social responsibility strategies. Yet, the concrete meaning of such corporate responsibilities is often unclear, especially in the context of taxation. Furthermore, it is open to debate whether companies are actually engaging in CSR or just use it to build a better reputation. Some multinationals, such as Starbucks, claim to endorse CSR but, at the same time, they also use complex aggressive tax planning schemes to minimize their tax burden. Such corporate behaviour puts the moral responsibilities of corporations into question. This research examined these questions in the context of tax planning. Taxes are important contributions towards society, which was argued to be sufficient ground to consider paying taxes as a part of CSR. CSR highlights moral concerns of the society in situations where other solutions fall short.

In order to better understand the extent of corporate moral responsibilities beyond profit maximization, this chapter focused on the societal expectations on corporations beyond the strict legal obligations. Based on the analysis of the expectations (moral and legal) on multinationals with regard to CSR, the aim of this chapter was to understand whether corporate tax practices should be considered under CSR. This chapter first explored the underlying reasons for the development of CSR from practice. It was explained that CSR entails going beyond mere compliance with the law. However, as it is usually difficult to agree upon what an ideal good (corporate) citizen should do, this chapter shed also light on the other end, the counterpart of CSR, corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). CSR and CSI were, similar to tax planning, illustrated in a continuum developed by Tench et al.. This continuum presents CSI as having a finite endpoint, whereas CSR is infinitely scalable. That is because CSI can have a concrete definition (e.g. illegal acts), while

CSR is an aspirational ideal that leaves room for various corporate activities. The starting point of this continuum is illegal activities that are clearly socially irresponsible. Further, this continuum presents that not all kinds of legal behaviours are necessarily socially responsible, since, next to legal norms, there are also moral norms in a society. Corporations are part of a social contract and are, in my opinion, therefore also subject to the underlying moral norms of society. CSR is an ideal to strive for and keeping away from CSI can be seen as a practical starting point for responsible corporations.

In order to give more content to the aspirational ideal of CSR, this chapter analyzed Carroll's CSR theory. This theory implies that, next to economic and legal responsibilities, corporations also have ethical responsibilities which go beyond the legal and economic responsibilities. CSR corporations have accepted the bottom line of CSR, which expects corporations to go beyond pure compliance with the law. The basic element of Carroll's CSR theory, that socially responsible corporations accept their responsibilities beyond the pure compliance with the letter of the law, provided a theoretical framework for understanding CSR in this research. It is important to note that the understanding that CSR corporations go beyond pure compliance with the letter of the law does not imply that ethical responsibilities should replace legal ones but rather they exist in addition to legal responsibilities. It means that not all kinds of legal behaviour is automatically morally responsible. Corporations have a social role. Not only from a societal but also a regulatory perspective, there are clear expectations on corporations; yet, some corporate actions cannot be restricted by the law but are still not acceptable by society. They are legal but illegitimate. As a consequence, socially responsible behaviour is not purely voluntary, because there is a lot of social pressure for corporate moral accountability. Having said that, corporations are left with wide discretion to decide upon the content and extent of such responsibilities. This can be seen as a space between corporate CSR and CSI. Clarifying what a corporation should not do probably adds to the effectiveness of CSR; clarity about what not to do may be more effective as guidance to convince businesses to take action than a prescriptive approach. Corporations are expected to take responsibility and accept accountability for their actions, to stay away from CSI and engage in CSR. In other words, CSR is a tool for stakeholders to keep corporations accountable for their corporate power, but also a tool for corporations to endorse and prove corporate moral responsibility where legal systems fall short. Conceptualizing CSR as an ideal also means that it faces various challenges and limitations that were discussed in chapter 4. Corporations, namely, have to manage the conflicting interests of various stakeholders with regard to CSR. As a result of many conflicting interests, corporations can have various drivers to engage in CSR, which were also introduced in this chapter. Engaging in CSR can be driven by intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motives are a characteristic of an integrity-based approach, where corporations are driven by morality next to the economic performance (profits) and compliance with the law. Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, indicates that a corporation behaves in a certain way because of some (external) reward, coercion or a desire to avoid penalties or a bad reputation. In terms of extrinsic motivation, CSR serves the corporate business strategy. This would be the instrumental use of CSR. CSR actions can be attributed to both intrinsic and extrinsic motives at the same time.

Furthermore, there are different opinions possible with regard to the moral responsibilities of business: the stakeholder view and shareholder view. According to the shareholder value maximization view, the only responsibility of a company comes down to operating within the framework of the law with minimal ethical constraints. The stakeholder perspective, on the other hand, stresses that corporations should behave ethically above law, taking account of certain moral responsibilities towards the society in which they operate. Both views imply different expectations on corporations with regard to CSR. Corporate boards do not only need to balance the different interests of shareholders and stakeholders in general, but also the conflicting interests within these groups. This leaves corporations with difficult choices. In addition, corporations face a challenge defining the nature of CSR. Societal expectations of CSR corporations change together with the developments in business practices. Such a dynamic nature of CSR also clarifies why taxation is increasingly discussed in the context of CSR.

I concluded in chapter 4 that taxation can be considered an independent category of CSR, since, in the case of aggressive tax planning or tax avoidance, corporations can use their corporate power to ignore the laws and harm the societies in which they operate. In this research combining CSR and tax promotes the idea that certain members of society should not be earning unfair profits at the expense of society. CSR is a tool for corporations to show how they deal with the insufficiencies of public governance systems with regard to problems related to corporate moral responsibility towards society. This does not mean that corporations should forget their economic responsibilities, as moral behaviour does not require denying one's own personal needs and aspirations. A corporate management board should act in the best interests of the company. The best interest of the company is long-term financial stability, which is dependent on corporate reputation among its shareholders as well as stakeholders. The question is whether these best interests are in conflict with shareholder value maximization. In order to analyze such corporate obligations and their relationship to taxation and CSR, chapter 5 focused on corporate governance theories and practices.

7.2.4. Good tax governance and corporate governance: conflicting interests?

Multinationals are complex entities with multidimensional layers of decision-making processes that need to balance conflicting interests. Taxation poses various challenges for corporate decision making. On the one hand, taxes are considered a cost that should be kept low in order to keep some stakeholders, such as shareholders, satisfied. On the other hand, taxes are a crucial contribution to society and, by avoiding their tax liabilities, corporations fail to account for the other stakeholders, such as society at large. For corporations that have chosen to endorse CSR, the second perspective should prevail. However, in order to prove that, chapter 5 analyzed some underlying principles of corporate law in order to understand whether some corporate governance rules could possibly restrict corporate managers considering tax as a part of CSR.

The central subject of this chapter was corporate governance, the third main pillar of this research. This chapter first explained the background of the importance of CG with regard to the corporate tax planning debate that is central for this research. The concept of CG and one of the key concepts of CG – fiduciary duty – were explained. Corporate governance refers to the way power is distributed within a corporation and to the decision-making process with regard to the use of this power. It is sets of rules and principles for how a (large) company should be regulated and managed. Among corporate law scholars, there are two prevailing theories when addressing the essence of a corporation. These theories, which reflect upon to whom corporations should be responsible and accountable, are shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. Based on these CG theories, chapter 5 focused on the question: can multinationals that have committed themselves to ethical business making, for instance in the form of CSR, also opt for good tax governance?

In order to answer this question, chapter 5 briefly compared different CG regimes to understand whether and what kind of limits they could possibly pose for good tax governance. The focus was on the conflicting interests of various corporate stakeholders and their relevance from the CG perspective. Therefore, the comparison was based on the 'market-oriented' Anglo-Saxon model (shareholder model) and the 'network-oriented' Rhineland model (stakeholder model) of corporate governance. These models illustrate two diverging regulatory approaches towards stakeholders and shareholders in company management. Based on four corporate law jurisdictions (the UK, US, Germany and the Netherlands) it was shown that corporate boards in all jurisdictions have exclusive discretion to decide upon the corporate strategy, under which also CSR falls, and upon the corporate tax strategy. Therefore, from the corporate law perspective, corporate boards have sufficient discretion to opt for good tax governance.

It is the responsibility of corporate managers to ensure that corporate legal obligations are met. The responsibility to operate in the best interests of the shareholders sometimes even seems to override the interests of other stakeholders, which is at the centre of CSR. In chapter 5, I concluded that corporate managers should foremost act in the best long-term interests of the company. Choosing the right tax strategy is also a task of corporate management. Corporate management has to follow

the applicable laws but, at the same time, they also have the freedom to opt for good tax governance. Furthermore, balancing between shareholder and stakeholder approaches, in practice, is not an exact science. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, I concluded in chapter 5 that the main conflict between the two approaches lies in prioritizing conflicting interests: shareholder theory prioritizes the economic interests of the company, while stakeholder theory sets society above or on a equal level with pure economic interests. The connecting factor between both approaches is that corporate boards should foremost be acting in the long-term best interests of the company. Without a doubt, financial performance is crucial for the best long-term interests of the company. Furthermore, a financially healthy corporation can add more value to a society than a corporation that performs poorly with regard to its economic responsibilities. Therefore, corporate boards should balance between being profitable and being socially responsible. Having said that, the aspirational idea of accepting ethical obligations beyond compliance with the law is quite ambiguous.

Corporate boards that act in the best interests of the company take into account the interests of various stakeholders and balance those with the interests of the company and shareholders. This is the discretion that corporate managers have in their decision making. Therefore, to a certain extent, corporate boards are free to decide how aggressive or responsible the company should be in relation to the societies in which they operate. In order to understand the freedom that corporate boards have better, in this chapter, I proposed that the concept of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) might be a helpful tool for corporations. CSI is namely a concept that represents decisions that responsible companies should not make. Aggressive tax planning has been suggested as a familiar example of irresponsible corporate behaviour, because it exploits negative externalities. It is quite clear that corporate boards that operate in the framework of CSI are not acting in the best interests of the company. Taking risks is a usual business practice and aggressive tax planning might bring considerable short-term gains. However, at the same time, aggressive tax planning (or, indeed, tax avoidance) brings certain risks, such as reputation damage. In order not to risk failing to act in the best long-term interests of the company, CSR corporations should engage in good tax governance.

7.2.5. Good tax governance

The final aim of this research was to conceptualize good tax governance and provide some guiding principles that could serve as the foundation for developing a framework for a code of conduct for good tax governance. Three main frameworks studied in the preceeding chapters formed a basis for conceptualizing good tax governance. First, studying tax planning provided the understanding on the central topic of the international tax debates and alleged problems. Second, analyzing corporate social responsibility provided a basis for exploring possibilities for combining tax and CSR. Third, studying CG was necessary to understand whether good tax governance could be applied in practice; whether and to what extent could CG regimes pose restrictions in binding corporate tax and CSR as a form of good tax governance. All pillars were fundamental building blocks for good tax governance. In chapter 6 of this research, I provided my perspective on good tax governance. In light of recent developments, all corporations should reflect upon their tax planning practices and choose their position in this matter; if necessary, they might need to reconsider some of their practices. This might have certain short-term economic consequences, but it is not in conflict with the best long-term interests of the company. Despite the understanding that corporations should be run to maximize profit and exclusively increase shareholders' value that still might prevail in the business world, corporate boards have sufficient freedom to consider tax planning under the umbrella of CSR (based on the board supremacy or business judgement rule principles). Even Friedman, whose statements are often interpreted as supporting the absolute opposite to businesses having social responsibilities, leaves room for corporations to engage in practices that take the interests of stakeholders into account and not solely those of shareholders in order to advance the long-term interests of the firm. As a result of the analysis, in chapter 5, I showed that, in my opinion, corporations' (legal) excuse for supporting aggressive tax planning is weak. Furthermore,

companies that have already voluntarily taken on the responsibility to engage in CSR should not claim that they behave responsibly while minimizing their tax obligations to the bare minimum. Multinationals presenting themselves as corporations that operate according to socially responsible values should also apply these values in their tax planning practices. In other words, socially responsible corporations should engage in good tax governance. Good tax governance can be seen as a tool that helps corporations to be consistent with regard to their tax planning strategies internally and also to communicate them properly externally. In this research, good tax governance refers to the ethical dimension of tax governance. From the business practice perspective, however, the words such as *good*, *ethical*, or *moral* are often vague and do not provide sufficient guidelines nor a normative framework for a sound business practice. Therefore, in chapter 6, such terms were fleshed out in order to provide a more concrete content for good tax governance. I argued that, with regard to tax planning, the notion of going beyond compliance consists of two layers, one substantive and the other procedural. The substantive element of good tax governance requires ethical decision making and developing tax values. The procedural element means being open about the tax values and strategies of a corporation. Good – socially responsible – tax governance entails both.

With regard to the substantive layer, based on Carroll's CSR Pyramid, socially responsible companies need to take into account ethical considerations in addition to legal and economic considerations when defining and implementing a business strategy and making tax-related decisions. Socially responsible multinationals should develop and live up to certain tax values that are also sufficient from the public perspective in terms of morality and fairness. Such tax values could for instance be: openly considering tax as a part of CSR, paying corporate income taxes in the countries where the value is created, using only business structures that are driven by commercial considerations, use of tax incentives without allowing such incentives to become the main driver for structuring transactions, and being transparent about the corporate approach to tax and corporate income taxes paid.

The procedural layer of good tax governance involves the principle of transparency and thereby going beyond compliance with legal reporting obligations. In terms of good tax governance, accountability concerns both the process and outcome; thus, the substantive and procedural elements. Corporations that claim to be socially responsible should pay their fair share of tax (or at least not unfair), and they should be open and willing to discuss their tax planning strategy and practice. Good tax governance goes beyond a mere cost-benefit analysis aimed at achieving high returns on shareholders; it takes a broader perspective on the effects that a corporation's tax planning practices can have. Good tax governance stays (at least) away from socially irresponsible behavior.

In other words, good tax governance requires that multinationals develop a corporate tax strategy that is in accordance with the overall corporate values, such as those set out in codes of conduct. This strategy should be communicated to internal and external stakeholders (transparency). Furthermore, such a strategy should be monitored, evaluated and, where necessary, adjusted over time. Good tax governance stands for corporate tax planning practices that are in line with the corporation's CSR agenda; corporations that wish to pursue good tax governance pay a fair share and are transparent about it. Substantive part of good tax governance is ethical behaviour, as a goal in itself, and transparency as means to that end. Without information, no evaluation of the way power is exercised is possible.

Transparency includes extrinsic and intrinsic drivers, as was explained. The extrinsic motivation of transparency is to respond to various disclosure rules. Nevertheless, for true good tax governance, this alone is not enough. Intrinsic motivation aims at engaging in dialogue with the stakeholders by going beyond compliance with (legal) disclosure requirements and reporting obligations. Although transparency is not a panacea, it is still a precondition for accountability to the people. Decision-making procedures and their results should be transparent.

7.3. Findings

Based on the analysis of tax planning, CSR and CG, I concluded that taxation is a part of corporate ethical responsibilities towards society and that corporate law leaves sufficient discretion for corporate boards to opt for good tax governance. In line with this, the research questions, posed in the first chapter of this research, can be answered. The main research question of this dissertation read as follows:

How can multinationals opt for socially responsible tax governance while meeting company law requirements?

Based on the discussions in this research and on the sub-questions (divided according to the pillars of this research), the answer to this question can be summarized as follows: good tax governance means that multinationals set their tax values and do not act as irresponsible (substantive element), and are transparent about them (procedural element). Engaging in dialogue with their stakeholders about their tax values allows corporations to better understand what the society expects from corporations (but also, for example, to improve their reputation among various stakeholders), which in turn is in the best long-term interests of the company. Moreover, by contributing fair share of taxes, corporations invest in a stable and well-functioning system of public goods and services, which is important for corporations to mitigate unnecessary risks.

More specifically, the sub-questions can be answered as follows:

1. Tax planning: What kind of tax planning is (not) socially responsible?

As laws are imperfect, the letter of the law can be interpreted in a way that it violates the spirit of the law.¹⁴⁶⁵ Especially multinationals that enjoy corporate power are in a position to circumvent the rules.¹⁴⁶⁶ In general, it is a task of the lawmaker to strive for the best legal system that does not leave much room for (wishful) interpretation. However, as argued through this research, a perfect system is impossible. In the case of international corporate tax planning, multinationals have choices concerning how they interpret the law (whether they deviate from the spirit of the law or not) and, as a result, to what extent they contribute to the societies in which they operate. In addition, the international context of corporate tax planning complicates the national legislators' opportunities to reduce the gap between the letter and the spirit of the law, because of different interests or possibilities of states. This difficult situation suggests that, in order to respond to public outcry, multinationals also have a moral responsibility to pay their fair share, to (morally) account for their choices.

Due to various justified standpoints, it is difficult to agree on what is fair and what exactly complies with the spirit of the law; it is easier to start with what is evidently unfair. In this research, the concept of 'fair share' refers to corporate tax practices that aim at going beyond strict compliance with the letter of the law. Moral corporate behaviour with regard to tax planning is an active attitude towards aiming at paying a fair share while staying away from evidently unfair behaviour. In other words, the concept of a fair share reflects whether multinationals contribute a part to public goods and services without free-riding. Having said that, I do not agree that all kinds of tax planning is immoral, *per se*, as the tax planning continuum in chapter 3 also illustrated. Based on (business) ethics, it can, however, be argued that a certain kind of tax planning, such as tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, is socially irresponsible. The societal issue with regard to international corporate tax planning in general is that multinationals that are part of society are in a position to eliminate their moral responsibilities towards the societies in which they operate and free ride on societal goods and services funded by other taxpayers.

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¹⁴⁶⁵ Chapter 3.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Chapter 2.

2. Tax planning and CSR: How does tax planning fit in the context of CSR?

In chapter 4, I argued that two basic premises of CSR are that corporations are part of society and have moral agency. Based on Carroll's CSR Pyramid, I explained that the core of business practices entails that corporations pursue their economic missions within the framework of the law. CSR, however, also requires ethical responsibilities in addition to these economic and legal responsibilities. The ethical responsibilities of a company go beyond the law and profit making and embody these standards, norms or expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders, and the community regard as fair, just, or moral. Ethical responsibilities are seen as the corporate moral obligation to do what is right, just and fair.

From a CSR perspective, organizations are, thus, (morally) accountable for their actions towards the societies in which they operate. In chapter 2, I argued that, to be successful, corporations need a social license to operate from the local communities, which increases corporate social legitimacy. Consequently, this reflects the trust stakeholders have in a corporation. In case businesses do not use their corporate power responsibly, they lose such social legitimacy and also risk reputation damage. In other words, corporations engage in CSR to receive and maintain their social legitimacy to operate.

In chapter 4, I presented various reasons why tax planning should be part of CSR. Foremost, similar to other CSR domains, such as human rights and environment, with regard to tax planning, multinationals have power that allows them to abuse the legal vacuum that exists on the global level. CSR is a tool that allows stakeholders to hold corporations accountable for corporate actions in case the legal vacuum or imperfections leave room to engage in strictly legal but socially illegitimate corporate behaviour. Behaving in a moral way ensures that multinationals do not harm or free ride at the cost of the societies in which they operate. In addition, irresponsible corporate tax practices (indirectly) undermine CSR in other fields.¹⁴⁶⁷ In other words, CSR limits the possibility of powerful multinationals to eliminate their moral responsibilities towards the societies in which they operate and free ride on societal goods and services funded by other taxpayers.

3. Good tax governance and corporate governance: What are possible CG challenges corporations face (internally and externally) when trying to fit their tax planning strategies into their CSR policy?

In chapter 5 I identified a possible challenge corporations face when trying to fit their tax planning strategies into their CSR policy. This challenge entails that corporate responsibilities in Anglo-Saxon CG cultures (especially the supposed responsibility to maximize shareholder value) might be so strong that corporate managers are not in a position to opt for good tax governance. For instance, some businesses protect their very aggressive tax planning practices by arguing that they cannot opt for less aggressive tax planning due to their legal obligations towards shareholders (profit maximization). My aim in this research was to find out whether that really is a correct and justified argument. Based on a brief analysis of the UK, US, Germany and the Netherlands corporate laws I illustrated that corporate boards in both, Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland model jurisdictions have exclusive discretion to decide upon the corporate strategy. Such corporate strategy includes also CSR. Moreover, corporate boards are obliged to choose the right corporate tax strategy. Therefore, from the corporate law perspective, corporate boards have sufficient discretion to opt for good tax governance.

In this chapter I also presented examples of how the Rhineland model of CG encourages corporate boards to consider a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests than only the interests of shareholders. I further showed that it is true that the Anglo-Saxon model of GG culture prioritizes shareholders interests. Having said that, for instance, the US CG regime (the largest corporate law regime that

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¹⁴⁶⁷ See chapter 4, section 5.1.

is based on Anglo-Saxon roots) does not restrict corporate boards from considering a wider spectrum of stakeholder interests, as long as it is in the best interests of the company. For example, a recent statement of the Business Roundtable also confirmed that.¹⁴⁶⁸

I showed that, even though the Anglo-Saxon CG regime does prioritize shareholder interests above the larger group of stakeholders, it does not exclude good tax governance entirely. Both CG regimes (Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland) require corporate managers to act in the best long-term interests of a corporation in the first place. Thus, in order to understand whether corporate managers have discretion to opt for good tax governance also under a regime that prioritizes shareholder value maximization as opposed to a larger group of stakeholders, it was necessary to prove that good tax governance is in the best interests of the company. As I argued in chapter 5, it is difficult to generalize what exactly is in the best interests of the company.¹⁴⁶⁹ Having said that, the changing nature of how corporate tax planning is perceived and publicly debated allows one to conclude that aggressive tax planning brings with it the risk of getting a bad reputation and losing social legitimacy, which definitely is not in the best interests of the company. Furthermore, it was explained that a growing group of shareholders value CSR in various forms of corporate operations. In chapters 2 and 3, I illustrated that the existence of public goods and services, but also other functions of taxes, are the basis for an equal and stable society, which is integral to a successful business. In chapter 2, I explained in more detail how companies benefit from society and state and how, by paying their fair share of taxes, corporations are indirectly managing certain fundamental risks. Based on these arguments, I conclude that good tax governance is in the best long-term interests of the company.

There are many issues related to CG that this research did not discuss or solve. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, I showed that various CG approaches, in principle, leave freedom for corporate managers to opt for good tax governance. Naturally, corporate decision making cannot satisfy all of the conflicting interests of various stakeholders and shareholders. Corporate boards should balance various interests and create value fairly. Needless to say, this does not suggest that the corporate managerial power should be increased. CSR that expects corporations to consider larger groups of stakeholders affects corporate decision making from an external perspective, while CG rules affect it from the internal perspective. A successful company should balance both. Corporate boards foremost need to act in the best interests of the company and not only in their own interests or shareholders' or nonshareholder stakeholders' interests. The analysis in chapter 5 confirmed that good tax governance is a possible tool to allow multinationals to prove their moral tax planning behaviour.

4. Good tax governance: What is good tax governance and how can multinationals opt for good tax governance?

In chapter 3 I agreed that corporations have a right to choose the most effective way, as long as it is within the law. However, corporations that value their social licence to operate and aim to morally account for their tax behaviour (chapter 2) should engage in good tax governance (chapter 6). In chapter 4 I conceptualized corporate tax planning that is in line with corporations CSR agenda as good tax governance. In chapter 6, I explained that good tax governance consists of two layers: substantive and procedural. The substantive element of good tax governance requires ethical decision making and developing tax values. The procedural element means being open about the tax values and strategies of a corporation. Good – socially responsible – tax governance entails both. In chapter 6 I suggested that corporations that wish to engage in good tax governance should first think of their corporate tax values and develop a tax code of conduct. Following, corporations should be transparent about their tax values and engage in a dialogue with its internal and external stakeholders in order to reach commonly accepted standards with regard to good tax governance.

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¹⁴⁶⁸ The statement of Business Roundtable (April 2019), however, seems to suggest that there is a convergence more towards the stakeholder model. See The Business Roundtable. (2019, April 19). *Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation*.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Chapter 5, section 4.2.

Accordingly, this research concluded that companies that claim to be socially responsible should impose restrictions on themselves with some kind of social norms. Therefore, multinationals that claim to be CSR companies should have more transparent tax planning systems and they should not avoid paying taxes over the limits of moral and societal acceptability (thus, no aggressive tax planning). The recent developments with regard to international regulation and the public attention that corporate tax planning has received shows that it is a dynamic concept since norms are apparently changing. Therefore, good tax governance should also be seen as a dynamic concept that evolves over time and does not have a one-size-fits-all definition.

7.4. Practical implications of good tax governance

This research is mainly based on a theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, it can have various practical implications. This research illustrated that multinationals should and can re-think their tax planning strategies. For instance, do their tax practices respond to the economic activities or do they make use of artificial structures in order to minimize tax close to zero? Do they structure their business operations (artificially) in order to benefit from tax incentives or do they apply for tax incentives that respond to their real business activities?

Corporate practice is much more nuanced than this research was able to grasp. Nevertheless, this research identified several principal starting points that corporations that wish to improve could use. From a more practical perspective, this research provided some basic elements of good tax governance that can both be used, in business practice as well as in the regulatory field when developing either best practices or guidelines. CSR corporations should engage in good tax governance and corporations that have not yet adopted CSR strategies but wish to improve the social legitimacy of their tax planning practices can use good tax governance as explained in this research. Multinationals that have already accepted certain moral responsibilities to go beyond the law (CSR corporations) should also acknowledge that they have to strive for moral behavior with regard to tax planning (good tax governance). As explained in chapter 6, to apply good tax governance in practice, corporations should reflect upon their existing tax practices in order to understand whether these respond to the expectations of various stakeholders. It goes without saying that it is not an easy task to identify whether corporate tax practices respond to the stakeholder's expectations. Therefore, corporations can develop their corporate tax values in the form of a tax code of conduct. These values should not only be applied in corporate practices but also be communicated with internal and external stakeholders in order to create a dialogue and see whether these values respond to the expectations. When necessary, the values should be adjusted and the tax code of conduct updated. In addition to this substantive part of good tax governance, corporations that wish to improve their tax planning practices should also be transparent about their tax planning practices. As explained in chapter 6, full transparency is not expected. Instead, responsible corporations should be able to show and explain to the stakeholders how their tax values match their tax practices.

Furthermore, this research illustrated that multinationals that engage in international tax planning are not immoral *per se*. This image has prevailed in public debates for too long and I think that this should change. As shown in chapter 3, corporations should often engage in tax planning in order to avoid double taxation or make (legitimate) use of tax incentives. Only certain kinds of abusive tax planning practices can be considered to be in conflict with corporate moral responsibilities. Debates should be more nuanced in this sense, also including, for instance, the roles and responsibilities of various other actors and multinationals that wish to improve should be included in a constructive societal dialogue.

7.5. Discussion and suggestions for further research

When starting this research in 2014, I realized that there was no theoretical basis for combining tax, CSR and CG. I believe that I have succeeded in providing a sufficient basis for hypotheses that can

further be tested with empirical research. Nevertheless, during this journey I also realized that there are still many unanswered questions that make this topic interesting for any researcher in any field. Here I will briefly summarize some of the most important points that, in my opinion, deserve further research.

First, a fairer tax system under the umbrella of CSR is not a responsibility that should rest exclusively on the shoulders of corporations, as it is a much broader issue. International corporate tax planning is a topic that includes various actors with different interests, such as multinationals, states, tax administrations, international organizations, media, and academics. For instance, NGOs fight for tax fairness and justice, whereas multinationals tend to lobby for even more favourable tax laws; also media often presents negative news because this *sells* more.¹⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, each group of actors is inevitably biased and puts their own specific interests over those of others; states ideally need to consider and balance all of them. For a legitimate change on the international level, a multi-stakeholder approach is necessary.¹⁴⁷¹ In addition to taking into account such different interests, cultural differences also need to be thought of in the international setting. This is where, for instance, the media and academics can contribute in their role of knowledge providers. It goes without saying that different actors should all contribute and cooperate to improve the system as such. For instance, whether NGO's campaigns have an effect depends in the end on how the public reacts. Elliot writes that if the public does not agree with certain matters, there are two possible reactions: "put pressure on governments to break up monopolies and inject more competition" and thereby plant incentives to reconsider the business mind-set, or stakeholders could vote with their feet and "stop patronising the companies that exploit loopholes in the tax system, even though that might mean higher prices and less choice."¹⁴⁷² McBarnet et al. have argued that "changes to the law alone cannot easily tackle creative compliance, because creative compliance is the product not just of limits of the law but of a mind-set which seeks to exploit those limits, and, crucially, which sees this exploitation as perfectly legitimate."¹⁴⁷³ In my opinion, from society's perspective, it is important that the mind-set with regard to how taxes are experienced changes, since tax is an important building block for a sustainable society. By engaging in a dialogue, various actors contribute to developing and improving good tax governance practices. However, all participants in such dialogue bear responsibility for achieving a better system; only striving for one's own interests and pursuing one's own agenda will not help in finding commonly accepted solutions.

Also, states have a crucial role to play with regard to eliminating socially unacceptable corporate tax practices.¹⁴⁷⁴ The legislature bears the responsibility to establish a fair and well-functioning system of tax laws. Next to the legislature, the executive and judicial branches of the state also play a role in the tax-planning process. The tax authorities and judges, namely, put the laws into action. Tax authorities should be safeguarding tax laws; they need to ensure the effective enforcement of tax laws and tax income of the state. However, the tax authorities' only toolkit is usually the law and, if multinationals operate in strict accordance with the law, the tax authorities' possibilities to fight tax avoidance are limited. Moreover, multinationals can use their corporate power against the state: if tax authorities reject certain agreements, multinationals can move to other states. In addition, different tax authorities in different countries have different resources and (working) culture that can also weaken their negotiation position against multinationals.¹⁴⁷⁵

¹⁴⁷⁰ See e.g. Douma, S. (2018). *Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate*. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.

¹⁴⁷¹ Davarnejad, L. (2010). The Impact of Non-State Actors on the International Law Regime of Corporate Social Responsibility: Blessing or Curse? In Ryngaert, C. and Noortmann, M. (Eds.), *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers* (pp. 41-65). Farnham: Ashgate. pp. 41-65, p. 61; Stevens, S. (2014). The Duty of Countries and Enterprises to Pay Their Fair Share. *Intertax* 42 (11), 702-708; Stevens, S. (2018, September 14). *Meer transparantie in de vennootschapsbelasting?* Tilburg University.

¹⁴⁷² Elliot, L. (2013, May 19). Tax Avoidance: How to Change Corporate Behaviour. *The Guardian* (online).

¹⁴⁷³ McBarnet, D. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, through Law, for Law: the New Corporate Accountability. In McBarnet, D. et al. (Eds.), *The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law* (pp. 9-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 48.

¹⁴⁷⁴ See also e.g. Freedman, J. (2007). The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is Responsible? Governmental Influences and Corporate Social Responsibility. In Holder, J. and O'Conneide, C. (Eds.), *Current Legal Problems 2006* (pp. 359-390). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 384-385; De Wilde, M. F. (2015). *'Sharing the Pie': Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market*. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. p. 22.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Ylönen, M. and Laine, M. (2015). For Logistical Reasons Only? A Case Study of Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 33, 5-23. p. 14.

If corporations are expected to be transparent in their tax planning strategies, values and tax contribution and consider it as part of their CSR policy, other actors also need to take responsibility and contribute to sustainable global tax governance. While states bear a primary responsibility for creating a fair legal system and legal certainty, a fairer tax system is a shared responsibility of all the actors.¹⁴⁷⁶ Currently there is no common understanding on what is right or wrong. A dialogue is necessary to reach such an understanding. At the end of the day, aggressive tax planning cannot be resolved merely by changing the laws, for all laws can be circumvented; it also requires that the mind-set and attitude of multinationals, but also other actors, such as politicians, public in general or media, change.

The majority of existing literature on responsible corporate tax planning focuses mainly on multinationals, since corporations have a significant role to play in this respect. Nevertheless, tax planning is a complex process that also requires the input of several other actors. The fact that various other actors have an important role to play in initiating but also in eliminating excessive aggressive tax planning, however, seems to be a forgotten part of the tax avoidance debate. Such different actors have different interests and different professional and cultural backgrounds. Consequently, the debate concerning aggressive tax planning is peppered with different perspectives. Gribnau describes taxes as an elephant in a village of blind people – depending on their perspective, different people understand it differently.¹⁴⁷⁷ Different parts need to be put together in order to understand the complete picture. This research only focused on the perspective of multinationals. Further research is necessary to better understand the role and responsibilities of other relevant actors with regard to good tax governance.

For instance, further research could identify the role of various corporate advisors (external and in-house), international organizations, civil society actors (NGOs), intermediaries such as banks, shareholders, investors, and pension funds. How do these actors influence the tax planning culture and corporate decision making? What are the possibilities to engage these actors more in good tax governance? How do corporate tax decisions concretely affect these specific actors?

Furthermore, this research argued that good tax governance is in the best interests of society as well as corporations. However, further empirical research should, for instance, find out whether practicing good tax governance leads to higher prices or lower shareholder returns. If so, are consumers or shareholders willing to pay the price? If consumers or shareholders are not interested in more responsible business practices, then corporations would also not want to do that, because they would risk losing an important external incentive. In addition, more empirical research is necessary in order to find out what exactly the most important factors are in relation to the trustworthiness of multinationals' tax behaviour and also to better understand the relationship between corporate reputation in tax avoidance.

From a CG perspective, this research argued that corporate managers have sufficient freedom to opt for good tax governance. However, tempting executive compensation might push executives towards more amoral decisions. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that, due to the high mobility of shareholders, managers might often be under pressure to satisfy shareholders' needs in order not to lose the (future) investment. This can, however, create negative externalities for the rest of the stakeholders or society at large. Therefore, in order to understand what would internally motivate corporate managers to opt for good tax governance, the link between executive compensation and corporate tax planning behaviour could be further researched. Moreover, this research generalized the CG perspective. Focusing on theoretical models, instead of comparing concrete jurisdictions in depth, made it possible to present a fundamental picture of the expectations of corporate management. At the same time, such an approach limits drawing country-specific concrete conclusions, which leaves room for further research.

As also identified in this research, the core of the issue is not whether the managers have a duty to increase shareholder value. To act in the best interests of the company, corporate managers are

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¹⁴⁷⁶ See also Peters, C. (2020). Global Tax Justice: Who's Involved?. In Van Brederode, R. F. (Ed.), *Ethics and Taxation* (pp. 165-187). Singapore: Springer.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Gribnau, J. L. M. (2016). Belastingen als Olifant. *NTFR: Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal recht* 17 (8), 1-5.

probably very capable of balancing the interests of different stakeholders. However, some stakeholders, such as some short-term interest shareholders, can have a strong ability to influence the corporate board members' decisions. As Lipton et al. rightly argue, "[U]nless shareholders consistently support the board in managing for the long-term and balancing the interests of all stakeholders, the lowest common denominator will often prevail and long-term investments will be sacrificed for near-term gains."¹⁴⁷⁸ In this line, further research should clarify how shareholders informally influence the corporate tax planning decisions. For instance, is there a certain change in corporate law necessary in order to make more space for good tax governance? Moreover, further (empirical) research should also identify, in more detail, how multinationals make their tax planning decisions. Such research should provide more practical guidance for corporations with regard to using certain tax planning structures; for instance, what are the relevant concrete criteria for socially responsible tax planning structures and which criteria help the management board to balance the different interests of stakeholders.

This research also presented various examples of corporations that already claim to be responsible taxpayers and have good tax governance practices. Nevertheless, there is insufficient empirical research confirming that corporations that apply good tax governance also live up to their intentions. From the perspective of transparency, further research should identify what kind of information exactly is material to sufficient disclosure.

In addition, from a more global sustainable development perspective, future research should analyze how (separate) SDGs are exactly related to taxation. Namely, SDGs give more concrete content to CSR and thereby are also relevant for good tax governance. Such research would, in my opinion, add much value to understanding and developing the concept of good tax governance further.

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¹⁴⁷⁸ Lipton, M., et al. (2019, June 3). Wachtell Lipton Discusses Corporate Purpose—Stakeholders and Long-Term Growth. The CLS Blue Sky Blog.

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