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Pierre Bourdieu and language in society

by

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Pierre Bourdieu and language in society

Jan Blommaert

Abstract

This paper argues that Bourdieu’s oeuvre presents a radically new set of images on man and society in which language, as object and practice, assumes a key role. Three aspects of Bourdieu’s work are highlighted: (1) Bourdieu’s New Left-inspired search for a “socialized humanity” and his related interest in American symbolic interactionism; (2) the particular “methodological loop” he constructed in his work, in which ethnographic insight was used as the foundation for statistical work, which in turn yielded new ethnographic issues; (3) the development of “nexus concepts” such as habitus, in which the traditional “micro-macro” divide was crossed, leading to an analytic of “the big in the small” which enables ethnographic generalization. These three points, I argue, continue to serve as a fertile source of inspiration for innovative and explorative research into language in society.

Keywords: Bourdieu, habitus, sociolinguistics, methodology, ethnography, symbolic interactionism, linguistic anthropology, language ideologies.

Introduction

It is no overstatement to say that Pierre Bourdieu is one the most influential social-scientific thinkers of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Terms designed by him – “habitus”, “field”, “symbolic violence” and so forth – have become part of the core vocabulary of anthropology, sociology, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, cultural studies and media studies, to name just a few disciplines. Ignorance of his work is widely construed as a major intellectual flaw because “French Theory”, the complex of Anglosaxon scholarly interpretations of the work of Derrida, Ricoeur, Bourdieu and Foucault (Cusset 2008), is an important part of the canon of social sciences and humanities. The mediating effect of
Anglosaxon uptake and interpretation is substantial: the history of translations of works by the French *Mandarins* can be shown to have an impact on how such work was read, understood and incorporated in general and specific theoretical projects worldwide. In Bourdieu’s case, Gorski (2013) notes that the sequence of English translations of Bourdieu’s books did not chronologically mirror their sequence in Bourdieu’s own development and that some of his work remains untranslated. Such factors can explain the lack of attention to Bourdieu’s ethnographic and historical ambitions in much secondary work. I shall have occasion to return to this issue below.

Given Bourdieu’s status, I have the comfort of assuming that most readers will be at least superficially acquainted with the baseline of his work in the field of language (especially his *Language and Symbolic Power*, 1991), and focus on some perhaps less widely understood aspects of it that are of direct relevance to contemporary theorizing in the field of language in society. Three aspects, in particular, merit elaborate discussion: (i) Bourdieu’s theoretical investment in a post-orthodox “new left” Marxism and his deep interest in the ethnographic stance developed in American symbolic interactionism; (ii) his view of research methodology, in particular his ethnographic bias and the way in which that bias led to a continuous “loop” of ethnography and quantification; (iii) the way in which, throughout his oeuvre, Bourdieu sought to develop “nexus concepts” such as habitus, where “micro-“ and “macro-” features coincide. All three aspects, I hope, can be seen as useful for addressing the phenomenology of contemporary social change and the role of language therein.

**New Left foundations and symbolic-interactionist interests**

The big questions addressed in Bourdieu’s work are clear, and Bourdieu himself was generous in spelling them out in prefaces to his major works, often as a story of cohesion between different parts of his oeuvre (see e.g. the prefaces to *Distinction*, 1984, and *The Logic of Practice*, 1990). These questions demand some measure of erudition and insight into the intellectual history of the twentieth century, because as we shall see, Bourdieu sweeps up large chunks of theory and methodology reflection from various different branches of social sciences and humanities before he positions his own efforts. A great many of his theoretical and methodological concerns were aimed at answering the Marxian question that has kept much of twentieth-century intellectual history going: that of the relationship between “social being and social consciousness” – does “subjective” consciousness shape the “objective” world or is (as Marx claimed) the “objective” world determining consciousness? Do humans
shape the social conditions in which they live and the interests they draw from them, or are they shaped by them? Engagement with these issues, certainly after the Second World War and the appearance in print of Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks*, defined (and defines) the so-called New Left as a “humanist” Marxism that questions the simple mechanics of basis and superstructure of an earlier orthodoxy and searches for spaces of human agency and intellectual creativity as “objective” forces of history.

Much of what Bourdieu was concerned with in his oeuvre revolves around this: how exactly do we describe what Marx called “socialized humanity” – individuals and communities that are deeply formed by the historical and social environments in which they develop, the social structures they are part of and which they – here comes “habitus” – have incorporated in such a way that it shapes their bodies, attitudes, thoughts and everyday behavior? How do we describe the patterns by means of which such forms of socialization emerge, operate, get reinforced or changed? And how do we, then, handle “objectivity” and “subjectivity” in scientific practice?

The answers to these questions required, for Bourdieu, an entire reconstruction of himself as a scientist and of the science he practiced. Showing the nature of the socialized subject, as described above, involved a challenge to scientific “objectivity” as then described and prescribed in Lévi-Straussian structuralism. As an anthropologist trained in this distinguished French tradition, Bourdieu had learned to turn the observed subject of anthropology into an “object” of structuralist analysis by rendering the researcher (and his instruments) invisible. Lévi-Straussian anthropologists were never “really there” in research other than as an unchallengeable epistemic superior, a position Bourdieu found untenable in actual fieldwork (see Bourdieu 1990:14; 2000: 23-25; Blommaert 2005a offers a discussion). Instead, an *ethnographic* stance grounded in the practice of fieldwork in Algeria, on local economic issues, pushed him towards fundamentally different insights:

“It was (…) because I found myself in a situation where I could directly observe the disarray or the distress of economic agents devoid of the dispositions tacitly demanded by an economic order that for us is entirely familiar (…) that I was able to conceive the idea of statistically analyzing the conditions of possibility of those historically constituted dispositions.” (2000: 18)

Bourdieu had, thus, ethnographically encountered a *contrast* between “historically constituted dispositions”, one set determining how rural Algerians uncomfortably handled a capitalist
economic system and another set determining his own habituated ways of going about economic aspects of life (cf. Wacquant 2005; Reay 2004; Blommaert 2005a). Two “habituses” (we would now say) had clashed in fieldwork interactions between an anthropologist and his “subject”, since both occupied very different historically constituted “positions” in the “field” of economic behavior – the French intellectual had the habitus of a sophisticated habitué of such practices, the Algerian farmer that of a novice lacking many of the resources and skills long rendered “normal” in the French intellectual’s way of life.

Very little of Bourdieu’s work can be understood unless we grasp this vital epistemological and methodological moment where Bourdieu breaks away from structuralism and moves towards what was to become “reflexive sociology”. The move is grounded in ethnography, the realization of the fact that knowledge emerges not from one “objective” partner interacting with a “subjective” one, but from intersubjective engagement negotiating the “objective” historically constituted positions from which each party acts and produces meaning (cf. also Fabian 1983). “Subjects” can be “objectively” studied by recognizing their fundamental subjectivity, in itself grounded in and generated by objective social-historical conditions. These historically constituted positions, we can see, shape the “socialized subject” Bourdieu wanted to describe: history in society has put all of us in a specific position towards specific things and towards other people; this position can change as we live our lives, but its initial conditions are what they are – a point of departure which is never neutral but always covered with specific interests, preferences, habitual patterns of action, speech and understanding. It is in La Misère du Monde (1993) that this is clearest: through a large interview project in the working-class suburbs, he shows “the tragedy of the confrontation, without concession or possible compromise, of viewpoints that are incompatible because they are all grounded in social reason” (1993:13, my translation).

This ethnographic and intersubjective streak in Bourdieu’s work is rarely identified as crucial in understanding his work (but see Hanks 2005). It not only helps us understand the large intellectual project he undertook; it also helps us understand his deep and active interest in the work of American symbolic-interactionist sociologists such as Goffman, Garfinkel and Cicourel. The interest is not hard to justify, given the insistence of symbolic interactionists on observing everyday lived experience in its “natural environment” in order to “catch the process of interpretation from the standpoint of the acting person”, where this standpoint is defined as interactional, i.e. in terms of responses to and anticipations of the moves of others in social interaction (McCall & Becker 1990: 2-3, drawing on Blumer 1969). The insistence
of symbolic interactionists (especially those raised in the tradition of the Chicago School of Sociology) on meticulous fieldwork and participant observation was another point of attraction for Bourdieu, since such fieldwork inevitably provoked an explicit (reflexive) questioning of the researcher’s role and showed the epistemic potential of such role-play in fieldwork in which the ethnographer was present, visible and salient as an actor in the process of knowledge construction.

Bourdieu emphasized these merits of symbolic interactionism in several of his writings, most notably in the obituary he wrote for Erving Goffman and the introduction to the last publishing effort he made in his lifetime: a French edition of several of Aaron Cicourel’s classic essays on interaction in medical practice (Bourdieu 1982; Bourdieu & Winkin 2002).

Especially developments such as ethnomethodology and, later, cognitive sociology (Cicourel 1972) received accolades from Bourdieu, who saw clear parallels between ethnomethodological concerns and his own focus on “logic of practice”: the ways in which people interacting in social settings co-construct the realities they inhabit by means of habituated and socially ratified modes of thought and action adjusted to specific social fields. The difference he had with symbolic interactionism was made explicit in the opening pages of Language and Symbolic Power:

“although it is legitimate to treat social relations – even relations of domination – as symbolic interactions (…) one must not forget that the relations of communication *par excellence* – linguistic exchanges – are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized.” (Bourdieu 1991: 37)

In this book – Bourdieu’s most influential intervention on language – he subscribes to the fundamentally dynamic, practice-based and “emic” approach to communication developed by the likes of Goffman, Cicourel and Garfinkel; but he couches it into a broader historical frame (making his approach effectively Bakhtinian, one could say) and designs his analysis of language in society through the theoretical vocabulary developed in *The Logic of Practice* (1990). Thus, social interaction articulates socio-historically configured “positions” from whence people speak; these positions are defined by a “market” of symbolic capital in which

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1 The patterns of referencing in Bourdieu’s work are also telling. While his universe of referencing is clearly dominated by the likes of Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim, Weber and other major scholars from the French structuralist canon, references to Goffman, Garfinkel and Cicourel are hard to overlook in Bourdieu’s work.
resources are circulated and unevenly distributed, ensuring, for instance, that a “high” Parisian accent will be perceived as superior vis-à-vis a “low” upcountry accent. The play of different positions in social arenas is the play of symbolic violence, or “misrecognition” and “recognition” of linguistic-communicative resources not because of their “linguistic” features but of the sociohistorical load they carry within a given social field. Thus, in any social field, distinctions will emerge between “legitimate” language (the “norm”, one could say) and deviant forms of language. The target of Bourdieu’s critical efforts in Language and Symbolic Power is classical structuralism – Saussure, this time, with a polemical gesture towards Chomsky – and the instrument he uses for his critique is a blend of symbolic-interactionist ontology with his own unique historicizing methodology.

The Bourdieuan methodological loop

This blending of an ethnographically inflected ontology with a tendency to aim for larger, historically configured patterns of social structure, all of this often pitted against classical structuralist assumptions, yielded a remarkable research procedure in much of Bourdieu’s work.² Let us take a closer look at his methodological toolkit.

Bourdieu started from an acute awareness of ‘framing’ in research. We all enter our research sites under particular sociohistorical conditions and they have an effect on what we see and perceive and understand. Bourdieu was aware of this during his 1960s fieldwork in Algeria. The country had just passed through a traumatic war of liberation, and the impact on his fieldwork was considerable – former enemies had to collaborate in research. In order to escape this bias, Bourdieu explored two measures. First, he emphasized the importance of revisiting the same object over and over again, of comparison (his work in Algeria was followed by ‘native ethnography’ in the Béarn) and expansion (including more materials than just those collected during fieldwork). Second, as we know, he turned to the kind of structuralism then advocated by Lévi-Strauss, in order to find a vantage point which allowed scientific objectivity. In doing this, like Lévi-Strauss, he intended to move from ethnography to ethnology – a search for transcontextual (or a-contextual) “driving principles” in the social system observed, by focusing on correlations, contrasts and forms of systemic coherence. This

² The following paragraphs are adapted from Blommaert (2005a) and Blommaert & van de Vijver (2014). I refer the reader to the latter source for a more elaborate discussion of the potential of the Bourdieuan methodological loop.
ethnological tendency explains Bourdieu’s search for higher-level validity – his difference with symbolic interactionism.

Whereas the first set of measures was maintained throughout Bourdieu’s oeuvre, the second set – the appeal to structuralism – was abandoned. The main reason, I repeat, was ethnographic experience. Bourdieu had encountered paradoxes, contradictions and flexible potential in the field, rather than the strict, transparent and mechanic schemes of structuralism. Furthermore, and as we have seen above, he had experienced experience, so to speak: the fact that the distance advocated in ethnology is, in actual fieldwork conditions, overgrown with sharedness of meaning, joint understandings of “the logic of the game” and so on. In other words, Bourdieu had ethnographically experienced that the ethnological claim to distance generates another, and a potentially more dangerous form of ethnocentrism than the intrinsic ethnocentrism of his own observer’s – but participating and co-constructing – role in ethnography (a point also extensively belabored in critical ethnography, e.g. Fabian 1983). Bourdieu worried about the specific role of the observer, and this role is not substantially different whether one investigates faraway Algeria or his home region in the Béarn. We have seen that he allowed himself to be deeply inspired by Goffman, Cicourel and other ethnographers in this respect. And this led to his rejection of Lévi-Straussian ethnology as “methodologically provoked anamnesis” (2000: 24) which suggests closure and total strangeness – absence of shared understanding – between observer and observed. From that point onwards, “dispositions” occur, and Bourdieu theorizes how he himself became part of the object – the objectification of subjectivity. This is also the point where he makes the shift from anthropology (or ethnology, see above) to sociology: a science in which precisely the objectification of subjectivity is central, and a science which can aspire to eventually develop a subject.

Bourdieu used extensive surveys as the backbone of some of his most impressive work. *Distinction*, for instance, presents its readers with the results of a large-scale series of survey studies in which aspects of subjective experiences of class structure were investigated. He had, however, grave reservations about “naïve” statistical research – a point for which he found ample motivation in Cicourel’s (1964) classic critique of quantitative approaches in sociology (e.g. Bourdieu & Winkin 2002: 19). *Distinction*, that survey-driven study, is,
remarkably, presented by Bourdieu as “a sort of ethnography of France” (1986: xi).³

Such statements in Bourdieu’s work are not frivolous; we know that they are fundamental methodological statements. As said, he invariably started from ethnographic engagement in the field, where the confrontation of two social-historically grounded forms of embodied subjectivity (habituses) provided the hypotheses to be statistically tested. The connection between ethnography and statistical analysis is clear:

“nothing had prepared me to understand the economy, especially my own, as a *system of embodied beliefs*, I had to learn, step by step, through ethnographic observation later corroborated by statistical analysis, the practical logic of the precapitalist economy, at the same time as I was trying as best as I could to figure out its grammar” (Bourdieu 2000: 24)

We have seen above where his tendency to aim for a “grammar” – a generalization – came from: from structuralist ethnology. But generalization (the “grammar” mentioned in the quote above), for him, should be *empirical*, not abstract, and reflecting the on-the-ground realities detected in ethnography. And such generalizations would be built by statistical work entirely grounded in ethnographic observation – the questions would be ethnography-based – and framed in an ethnographic epistemology, that is: an awareness that outcomes of statistical generalization needed to be fed back to the empirical on-the-ground realities from which they emerged, and that they needed to speak to the “lived experience” of everyday social engagements. Echoes of Cicourel’s (1964) famous statements on ecological validity are evident.

This created a loop: ethnography-statistics-ethnography-statistics and so forth. And this loop explains the other major feature of Bourdieu’s approach mentioned earlier: he would return throughout his career to the same field sites for ethnographic follow-up work. This move *historicized* his work: the loop in which ethnographic material was tested statistically and then

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³ Bourdieu was usually generous when it came to inform his readers about the types of data he used in his research, and reading the appendices to works such as *Homo Academicus* is worth the trouble for those who wish to explore the highly unorthodox ways in which he built his arguments, seen from a conventional sociological stance. Bourdieu uses large quantities of popular published data – newspaper articles, “rankings” and “pop polls”, gossip stories and so forth – as well as lengthy interviews in preparing the grounds for statistical extrapolation, and some seriously good discourse analysis precedes that quantitative stage of work. See Hanks (2005) for comments on this point.
brought into a new ethnographic round of inquiry removed the synchronic bias of Levi-Straussian structuralism and made Bourdieu’s object *dynamic*. His methodology, consequently, was one that addressed *change* rather than stasis. The acute historical awareness in Bourdieu’s work is the second point, along with his ethnographic epistemology, that shines through in almost every major theoretical statement made by him. Consider his definition of habitus (Bourdieu 1990: 54):

“the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence produce the structures of the habitus, which in their turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences. The habitus, product of history, produces individual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with the schemes generated by history.”

The ethnographic grounding of Bourdieu’s approach removed the ‘snapshot’ (i.e. synchronic) quality from survey methodology and replaced it with a dynamic and change-oriented one.4

Note once more that the dynamic theory, lodged in his central theoretical concepts, is generated by ethnography. Bourdieu moves from ethnographic generalization – his theory – to statistical generalization; the latter he qualifies as “corroboration”: statistical analysis enables him to grant his theory not just ecological validity but also representativeness. His level of generalization is no longer, *contra* Levi-Strauss, an ethnology grounded in universalist abstractions; it is an empirical (ethnographic) generalization, and this enables him to call *Distinction* with its many statistical data an “ethnography of France”.

**Nexus concepts and language ideology: habitus**

The preceding discussion already shows that simple and widespread scalar metaphors such as “micro versus macro” are hard to apply to Bourdieu’s work. It is not as if statistics “just” enables an extrapolation to a scale-level we usually call “macro”, *in contrast with* ethnographic observation which would be “micro”. Reading Bourdieu in these superficial and schematic micro-macro terms is invariably disappointing and risks missing the entire point.

A concept such as habitus is an attempt at “macro” generalization at the level of what we would call “micro” practices – let us call it a “nexus concept” in which different scale-levels

4 The “schemes” mentioned by Bourdieu fit into the category of notions such as “genre”, “register” etc. (see below). In fact, it is on the basis of such notions, all referring to the partly systemic (structured) nature of human conduct, that ethnographic generalizations are made.
of social behavior are shown to be dialectically connected. Habitus shows itself in every social activity – we always embody the sociohistorical realities that formed us as individuals who take specific (nonrandom) positions in a social field, with degrees of access to the material and symbolic capital that characterizes these positions, and the relationships of dominance or subordination they involve with others. The fact that these positions are being renegotiated over and over again in social encounters, that they can be negated or challenged (as shown in e.g. Goffman 1971), and that they are dynamic and do change over time does not detract from the essential reproductive quality of social structures and the habituated characteristics they attribute to everyday social practice. While Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron 1970) emphasizes this reproductive systemic quality, Homo Academicus shows its potential for development and change over time: profound economic and political changes in the foundations in society also involve reshuffling the symbolic markets in society, they recreate its “culture”, one could say, as an intrinsic part of these deep changes.

Language and Symbolic Power can be seen as Bourdieu’s most advanced argument in favor of this view, but note that in studies such as Academic Discourse (Bourdieu, Passeron & de Saint Martin 1965), Homo Academicus and Reproduction, developments in the discursive field were crucial evidence for the central thesis of symbolic capital reproduction and circulation: language usage is an extraordinarily sensitive indicator of actual social (“macro”) relationships and their dynamics, and such “macro” features occur across the entire field of language in society.5 The analysis is, as suggested earlier, Bakhtinian: Bourdieu sees words, expressions and discourses as filled with historically configured symbolic power features, in such a way that any aspect of speech can be seen as what Bakhtin called “voice” – an index of social positions within a given social status quo (Bakhtin 1981; cf. Blommaert 2015). Thus, the country folk from the Béarn will, when talking to the “sophisticated” Parisian, “lose voice”, feeling insecure about pronunciation and lexical choice, leading to hypercorrection and self-stereotyping, out of an awareness that the Parisian’s French occupies a different, superior symbolic position in the public order projected onto language usage.

A very similar argument (influenced more by Bakhtin than by Bourdieu) was made in Asif Agha’s major study on Language and Social Relations (2007; cf. also Kroskrity 2000; Collins & Blot 2003; Hanks 2005; Blommaert 2005b). Agha surveys linguistic-anthropological work

5 Hanks (2005) offers an insightful review of Bourdieu’s focus on language practices in support of his larger conceptual efforts, notably in the development of the concepts of habitus and field.
on language ideologies, emphasizing the concept of “register” as an ordered set of indexical (i.e. language-ideological) form-function-effect mappings (Silverstein 2003). “Order” here stands for the nonrandom character of such orders of indexicality: It is the skillful deployment of specific “enregistered” forms of speech in particular social arenas that sets the tone and key of interactions and indexically projects identities onto the speakers. An identity such as “wine connoisseur”, for instance, demands the careful and sustained deployment of specific jargons, genres and modes of talk about wine – a discourse indexing someone as “wine connoisseur” (Silverstein 2006). Violations of such orders come with a penalty: one is identified as “awkward”, a “wannabe”, a “dilettante” or just a “weirdo”. The order is socially compelling since “recognition as (identity X)” is a socially regimented effect that demands recognizability within a frame of intersubjectivity. While, of course, various degrees of deviance can and do occur without heavy penalties, the deployment of specific registers impose a stereotypical “frame” on interactions, the effects of which are relatively stable – registers are part of the stuff that constructs the benchmarks of social order (cf. also Rampton 2006).

Observe the obvious connection between Agha’s view of register and that venerable object of sociology that has been a central concern since Simmel and Durkheim: social norms, what it takes to be seen as socially “normal”. Registers are conventional and therefore “normative” of course, and in Agha’s view they are arrangements of behavioral features that, within given social arenas and social groups, count as understandable language. The echo of symbolic interactionism is evident here – norms are “emic” and emerge out of intersubjective social interaction – and so is the parallel between this view and Bourdieu’s notion of “legitimate” language – something that emerges out of the dynamic of recognition and misrecognition. And observe how a notion such as language-ideological “register” becomes, like habitus, a nexus concept in which the small stuff of everyday interaction is intrinsically colored, patterned and regimented by the “big” stuff of culture, social structure and history (cf. Scollon & Scollon 2004; Silverstein 2004). While recognizability – the crucial feature of register – is always uniquely and variably enacted in situated moments of interaction, it derives its effects from prior existence as an order of indexicality in which the deployment of certain features stereotypically points towards particular social categories and relationships (cf. Blommaert 2015). Register and processes of enregisterment, therefore, can be seen as the empirical aspects of habitus formation and development. The social order is incorporated, reproduced and amended, practically, in enregisterment.
This insight, I would argue, turns Bourdieu’s social-theoretical legacy even more into an ethnographic invitation, in which longitudinal and slow processes of social structuration can be read, followed and appraised, so to speak, through the lens of register development and change in actual moments of social interaction. “Micro”-ethnographies of social interaction can be shown to directly (not by prior or posterior assumption) relate to “macro”-social and political relationships in nonrandom ways, and patterns of shifting from one register into another (Goffman’s “footing changes”, Agha 2005) can be understood as effects of the complexity of social environments in which people dwell, and as proof of the social versatility required from real people in real societies (cf. Silverstein 2004; Collins 2014; Rampton 2014). Sociolinguistically, this methodological line suggests important potential for revisiting “macro”-features of language in society such as language policies, now possibly seen as one set of norms amidst several other socially recognizable ones, leading to language behavior which appears, from a formal language policy viewpoint, as a violation of rules but proves to be, upon closer inspection, perfectly “normal” in view of the polycentric normative environment that characterizes real and highly diverse social arenas (Blommaert 2005b, 2014; Blommaert & Rampton 2011). At the same time, this view suggests a profound critique of classical notions of “structure” as stable and replaces them with a view of social life as governed and patterned by means of complex interplays of multiple and dynamic structures demanding a capacity to change and shift rather than a capacity for adherence to (fixed, singular and dominant) “rules”.

**Conclusion: Bourdieu as inspiration**

Bourdieu’s work is canonical – his books are almost without exception classics. Whereas a degree of reverence in reading them is expected (and perhaps desirable), the classic status of such work invites continuous re-reading, updating and reappraisal in view of recent insights. Real classics, in that sense, are works that continue to be relevant not as a fixed codex but as a flexible source of inspiration, allowing exploratory confrontation with new relevant data, methodologies and theoretical concepts.

What contemporary scholars of language and society can take from Bourdieu’s work is the fundamental insight that language can be approached from the viewpoint of society, as an extraordinarily sensitive index of social relationships, processes and developments. I have pointed above to the ways in which Bourdieu used discursive data as key evidence for change in the social system – the central plot of *Homo Academicus* is the shift in the social and
cultural composition of French academic infrastructures. Ethnographic and discursive data did what mainstream statistics could not achieve: they identified the effective locus of change in actual, situated nonrandom social behavior, and his usage of statistics was in that sense a technique of confirmation and double-checking of what ethnographic and discourse-analytic data had established (yielding, in the process, additional ethnographic questions). He stood, in this respect, shoulder by shoulder with his American friends and colleagues, Goffman, Cicourel and Garfinkel. And he took their efforts further into the direction of “macro”-social generalization by means of nexus concepts such as habitus, providing a theory of Marxian “socialized humanity” as a matter of actual practice, governed and regulated by historically configured (but dynamic) dispositions that circumscribed the possibilities and limitations of social practices within specific fields.

This achievement is formidable, even if in many respects incomplete and unfinished, and even if drawing these fundamental insights from Bourdieu’s work demands hard reading, not just of *Language and Symbolic Power* but of large parts of the entire oeuvre. He did, indeed, establish sociology on a different footing, providing a fundamental set of images of man and society deeply different from those advocated by Durkheim, Weber, Parsons or Lévi-Strauss. Bringing recent advances in sociolinguistic and discourse-analytical analysis and theorizing within the framework of these images of man and society is both a challenge and an opportunity hard to dismiss for creative and innovative scholarship on language in society.

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