VERY SIMPLE MARKOV-PERFECT INDUSTRY DYNAMICS: THEORY

By

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Abstract

This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It features toughness of competition, sunk entry costs, and market-level demand and cost shocks, but assumes that firms’ expected payoffs are identical when entry and survival decisions are made. We prove that this model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, and we provide an algorithm for its computation. Because this algorithm only requires finding the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction mappings, it is guaranteed to converge quickly.

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1 Introduction

In this paper, we present a model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It features toughness of competition, sunk entry costs, and market-level demand and cost shocks. We allow firms to use mixed strategies and close the model by focusing on symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria. The model’s key simplifying assumption is that firms’ expected payoffs are identical when entry and survival decisions are made. Using this and the equilibrium implications of mixed strategies for payoffs, we construct an algorithm for equilibrium computation that calculates the fixed points of a finite sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. Since it relies only on contraction mappings, the algorithm is guaranteed to calculate an equilibrium. We prove that adding a competitor cannot increase incumbents’ equilibrium continuation values. This result in turn ensures that the symmetric equilibrium calculated by our algorithm is essentially unique. The algorithm converges sufficiently quickly to be embedded in a nested fixed point estimation procedure and used for large-scale computational experiments.

Our model can be viewed as a special case of Ericson and Pakes’s (1995) Markov-perfect industry dynamics framework. Ericson and Pakes focused on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, but Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) showed that such equilibria might not exist in their original framework. To address this problem, Gowrisankaran (1999) added privately-observed firm-specific shocks to the costs of continuation; and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite provided sufficient conditions for such an augmented framework to have a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Research following Ericson and Pakes (summarized by Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007) has generally adopted this augmented version of their framework.

We instead return to Ericson and Pakes’s original complete-information approach. We show that the firm-specific shocks that guarantee existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in the augmented framework obscure a useful consequence of firms employing mixed strategies. In equilibrium, firms earn the value of the outside option (zero) whenever they nontrivially randomize over exit and survival. Therefore, symmetric equilibrium payoffs to incumbents contemplating survival equal either zero or the value of all incumbents choosing certain continuation. This insight allows us to calculate continuation values from some nodes of the game tree without knowing everything about the game’s
subsequent play. Combining this insight with a demonstration that continuation values weakly decrease with the number of active firms yields the contraction mappings that we use both to calculate the equilibrium and to demonstrate its uniqueness. In contrast, there is no guarantee that the augmented Ericson and Pakes framework has a unique equilibrium; and computing even one of its equilibria can be onerous.

Earlier research similarly exploited the structure of specific games to enable their theoretical and computational analysis. Abbring and Campbell (2010) considered a dynamic oligopoly model like ours, but assumed that incumbent firms make continuation decisions sequentially in the order of their entry. Moreover, they restricted attention to Markov-perfect equilibria in which older firms always outlive their younger rivals, which they called “last-in first-out” dynamics. Our equilibrium characterization and computation rely neither on sequential timing assumptions nor on a restriction to last-in first-out dynamics.

Another strand of the literature applied backward induction to compute the equilibria of dynamic directional games (e.g. Cabral and Riordan, 1994; Judd, Schmedders, and Yeltekin, 2012). Iskhakov, Rust, and Schjerning (2016) systemized this familiar procedure into an algorithm for computing all these games’ equilibria. In the games considered, the state space can be partially ordered using primitive restrictions on state transitions: State B comes after state A if B can be reached from A but not the other way around. Their algorithm iterates backwards through this partially ordered set of states. Transitions from states considered in a given iteration to states considered in later iterations are impossible, so the algorithm can calculate equilibrium outcomes and continuation values recursively. Our algorithm similarly iterates over an ordered partition of our game’s state space. However, our game is not directional and in each iteration transitions to states not yet visited by our algorithm are possible. Instead of exploiting the directionality of state transitions hardwired into the primitives of Iskhakov, Rust, and Schjerning’s framework, we rely on the fact that the expected symmetric equilibrium payoff in any survival subgame in which firms exit with positive probability must be zero. This allows us to order state D after state C if state D can be reached from state C but the opposite transition requires firms to choose exit with positive probability.
2 The Model

Consider a market in discrete time indexed by \( t \in \mathbb{N} \equiv \{1, 2, \ldots\} \), in which firms make entry and exit decisions. In period \( t \), firms that have entered in the past and not yet exited serve the market. Each firm has a name \( f \in \mathcal{F} \equiv \mathcal{F}_0 \cup (\mathbb{N} \times \{1, 2, \ldots, j\}) \). Initial incumbents have distinct names in \( \mathcal{F}_0 \), while potential entrants’ names are from \( \mathbb{N} \times \{1, 2, \ldots, j\} \). The first component of a potential entrant’s name gives the period in which it has its only opportunity to enter the market, and the second component gives its position in that period’s queue of \( j < \infty \) firms. Aside from the timing of their entry opportunities, the firms are identical.

Figure 1 details the actions taken by firms in period \( t \) and their consequences for the game’s state at the start of period \( t + 1 \). We call this the game’s recursive extensive form. For expository purposes, we divide each period into two subperiods, the entry and survival stages. Play in period \( t \) begins on the left with the entry stage. If \( t = 1 \), nature sets the number \( N_1 \) of firms serving the market in period 1 and the initial demand state \( Y_1 \). If \( t > 1 \), these are inherited from the previous period. We use \( Y \) to denote the support of \( Y_t \). Although we consistently refer to \( Y_t \) as “demand,” it can encompass any market characteristics that may affect, but are not affected by, firms’ decisions. For instance, \( Y_t \) may be vector-valued and include cost shocks. It follows a first-order Markov process.

Each incumbent firm earns a profit \( \pi(N_t, Y_t) \) from serving the market, and all firms value future profits and costs with the discount factor \( \rho \in [0, 1) \). We assume that

A1. \( \exists \bar{\pi} < \infty \) such that \( \forall (n, y) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Y}, -\infty < \mathbb{E} [\pi(n, Y')|Y = y] < \bar{\pi} \);

A2. \( \exists \hat{n} \in \mathbb{N} : \forall n > \hat{n} \) and \( \forall y \in \mathcal{Y}, \pi(n, y) < 0 \); and

A3. \( \forall (n, y) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Y}, \pi(n, y) \geq \pi(n + 1, y) \).

Here and throughout; we denote the next period’s value of a generic variable \( Z \) with \( Z' \), random variables with capital Roman letters, and their realizations with the corresponding small Roman letters. The first assumption ensures that expected discounted profits (values) in all entry or survival decision nodes are bounded from above. Because firms will, in equilibrium, limit losses by exiting, this will allow us to restrict our analysis of equilibrium values to the space of bounded functions. We will
Figure 1: The Model’s Recursive Extensive Form

use the second assumption to bound the number of firms that will participate in the market simultaneously. It is not restrictive in empirical applications to oligopolistic markets. The third assumption requires the addition of a competitor to reduce weakly each incumbent’s profit. That is, what Sutton (1991) labelled the toughness of competition must dominate any complementarities between firms’ activities.

After incumbents earn their profits, entry may occur. The period $t$ entry cohort consists of firms with names in $\{t\} \times \{1, \ldots, j\}$. These firms make their entry decisions sequentially in the order of their names’ second components. We denote firm $f$’s entry decision with $d_E^f \in \{0, 1\}$. A firm in the $j$’th position of the current period’s entry queue that enters pays the sunk cost $\varphi(N_t + j, Y_t)$. This satisfies

A4. $\forall m \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\forall y \in \mathcal{Y}$, $0 < \varphi(m, y) \leq \varphi(m + 1, y)$.

If $\varphi(m, y) < \varphi(m + 1, y)$, then the $m + 1$’th firm faces an economic barrier to entry (McAfee, Mialon, and Williams, 2004). A firm choosing not to enter earns a payoff of zero and never has another entry opportunity. Such a refusal to enter also ends
the entry stage, so firms remaining in this period’s entry cohort that have not yet had an opportunity to enter never get to do so.

The total number of firms in the market after the entry stage equals \( N_{E,t} \), which sums the incumbents with the actual entrants. Denote their names with \( f_1, \ldots, f_{N_{E,t}} \). In the survival stage, these firms simultaneously choose probabilities of remaining active, \( a_f^{f_{S}}, \ldots, a_f^{f_{N_{E,t}}} \in [0,1] \). Subsequently, all survival outcomes are realized independently across firms according to the chosen Bernoulli distributions. Firms that exit earn a payoff of zero and never again participate in the market. The \( N_{t+1} \) surviving firms continue to the next period, \( t + 1 \).

To end the period, nature draws a new demand state \( Y_{t+1} \) from the Markov transition distribution \( G(\cdot | Y_{t}) \).

The timing of our game is similar to that in Ericson and Pakes (1995). Like them, we allow for sequential entry. Moreover, like Ericson and Pakes, and unlike Abbring and Campbell (2010), we assume simultaneous survival decisions. Because we allow for mixed survival rules, this may lead to excessive exits. Since entry precedes exit, potential entrants cannot take immediate advantage of such “exit mistakes” and thereby outmaneuver incumbents. This is not so relevant to Ericson and Pakes, who restrict strategies to be pure (at the expense of losing equilibrium existence; see Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010). To establish the robustness of our results to the game’s timing assumptions, we considered a variant of our model in which at most one firm enters each period and entry and survival decisions are all taken simultaneously. In this paper’s online supplement, we demonstrate that this alternative game has a unique equilibrium in which potential entrants never displace incumbents; and we provide an algorithm for its rapid calculation.

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1We do not explicitly model the firms’ randomization devices. A more complete development would assign each active firm an independent uniformly-distributed random variable and have each firm choose a set of realizations that direct it to survive. In this extension, a survival probability equal to one could indicate either that the firm chooses to exit never or that it chooses to exit whenever its random variable falls into a particular non-empty set of measure zero. Throughout this paper, we will assume the former and interpret \( a_{S} = 0 \) and \( a_{S} = 1 \) as dictating certain exit and survival.

2The assumption that entrants immediately contemplate exit might seem strange, but exit immediately following entry never occurs in equilibrium. Furthermore, this timing assumption removes an unrealistic possibility. If entrants did not make these continuation decisions, then they could effectively commit to continuation. This would allow an entrant to displace an incumbent only by virtue of this commitment power.

3See their page 60: “We assume that, in each period, ex ante identical firms decide to enter sequentially until the expected value of entry falls sufficiently to render further entry unprofitable.”
3 Equilibrium

We assume that firms play a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all firms use the same Markov strategy.

3.1 Symmetric Markov-Perfect Equilibrium

A Markov strategy maps payoff-relevant states into actions. When a potential entrant \((t, j)\) makes its entry decision in period \(t\), the payoff-relevant states are the number of firms committed to activity in the next period if firm \((t, j)\) chooses to enter, \(M^t_j \equiv N_t + j\), and the current demand \(Y_t\). We collect these into the vector \((M^t_j, Y_t) \in \mathcal{H} \equiv \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Y}\). Similarly, we collect the payoff-relevant state variables of a firm contemplating survival in period \(t\) in the \(\mathcal{H}\)-valued \((N_{E,t}, Y_t)\). Since survival decisions are made simultaneously, this state is the same for all active firms. A Markov strategy is a pair of functions \(a_E : \mathcal{H} \to \{0, 1\}\) and \(a_S : \mathcal{H} \to [0, 1]\). The entry rule \(a_E\) assigns a binary indicator of entry to each possible state. Similarly, \(a_S\) gives a survival probability for each possible state. Since time and firms’ names themselves are not payoff-relevant, we henceforth drop the subscript \(t\) and the superscript \(j\) from the payoff-relevant states.

In a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, a firm’s expected continuation value at a particular node of the game can be written as a function of that node’s payoff-relevant state variables. Two of these value functions are particularly useful for the model’s equilibrium analysis: the post-entry value function, \(v_E\), and the post-survival value function, \(v_S\). The post-entry value \(v_E(N_{E}, Y)\) equals the expected discounted profits of a firm in a market with demand state \(Y\) and \(N_{E}\) firms just after all entry decisions are made. The post-survival value \(v_S(N', Y)\) equals the expected discounted profits from being active in the same market with \(N'\) firms just after the survival outcomes are realized. Figure 1 shows the points in the survival stage when these value functions apply.

A firm’s post-survival value equals the expected sum of the profit and post-entry value that accrue to the firm in the next period, discounted to the current period with \(\rho\):

\[v_S(n', y) = \rho \mathbb{E}_{a_E} \left[ \pi(n', Y') + v_E(N'_E, Y') \right] | N' = n', Y = y\]. (1)

Here, \(\mathbb{E}_{a_E}\) is an expectation over the next period’s demand state \(Y'\) and post-entry
number of firms $N_E'$. This expectation operator’s subscript indicates its dependence on $a_E$. In particular, given $N' = n'$, $N_E'$ is a deterministic function of $a_E(\cdot, Y')$. Note that Assumption A1 implies that $v_E$ is bounded from above. This ensures that the expectation in the right-hand side of (1) exists.\(^4\)

Because the payoff from leaving the market is zero, a firm’s post-entry value in a state $(n_E, y)$ equals the probability that it survives, $a_S(n_E, y)$, times the expected payoff from surviving:\(^5\)

$$v_E(n_E, y) = a_S(n_E, y) \, \mathbb{E}_{a_S} \left[ v_S(N', y) \mid N_E = n_E, Y = y \right].$$

(2)

The expectation $\mathbb{E}_{a_S}$ over $N'$ takes survival of the firm of interest as given. That is, it takes $N'$ to equal one plus the outcome of $n_E - 1$ independent Bernoulli (survival) trials with success probability $a_S(n_E, y)$. Its subscript makes its dependence on $a_S$ explicit. It conditions on the current value of $Y$ because this influences the survival probability’s value.

If a strategy $(a_E, a_S)$ forms a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with payoffs $(v_E, v_S)$, then no firm can gain from a one-shot deviation from its prescriptions:\(^6\)

$$a_E(m, y) \in \arg \max_{a \in \{0,1\}} a \left( \mathbb{E}_{a_E} [v_E(N_E, y) \mid M = m, Y = y] - \varphi(m, y) \right) \quad \text{and} \quad (3)$$

$$a_S(n_E, y) \in \arg \max_{a \in [0,1]} a \mathbb{E}_{a_S} [v_S(N', y) \mid N_E = n_E, Y = y]. \quad (4)$$

Together with Assumption A2, (3) and (4) bound the long-run number of firms in equilibrium.

**Lemma 1 (Bounded number of firms)** *In a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, $a_E(n, y) = 0$ and $a_S(n, y) < 1$ for all $n > \tilde{n}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.*

The Appendix provides this Lemma’s proof. Intuitively, firms cannot survive for sure with $n > \tilde{n}$ firms because this would give them negative payoffs. To see this, note that if all firms continue for sure, each would earn a negative profit one or more times (due to our assumption $\pi(n, y) < 0$ for all $n > \tilde{n}$). In the first future period in which firms leave with positive probability, (4) requires the post-entry value to equal zero. Therefore, continuing for sure with $n > \tilde{n}$ yields a negative

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\(^4\)At this point in our model’s development, we cannot exclude the possibility that it equals $-\infty$.

\(^5\)We define the right-hand side of (2) to equal zero if the firm collects a payoff of zero by exiting for sure ($a_S(n_E, y) = 0$), even if $\mathbb{E}_{a_S} [v_S(N', y) \mid N_E = n_E, Y = y] = -\infty$.

\(^6\)We define the maximands in the right-hand sides of (3) and (4) to equal zero if $a = 0$. 
expected payoff. Any firm could avoid this by exiting instead, so $a_S(n, y) < 1$ and $v_E(n, y) = 0$. Because no firm would be willing to pay a positive sunk cost to enter a survival subgame with zero expected payoff, $a_E(n, y) = 0$.

In equilibrium, the market can have more than $\hat{n}$ active firms only if the initial number of active firms, $N_1$, exceeds $\hat{n}$. Because these firms exit with positive probability until there are $\hat{n}$ or fewer of them, $N_t$ must eventually enter $\{0, 1, \ldots, \hat{n}\}$ permanently. Consequently, the equilibrium analysis hereafter focuses on the restrictions of $a_E, v_E, a_S, \text{and } v_S$ to $\{1, 2, \ldots, \hat{n}\} \times Y \subset H$. Extending an equilibrium strategy on this restricted state space to the full state space is straightforward.

Lemma 1 implies that setting the number of potential entrants per period ($j$) to exceed $\hat{n}$ guarantees that at least one potential entrant per period refuses an entry opportunity. In this sense, the model becomes one of free entry, as in Ericson and Pakes (1995). This is a standard and convenient assumption in applications without an identifiable and finite set of potentially active firms. The remaining development of our model imposes this free entry assumption ($j > \hat{n}$).

In the online supplement, we show that (3) and (4) are not only necessary, but also sufficient for $(a_E, a_S)$ to be an equilibrium strategy. Proofs of this “one-shot deviation principle” (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Theorem 4.2) typically make assumptions on payoffs that bound from both above and below the value gains from deviating in the distant future from any strategy, whether that strategy satisfies (3) and (4) or not. Our model does not satisfy these assumptions, because it imposes no lower bound on profits.\(^{7}\) Conditions (3) and (4) do, however, imply a lower bound (corresponding to the outside option of zero) on the values in the survival and entry nodes in equilibrium (including $v_E$). Because the expected discounted profits in these decision nodes are bounded from above under any strategy profile, the gains from deviating from a strategy $(a_E, a_S)$ that satisfies (3) and (4) are bounded from above. Using this, we adapt existing proofs of the one-shot deviation principle.

Before proceeding to characterize the equilibrium set, we wish to note and dispense with an uninteresting source of equilibrium multiplicity. If a potential

\(^{7}\)The absence of a lower bound on profits is important when we bring the model to the data as we do in Abbring et al. (2017), where we provide a full econometric development of the model presented here. There, $y$ is vector-valued and includes two elements, a demand state that is observed by the econometrician and a cost shock that is unobserved by the econometrician. These cost shocks serve as the model’s econometric error. Permitting profits to be unbounded from below (and therefore permitting cost shocks to become arbitrarily large) is critical for ensuring that the model is statistically nondegenerate.
entrant is indifferent between entering and staying out, we may be able to construct one equilibrium from another by varying only that choice. Similarly, an incumbent monopolist can be indifferent between continuation and exit, and we can possibly construct one equilibrium from another by changing that choice alone. To avoid such uninteresting caveats to our results, we follow Abbring and Campbell (2010) by focusing on equilibria that default to inactivity. In such an equilibrium, a potential entrant that is indifferent between entering or not stays out,

\[ E_a \left[ v_E(N_E, y)|M = m, Y = y \right] = \varphi(m, y) \Rightarrow a_E(m, y) = 0, \]

and an active firm that is indifferent between all possible outcomes of the survival stage exits,

\[ v_S(1, y) = \cdots = v_S(n_E, y) = 0 \Rightarrow a_S(n_E, y) = 0. \]

The restriction to equilibria that default to inactivity does not restrict the game’s strategy space. Hereafter, we require the strategy underlying a “symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium” to default to inactivity. When \( Y \) follows a continuous distribution, an exact indifference between activity and inactivity occurs with probability zero. For this reason, the restriction to equilibria that default to inactivity is very weak.

### 3.2 Existence, Uniqueness, and Computation

A key step in the equilibrium analysis uses the assumption that the per period profit weakly decreases with the number of competitors to show that the same monotonicity applies to the post-survival value functions.

**Lemma 2 (Monotone equilibrium payoffs)** In a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, \( v_S(n', y) \) weakly decreases with \( n' \) for all \( y \in \mathcal{Y} \).

The Appendix contains Lemma 2’s proof. It says that no endogenous complementarity between firms arises in equilibrium. To appreciate its implications, consider a one-shot simultaneous-moves survival game played by \( n_E \) active firms. In it, each of the \( n' \) survivors earns \( v_S(n', y) \), where \( v_S \) is the post-survival value in a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of our dynamic game, and each exiting firm earns zero. A survival probability \( a_S(n_E, y) \) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy of this one-shot game if and only if it satisfies (4). Thus, a survival rule \( a_S \) from a symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibrium gives a symmetric Nash equilibrium survival probability \( a_S(n_E, y) \) for each one-shot game defined by \( n_E \in \{1, \ldots, \hat{n}\} \) and \( y \in \mathcal{Y} \). The converse also holds good: A collection of Nash equilibrium survival probabilities from survival games can be assembled into a survival rule.

This one-shot game has many equilibria in the trivial case that \( v_S(1, y) = \cdots = v_S(n_E, y) = 0 \). In this case, our restriction to equilibria that default to inactivity requires \( a_S(n_E, y) = 0 \). In the more interesting case where \( v_S(n', y) \neq 0 \) for at least one \( n' \in \{1, \ldots, n_E\} \), Lemma 2 guarantees that the one-shot game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. To show this, we distinguish three mutually exclusive subcases.

- \( v_S(1, y) \leq 0 \). Lemma 2 implies that \( v_S(n', y) \leq 0 \) for all \( n' > 1 \). Therefore, exiting for sure is a weakly dominant strategy. Since \( v_S(n', y) \neq 0 \) for at least one \( n' \in \{1, \ldots, n_E\} \), we also know that \( v_S(n_E, y) < 0 \). This makes exiting for sure the unique best response to any positive symmetric continuation probability, so there is only one symmetric equilibrium. In it, \( a_S(n_E, y) = 0 \).

- \( v_S(n_E, y) \geq 0 \). Lemma 2 implies that \( v_S(n', y) \geq 0 \) for \( n' < n_E \). Therefore, continuing for sure is a weakly dominant strategy. Since \( v_S(n', y) \neq 0 \) for at least one \( n' \in \{1, \ldots, n_E\} \), we also know that \( v_S(1, y) > 0 \). This makes continuing for sure the unique best response to any continuation probability less than one, so there is only one symmetric equilibrium. In it, \( a_S(n_E, y) = 1 \).

- \( v_S(1, y) > 0 > v_S(n_E, y) \). No symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, because the best response to all other firms continuing for sure is to exit for sure, and vice versa. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, firms must be indifferent between continuation and exit. By the intermediate value theorem, there is some \( a \in (0, 1) \) that solves the indifference condition

\[
\sum_{n'=1}^{n_E} \binom{n_E - 1}{n' - 1} a^{n'-1} (1 - a)^{n_E-n'} v_S(n', y) = 0,
\]

where the left-hand side gives the expected value from survival when all other \( n_E - 1 \) firms survive with probability \( a \) and the right-hand side gives the value from exit. This establishes existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Lemma 2 and this case’s preconditions together guarantee that the left-hand side strictly decreases with \( a \). Therefore, there is only one symmetric mixed
For future reference, we state this equilibrium uniqueness result with

**Corollary 1** Fix \( n_E \in \{1,\ldots,\tilde{n}\} \) and \( y \in \mathcal{Y} \), let \( v_S \) be the post-survival value function associated with a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, and suppose that \( v_S(n',y) \neq 0 \) for at least one \( n' \in \{1,\ldots,n_E\} \). In the one-shot survival game in which \( n_E \) firms simultaneously choose between survival and exit (as in the survival stage of Figure 1), each of the \( n' \) survivors earns \( v_S(n',y) \), and each exiting firm earns zero; there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies.

When the individual payoff from joint continuation is positive, this unique Nash-equilibrium strategy from Corollary 1 guarantees that firms survive for sure and receive this payoff. In all other states, each firm is either indifferent between surviving and exiting or prefers to exit for sure; and following the strategy gives each of them an expected payoff of zero. The post-entry payoff is always zero in the trivial case with \( v_S(1,y) = \cdots = v_S(n_E,y) = 0 \) excluded by Corollary 1. Thus,

**Corollary 2** If \( v_E \) and \( v_S \) are the post-entry and post-survival value functions associated with a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, then

\[
v_E(n_E, y) = \max \{ 0, v_S(n_E, y) \}.
\]

Note that Corollary 2 in combination with Lemma 2 implies that \( v_E(n_E, y) \) also weakly decreases with \( n_E \).

We proceed to demonstrate equilibrium existence constructively using Algorithm 1. Equilibrium uniqueness follows from this as a byproduct. Denote the candidate equilibrium values that the algorithm calculates with \( v_E \) and \( v_S \), and the corresponding candidate equilibrium strategy with \((\alpha_E, \alpha_S)\).

First, consider states with \( \tilde{n} \) firms. By Lemma 1, there will be no entry in a period starting with \( \tilde{n} \) firms. With (1), this implies that any possible candidate equilibrium post-survival value must satisfy

\[
v_S(\tilde{n}, y) = \rho \mathbb{E}[\pi(\tilde{n}, Y') + v_E(\tilde{n}, Y') | Y = y].
\]

With Corollary 2, this constrains the candidate post-entry value to satisfy

\[
v_E(\tilde{n}, y) = \max \left\{ 0, \rho \mathbb{E}[\pi(\tilde{n}, Y') + v_E(\tilde{n}, Y') | Y = y] \right\}.
\] (5)
Algorithm 1: Equilibrium Calculation

Above, we take $\sum_{m=n+1}^{\tilde{n}} \alpha_E(m, \cdot) \equiv 0$, $T_n$ from (7), and $T_n^i$ to denote $T_n$ composed with itself $i$ times.
The right-hand side of (5) defines a contraction mapping on the space of bounded functions on \( \mathcal{Y} \), with a unique fixed point \( \nu_{E}(\hat{n}, \cdot) \). This \( \nu_{E}(\hat{n}, \cdot) \) is the only possible equilibrium post-entry value in a state with \( \hat{n} \) firms. Moreover, any entry rule that is (i) consistent with it, (ii) one-shot deviation proof as in (3), and (iii) defaults to inactivity must dictate entry into a market with \( \hat{n} - 1 \) incumbents if and only if the payoff from doing so is positive. Thus, the algorithm sets

\[
\alpha_{E}(\hat{n}, y) = 1 \left[ \nu_{E}(\hat{n}, y) > \varphi(\hat{n}, y) \right].
\]

Here, \( 1[x] = 1 \) if \( x \) is true and equals 0 otherwise.

With \( \nu_{E}(\hat{n}, \cdot) \) and \( \alpha_{E}(\hat{n}, \cdot) \) calculated, the algorithm proceeds with the recursive construction of \( \nu_{E}(n, \cdot) \) and \( \alpha_{E}(n, \cdot) \) for \( n \) decreasing from \( \hat{n} - 1 \) to 1. For a given \( n \), the algorithm has already calculated \( \nu_{E}(n^{\star}, \cdot) \) and \( \alpha_{E}(n^{\star}, \cdot) \) for \( n^{\star} = n + 1, n + 2, ..., \hat{n} \). Suppose that \( \nu_{E}(n^{\star}, \cdot) \) and \( \alpha_{E}(n^{\star}) \) weakly decrease with \( n^{\star} \) (which, by Lemma 2 and Corollary 2, they will if \( \nu_{E} \) is indeed an equilibrium post-entry value). Then,

\[
\mu(n, y) = n + \sum_{m=n+1}^{\hat{n}} \alpha_{E}(m, y)
\]
equals the number of firms that will be active in a period that starts with \( n \) firms after all that period’s potential entrants have followed the candidate entry rule. Together, (1) and Corollary 2 require the candidate post-entry values to satisfy

\[
\nu_{E}(n, y) = \max \left\{ 0, \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \pi(n, Y') + \nu_{E}(\mu(n, Y'), y') \mid Y = y \right] \right\}.
\]

(6)

Given \( \nu_{E}(n^{\star}, \cdot) \) for \( n^{\star} = n + 1, \ldots, \hat{n} \), the right-hand side of (6) defines a contraction

\[
T_n(f)(y) = \max \left\{ 0, \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \pi(n, Y') + 1[\mu(n, Y') = n] f(Y') \right] \right\}
\]

\[
+ 1[\mu(n, Y') > n] \nu_{E}(\mu(n, Y'), y') \mid Y = y \right\}
\]

(7)

with a unique fixed point \( \nu_{E}(\cdot, \cdot) \). This is the only possible post-entry value. Finally, a firm in state \( (n, y) \) enters if and only if \( \nu_{E}(\mu(n, y), y) > \varphi(n, y) \). Again supposing that \( \nu_{E}(n^{\star}, y) \) and \( \alpha_{E}(n^{\star}, y) \) weakly decrease with \( n^{\star} \), and using that \( \varphi(n^{\star}, y) \) weakly increases with \( n^{\star} \), this entry rule can be simplified to

\[
\alpha_{E}(n, y) = 1 \left[ \nu_{E}(n, y) > \varphi(n, y) \right].
\]

Once the algorithm’s recursive part is complete, it has constructed a candidate post-entry value and entry rule. With (1), these imply a unique candidate post-survival value \( \nu_{S} \). After computing \( \nu_{S} \), the algorithm ends by setting the candidate survival rule \( \alpha_{S} \) to a value consistent with \( \nu_{S} \) and the analysis leading up to Corollary
1. Specifically, it sets $\alpha_S(n_E, y) = 0$ for all $(n_E, y)$ such that $\nu_S(n_E, y) = \cdots = \nu_S(1, y) = 0$ (the algorithm subsumes this in the case that $\nu_S(1, y) \leq 0$) and finds an equilibrium to Corollary 1’s one-shot survival game for all other $(n_E, y)$.

If the candidate is actually an equilibrium, then Corollary 1 guarantees that this candidate survival rule exists and is unique. This is indeed so.

**Theorem 1 (Equilibrium existence and uniqueness)** There exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy and corresponding equilibrium payoffs are those computed by Algorithm 1.

### 4 Conclusion

This paper’s theoretical and computational results enable our model’s empirical application. Since its key simplifying assumption imposes homogeneity of expected profits when firms make their entry and continuation choices, it is best suited for investigations that can be usefully undertaken while abstracting from persistent heterogeneity among competing firms. Examples of such studies include Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1994) and Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu’s (2013) estimations of oligopolists’ sunk costs with panel data on firm counts and demand from cross sections of markets. In Abbring, Campbell, Tilly, and Yang (2017), we propose a simple procedure for empirically determining whether or not our model can be usefully applied to such data from a given industry. This decomposes the industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ($HHI$) into its value with equally sized firms and a residual that we label the *contribution of heterogeneity*. Our procedure tests whether this heterogeneity measure contributes to forecasts of the number of active firms. If not, then our model can accommodate observed heterogeneity with *transitory* firm-specific disturbances. We applied this procedure to data from Motion Picture Theaters in 573 Micropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States. We found that heterogeneity’s contribution to the $HHI$ makes economically trivial contributions to Poisson regressions’ forecasts of the number of firms serving that industry.

Our companion paper also demonstrates the practicality of applying our model to such data by estimating Motion Picture Theaters’ sunk costs and the toughness of competition between them. The model’s maximum likelihood estimation requires calculating a separate equilibrium for each market in the data for each trial value of its parameters, but this required only about thirty minutes using two Intel Xeon
E5-2699 v3 CPUs (released by Intel in 2014) on a single machine with C++ code. We were also able to conduct many policy experiments, which calculated the effects of large demand shocks and counterfactual competition policies. This experience leads us to conclude that structural investigations of oligopoly dynamics based on this paper’s model can be done with few computational resources.

References


Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. First, we will prove that $a_S(n, y) < 1$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $n > \bar{n}$. Consider a period $t^*$ survival subgame with $N_{E,t^*} = n > \bar{n}$ firms and demand state $Y_{t^*} = y$. Define the random time $\tau$ as the first period weakly after $t^*$ in which firms choose exit with positive probability, with $\tau \equiv \infty$ if they never do:

$$\tau \equiv \min \left( \{ t \geq t^* : a_S(N_{E,t}, Y_t) < 1 \} \cup \{ \infty \} \right).$$

Suppose that $a_S(n, y) = 1$, so $\tau > t^*$. By definition, exit occurs only in or after period $\tau$, so we know that $N_t = N_{E,t-1} \geq n$ for $t \in \{ t^* + 1, \ldots, \tau \}$. (Recall from Footnote 1 that we take $a_S(\cdot) = 1$ to dictate sure survival, not merely almost-sure survival.) Since $n > \bar{n}$, this together with Assumption A2 implies that $\pi(N_t, Y_t) < 0$ for $t \in \{ t^* + 1, \ldots, \tau \}$. If $\tau = \infty$, then the incumbent firms receive an infinite sequence of strictly negative payoffs. If instead $\tau < \infty$, then the incumbent firms receive a finite sequence of strictly negative payoffs followed by the post-entry value from playing the period $\tau$ survival subgame $v_E(N_{E,\tau}, Y_\tau)$, which equals zero by (2), (4), and the definition of $\tau$. Therefore, the period $t^*$ post-survival value satisfies $v_S(n, y) < 0$. Since a period $t^*$ incumbent firm can raise its payoff to zero by choosing certain exit, the supposition that $a_S(n, y) = 1$ must be incorrect.

Next, we will prove that $a_E(n, y) = 0$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and $n > \bar{n}$. Consider the decision of the first potential entrant, firm $(t^*, 1)$, in a period $t^*$ entry subgame that starts with $N_{t^*} = n - 1 > \bar{n} - 1$ incumbents and demand state $Y_{t^*} = y$. Note that this firm pays $\varphi(n, y) > 0$ upon entry. In return, it earns a post-entry value of zero.
(as proven above). Therefore, it maximizes its payoff by staying out of the market and earning zero: \( a_E(n, y) = 0 \). 

**Proof of Lemma 2.** It suffices to prove that \( v_S(n', y) \geq v_S(n' + 1, y) \) for all \( n' \geq 1 \) and \( y \in \mathcal{Y} \). To this end, consider a subgame beginning immediately after the period \( t^* \)'s simultaneous continuation and entry choices with \( N_{t^* + 1}^n = n' \) and \( Y_{t^*} = y \). We call this the original subgame. Now consider a second period \( t^* \) subgame starting at the same point but with one additional firm. We refer to this as the perturbed subgame and use \( N_{t}^n \) and \( N_{E, t}^n \) to denote the initial and post-entry numbers of firms in this perturbed subgame in period \( t \). Finally, define the random time \( \tau^+ \) as the first period weakly after \( t^* + 1 \), in which the firms in the perturbed subgame choose exit with positive probability, with \( \tau^+ \equiv \infty \) if they never do:

\[
\tau^+ \equiv \min \{ \{ t \geq t^* + 1 : a_S(N_{E, t}^n, Y_t) < 1 \} \cup \{ \infty \} \}.
\]

There is no exit before period \( \tau^+ \) in the perturbed subgame. Furthermore, we know that the period \( \tau^+ \) post-entry value in that subgame equals zero. Therefore, we can write

\[
v_S(n' + 1, y) = \lim_{T \to \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=t^*+1}^{T} \rho^{t-t^*} 1 \left[ t \leq \tau^+ \right] \pi(N_{E, t}^n, Y_t) \bigg| Y_{t^*} = y \right].
\]

Since \( \tau^+ \) is a consequence of equilibrium choices, we know that \( v_S(n' + 1, y) > -\infty \).

Now consider an incumbent firm in the original subgame which (possibly) deviates after the period \( t^* \) survival stage by choosing to survive for sure as long as \( t < \tau^+ \) and to exit for sure if \( t = \tau^+ \). Let \( \tilde{N}_t \) denote the number firms serving the market during period \( t \) in the original subgame with this deviation. Since the original strategy was part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium, \( v_S(n', y) \) exceeds the expected payoff from following this deviating strategy. That is

\[
v_S(n', y) \geq \lim_{T \to \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=t^*+1}^{T} \rho^{t-t^*} 1 \left[ t \leq \tau^+ \right] \pi(N_{E, t}^n, Y_t) \bigg| Y_{t^*} = y \right].
\]

To show that the limit on the right-hand side is well defined, note that \( \tilde{N}_t \leq N_{E, t}^n \) for all \( t \leq \tau^+ \). Otherwise, the two subgames would have potential entrants in the same states making different entry choices. This would violate either the presumption that the equilibrium strategy is Markov or that it defaults to inactivity. This and Assumption A3 imply that \( \pi(\tilde{N}_t, Y_t) \geq \pi(N_{E, t}^n, Y_t) \) for all \( t = t^* + 1, \ldots, \tau^+ \). Combining this with \( v_S(n' + 1, y) > -\infty \) gives the desired result.
Because the difference of two convergent sequences’ limits equals the limit of the sequences’ difference, we can write

\[ v_S(n', y) - v_S(n' + 1, y) \]

\[ \geq \lim_{T \to \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=T+1}^{\tau^+} \rho^{t-t^*} \mathbb{1} \left( \tau^+ \leq t \right) \left( (\pi(\bar{N}_t, Y_t) - \pi(N^+_t, Y_t)) \right) \mid Y_{\tau^+} = y \right]. \]

Each term in the partial sum on the right-hand side is non-negative, so we conclude that \( v_S(n', y) - v_S(n' + 1, y) \geq 0. \]

**Proof of Theorem 1.** The proof is divided into three parts. First, we show that the candidate post-survival value from Algorithm 1 satisfies Lemma 2’s monotonicity requirements. Second, we use this to demonstrate that the candidate strategy indeed forms an equilibrium. Third, we demonstrate equilibrium uniqueness.

Fix \( n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \tilde{n} - 1\} \) and suppose that we know that \( \nu_E(n + 1, \cdot) \geq \cdots \geq \nu_E(\tilde{n}, \cdot) \). Evaluating \( T_n \) at \( f^*(\cdot) = \nu_E(n + 1, \cdot) \) gives

\[ T_n(f^*)(\cdot) = \max \left\{ 0, \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \pi(n, Y') + f^*(Y') \right] + \mathbb{1} \left[ \mu(n, Y') > n \right] (\nu_E(\mu(n, Y'), Y') - f^*(Y')) \mid Y = \cdot \right\} \]

\[ \geq \max \left\{ 0, \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \pi(n + 1, Y') + f^*(Y') \right] + \mathbb{1} \left[ \mu(n, Y') > n + 1 \right] (\nu_E(\mu(n, Y'), Y') - f^*(Y')) \mid Y = \cdot \right\} \]

\[ = \nu_E(n + 1, \cdot). \]

The inequality in (8) follows from Assumption A3 and the assumed \( f^*(Y') = \nu_E(n + 1, Y') \). Since \( \nu_E(n^*, Y') \) weakly decreases with \( n^* \) for \( n^* > n \), so does \( \alpha_E(n^*, Y') \). Therefore, \( \mu(n, Y') = \mu(n + 1, Y') \) whenever \( \mu(n, Y') > n + 1 \). This gives us (9).

The final equality follows again from \( f^*(Y') = \nu_E(n + 1, Y') \). The operator \( T_n \) is a monotone contraction mapping, so \( T_n(f^*)(\cdot) \geq \nu_E(n + 1, \cdot) \) implies that its fixed point, \( \nu_E(n, \cdot) \), weakly exceeds \( \nu_E(n + 1, \cdot) \). Recursively applying this argument for \( n \) decreasing from \( \tilde{n} - 1 \) to 1 proves that \( \nu_E(1, \cdot) \geq \nu_E(2, \cdot) \cdots \geq \nu_E(\tilde{n}, \cdot) \). With Assumption A3 and the now established fact that \( \mu(n', \cdot) \) weakly increases with \( n' \), this monotonicity implies that

\[ \nu_S(n', \cdot) = \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \pi(n', Y') + \nu_E(\mu(n', \cdot), Y') \mid Y = \cdot \right] \]

weakly decreases with \( n' \). This is the desired monotonicity result.
For the second part, we first verify that $\alpha_E$, $\nu_S$, and $\nu_E$ satisfy (3) and (1). Since $\nu_E(n_E, y)$ weakly decreases with $n_E$, $\alpha_E(m, y)$ weakly decreases with $m$, so that

$$E_{\alpha_E} [\nu_E(N_E, y) | M = m, Y = y] = \nu_E(\mu(m, y), y).$$

Thus, to verify (3), it suffices to show that $\nu_E(\mu(m, y), y) > \varphi(m, y)$ if and only if $\nu_E(m, y) > \varphi(m, y)$. If $\nu_E(\mu(m, y), y) > \varphi(m, y)$ then, because $\mu(m, y) \geq m$ and $\nu_E(n_E, y)$ weakly decreases with $n_E$, $\nu_E(m, y) \geq \nu_E(\mu(m, y), y) > \varphi(m, y)$. Conversely, if $\nu_E(m, y) > \varphi(m, y)$, then $\nu_E(\mu(m, y), y) > \varphi(m, y)$ so that, by Assumption A4, $\nu_E(\mu(m, y), y) > \varphi(m, y)$. This establishes that $\alpha_E$ and $\nu_E$ satisfy (3). Using (10), it is easy to verify that $\alpha_E$, $\nu_S$, and $\nu_E$ satisfy (1).

Next, consider (4) and (2). For states $(n_E, y)$ such that $\nu_S(1, y) = \cdots = \nu_S(n_E, y) = 0$, (4) imposes only the trivial requirement that $\alpha_S(n_E, y) \in [0, 1]$. Algorithm 1’s selection of $\alpha_S(n_E, y) = 0$ (subsumed in the case $\nu_S(1, y) \leq 0$) satisfies this. For all other states, Algorithm 1 sets $\alpha_S(n_E, y)$ to the symmetric Nash equilibrium of Corollary 1’s $n_E$-player one-shot survival game with payoffs $\nu_S(n', y)$ from survival with $n' = 1, \ldots, n_E$ firms, which satisfies (4). (If $\nu_S(n_E, y) = 0 < \nu_S(1, y)$, it sets $\alpha_S(n_E, y)$ to the unique mixing probability that makes firms indifferent, which indeed equals one as in Corollary 1’s equilibrium.) Equation (2) requires $\nu_E(n, y)$ to equal the expected payoff to this game, $\max\{0, \nu_S(n, y)\}$, which is true by construction. We conclude that $(\alpha_E, \alpha_S)$ indeed forms an equilibrium.

We end by demonstrating equilibrium uniqueness. First, Section 3.2’s argument implies that any $\nu_E(\tilde{n}, \cdot)$ equals the unique fixed point $\nu_E(\tilde{n}, \cdot)$ of $T_n$. With (3), this gives a unique $a_E(n, \cdot)$ that defaults to inactivity, $\alpha(n, \cdot)$. Next, repeat the following argument for $n$ decreasing from $\tilde{n} - 1$ to 1. For given $n$, suppose that we have uniquely determined $\nu_E(n^*, \cdot) = \nu_E(n^*, \cdot)$ and $a_E(n^*, \cdot) = \alpha_E(n^*, \cdot)$ for $n^* = n + 1, \ldots, \tilde{n}$. Then, Section 3.2’s argument (which uses (10)) implies that any $\nu_E(n, \cdot)$ equals the unique fixed point $\nu_E(n, \cdot)$ of $T_n$. With (3), this gives a unique $a_E(n, \cdot)$ that defaults to inactivity. By the argument following (10), $a_E(n, \cdot) = \alpha_E(n, \cdot)$. This establishes that $\nu_E = \nu_E$ and $a_E = \alpha_E$. With (1), these imply a unique value of $\nu_S$, $\nu_E$. Finally, Corollary 1 and the requirement that the strategy defaults to inactivity together imply that there is a unique $\alpha_S$ corresponding to this post-entry value, $\alpha_S$. ■