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Publication date:
2011

[Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Humphery-Jenner, M. (2011). *Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-044). Economics.

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Discussion paper

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DISCIPLINE FOLLOWING SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

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April 2011

European Banking Center Discussion Paper
No. 2011-008

This is also a CentER Discussion Paper
No. 2011-044

ISSN 0924-7815

Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions

Abstract

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). While some literature has examined SEC actions, it has not examined SCAs, and has not examined external discipline and the managers's future employment prospects after either action. Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO/CFO turnover and CEO/CFO pay-cuts, and harm CEOs future job-prospects. This suggests that even if the law governing SCAs is sub-optimal, they can still induce internal and external discipline.

Keywords: Securities Class Actions, Securities Law, Governance, Ethics, Takeovers, Managerial Turnover, Fraud, Disclosure

JEL Classification: G28, G34, G38, K22, K41

1 Introduction

This paper examines what happens to the managers of companies that are accused of poor disclosure and of issuing misleading statements. CEOs,

CFOs, and the companies they manage, may mislead the market by issuing false statements or by concealing value-relevant information. I hypothesize that a SCA highlights poor managerial ethics and governance. I predict that this signal encourages boards to discipline managers by firing them or reducing their pay, harms managers' future job prospects, and makes the firm a target for a disciplinary takeover designed to remove inefficient managers. I find support for these predictions using a sample of 416 SCAs.

Two legal ramifications for misleading the market are a 'securities class action' (SCA) initiated by shareholders and a 'regulatory action' initiated by the SEC. The difference between SCAs and regulatory actions important for two reasons: (1) The regulator initiates and funds a regulatory action. Shareholders initiate securities class actions, often at the suggestion of a lawyer. They often receive funding from an external litigation funder who funds the action in return for a share of the winnings.¹ Thus, SCAs may capture riskier cases that the regulatory might ignore (Chen, Firth, and Gao, 2005; Chen, 2003). (2) The law on SCAs has received substantial criticism,² so it is unclear whether SCAs are currently an effective disciplinary mechanism.

There is limited empirical evidence on the ramifications of SCAs or regulatory actions. The literature on regulatory actions shows that (1) regulatory actions reduce firm value (Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998; Karpoff and Lott, 1993); and, (2) regulatory actions (as opposed to SCAs) can induce CEO turnover and pay cuts (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Karpoff, 1999; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008). The literature on SCAs has focused on the company and CEO characteristics that make securities class actions more likely

¹An example is the DQE Inc litigation, in which the lawyers obtained 33.3% of a USD 12 million settlement.

²See for example: Fox (2005, 2006); Humphery-Jenner (2011b); Langevoort (1996); Lev and de Villiers (1994).

(see for example Griffin, Lont, and Segal, 2010; Johnson, Ryan, and Tian, 2009b; Jones and Wu, 2010; Peng and Röell, 2008). The literature has not examined the implications of SCAs for managers, or of either action for external discipline and future job prospects.

This paper addresses several gaps in the literature: (1) Do SCAs induces internal discipline in the form of job-losses. (2) Does misconduct harm future job prospects? (3) Does misconduct precipitate falls in managerial compensation? (4) Does misconduct induce external discipline in the form of a disciplinary takeover?

I address the relation between SCAs and internal/external discipline. I examine a sample of 416 SCAs that occur between 1996 an 2007 and compare them to a control sample comprising 11,767 firm-year observations. I focus on internal and external discipline following the announcement of a SCA.³ The paper tests four issues: (1) do SCAs destroy corporate value, (2) do SCAs precipitate CEO/CFO turnover and harm managers' future job prospects, (3) do CEOs/CFOs suffer pay cuts following SCAs, and , and (4) do SCAs make disciplinary takeovers more likely?

The results show that SCAs significantly reduce firm value, as proxied by the market's reaction to the announcement of litigation, significantly increase the likelihood that the CEO and CFO will suffer a pay cut or leave the company, and significantly increase the likelihood of receiving a disciplinary takeover bid. This implies that even if the law governing SCAs is sub-optimal, it does have tangible governance implications.

These findings make several important contributions to the literature. First, they provide new insight into the internal and external governance

³The focus on the announcement rather than the settlement is to (a) avoid any look-ahead bias, and (b) to avoid any contamination arising from the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of either party's legal representation.

following the initiation of a SCA. Second, they show that fraudulent conduct can induce disciplinary takeovers. Third, the results show that SCAs harm CEOs' job-prospects at other firms. Fourth, they show that boards are willing to perform their over-sight function by reducing CEOs' fixed salary compensation. Overall, the results help to further our understanding of the disciplinary implications of engaging in fraudulent conduct.

The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the sample construction. Section 4 tests the threshold issue of whether securities litigation reduces firm value. Section 5 determines if turnover increases following litigation. Section 6 tests whether CEO and CFO compensation falls following securities litigation. Section 7 examines whether securities class actions make disciplinary takeovers more likely. Section 8 ensures that the results are robust, and Section 9 concludes.

2 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions

The goal is to examine whether SCAs encourage internal or external discipline. A threshold issue is whether class actions reduce firm value. This induces several predictions.

The threshold prediction is that securities class actions should reduce firm value. The rationale is that poor disclosures and governance imply agency conflicts and poor managerial ethics. This should reduce firm value (Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2006; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). Securities fraud implies inadequate or misleading disclosure (Fox, 2005). Therefore, securities class actions should imply reductions in firm value. Consistent

with this, prior literature shows that firm values decrease following prosecutions for criminal fraud (Karpoff and Lott, 1993) and SEC regulatory actions (Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles, 1998).

The occurrence of a SCA should reduce value even if the manager is likely to be disciplined. This is because (1) future disciplining is uncertain, (2) the occurrence of a SCA sheds doubt on the firm’s reported performance and governance, and (3) the SCA implies that the current market value is based on false information; and thus, that the stock might be over-priced. Therefore, the threshold prediction (in Prediction 2.1) is that the firm’s value decreases upon announcement of the securities class action.

Prediction 2.1 (Value Reduction Prediction). The firm’s value decreases upon announcement of the securities class action.

I predict that SCAs will also encourage disciplinary actions. The overarching theory is that the occurrence of a SCA implies poor governance and managerial malfeasance. If the board (or the market for corporate control) functions properly, then it should discipline managers for this malfeasance. This induces several discipline-related hypotheses.

First, securities class actions should increase the likelihood of CEO and CFO turnover. Boards are less likely to remove strong-performing managers than they are to remove poorly performing managers (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Subsequently, Lehn and Zhao (2006) find that CEOs who make value-reducing takeovers are significantly more likely to be fired. Further, Kang (2008) and Tillman (2009) suggest that fraud-actions harm the firm’s reputation. This implies that managers whose conduct invites SCAs should be more likely to be fired.

CFOs should also be more likely to be fired following securities class actions. This is for two reasons. (1) The two parties mainly responsible

for financial disclosure are the CEO and the CFO (Arjoon, 2005). Both, CEOs and CFOs have fiduciary responsibilities vis-à-vis the firm (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2008). Subsequently, Tillman (2009) shows that (a) law suits name CFOs in 78% of cases and name CEOs in 90% of cases; and (b) 94% of cases that name the CFO also name the CEO. (2) CEOs and CFOs generate close working ties. These ties might make it difficult to maintain a co-operative relationship with the CFO if the board dismisses the CEO in acrimonious circumstances (Buettner, Hilger, Richter, Schaffer, and Zander, 2010; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002). Therefore, SCAs should increase the likelihood of CFO dismissal, but should mainly do so when the CEO is also dismissed. This induces the prediction:

Prediction 2.2 (Managerial Turnover Prediction). A CEO and/or a CFO is more likely to leave a company in year $t + 1$ if there was a securities class action in year t . Firing should harm the manager’s future job prospects.

Second, securities class actions should reduce CEO and CFO pay. The compensation literature indicates that CEO pay should be sensitive to performance (Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles, 1995; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Conduct inviting a regulatory action or a SCA is some evidence of poor performance. Subsequently, Persons (2006) suggests that SEC regulatory actions induce CEO pay cuts. This indicates that SCAs should similarly sound in pay reductions. To the extent that CFOs are also held responsible for releasing false information to the market, CFOs should also suffer pay cuts. A well functioning board should especially target reductions in fixed salary-based compensation, rather than stock-linked compensation, in order to avoid further misaligning shareholder-manager incentives (following Kang, Kumar, and Lee, 2006; Mehran, 1995). This induces Prediction 2.3.

Prediction 2.3 (Managerial Pay Prediction). Litigation in year t should increase the likelihood that the CEO's (and CFO's) pay is lower in year $t + 1$.

Third, securities class actions should increase the likelihood of a 'disciplinary' takeover. A disciplinary takeover is one whose purpose is to remove inefficient managers or to address agency conflicts (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Offenberg, 2009; Scharfstein, 1988). While Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) find little evidence to support the claim that under-performing targets are subject to takeover bids, other literature finds that poor internal governance encourages disciplinary takeovers (see John and Senbet, 1998; Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 1995, 2004; Shivdasani, 1993). Behavior that induces a securities class action could evidence agency conflicts. Subsequently, firms that are subject to a securities class action in year t should be more likely to sustain a 'disciplinary' takeover bid in year $t + 1$. This induces Prediction 2.4.

Prediction 2.4 (Disciplinary Takeover Prediction). A securities class action in year t increases the likelihood of a disciplinary takeover bid in year $t + 1$.

I note that there are two alternative hypothesis. First, (a) poorly performing managers are more likely to inspire a SCA, (b) poorly performing managers are more likely to be disciplined even if there is no SCA; and thus, (c) any SCA/discipline relation is merely a performance/discipline relation. I examine this alternative hypothesis in robustness tests by ensuring that the results hold in a propensity score matched sample and across industry adjusted ROA quartiles. Second, CEOs/CFOs may become scape-goats. I examine this in robustness tests by focusing on SCAs that induce a negative market reaction.⁴

⁴I note that the results hold in the propensity score matched sample, the ROA sorts,

3 Data and Sample Construction

The paper analyzes 416 securities class actions (SCAs) that occur between 1996 and 2007 and compares them to a control sample of non-litigated firms. It examines managerial turnover, paycuts, and disciplinary takeovers in year $t + 1$ conditional on whether there was a class action in year t . The focus on disciplinary action within one year of a litigation announcement (if any) is to avoid contamination due to disciplinary action for unrelated reasons. Using a control sample ameliorates any sample-selection bias that would arise if the sample only included firms that suffered a SCA. The class actions are law suits for issuing statements that the shareholders claim were false. The litigation data is from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House. Firm-level data is from Compustat. Executive compensation data is from Execucomp. The sample excludes firms that lack Compustat or Execucomp data. Table 1 defines the variables. The subsequent sections explain the variables in detail.

The sample construction is as follows. For each year t there is the sample of all firms for which there is data in Compustat and Execucomp. For each firm i , the dummy variable $SCA_{i,t}$ equals one if a securities class action is initiated against it in year t . Therefore, in each year, there are two sets of firms: (1) those that sustain a securities class action; and (2) those that do not. The models do not require the SCA to be successful. This is because the models analyze the relation between the initiation of a SCA in year t and disciplinary action in year $t + 1$. Many SCAs settle several years after initiation.⁵ Thus, focusing on successful SCAs imposes look-ahead bias

and in models that only use negatively received SCAs.

⁵For example, the class action filed against Health South Corporation (ticker: HRC) in October 1998 settled in February 2006. Similarly, the action initiated against Xerox (ticker: XRC) in August 2000 settled in March 2008.

and model-misspecification. Further, extending the window for disciplinary action from $t + 1$ to (say) $t + 4$, to give the litigation time to conclude, increases the risk of spurious correlation and contaminating factors driving the results.

The sample excludes any observations for which the CEO's age exceeds 70. This is because the literature generally classifies a departure as forced if the CEO is below a certain age, usually between 60 and 70 years old (see Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). The study imposes this restriction on all models in order to promote stability in the sample size.⁶

The total sample comprises 12,183 firm-year observations. This comprises 416 firm-years where there is a SCA, and 11,767 firm-year observations where there is no SCA. Table 2 contains sample composition by year. The number of class actions per year has increased over time. Class actions increased the most between 2001 and 2002, corresponding with the end of the tech-boom, and with the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This suggests that regression models should include year dummies to control for year effects, and should explicitly control for the introduction of SOX.

The key issues are then whether class actions destroy firm value, and if so, whether they induce internal or external discipline. Thus, the following sections consider whether class actions (a) reduce firm value (Section 4), (b) increase the likelihood of CEO turnover (Section 5), (c) reduce CEO pay (Section 6), and (d) induce disciplinary takeovers (Section 7). These sections discuss the dependent and independent variables in more detail.

⁶Relaxing this assumption does not qualitatively change the results.

4 Do securities class actions reduce firm value?

The threshold issue is whether securities class actions reduce firm value. I predict that the market should react negatively to the announcement of a SCA even if SCAs precipitate disciplinary action on average. The main reasons are: (1) disciplinary actions are not certain, (2) even if the CEO/CFO is certain to be replaced, the CEO's/CFO's successor is not certain, (3) the SCA is a signal of some poor internal governance and management, this may signal poor managerial ethics and indicate that the firm's current price is based on inaccurate disclosure.

I analyze value-destruction by assessing the market's reaction to the SCA. The market's reaction to the litigation-announcement is a proxy for whether litigation reduces firm value (following Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). The buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the litigation announcement are a proxy for the litigation's long-term value implications (following Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Megginson, Morgan, and Nail, 2004).

The proxy for the market's reaction to the announcement is the cumulative abnormal return surrounding the announcement. The abnormal return on day t , denoted $AR_{i,t}$, is the firm's return on day t less the return predicted by an OLS estimation of the market model computed over the period 11-days before the announcement to 210 days before the announcement.⁷ The cumulative abnormal return from τ_1 days before the announcement to τ_2 days after the announcement (denoted, $CAR_{i,(\tau_1,\tau_2)}$) is the sum of firm i 's abnormal returns between days τ_1 and τ_2 .

The proxy for persistence of any negative reaction is the buy and hold abnormal return. This is the compound actual return less the predicted

⁷Section 8 ensures the results are robust to abnormal return specification.

return. The predicted return derives from an OLS estimation of the market model. The compounding occurs from day τ_1 to day τ_2 . The buy and hold abnormal return over the interval is denoted $\text{BHAR}_{i,(\tau_1, \tau_2)}$.

The results suggest that litigated firms have significantly negative CARs and BHARs. Table 3 contains the CARs and BHARs in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The results show that the market reacts significantly and negatively to the announcement of a securities class action and this reaction persists long-term.

This negative reaction to securities class actions holds both before and after the implementation of SOX.) CARs and BHARs are significant and negative in the pre-SOX and post-SOX subsamples. However, the CARs are insignificantly more negative, and BHARs are significantly more negative, before the introduction of SOX than after the introduction of SOX.

There are two key explanations for the impact of SOX. First, the number of SCAs increased after 2002. Many of these are (arguably) frivolous (Choi, 2007; Coffee, 2006). Thus, the market might expect the SCA to yield minimal damages. This might reduce the market's reaction to the announcement of the SCA. Second, and alternatively, it may be that SOX improves firms' internal governance mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007; Coates, 2007). This enables boards to discipline culpable managers. Thus, the board can limit value-destruction. Further, if SCAs precipitate a disciplinary takeover, they might imply the possibility of a takeover premium. The market might realize this; and thus, the market might react less negatively to SCAs that occur after SOX. This motivates further analysis of the implications of class actions for CEOs and CFOs.

5 Do securities class actions induce CEO and CFO turnover?

Dismissal is one way to punish CEOs and CFOs. Thus, the issue is whether litigation increases the likelihood that the CEO or CFO will leave the company immediately following the instigation of a securities class action.

5.1 Methodology

The first issue is whether securities class actions induce management turnover. The CEO is the key manager of interest. However, class actions might also induce turnover of other executives, such as the CFO.

There are two sets of models. The first set examines whether SCAs increase the likelihood that the CEO/CFO will leave the company. This induces three key models. The first two models, in Equations (1) and (2), are logit models that examine the log-likelihood of the CEO, or the CFO, leaving the company within a year of the class action.⁸ The third model, in Equation (3), is a multinomial logit model whose dependent variable examines the likelihood of neither the CEO nor CFO leaving, only the CEO leaving, only the CFO leaving, or both the CEO and CFO leaving. The study estimates the models for the full sample-period and for sub-samples both before and after the imposition of SOX. The model has the following general form:

$$I(\text{CEO Leaves}_{t+1}) = \alpha + I(\text{SCA}_t)\beta + \text{Controls}_t\gamma + u_t \quad (1)$$

$$I(\text{CFO Leaves}_{t+1}) = \alpha + I(\text{SCA}_t)\beta + \text{Controls}_t\gamma + u_t \quad (2)$$

⁸The results are robust to the choice of logit or probit model.

$$\text{Departure}_{t+1} = \alpha + \text{I(SCA}_t\text{)}\beta + \text{Controls}_t\gamma + u_t \quad (3)$$

Here, $\text{I(CEO Leaves}_{t+1}\text{)}$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO at time t leaves the company in year $t + 1$. Similarly, $\text{I(CFO Leaves}_{t+1}\text{)}$ is an indicator that equals one if the CFO in year t leaves in year $t + 1$. The variable Departure_{t+1} is a categorical dependent variable that models the outcomes (1) neither the CEO nor the CFO leaves; (2) only the CEO leaves; (3) only the CFO leaves; and (4) both the CEO and the CFO leave. The variable $\text{I(SCA}_t\text{)}$ is a binary variable that equals 1 if a SCA is initiated against firm i in year t . The term Controls_t is a set of control variables, defined in Table 1, and discussed below. The terms α , β , and γ are regression coefficients, and u is the error term. The models control for year fixed-effects and cluster standard errors by 4-digit SIC code (following Petersen, 2009). To avoid endogeneity, by construction, dependent variables post-date the variable $\text{I(SCA}_t\text{)}$ and the control variables.

The second set of models set examines the likelihood that a CEO/CFO who leaves the company will fail to obtain another board or executive position. The issue is whether dismissal following a SCA harms the manager's job prospects. It does this if a manager who is fired is less likely to hold a board or CEO position in the future. These models replace the dependent variables in Equation (1) and Equation (2) with a dummy that equals one if (a) the CEO (or CFO) is leaves the company, and (b) the CEO (or CFO) falls out of the Execucomp database. This is under-inclusive because CEOs and CFOs can obtain non-Execucomp employment (such as in private equity funds). Nonetheless, even if the fired manager obtains non-Execucomp employment, failing to obtain Execucomp employment is still a punishment because it removes an employment option.

The models control for governance and firm variables that might affect CEO turnover. Past performance might drive turnover. Strong past operating performance should reduce managerial turnover (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Proxies for this are the operating performance scaled by total assets ('OCF/Assets') and the return on assets ('ROA'). Similarly, strong stock performance should reduce CEO turnover (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Jenter and Kanaan, 2010; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). Proxies for this are the firm's Tobin's Q ('Tobin's Q') and the industry adjusted stock return over the prior year ('Stock Return').

CEO turnover might increase after SOX. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) find that after SOX, boards tend to have more outside directors, meet more frequently, and include more lawyers. This should improve internal governance and facilitate turnover. Therefore the models include a SOX dummy ('I(SOX)') that equals 1 if the observation post-dates SOX.

Several CEO and CFO characteristics might affect turnover. Performance based compensation should reduce turnover. This is because performance-based compensation positively correlates with performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), and strong performance reduces the likelihood of being fired (following Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Proxies for this are the percentage of total CEO, or CFO, compensation that is incentive-based, denoted 'Incentive/Total (CEO)' and 'Incentive/Total (CFO)', respectively.

Turnover might increase with internal managerial entrenchment (Goyal and Park, 2002; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Proxies for this are the percentage of shares that insiders own ('Insider Ownership') and CEO-chairman duality ('CEO Chair Duality').

Tenure and age might influence turnover. Older managers might be more willing to accept redundancy packages and leave (see Lehn and Zhao, 2006;

Milbourn, 2003; Weisbach, 1988). The natural logs of the CEO/CFO age control for this ($\ln(\text{CEO Age})/\ln(\text{CFO Age})$). Similarly, if long tenure represents CEO age, then it should increase turnover. However, tenure might also reduce turnover if it enables the manager to generate a power-base (Salancik and Meindl, 1984). Proxies for this are the natural log of the CEO's/CFO's tenure ($\ln(\text{CEO Tenure})/\ln(\text{CFO Tenure})$).

The presence of many anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) might indicate managerial entrenchment and an accommodating board (Faleye, 2007). This might reduce turnover. Therefore, the models control for the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index of 24-anti-takeover provisions ('GIM').⁹

Size and stability should influence turnover. Turnover should be lower at capital-insensitive (cf technology intensive) firms because these firms are less volatile and are easier to value. Proxies for this are the CAPEX intensity ($\text{CAPEX}/\text{Sales}$) and a dummy for whether the firm is a high-tech firm as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) (I(High Tech Firm)). Similarly, managers of large firms might be entrenched (following Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). This might reduce turnover. A proxy for this is the natural log of the firm's total assets ($\ln(\text{Assets})$).

High free cash flows might induce agency conflicts and sub-optimal investment (following Jensen, 1986). This might precipitate turnover. A proxy for this is the firm's free cash flow scaled by its total assets (FCF/Assets). Conversely, debt might ameliorate this agency conflict. A proxy for this is the firm's total debt divided by its total assets ($\text{Debt}/\text{Assets}$).

Industry concentration might influence turnover. DeFond and Park (1999) suggest turnover is higher in competitive industries. Engel, Hayes,

⁹The ATP data is from IRRC (now RiskMetrics). IRRC only reports ATP data for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. For years that IRRC does not report data, the study uses the data from the last available year. Section 8 ensures that the results are robust to ATP specification.

and Wang (2003) find some evidence consistent with this. The models control for this by including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ('HHI').

5.2 Results

The sample characteristics are in Table 4. The univariate statistics show that CEOs are significantly more likely to leave the company if there was a SCA in the prior year. There is no univariate evidence that CFOs are more likely to leave the company. However, the results also show significant differences in the control variables. This suggests that analysis within a multivariate framework is necessary.

Table 5 examines the likelihood that a CEO will leave the company. Columns 1-3 examine CEO turnover; Columns 4-6 examine CFO turnover. The key result is that CEOs, but not CFOs, are more likely to leave the firm in year $t + 1$ if there was a SCA in year t . These results hold both before and after the imposition of SOX.

The control variables yield some interesting results. First and unsurprisingly, older CEOs/ CFOs are more likely to leave the company at any given time. Second, ATPs, as proxied by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, do not consistently reduce CFO turnover. However, this is unsurprising since ATPs are not designed to protect managers from internal discipline. Third, longer-serving CEOs and CFOs are less likely to leave the company, supporting the theory that long-serving managers are able to generate a power base.

The multinomial logit results are in Table 6. The base case is that neither the CEO nor the CFO are fired in year $t + 1$. The results show that litigation in the past year significantly increases the likelihood that (a) the CEO alone will leave the company, or (b) both the CEO and the CFO will

leave. SCAs do not increase the likelihood that the CFO alone will leave. This is consistent with prior literature that shows (a) CEOs are named in more securities actions than are CFOs (Tillman, 2009), (b) CEOs are the primary person in charge and that CEOs are primarily blamed for poor performance even if they are not solely responsible (see Dezsó, 2009; Walker and Wang, 2010).

Table 7 examines the likelihood that a manager who leaves is also unable to obtain a future board or managerial position. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 (Columns 4-6) is an indicator that equals one if the CEO (CFO) in year t leaves the company by the end of year $t + 1$ and also falls out of Execucomp. The results indicate that the occurrence of a SCA in year t makes it significantly less likely that a fired CEO will not obtain a future board or executive position. There is no such evidence for CFOs. This suggests that SCAs do have future career repercussions for CEOs.

Taken together, these results show: First, CEOs are significantly more likely to leave a company in year $t + 1$ if their company suffered a SCA in year t . Second, CFOs are more likely to leave the company but only if the CEO also leaves the company. Third, Leaving the company after the announcement of a SCA does harm CEO's future job prospects.

6 Do securities class actions reduce the CEO's and the CFO's income?

Firms may punish managers by reducing their compensation (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). This should particularly involve a reduction in fixed salary-based compensation because reducing incentive-compensation might further dis-align managers' and shareholders' incentives (following Kang,

Kumar, and Lee, 2006; Mehran, 1995).

6.1 Methodology

The goal is to determine if the CEO's or the CFO's compensation falls following the initiation of a securities class action. The compensation has two presently relevant components: a fixed salary and a performance bonus. Compensation can also involve stock grants. However, it is unclear whether boards should reduce stock grants following a SCA; reducing stock grants is a punishment, but it also reduces the alignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives. Thus, this paper focuses on the prediction that a well-functioning board should penalize CEOs or CFOs by reducing their fixed compensation and performance bonus.

Logit regressions examine whether the CEO's, or the CFO's, compensation falls after the initiation of litigation. The models examine the log-likelihood that (1) the fixed compensation falls, or (2) the bonus compensation falls. Data on compensation is from Execucomp. The general form regressions are in Equation (4) and Equation (5).

$$I(\text{Salary}_{t+1} < \text{Salary}_t) = \alpha + I(\text{SCA}_t)\beta + \text{Controls}_t\vartheta + \eta_t \quad (4)$$

$$I(\text{Bonus}_{t+1} < \text{Bonus}_t) = \alpha + I(\text{SCA}_t)\beta + \text{Controls}_t\vartheta + \eta_t \quad (5)$$

Here, $I(\text{Salary}_{t+1} < \text{Salary}_t)$ is an indicator that equals one if the CEO's (or CFO's) fixed compensation is lower in year $t + 1$ than in year t . Similarly, $I(\text{Bonus}_{t+1} < \text{Bonus}_t)$ is an indicator that equals one if the CEO's (or CFO's) bonus compensation is lower in year $t + 1$ than it was in year t . The variable $I(\text{SCA}_t)$ is a dummy that equals 1 if a SCA is initiated against firm

i in year t , and Controls_t represents the controls. The terms α , β , and ϑ are regression coefficients, and η is the error term. All models use year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by 4-digit SIC code.

The control variables are variables that might affect executive compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act might influence executive compensation. Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) suggest that SOX reduced managerial influence the grant-date of securities. Further, Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2009) find that that SOX reduced the level of compensation tied to managerial risk-taking. Thus, the compensation models include ‘SOX’, a dummy that equals 1 if the observation post-dates SOX.

Age and tenure should influence compensation. Ryan and Wiggins (2001) find a positive relation between the use of cash bonuses and CEO age. Further, Milbourn (2003) finds a negative relation between stock-incentives and CEO age. Thus, the models include the natural log of the CEO’s and CFO’s age, denoted ‘ $\ln(\text{CEO Age})$ ’ and ‘ $\ln(\text{CFO Age})$ ’, respectively. Similarly, long-serving managers have higher pay and more control over their pay (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Hill and Phan, 1991). Thus, the models include the natural log of the number of years that the CEO, or CFO, has been with the corporation (denoted ‘ $\ln(\text{CEO Tenure})$ ’, and ‘ $\ln(\text{CFO Tenure})$ ’).

Managers are more likely to have higher pay if they have greater control over the board (Boyd, 1994). They have greater control over the board if they are also the chairperson of the board. However, prior evidence finds weak (Conyon and Peck, 1998) or insignificant (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001) relation between duality and compensation. Nonetheless, the models include ‘CEO Chair Duality’, a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson.

Managerial entrenchment should increase compensation. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) suggest that managerial entrenchment could facilitate rent-extraction and agency conflicts. Subsequently, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that proxies for agency conflicts increase CEO compensation, and Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) find that ATPs enable managers to sustain super-normal compensation levels. Thus, the models include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, ‘GIM’, as a proxy for poor governance.¹⁰

Product-market competition should influence pay. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Karuna (2007) find that product market competition increases pay sensitivity. Thus, the models include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI’).

The firm’s performance should influence the level of compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and the structure thereof (Mehran, 1995). Thus, the models include four measures of performance, Tobin’s Q (‘Tobin’s Q’), the return on assets (‘ROA’), the operating performance (OCF/Assets) and the industry adjusted stock return (‘Stock Return’).

Compensation should increase with firm size. There are two possible reasons. First, the agency explanation is that firm-size increases managerial entrenchment, which increases agency conflicts (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). Agency conflicts of managerial entrenchment give CEOs additional power, which they can use to increase compensation (following Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino, 1997). Second, the non-agency explanation is that larger firms are more difficult to manage. The added complexity should induce higher pay

¹⁰As with the managerial turnover models, these models are robust to the choice of ATP index, holding in models that use the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) 6-provision index, the presence of a poison pill, or the presence of a classified board.

(following Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Rose and Shepard, 1997). Supporting either theory, prior evidence shows a positive relation between firm size and CEO compensation (see Baker and Hall, 2004; Kostiuk, 1990; Zhou, 2000). Therefore, the models include the natural log of the firm’s total assets ($\ln(\text{Assets})$).

The level of free cash flow should influence CEO compensation. High free cash flows (FCF/Assets) should induce Jensen (1986) type agency conflicts. These agency conflicts should increase overall compensation, and should increase the proportion of compensation that comes from fixed salary rather than incentives. Subsequently, Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) find a negative relation between free cash flows and the level of incentive compensation.

The level of capital expenditure, and conversely, the preference for technology, has an ambiguous impact on pay. Arguably, high levels of capital expenditure should increase CEO pay since they should increase firm-size (following Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996). However, other evidence suggests that ‘risky’ investment, such as technology investment, is positively related to option-based compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). This suggests that the level capex or technology might influence pay in general, but might influence incentive-compensation and fixed-compensation differently. The dummy ‘I(High Tech Firm)’ controls for whether the firm operates in a high-tech industry, as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004), and the variable ‘CAPEX/Sales’ controls for the level of capital expenditure.

6.2 Results

The univariate results, in Table 4, suggest that pay cuts in year $t + 1$ are significantly more likely if a SCA is initiated in year t . The CEO logit results

are in Table 8. The key finding is that fixed salaries and bonuses in year $t+1$ are likely to be lower if there was a SCA in year t . Because reductions in salary are the most important type of compensation-penalty, this suggests that boards do perform their oversight function. Supporting this, insider ownership, CEO age, and CEO tenure and large firm-size do not protect CEOs from reductions in fixed-compensation. The size-result in particular is consistent with the Offenberg (2009) finding that large size does not effectively insulate managers from disciplinary takeovers. Nonetheless, poor governance in the form of ATPs does protect CEOs from salary reductions. An interesting result is that firm-size does not prevent salary reductions. The CFO compensation results are in Table 9. The CFO results largely echo the CEO results.

Overall, these results, coupled with the CEO/CFO turnover results, show that boards can effectively internally discipline poor performing managers. However, if the market perceives persistent agency conflicts, then a disciplinary takeover may occur.

7 Do securities class actions increase the chances of a disciplinary takeover?

Takeovers are one way to exert external discipline upon poorly performing managers and boards. Thus, the issue is whether a SCA in year t increases the likelihood of a disciplinary takeover in year $t+1$. There is a possibility that managers might make false statements precisely to encourage (or discourage) a takeover. To address this, the study requires that the takeover bid post-date the announcement of the SCA. It is implausible that a class action would encourage a friendly takeover or promote superior deal terms.

The models examine four possible definitions of a disciplinary takeover attempt: (1) A mere bid for 100% of the company; (2) a completed bid for the company; (3) a hostile or unsolicited bid for the company; or (4) a hostile or unsolicited bid for the company that is subsequently completed. The first two follow Offenberg (2009). The second two follow the logic that the purpose of a disciplinary takeover is to replace the manager, and this is likely to induce hostility (see Martin and McConnell, 1991). The general regression equation is:

$$TO_{t+1} = \alpha + I(SCA_t)\beta + Controls_t\gamma + u_t \quad (6)$$

The dependent variable, TO_{t+1} is variously an indicator that (1) the company receives a takeover bid in year $t+1$ (denoted, Bid_{t+1}), (2) the company receives a bid that is subsequently completed (denoted $Complete\ Bid_{t+1}$), (3) the company receives a bid that SDC classifies as hostile or unsolicited ($Hostile\ Bid_{t+1}$), or (4) the company receives a bid that is hostile or unsolicited, and that is subsequently completed ($Hostile\ Complete\ Bid_{t+1}$). In all cases the bid must be for 100% control of the company. The takeover event data is from SDC. A deal is hostile if SDC records the takeover attempt as ‘unsolicited’ or ‘hostile’. The key independent variable $I(SCA_t)$ is an indicator of a securities class action being initiated in year t .

The control variables are variables standard in the takeover prediction literature (see Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009; Powell, 2001, 2004, 1997). Specifically the models control for firm-level variables such as the firm’s size (variable: ‘ $\ln(Assets)$ ’); Tobin’s Q (‘Tobin’s Q’); leverage (‘ $Debt/Assets$ ’); accounting operating performance (‘ $OCF/Assets$ ’) and return on assets (‘ROA’);

industry adjusted stock return ('Stock Return'); free cash flow ('FCF/Assets'); CAPEX intensity ('CAPEX/Sales'); whether the firm is in a high-tech industry ('I(High Tech Firm)'); and, the concentration of the firm's industry as proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index ('HHI'). Further, since the purpose is to examine disciplinary takeovers, the models also control for the CEO's tenure ('CeoTenure'); CEO-chairman duality ('CEO Chair Duality'); the CEO's age ('CEO Age'); the level of incentive compensation ('Incentive/Total (CEO)'); the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index; and, the level of insider ownership ('Insider Ownership').

The univariate results in Table 4 suggest that a firm is significantly more likely to receive a disciplinary takeover bid in year $t+1$ if a SCA was initiated in year t . The logit results are in Table 10. The important result is that a firm is significantly more likely to receive a disciplinary takeover bid if it was sued under a securities class action in the prior year. This holds for all four definitions of a disciplinary takeover.

The control variables indicate that ATPs do not effectively deter a disciplinary takeover (GIM is positive and significant in Columns 1 and 2). While this appears anomalous, it is consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995) and Humphery-Jenner (2011a). Further, consistent with Offenberg (2009), large size does not effectively entrench managers. Interestingly, CEO-chair duality reduces the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid (in Columns 1, 3, and 4). However, this may merely reflect the prevalence of CEO-chair duality (featuring 67.6% of the sample).

Overall, these results, coupled with the pay-cut and turnover results, show that SCAs do sound in internal and external discipline.

8 Robustness

This section ensures that the results are robust to model specification issues. Most response are unreported but are available on request. First, the results are robust to the specification anti-takeover provisions. The results hold in models that replace GIM with the presence of a staggered board (following Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005), the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) 6-provision index, or a dummy to reflect the presence of a poison pill.

Second, the results are robust to other board-based variables. The results hold in models that (a) use *CeoAge*, *CfoAge*, *CeoTenure* and *CfoTenure* instead of the natural logs; (b) control for the size of the board; and (c) control for the lagged natural log of the CEO's total compensation, salary, or incentive compensation.

Third, the results are robust to industry effects. The reported models use year dummies and standard errors clustered by 4-digit SIC industry (following Petersen, 2009). However, Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009a) suggests that governance-based results can be sensitive to the specificity of the industry-classification. Thus, the robustness tests ensure the results hold for (a) models that cluster by year and industry instead of using year dummies, and (b) models that cluster standard errors by 2-digit and 3-digit SIC industry code.

Fourth, the logit results are robust to other model specifications. The results hold in logit and probit models. Logit models are more robust to deviations from the Probit's normality assumption (following Hagle and Mitchell, 1992; Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972). Nonetheless, the results are not sensitive to modeling technique.

Fifth, the returns results are robust to the definition of abnormal returns. Thin trading can cause biased and inconsistent estimates of market

model parameters (Cowan, 1992; Cowan and Sergeant, 1996; Dimson, 1979; Dimson and Marsh, 1983). To control for thin trading and non-synchronous trading, the paper also uses Scholes-Williams estimates (following Scholes and Williams, 1977). To control for auto-regressive and heteroscedastic returns, the paper also uses and GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) estimates of the market model (following Fatum and Hutchison, 2003; McKenzie, Thomsen, and Dixon, 2004; Rayhorn, Hassan, Yu, and Janson, 2007). The results hold in these specifications.

Sixth, the results are robust to sample-selection and pre-performance issues. One possibility is that poorly performing managers make SCAs. Poorly performing managers are more likely to be disciplined whether or not there is a SCA. Thus, the SCA/discipline relation may merely be a performance/discipline relation. I control for this in two ways:

The first method re-runs the regressions in industry adjusted ROA quartiles (similarly to Frakes, 2007). The goal is to ensure that the results hold for all ROA quartiles. I do not report the results, but they are available on request. I find that the results hold in all quartiles and are marginally stronger in high-performance quartiles. This implies that strongly performing firms are more likely to discipline misconduct.

The second method uses propensity score matching.¹¹ The process is: (1) Run a logit model to predict the likelihood that a firm receives a SCA in year t as a function of variables from year $t - 1$. (2) Use the logit results to estimate a propensity score.¹² (3) For the sample of firms that do receive a SCA in year t construct a 90% confidence interval for the propensity scores (i.e. find the 5% and 95% cut-offs). (4) Let the final sample comprise only

¹¹For some use of this see: Dehejia and Wahba (2002); Desyllas and Hughes (2010); Egger, Eggert, and Winner (2010).

¹²For a logit model this is $\exp \mathbf{x}\beta / (1 + \exp \mathbf{x}\beta)$.

firms that receive a SCA in year t or have a propensity score within this 90% interval. The (unreported) results hold in this propensity score restricted sample.

Seventh, I ensure that the results hold for value-destroying SCAs. It is interesting to ensure that the results hold for SCAs to which the market reacts negatively (rather than just the occurrence of a SCA per se). Thus, I replace the SCA dummy with an indicator that equals one if the firm receives a SCA in year t and the market reacts negatively to it, denoted ‘I(Negative SCA)’. The results for the I(Negative SCA) variable echo those for the I(SCA) variable.

Eighth, I ensure that coincidental regulatory actions do not drive the results. I do this in two ways: (1) I remove all firms from the sample that experience both a SCA and a regulatory action (the regulatory action can occur at any time in the sample period). The results hold in this sample. (2) I include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm receives both a regulatory action and a SCA. This variable does not qualitatively change the coefficient on the I(SCA) indicator.

9 Conclusion

This paper examines the ramifications of being sued for misleading the market. The results show that if a firm receives a class action suit for misleading the market, then the CEO and CFO are more likely to be fired or to suffer a pay-cut, and the firm is more likely to sustain a disciplinary takeover. These results are robust to other board, CEO, CFO, and corporate characteristics that might explain the pay, turnover, and takeover findings.

The results make a key contribution to the literature. Prior studies focus on regulator actions. This study focuses on securities class actions. This

difference is important because (1) regulatory actions require the involvement of the SEC; and thus, may not capture all fraud-related litigation; and (2) the law governing SCAs is arguably sub-optimal. Further, unlike prior studies, this paper examines whether securities fraud harms managers' future job prospects and induces disciplinary takeovers.

The results have corporate and policy implications. They show that even if the law governing market manipulation is doctrinally sub-optimal, it is functional from a practical perspective. Managers are disciplined following securities class actions, suffering an increase chance of pay cuts and dismissal. Further, securities class actions precipitate disciplinary takeovers. Therefore, this paper supports the findings in Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008), and shows that poor disclosure does promote discipline through both internal and external channels.

Table 1: Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent or Explained Variables		
$CAR_{(\tau_1, \tau_2)}$	The firm's cumulative abnormal return from τ_1 days before the announcement of the SCA to τ_2 days after the announcement of the SCA. The abnormal return on day τ is the firm's actual return less that predicted by a market model estimated over 11 days before the announcement to 210 days before the announcement.	CRSP
$BHAR_{(\tau_1, \tau_2)}$	The firm's cumulative abnormal return from τ_1 days before (or after) the announcement of the SCA to τ_2 days after the announcement of the SCA.	CRSP
$I(\text{CEO Leaves}_{t+1})$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO in year t is not the CEO in year $t + 1$.	Execucomp
$I(\text{CFO Leaves}_{t+1})$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CFO in year t is not the CFO in year $t + 1$.	Execucomp
Departure_{t+1}	A categorical variables that equals 0 if neither the CEO nor the CFO leave, equals 1 if only the CEO leaves, equals 2 if only the CFO leaves, and equals 3 if both the CEO and the CFO leave. All departures must be within one year of the litigation announcement.	Execucomp
$I(\text{Salary}_{t+1} < \text{Salary}_t)$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager's fixed compensation (salary) falls in year $t + 1$. This is a dummy variable that equals one if $0 > [(\text{salary}_{t+1} - \text{salary}_t) / \text{salary}_t]$, where salary_t is the manager's fixed salary compensation in year t	Execucomp
$I(\text{Bonus}_{t+1} < \text{Bonus}_t)$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the manager's bonus compensation (cf stock compensation) falls in year $t + 1$. This is a dummy variable that equals one if $0 > [(\text{bonus}_{t+1} - \text{bonus}_t) / \text{bonus}_t]$, where bonus_t is the manager's bonus compensation in year t .	Execucomp
$I(\text{Bid}_{t+1})$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for 100% control in year $t + 1$.	SDC Platinum
$I(\text{Complete Bid}_{t+1})$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for 100% control in year $t + 1$ and the deal is subsequently completed.	SDC Platinum
$I(\text{Hostile Bid}_{t+1})$	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for 100% control in year $t + 1$, and SDC codes the deal as unsolicited or hostile.	SDC Platinum

I(Hostile Complete Bid _{<i>t</i>+1})	An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a takeover offer for 100% control in year <i>t</i> + 1, the deal is subsequently completed, and SDC codes the deal as hostile or unsolicited.	SDC Platinum
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Independent Variables		
I(SCA _{<i>t</i>})	An indicator that equals one if the firm or the court announces a securities class action in that year. The source is the Stanford Securities clearing house.	Stanford Securities Clearing-house
HHI _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's Hirfindahl-Hishmann Index at the time of the litigation.	Compustat
Tobin's Q _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's Tobin's Q in year <i>t</i> .	Compustat
Stock Return _{<i>t</i>}	The industry adjusted market return computed over the year before the litigation. This is the firm's return less the average return in the firm's 4-digit SIC industry.	CRSP
I(High Tech Firm _{<i>t</i>})	An indicator that equals one if the firm is a 'high-tech' firm as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004).	Compustat
ln(Assets _{<i>t</i>})	The natural log of the firm's total assets (Compustat mnemonic: at) in year <i>t</i> .	Compustat
OCF _{<i>t</i>} /Assets _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's operating performance in year <i>t</i> . The operating performance in a given year is the firm's operating cash flow (Compustat mnemonic: oibdp) divided by the firm's total assets (Compustat mnemonic: at).	Compustat
ROA _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's return on assets in year <i>t</i> . The return on assets is the firm's net income (Compustat mnemonic: ni) divided by the firm's total assets (Compustat mnemonic: at).	Compustat
Debt _{<i>t</i>} /Assets _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's leverage in year <i>t</i> . Leverage is the firm's long term debt (Compustat mnemonic: dltd) divided by its market value of assets. The market value of assets is assets less book equity plus market equity (in Compustat mnemonics: at - ceq + csho × prcc.c).	Compustat
FCF _{<i>t</i>} /Assets _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's free cash flows in year <i>t</i> divided by its assets in year <i>t</i> . Free cash flow is the operating cash flow less expenditures on interest, tax, and capex (in Compustat mnemonics: oibdp - xint - txt - capx).	Compustat
CAPEX _{<i>t</i>} /Sales _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's capex intensity in year <i>t</i> . Capex intensity is the firm's expenditure on capex (Compustat mnemonic: capx) divided by its sales (Compustat mnemonic: sale).	Compustat
I(SOX _{<i>t</i>})	An indicator that equals 1 if the observation post-dates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.	N/A
GIM _{<i>t</i>}	The firm's Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index in year <i>t</i> .	RiskMetrics/ IRRC
ln(CEO Tenure _{<i>t</i>})	The natural log of the number of years the CEO has been at the company in year <i>t</i> .	Execucomp

$\ln(\text{CFO Tenure}_t)$	The natural log of the number of years the CFO has been at the company in year t .	Execucomp
$\ln(\text{CEO Age}_t)$	The natural log of the CEO's age in year t .	Execucomp
$\ln(\text{CFO Age}_t)$	The natural log of the CFO's age in year t .	Execucomp
$\text{Incentive}_t / \text{Total}_t$ (CEO)	The proportion of the CEO's total compensation that is incentive based (i.e. stock-linked) in year t . In Execucomp codes this is $[(\text{tdc2}_t - \text{salary}_t) / \text{salary}_t]$	Execucomp
$\text{Incentive}_t / \text{Total}_t$ (CFO)	The proportion of the CFO's total compensation that is incentive based (i.e. stock-linked) in year t . In Execucomp codes this is $[(\text{tdc2}_t - \text{salary}_t) / \text{salary}_t]$	Execucomp
CEO Chair Duality $_t$	An indicator that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board in year t .	Execucomp
Insider Ownership $_t$	The percentage of the firm's shares that insiders (board-members) own in year t .	Execucomp

Table 2: Class Actions by Year

Table 2 contains the sample composition by year. Column 1 contains the number of all firms in the sample. Column (2) contains the number of firms that sustain a class action in year $t \in \{1996, \dots, 2007\}$. Column 3 contains the number of control firms in year $t \in \{1996, \dots, 2007\}$.

Year	All	SCA This Year	No SCA This Year
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1996	886	9	877
1997	833	25	808
1998	1154	32	1122
1999	1083	40	1043
2000	1066	32	1034
2002	1193	60	1133
2003	1182	44	1138
2004	1240	62	1178
2005	1198	42	1156
2006	1207	29	1178
2007	1141	41	1100
Total	12183	416	11767

Table 3: Abnormal Returns

Table 3 contains abnormal returns. It considers the full sample of securities class actions (SCAs), and sub-samples of SCAs that occur before SOX and after SOX. Panel A contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based upon an OLS estimation of the market model. Panel B contains buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using ttests for means and signrank tests for medians.

Window	All		Pre SOX		Post SOX		Pre-SOX - Post-SOX	
	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
Panel A: Short Run CARs								
(-5,+5)	-0.077***	-0.028***	-0.102***	-0.035***	-0.062***	-0.022***	-0.040*	-0.013
(-3,+3)	-0.064***	-0.017***	-0.081***	-0.024***	-0.053***	-0.015***	-0.027	-0.009
(-1,1+)	-0.037***	-0.005***	-0.056***	-0.011***	-0.026***	-0.004***	-0.030**	-0.007
(-1,0)	-0.035***	-0.007***	-0.057***	-0.015***	-0.023***	-0.003***	-0.034**	-0.012
(-0,+1)	-0.015***	-0.004**	-0.020**	-0.005	-0.012**	-0.004*	-0.008	-0.002
Panel B: Long Run BHARs								
(-5,+28)	-0.079***	-0.042***	-0.132***	-0.089***	-0.049***	-0.026***	-0.083***	-0.062*
(-5,+35)	-0.082***	-0.050***	-0.130***	-0.078***	-0.054***	-0.040***	-0.076**	-0.038
(-5,+200)	-0.129***	-0.070***	-0.207***	-0.204***	-0.084**	-0.021**	-0.123*	-0.183***
(-5,+250)	-0.178***	-0.088***	-0.284***	-0.220***	-0.117***	-0.048***	-0.168**	-0.171***
(-5,+300)	-0.184***	-0.146***	-0.306***	-0.273***	-0.113**	-0.061**	-0.193**	-0.212***

Table 4: Univariate Statistics

Table 4 contains univariate statistics (means). Column 1 contains statistics for firms that sustain a class action suit. Column 2 contains statistics for the control sample. Column 3 contains the difference between Column 1 and Column 2. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Superscripts **, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for means using a ttest (Column 1 and Column 2) or difference in mean (for Column 3).

Variable	All (1)	SCA _{i,t} (2)	No SCA _{i,t} (3)	Difference (4)=(2)-(3)
Panel A: CEO and CFO Turnover				
I(CEO Leaves _{i,t+1})	0.059***	0.062***	0.057***	0.005***
I(CFO Leaves _{i,t+1})	0.011***	0.019***	0.006***	0.014
Panel B: CEO and CFO Salary Reductions				
I(CEO Salary _{t+1} < CEO Salary _t)	0.341***	0.488***	0.336***	0.152***
I(CEO Bonus _{t+1} < CEO Bonus _t)	0.489***	0.674***	0.483***	0.191***
I(CFO Salary _{t+1} < CFO Salary _t)	0.776***	0.844***	0.773***	0.070***
I(CFO Bonus _{t+1} < CFO Bonus _t)	0.904***	0.966***	0.902***	0.064***
Panel C: Disciplinary Takeover Statistics				
I(Bid _{t+1})	0.019***	0.048***	0.018***	0.030***
I(Complete Bid _{t+1})	0.008***	0.024***	0.008***	0.016**
I(Hostile Bid _{t+1})	0.007***	0.022***	0.007***	0.015**
I(Hostile Complete Bid _{t+1})	0.002***	0.010**	0.001***	0.008*
Panel D: Control Variables				
Incentive _t /Total _t (CEO)	0.624***	0.577***	0.626***	-0.049***
CEO Tenure _t	6.165***	5.372***	6.193***	-0.821**
CEO Age _t	55.170***	54.366***	55.199***	-0.832***
Incentive _t /Total _t (CFO)	0.227***	0.166***	0.230***	-0.064***
CFO Tenure _t	4.923***	5.510***	4.905***	0.605
CFO Age _t	49.120***	48.587***	49.139***	-0.552***
CEO Chair Duality _t	0.661***	0.620***	0.662***	-0.042*
Insider Ownership _t	0.035***	0.027***	0.035***	-0.008*
GIM _t	9.260***	9.077***	9.266***	-0.189
I(High Tech Firm) _t	0.162***	0.221***	0.160***	0.061***
HHI _t	0.335***	0.322***	0.336***	-0.013
Stock Return _t	-0.009***	-0.148***	-0.004***	-0.144***
Tobin's Q _t	1.996***	2.231***	1.988***	0.243***
Debt _t /Assets _t	0.141***	0.137***	0.141***	-0.004***
Assets _t	10,972.840***	53,131.720***	9,482.396***	43,649.324***
OCF _t /Assets _t	0.136***	0.120***	0.136***	-0.016**
ROA _t	0.035***	0.020***	0.036***	-0.015**
FCF _t /Assets _t	0.035***	0.030***	0.035***	-0.005
CAPEX _t /Sales _t	0.080***	0.073***	0.081***	-0.008

Table 5: CEO and CFO Turnover Regressions

Table 5 contains logit regressions for Equation (1) and Equation (2). Columns 1 to 3 examine the log-likelihood of the CEO leaving in year $t + 1$. Columns 4 to 6 examine the log-likelihood of a CFO leaving in year $t + 1$. Columns 1 and 4 examine the full sample; Columns 2 and 5 the sample from before SOX; and, columns 3 and 6 the sample from after SOX. The key independent variable is SCA, a dummy that equals one if the firm has a class action filed against it in year t . Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ^{***}, ^{**}, and ^{*} denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

	I(CEO Leaves _{$t+1$})			I(CFO Leaves _{$t+1$})		
	All (1)	Pre-SOX (2)	Post-SOX (3)	All (4)	Pre-SOX (5)	Post-SOX (6)
I(SCA _{t})	1.421*** [0.000]	1.789*** [0.000]	1.259*** [0.000]	0.42 [0.290]	0.388 [0.483]	0.547 [0.494]
I(SOX _{t})	-0.300*** [0.001]			-1.103*** [0.000]		
Insider Ownership _{t}	0.186*** [0.000]	-0.007 [0.995]	0.174*** [0.000]	-2.634 [0.150]	-2.298 [0.293]	-3.346 [0.330]
Incentive _{t} /Total _{t} (CEO)	0.724*** [0.001]	-0.006 [0.980]	1.273*** [0.000]			
ln(CEO Tenure _{t})	-1.199*** [0.000]	-1.347*** [0.000]	-1.097*** [0.000]			
ln(CEO Age _{t})	0.809** [0.016]	1.459*** [0.008]	0.257 [0.529]			
Incentive _{t} /Total _{t} (CFO)				2.899*** [0.000]	2.539*** [0.000]	3.719*** [0.000]
ln(CFO Tenure _{t})				-0.441*** [0.000]	-0.697*** [0.000]	-0.059 [0.733]
ln(CFO Age _{t})				-0.337 [0.743]	-0.736 [0.579]	0.171 [0.931]
CEO Chair Duality _{t}	-0.664*** [0.000]	-0.650*** [0.000]	-0.634*** [0.000]	-0.354* [0.065]	-0.282 [0.201]	-0.429 [0.198]
GIM _{t}	0.015 [0.256]	0.018 [0.375]	0.017 [0.334]	-0.04 [0.208]	-0.03 [0.453]	-0.053 [0.324]
I(High Tech Firm _{t})	-0.038 [0.760]	-0.057 [0.826]	-0.026 [0.882]	0.26 [0.384]	0.252 [0.486]	0.146 [0.752]

HHI _t	0.065	0.013	0.052	-0.253	0.046	-0.946
	[0.681]	[0.955]	[0.798]	[0.543]	[0.928]	[0.205]
Stock Return _t	-0.363**	-0.209	-0.533**	-1.343***	-1.370***	-1.306*
	[0.015]	[0.330]	[0.039]	[0.000]	[0.008]	[0.071]
Tobin's Q _t	-0.079*	-0.001	-0.236**	-0.220**	-0.161	-0.396**
	[0.055]	[0.977]	[0.011]	[0.021]	[0.116]	[0.049]
Debt _t /Assets _t	1.687**	2.114	1.776	3.717**	4.740***	0.781
	[0.033]	[0.119]	[0.132]	[0.036]	[0.006]	[0.883]
Debt _t /Assets _t × Tobin' Q _t	-0.952	-1.598	-0.902	-2.286	-3.141**	0.011
	[0.129]	[0.174]	[0.314]	[0.116]	[0.035]	[0.998]
ln(Assets _t)	-0.024	0.052	-0.094***	-0.274***	-0.212***	-0.399***
	[0.362]	[0.268]	[0.009]	[0.000]	[0.008]	[0.003]
OCF _t /Assets _t	-0.771	-0.838	0.104	-3.261**	-1.103	-8.018***
	[0.328]	[0.420]	[0.926]	[0.045]	[0.504]	[0.009]
ROA _t	-0.248	-1.027	-0.244	0.09	-0.974	2.322
	[0.249]	[0.104]	[0.300]	[0.889]	[0.291]	[0.148]
FCF _t /Assets _t	0.802	2.265	-0.259	1.781	-0.262	6.381**
	[0.359]	[0.106]	[0.806]	[0.424]	[0.914]	[0.029]
CAPEX _t /Sales _t	0.024	0.334	-0.124	-0.139	-0.588	0.308
	[0.908]	[0.267]	[0.772]	[0.885]	[0.623]	[0.540]
Constant	-4.622***	-7.504***	-2.442	0.163	1.243	-2.085
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.136]	[0.967]	[0.807]	[0.791]
Observations	12,183	5,022	7,161	12,183	5,022	7,161
Wald χ^2	857.2388	291.6766	549.0072	256.4369	107.2143	252.1088
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pseudo R ²	15.94%	19.03%	15.51%	14.38%	10.09%	17.42%

Table 6: Multinomial Logit Regressions

Table 6 contains multinomial logit regressions for Equation (3). The base outcome is that neither the CEO nor the CFO are removed. Columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively examine the outcomes of only the CEO leaving, only the CFO leaving, and both the CEO and the CFO leaving. The CEO and the CFO must be less than 70 years old. The main independent variable is SCA, a dummy that equals one if the firm has a class action filed against it in year t . Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

	I(CEO Leaves _{t+1}) (1)	I(CFO Leaves _{t+1}) (2)	I(Both Leave _{t+1}) (3)
I(SCA _t)	1.410*** [0.000]	-0.163 [0.782]	2.494*** [0.000]
I(SOX _t)	-0.164* [0.100]	-0.972*** [0.000]	-0.943* [0.068]
Insider Ownership _t	0.190*** [0.000]	-1.827 [0.277]	-57.658** [0.049]
Incentive _t /Total _t (CEO)	-0.675*** [0.000]	-0.404* [0.084]	0.145 [0.790]
ln(CEO Tenure _t)	0.694*** [0.001]	-1.626*** [0.001]	0.265 [0.818]
ln(CEO Age _t)	-1.186*** [0.000]	-0.009 [0.940]	-1.205*** [0.000]
Incentive _t /Total _t (CFO)	0.720** [0.032]	-0.029 [0.968]	3.77 [0.271]
ln(CFO Tenure _t)	-0.085 [0.518]	3.535*** [0.000]	2.481*** [0.001]
ln(CFO Age _t)	-0.202*** [0.004]	-0.390*** [0.003]	-0.738*** [0.000]
CEO Chair Duality _t	0.452 [0.559]	-0.594 [0.552]	3.238 [0.551]
GIM _t	0.02 [0.136]	-0.017 [0.586]	-0.131 [0.171]
I(High Tech Firm _t)	-0.051 [0.683]	0.299 [0.326]	-0.07 [0.907]
HHI _t	0.01 [0.952]	-0.544 [0.227]	0.777 [0.311]
Stock Return _t	-0.304** [0.042]	-1.135** [0.010]	-1.795* [0.055]
Tobin's Q _t	-0.071* [0.083]	-0.157* [0.088]	-0.652 [0.231]
Debt _t /Assets _t	1.735** [0.029]	2.832 [0.102]	9.086 [0.165]
Debt _t /Assets _t × Tobin's Q _t	-0.91 [0.148]	-1.303 [0.357]	-7.742 [0.190]
ln(Assets _t)	-0.016 [0.560]	-0.168** [0.043]	-0.581*** [0.000]
OCF _t /Assets _t	-0.745 [0.365]	-3.001 [0.118]	-1.595 [0.657]
ROA _t	-0.286 [0.183]	0.531 [0.624]	-0.109 [0.898]
FCF _t /Assets _t	0.972 [0.282]	2.098 [0.490]	-0.694 [0.887]
CAPEX _t /Sales _t	0.013 [0.954]	-0.973 [0.437]	0.622*** [0.009]
Constant	-5.896* [0.068]	0.706 [0.882]	-25.849 [0.356]

Observations	12,178
Wald χ^2	2250.542
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]
Pseudo R^2	16.39%

Table 7: CEO and CFO Post-Turnover Employment

Table 7 contains logit regressions that examine the likelihood that a fired CEO fails to obtain another board or executive position. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 (Columns 4-6) is a dummy that equals one if the CEO (CFO) in year t (a) leaves the company by the end of year $t + 1$ and (b) drops out of Execucomp. Columns 1 and 4 examine the full sample; Columns 2 and 5 the sample from before SOX; and, columns 3 and 6 the sample from after SOX. The key independent variable is SCA, a dummy that equals one if the firm has a class action filed against it in year t . Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

	I(CEO leaves the company and Execucomp)			I(CFO leaves the company and Execucomp)		
	All	Pre-SOX	Post-SOX	All	Pre-SOX	Post-SOX
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
I(SCA _{<i>t</i>})	1.688*** [0.000]	1.958*** [0.000]	1.582*** [0.000]	0.282 [0.565]	0.005 [0.995]	0.742 [0.335]
I(SOX _{<i>t</i>})	-0.340** [0.023]			-1.086*** [0.000]		
Insider Ownership _{<i>t</i>}	0.218*** [0.000]	-0.241 [0.878]	0.216*** [0.000]	-3.467 [0.181]	-3.398 [0.284]	-2.679 [0.482]
Incentive _{<i>t</i>} /Total _{<i>t</i>} (CEO)	1.519*** [0.000]	0.783* [0.096]	2.140*** [0.000]			
ln(CEO Tenure _{<i>t</i>})	-0.417*** [0.000]	-0.601*** [0.000]	-0.277*** [0.005]			
ln(CEO Age _{<i>t</i>})	3.643*** [0.000]	5.070*** [0.000]	2.604*** [0.000]			
Incentive _{<i>t</i>} /Total _{<i>t</i>} (CFO)				2.750*** [0.000]	2.588*** [0.000]	3.236*** [0.000]
ln(CFO Tenure _{<i>t</i>})				-0.307** [0.025]	-0.476** [0.028]	-0.061 [0.768]
ln(CFO Age _{<i>t</i>})				1.122 [0.320]	1.36 [0.239]	0.404 [0.880]
CEO Chair Duality	-1.073*** [0.000]	-1.105*** [0.000]	-1.030*** [0.000]	-0.165 [0.444]	-0.139 [0.583]	-0.161 [0.661]
GIM _{<i>t</i>}	0.018 [0.474]	0.003 [0.939]	0.027 [0.427]	-0.029 [0.428]	-0.022 [0.645]	-0.045 [0.398]
I(High Tech Firm _{<i>t</i>})	-0.024	-0.053	-0.028	0.143	-0.007	0.265

	[0.908]	[0.901]	[0.922]	[0.652]	[0.988]	[0.606]
HHI _t	0.359	0.055	0.464	0.031	0.234	-0.278
	[0.137]	[0.897]	[0.123]	[0.947]	[0.694]	[0.702]
Stock Return _t	-0.579**	-0.402	-0.495	-1.721***	-1.547***	-2.530***
	[0.045]	[0.361]	[0.234]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]
Tobin's Q _t	-0.084	-0.042	-0.166	-0.247**	-0.154	-0.576*
	[0.324]	[0.677]	[0.293]	[0.023]	[0.150]	[0.059]
Debt _t /Assets _t	3.358**	3.266*	4.042**	4.174**	5.593***	0.227
	[0.010]	[0.068]	[0.039]	[0.049]	[0.005]	[0.968]
Debt _t /Assets _t × Tobin's Q _t	-2.067**	-2.727*	-2.172	-2.633	-4.170**	1.148
	[0.049]	[0.083]	[0.141]	[0.146]	[0.021]	[0.778]
ln(Assets _t)	-0.161***	-0.054	-0.245***	-0.276***	-0.196**	-0.458***
	[0.001]	[0.517]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.045]	[0.001]
OCF _t /Assets _t	-2.651**	-1.723	-2.834	-2.067	-1.182	-3.357
	[0.048]	[0.340]	[0.232]	[0.341]	[0.659]	[0.293]
ROA _t	-0.374	-0.553	-0.371	0.07	-1.217	3.095**
	[0.134]	[0.699]	[0.114]	[0.896]	[0.231]	[0.044]
FCF _t /Assets _t	1.992	2.259	1.814	-0.769	-1.365	-0.264
	[0.219]	[0.341]	[0.470]	[0.796]	[0.740]	[0.947]
CAPEX _t /Sales _t	0.091	0.478	-0.129	-2.339	-2.169	-3.53
	[0.818]	[0.399]	[0.924]	[0.153]	[0.313]	[0.277]
Constant	-17.044***	-22.774***	-13.002***	-6.093	-7.583*	-3.081
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.156]	[0.072]	[0.775]
Observations	12,183	5,022	7,161	12,183	5,022	7,161
Wald χ^2	260.5532	152.5718	256.5931	243.2075	127.1541	244.4777
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pseudo R ²	9.28%	11.82%	9.39%	13.30%	9.77%	14.99%

Table 8: CEO Compensation Regressions

Table 8 contains logit regressions for Equation (4), and (5), where the dependent variables relate to whether the CEO's fixed or bonus compensation decreases. Columns 1 and 2 examine the full sample period; Columns 3 and 4 examine the pre-SOX period and Columns 5 and 6 examine the post-SOX period. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 3, and 5 is an indicator that equals one if the CEO's fixed compensation decreases. The dependent variable in Columns 2, 4, and 6 is an indicator that equals one if the CEO's bonus compensation (excluding vesting or exercised options) decreases. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Sample Dependent Variable	All		Pre-SOX		Post-SOX	
	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t) (1)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t) (2)	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t) (3)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t) (4)	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t) (5)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t) (6)
I(SCA _t)	0.325*** [0.002]	0.770*** [0.000]	0.283** [0.016]	0.904*** [0.000]	0.341** [0.012]	0.694*** [0.000]
I(SOX _t)	-0.055 [0.313]	0.409*** [0.000]				
Insider Ownership _t	3.198*** [0.000]	1.472*** [0.002]	3.106*** [0.000]	1.898*** [0.001]	3.329*** [0.000]	1.019* [0.055]
ln(CEO Tenure _t)	-0.150*** [0.000]	-0.132*** [0.000]	-0.242*** [0.000]	-0.161*** [0.000]	-0.089** [0.020]	-0.103*** [0.001]
CEO Chair Duality _t	-0.282*** [0.000]	-0.322*** [0.000]	-0.388*** [0.000]	-0.248*** [0.000]	-0.233*** [0.002]	-0.383*** [0.000]
ln(CEO Age _t)	-0.475* [0.053]	-0.189 [0.346]	-0.516 [0.147]	-0.418 [0.177]	-0.45 [0.139]	0.047 [0.863]
GIM _t	-0.038*** [0.001]	-0.034*** [0.000]	-0.024 [0.122]	-0.037*** [0.003]	-0.046*** [0.001]	-0.029*** [0.008]
I(High Tech Firm _t)	0.162* [0.098]	0.126 [0.150]	0.082 [0.347]	0.115 [0.285]	0.203 [0.149]	0.133 [0.244]
HHI _t	0.13 [0.406]	0.263** [0.018]	0.108 [0.584]	0.179 [0.289]	0.154 [0.384]	0.309** [0.028]
Stock Return _t	-0.032 [0.624]	-0.949*** [0.000]	-0.103 [0.358]	-1.023*** [0.000]	0.052 [0.530]	-0.861*** [0.000]
Tobin's Q _t	0.009	-0.063***	0.003	-0.054**	0.029	-0.081**

	[0.673]	[0.005]	[0.894]	[0.013]	[0.474]	[0.037]
$Debt_t/Assets_t$	0.862	0.937**	1.440**	1.515***	0.512	0.347
	[0.108]	[0.025]	[0.049]	[0.007]	[0.468]	[0.535]
Tobin's $Q_t \times Debt_t/Assets_t$	-0.571	-0.809***	-1.243**	-1.098***	-0.198	-0.535
	[0.163]	[0.004]	[0.031]	[0.004]	[0.707]	[0.152]
$\ln(Assets_t)$	0.095***	-0.069***	0.081**	-0.099***	0.111***	-0.044**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.017]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.030]
$OCF_t/Assets_t$	-1.666***	1.040**	-1.283	1.880**	-2.002***	0.579
	[0.003]	[0.032]	[0.121]	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.423]
ROA_t	-0.412	-0.826**	-0.129	-1.339*	-0.509	-0.646
	[0.238]	[0.040]	[0.789]	[0.055]	[0.245]	[0.167]
$FCF_t/Assets_t$	0.275	-2.108***	-0.629	-2.571***	0.856	-1.718*
	[0.600]	[0.001]	[0.427]	[0.002]	[0.287]	[0.050]
$CAPEX_t/Sales_t$	-0.176	-0.463	-0.01	-0.612**	-0.39	-0.375
	[0.211]	[0.271]	[0.968]	[0.033]	[0.208]	[0.496]
Constant	1.194	2.355***	1.581	3.405***	0.831	1.664
	[0.211]	[0.003]	[0.243]	[0.005]	[0.487]	[0.123]
Observations	11,463	11,463	4,711	4,711	6,752	6,752
Model Wald χ^2	230.7387	427.853	139.6993	277.2969	161.7654	177.1846
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pseudo R^2	2.98%	4.28%	3.49%	4.63%	3.03%	2.92%

Table 9: CFO Compensation Regressions

Table 9 contains logit regressions for Equation (4), and (5), where the dependent variables relate to decreases in the CFO's fixed or bonus compensation. Columns 1 and 2 examine the full sample period; Columns 3 and 4 examine the pre-SOX period and Columns 5 and 6 examine the post-SOX period. The dependent variable in Columns 1, 3, and 5 is an indicator that equals one if the CFO's fixed compensation decreases. The dependent variable in Columns 2, 4, and 6 is an indicator that equals one if the CFO's bonus compensation (excluding vesting or exercised options) decreases. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Sample Dependent Variable	All		Pre-SOX		Post-SOX	
	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t)	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t)	I(Salary _{t+1} < Salary _t)	I(Bonus _{t+1} < Bonus _t)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
I(SCA _t)	0.267* [0.054]	0.875*** [0.003]	0.231 [0.210]	0.892*** [0.003]	0.535** [0.037]	1.096* [0.079]
I(SOX _t)	1.091*** [0.000]	2.680*** [0.000]				
Insider Ownership _t	0.833* [0.090]	0.04 [0.868]	0.827 [0.138]	0.553 [0.375]	1.189* [0.078]	-0.019 [0.566]
ln(CFO Tenure _t)	0.291*** [0.000]	0.012 [0.886]	-0.410*** [0.000]	-0.297*** [0.004]	0.416*** [0.000]	0.378*** [0.000]
CEO Chair Duality _t	0.096 [0.108]	-0.059 [0.487]	-0.064 [0.478]	-0.115 [0.228]	0.204*** [0.007]	0.122 [0.549]
ln(CFO Age _t)	-7.290*** [0.000]	-1.764** [0.043]	-0.116 [0.883]	0.481 [0.555]	-18.137*** [0.000]	-10.950*** [0.000]
GIM _t	0 [0.972]	-0.021 [0.122]	-0.019 [0.163]	-0.037** [0.011]	0.002 [0.859]	0.052 [0.165]
I(High Tech Firm _t)	0.002 [0.981]	0.066 [0.558]	-0.22 [0.114]	-0.044 [0.725]	0.187* [0.081]	0.48 [0.235]
HHI _t	-0.399*** [0.002]	-0.169 [0.267]	-0.169 [0.321]	-0.1 [0.568]	-0.649*** [0.001]	-0.423 [0.230]
Stock Return _t	0.282** [0.015]	-0.469*** [0.000]	0.133 [0.218]	-0.536*** [0.000]	0.953*** [0.001]	0.515 [0.299]
Tobin's Q _t	0.122***	0.031	0.120***	0.017	0.150***	0.341**

	[0.000]	[0.205]	[0.000]	[0.491]	[0.005]	[0.030]
$Debt_t/Assets_t$	2.147***	1.931***	1.316**	1.622***	1.965**	2.037
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.017]	[0.008]	[0.044]	[0.301]
Tobin's $Q_t \times Debt_t/Assets_t$	-1.076***	-1.296***	-0.695	-1.170***	-0.583	-0.875
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.109]	[0.005]	[0.428]	[0.539]
$\ln(Assets_t)$	-0.014	-0.039	0.083***	0.007	-0.119***	-0.215***
	[0.494]	[0.170]	[0.005]	[0.833]	[0.000]	[0.001]
$OCF_t/Assets_t$	-0.854	1.203*	-0.899	1.467*	-1.229	-2.842
	[0.134]	[0.094]	[0.188]	[0.070]	[0.164]	[0.138]
ROA_t	-1.529***	-1.950***	-0.241	-1.653**	-3.311***	-2.754
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.553]	[0.014]	[0.000]	[0.288]
$FCF_t/Assets_t$	1.920***	-0.478	0.941	-1.024	3.516***	4.930**
	[0.001]	[0.514]	[0.210]	[0.255]	[0.000]	[0.016]
$CAPEX_t/Sales_t$	0.044	-0.292	0.285	0.048	-0.018	-0.437**
	[0.846]	[0.101]	[0.405]	[0.886]	[0.945]	[0.030]
Constant	28.628***	8.662**	1.006	0.099	72.604***	47.020***
	[0.000]	[0.012]	[0.742]	[0.975]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	12,049	12,049	4,927	4,927	7,122	7,122
Model Wald χ^2	1172.041	727.1431	56.7948	92.9828	611.2427	173.2314
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pseudo R^2	11.03%	18.32%	1.41%	1.75%	18.21%	12.14%

Table 10: Disciplinary Takeover Regressions

Table 10 contains logit regressions for Equation (6). The dependent variables in Columns 1 to 4 are indicators that equal one if (1) the firm receives a bid in year $t + 1$, (2) the firm receives a bid and the deal is subsequently completed, (3) the firm receives a bid and SDC classifies the bid as unsolicited or hostile, and (4) the firm receives a bid, that bid is unsolicited or hostile, and the deal is subsequently completed. In all cases, the bid must be for 100% control. Table 1 contains the variable definitions. Brackets contain p-values calculated using robust standard errors clustered by industry. All models contain year dummies. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

	I(Bid _{t+1})	I(Complete Bid _{t+1})	I(Hostile Bid _{t+1})	I(Hostile Complete Bid _{t+1})
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
I(SCA _t)	1.031*** [0.000]	1.273*** [0.001]	1.054** [0.011]	1.881** [0.018]
I(SOX _t)	0.133 [0.660]	-0.274 [0.522]	-0.015 [0.973]	-1.352 [0.127]
Incentive _t /Total _t (CEO)	0.21 [0.468]	0.426 [0.332]	0.466 [0.325]	0.37 [0.737]
Insider Ownership _t	0.975 [0.265]	0.506 [0.728]	-0.017 [0.922]	-0.049 [0.989]
ln(CEO Tenure _t)	-0.014 [0.866]	-0.072 [0.524]	0.082 [0.469]	-0.093 [0.649]
CEO Chair Duality _t	-0.427*** [0.010]	-0.469** [0.042]	-0.575** [0.023]	-0.975** [0.036]
ln(CEO Age _t)	-0.809 [0.162]	-1.091 [0.264]	-1.073 [0.192]	-0.939 [0.647]
GIM _t	0.077*** [0.003]	0.101*** [0.009]	0.039 [0.314]	0.048 [0.607]
I(High Tech Firm _t)	-0.051 [0.846]	-0.197 [0.584]	0.599* [0.053]	0.452 [0.476]
HHI _t	-0.585 [0.140]	-0.997 [0.143]	0.066 [0.893]	0.685 [0.440]
Stock Return _t	0.260* [0.077]	0.576*** [0.001]	0.32 [0.183]	0.358 [0.600]
Tobin's Q _t	0.039	0.005	-0.038	0.004

	[0.618]	[0.964]	[0.725]	[0.968]
$Debt_t/Assets_t$	2.408*	1.537	1.777	-0.634
	[0.083]	[0.271]	[0.437]	[0.872]
$Debt_t/Assets_t \times \text{Tobin}' Q_t$	-1.025	-0.118	-0.613	0.721
	[0.287]	[0.900]	[0.702]	[0.781]
$\ln(Assets_t)$	0.210***	0.169**	0.349***	0.343***
	[0.000]	[0.028]	[0.000]	[0.004]
$OCF_t/Assets_t$	0.392	0.668	4.064*	-0.613
	[0.805]	[0.784]	[0.092]	[0.906]
ROA_t	-0.552**	1.026	-0.635	-0.138
	[0.027]	[0.571]	[0.172]	[0.943]
$FCF_t/Assets_t$	-0.202	-2.912	-3.976	-2.911
	[0.909]	[0.208]	[0.164]	[0.650]
$CAPEX_t/Sales_t$	0.018	-0.552	-2.323*	-2.3
	[0.963]	[0.482]	[0.076]	[0.385]
Constant	-2.941	-2.224	-4.145	-4.551
	[0.198]	[0.559]	[0.180]	[0.545]
Observations	12,183	12,183	12,183	8,651
Wald χ^2	169.2236	96.8082	169.8056	454.9805
p-value(χ^2)	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pseudo R^2	6.67%	7.77%	8.25%	11.16%

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