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Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihoodis sufficiently high.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages27
Volume2018-002
StatePublished - 11 Jan 2018

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2018-002

    Research areas

  • cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study

Documents

  • 2018-002

    Submitted manuscript, 550 KB, PDF-document

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