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Evolution of Trust and Trustworthiness between Cooperators and Non-Cooperators in Public Goods: Evidence from Field Experiment: Ethiopia

Research output: Other research outputDiscussion paper

The standard economic theory predicts that collective action problem arise because the selfish agents have no incentive to contribute to public goods. However, considerable shares of mankind, conditional cooperators, contribute to public goods as revealed by numerous empirical and experimental findings. Ostrom (2000) revised collective action problems predicts that as time passes with proper social norm institution in place, and information about the types of agent is known, the share of such cooperators will grow in population and the cooperative behavior will be a dominant economic decision. This is because, the conditional cooperators are in general more trusted, whereas, selfish agents are less trusted which enables the cooperators to drive higher payoff. I tested this hypothesis in a setting that let participants who are members of collaborative forest management group (CFM), and non- members (non-CFM) to play a trust game. Using this experiment, the finding in this study support the hypothesis that high trust is placed on the cooperators than non-cooperators. Therefore, the cooperator type receives more money, but send and return less to non-cooperators which allow them to receive consistently higher pay off.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages48
Volume2017-030
StatePublished - 20 Jul 2017

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2017-030

    Research areas

  • collective action, trust and trustworthiness, field experiment, forestry, public goods

Documents

  • 2017-030

    Submitted manuscript, 748 KB, PDF-document

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